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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 09-1756

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 v.

JAMES L. CHEESEMAN,

 Appellant

___________

On Appeal from the District Court 

for the District of Delaware

(No. 09-cr-00124-001)

District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

___________

Argued October 27, 2009

Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN, 

Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: March 2, 2010)
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Chandra J. Williams (Argued)

Charles M. Oberly, III

Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP

1100 North Market Street

Suite 1000

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Appellant

Keith M. Rosen (Argued)

Lesley F. Wolf

Office of the United States Attorney

1007 N. Orange Street

Suite 700

P.O. Box 2046

Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
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Appellant, James L. Cheeseman, pled guilty to violating

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which criminalizes possession of

firearms and ammunition by an unlawful user or addict of a

controlled substance. He appeals from the District Court’s

judgment directing the forfeiture of over 600 firearms and

ammunition enumerated in Count I of the indictment to which

he pled guilty. Cheeseman raises two arguments on appeal. He

first contends that forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1)

was improper because the property was neither “involved in”

nor “used in” a knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).

Alternatively, Cheeseman argues that forfeiture of his property

violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

Because we find that the firearms and ammunition specifically

identified in Count I of the indictment were involved in

Appellant’s § 922(g)(3) violation, and because we conclude that

the forfeiture of Cheeseman’s property was not grossly

disproportionate to the gravity of the § 922(g)(3) offense, we

will affirm the District Court’s Order of Forfeiture.
 These facts are derived from the indictment and the 1

District Court’s opinion. See United States v. Cheeseman, 593

F. Supp. 2d 682 (D. Del. 2009). Although Cheeseman’s

recitation of the facts surrounding his access and use of X-Ring

differs slightly from the District Court’s findings of fact, he does

not allege that those findings are clearly erroneous, nor does he

point to any factual error. He merely presents the facts in a light

more favorable to his legal arguments. After reviewing the

record, including the portions cited by Cheeseman in support of

his factual assertions, we discern no clear error in the District

Court’s findings of fact. 

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I. Background1

From 1994 through August 2007, Cheeseman was the

owner and sole proprietor of X-Ring Supply, a sporting goods

and firearms store located in Newark, Delaware. The federal

firearms license (“FFL”) for X-Ring was held in Cheeseman’s

name. X-Ring maintained an inventory of approximately 600

firearms. The premises included a separate warehouse located

next to the store. 

Cheeseman’s drug abuse began in 2003 after his wife

ended their marriage. Between 2005 and 2007, as his crack

cocaine addiction worsened, Cheeseman converted X-Ring’s

warehouse into his home, storing inside it an air mattress,

sleeping bag and bedding. The District Court found that fellow

crack cocaine abusers occasionally stayed with Cheeseman in

the warehouse and that he occasionally turned off X-Ring’s

security system. Although Cheeseman argues to the contrary,

the District Court found that ammunition and gun boxes were
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stored in the warehouse. 

In 2005, Cheeseman completed a renewal application for

his FFL, on which he indicated that he did not unlawfully use

narcotics. Answering this question falsely subjects an applicant

to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) penalties. Because of Cheeseman’s

erratic behavior due to his severe drug habit, his sister Nancy

Macknatt assumed power of attorney over her brother and

began to manage X-Ring’s daily operations. Accordingly,

Cheeseman’s presence in the store was “sporadic and

unpredictable.” Cheeseman, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 685.

Nonetheless, employees found crack pipes on X-Ring’s

premises on at least three separate occasions. 

A. 

The incident prompting this case occurred on August 5,

2007, when Delaware police officers observed a woman

urinating in the parking lot of a pharmacy. The woman was

Cheeseman’s companion. After the police officers found drugs

on her person, Cheeseman consented to a pat down, during

which officers located a crack pipe and crack cocaine. A

subsequent search of his vehicle revealed a second crack pipe

and additional crack cocaine. Cheeseman told the police

officers that he abused drugs and had recently returned from a

rehabilitation facility. 

Shortly thereafter, federal agents executed a search

warrant at X-Ring and seized approximately 609 guns and

ammunition; an estimated sixty-seven of the firearms were

identified as comprising Cheeseman’s personal collection.

Some of the seized weapons were antique firearms. In the

warehouse, agents recovered a crack pipe, a mirror with cocaine
 Now a convicted felon, Cheeseman cannot lawfully 2

possess a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). If we were to rule

that the forfeiture was improper or unconstitutional, it is less

than certain that the firearms and ammunition would be returned

to Cheeseman’s sisters, the owners of X-Ring. Cf. United States

v. Felici, 208 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2000) (ruling that

convicted felons cannot constructively possess firearms).

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residue, a burnt spoon with cutting residue, an ashtray with

white residue, ammunition, a butane torch and a scale with

white residue. Consequently, a federal grand jury returned a

three-count indictment against Cheeseman with notice of

forfeiture, accusing him of: (1) possession of a firearm by an

unlawful drug user in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); (2)

possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and (3) distribution of crack cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

Relevant to this appeal, § 922(g)(3) makes it unlawful

for any person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any

controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the

Controlled Substances Act . . .) . . . to . . . possess in or affecting

commerce, any firearmor ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).

