COURT OF A PPEAL S EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEX AS ELPASO, TEXAS
STATE OF FI CE OF RI SK MANAGEMEN T, Appellant,

v. MAE DAVI S, Appellee

. § § § § § § No. 08-08-00307- CV

Appea l from the 327th District Court of El Paso County , Texas (TC# 2007-3271)

O P I N I O N The State Offic e of Risk Manag ement (SORM) appea ls the trial court’s awa rd of attorney ’s fee s, stemming from the jury ’s verdic t in favor of Mae Davis. We conclude the trial court err ed by 1
order ing SORM to pay Davis’s attorney ’s fee s, and there fore , we modify the trial court’s judgme nt to delete the a

war d of attorne y ’s fe es, and a ffirm the judg ment as modified.
BACK GR OUND On November 30, 1999, Mae Davis was injured on the job while employ ed as a nurse with the El Paso State Center. As a result of that injury , she soug ht supplemental income benef its fr om SORM, the ag ency that administers her worke r’s compensa tion claims, and was awa rded the same for thirteen consec utive quarte rs. Howeve r, a benef its revie w confe renc e was h eld for Davis’s entitlement to supplemental income benef its for the fourtee nth, fiftee nth, six teenth, and sevente enth

S O R M ’ s o r i g i n a l b r i e f a l s o c h a l l e n g e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s a s s e s s m e n t o f c o u r t c o s t s ; h o w e v e r , p r i o r t o 1
s u b m i s s i o n o n o r a l a r g u m e n t , S O R M f i l e d a m o t i o n t o s e v e r a n d d i s m i s s t h a t i s s u e f r o m i t s b r i e f

. T h e C l e r k o f t h i s C o u r t a s k e d f

o r a r e s p o n s e f

r o m D a v i s , a n d D a v i s i n f o r m e d t h i s C o u r t t h a t s h e d i d n o t o p p o s e t h e m o t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , w e g r a n t S O R M ’ s m o t i o n t o s e v e r i t s c o u r t

- c o s t s i s s u e a n d d i s m i s s t h a t i s s u e f r o m t h i s a p p e a l

. S e e T E X
. R

. A P P
. P

. 4 2

. 1 ( b ) ( a l l o w i n g a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o d i s p o s e o f s e v e r a b l e p o r t i o n o f p r o c e e d i n g u n d e r R u l e 4 2

. 1 ( a ) i f d o i n g s o w i l l n o t p r e j u d i c e r e m a i n i n g p a r t i e s )

.quarte rs. When the parties wer e unable to rea ch an ag ree ment, a contested hear ing was held on April

23, 2007, befor e the Texas Worke rs’ Compensation Commi ssion (“TWCC”). The hear ing office r deter mined that Davis was not entitled to supplemental income benef its for those quarte rs, and the TWCC Appea ls Panel aff irmed that decision. Davis then filed suit in district court seeking judicial revie w of the decision. I n so doing, Davis soug ht attorney ’s fee s. SORM answe red, pled sovere ign immunit y , and specia lly excepted to Davis’s reque st for attorney ’s fee s. T h e t ri al court denied SORM’s speci al exception, and afte r a jury found Davis was entitled to supplemental income benef its for the complained- of quarte rs and awa rded her attorney ’s fee s, the court enter ed judgme nt

acc ording ly

. DISCUSSIO N On appea l, SORM contends, in a single issue, that the trial court err ed by awa rding attorney ’s fee s to Davis absent a

n express waiver

of sover eig n immunit y

for the sa me. We ag ree . Applicable Law A. Sove reign Immunity Sovereig n immunit y consists of two co m p onents: (1) immunit y from liability , and (2) immunit y from suit. Tooke v. City of Mex ia , 197 S.W .3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). Whil e im munity from suit defe ats a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, see Tex. De p ’t o f T r a nsp. v. Jones , 8 S.W .3d 636, 639 (Tex. 1999), immunit y from liability protec ts the State from monetary judgme nts. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002). The leg islature, howeve r, may waive or abrog ate sovere ign immunit y throug h clear and unambig uous statutory lang uag e. Tooke , 197 S.W .3d at 332; T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E A N N
. § 311.034 (Ve rnon Supp. 2009) (“In order to prese rve the leg islature’s inte re s t i n manag ing state fiscal matters throug h the
appropr iations proce ss, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovere ign immunit y unless thewaiver

is effe cted by

clea r and una mbiguous lang uag e.”)

