62224 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 198 / Friday, October 12, 2012 / Notices 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Department of the Army; Corps of 

Engineers 

Notice of Intent To Revise Scope of 

Draft Environmental Impact Statement 

for Updating the Water Control Manual 

for the Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint River Basin To Account for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 

Circuit Ruling and a June 2012 Legal 

Opinion of the Corps’ Chief Counsel 

Regarding Authority To Accommodate 

Municipal and Industrial Water Supply 

From the Buford Dam/Lake Lanier 

Project 

AGENCY: Department of the Army, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, DoD. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(Corps), Mobile District, intends to 

revise the scope of the Environmental 

Impact Statement (EIS) for the Water 

Control Manual (WCM) updates for the 

Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint 

(ACF) River Basin in Alabama, Florida, 

and Georgia, in light of a June 2011 

decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Eleventh Circuit and a June 2012 

legal opinion of the Corps’ Chief 

Counsel regarding authority to 

accommodate municipal and industrial 

water supply from the Buford Dam/Lake 

Lanier project. The Corps is updating 

the water control plans and manuals for 

the ACF Basin in order to improve 

operations for authorized purposes to 

reflect changed conditions since the 

manuals were last developed. The 

revised EIS will also consider, along 

with operations for all authorized 

purposes, an expanded range of water 

supply alternatives associated with the 

Buford Dam/Lake Lanier project, 

including current levels of water supply 

withdrawals and additional amounts 

that Georgia has requested from Lake 

Lanier and downstream at Atlanta. In all 

other respects, the scope of the EIS for 

the WCM updates will remain as 

described in the Updated Scoping 

Report, Environmental Impact 

Statement, Update of the Water Control 

Manual for the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin, 

in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia 

(March 2010), available at http:// 

www.sam.usace.army.mil/pa/acf-wcm/ 

docs.htm, the Corps solicits comments 

from interested persons regarding the 

scope of the EIS for the WCM updates. 

DATES: The public comment period will 

commence with publication of this 

notice, and will end 60 days after its 

publication. This notice will also be 

distributed to those who commented 

during the original scoping comment 

periods of October–December 2008 (see 

72 FR 63561 [November 9, 2007], 73 FR 

9780 [February 22, 2008], 73 FR 54391 

[September 19, 2008]), and November– 

December 2009 (see 74 FR 59965 

[November 19, 2009]). This distribution 

will occur by mail and/or email on or 

about the date of this notice. No 

additional public scoping meetings are 

planned. Comments on the scope of the 

EIS, including concerns, issues, or 

proposed alternatives that should be 

considered in the EIS, should be 

submitted in writing to (see ADDRESSES) 

and will be accepted throughout the 

public comment period. Comments may 

also be submitted by using the 

electronic comment form at: http:// 

www.sam.usace.army.mil/pa/acf-wcm/ 

form.htm. 

ADDRESSES: To facilitate the Master 

Water Control Manual update, a support 

contract has been awarded to Tetra 

Tech, Inc. for preparation of the EIS and 

additional scoping. Please mail written 

comments to Tetra Tech, Inc., 61 St. 

Joseph Street, Suite 550, Mobile, AL 

36602–3521. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Questions about the manual update or 

National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) process should be directed to: 

Mr. Brian Zettle, Biologist, Environment 

and Resources Branch, Planning and 

Environmental Division, U.S. Army 

Engineer District-Mobile, Post Office 

Box 2288, Mobile, AL 36628–0001; 

Telephone (251) 690–2115; or delivered 

by electronic facsimile at (251) 694– 

3815; or email: 

brian.a.zettle@usace.army.mil. You may 

also request to be included on the 

mailing list for public distribution of 

notices, meeting announcements and 

documents. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Corps 

is updating the water control plans and 

manuals for the ACF Basin in order to 

improve operations to reflect changed 

conditions since the manuals were last 

developed. As explained in a November 

2009 Federal Register Notice of Intent, 

74 FR 59965 (November 19, 2009), and 

in the March 2010 Updated Scoping 

Report, the Corps previously narrowed 

the scope of the EIS for the WCM update 

to exclude from consideration certain 

water supply operations at the Buford 

Dam/Lake Lanier project that would 

have violated a July 2009 district court 

order. In June 2011, the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated 

that 2009 district court order and 

directed the Corps to determine its legal 

authority to operate the Buford Dam/ 

Lake Lanier Project to accommodate 

water supply withdrawals. See In re TriState Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 

1160 (11th Cir. 2011). In compliance 

with the Eleventh Circuit’s order, the 

Chief Counsel issued a legal opinion on 

June 25, 2012 (available at http:// 

www.sam.usace.army.mil/ 

2012ACF_legalopinion.pdf), concluding 

that the Corps has the legal authority to 

accommodate both current and 

increased levels of water supply 

withdrawals from Lake Lanier and 

downstream at Atlanta. The Chief 

Counsel’s legal opinion does not dictate 

what operational decisions will be 

made, with regard to water supply or 

otherwise, but it does establish certain 

analytical principles that will be taken 

into account as the Corps makes its final 

operational decisions at the conclusion 

of the WCM update process. Such 

decisions will be made in light of all 

applicable authorities, and will be 

guided by the legal principles 

articulated in the Chief Counsel’s June 

25, 2012 opinion. 