Count One of the indictment identified individually the 609

firearms and a quantity of ammunition that Cheeseman was

accused of illegally possessing. In December 2007, Cheeseman

divested himself of all of his interest in X-Ring, selling it to

Macknatt and to his other sister, Pamela Rhoades.2
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B. 

In February 2008, Cheeseman pled guilty to violating §

922(g)(3). In his plea agreement he admitted that:

[I]f there were a trial, the Government would

have to prove three elements of the offense: (1)

that from on or about August 5, 2007, through

August 14, 2007, the defendant possessed a

firearm or ammunition; (2) that the defendant was

a regular user of, or addicted to, a controlled

substance during a period of time proximate to or

contemporaneous with the possession of the

firearm or ammunition; and (3) the

above-described firearm affected interstate

commerce. The defendant knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently admits for purposes of his guilty

plea and sentencing that, from on or about August

5, 2007, through August 14, 2007: (a) he actually

and constructively possessed the firearms and

ammunition set forth in [Count One] of the

indictment; (b) he was a regular unlawful user of,

and addicted to, cocaine base; and (c) the firearms

and ammunition at issue affected interstate

commerce.

Cheeseman, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 683 (internal quotation marks

& citation omitted). The District Court delayed sentencing in

order to hold a forfeiture hearing to determine whether the

firearms and ammunition specifically enumerated in Count One

of the indictment were forfeitable pursuant to § 924(d)(1), and

if so, whether forfeiture would violate the Excessive Fines
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 

Section 924 is the penalty provision of the Gun Control

Act of 1968 (“Gun Control Act”). Section 924(d)(1) provides

that “any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any

knowing violation of subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922 . . .

shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.” Section 924(d)(2)(c)

mandates that “[o]nly those firearms or quantities of

ammunition particularly named and individually identified as

involved in or used in any violation of the provisions of this

chapter . . . shall be subject to seizure, forfeiture, and

disposition.” Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 5872(b), any firearms or

ammunition forfeited may be destroyed, sold to a state, or used

by the federal government. 

C. 

Although the District Court did not clearly identify

which portion of § 924(d) it found satisfied, i.e., whether

Cheeseman “involved” or “used” the firearms in a knowing

violation of § 922(g)(3), the District Court, after holding a

hearing on the forfeitability of Cheeseman’s property,

concluded that Cheeseman’s guilty plea sufficiently satisfied the

statute’s forfeiture requirements. The District Court first noted

that the Government must prove forfeitability by a

preponderance of the evidence and establish a sufficient nexus

between the § 922(g)(3) violation and the property sought to be

forfeited. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (providing that

when “the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the

court must determine whether the government has established

the requisite nexus between the property and the offense”).

Next, the District Court rejected Cheeseman’s contention that
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“there [was] no evidence that he ever used or involved a firearm

in any manner to facilitate his cocaine addiction.” Cheeseman,

593 F. Supp. 2d at 687.

Rather, the DistrictCourt made the following findings of

fact linking Cheeseman’s drug abuse to his § 922(3)(g)(3)

violation: 

[I]t is clear from the evidence and testimony

presented at the evidentiary hearing as well as the

uncontested [Pre-Sentencing Report] that: (1)

defendant has been using cocaine since 2003; (2)

he was living and using crack cocaine at X-Ring;

(3) during after[-]business hours, defendant

allowed users of crack cocaine to stay with him at

X-Ring; (4) drug paraphernalia was found at

X-Ring; (5) defendant lied about his addiction on

his FFL renewal; (6) after defendant’s FFL was

renewed-on false pretenses-he continued to

operate X-Ring, including purchasing and selling

firearms; (7) he compromised the security of

X-Ring by turning off the security alarm in order

to allow himself and crack addicts into the retail

store; (8) he stored his personal gun collection

unsecured; and (9) although not actively involved

in the day-to-day business of X-Ring, defendant

used drugs on the premises and had unfettered

access to the inventory of firearms and
 Cheeseman offers “innocent” explanations for his 3

behavior. For example, he contends that he would occasionally

turn off X-Ring’s security cameras for privacy reasons when he

had female companionship at the store. (See Appellant’s Br.

17.) He does not, however, explain why the District Court’s

finding constitutes clear error. 

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ammunition.3

Id. Thus, the District Court ruled that the firearms and

ammunition specifically identified in Count One of the

indictment were forfeitable pursuant to § 924(d)(1).

Next, the District Court rejected Cheeseman’s contention

that forfeiture of the firearms and ammunition would violate the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines. While

Cheeseman contended that the seized firearms were worth

approximately $500,000 and the Government countered that

they were valued at $371,500, the District Court assumed,

arguendo, that the actual value was the higher figure.

Reasoning that the Government could have charged each

individual possession as a separate offense, thereby exposing

Cheeseman to multiple special assessments and statutory fines,

the District Court concluded that the Government’s restraint in

charging rendered the forfeiture constitutional. Cheeseman was

then sentenced to eight months time-served and three years of

supervised release. The District Court declined to impose a

fine. 

II. Discussion

Cheeseman raises two arguments on appeal. First, he

contends that forfeiture of his firearms and ammunition

pursuant to §924(d)(1) was improper because the property was

neither involved in nor used in a knowing violation of § 922(g).

