No. 451 September 13, 2023 1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

JAMES SNODGRASS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Jamie MILLER, 

Superintendent, 

Snake River Correctional Institution,

and Oregon State Board of Parole,

Defendants-Respondents.

Polk County Circuit Court

20CV28914; A176748

Rafael A. Caso, Judge.

Submitted August 8, 2023.

Margaret Huntington and O’Connor Weber LLC filed the 

briefs for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, 

Solicitor General, and Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney 

General, filed the brief for respondents.

Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Kamins, Judge, and 

Kistler, Senior Judge.

LAGESEN, C. J.

Affirmed.
2 Snodgrass v. Miller
Cite as 328 Or App 1 (2023) 3

LAGESEN, C. J.

In 1998, a jury found defendant guilty of 10 

sex offenses. Eight of the verdicts were not unanimous. 

Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d 

583 (2020), petitioner filed this post-conviction proceeding 

seeking relief from his convictions resulting from nonunanimous verdicts. The post-conviction court granted summary 

judgment to defendants, the Superintendent of the Snake 

River Correctional Institution and the Oregon State Board 

of Parole, on two alternative grounds: (1) that Ramos did 

not apply retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings; 

and (2) that, as part of a settlement of a federal habeas corpus case, petitioner waived the right to file post-conviction 

proceedings challenging his convictions. Reviewing for legal 

error, Yann v. Bowser, 301 Or App 720, 722, 459 P3d 272 

(2020), we affirm on the ground that petitioner’s waiver bars 

him from pursuing this post-conviction relief.

To start, in view of the Oregon Supreme Court’s 

decision in Watkins v. Ackley, 370 Or 604, 523 P3d 86 (2022), 

decided after the post-conviction court rendered its decision 

in this matter, the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that Ramos did not apply retroactively in state postconviction proceedings.

Given that error, the remaining question is whether 

the post-conviction court was nonetheless correct in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the alternative ground that petitioner had waived the right to seek 

post-conviction relief from the convictions at issue. It was. 

As part of a stipulated agreement to resolve two pending 

federal habeas cases, petitioner unambiguously waived his 

right to bring a further post-conviction challenge to the convictions at issue in this case. Specifically, petitioner stipulated to the following:

“In consideration for the above stipulations, petitioner 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any further challenges to his convictions and sentences in State 

of Oregon v. James Lowell Snodgrass, Multnomah County 

Circuit Court Case 060835039 and State of Oregon v. James 

Lowell Snodgrass, Polk County Circuit Court Case No. 
4 Snodgrass v. Miller

96P-3054, including the filing of a petition in state court for 

post[-]conviction relief, a petition [in state or federal court] 

for a writ of habeas corpus, or any other form of collateral 

relief. ** * This waiver is intended to resolve any claims 

and prevent any future litigation based on or related to 

petitioner’s convictions and sentences in State of Oregon 

v. James Lowell Snodgrass, Multnomah County Circuit 

Court Case 060835039 and State of Oregon v. James Lowell 

Snodgrass, Polk County Circuit Court Case No. 96P-3054, 

and any collateral proceedings stemming from those convictions and sentences.

“Petitioner acknowledges, via declaration, that he 

has reviewed these stipulations with his attorney, Mark 

Weintraub, and that he (petitioner) knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily agrees to all of the stipulations contained 

in this motion and the stipulated order.”

Petitioner’s stipulation could not be clearer. He 

unambiguously waived “any further challenges,” including 

state post-conviction challenges, to the convictions that he 

seeks to challenge in this proceeding. Petitioner nevertheless argues that the waiver should not be enforced against 

him. He argues that the waiver was not “knowing” because, 

at the time he waived his right to further challenge his 

convictions, he did not know that, ultimately, the Supreme 

Court would reach the conclusion it reached in Ramos. 

Alternatively, he argues that a waiver should not apply any 

time a person can demonstrate that a conviction or sentence 

is “illegal.”

We are not persuaded.

Petitioner’s first argument is contrary to case law. 

A waiver that is “intelligently made in the light of the then 

applicable law does not become vulnerable because later 

judicial decisions” indicate that it “rested on a faulty premise.” Brady v. United States, 397 US 742, 757, 90 S Ct 1463, 

25 L Ed 2d 747 (1970); see Peeler v. Reyes, 328 Or App 110, 

___ P3d ___ (2023).

Petitioner’s second argument rests on a Ninth 

Circuit decision, United States v. Torres, 828 F3d 1113 (9th 

Cir 2016). We are not bound by Ninth Circuit precedent. 

However, even if we adopted the reasoning in Torres, it 
Cite as 328 Or App 1 (2023) 5

would not assist petitioner here. That case addressed the 

scope of a direct appeal waiver of the ability to challenge 

a sentence, and did not hold that knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary waivers of collateral remedies cannot be enforced 

to bar a constitutional challenge to a conviction. Id. at 1125. 

As defendants point out, courts generally have concluded 

that waivers of collateral remedies are enforceable. See, e.g.,

United States v. Lemaster, 403 F3d 216, 220 (4th Cir 2005) 

(noting that “[e]very Circuit Court of Appeals to consider 

the issue * * * has held that the right to attack a sentence 

collaterally may be waived so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary”). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit itself has 

explained that its decision in Torres is limited. Specifically, 

the court has held that its decision in Torres does not apply 

to waivers of the right to challenge convictions. In particular, the decision in Torres does not stand for the proposition that a waiver of right to challenge a conviction becomes 

unenforceable when a change in the law gives rise to a new 

basis on which to challenge the legality of the conviction. 

United States v. Goodall, 21 F4th 555, 562-64 (9th Cir 2021). 

Rather, a person agreeing to such a waiver assumes the risk 

that “the law could change in [their] favor,” when the person 

knowingly and voluntarily agrees to a bargain that includes 

a waiver of a subsequent challenge. Id. at 563-64. That is 

what happened in this case.

Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly 

granted summary judgment to defendants on the ground 

that petitioner had waived the right to challenge the convictions at issue in this post-conviction proceeding.

Affirmed.