. B. Attorney’s Fe es Attorney ’s fee s are not rec overa ble unless such rec overy is provided for by statute or by
contra ct betwee n the parties. See Travelers Indem

. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield , 923 S.W .2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996); Rodriguez v. Y sleta Indepe ndent School Dist. , 68 S.W .3d 699, 700 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2001, pet. denied)

. As no contra ct exis ted betwee n the parties, we limit our revie w to the statutory
context. “In ci v i l case s, the statute in question must expressly provide for the attorney ’s fee s.” Rodriguez , 68 S.W .3d at 700 (citing Mayfield , 923 S.W .2d at 593). Whether a statute authorizes an

awa rd of attorney ’s fees i s a question of law. See H olland v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 1 S.W .3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999). Application of the Law to the Facts
I nitially , we note that as SORM administers a worke rs’ compensa tion insurance prog ram for
g overnme nt employ ees, it is trea ted as an “insurer ” under the L abor Code. See T E X
. L A B
. C O D E AN N
. § 412.011(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009); T E X
. L A B
. C O D E AN N
. § 501.002(c) (Ve rnon 2006) (stating that for the purpose of apply ing Chapter 408, other than sections 408.001(b) and (c) , “insurer ” means “state” or “state ag ency ”). There fore , under Section 408.147, “[i] f an insurance car rier disputes the commissioner’s deter

mination that an employ ee is e ntitled to supplemental income benef its or the
amount of supplemental income benef its due and the employ ee preva ils on any disputed issue, the insurance car

rier is liable for rea sonable and nece ssary attorney ’s fee s incurre d by the employ ee as

a re s u l t of the insurance car rier’ s dispute

. . . .” Id

. at § 408.147(c) (Ve rnon 2006). However , Section 501.002(d) limit s a state ag ency ’s liability under the L abor Code to only those actions and damag es authorized by the Texas Tort Claims Act. Id

. at § 501.002(d). And the Texas Tort Claims Act does not e x pressly provide for the rec overy of attorney ’s fee s. See Texas Education Agenc y v.Leeper , 893 S.W .2d 432, 448 (Tex. 1994) (Gonzalez, J ., concur ring in part and dissenting in part); City of W aco v. Hester , 805 S.W .2d 807, 820 (Tex. App.–Waco 1990, writ denied) ; Ramirez v. Dietz , No. 07-04-0108- CV, 2006 WL 507947, at *2 (Tex. App.–Amar illo Mar. 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not desig nated for publ i ca t i o n ). Acc ording ly , we do not believe that the l eg islature has expressly waived SORM’s sovere ign immunit y for attorney ’s fee s under the L abor Code. See, e.g., Holland , 1 S.W .3d at 95; St ep hens v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit , 50 S.W .3d 621, 631 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (ca ses holding attorney ’s fee s not rec overa ble from worke r’s compensa tion discrimination suit when there was no statutory provision specific al l y p ro v iding for rec overy of attorney ’s fe es).
CONCLUSION Fi n ding the trial court err ed by awa rding Davis attorney ’s fee s, we sustain SORM’s sole issue. There fore , we ref

orm the trial court’s judgme nt to delete the aw ar d of attorney ’s fee s and aff irm the judg ment as re formed.

GUADA L UPE RI VERA, J ustice May 19, 2010
Be fore McClure, J., R ivera , J ., and Gua derr ama, Judge Guade rrama, J udg e, sitting by assig nment