Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1602-GU-300 | October 18, 2016 Page 1 of 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Laura L. Rybicki

Dugan, Repay & Rybicki, P.C.

St. John, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Adam J. Sedia

Rubino, Ruman, Crosmer & Polen

Dyer, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the 

Guardianship of A.P., Adult,

Louisa Jurich,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Louis Picicco,

Appellee-Respondent.

October 18, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A05-1602-GU-300

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable William E. Davis, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45D01-1012-GU-63

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1602-GU-300 | October 18, 2016 Page 2 of 22

Statement of the Case

[1] Louisa Jurich appeals from the trial court’s order accepting Louis Picicco’s 

amended verified account of administration of the guardianship of A.P.

(“amended account”) and denying Jurich’s petition to remove Picicco as 

guardian of A.P. Jurich presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it accepted Picicco’s 

amended account.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Jurich’s 

petition to remove the guardian without first conducting a

hearing.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[3] A.P., a widow, was born in 1926 and resides in St. John with her adult 

daughter Joanne Hubbell and one other person. A.P. has four children, 

including Hubbell, Jurich, and Picicco. In December 2010, Jurich filed a 

verified petition for appointment of temporary and permanent guardian of the 

person and estate of A.P. alleging that A.P. was “exhibiting mental deficiencies 

indicative of dementia and/or Alzheimer’s Disease” and was incapable of 

taking care of her person and her finances. Appellant’s App. at 15. Following 

a hearing on that petition, the trial court appointed Picicco guardian over A.P.’s 

person and estate. The trial court’s order on petition for letters of guardianship 

provided in relevant part as follows:
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[A.P.] is an adult who is incapable of handing her financial 

affairs. She has poor memory but she appears to retain the ability 

to care for her person, to make certain decisions about her 

personal care and to decide with whom she communicates and at 

what times. [A.P.] admits that she doesn’t understand what 

property she owns or what is happening with her money and she 

requests that if a guardian is appointed over her, then she wishes 

her son[, Picicco,] to be appointed as her guardian. The Court 

finds that her son[, Picicco,] should be appointed [A.P.]’s 

guardian.

[A.P.] and her late husband had made arrangements to live out 

their years in a home with their daughter [Hubbell] although in 

separate quarters with separate entrances. That is the situation 

under which [A.P.] resides today and it should remain that way 

unless and until circumstances materially change. [A.P.] and her 

late husband appear to have paid a substantial amount of money 

towards the purchase of that home in exchange for the 

convenience of having their daughter [Hubbell] assist them to an 

undetermined extent. [Hubbell] has, in fact, offered some 

assistance since the middle of 2009. . . .

* * *

A good deal of animosity, at least among [A.P.]’s children, has 

been created by certain expenditures of [A.P.]’s money that were 

made under color of power of attorney or otherwise. [A.P.] 

herself is worried about what is being done with her finances. . . .

* * *

IT IS THEREFOR[E] ORDERED as follows

1. [A.P.] is an adult in need of a guardian of her estate and a 

guardian with limited powers over her person.
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2. Her son Louis Picicco is hereby appointed the guardian 

over her estate and with limited powers over her person. 

The Clerk shall issue letters of Guardianship to him upon 

his qualification by taking oath [sic]. The requirement of a 

bond will be determined upon receipt of an inventory.

3. The Guardian shall prepare and file an inventory of 

[A.P.]’s assets and a description of her income within 60 

days of the date of this Order. . . .

4. Within 90 days of the date of this Order, the Guardian 

shall, to the extent possible, reconstruct and file with this 

court an accounting of [A.P.]’s income and expenditures 

for the period July 1, 2010 through December 31, 

2010. . . . 

* * *

6. The Guardian shall seek Court approval before [A.P.]’s 

assets are used for making gifts in excess of $50 to any one 

individual and shall only make such gifts after determining 

that [A.P.] knowingly wanted to make the gift.

7. [A.P.] shall have unrestricted visitation rights with 

whomever she wishes to visit.

* * *

9. After the filing of the accounting, the Guardian shall 

propose a periodic allowance to be given to [A.P.] so that 

she may have petty cash to spend as she sees fit.

* * *

11. The Clerk is Directed to issue Letters of Guardianship to 

Louis Picicco with unlimited powers over the Estate of 
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[A.P.] and with the following limitations on the powers 

over the person of [A.P.]:

[A.P.] retains the right to visit with whomever she wishes 

including going outside the house as long as it is not for an 

overnight.

Each of [A.P.]’s children shall have unimpeded visitation 

rights with [A.P.] as long as [A.P.] desires to see them.

[A.P.] shall retain the right to decide what she eats, what 

she wears and what she does with her time.

The Guardian is directed and authorized to take [A.P.] for 

at least semi-annual physical and mental check-ups, with 

or without [A.P.]’s cooperation.

Id. at 29-31.

[4] On March 31, 2011, Picicco filed an inventory of A.P.’s assets, and on August 

15, he filed an accounting and a “Petition to Approve Budget and 

Expenditures.” Id. at 40. In the Petition, Picicco stated that A.P.’s monthly 

income totaled $1297, and he asked the trial court to approve the following

monthly expenses: $213.88 for supplemental insurance; $145.45 for one-half of 

the water/sewer bill; $117.55 for one-half of the Comcast cable/telephone bill; 

$157.74 for one-half of the gas/electric bill;1 $107.73 for A.P.’s share of the real 

estate taxes; $450 for “food, household supplies”; $100 for gifts to “family 

 

1

 In the petition, Picicco states that the “actual living space occupied by [A.P.] is approximately 38% of the 

entire square footage of the residence.” Appellant’s App. at 40.
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members, birthdays, anniversaries, holidays”; and $100 for “miscellaneous.” 

Id. at 41. In an order dated September 21, the trial court approved the budget. 

However, after “interested parties” met to discuss said budget, Picicco moved 

the trial court to vacate the order, which it did. Id. at 45.

[5] On October 9, 2013, Picicco filed his First Current Account of A.P.’s assets 

covering the period from January 12, 2011, to May 31, 2013. In that filing, 

Picicco included a list of A.P.’s assets, including her income from interest

income and Social Security benefits, and an itemized list of “Disbursements.” 

Id. at 48. Picicco did not substantiate the disbursements with copies of receipts. 

[6] On December 10, Jurich filed her Objections to Guardian’s First Current 

Account in which she alleged the following: Picicco omitted Social Security 

benefits from January 1, 2011, through March 30, 2011; the Disbursements 

were “excessive” including, for instance, an average of $570 per month spent on 

food and groceries, “which is twice the average cost of food” estimated by the 

USDA for an average woman over seventy-one years of age; A.P.’s share of the 

utilities is not commensurate with her usage of the utilities; and Picicco failed to 

substantiate the disbursements with receipts as required by local rule. Id. at 57.

[7] On January 2, 2014, Picicco filed the amended account in an attempt to address 

some of Jurich’s objections. Again, Picicco did not submit copies of receipts to 

substantiate the listed disbursements. Instead, Picicco submitted an “Affidavit 

Regarding Receipts” in which he stated that “he has receipts available with 

respect to all disbursements contained in his accounting.” Id. at 75. On 
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February 11, Jurich filed her Objections to Guardian’s First Current Account—

Amended alleging in relevant part that: the trial court should require Picicco 

“to produce records and receipts confirming the actual amount of income 

received and disbursements made” during the period of the accounting; the 

stated amount of Social Security benefits does not comport with the total 

amount A.P. should have received for that period; the disbursements for food 

and groceries still far exceeds that required for A.P.’s personal consumption; 

and A.P.’s share of utilities does not comport with her usage of those utilities. 