In light of this legal opinion and the 

Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, it is 

appropriate for the Corps to consider a 

broader range of water supply 

alternatives, including both current 

levels of water supply withdrawals and 

increased withdrawals, from Lake 

Lanier and downstream at Atlanta, that 

have been determined to be within the 

Corps’ legal authority to implement. All 

other scoping aspects described in the 

March 2010 Updated Scoping Report 

remain the same. Information on the 

ACF River Basin and the Master Water 

Control Manual Update process will be 

posted on the Mobile District Web page 

as it becomes available: http:// 

www.sam.usace.army.mil. 

Steven J. Roemhildt, 

Colonel, Corps of Engineers, District 

Commander. 

[FR Doc. 2012–25202 Filed 10–11–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3720–58–P 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

SAFETY BOARD 

[Recommendation 2012–2] 

Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas 

Safety Strategy 

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board. 

ACTION: Notice, recommendation. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

2286a(a)(5), the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board has made a 

recommendation to the Secretary of 

Energy concerning the Hanford Tank 

Farms flammable gas safety strategy. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 198 / Friday, October 12, 2012 / Notices 62225 

DATES: Comments, data, views, or 

arguments concerning the 

recommendation are due on or before 

November 13, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments concerning 

this notice to: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue NW., 

Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2001. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Deborah H. Richardson or Andrew L. 

Thibadeau at the address above or 

telephone number (202) 694–7000. 

Dated: October 5, 2012. 

Jessie H. Roberson, 

Vice Chairman. 

RECOMMENDATION 2012–2 TO THE 

SECRETARY OF ENERGY 

Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas Safety 

Strategy 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a)(5) Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, As Amended 

Dated: September 28, 2012 

Background 

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (Board) believes that current 

operations at the Hanford Tank Farms require 

safety-significant active ventilation of 

double-shell tanks (DSTs) to ensure the 

removal of flammable gas from the tanks’ 

headspace. A significant flammable gas 

accident would have considerable 

radiological consequences, endanger 

personnel, contaminate portions of the Tank 

Farms, and seriously disrupt the waste 

cleanup mission. Further, the Board believes 

that actions are necessary to install real time 

monitoring to measure tank ventilation 

flowrates as well as upgrade other indication 

systems used to perform safety-related 

functions. 

On August 5, 2010, the Board sent a letter 

to the Department of Energy (DOE) outlining 

issues related to the safety strategy for 

flammable gas scenarios at the Hanford Tank 

Farms. In its letter, the Board identified that 

the safety analyses for accident scenarios 

used non-bounding values for (1) the 

radiological inventory of the tanks and (2) the 

amount of waste that could be released in a 

major accident. Notwithstanding these nonconservatisms, DOE’s safety analyses show 

that all of the DSTs generate flammable gas 

in sufficient quantities to reach the lower 

flammability limit (LFL) for hydrogen. 

Further, many of the tanks contain sufficient 

quantities of gas trapped in the waste such 

that the LFL could be exceeded if the gas 

were spontaneously released, which is 

possible under both normal operating and 

accident conditions. The current control 

strategy does not include any measures to 

periodically release the trapped gases in a 

controlled manner to preclude the 

accumulation of flammable concentrations. 

DOE’s safety analyses show that the 

potential flammable gas scenarios warrant a 

credited safety control due to the dose 

consequences to workers and the public. 

Accordingly, the ventilation systems for the 

DSTs were previously classified as safetysignificant and credited in the documented 

safety analysis for the Tank Farms to address 

flammable gas scenarios. The revision of the 

safety analysis approved by DOE on January 

21, 2010, and implemented on March 30, 

2010, reduced the DST ventilation systems 

from safety-significant to defense-in-depth 

and replaced them with a specific 

administrative control (SAC) for flammable 

gas monitoring. 

