MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 14 0 Docket: Ken

- 20

- 138 Argued : October	6,	2020 Decided: December	22,	2020 Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HUMPHREY, HORTON , and CONNORS , JJ.

PAT	DOE 1

v. CHRISTOPHER	HILLS

- PETTITT

HUMPHREY ,	J. [¶1] Pat	 Doe appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 entered	 in	 the	 District	 Court (Augusta, Nale,	J. )	dismissing with	prejudice	a complaint for	protection	 from abuse that	 she	 brought	 on	 behalf	 of her three minor	 children	 against their father , Christopher	Hills

- Pettitt

. Doe contends	that	the	court erred or	abused its	discretion	in	di smissing	her	complaint	with	prejudice instead	of	granting	her oral	 motion	 to voluntarily	 dismiss	 the	 complaint	 without	 prejudice

. We conclude ,	 contrary	 to	 the	 court’s	 determination, that	 due	 process	 did	 not

1 In	accordance	with	the	Violence	Against	Women	Act,	18	U.S.C.S.	§	2265(d)(3)	(LEXIS	through Pub.	L.	No.	116

- 214 ),	we	have	employed	the	pseudonym	“Pat	Doe”	for	the	plaintiff.		The	individual who	filed	the	complaint	and	initially	appeared	on	behalf	of	the	children	died	during	the	course	of	this appeal,	and	we granted	a	request	to	allow	the	trial	court	to	order	the	su bstitution	of	a person	who	is now	responsible	for	the	children. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	4005(1)	(2020);	22 M.R.S.	§	4002(9)	(2020). On November	23,	2020,	the	trial	court	ordered	that	substitution,	and we	employ	the	pseudonym	“Pat Doe”	interchangeably	to	refer to	both	individuals	who	have	appeared	as	plaintiffs	in	this	case.2 require	the	court	to	dismiss	the	matter	with	prejudice and	we therefore vacate the	judgment	and	remand for	further	proceeding s consistent	with	this	opinion

. I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] On	 February	 19,	 2020,	 pursuant	 to	 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §§	 4001

- 4014 (2020), Doe filed	 a	 complaint	 for	 protection	 from	 abuse	 on	 behalf	 of the children , alleg ing that	Christopher	was	sexually	abusing two	of them

. The	court granted	 a	 temporary	 order	 for	 protection	 from	 abuse	 and	 scheduled	 a	 final hearing	for	March	9,	2020

. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§ 4006

. [¶ 3 ] After the	court	entered	 the	 temporary	 order and before	 the	 final hearing ,	Christopher	was	arrested	and	charged	with	unlawful	sexual	contact.
See 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 255

- A	 (2020). Christopher ’ s	 bail	 conditions prohibited contact	 between	 Christopher	 and	 the	 children. 2 B oth	 parties and their attorneys	 attended	 the March	 9 hearing , b ut Doe did	 not	 bring	 the	 children whose	reports	serve d as	the	basis	of	the	complaint. At	the outset , Doe orally moved	to	dismiss the complaint	without	prejudice,	citing the	need to	spare the children	 the	 trauma	 of testifying given	 that Christopher ’ s	 bail conditions protect ed the m	by	prohibiting any contact between	him	and the children

. T he

2 Pursuant	to	M.R.	Evid.	201,	we	take	judicial	notice	of	the	bail	conditions , which prohibit	any contact	between	Christopher	and	the	children. See ,	e.g., Guardianship	of	Jewel	M. ,	2010	ME 80,	¶	24, 2	A.3d	301	(noting	that	a	court	may	take	judicial	notice	of	docket	records	in	other	cases).3
court responded	 that	 it	 was going to	 either	 hold a final	 hearing	 that	 day	 or dismiss the complaint	with	prejudice.		The	court	allowed	the	parties	to confer briefly before Doe renewed	her oral request.		The	court	denied Doe ’ s motion and	entered	an	order	dismissing	the	case	with	prejudice. [¶ 4 ] On	March	13,	2020, pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	52(a), Doe moved	for further	 findings	 of	 fact	 and	 conclusions	 of	 law , arguing t hat the	 court	 was required	 to	allow	 the	voluntary	dismissal	of	 the	complaint	without	prejudice pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 41(a)(1), and	 further requesting	 that	 the	 court	 find additional facts to	support its	decision	to	dismiss	the	complaint	with	prejudice. In	an	order	denying	that	motion,	the	court	stated that	Christopher “ was	entitled to	have	the	matter	adjudicated	on	the	day	the	trial	was	scheduled.		[ Doe ]	did not	request	a	continuance.		The	court	did	not	intend	this	dismissal	to	act	as	a sanction	upon [Do e] but	a	rendering	of	due	process. ” Doe timely appea led