Cheeseman alternatively avers that the forfeiture violates the
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 4

this criminal case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise

jurisdiction over this appeal from the final judgment of

conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Even though

Cheeseman no longer owns the firearms or ammunition, Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(4)(A), which governs criminal

forfeiture, provides that a forfeiture becomes final at sentencing

and that a defendant may appeal a forfeiture order once

sentenced. See United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271, 275 (3d

Cir. 2005) (holding that a final order of forfeiture can only be

imposed as part of a defendant’s criminal sentence); United

States v. Pelullo, 178 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that

“the order of forfeiture entered at sentencing is a final order with

respect to the defendant from which he can appeal”).

We review a district court’s factual findings for clear

error and exercise plenary review over a district court’s

interpretation of a statute. See United States v. Rivera Constr.

Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). We review de novo

a district court’s determination of whether a forfeiture

constitutes an excessive fine in violation of the Constitution’s

Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.

321, 336-37 (1998). 

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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines. We do 4

not find either argument persuasive.

A. Statutory Arguments

Cheeseman first argues that forfeiture pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 924(d) was improper because the contraband was not

“involved in” or “used in” a knowing violation of the

substantive provision of the Gun Control Act to which he pled

guilty. We will first address the second of the two alternatives

in the statute, which permits forfeiture of firearms and

ammunition “used in” a § 922(g)(3) violation. 
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The first step in interpreting the meaning of § 924(d)(1)

is analyzing the statutory text. See Bailey v. United States, 516

U.S. 137, 144-45 (1995). Because neither “involved in” nor

“used in” is defined in the statute, we look to the ordinary and

natural meaning of the words, as well as the “placement and

purpose [of the phrases] in the statutory scheme.” Id. at 145

(internal quotation marks & citation omitted). Thus, the

“meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on

context.” Id. at 144-45 (instructing interpreting courts to review

the “language, context, and history” of a statute). In turn, it is

appropriate to examine similar language in the statute to

ascertain the meaning of undefined terms. See id. (noting that

“using a firearm should not have a different meaning in §

924(c)(1) than it does in § 924(d)”) (internal quotation marks &

citation omitted). 

If a statute is ambiguous and punitive in nature, “the rule

of lenity requires that any ambiguity in the statute be resolved in

favor of the claimant.” United States v. $734,578.82 in United

States Currency, 286 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing

United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 801 (3d

Cir. 1994)). The rule of lenity, however, is inapplicable if there

is only a mere suggestion of ambiguity because most “statutes

are ambiguous to some degree.” See id. at 658 (internal

quotation marks & citation omitted). Furthermore, any

“[j]udicial perception” that the result in a case is unreasonable

may not enter into our interpretation of an unambiguous statute.

See Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987).

1. “Used In” Prong of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)

Cheeseman argues that forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(d)(1) was improper because the seized firearms and

ammunition were not “used in” his § 922(g)(3) violation.

Although no precedential case law directly addresses the

meaning of “used in” with respect to a § 922(g)(3) violation, in

a trilogy of cases the Supreme Court has extensively explored
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the meaning of “uses” in the § 924(c) context. Section 924(c)

adds five years to a sentence for anyone who uses, carries, or

possesses a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence

or a drug trafficking crime. Because the meaning of “use” is

presumed to be the same in §§ 924(c) and 924(d)(1), these cases

guide our interpretation of the meaning of the phrase “used in

any knowing violation of subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922”

in § 924(d)(1). See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs.,

Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) (“A standard principle of

statutory construction provides that identical words and phrases

within the same statute should normally be given the same

meaning.”).

The first case in which the Supreme Court addressed the

definition of “uses” in the context of § 924(c) was Smith v.

United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). In Smith, the Court ruled

that trading a firearm for drugs constituted a “use” for purposes

of applying § 924(c)’s enhanced penalty. 508 U.S. at 225. The

Court looked at the dictionary definition of “use,” noting that it

is defined, variably, as “[t]o make use of; to convert to one’s

service; to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a

purpose or action by means of.” Id. at 229 (internal quotation

marks & citation omitted). Thus, according to the plain

language of the term, the Smith Court ruled that “use” of a

firearm is not limited to firing a firearm. Id. To the contrary,

the Court held that Smith used the firearm when he traded it for

drugs. See id. at 240-41. 

Two years later in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137

(1995), the Court addressed whether mere possession of a

firearm constituted a “use” of a firearm during and in relation to
 At the time Bailey was decided, § 924(c) did not 5

include the term “possess.” It only included the terms “carry”

and “use.” After the Court ruled that mere possession did not

constitute a “use” for § 924(c) purposes, Congress amended the

statute to criminalize possession of a firearm during and in

relation to a drug trafficking offense. 

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drug trafficking. Ruling in the negative, the Court concluded 5

that “evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to

drugs or drug proceeds is alone [in]sufficient to support a

conviction for ‘use’ of a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking offense.” Bailey, 516 U.S. at 138-39. Invoking the

canon of statutory interpretation that “a legislature is presumed

to have used no superfluous words,” the Court reasoned that the

expansive reading of “use” urged by the government would also

encompass carrying a firearm, thereby rendering the term

“carry” superfluous. Id. at 145-46. Because the Court discerned

no intention by Congress for these terms to be redundant, it

rejected the government’s expansive reading of “use.” Thus,

according to Bailey, “use” requires more than mere possession

of a firearm; rather, “use” entails active employment or

utilization of a firearm to bring it within the meaning of §

924(c). See id. at 143. 