In its August letter, the Board noted that 

DOE’s SAC for flammable gas monitoring 

exhibited a number of weaknesses that 

collectively rendered it inadequate as a safety 

control. The reliance on an administrative 

control in lieu of an engineered feature is 

also contrary to DOE’s established hierarchy 

of controls as well as sound engineering 

practice. Further, the Board noted that a 

number of other installed systems that are (1) 

necessary to provide accurate and reliable 

indications of abnormal conditions 

associated with flammable gas events, and (2) 

serve as a direct input to determining 

whether an operator action is required were 

not appropriately classified in accordance 

with their safety function. 

In response to these issues, DOE, in a letter 

dated February 25, 2011, informed the Board 

that it had revised its decision to downgrade 

the DST ventilation systems and would take 

action to restore the systems to their former 

safety-significant status. Additionally, DOE 

indicated that the level indication systems 

for the DST annuli and the double contained 

receiver tank would be upgraded to safetysignificant. 

During the last year, the Board reviewed 

DOE’s progress in meeting these 

commitments and addressing the Board’s 

safety concerns. The Board noted that while 

some improvements had been made to the 

SAC used for flammable gas monitoring, it 

remained inadequate as a credited safety 

control. The SAC is less reliable than an 

engineered feature, remains susceptible to 

undetectable false low readings, and lacks 

independent verification. 

Although DOE maintains a commitment to 

upgrading the DST ventilation systems and 

other installed non-safety-related 

instrumentation used to perform safety 

functions, the Board has concluded that no 

progress has been made in these areas, and 

the schedule for upgrades continues to slip. 

The latest schedule, outlined in a letter to the 

Board dated April 2, 2012, reflects a 

commitment to completing the upgrades to 

three of the five DST ventilation systems by 

fiscal year 2014. During the Board’s June 

2012 review, DOE indicated that even this 

was no longer a realistic schedule. DOE’s 

current path forward is to upgrade only one 

of the DST ventilation systems (AY/AZ Tank 

Farm) by fiscal year 2015 to support mixer 

pump testing that is currently anticipated in 

2016. No near-term procurement or 

installation plans are in place for the four 

other DST ventilation systems. Similarly, no 

plans or activities are proposed to upgrade 

the installed non-safety instrumentation 

systems being used in safety-related 

applications (e.g., the level indication 

systems for the DST annuli and the double 

container receiver tank). 

Conclusions 

The Board believes that DOE needs to 

upgrade the DST ventilation systems and 

other instrumentation systems used for 

safety-related functions at the Hanford Tank 

Farms. Further, the continued reliance on an 

inadequate SAC for flammable gas control 

presents an unnecessary risk to safety. At this 

time, DOE does not have a means to provide 

alternate ventilation if the existing 

ventilation system becomes inoperable. The 

hazards posed by flammable gas releases in 

DSTs and the challenges they pose to any 

ventilation system are directly proportional 

to the volume of flammable gas retained 

within the DST wastes. Reducing the current 

inventories of flammable gases retained in 

the DST waste and keeping them small 

would reduce the future hazards posed by 

gas release events. 

Recommendation 

Accordingly, the Board recommends that 

DOE: 

1. Take near-term action to restore the 

classification of the DST ventilation systems 

to safety-significant. In the process, 

determine the necessary attributes of an 

adequate active ventilation system that can 

deliver the required flow rates within the 

time frame necessary to prevent and mitigate 

the site-specific flammable gas hazards at the 

Hanford Tank Farms. 

2. Take near-term action to install safetysignificant instrumentation for real-time 

monitoring of the ventilation exhaust flow 

from each DST. 

3. Take near-term action to upgrade the 

existing installed non-safety-related 

equipment that is being used to fulfill safety 

functions at the Hanford Tank Farms to an 

appropriate safety classification. This 

includes instrumentation and control 

equipment whose indications are necessary 

for operators to take action to accomplish 

necessary safety functions. 

4. Identify compensatory measures in case 

any existing DST ventilation systems become 

unavailable at the Hanford Tank Farms. 

5. Evaluate means to reduce the existing 

inventory of retained flammable gases in a 

controlled manner. Since these gases will 

continue to be generated until the tank 

contents are processed, evaluate methods to 

reduce the future retention of flammable 

gases in these tanks or to periodically mix 

them to prevent the future accumulation of 

flammable gas inventories that could cause 

the tank headspace to exceed the LFL if 

rapidly released. 

The Board urges the Secretary to avail 

himself of the authority under the Atomic 

Energy Act (42 U.S.C. § 2286d(e)) to 

‘‘implement any such recommendation (or 

part of any such recommendation) before, on, 

or after the date on which the Secretary 

transmits the implementation plan to the 

Board under this subsection.’’ 

Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D., 

Chairman. 

[FR Doc. 2012–25064 Filed 10–11–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3670–01–P 


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