. See
19

- A	M.R.S.	§	104	(2020);	M.R.	App.	P.	2A,	2B(c)(1),	(2)(B).
II.		DISCUSSION
A

. M.R.	Civ.	P. 41(a)(1)

— Voluntary	Dismissal	by	Plaintiff [¶ 5 ] Doe argues that the	court misapplied	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(1) when	it dismissed	her	complaint	with	prejudice. We	review	the	court ’ s	interpretation4 of	the	Maine	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure 3 de	novo “ and	look	to	the	plain	language of	the	rules	to	determine	their	meaning. ” Kline	v.	Burdin ,	2017	ME	194,	¶	7,	170 A.3d	282 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. [¶ 6 ] Rule	 41(a)(1) 4 provides	 that a plaintiff may dismiss an action without a	court order by	filing	either	a	notice	of	dismissal

— i f	the	defendant	has not	served	an	answer	or	a	motion	for summary	judgment 5

— or	a	stipulation	of dismissal	signed	by	all	of	the	parties

. “ U nless	otherwise	stated	in	the	notice	of dismissal	or	stipulation,	the	dismissal	is without	prejudice

. ” M.R

. Civ.	P.	41(a)(1) (emphasis	added)

. T hus,	t he	plain	language	of the Rule permits a	plaintiff	to specify	whether	or	not	the	dismissal	is	with	prejudice. S ee	e.g., In	re	Kaleb	D. ,

3 Pursuant	 to 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 4010(1) (2020) ,	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Procedure	 apply	 to	 all proceedings	brought	under the	chapter	governing	complaints	 for protection	 from	abuse. See	also Shaw	v.	Packard ,	2005	ME	122,	¶	9,	886	A.2d	1287

.
4 Rule	41(a)(1)	was	amended	in	1989	to	allow	a	plaintiff	to	dismiss	an	action	voluntarily	only before	 the	defendant	served	an	answer or	a	motion	 for	summary	judgment.		M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(1) Advisory	Committee’s	Notes	1989.

5 Maine’s	protection	from	abuse	law	does	not	affirmatively	require	a	defendant	to	file	an	answer or permit	 the	 defendant	 to	 file a	 motion	 for	 summary	 judgment

. S ee 19

- A	M.R.S.	 §§	 4001

- 4014 (2020).		Similarly,	the	Ju dicial Branch’s	Guide	to	Protection	from	Abuse	and	Harassment	Cases	notes that	the	defendant	is	not	required	to	submit	a	written	response	to	the	plaintiff’s	complaint.		Maine Judicial	Branch , Administrativ e	Office	of	the	Courts, A	Guide	to	Protection f rom	Abuse	&	Harassment Cases 10	(June	2018), https://www.courts.maine.gov/help/guides/pa

- ph

- guide.pdf

. Importation	of summary	judgment	practice	would	entirely	defeat	the	purpose	of	what	is	supposed	to	be	a	sy stem that	allows	“victims	of	domestic	abuse	to	obtain	expeditious	and	effective	protection	against	further abuse	 so	 that	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 nonabusing	 family	 or	 household	 members	 are	 as	 secure	 and uninterrupted	as	possible.”		19

- A	M.R.S.	§	4001(2).		We	have already	noted	that	Rule	56(a)	does	not authorize	the	use	of	summary	judgment	process	in	family	law	matters , Higgins	v.	Wood ,	2018	ME	88, ¶	 8,	 189	 A.3d	 724,	 and	 take	 this	 opportunity	 to	 instruct litigants	 and	 the	 District	 Court that	 the process	is	not	authorized	in actions	for protection	from	abuse	or	harassment

.5 2001	ME	55,	¶	3	n.4,	769	A.2d	179 ( “ Because	there	was	no	stipulation	among the	 parties	 indicating	 otherwise	 and	 because	 the	 dismissal	 was silent	 as	 to whether	 it	 was	 with	 or	 without	 prejudice,	 the	 dismissal	 in	 this	 case	 did	 not operate	as	an	adjudication	on	the	merits. ” ). [¶ 7 ] However, to	 avail	 herself	 of	 Rule	 41(a)(1), a plaintiff	 must file a written notice	of the dismissal with	the	cour t	or a stipulation	of	dismissal signed by	all	parties

. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	41	Advisory	Committee’s	Notes	1989	(stating	that the	1989	amendment	adopts	the	language	of	Federal	Rule	41(a)(1)); 8	James
W.	Moore et	al., Moore’s	Federal	Practice	§	41.33(4)(a) (3d ed.	20 0 7) (noting that	 oral	 notice	 is	 insufficient	 for	 a	 plaintiff	 to	 voluntarily	 dismiss	 an	 action pursuant	 to	 Fed. R.	 Civ.	 P.	 41(a)(1))

. Here, the	 defendant	 did	 not	 serve	 an answer	or	a	motion	 for	summary	judgment	and Doe orally	moved	 to	dismiss her	complaint

. Thus,	i n	the	absence	of	a	writ ten notice or	signed	stipulation , Doe	could	not	implement	 the	provisions	of Rule	41(a)(1) that	allowed her to specify that	the dismissal was without	prejudice.
B

. M.R.	Civ.	P.	41( a)(2)

— Voluntary	Dismissal	by	Order	of the Court [¶ 8 ] Next, we	 examine whether	 the	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 in dismissing	the	case	with	prejudice

. M.R.	Civ.	P. 41 (a)(2) provides	that	a	court
may dismiss	 a	 case “ upon	 such	 terms	 and	 conditions	 as	 the	 court	 deems6
proper, ” and we	have recognized	that	this	language	grants	a	court “ discretion to	dismiss	a	case	with	or	without	prejudice , ” Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC	v.	Cope , 2017	ME	68,	¶	16,	158	A.3d	931

. Thus,	unlike	R ule	41(a)(1),	which allows	the plaintiff	 to	 decide	 whether	 the	 dismissal	 is	 with	 or	 without	 prejudice,	 Rule 41(a)(2)	gives	this	discretion	to	the	court. We	review	a	court ’ s	dismissal	with prejudice	for	an	abuse	of	discretion. U.S.	Bank	N at’l A ss’n v.	Curit ,	2016	ME	17, ¶ 10, 131	A.3d	903 .		In	doing	so,	we	evaluate “ (1)	whether	the	court ’ s	factual findings	are	supported	by	the	record	according	to	the	clear	error	standard,	(2) whether	 the	 court	 understood	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 its dis cretion,	 and	 (3)	 whether	 the	 court ’ s	 weighing	 of	 the	 applicable	 facts	 and choices	was	within	the	bounds	of	reasonableness. ” Green	Tree	Servicing , LLC , 2017	 ME	 68,	 ¶	 12,	 158	 A.3d	 931. Here,	 because	 the	 court	 concluded	 that Christopher ’ s	due	process	rights precluded	it	from	exercising	its	discretion , 6 we begin	by addressing	the	court’s	understanding	of	the	law , which	requires	us	to determine “the	parameters	of	the	court’s	authority

— a	matter	that	we	review de	novo. ” Id. ;	see	also State	v.	Mason ,	408 A.2d	1269,	1 2 72	(Me.	1979)	(noting that	whe re “the	presiding	Justice	does	not	exercise	judicial	discretion	when	he

6 The	court	was	unequivocal	that	it	did	not	intend	the	dismissal	with	prejudice	“to	act	as	a	sanction upon	[Doe].”		Instead,	the	court	reasoned	that	due	process requi red it	to	dismiss	the	complaint	with prejudice	because	Christopher	“was	entitled	to	have	the	matter	adjudicated	on	the	day	the	trial	was scheduled.”7 is	authorized	to	do	so,	his	ruling	is	based	upon	a	misconception	of	the	applicable law”).
1

. Procedural Due	Process [¶ 9 ] Doe argues	that	the	court	erred	in	concluding	that if	no	hearing	was held	on	March	9, 2020, due	process	required	the court	to	dismiss	the complaint with	 prejudice

. Christopher contends that	 because	 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 4006(1) requires	a	hearing	within	twenty

- one	d ays after the	filing	of the	complaint, due process	dictates	that	the	matter either be	adjudicated on	that exact date or be dismissed	with	prejudice. [¶1 0 ]		We	review	th is	issue	of	procedural	due	process de	novo. State	v. Jones ,	2012	ME	126,	¶	35,	55 A.3d	432