Finally, in United States v. Watson, the Court ruled that

trading drugs for a firearm did not constitute a use within the

meaning of § 924(c). 552 U.S. 74, 76 (2007). Building upon

Smith and Bailey, the Watson Court noted that in a bartering

situation, a “seller does not ‘use’ a buyer’s consideration.” 552

U.S. at 79 (citation omitted). Thus, receipt of a gun in trade for

drugs does not constitute a “use” of a firearm for § 924(c)

purposes. 

Citing this trilogy of cases, Cheeseman contends that

forfeiture was inappropriate because the seized firearms and

ammunition were not “used in” a knowing violation of §
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922(g)(3). The Government counters that Cheeseman employed

the firearms by “purchasing them, offering them for sale

[through X-Ring], and using the proceeds to support his crack

cocaine addiction.” (Appellee’s Br. 23.) According to the

Government, like the defendant in Smith, Cheeseman bartered

with his firearms to purchase drugs. To adopt this argument, we

must accept that (1) illegally purchasing guns on behalf of

X-Ring (2) in order to sell those guns to lawful buyers (3) for

the purpose of using the proceeds from the sales to purchase

drugs, is similar to the facts of Smith, in which the defendant

gave his gun directly to a drug dealer for cocaine. This

reasoning stretches Smith too far and therefore must be rejected.

There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Cheeseman

actively employed the firearms or traded his firearms to drug

dealers to purchase crack cocaine. Rather, the record supports

a finding that Cheeseman unlawfully possessed the firearms

while addicted to narcotics. Indeed, unlawful possession due to

his status as a drug abuser was the basis for Cheeseman’s guilty

plea. Because Bailey dictates that mere possession does not

constitute “use” for § 924(d)(1) purposes, forfeiture cannot be

based upon this portion of the statute. 

2. “Involved In” Prong of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)

Cheeseman’s next argument, that the District Court’s

order should be reversed because the seized firearms and

ammunition were not “involved in” a violation of the Gun

Control Act, is less persuasive. Like “used in,” “involved in” is

not defined in § 924(d)(1). Therefore, our analysis again begins

with the plain meaning of “involved.” Merriam-Webster defines

“involved” as: (1) “to engage as a participant”; (2) “to relate

closely”; (3) “to have within or as part of itself”; and (4) “to

require as a necessary accompaniment.” Merriam-Webster’s

Collegiate Dictionary 660 (11th ed. 2003). The term’s plain

meaning leads to the conclusion that the seized firearms

specifically identified and enumerated in Count I were
 Corpus delicti means “the substance of the crime.” 6

Black’s Law Dictionary 369 (8th ed. 2004). 

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“involved in” the offense to which Cheeseman pled guilty

because the firearms served as the foundation of his criminality

and conviction. Indeed, without the firearms, there would have

been no crime. Accordingly, the firearms were related closely

to and were a necessary accompaniment to the crime charged in

Count One. 

Nonetheless, Cheeseman contends that the firearms were

not “related at all to,” nor “involved in,” his addiction. (See

Appellant’s Br. 25.) This argument exposes Cheeseman’s

misunderstanding of § 924(d)(1). The forfeiture statute does not

require that the firearms be “involved in” Cheeseman’s

addiction in order to be subject to forfeiture. To the contrary, §

924(d)(1) permits forfeiture of all firearms that are involved in

the § 922(g)(3) offense. In other words, the object of “involved

in” is not Cheeseman’s addiction. Rather, “involved in”

addresses the offenses enumerated in § 924(d)(1), including the

§ 922(g)(3) violation to which Cheeseman pled guilty. 

Furthermore, as the Government notes, possession of

firearms is a necessary element of a § 922(g)(3) offense. See

United States v. 13 Firearms & Ammunition Seized from 7438

KY 718 Dewitt, Ky., No. 06-cv-51, 2006 WL 1913360, at *2

(E.D. Ky. July 11, 2006) (noting that “involved in . . . includes

firearms possessed by prohibited persons”); see also United

States v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 n.8 (E.D. Va. 2002)

(reasoning that in § 922(g)(3) the firearm is the corpus delicti) ;6

cf. United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1056 (8th Cir. 2005)

(noting that the laundered money is the corpus of a money

laundering violation and is therefore “involved in” the offense).
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Indeed, all § 922(g)(3) requires for a violation is mere

possession of firearms by an unlawful drug abuser, and

Cheeseman admitted unlawful possession in his guilty plea.

Cheeseman’s argument that the very firearms that serve as the

basis for his underlying conviction are not “involved in” or

“related to” that conviction strains credulity. 

Nor is the phrase “involved in” ambiguous, which would

otherwise merit application of the rule of lenity, because when

read in the context of the entire statute, interpreting “involved

in” to include possession of firearms does not render §

924(d)(1)’s “used in” clause redundant. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at

146 (“We assume that Congress used two terms [‘carry’ and

‘use’] because it intended each term to have a particular,

nonsuperfluous meaning.”). When read in the context of the

entire statute and in conjunction with the Gun Control Act’s

legislative history, it is clear that both terms “used in” and

“involved in” have particular meanings. 

