[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10654

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

OLEN FAISON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02901-SPF

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10654

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Olen Faison appeals the district court’s order affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. He argues that 

the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in assessing his residual 

functional capacity by not relying on uncontroverted medical opinion evidence. After careful review, we affirm.

I.

Faison applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits with the Social Security Administration, alleging that 

he was disabled due to various impairments.1 An ALJ held multiple 

evidentiary hearings on Faison’s application for benefits.2 The record before the ALJ showed that Faison was a Navy veteran who 

had previously worked for the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(“VA”) at a VA hospital as a purchasing agent. Faison testified that 

he was no longer able to work due to a variety of impairments, 

1 Because we write for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the underlying record and include only what is necessary to resolve this appeal. 

2 After the first two hearings, the ALJ found that Faison was not disabled and 

denied his application for benefits. Faison sought review of that decision in the 

district court, which reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for 

further proceedings. See Faison v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:19-cv-1959, 2020 

WL 13401909, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2020). Upon remand, the ALJ held a 

third evidentiary hearing.

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23-10654 Opinion of the Court 3

including post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and anxiety. Faison reported that due to these conditions, he had problems following instructions, had difficulty managing stress, had panic attacks 

around crowds, and found it hard to learn a new routine. 

The evidence before the ALJ included Faison’s medical records. The ALJ also reviewed VA determinations that Faison was 

disabled. In 2010, the VA determined that Faison had a service-connected disability rating of 100%, 70% of which was assessed for 

“[r]ecurrent major depressive disorder without psychotic features; 

post traumatic stress disorder; panic disorder; and intermittent explosive disorder.” Doc. 8-7 at 2.3 In a later review in 2016, the VA 

again concluded that he had a service-connected disability rating of 

100%, this time with 70% assessed for panic disorder.

The record before the ALJ also included evidence about a 

2015 incident when Faison was seeking care at a VA clinic. A health 

care worker reported that Faison had made a statement reflecting 

suicidal ideation. As a result, Faison was involuntarily committed

overnight. Both at the time of his commitment and before the ALJ, 

Faison denied making any statement reflecting suicidal ideation or 

that he would hurt himself.

After reviewing the entire record, the ALJ issued a decision 

concluding Faison was not disabled. The ALJ used the five-step sequential evaluation framework to evaluate whether Faison was 

3 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

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disabled. At the first step, she found that Faison had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period. 

At the second step, the ALJ found that Faison suffered from 

the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the 

lumbar spine, osteoarthritis of the wrists and knees, and obesity. 

She acknowledged that Faison also had been diagnosed with depression and anxiety but concluded that these mental impairments 

were not severe because they “did not cause more than minimal 

limitation in [Faison’s] ability to perform basic mental work activities.” Doc. 8-18 at 15. The ALJ explained that treatment notes 

showed that for his mental health conditions, Faison received “only 

conservative treatment, which appear[ed] to have been successful.” Id. at 16. 

At the third step, the ALJ determined that Faison did not 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 

medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment. 

The ALJ then assessed Faison’s residual functional capacity. 

She concluded that Faison could engage in light work with certain

exertional limitations. But she determined that Faison’s mental impairments “cause[d] . . . no more than minimal limitations in his 

ability to perform basic work activities.” Id. at 25. In reaching this 

conclusion, the ALJ found that Faison’s “statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects of [his] symptoms 

[were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 

evidence in the record.” Id. at 24.

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The ALJ acknowledged that State agency psychological consultants had opined that Faison’s anxiety disorder caused moderate 

limitations in several areas, including interacting with others; maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace; following instructions; responding to criticism; and responding appropriately to 

changes in a work setting. But the ALJ assigned these opinions “little weight” because they were inconsistent with Faison’s medical 

records from during the period, which showed that he had “no 

more than mild symptoms and limitations.” Id. at 18. 

The ALJ also acknowledged that the VA had assigned Faison 

a 70% disability rating for his mental impairments. But the ALJ 

found that this rating was of “little probative value” because “substantial evidence of record . . . support[ed] a departure from the 

VA’s decision.” Id. at 25. 

Based on the residual functional capacity assessment, the 

ALJ concluded at step four that Faison was able to perform his past 

relevant work as an order clerk. The ALJ thus determined that Faison was not disabled during the relevant time period. 