. The	due	process	clause	of	the	Maine Constitution	echoes	its	federal	counterpart : “ No	person	shall	be	deprived	of	life, liberty	or	property	without	due	process	of	law. ” Me.	Const.	art.	 I,	§	6

- A;	U.S. Const.	 amend.	 XIV,	 §	 1; see	 also Green	 v.	 Com m ’ r	 of	 Mental	 Health	 &	 Mental Retardation ,	2000	ME	92,	¶	21	n.4,	750	A.2d	1265

. [¶1 1 ] In determining whether	a	person	has	been	deprived	of	a	protected interest	without	due	process	of	law,	we	employ	two	steps.		“First,	we	determine if	the	government	has	deprived	a	claimant	of	life,	liberty,	or	property	interests. Second,	 if	 such	 deprivation	 occurred,	 we then	 determine	 what	 process,8 pursuant	to	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	is	due	utilizing	the	factors	in Mathews v.	Eldridge ,	424	U.S.	319,	96	S.	Ct.	893,	47	L.	Ed.	2d	18	(1976).” DaimlerChrysler Corp.	v.	Exec.	Dir.,	Me.	Revenue	Serv. ,	2007	ME	62,	¶	26,	922	A.2 d	465 (citation omitted)

. Those	factors	are	as	follows : First,	the	private	interest	that	will	be	affected	by	the	official	action; second,	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 erroneous	 deprivation	 of	 such	 interest through	 the	 procedures	 used,	 and	 the	 probable	 value,	 if	 any,	 of additional	 or	 substitute	 procedural	 safeguards;	 and	 finally,	 the Government ’ s	 interest,	 including	 the	 function	 involved	 and	 the fiscal	and	administrative	burdens	that	the	additional	or	substitute procedural	requirement	would	entail

. In	re	A.M. ,	2012	ME	1 18,	¶	15,	55	A.3d	463	(quoting Mathews ,	424	U.S. at 335 )

. [¶1 2 ] Pursuant	to	this	framework,	we	must	first	determine whether any of Christopher’s constitutionally	protected interest s would have	been affected had	the	court	dismissed Doe ’s complaint with out , rather	than	with , prejudice. A	 parent’s right to	 make	 decisions	 concerning	 the	 care	 and	 custody	 of his children	 is	 a	 fundamental	 liberty	 interest	 that is undoubtedly at	 stake in a n action	like	 this	 for protection	 from	abuse

. S ee	Rideout	v.	Riendeau , 2000	ME 198,	¶ 18,	761	A.2d	291

. H owever, that interest is not implicated	by a court’s dismissal of	a n	action	 for protection from	abuse because a dismissal with	 or without	prejudice can actually restore the parental	rights of	the	defendant by terminating	the	court’s	temporary protection order. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	4006(2)

.9 In	 short ,	a dismissal	without	 prejudice would not	deprive	Christopher	 of his parental	 rights	 without	 due	 process	 of	 law. Neither	 the trial court	 nor Christopher	identifie d	any	legal	authority	to	support	the	proposition	that there is	 a	 protected	 liberty	 interest	 in	 being	 shielded	 from	 future	 litigation	 o n a complaint	 for	 protection	 from	 abuse	 when the	 plaintiff seeks to	 dismiss	 an initial	complaint. 7 Because,	in	 the	context	 of	 this	case,	 there	is	no protected
interest that	inoculates	Christopher from	a	future	civil	complaint arising	from facts	 that	 have	 not previously been	 developed	 at	 trial ,	 there can	 be no procedural due	process	violation. 8 See Daim lerChrysler	Corp. ,	2007	ME	62,	¶ 26, 922	A.2d	465

.

7 To	the	extent	that	we	have	opined	on the procedural	safeguards	surrounding a dismissal	with prejudice, we	 have	 focused	 on	 the	importance	 of	 the	 court	 or	 the	 opposing	 party	 providing	 “ the plaintiff with	adequate	notice	that	such	a	result	will	be	considered.” Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC v.	Cope , 2017	ME	68,	¶	20,	158	A.3d	931	(emphasis	added).