A central goal of the Gun Control Act was restricting

public access to firearms. It was enacted to “strengthen Federal

controls over interstate and foreign commerce in firearms and to

assist the States effectively to regulate firearms traffic within

their borders.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, at 6 (1968), reprinted in

1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4411. Congressional action was

prompted by the “increasing rate of crime and lawlessness and

the growing use of firearms in violent crime.” Id. at 7.

Additionally, the Gun Control Act amended Title IV of the

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Acts of 1968 to include

unlawful users of narcotics in the class of individuals whose

access to, and possession of, firearms Congress deemed contrary

to public interest. Id.; see also Huddleston v. United States, 415

U.S. 814, 824 (1974). This purpose is illustrated by

Congressman Celler’s floor statement, entered into the

Congressional Record during the Act’s debate, wherein he noted

that: 
Significantly, under the Senate version of the bill, an 7

amendment removed the prohibition on drug abusers from

owning, possessing or receiving firearms or ammunition. H.R.

Rep. No. 90-1577, at 30, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410,

4430. The House version of the bill, however, preserved the

broad exclusion and was ultimately adopted by the Conference

Committee, passed by both Chambers of Congress and signed

into law. Id. Thus, despite a challenge from the Senate, the

proscription against unlawful drug users possessing firearms

remained intact. 

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[W]e are convinced that a strengthened [firearms

control system] can significantly contribute to

reduc[ing] the danger of crime in the United

States. No one can dispute the need to prevent

drug addicts, mental incompetents, persons with

a history of mental disturbances, and persons

convicted of certain offenses from buying,

owning, or possessing firearms. This bill seeks to

maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out

of the hands of such persons. 

Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 828 (internal quotation marks &

citation omitted). Therefore, § 922(g) was enacted to keep

firearms “out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess

them” due to their status of falling into one of § 922(g)’s

prohibited categories. Id. at 824 (internal quotation marks &

citation omitted). In other words, § 922(g) “simply strikes at 7

the possession of firearms by the wrong kind of people.”

Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 573 (1977)

(internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The regulation

interpreting this section of the Gun Control Act defines an

unlawful user of a controlled substance as someone who “uses

a controlled substance and has lost the power of self-control.”
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27 C.F.R. § 478.11. Cheeseman’s guilty plea makes plain that

he is just such a person. 

In 1986, Congress passed the Firearms Owners

Protection Act (“FOPA”), which amended the Gun Control Act.

FOPA was designed to relieve the “burdens” the 1968 Act

imposed on lawful firearms users while simultaneously

strengthening “the ability of law enforcement to fight violent

crime and narcotics trafficking.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-495, at 1

(1986), printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1327. FOPA also

limited the forfeiture provision of the Gun Control Act to

firearms or ammunition “particularly named and individually

identified as involved in or used in specified violations of law.”

Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). FOPA

did not define the term “involved in” in either the definitions

portion of the bill or in the accompanying report language. Nor

did FOPA remove the prohibition on drug abusers owning,

possessing or receiving firearms or ammunition. 

This legislative history supports our conclusion that our

interpretation of “involved in” does not render the “used in”

clause superfluous. In Smith, the Supreme Court opined that

Congress varied the statutory language in § 924(d)(1) and

included the broad term “involved in” to apply to crimes in

which the firearm’s involvement in the enumerated offense

would not require a use of the firearm. 508 U.S. at 235

(Congress “carefully varied the statutory language [in §

924(d)(1)] in accordance with the guns’ relation to the

offense.”). Consequently, the term “involved in” necessarily has

a more expansive meaning than the term “use” in order to

effectuate Congress’ intention that forfeiture apply to the unique

crimes enumerated in § 922, which may be committed without

ever using a firearm. Id. In this way, Congress ensured that the

class of individuals it deemed should not possess weapons

would have their firearms forfeited upon a violation of § 922. 
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As an example, the Smith Court noted that § 922(a)(6)

criminalizes “making of a false statement material to the

lawfulness of a gun’s transfer.” Id. “Because making a material

misstatement in order to acquire . . . a gun is not ‘use’ of the gun

even under the broadest definition of the word ‘use,’” the

Supreme Court concluded that “Congress carefully expanded the

statutory language” by including the term “involved in” in the

statute. Id. Therefore, Congress chose such a broad term to

ensure forfeiture of firearms for offenses where, as in

Cheeseman’s case, “use” is not a necessary - or sometimes even

a possible - element of the crime. Thus, when read in context of

the entire statute and with Congress’ intent in mind, the terms

“involved in” and “used in” retain separate meanings. 

In sum, we hold that possession of firearms and

ammunition is sufficient for a district court to find that the

property was “involved in” a § 922(g)(3) offense. This

interpretation of “involved in” makes sense in light of Congress’

intent to keep firearms out of the possession of drug abusers, a

dangerous class of individuals, and supports a finding that the

seized firearms and ammunition were “involved in”

Cheeseman’s § 922(g)(3) offense. This conclusion is bolstered

by the District Court’s findings that: (1) Cheeseman had

unfettered access to the full panoply of weapons located in

X-Ring; (2) he used crack cocaine in and around those weapons;

and (3) he brought other drug abusers to the store and warehouse

to smoke crack. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s
 For the same reasons that the forfeited firearms and 8

ammunition were “involved in” a knowing violation of §

922(g)(3), the District Court correctly found, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2, that a sufficient nexus existed

between the forfeited property and the offense.