Also on February 11, Jurich filed a petition to remove Picicco as guardian of 

A.P.

[8] On April 29, Picicco filed a response to Jurich’s objections to the amended 

account. In his response, Picicco stated that, in appointing him guardian over 

A.P., the trial court gave him “limited powers over the Ward’s estate.” Id. at 

96. In particular, Picicco stated that “the Court’s order indicates that the Ward 

was to be allowed certain freedoms in the use of her assets and that the 

Guardian was to comply with the Ward’s desires in some circumstances as to 

the use of her assets.” Id. Picicco also stated as follows:

3. All receipts for all grocery/household/toiletry item 

expenditures have been provided to counsel for Louisa Jurich. 1) 

That an actual total of the grocery/household/toiletry item 

expenditures for the time period of the accounting averages to 

exactly $480.24 per month. This is consistent with the costs of 

these items utilized by and desired by the Ward, is not an 

excessive amount and comports with this Court’s original order 

to allow the Ward liberal use of her assets. This also includes 

costs for the Ward’s contributions to holiday meals as desired by 
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the Ward for her family including her five children and their 

families. Contrary to the objection of Ms. Jurich, these 

expenditures are appropriate, comply with the Court’s original 

appointment order and are consistent with the desires of the 

Ward. 2) In addition, although the objecting party claims that 

she observed insufficient food present in the Ward’s home, she 

does not report to the Court that during the entire year 2013, she 

only visited the Ward on 10 occasions and only made one phone 

call to the Ward. Further, the Ward’s daughter who lives in the 

home with the Ward, handles the majority of the cooking and 

meal preparation for the Ward, as such, many times the food 

supplies are in the second kitchen of the home which is not 

visited by Ms. Jurich. 3) The Guardian has produced all medical 

records of the Ward to counsel for Ms. Jurich. In the one report 

where the Ward was noted as malnourished, the health 

professional only prescribes one can of Ensure as a treatment and 

the lab results from the blood taken on the day of the exam 

showed that the Ward’s levels in all areas tested were normal. 

See Exhibit A, attached hereto. In addition, in the Ward’s next 

examination, which occurred approximately one month later, the 

Ward was noted as being well nourished. See Exhibit “B” 

attached hereto.

4. In the residence of the Ward, two other individuals reside in a 

larger portion of the house. The Ward’s living area has a full 

household of appliances and space such as a full kitchen, 

bathroom, laundry room, living area and bedroom. The 

Guardian has observed the Ward’s use of electricity and water in 

her living area and due to the excessive nature of her use, has 

determined to pay one-half of the entire household water and 

electric bills. The Guardian has discretion to make this 

determination and has made the calculation based on his 

informed observations. The Guardian is present with the Ward 

weekly and has ample access to view her habits. As to the 

Comcast bill, the Guardian only pays one half of the cost of the 

cable and phone and pays nothing toward the internet costs. The 

September 2011 through May 2013 bills for utility services have 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1602-GU-300 | October 18, 2016 Page 9 of 22

been produced and provided to counsel for Ms. Jurich. Further, 

the Guardian pays 19.61% of the real estate taxes owed on the 

residence as that represents the square footage occupied by the 

Ward. The real estate tax statements have been produced to 

counsel for Ms. Jurich.

* * *

8. Finally, as to the accounting, Ms. Jurich takes issue with the 

purchase of fast food by the Ward for her companions on a few 

occasions. The Ward’s daughter Rose often takes her mother 

shopping and running errands, spending the entire day with 

Ward meeting the Ward’s needs. The Ward is adamant on some 

occasions that since the daughter takes her time and resources to 

assist her mother, the Ward wants to purchase lunch for the 

daughter. As the Court desired the Guardian to allow the Ward 

freedom in these types of expenditures and since the meals 

purchased were inexpensive, the Guardian determined these 

expenses were permissible. There are only a few instances where 

this took place and it is not a common occurrence for the Ward 

to purchase lunch out at a restaurant for her children. As to the 

ATM withdrawals, on any entry where the entire amount of the 

withdrawal was not spent entirely, the excess funds were retained 

by Ward. There are entries such as 5/12/12 where the amount 

spent exceeds the amount withdrawn from the ATM thus 

additional funds held by the Ward were used to supplement the 

withdrawal. Overall, the accounting shows an accurate depiction 

of the expenditures and income of the Ward, all receipts for the 

expenditures as well as bank statements and bill statements have 

been provided to the counsel for the objecting party and there is 

not any evidence that the Guardian misused or misappropriated 

any funds. As such, the accounting is proper and should be 

approved as amended.

Id. at 97-99 (emphases added).
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[9] On May 20, Jurich filed a reply to Picicco’s responses to her objections. Jurich 

alleged in relevant part that Picicco had mischaracterized the trial court’s order 

with respect to his obligation to manage A.P.’s finances. In particular, contrary 

to Picicco’s averment that the trial court had ordered him “to allow the Ward 

liberal use of her assets,” Jurich pointed out that Picicco had “unlimited powers 

over the estate” of A.P. and had limited powers only over A.P.’s person. Id. at 

170. And, while Picicco was allowed to “propose a periodic allowance to be 

given to [A.P.] so that she may have petty cash to spend as she sees fit,” there is 

no evidence that Picicco ever established such an allowance. Id. Thus, Jurich 

alleged, Picicco was not complying with the trial court’s order when he 

permitted A.P. to spend her own money freely on things like personal items and 

meals for other people. In particular, Jurich stated that,

[b]ased upon the items purchased (as determined by examining 

receipts provided by Guardian in support of his Accounting), it is 

apparent that [A.P.]’s assets are being used to provide groceries 

and other items for individuals other than herself. The 

Respondent has compiled a report identifying of some of the 

items most frequently purchased. (Said Report is attached 

hereto, and incorporated herein by reference, as demonstrative 

Exhibit “C.”) The items purchased exceed what could 

reasonably be consumed by [A.P.]. As one example, in a onemonth period of time (June of 2011), 14 loaves of bread, 32 

gallons of water, 41 pounds of bananas, and 6 gallons of orange 

juice were purchased. In some instances, the same items are 

being purchased on a daily basis. Additionally, there are a 

number of entries for items that were obviously purchased for 

someone other than [A.P.]. For example, the following items 

were purchased (sometimes repeatedly) over the course of the 

accounting period: feminine sanitary pads, dog food (although 
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[A.P.] does not own a dog), Blast deodorant for men, Degree 

deodorant for men, liquid makeup, Monster Energy Drinks, 

Aleve (which contradicts the Doctor’s Report provided by the 

Guardian which states that [A.P.] is currently taking “aspirin”), 

reading glasses ([A.P.] wears prescription glasses) and Lee Rider 

Jeans. Other items that were purchased, which the Respondent 

contends would not be within [A.P.]’s customary diet, include 

Flaming Hot Cheetos, salsa, Spaghettios, Lunchables, Danimal 

Yogurt, soy milk, almond milk, candy bars, cheese sticks, 

Pringles, Soda Pop, peanut butter, Pillsbury Toaster Streudel, 

Doritos, sour cream, frozen dinners, chocolate drinks, carryout 

chicken wings, Spanish Rice, cheesy brats, oysters, coconuts, 

bottles of wine, cheese in a can, picante sauce, Hot Pockets, 

Tostitos con queso, Armour Eckridge Sausage, Snapple, 

Gushers, and cakes for birthdays. (True and accurate copies of 

the receipts provided by the Guardian and showing these 

questionable expenditures are attached hereto, and incorporated 

herein by reference, as group Exhibit “D.”)

Id. at 154-55.2

[10] On March 27, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Jurich’s objections to 

Picicco’s amended account.3 Jurich attempted to present testimony, but the 

trial court refused to let her testify, and neither party presented evidence. That 

same day, the trial court issued an order stating that it was allowing “the 

Guardian to address the second Set of objections in writing” and that it would 

 

2

 Jurich also addressed the alleged disproportionate share of the utilities being paid on behalf of A.P. and 

other concerns.

3

 The trial court stated that it would hold an evidentiary hearing on Jurich’s petition to remove the guardian 

at a later date.
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“then rule on the objections without further briefing or oral argument.” Id. at 

91. On April 28, Jurich filed a motion to reconsider the March 27 order and 

requested an evidentiary hearing on Picicco’s amended account and Jurich’s 

objections thereto. On April 29, Picicco filed his response to Jurich’s 

objections. On May 1, the trial court denied Jurich’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing, but permitted Jurich twenty days to file a reply to Picicco’s April 29 

response to her objections. And the court stated that it would then “rule 

without further oral arguments.” Id. at 150. On May 20, Jurich filed her reply 

to Picicco’s response to her objections.

[11] On January 7, 2016, the trial court issued an order stating as follows:

The Court has reviewed the Personal Representative’s Current 

Account and 1st Amended Current Account and Mrs. Jurich’s 

objections.

The Court now accepts the Current account as amended. 

Further the Court directs that the other tenants in the home of 

the Ward need to pay a reasonable rent to the Guardianship 

estate which would include their reasonable share of utilities, 

maintenance, and other miscellaneous expenses on a monthly 

basis. Since the residence is owned by the Ward [sic]. If the 

physical or mental condition of the Protected Person has 

deteriorated since the opening of the guardianship someone 

should file a Petition for modification of the Court’s order.

* * *
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The Petition to remove the Guardian is denied.[4]

Id. at 14.

[12] On February 5, Jurich filed with the trial court a motion for certification of 

interlocutory order for appeal, but she also filed with this court a notice of 

appeal stating in relevant part that she was appealing from a final judgment. 

Under Indiana Code Section 29-3-9-6(f), Picicco’s amended account “may be 

reviewed by the court at any subsequent time and does not become final until 

an account in final settlement is approved by the court[.]” Thus, the trial 

court’s order approving the amended account was, by statute, an interlocutory 

order. And, because the trial court denied Jurich’s petition to remove the 

guardian, Picicco’s appointment remains subject to the trial court’s supervision 

until the guardian has been finally discharged. Accordingly, the trial court’s 

order approving Picicco’s amended account and denying Jurich’s petition to 

remove the guardian was not a final judgment, but an interlocutory order, as it 

did not dispose of all issues as to all parties thereby ending the case. Georgos v. 

Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003). And neither was it a final, appealable 

order under Trial Rule 54(B). See Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 696 N.E.2d 383, 385 

(Ind. 1998) (citing Trial Rule 54(B) and noting that a judgment or order as to 

less than all of the issues, claims, or parties in an action may become final only 

 

4 The trial court did not hold a hearing on Jurich’s petition to remove the guardian.
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if the trial court, in writing, expressly determines that there is no just reason for 

delay and, in writing, expressly directs entry of judgment).

[13] On February 10, the trial court certified the interlocutory order for appeal, and 

on February 18, that certification was noted in the chronological case summary. 

On March 18, Jurich timely filed with this court a motion to accept jurisdiction 

over the interlocutory appeal. A motions panel of this court denied that motion 

as moot, holding that “this is an interlocutory appeal as of right under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 14(A).” However, while the trial court’s order included an 

attorney’s fee award, which is an order for the payment of money, it did not 

require payment of attorney’s fees at a specific time. Accordingly, the order

was not appealable as of right. See, e.g., Huber v. Montgomery, 940 N.E.2d 1182, 

1184-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[14] It is well established that a writing panel may reconsider a ruling by the motions 

panel. Simon v. Simon, 957 N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). While we 

are reluctant to overrule orders decided by the motions panel, this court has 

inherent authority to reconsider any decision while an appeal remains in fieri. 

Id. Here, by separate order, we have vacated our motions panel’s basis for 

accepting jurisdiction and have instead granted Jurich’s motion to accept 

jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 

14(B).
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Discussion and Decision 

Issue One: Objections to Amended Account

[15] Jurich first contends that the trial court erred when it approved Picicco’s 

amended account. The trial court is vested with discretion in making 

determinations as to the guardianship of an incapacitated person. See Ind.

Code § 29-3-2-4 (2016); In re the Guardianship of A.L.C., 902 N.E.2d 343, 352 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Thus, we apply the abuse of discretion standard to review 

the trial court’s order. A.L.C., 902 N.E.2d at 352. An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances presented or if the court has misinterpreted the law.

5

 

Id. 

[16] A guardian is a fiduciary, I.C. § 29-3-1-6, and has “a statutory duty to manage 

the estate for the ward’s best interest,” Wells v. Guardianship of Wells, 731 N.E.2d 

1047, 1051-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. A guardian of an 

incapacitated person is responsible for the incapacitated person’s care and 

custody and for the preservation of the incapacitated person’s property to the 

 

5

 Jurich is correct that, where, as here, “‘only a paper record has been presented to the trial court, we are in 

as good a position as the trial court . . . and will employ de novo review. . . .’” Norris Ave. Prof’l Bldg. P’ship v. 

Coordinated Health, LLC, 28 N.E.3d 296, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 

57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)) (omissions original to Norris), trans. denied. But our de novo review is limited to the 

facts. Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, American Legion Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. 

denied. Because the trial court did not make findings of fact, and because the relevant facts are undisputed, 

we review the trial court’s approval of the amended account for an abuse of discretion.
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extent ordered by the court. I.C. § 29-3-8-1(b). In particular, a guardian shall 

do the following:

(1) Act as a guardian with respect to the guardianship property 

and observe the standards of care and conduct applicable to 

trustees.

(2) Protect and preserve the property of the protected person 

subject to guardianship . . . .

(3) Conserve any property of the protected person in excess of 

the protected person’s current needs. . . .

I.C. § 29-3-8-3. 

[17] Jurich maintains that the trial court should not have approved the amended 

account because (1) Picicco did not substantiate the amended account with 

sufficient evidence, namely, receipts, and (2) Picicco did not manage the estate 

in A.P.’s best interests. We address each contention in turn.

Evidence

[18] Indiana Code Section 29-1-16-4, which applies to guardianships under Indiana 

Code Section 29-3-2-6, provides in relevant part that, “[w]hen an account is 

filed, the [guardian] shall also file receipts for disbursements of assets made 

during the period covered by the account. Whenever the [guardian] is unable to 

file receipts for any disbursements, the court may permit him to substantiate 

them by other proof.” Here, as Jurich points out, Picicco did not submit to the 

trial court receipts to substantiate the disbursements listed in the amended 
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account. However, Picicco’s amended account was verified, and he submitted 

to the trial court an “Affidavit Regarding Receipts” stating that “he has receipts 

available with respect to all disbursements contained in his accounting.” 

Appellant’s App. at 75. Picicco also provided copies of those receipts to Jurich, 

which gave her the opportunity to review them and make objections thereto.

6

 

We cannot say that Picicco did not submit sufficient evidence to support the 

amended account.

Best Interests

[19] Jurich also contends that, because the amended account indicates that Picicco 

has not managed A.P.’s finances in a way to conserve her property “in excess of 

[her] current needs,” the trial court should not have approved the amended 

account. See I.C. § 29-3-8-3. In particular, Jurich maintains that the trial court 

should not have approved the amended account because:

• the amended accounting does not contain any affirmative 

statement by the Guardian that the reported expenditures were in 

[A.P.]’s best interest or were necessary for [her] current needs for 

support . . . [and] none of the disbursements identified by the 

Guardian include any description of, or explanation for, the 

purpose of the expenditure.

• many of the figures reported in the Guardian’s amended 

accounting are unclear and simply mathematically inaccurate. 

 

6

 We note that Jurich makes no contention that the expenditures listed in the amended account do not match 

up with receipts provided by Picicco. She merely contends that Picicco should have submitted those receipts 

to the trial court.
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For example, the Guardian’s amended accounting contains an 

“ATM Detail Summary” which attempts to substantiate more 

than $10,000 in ATM withdrawals that were made by the 

Guardian or others. However, the total amount reported as 

having been withdrawn on any particular date is often 

inconsistent with the Guardian’s detailed breakdown of how the 

funds were used. The only explanation that the Guardian even 

attempted to provide for such discrepancies was that “on any 

entry where the entire amount of the withdrawal was not spent 

entirely, the excess funds were retained by Ward.” However, this 

explanation is inadequate. . . . [T]o the extent that such 

inconsistencies may have been caused by the unmonitored use of 

guardianship assets by someone other than the Guardian, the 

Guardian must either substantiate the accounting or be held 

accountable for the loss.

Appellant’s Br. at 10-11. Finally, Jurich contends that

any statements made by the Guardian to explain away 

discrepancies in his accounting under the guise that the funds 

were given directly to [A.P.]—an elderly adult whom the trial 

court has already found to be incapable of managing her own 

financial affairs—should have been subjected to the highest level 

of scrutiny.

Id. at 15.

[20] But Jurich does not direct us to any case law or statute setting out guidelines a 

trial court must follow in considering whether to approve a guardian’s interim 

account. Indeed, Jurich points out that,

[t]he precise questions of how “specific” an accounting must be 

and what constitutes a prima facie showing that the accounting is 

proper appear to be questions of first impression in Indiana. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1602-GU-300 | October 18, 2016 Page 19 of 22

Therefore, there is no common law guidance on this issue. 

However, Jurich contends that an accounting that provides 

almost no detail regarding the purpose of the reported 

expenditures; that fails to include receipts, in direct contravention 

of Ind. Code § 29-1-16-4; and that does not even contain an 

affirmative statement by the Guardian that the expenditures 

reported were in the ward’s best interest or were necessary for the 

ward’s current needs for support (i.e., that the expenditures were 

proper) simply does not qualify.

[21] We begin our analysis with Indiana Code Section 29-3-9-6, which provides that 

a guardian’s written verified account must include “the incapacitated 

person’s . . . current residence and a description of the condition and 

circumstances of the incapacitated person[.]” And Indiana Code Section 29-1-

16-4, which, again, applies to guardianships per Indiana Code Section 29-3-2-6, 

provides as follows:

Accounts rendered to the court by a personal representative shall 

be for a period distinctly stated and shall consist of three (3) 

schedules, of which the first shall show the amount of the 

property chargeable to the personal representative; the second 

shall show payments, charges, losses and distributions; the third 

shall show the property on hand constituting the balance of such 

account, if any. When an account is filed, the personal 

representative shall also file receipts for disbursements of assets 

made during the period covered by the account. Whenever the 

personal representative is unable to file receipts for any 

disbursements, the court may permit him to substantiate them by 

other proof. The court may provide for an inspection of the 

balance of assets on hand. The court may, upon its own motion, 

or upon petition, provide that verification of accounts or credits 

thereon may be made by the unqualified certificate of a certified 

public accountant in lieu of receipts or other proof.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1602-GU-300 | October 18, 2016 Page 20 of 22

Thus, while Picicco did not file receipts, the trial court is vested with discretion 

and “may permit” a guardian to substantiate disbursements by “other proof.” 

See id. Jurich does not contend that the amended account does not conform to 

any other specific statutory requirements. And Jurich’s bare contentions that 

Picicco was required to state the propriety and purpose of each expenditure 

finds no support in the law.

[22] In essence, Jurich maintains that the trial court should not have approved the 

amended account because Picicco mishandled A.P.’s funds and because the 

amended account includes discrepancies and errors. But the trial court did not 

agree, and Jurich has not persuaded us that the court abused its discretion in 

that regard. Indeed, the trial court’s broad discretion over guardianships 

includes the discretion to, at any time, on its own motion, “confer upon the 

guardian any additional responsibilities and powers[.]” I.C. § 29-3-8-8(a)(1). 

Thus, if, as Jurich contends, the trial court’s initial guardianship order did not 

permit Picicco to use A.P.’s funds to pay for meals for others or buy groceries 

for family members living with her, the trial court had discretion to grant such 

permission at any time.

[23] “A guardian is a mere officer of the court and is at all times subject to the 

supervision and control of the court appointing him in everything that pertains 

to the management of the ward’s estate or to his person.” Rittenour v. Hess (In re 

Guardianship of Boyer), 96 Ind. App. 161, 174 N.E. 714, 715 (1931). Jurich 

submitted her verified objections to the amended account to the trial court, and 

the court considered and weighed the evidence when it approved the amended 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1602-GU-300 | October 18, 2016 Page 21 of 22

account. Jurich has not demonstrated that the trial court’s order is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances presented or contrary 

to law. Given the trial court’s broad discretion in management of the 

guardianship, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

approved the amended account.

Issue Two: Petition to Remove the Guardian

[24] Finally, Jurich contends that the trial court erred when it denied her petition to 

remove the guardian without first holding a hearing. Indiana Code Section 29-

3-12-4 provides in relevant part that the court “may remove a guardian on its 

own motion or on petition of the protected person or any person interested in 

the guardianship, after notice and hearing, on the same grounds and in the 

same manner as is provided under IC 29-1-10-6 for the removal of a personal 

representative.” Jurich maintains that that statute required the trial court to 

hold a hearing on her petition to remove the guardian.

[25] While the statute requires a hearing when a trial court removes a guardian, it 

does not appear to require a hearing when, as here, a court declines to remove a 

guardian. Id. But we need not decide whether the trial court erred when it did 

not hold a hearing on Jurich’s petition because any error was harmless. As 

Picicco points out, Jurich’s allegations in her objections to amended account 

and in her petition to remove the guardian were identical.7 Thus, the trial court 

 

7

 In her reply brief, Jurich asserts that she raised “additional issues” in her petition to remove the guardian, 

namely, “concerns about the Guardian’s failure and/or refusal to address [A.P.]’s need for in-home health 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1602-GU-300 | October 18, 2016 Page 22 of 22

considered evidence relevant to the petition to remove the guardian when it 

considered Jurich’s objections to amended account. Indeed, on appeal, Jurich 

does not identify any evidence she would have proffered to the trial court at a 

hearing on the petition to remove the guardian that she did not include in her 

verified objections to the amended account. Any error in the trial court’s failure 

to hold a hearing on Jurich’s petition to remove the guardian was harmless. 

Ind. Appellate Rule 66.

[26] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.

 

care and supervision, and his failure to take [A.P.] for routine and periodic physical, mental, dental and eye 

examinations.” Reply Br. at 14. However, in her objections to amended account filed on February 11, 2014, 

Jurich alleged in relevant part that Picicco had not taken to A.P. to see her doctor as ordered by the court and 

that Picicco “has failed to provide adequate care and supervision” of A.P. Appellant’s App. at 82. Thus, 

these concerns were raised both in her objections to amended account and her petition to remove the 

guardian. Moreover, in its January 7, 2016, order the trial court stated that, “If the physical or mental 

condition of [A.P.] has deteriorated since the opening of the guardianship someone should file a Petition for 

modification of the Court’s order.” Id. at 14.