8 Even	if	we	were	to	conclude	that	Christopher	had	a	protected	interest	in	not	being	subjected	to future	litigation	about	Doe’s	allegations,	we	note	that	“ the	State	has	a	compelling	interest	in	limiting, restricting,	or	even	terminating	a	parent’s	rights	w hen	harm	to	the	child	will	result	from	the	absence of	such	governmental	interference,” In	re	Children	of	Bethmarie	R. ,	2018	ME	96,	¶	23,	189	A.3d	252 (quoting Pitts	v.	Moore ,	2014	ME	59,	¶	14,	90	A.3d	1169),	and	that	“[t]he	Due	Process	Clause	is	not	an imp enetrable	wall	behind	which	parents	may	shield	their	children;	rather,	it	provides	heightened protection	against	state	intervention	in	parents’	fundamental	right	to	make	decisions	concerning	the care,	custody,	and	control	of	their	children , ” Rideout v.	Rie ndeau ,	2000	ME	198,	¶	19,	761	A.2d	291. Moreover, contrary	to the	court ’s conclu sion that	Christopher’s	due	process	rights	entitled	him	to have	the	complaint	“adjudicated	on	the	day	the	trial	was	scheduled,”	it	is	well	settled	that	there	is	no due	process property	 right	in a procedure	itself. See	Gregory	v.	Town	 of	Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304, 1308	 (Me.	 1984)	 (holding	 that	 the	 failure	 to	 follow	 statutorily	 prescribed	 procedures	 was	 not	 a violation	of	due	process	because	there	is	“no	property	interest	in	sta tutory	procedures	themselves”); Botting	v.	Dep’t	of	Behav.	&	Dev.	Servs., 2003	ME	152,	¶	23,	838	A.2d	1168	(holding	that	“[t]he	interest in	procedure	itself	is	not	an	interest	protected	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment”).		As	we	have	held, in an	action	 for	protection	 from	abuse, “the	court	has	 the	discretion,	 for	good	cause,	 to	schedule	 the10 [¶1 3 ] Furthermore, Christopher’s	contention	that	his	due	process	rights

are “ inextricably	tied ” to a hearing , see 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	4006(1) , is	accurate	but misapplied. See	Sparks v.	Sparks ,	2013	ME	41,	¶	28,	65	A.3d	1223.		Christopher would still	be	afforded	an	opportunity	to	be	heard	and	present	evidence	if Doe files	 a	 second	 complaint , and	 we	 have	 held	 that,	 if	 followed	 correctly,	 the procedures	 in	 actions	 for protection	 from	 abuse	 adequately	 protect	 a defendant’s	 procedural	 due	 process	 rights. Se e id. at	 ¶	 29 (holding	 that

“ [b] ecause	 the	 father	was	actually	present	at	and	participated	in	 the	hearing and	 was	 able	 to	 present	 evidence	 concerning	 a	 possible	 award of	 parental rights	to	[the	mother],	he	received	ample	due	process ” ). We	conclude	that the court	erred	as	a	matter	of	law	when	it	determined	that due	process and	19

- A M.R.S.	§	4006(1) required	it	to	either	hold the March	9 hearing	as	scheduled or dismiss the	complaint	with	prejudice and	that ,	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(2), the	 court	 re tained	 the authority	 and discretion	 to	 dismiss	 Doe’s	 complaint without	prejudice

. 9

hearing	for	a	date	later	than	twenty

- one	days	after	the	filing	of	the	complaint,	even	over	the	objection of	one	of	the	parties.” Connolly	v.	Connolly ,	2 006	ME	17,	¶	5,	892	A.2d	465	(citing	to Shaw	v.	Packard , 2005	ME	122,	¶	11,	886	A.2d	1287); see	also Hayes	v.	Hayes ,	2009	ME	31,	¶	6,	967	A.2d	725.

9 To	the	extent that Christopher	argues	that	allowing	the	court	to	dismiss	Doe’s	complaint	without prejudi ce	would	permit	other	plaintiffs	to	misuse	the statutes	governing	actions	for protection	from abuse	through	multiple	refilings	and	dismissals,	we	note	that	M.R.	Civ.	P	41(a)(1)	allows	only	one voluntary	dismissal	before	the	second	dismissal	acts	as	an	adju dication	on	the	merits. See M.R.	Civ. P. 41(a)(1)	(“[A]	notice	of	dismissal	operates	as	an	adjudication	upon	the	merits	when	filed	by	a	plaintiff11
2