-21-

determination that the specified firearms and ammunition were

“involved in” Cheeseman’s § 922(g)(3) violation.8

3. “Knowing” Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)

Cheeseman’s final statutory argument, that he did not

knowingly violate § 922(g)(3), also fails. Cheeseman contends

that while he pled guilty to violating § 922(g)(3), his guilty plea

“does not provide an admission of ‘knowingly’ violating Section

922(g) for purposes of forfeiture.” (Appellant’s Br. 26.)

Cheeseman argues, without citation to any supporting case law,

that knowledge is especially important in cases, such as his,

where the forfeiture is a criminal punishment. (Id. at 27.) 

This argument is unpersuasive because it discounts firmly

established case law construing the term “knowing” to require

“only that the act be voluntary and intentional and not [to

require] that a person knows he is breaking the law.” United

States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 408 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal

quotation marks & citation omitted). Cheeseman does not

contend that his drug use or firearm possession was involuntary

or unintentional. 

In essence, Cheeseman invites the Court to read into §

924(d)(1) a willfulness requirement, which, if applied, would

require him to have had actual knowledge that his prohibited

conduct was illegal in order for the firearms to be forfeitable.

(Appellant’s Br. at 26-27). We reject this argument. “Congress

[is] presumed to know the meanings of the words and phrases it

uses in drafting statutes.” Pope by Pope v. E. Brunswick Bd. of

Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1249 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, Congress used
-22-

the term “knowing” and not “willful,” clearly indicating its

preference for the lower scienter. Further undermining

Cheeseman’s argument is the fact that Congress included a

willful mens rea in another clause of 924(d)(1). Therefore, if

Congress intended the first clause of § 924(d)(1) to also contain

a heightened scienter, it would have used the term willful

instead of knowing. 

Second, despite his protestations to the contrary, in his

plea agreement Cheeseman unambiguously admitted that he was

an unlawful user of narcotics who knowingly possessed firearms

and ammunition. Prior to enactment of FOPA, courts often

considered § 922(g) strict liability crimes. See, e.g., United

States v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 352 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996). After

FOPA became law, however, courts read into § 922(g) a mens

rea requirement. Id. While the statute is silent as to its requisite

mens rea, the elements of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violation are:

(1) that the defendant is an unlawful user or addicted to any

controlled substance; (2) who thereafter knowingly possessed a

firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate

commerce. Cf. United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d

Cir. 2000) (reading into the felon-in-possession portion of §

922(g)(1) a “knowing” scienter ); Capps, 77 F.3d at 352 (same).

Therefore, because Cheeseman pled guilty to Count One, he

admitted that he knowingly violated § 922(g)(3). 

Third, to the extent that Cheeseman’s argument is based

on his contention that he had not been adjudicated an unlawful

possessor of firearms at the time he committed the § 922(g)(3)

offense, and was therefore not on notice that he was knowingly

violating the statute, this argument also fails. This is essentially

a variant on the losing argument that ignorance of the law

excuses illegal conduct. Cf. United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d

394, 398 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] legally relevant status under §

922(g) may arise in the absence of any formal proceeding. For

example, § 922(g)(3) prohibits an individual addicted to
-23-

controlled substances from possessing a firearm, yet an

individual attains the status of a drug addict without a court

proceeding of any kind.”). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the firearms and

ammunition enumerated in Count One of the indictment are

subject to forfeiture because they were “involved in”

Cheeseman’s knowing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violation. 

B. Excessive Fines Claim

Having concluded that § 924(d)(1) permits forfeiture of

Cheeseman’s firearms and ammunition, we must determine

whether that forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on excessive fines. 

1. History of the Excessive Fines Clause

The Eighth Amendment provides that: “Excessive bail

shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

There was little debate surrounding the adoption of the Eighth

Amendment and no discussion regarding the inclusion within

the Amendment of the Excessive Fines Clause. See Tillman v.

Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 420 n.9 (3d Cir.

2000). Still, the Excessive Fines Clause traces its roots as far

back as the Magna Carta. See United States v. Premises Known

as RR No. 1 Box 224, Dalton, Scott Twp. & North Abington

Twp., Lackawanna, Pa., 14 F.3d 864, 875 n.12 (3d Cir. 1994)

(“Blackstone says that the reasonableness of a fine must be

determined by reference to Magna Carta’s prohibition on

excessive amercements [a common criminal sanction].

Specifically, Blackstone says ‘no man shall have a larger

amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances or

personal estate will bear: saving to . . . the trader his

merchandize.’”) (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries

*372). Thus, at the time of the Framing, the Founders

understood “‘fine’ . . . to mean a payment to a sovereign as
-24-

punishment for some offense.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327

(internal quotation marks & citation omitted); see also Austin v.

United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609 (1993) (“The purpose of the

Eighth Amendment . . . was to limit the government’s power to

punish.”). In turn, the Excessive Fines Clause restricts “the

Government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in

kind, as punishment for some offense.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at

328 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The Eighth

Amendment is applicable if the forfeiture constitutes a “fine”

and is violated only if that fine is “excessive.” See Tillman, 221

F.3d at 420. 

While the Excessive Fines Clause was initially applied

only to in personam actions, the Supreme Court expanded its

applicability to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings if the

forfeiture constituted, in part, punishment. See Austin, 509 U.S.

at 610 (noting that sanctions can serve both a remedial and

punitive purpose). This holding was narrowed somewhat by the

Supreme Court in Bajakajian, wherein the Court noted that

traditional in rem forfeitures were not punitive and would

therefore fall outside of the Eighth Amendment’s protections.

524 U.S. at 331. The Court further noted, however, that

“[b]ecause some recent federal forfeiture laws have blurred the

traditional distinction between civil in rem and criminal in

personam forfeiture, we have held that a modern statutory

forfeiture is a ‘fine’ for Eighth Amendment purposes if it

constitutes punishment even in part, regardless of whether the

proceeding is styled in rem or in personam.” Id. at 331 n.6.

Thus, while the Court has classified § 924(d)(1) as remedial and

therefore a civil sanction, see United States v. One Assortment

of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363-65 (1984), forfeiture

pursuant to this section nonetheless is subject to Eighth

Amendment scrutiny. Here, the Government and Cheeseman

agree that the forfeiture is criminal in nature since it is part of

his criminal judgment and sentence. A defendant bears the

burden of establishing that a forfeiture constitutes an
-25-

unconstitutional excessive fine. See, e.g., United States v. Jose,

499 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2007). 

2. United States v. Bajakajian: Gross Disproportionality

In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture

of a sum of money grossly disproportionate to the underlying

crime constituted an Excessive Fines Clause violation.

Bajakajian involved the forfeiture of $357,144 for failure to

report to the United States government sums over $10,000

transported by an individual leaving the country in violation of

31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A). See Bajakajian, 524 U.S at 324-25.

Bajakajian argued that forfeiture of the entire $357,144 sum

involved in the reporting offense ran afoul of the Constitution.

Id. at 324. 

After first determining that the forfeiture was punitive,

the Bajakajian Court reasoned that the next step in an Excessive

Fines Clause analysis was to ascertain whether it was excessive.

According to the Court, the “touchstone of the constitutional

inquiry . . . is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the

forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the

offense that it is designed to punish.” Id. at 334. The Court

further reasoned that because “judgments about the appropriate

punishment for an offense belong . . . to the legislature” and

because “any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a

particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise[,] . . .

[b]oth of these principles counsel against requiring strict

proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and

the gravity of a criminal offense.” Id. at 336. In turn, the Court

adopted a gross disproportionality standard. Id. 

To analyze proportionality, the Bajakajian Court first

examined the nature of the substantive crime, noting that it was

solely a reporting offense, unrelated to any other illegal activity,

which required a “willful” mens rea for conviction. Id. at 337.

Next, the Court opined that Bajakajian did “not fit into the class
 Though our reasoning differs from that of the District 9

Court, because we review a district court’s interpretation of the

Constitution de novo, we may affirm the District Court’s ruling

based upon the alternative reasoning discussed in this section. 

-26-

of persons for whom the statute was principally designed,” i.e.,

money launderers, drug dealers, or tax evaders. Id. at 338.

Third, the Court noted that the six-month maximum sentence

and $5,000 maximum fine recommended by the Sentencing

Guidelines evidenced a “minimal level of culpability.” Id. at

338-39. The Court also indicated that it was appropriate to

compare the amount the government sought to forfeit with the

maximum fine permitted under the statute. Id. at 339 n.14.

Finally, the Court concluded that the harm Bajakajian caused

was minimal since his offense only injured the government in “a

relatively minor way.” Id. at 339; see also Premises Known as

RR No. 1 Box 224, 14 F.3d at 875 (noting that a reviewing court

should evaluate the gravity of the offense, the harshness of the

penalty, the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same

jurisdiction, the sentences imposed for commission of the same

crime in other jurisdictions and the culpability of the offender).

After considering all these factors, the Supreme Court ruled the

$357,144 forfeiture unconstitutional. 

3. The Forfeiture was Not Grossly Disproportionate to

Cheeseman’s Crime

Applying the factors outlined in Bajakajian, we conclude

that the forfeiture of Cheeseman’s firearms and ammunition was

not grossly disproportionate to his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)

violation. Here, unlike the reporting offense in Bajakajian, the 9

illegal possession of the firearms was not the only illegality

associated with Cheeseman’s crime. Rather, in addition to

unlawfully possessing firearms, Cheeseman was also abusing

illegal narcotics. 
-27-

Next, Cheeseman’s protestation that his crime was

victimless because he did not possess the firearms as a means to

procure drugs is unpersuasive because it demonstrates a

misunderstanding of § 922(g)(3)’s purpose. (See Appellant’s

Br. at 32.) Cheeseman is exactly the type of individual for

whom the statute was designed. Section 922(g)(3) of the Gun

Control Act reflects Congress’ view that certain types of

individuals, including drug abusers, mental incompetents, and

violent felons, should not possess firearms. This is eminently

reasonable considering that intoxicated individuals should not

have access to, nor possess, firearms because of public safety

concerns. Therefore Cheeseman, a crack cocaine addict with

unfettered access to an arsenal of weapons and ammunition,

who facilitated other crack cocaine addicts’ access to that

arsenal, squarely fits within the class of persons whose behavior

the statute aims to criminalize. Additionally, Cheeseman’s

contention that he legally owned and operated a firearms

dealership for many years is disingenuous at best since he was

abusing drugs during his ownership of X-Ring. Cheeseman’s

misrepresentation on his FFL application further undermines

this argument. 

Finally, even assuming the firearms and ammunition

were worth approximately $500,000, this sum is not grossly

disproportionate to the crime to which Cheeseman pled guilty.

While Cheeseman correctly notes that $500,000 exceeds the fine

range of $7,500 to $75,000 recommended by the Sentencing

Guidelines, when weighed against the circumstances

surrounding Cheeseman’s crime, this factor is not dispositive.

In Bajakajian, the amount the government sought to forfeit was

$357,144, over seventy times the $5,000 maximum fine

authorized by his Guideline. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-

38. Here, although $500,000 is roughly seventy times greater

than the low end of Cheeseman’s Guideline range, it is less than

seven times greater than the high end of his Guideline range. In

any event, when considered in light of all the factors that
-28-

Bajakajian instructs courts to consider, the fact that the worth of

the guns is a larger sum than the Guideline fine does not

sufficiently outweigh the remaining factors that militate against

a finding of unconstitutionality. Furthermore, as noted in

Bajakajian, the Guideline fine alone is not dispositive and we

may also consider the statutory maximum fine that Cheeseman

faced. See id. at 339 n.14. Here, the statutory maximum fine

was $250,000. Thus, a forfeiture valued at $500,000 is only two

times greater than the maximum fine permitted by the statute.

Cf. United States v. Wallace, 389 F.3d 483, 486-87 (5th Cir.

2004) (ruling forfeiture of a $30,000 plane willfully operated

without a federal registration by an individual with no criminal

history would not violate the Eighth Amendment when the

statutory maximum fine was $15,000). Thus, any discrepancy

between the value of the firearms and the Guideline fine is not

controlling and therefore does not serve as the basis for finding

an Excessive Fines Clause violation.

In sum, we conclude that the forfeiture of Cheeseman’s

firearms and ammunition was not grossly disproportionate to his

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) offense because he was abusing drugs

while illegally possessing firearms, he was part of the class of

persons whose behavior the statute criminalized, and the value

of the firearms was at most two times the maximum penalty

imposed by the statute. In turn, forfeiture of Cheeseman’s

firearms and ammunition did not violate the Excessive Fines

Clause. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s Order of Forfeiture. 
1

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I join the Majority’s thoughtful and comprehensive

opinion in every respect save one: because I agree with the

Majority that the phrase “involved in” as used in 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(d)(1) is unambiguous, I do not believe recourse to

legislative history is necessary or proper.

When interpreting a statute, it has long been accepted that

courts should only examine legislative history when the statutory

text is ambiguous or otherwise unclear. See Ex Parte Collett,

337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949). If the text is clear and unambiguous,

our inquiry ends. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176,

183, 186 (2004); Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp.,

360 F.3d 404, 406 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, we have observed

that reliance on legislative history “is to be avoided whenever

possible due to the inherent unreliability of using legislative

history as a basis for ascertaining legislative intent.” Roe v.

Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 842 (3d Cir. 1980).

Here, after a convincing analysis of the text of

§ 924(d)(1), the Majority quite rightly concludes that the plain

meaning of the phrase “involved in” authorizes the forfeiture of

Cheeseman’s firearms. Maj. Op. Typescript at 14. In rejecting

Cheeseman’s request that we apply the rule of lenity, the

Majority states: “Nor is the phrase ‘involved in’ ambiguous.”

Id. at 15. Despite this conclusion, the Majority expounds upon

the legislative histories of the Gun Control Act and the Firearm

Owners Protection Act to buttress its textual interpretation of
2

§ 924(d)(1). Id. at 16-18. At least six of the sitting Justices of

the Supreme Court have counseled against this approach. See,

e.g., Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2246 (2009) (Alito,

J.) (“Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need to

reach petitioner’s remaining arguments based on . . . legislative

history . . . .”); Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-10

(2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment) (“Here, the Court looks to legislative history even

though the remainder of its opinion amply establishes that the

[statute] is unambiguous . . . Use of legislative history in this

context . . . conflicts . . . with this Court’s repeated statements

that when the language of the statute is plain, legislative history

is irrelevant.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,

119 (2001) (Kennedy, J.) (“As the conclusion we reach today is

directed by the text of [the statute], we need not assess . . .

legislative history . . . .”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,

147-48 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative

history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”); Connecticut Nat.

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (Thomas, J.)

(“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, . . . [the]

judicial inquiry is complete.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v.

Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.)

(quoting Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991))

(“‘[A]lthough a court appropriately may refer to a statute’s

legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity, there is no

need to do so’ if the statutory language is clear.”).

For the foregoing reasons, I do not join that portion of the

Court’s opinion that delves into legislative history.