NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0746n.06 No. 08-5230 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
KE I TH L AM ON T A DA MS, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v.
GL ENN HA EBE RL I

N, Warden, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE W ES TER

N DI S TR I CT OF KENTUCKY

B e fo re : B OG GS, SI L ER, and MO OR E, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SILE R , Circuit J udg e. Petitioner Ke ith L amont Adams, who is servinga fifty -y ear sentenc e fo r h is c on vic tio n on mur de r an d fir st- de g re e ra pe c ha rg e s, a pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his petition for a wr it of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Adams conte nds that, pursuant to the Four teenth Amendment, his c onviction w as constitutionally infirm beca use he was not compe tent to s tand tr ia l. H e a lso c on te nd s th a t he la c ke d th e c a pa c ity to k no wi ng ly and int e lli g e ntl y

wa ive his Miranda ri g hts , an d th at the tri a l c ourt vio la te d h is F if

th A me ndme nt r ig hts by a llo wi nghis confe ssion to be used ag ainst him at trial. The Antiterr orism and Eff ec tive Death Penalty

Act of 19 96 (“ AE DPA ” ) g ov e rn s o ur re vie w o f A dams’ s c la ims . F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m. I. I n 1998, the body

of Mar y Eliz abeth Ta

y lor was f

ound i n a v ac ant l ot in L ouisvill e, Kentucky . She had been sexually assaulted and murdere d. After L ouisvill e police le arne d that theNo. 08-5230

Ad a ms v . H a e be rl in

- 2 - victim had last b ee n s een w ith Adams, he wa s detained a nd transporte d to the police station for qu e sti on in g. He wa s e sc or te d to an in te rv ie w r oo m and a dv ise d o f h is Miranda rig hts before a
consensua l po ly g raph e x amination was a dminist ere d. At the close of the examination, the police of fi c e r t old Ada ms th a t he ha d f a ile d th e po lyg ra

phand wa s n ot b e ingtr

uth fu l. T he of

fi c e r a lso fa lse ly tol d A dams that hi s fing e rp ri nts ha d b e e n f ound on a br ic k u se d to kil l th e vic tim . A dams then said he w ould tell the tr uth a nd made inculpatory

statements to the police. The police stopped Adams and r ead him the Miranda wa rn ing s a se c on d tim e . Ad a ms i nd ic a te d th a t he un de rs too d h is rig hts, ag ree d to waive his rig hts, and executed a rig hts waiver f orm. He the n admitted to hitti ng the victim in the head with a br ick and having se x with her. Ada ms al s o agr ee d t o g ive a videota ped state me nt. At

the ou tse t of

the vid e ota

pe d in te rv ie w, the po lic e on ce again adv ised Ad a ms o f h is Miranda ri g hts , a

nd Ad a ms o nc e a g a in a g re e d to wa ive his ri g hts
. Adams wa s indicted and late r moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he was not
c o mp e t e n tt o s t an d

t r i a l
. T h e t r i a l c o u rth e l d a com pe te nc y h e ar i n g an d h e ar d t e s t i m o n y

f r o m J. Rob e rt No on an, Ph. D, wh o e va luate d A dams o n b e ha lf of the Ken tu cky

Cor re c tio na l Psyc hiatr ic Center, a nd Peg g y Pack, Ph.D., who eva luated Ada m s o n b eh al f of the de fense . The two c linical psy cholog ists agr eed that Adams is mentally reta rded a nd suffe rs from schiz ophrenia ; however , they differ ed re g ardinghis level of intellectua l funct i o n i ng . Dr. Noona n testified that Adams wa s competent to stand trial, a nd Dr. Pac k testified that Adam s wa s n o t co m petent to stand trial. The tr ia l c ourt c re dit e d D r. No on an’ s te sti mony and fo un d th a t A dams w a s c omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l. Adams also moved to suppr ess the inculpatory statements he had g iven to the police. The trial court he ld a suppression hea ring , which incorporated the evidenc e pre sented at the competenc yNo. 08-5230

Ad a ms v . H a e be rl in

- 3 - hear ing. T he two clinica l psy cholog ists dis ag ree d reg ardingAdams’s i n t el l ectual and mental
c a pa c ity to u nd e rs tand his Miranda rig hts. Dr. Noonan te stified th at Adams was capa ble of understandingthe Miranda wa rn ing s, and

Dr . Pac k tes tif

ie d tha t Adams w a s n ot m e nta lly c a pa ble of un de rs tand inghis Miranda rig hts. Detec tive Rick Eastham testified that Ada ms was advised of his Miranda rig hts three times, stated that he understood his rig hts, and waive d his rights on e ach
occa sion. Detec tive Eastham fur ther testified: “ [Adams] appea red luc id, appea

red to be awa

re of wh e re he was and was no t ra mbl ing . H e wa s sp e a kin g c oh e re ntl y and se e me d, in my

op ini on , to
un de rs tand

wh a t w a s takin g pla c e . . . . Ad a ms a pp e are d no rm a l to me , my un de rs tand ing of no rm a l. And he a ppear ed to under stand what wa s ta k i n g p l ac e. ” [App’x 121-22.] The trial cour t denied Adams’s motion to suppress. Adams wa s tried bef

ore a jury and convic ted of murde r and r ape in the f irst deg ree . On direc t appea l, the Kentucky Supreme Court a ffirme d the trial court’s c ompetency deter mination, holding that it was “cle arly supported by substantial evidenc e in t he re cord.” [R OA 367.] I t also aff irmed the trial cour

t’s denial of A dams’s motion t o s u p p re s s statements, finding that “base d upon the tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s surr ound ing the c us tod ia l int e rr og a tio n, [Ad a ms] wa s n ot c oe rc e d in to waiving his Fifth Amendment r ights a nd he wa s fu l l y aw are of the nature of those rig hts and the conseque nces of

such a w aiver .” [ROA 370.] The dist rict court later denied Adams’s petition for
a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s. II. “I t has long been a cce pted that a pe rson whose me ntal condition is such that he lac ks the
c a pa c ity to u nd e rs tand the natur e and

ob je c t of the pr oc e e din g s a g a ins t hi m, t o c on su lt w ithc ouns e l,No. 08-5230

Ad a ms v . H a e be rl in

- 4 - and to assist in prepar ing his de fense may not b e subjected to trial.” Dr op e v . M iss ou ri , 4 20 U. S. 162, 171 (1975). The fede ral test of incompetenc e seeks to a scer tain whether a cr iminal defenda nt “has suf ficient present ability

to consult with his l awy er w ith a rea sonable de g ree of rational
u n d er s t an d i n g– an d

wh et h er h e h as a r at i o n al as we l l as fa ct u a l u n d er s t an d i n g o f t h e p ro ce ed i n gs ag ainst him.” Dusky

v. United States , 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (pe r cur iam). Unde r Ke ntucky law, “‘[i] ncompetenc y

to stand trial’ mea

ns . . . lack of capa city

to appre ciate the nature and conse quence s of the proc eeding s ag ainst one or to pa rticipate r ationally

in one’s own de fense .” Ky . Rev. Stat. § 504.060(4). There is no meaning ful d is ti n c ti o n b e tw e e n K e ntu c k y ’s standar d for c ompetence to stand trial and th e f e d e r a l s ta n d ar d arti c u late d

b y th e Su p r e me Co u rt. N e v e rth e le s s , b e c a u s e th e K e ntucky Sup re me Court

re vie we d A dams’ s c omp e te nc y c la im und e r K e ntu c ky law r athe r t

ha n th e F ourt e e nth Amendment, we revie w this claim under the modified AEDPA st andar d of review. See F iliaggi v. Bagley , 445 F.3d 851, 858- 59 (6th Cir. 2006) (ap p l y i n g t h e modi fied AED PA standard of revie w when the O hio Supreme C ourt analy zed habea s petitioner’s compe tency claim under

Ohio law rather than the F ourtee nth Amendment). “ This standard of revie w re quires the c ourt to conduct a car eful revie w of the r ecor d and applic ab le law, but nonethe less bars the c ourt from re versingunless the state court’s decision is c ontrary to or an unre asonable application of f eder al law.” Maldonado v. W ilson , 416 F.3d 470, 476 ( 6th Cir. 2005). “A de termination of compe tence i s a fa ctual finding , to which def ere nce must be pa id.” Filiaggi , 445 F.3d at 858. Under the AEDPA, the state c ourt’s fa ctual dete rmination that Adams was
c omp e te nt t o s tand

tr ia l is pr e sume d to be c or re c t, and Ada ms has the b ur de n o f r e bu tti ngthi sNo. 08-5230

Ad a ms v . H a e be rl in

- 5 - presumption by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1). Ada ms contends that the trial cour

t should have give n more weig ht to Dr. P ack’ s testimony . Howeve r, this is insufficient to r ebut the presumption that Adams was c ompetent to stand trial. See Rice v. Colli ns , 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (“Rea sonable minds revie wing the re cord mig ht disag ree . . . but on ha beas r eview that does not suffice to supersede the trial cour t’s cre dibilit y

deter mination.”). Although A dams is mentally reta rded, a finding that a def

endant is mentally

reta rded is not dispositi ve as to a finding of c ompetency to stand trial. Ad

k ins v . V irg ini a , 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (“ Th os e me nta lly

re tard e d p e rs on s w ho me e t th e law’ s r e qu ir e me nts fo r c ri min a l r e sp on sib ili ty should be tried and punishe d when they commit crimes.” ). The e ssential question on habea s review is w he the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly re lie d on Dr . N oo na

n’ s te sti mony

to f ind that A dams
was competent to sta

nd trial. Dr. Noona

n testified that Adams wa s “cle arly competent” and base d that assessment on the f

oll o wi n g fa ctors: (1) his ve rbal I Q score of 65; (2) his past I Q score s that place d him in the mil d rang e of me ntal reta rdation; (3 ) t h e fac t that Adams had be en found competent to stand trial twice befor e; (4) Dr. Noonan’ s assessment that Adams’s schizophrenia wa s controlled with medication; (5) Adams’s pa st ex perie nce in the courtroom; (5) his understanding of the cha rg es aga inst him and the se riousness of the c harg es; (6) his under standing of the va rious roles
o f p e o p l e i nt h e c o u rtr o o m ; ( 7 ) h i s u n d e r s t an d i n g o f t h e p o s s i b l e c o n s e qu e n c e s o f b e i n g f o u n d g u i l t y;
an d (8 ) h i s ab ility

to aid his attorney

in his defense . Thus, the Kentuc ky Supreme Court’s deter mination that the trial court did not c lear ly err in finding that Adams was c ompetent to stand trial was not objec tively

unrea sonable in lig ht of the evidence pr esente d at the state c ourt compete ncy hear ing.No. 08-5230

Ad a ms v . H a e be rl in

- 6 - III . Ad a ms c on te nd s th a t he wa s n ot c omp e te nt to wa ive his Miranda ri g hts and that th e state
c ourt vio la te d h is F if

th A me ndme nt r ig hts by a llo wi ng his c on fe ssi on to b e us e d a g a ins t hi m a t tr ia l. We reviewthis c laim unde r the standards set forth in the AEDPA. “Whether a def endant unde rstood his Miranda ri g hts is a

qu e sti on of fa c t un de rl y ing the qu e sti on of wh e the r h is w a ive r o f t

ho se ri g hts
w a s kn o w in g an d in te ll ig e n t.” W i l l i ams v. J

ones , 117 F. App’ x 406, 412 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpubl i shed). The state cour t’s fac tual finding that Adams under stood what was be ing sa id and asked of him is presumed to be cor rec t unless Adams demonstrate s o t h erw ise by clea r and convincingevidenc e. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1). Moreover , Adams has the bur den of e stablishing that, u nd e r t he tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s, he did no t kn ow ing ly

and int e lli g e ntl y

wa ive his Miranda rig hts. Se e Cla rk v . M itc he ll , 425 F.3d 270, 283 ( 6th Cir. 2005). “The rele vant question is not whether the ‘c riminal suspect [knew] and [understood] ever y possible conseque nce of

a wa iver of the Fifth Amendment privil eg e,’ but rather w hether the ‘suspec t [knew] t hat he [could] choose not to talk to law enfor ceme nt office rs, to talk only with cou nsel prese nt, or to discontinue talking at any time.’” Ga rn e r v . M

itc he ll , 557 F.3d 257, 2 6 1 (6 t h Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) ( en b an c) (q u o t i n g Colorado v. Spring , 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987)) . The c ompetency standard for plea ding guil t y o r waiving the r ight to counse l is not hi g her tha n the compete ncy

standard f

or standing trial. Godinez v. M oran , 509 U.S. 389, 391 (1993). The ref ore, the re is no re ason to believe t h at t h e c o mp et en cy

s t an d ar d fo r w ai v i n g Miranda rig hts is highe r t han the competenc y standard f

or standing trial. See id. a t 39 9. Mo re ov e r, “ dim ini sh e d me nta l c a pacit y alo ne do e s n ot p re ve nt a defe ndant from va lidly

waiving his or her Miranda rig hts.” Garner , 557 F.3d at 264.No. 08-5230

Ad a ms v . H a e be rl in

- 7 - Th e Ke ntu c ky

Sup re me Court ba se d its f ind ingtha t A dams’ s w a ive r o f h is Miranda ri g hts was knowingand intellige nt on the following evidenc e: (1) D r. Noonan testified that, in his ex pert op ini on , A dams w a s c a

pa ble of un de rs tand inghis ri g hts ; (2) De te c tiv e Ea sth a m te sti fi e d th a t A dams had been read hi s rig hts three times; (3) the police had g one over the Miranda war

nings slowly ; (4) Adams ac knowledg ed that he unde rstood his rights; (5) Adams si g ned a w ritten waive r of r ights; and (6) Adams had forty prior arrests and w as familiar with the Miranda war nings a nd the nature of the criminal j ustice sy stem. The fa ct that Dr. Pac k disag ree d with Dr. Noona n’s assessment a

nd testified that A da ms w a s no t c omp e te nt t o w a ive his Miranda rig hts does not rende r the state c ourt’s denia l of Adams’ s Fifth Ame ndment claim objectively unrea sonable. See Thompson , 516 U.S. at 111. Thus, the Kentucky

Supreme Court’s de termination that Adams voluntarily , knowing ly , and int e lli g e ntl y

wa ive d h is Miranda rig hts was not objectively unrea sonable. AFF I RMED.No. 08-5230

Ad a ms v . H a e be rl in

- 8 - KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Judge, concurring i n the judgm ent. I n li g ht o f t his court’s r ece nt en banc decision in Ga rn e r v . M itc he ll , 557 F.3d 257 (6th Cir.) (e n banc) , cert. de nied , 130 S. Ct . 125 (2009), I

am constra ined to concur in this court’s judgm en t af fi rm i ng the district
c ourt ’s de nia l of

the pe tit ion

fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s.