. Court ’ s E xercise	of D iscretion [¶1 4 ] Because	 the	 court erred	 by	 concluding that	 it	 did	 not	 have	 the discretion	to grant	Doe’s	motion ,	we	v acate	the	order	dismissing	the	complaint with	 prejudice	 and	 remand	 for	 further	 proceedings	 consistent	 with	 this opinion. C.f.	Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC ,	2017	ME	68,	¶	2 3 ,	158	A.3d	931 ( vacatin g the	 order	 and	 remanding	 the	 case	 for	 further	 proceedings	 because the plaintiff’s	 lack	 of	 standing	 did	 not	 preclude	 the	 court	 from	 exercising	 its discretion	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(2 ) ) ; see	also	State	v.	Mason ,	408	A.2d 1269,	 1273 (Me. 1979) ( vacating	 the	 judgment	 and	 remanding	 the	 case	 for further	 proceedings because	 the	 defendant	 was	 entitled “to	 have	 the	 trial Justice	exercise	his	discretion	under	Rule	16(d)” ). [¶1 5 ] O n	remand,	the	court	should	consider that	p ursuant	to	19

- A	M.R.S. §	 4001( 2),	 courts	 must	 liberally	 construe	 the statutes	 governing protection from	 abuse	 to	 protect	 victims	 of	 domestic	 abuse	 by	 “allow[ing]	 family	 and household	members	who	are	victims	of	domestic	abuse	to	obtain	expeditious and	 effective	 protection	 against	 furthe r	 abuse	 so	 that	 the	 lives	 of	 the

who	has	once	dismissed	in	any	court	of	this	state	or	any	other	state	or	the	United	States	an	action based	 on or	including	 the	 same	 claim.”).	 	 Finally,	 should	 plaintiffs misuse the statutes	 governing actions	 for protection	 from	abuse,	courts	retain	the	discretion	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(2)	to dismiss	such	vexatious	actions	with	prejudice	“as	a	sanction	for	misconduct.” Green	Tree	Servicing, LLC ,	2017	ME	68,	¶	18,	158	A.3d	931.12 nonabusing	family	or	household	members	are	as	secure	and	uninterrupted	as possible.” See	 als o 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 4001(4)	 (stating	 that	 one	 of	 the	 chapter’s purposes	is	to	prevent	domestic	abuse	by	“expand[ing]	the	power	of	the justice system	to	respond	effectively	to	situations	of	domestic	abuse”); State	v.	Blum , 2018	ME	78,	¶	10,	187	A.3d	566 (noting	that	the	directive	and	stated	purposes of	 section	 4001	 “guide	 our	 interpretation”	 of	 the	 protection	 from	 abuse chapter); State	v. Falcone ,	2000	ME	196,	¶	7,	760	A.2d	1046 ,	(rejecting	a	narrow interpretation	 of	 the	 word	 “residence”	 because	 it	 would	 “contravene[]	 the express	statutory	purpose	of	protecting	the	victim”). [¶1 6 ] Moreover, because	 the court	incorrectly	 believed	 that	it	 h ad	 no choice	but	to	order	a	dismissal	with	prejudice,	it	failed	to	consider	the	merits	of Doe’s	 motion	 and	 put	 the	 safeguards	 of	 Maine’s statutes	 providing	 for protection	from	abuse, see 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	4001,	beyond	the	children’s	reach. On remand,	 t he	 cour t	 should	 also	 consider	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 Doe’s	 motion to dismiss the	complaint	without	prejudice was	to	spare	her	children	the	trauma of	testifying	about	what	they	allegedly	endured	and	to	guard	against	the	reality that,	 should	 the	 children	 lose	 the	 interim	 protections	 afforded	 to	 them	 by Christopher’s	 bail	 conditions,	 there	 might	 then	 be	 a	 pressing	 n eed	 to	 file	 a second	 complaint	 grounded	in	 the	 same	 allegations	 as	 the	 first. Finally, the13 court	should	consider	that n othing	in	the	record	suggests	that	Doe’s motion was made	in	bad	faith	or	to	delay	the	proceedings. The	entry	is: Judgment	 of	 dismissal with	 prejudice	 vacated. Remanded	 to	 the	 District	 Court	 for	 further proceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.

Jade	Richards,	Esq.,	Pine	Tree	Legal	Assistance,	Augusta , and	Melissa	L.	Martin, Esq. (orally) ,	Pine	Tree	Legal	Assistance,	Portland,	for	appellant Pat	Doe Ashley	T.	Perry,	Esq. (orally) ,	Sanders,	Hanstein	&	Carey,	P.A.,	Farmington,	for appellee	Christopher Hills

- Pettitt

Augusta	D istrict	Court	docket	numbe r	PA

- 2020

- 72 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY