In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 21, 2021

S21A0246. MONTANEZ v. THE STATE.

 BETHEL, Justice.

A Fulton County jury found Martin Montanez guilty of the 

murders of Byron Caceres and Eulalio Mederos-Vega and several

theft, firearm-possession, and drug-related offenses arising from the 

incident in which they were killed. On appeal, Montanez argues that

the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of due 

process to sustain his conviction as to one count of possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon under OCGA § 16-11-133 (b); that the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain any of his convictions because 

the testimony of his alleged accomplice was not corroborated, as 

required by Georgia law; and that his trial counsel provided 
2

constitutionally ineffective assistance. We affirm.1

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the 

 1 The crimes occurred on September 14, 2014. On December 19, 2014, a 

Fulton County grand jury returned a 21-count indictment charging Montanez 

with the malice murders of Caceres and Mederos-Vega (Counts 1 and 2), ten 

counts of felony murder (Counts 3 through 12), the armed robbery of Caceres 

and Mederos-Vega (Counts 13 and 14), the aggravated assault of Caceres and 

Mederos-Vega (Counts 15 and 16), conspiracy to possess methamphetamine 

(Count 17), burglary (Count 18), possession of a firearm during the commission 

of a felony (Count 19), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 20) 

and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon through use of a firearm (Count

21). A co-defendant, Zusi Aguirre, was also charged as to Counts 1 through 10 

and 13 through 19. Before trial, the State dismissed the burglary count and 

the two counts of felony murder predicated on burglary (Counts 9, 10, and 18)

as to Montanez. Aguirre pled guilty to aggravated assault, burglary, possession 

of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and conspiracy to possess 

methamphetamine and was sentenced to 15 years in prison and 20 years on

probation. Her case is not part of this appeal.

At a jury trial held from September 19 to 22, 2016, Montanez was found 

guilty on Counts 1 through 8, 11 through 13, 15 through 17, and 19 through 21

and not guilty on Count 14. On September 23, 2016, the trial court sentenced 

Montanez to life in prison without parole on both Counts 1 and 2, to be served 

concurrently, a term of 3 years in prison on Count 17 to be served concurrently 

with Counts 1 and 2, a term of 5 years in prison on Count 19 to be served 

consecutively to Counts 1 and 2, and a term of 15 years in prison on Count 21

to be served consecutively to Count 19. The remaining counts were either 

vacated by operation of law or merged. The State has not challenged 

Montanez’s sentences. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697-698 (808 SE2d 696)

(2017). On January 7, 2019, the trial court amended its sentencing order to 

merge both Counts 19 and 20 with Count 21.

Montanez filed a motion for new trial on October 6, 2016, which he 

amended on April 23, 2018. Following hearings on June 11 and June 19, 2018, 

the trial court denied the motion, as amended, on December 26, 2018.

Montanez filed a notice of appeal on January 16, 2019, which he amended on 

August 28, 2020. Montanez’s case was docketed to this Court’s term 

commencing in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
3

evidence presented at trial showed the following. In the early 

afternoon of September 14, 2014, Caceres drove to Diego Molina’s 

apartment so that the two could smoke marijuana and go to the 

mall. Molina knew that Caceres was in the business of selling 

methamphetamine, and after picking up Molina, Caceres received a 

call instructing him to come to an apartment in Chamblee. After 

driving to the apartment and going inside, Caceres returned to his 

car carrying a “heavy” black bag with two paper towels on top. 

Molina testified that Caceres did not tell him what was going on but 

that he “already had an idea.” After a phone call in which Caceres 

received directions from “his boss or something,” Caceres and

Molina drove to Mederos-Vega’s apartment complex in Sandy 

Springs. They arrived around 5:00 p.m., and Caceres went up to 

Mederos-Vega’s apartment with the black bag. Molina stayed in the 

car.

Mederos-Vega, Montanez, and his girlfriend, Zusi Aguirre, 

were inside the apartment. Aguirre testified to the following. She

drove Montanez to the apartment after Montanez received a phone 
4

call instructing him to go there. Montanez was carrying “his” gun at 

the time. Caceres came into the apartment carrying a black bag. He

then removed six plastic containers from the bag, each of which were 

full of methamphetamine. As Montanez, Mederos-Vega, and Caceres

were discussing a deal for the drugs, Montanez handed Aguirre a 

key and instructed her to go to his car to retrieve money from an 

envelope under his seat. She was confused by this request because 

she had the keys to the car, which was unlocked, and she did not 

think that he had any money in the car.

According to Aguirre, before walking into the apartment, 

Montanez instructed her to ask the men they were to meet whether 

the methamphetamine “was 36.” Aguirre testified that she did not 

understand what Montanez was asking her to do, that she never 

really became part of the conversation inside the apartment between 

Montanez, Mederos-Vega, and Caceres, and that she never asked 

any questions about the methamphetamine.

Aguirre went to the car and searched for the money Montanez 

described, but found nothing. She then saw Montanez walking 
5

toward her carrying the bag that Caceres had brought into the 

apartment. The bag had paper towels sticking out of the top.

Montanez seemed “hurried,” and he instructed her to get in the car 

and drive away. She then drove Montanez away from the apartment, 

drove onto Interstate 285, and then began driving north, eventually 

stopping near Helen. During their drive, she heard Montanez tell 

someone over a phone call that “it’s done.” Montanez then broke one 

of his cell phones and threw it out of the car window.2

After Caceres had been inside the apartment for about an hour, 

Molina became concerned because he knew Caceres was “working.” 

He then heard something that sounded like gunshots or fireworks 

coming from the apartment building. Molina answered several calls

placed to Caceres’s phone, which Caceres had left in the car with 

Molina. The caller was Caceres’s business associate, and he told 

Molina that he should leave.3 Molina then drove away in Caceres’s 

 2 Aguirre testified that Montanez had “multiple” cell phones and that he 

changed phones all the time. 3 The police never identified the individual (or individuals) Caceres and 

Molina spoke to on the phone. There was no subscriber information listed for 
6

car and went to the apartments where Caceres’s brother and 

girlfriend lived. Molina appeared to be nervous and scared, and he 

told Caceres’s brother and girlfriend that Caceres had gone into 

Mederos-Vega’s apartment but never came out.

Around 6:30 p.m., the police responded to a 911 call from 

Mederos-Vega’s wife reporting a shooting at their apartment. When 

the police arrived, they found Mederos-Vega and Caceres lying on 

the floor, having both suffered multiple gunshot wounds. Both were 

dead. The medical examiner later concluded that Mederos-Vega and 

Caceres both died from the gunshot wounds and that the manner of

their deaths was homicide.4

Aguirre testified that she and Montanez stayed in Helen only 

a short time and that she drove them back to her home in Mableton

that night. When they arrived, both Aguirre and Montanez 

 

the phone that called Caceres’s phone around the time of the shootings, and 

the police determined that it was likely a “burner” phone because service for 

the phone was only activated for one day and then terminated. The lead 

detective in the case testified that it is common for people engaged in criminal 

activity to use “burner” phones.

4 No methamphetamine was found in the apartment.
7

unpacked the methamphetamine from the bag. Montanez put most 

of it into a suitcase but gave some to Aguirre. The two then had an 

argument, and Aguirre demanded that Montanez leave. He did so

but later returned to their home and asked Aguirre to drive him 

across the Veterans Memorial Bridge, which spans the

Chattahoochee River. As they drove over the bridge, Montanez 

asked Aguirre to stop the car. Montanez then disassembled his 

silver 9mm handgun and threw the pieces into the river. Montanez 

later sent a text message to Aguirre warning her not to “f**k with 

the suitcase.”5

A few days later, Aguirre spoke with a friend who asked her if 

she had been involved in a double homicide that had been reported 

 5 This text message was sent from a number listed in Aguirre’s phone 

under the name “Jr Guzman.” That listing contained a picture of Montanez. 

Aguirre testified that this was a nickname she had given Montanez and that 

the number was for one of the phones Montanez used. Aguirre’s phone also had 

a listing for “Martin Montanez” with a different phone number. Records 

showed that, on September 17, after the murders, Aguirre sent a text message

to the number for “Jr Guzman” that began “Martin thank you so much . . .” and 

appearing to address “Martin” as the recipient. In later messages, the recipient 

responded to Aguirre, thus appearing to accept the name “Martin.” The police 

were unable to locate subscriber information for the number associated with 

“Jr Guzman” in Aguirre’s phone.
8

in the local news. Aguirre recognized the apartment shown in the 

news story and became emotional. She decided to leave the Atlanta 

area and drive to see her father in Pensacola, Florida.

The next day, the police arrested Aguirre in Alabama after 

stopping her for speeding and discovering that she had two 

handguns and methamphetamine in the car. She told the police that 

she had been speeding because she felt threatened because she knew 

about “a murder in Atlanta.” Aguirre told the police that she and 

Montanez had been in a romantic relationship and that she 

regularly saw Montanez carry a silver semiautomatic 9mm 

handgun. The State introduced photographs taken with Aguirre’s 

phone of Montanez on the day before the shootings showing him 

holding a silver handgun.6

On September 24, based on information from Aguirre, a police 

 6 The lead detective in the case characterized the gun Montanez could be 

seen holding in the photographs as “uncommon,” noting that the slide was 

shaped in a way that exposed the barrel. The detective said this design was 

“more unique and noticeable” than other common types of handguns. The 

detective stated that the upper piece of the firearm recovered from the river

had a similar shape and design. The firearms examiner also noted several 

design consistencies between the gun Montanez can be seen holding in the 

photographs and a Taurus 9mm pistol, including the “open slide” design.
9

dive team found the slide and lower grip of a silver Taurus 

semiautomatic 9mm handgun from the Chattahoochee River near 

the Veterans Memorial Bridge. A member of the dive team testified 

that based on the lack of corrosion and algae on the slide and grip, 

he estimated that those pieces had been in the water for only a few

days. Two weeks later, a second dive team searched the same 

location and found a lower receiver from a silver Taurus 9mm 

handgun. It matched the slide recovered in the earlier search. The 

police recovered eight 9mm shell casings and a number of 9mm 

bullets and bullet fragments from the crime scene and Caceres’s 

body. The State presented evidence that the shell casings had been 

fired from the gun recovered from the river and that all of the bullets 

recovered from the crime scene had been fired from the same 

firearm, which was consistent with a Taurus 9mm handgun.7

 7 The firearms examiner testified that she could determine that the 

cartridges recovered from the crime scene had been fired from the gun to which 

the slide was attached due to microscopic markings on the cartridges that were 

caused by contact with the slide. The firearms examiner was not able to 

determine whether the gun to which the slide had been attached fired the 

bullets that were recovered because no barrel had been recovered. However, 

microscopic examination of the bullets revealed that they had all been fired by 

the same gun, which was consistent with a Taurus 9mm pistol.
10

In November 2015, the police responded to a 911 call reporting 

a domestic disturbance involving Montanez, who had not yet been 

apprehended. Montanez fled from the scene but was apprehended 

based on a tip from the woman who placed the call. When Montanez

was found, his hair and beard were longer than they had been in 

2014, and he provided an alias to law enforcement. He was driving 

a vehicle with a Kansas license plate. The State introduced evidence 

that Montanez had previously been convicted of theft by receiving a 

stolen firearm, a felony.

(a) Montanez argues that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his 

conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation 

of OCGA § 16-11-133 (b). We disagree.

When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, this Court views 

the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the 

verdicts and asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) 
11

(1979). To prove a violation of OCGA § 16-11-133 (b), the State must 

present evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm in the 

commission of certain felonies after previously having been 

convicted of one of nine enumerated felonies or “any felony involving 

the use or possession of a firearm.” OCGA § 16-11-133 (b).8 Count 21 

of the indictment alleged that Montanez was in possession of a 

firearm, “having been previously convicted of a felony involving the

 8 OCGA § 16-11-133 (b) provides:

Any person who has previously been convicted of or who has 

previously entered a guilty plea to the offense of murder, murder 

in the second degree, armed robbery, home invasion in any degree, 

kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated 

sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, or any felony involving the use 

or possession of a firearm and who shall have on or within arm’s 

reach of his or her person a firearm during the commission of, or 

the attempt to commit:

(1) Any crime against or involving the person of another;

(2) The unlawful entry into a building or vehicle;

(3) A theft from a building or theft of a vehicle;

(4) Any crime involving the possession, manufacture, delivery, 

distribution, dispensing, administering, selling, or possession with 

intent to distribute any controlled substance as provided in Code 

Section 16-13-30; or

(5) Any crime involving the trafficking of cocaine, marijuana, or 

illegal drugs as provided in Code Section 16-13-31,

and which crime is a felony, commits a felony and, upon conviction 

thereof, shall be punished by confinement for a period of 15 years, 

such sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence which the 

person has received.
12

possession or use of a firearm[.]”

At trial, the State introduced its Exhibit 69, which was a copy 

of a sentencing order showing that Montanez had previously pled 

guilty to theft by receiving stolen property (a firearm), a felony, in 

September 2013.9 The State therefore presented evidence that 

Montanez had previously been convicted of a felony involving the 

use or possession of a firearm. Compare Brooks v. State, 309 Ga. 630, 

631-633 (1) (a) (847 SE2d 555) (2020) (holding that evidence was 

insufficient where evidence of the prior offense did not suggest that 

the offense had been committed with the use or possession of a 

firearm and the offense could be committed without the use or 

possession of a firearm). The State also presented evidence that 

Montanez then possessed a firearm during the commission of 

several crimes, including the murders of Caceres and Mederos-Vega. 

Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain 

 9 Although this exhibit in the original trial record transmitted to this 

Court was incomplete, the exhibit was supplemented and reflects Montanez’s 

prior indictments and sentencing in full.
13

Montanez’s conviction for violating OCGA § 16-11-133 (b).10

(b) Montanez also argues that the evidence presented against 

him was insufficient under Georgia law as to all of his convictions

because Aguirre’s testimony was not sufficiently corroborated, as 

required by OCGA § 24-14-8. We disagree.

Under Georgia law, “[t]he testimony of a single witness is 

generally sufficient to establish a fact.” OCGA § 24-14-8. However,

in felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice to the crimes, 

that witness’s testimony alone is insufficient to support a 

defendant’s convictions. See id. When “evidence presented at trial

could support a finding that a witness acted as an accomplice, it is 

for the jury to determine whether the witness acted in such a 

capacity.” Doyle v. State, 307 Ga. 609, 612 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 833)

(2020). However, the evidence may also authorize a properly 

 10 Montanez does not argue that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to sustain his other 

convictions. Thus, we limit our review under Jackson v. Virginia to the 

evidence presented as to Count 21. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 391-

392 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (for non-death-penalty cases docketed to the 

December 2020 term and thereafter, the Court will no longer routinely review 

the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial sua sponte).
14

instructed jury to find that a witness was not an accomplice, and in 

that case, the testimony of that witness is sufficient to convict the 

defendant. See State v. Grier, 309 Ga. 452, 456 (2) (847 SE2d 313) 

(2020).

Although OCGA § 24-14-8 provides that corroboration is 

required to support a guilty verdict in felony cases where 

the only witness is an accomplice, only slight evidence of 

corroboration is required. The necessary corroboration 

may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence, and 

evidence of the defendant’s conduct before and after the 

crime was committed may give rise to an inference that 

he participated in the crime. The evidence need not be 

sufficient in and of itself to warrant a conviction, so long 

as it is independent of the accomplice’s testimony and 

directly connects the defendant to the crime or leads to 

the inference of guilt. The sufficiency of the corroboration 

is a matter for the jury to decide.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582, 

588 (2) (820 SE2d 679) (2018).

[T]he independent evidence must corroborate both the 

identity of the defendant and the fact of his participation 

in the crime. In other words, corroboration of only the 

chronology and details of the crimes is not sufficient, and 

there must be some independent evidence tending to show 

that the defendant himself was a participant in the 

crimes.

(Citation omitted.) Pittman v. State, 300 Ga. 894, 896 (1) (799 SE2d 
15

215) (2017) (setting forth corroboration requirement under former 

OCGA § 24-4-8); see also Ramirez v. State, 294 Ga. 440, 442 n.5 (754 

SE2d 325) (2014) (noting that the provisions of former OCGA § 24-

4-8 were carried forward into the current Evidence Code as OCGA § 

24-14-8).11

Here, the jury was properly instructed on the requirement for 

corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony, and there was some

evidence, including Aguirre’s own testimony and her guilty plea to a 

number of offenses with which she had been jointly charged with 

Montanez, from which the jury could have determined that Aguirre 

was an accomplice to each of the crimes of which Montanez was 

convicted. Likewise, there was evidence from which the jury might 

have found Aguirre not to be an accomplice for one or more of the 

 11 Because courts generally defer to the jury’s assessment of the evidence 

against a defendant, appellate litigation regarding the requirements of OCGA 

§ 24-14-8 often revolves around whether the jury was properly instructed 

regarding the accomplice-corroboration requirement. In the absence of an 

instruction indicating to the jurors that there must be corroborating evidence 

before they can consider the testimony of a witness they find to be an 

accomplice, this Court has sometimes identified reversible error where there 

was evidence that a witness was an accomplice to the crime and that witness 

provided testimony directly linking the defendant to the crime. See, e.g., Doyle, 

307 Ga. at 613 (2).
16

offenses. However, even assuming the jury found that Aguirre was 

Montanez’s accomplice with respect to all counts, there was at least 

slight evidence that corroborated her testimony about Montanez’s 

participation in the crimes.

The State presented evidence that Caceres and Mederos-Vega 

were shot several times with 9mm bullets and that those bullets 

were fired from the same 9mm firearm. The State also presented 

evidence that 9mm shell casings recovered from the scene of the 

shootings had all been fired from a silver Taurus 9mm 

semiautomatic pistol, three pieces of which were recovered from the 

Chattahoochee River a few days after the shootings near where 

Aguirre testified Montanez had thrown pieces of his gun after the 

shootings. The bullets, shell casings, and pieces of the gun were all 

entered into evidence, and the State presented extensive testimony 

from law enforcement officials about those items.

The State also entered into evidence several photographs taken 

the day before the shootings showing Montanez and Aguirre 

together, with Montanez holding a silver handgun. The State 
17

presented testimony from the firearms examiner and the lead 

detective in the case that the gun Montanez could be seen holding 

had numerous design similarities to the pieces of the Taurus 9mm 

handgun recovered in the river.

From this evidence, the jury was authorized to determine that, 

on the day before the shootings, Montanez was in possession of the 

weapon used to kill Caceres and Mederos-Vega. Standing alone, 

such circumstantial evidence was likely insufficient to warrant 

Montanez’s convictions under Jackson v. Virginia. However, that 

evidence, independent of Aguirre’s testimony, authorized the jury to 

determine that Montanez was in possession of the murder weapon

on the day before the murders and provided at least slight 

corroboration of Aguirre’s testimony connecting Montanez to the 

firearm used in the shootings. See Raines, 304 Ga. at 588 (2) (noting 

that the corroborating evidence need not be sufficient on its own to 

warrant a conviction); see also Lanier v. State, 310 Ga. 520 (852 

SE2d 509, 513 (2) (a)) (2020) (finding slight corroboration of 

accomplice’s testimony where the police connected firearms to the 
18

defendant based on fired shell casings found at the crime scene);

Baines v. State, 276 Ga. 117, 119 (1) (575 SE2d 495) (2003) 

(determining that, among other independent evidence, evidence that 

the murder weapon was found in the location described by the 

accomplice corroborated the accomplice’s testimony)

There was also at least slight corroboration of Aguirre’s 

account in regard to the alleged conspiracy to possess 

methamphetamine. Molina and Caceres were friends, and Molina 

knew Caceres was involved in selling methamphetamine. On the 

day of the crimes, Molina was with Caceres when Caceres received 

a call from a person Molina believed to be his “boss,” directing him 

to make a pickup in Chamblee. After driving to an apartment in 

Chamblee, Caceres went inside and came back to his car a few 

minutes later with a “heavy” black bag with paper towels on top. 

Caceres placed the bag in his car, and he and Molina drove to an 

apartment complex in Sandy Springs. Caceres took the bag and 

went into the apartment. Although Molina never testified that he 

saw methamphetamine in the bag, he testified that he knew Caceres 
19

was “working” and became concerned when he did not return from 

the apartment. He later answered a call to Caceres’s phone from 

someone he knew to be a business associate of Caceres instructing 

him to leave the area. No subscriber information was ever found for 

the phone that placed the call, and the police determined that it 

likely came from a “burner” phone. Testimony also established that

“burner” phones are commonly used in criminal activity. 

Moreover, after the incident, Aguirre received a text message 

she testified came from Montanez instructing her not to “f**k with 

the suitcase,” which she said contained some of the 

methamphetamine Montanez took from Caceres and Mederos-Vega 

in the apartment. The text message came from a number listed in 

Aguirre’s phone as “Jr Guzman,” but Aguirre testified that it was 

actually a number for Montanez. No subscriber information was 

ever located for the phone associated with “Jr Guzman,” but on at 

least one occasion after the incident, Aguirre sent a text message to 

that number in which she appeared to address the recipient as 

“Martin.” The recipient responded to that message, thus appearing 
20

to accept the name “Martin.” Those text messages provided slight 

corroboration of Aguirre’s testimony that Montanez was the 

recipient. The jury was thus authorized to find at least slight 

corroboration of Aguirre’s testimony that she communicated with 

Montanez about methamphetamine after the incident. See 

Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 471 (2) (837 SE2d 362) (2019) (text 

communications between the defendant and his accomplice after the 

crimes corroborated the accomplice’s testimony); see also Edwards 

v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 23 (1) (785 SE2d 869) (2016) (finding at least 

slight corroboration of accomplice’s testimony where defendant 

referenced stolen property during a recorded phone call between 

defendant and his accomplice after the crimes); Crawford v. State, 

294 Ga. 898, 901-902 (1) (757 SE2d 102) (2014) (determining that 

accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated where cell 

phone records showed that defendant’s cell phone had 

communicated with accomplice’s cell phone around the time of the 

crimes even though the records did not reveal the contents of the 

conversations or establish that the defendant participated in the 
21

calls). Thus, in conjunction with Molina’s testimony about Caceres’s 

involvement in the methamphetamine business and events leading

up to the incident in Mederos-Vega’s apartment, including his 

description of the black bag with the paper towels sticking out of the 

top that Caceres was carrying, the jury heard at least slight 

corroboration of Aguirre’s testimony regarding the alleged 

methamphetamine conspiracy and Montanez’s participation in it. 

Accordingly, evidence independent of Aguirre’s testimony 

provided the slight corroboration of Aguirre’s account of Montanez’s 

identity and participation in the crimes necessary to sustain his 

convictions under OCGA § 24-14-8. See Nicholson, 307 Ga. at 471 

(2); Lanier, 852 SE2d at 513 (2) (a); Edwards, 299 Ga. at 23 (1);

Baines, 276 Ga. at 119 (1). Compare Taylor v. State, 297 Ga. 132, 

135 (2) (772 SE2d 630) (2015) (reversing murder conviction where 

accomplice’s testimony regarding defendant’s participation in the 

crimes was corroborated only by testimony that defendant was seen 

with other accomplices on the evening after the murder); Gilmore v. 

State, 315 Ga. App. 85, 87-92 (1) (726 SE2d 584) (2012) (reversing 
22

conviction where the only evidence against the defendant other than 

the testimony of the accomplice showed that the defendant had been 

with the accomplice the night the crimes were committed and that 

the defendant had a prior encounter with one of the victims). This 

enumeration of error therefore fails.

2. Montanez also argues that his trial counsel provided 

constitutionally ineffective assistance by not cross-examining 

Aguirre as to whether she would be eligible for parole as part of her 

plea bargain. To prevail on this claim, Montanez

has the burden of proving both that the performance of 

his lawyer was professionally deficient and that he was

prejudiced as a result. To prove deficient performance, 

[Montanez] must show that his trial counsel acted or 

failed to act in an objectively unreasonable way, 

considering all of the circumstances and in light of 

prevailing professional norms. To prove resulting 

prejudice, [Montanez] must show a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial 

would have been different. In examining an 

ineffectiveness claim, a court need not address both 

components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an 

insufficient showing on one.

(Punctuation omitted.) Stuckey v. State, 301 Ga. 767, 771 (2) (804 

SE2d 76) (2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 
23

(III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). “A strong presumption 

exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of 

professional conduct.” (Citation omitted.) Ford v. State, 298 Ga. 560, 

566 (8) (783 SE2d 906) (2016).

The jury was first made aware that Aguirre had accepted a plea 

bargain and would be testifying for the State in the prosecutor’s 

opening statement. On direct examination, Aguirre then testified 

that she had initially been charged with Montanez for the murders 

but pled guilty to aggravated assault, burglary, possession of a 

weapon during the commission of a felony, and conspiracy to possess 

methamphetamine, for which she had been sentenced to serve 15 

years in prison and 20 years on probation. Aguirre testified that she 

agreed to testify in Montanez’s trial as part of her plea agreement. 

The prosecutor then referred to Aguirre’s plea and sentence in his 

closing statement.

In both his opening statement and closing argument, 

Montanez’s lead trial counsel discussed the nature of the charges 

that Aguirre had pled guilty to as well as the sentences she was to 
24

receive. In his opening statement, Montanez’s lead counsel 

specifically noted that Aguirre had been indicted for the murders of 

Caceres and Mederos-Vega, that she initially faced two life 

sentences on those charges, and that she ultimately accepted a deal 

in which she would serve only 15 years in prison, noting that Aguirre 

received “a great deal, a huge deal.” Counsel also extensively crossexamined Aguirre as to the details of her trial testimony, how it 

varied from statements she initially gave to the police, the fact that 

she was under the influence of methamphetamine during the 

incident, and the terms of her plea agreement with the State. 

Counsel also explored inconsistencies in Aguirre’s statements 

during his cross-examination of the lead detective in the case. 

Finally, in his closing argument, counsel referred to inconsistencies 

in Aguirre’s testimony and argued that Aguirre had agreed to testify

“to avoid a harsher sentence.” Counsel went on to note that, “That’s 

her motivation. That’s why her story is so nice and clean[.]”

At the hearing on Montanez’s motion for new trial, his lead 

counsel, who had practiced criminal law for 18 years, testified that 
25

in his experience, he had never seen a defense attorney bring up 

parole guidelines when impeaching a prosecution witness. Counsel 

testified that he did not feel the need to go further into the sentence 

Aguirre received because the jury already knew that information.

Montanez has not carried his burden of establishing that his 

trial counsel performed deficiently by not inquiring about the 

possibility that Aguirre would be eligible for parole at some point 

during her sentence. Counsel clearly made efforts to attack Aguirre’s 

credibility through his cross-examination of her and the lead 

detective as to the terms of her plea agreement, her motivation for 

testifying, and the inconsistencies between her trial testimony and 

various statements she made to the police after her arrest. As noted 

above, Montanez’s counsel also used his opening statement and 

closing argument to attack Aguirre’s credibility, highlighting those

inconsistencies in her testimony and noting multiple times that her 

testimony was given in exchange for a significantly lesser sentence 

than she had initially faced.

Although counsel could likely have inquired further into the 
26

details of Aguirre’s sentence and the possibility that she might be 

eligible for parole, see Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 339-344 (2) (698 

SE2d 301) (2010), counsel did not perform deficiently by not doing 

so. See Daugherty v. State, 291 Ga. App. 541, 544 (3) (a) (662 SE2d 

318) (2008) (no deficient performance where trial counsel elicited 

testimony about witness’s plea agreement and sentence but did not 

impeach witness with his eligibility for parole and probation). As we 

have explained, 

[d]ecisions about what questions to ask on crossexamination are quintessential trial strategy and will 

rarely constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. In 

particular, whether to impeach prosecution witnesses and 

how to do so are tactical decisions.

(Citation omitted.) Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 24 (2) (785 SE2d 

869) (2016). Moreover, 

[a]lthough an attorney is permitted to thoroughly 

question a testifying co-defendant regarding the details of 

any plea agreement, it does not necessarily follow that 

counsel is ineffective for failing to elicit all details of the 

agreement. As trial counsel obtained testimony from 

[Aguirre] that [she] had substantial motivation to testify 

against [Montanez], we cannot say that [counsel’s] failure 

to ask about specific effects of the plea deal was patently 

unreasonable.
27

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 24-25 (2); see also Romer 

v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3) (745 SE2d 637) (2013) (strategic and 

tactical decisions, like those about the extent of cross-examination, 

“will not form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

unless it was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney 

would have chosen it” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Because 

Montanez has failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient, this claim of ineffective assistance fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.