Faison sought review from the Appeals Council, arguing 

that the ALJ “erred in the evaluation of [his] mental impairments.” 

Id. at 2. The Appeals Council disagreed, concluding that the “evidence [did] not . . . indicate” that Faison had “more than a minimal 

limitation in [his] ability to do basic work activities.” Id. at 3. Because the ALJ’s decision was “consistent with [the] applicable laws, 

regulations, and Social Security Rulings,” the Appeals Council declined to assume jurisdiction. Id.

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Faison then filed an action in district court alleging that the 

Commissioner improperly denied him benefits. Before the district 

court, Faison raised just one issue: “Whether the ALJ erred by substituting her opinion for the medical opinion evidence of record.” 

Doc. 18 at 5. 

The district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, 

concluding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s assessment of Faison’s residual functional capacity, including her decision to include no limitations related to Faison’s mental impairments. This is Faison’s appeal. 

II.

We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine 

whether it is supported by substantial evidence, but we review de 

novo the legal principles upon which the decision is based. Moore v. 

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence 

refers to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Our limited review 

precludes us from “deciding the facts anew, making credibility determinations, or re-weighing the evidence.” Id. “Even if we find 

that the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision, we must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial 

evidence.” Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991).

III.

A disabled individual may be eligible for disability insurance 

benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). To be eligible, a claimant must 

prove that he became disabled on or before the date for which he 

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was last insured. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. Because Faison’s last 

insured date was December 31, 2018, he had to show a disability 

on or before that date.

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ applies 

a five-step sequential evaluation process. The ALJ asks whether the 

claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and medically determinable impairment or combination of 

impairments; (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the criteria of a listing; (4) can perform his past 

relevant work in light of hisresidual functional capacity; and (5) can 

adjust to other work in light of his residual functional capacity, age, 

education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

In this case, we are concerned with the ALJ’s assessment of 

Faison’s residual functional capacity. Faison argues that the ALJ 

erred “by substituting her opinion for uncontroverted medical 

opinion evidence.” Appellant’s Br. 3. He says that the uncontroverted medical opinion evidence showed that his PTSD and anxiety caused at least moderate limitations in concentration; ability to 

interact with others; and ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace.4

4 Faison raises several other arguments for the first time on appeal, including 

that the ALJ erred by (1) finding that he had mild limitations in his ability to 

concentrate and engage in social functioning yet adopting a residual functional 

capacity assessment that included no corresponding limitations, and (2) concluding that he could perform his past work given his limitations in interacting

with others. We will not consider these issues because Faison raises them for 

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But the ALJ’s decision reflects that she considered these

opinions and ultimately concluded that they were entitled to little 

weight because they were inconsistent with Faison’s medical records, which showed milder limitations. Substantial evidence supports this determination. The record reflects that Faison received 

conservative treatment for his mental impairments and at times reported experiencing no anxiety, no depression, and no decreased 

functioning. In addition, his medical providers assigned GAF scores 

that showed only mild mental health limitations.5 And during the 

relevant period a VA examiner determined that Faison’s symptoms 

did not satisfy the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. As a result, we cannot say that the ALJ erred when she gave the opinion evidence little 

weight and concluded that Faison’s mental health impairments 

the first time on appeal. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871–72 (11th 

Cir. 2022) (en banc).

5 The GAF is a numeric scale used to rate an individual’s overall level of functioning. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 

of Mental Disorders 32–33 (4th ed. 2000). The DSM later abandoned the use 

of GAF scoring, noting “its conceptual lack of clarity” and “questionable psychometrics in routine practice.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic 

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 16 (5th ed. 2013) (“DSM-V”). After 

the DSM-V was published, the Social Security Administration issued a directive to ALJs instructing them to consider GAF scores as medical opinion 

evidence but emphasizing that they should not be considered in isolation because a GAF score is a snapshot about a person’s level of functioning. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., Administrative Message 13066 (July 22, 2013).

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caused no more than minimal limitations.6 In reaching this result, 

we emphasize that given our deferential standard of review, “we 

must affirm if the [ALJ’s] decision is supported by substantial evidence” and are not addressing whether we would have reached a 

different result in weighing the conflicting evidence. See Barnes, 

932 F.2d at 1358.

Faison also argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his residual 

functional capacity because her decision conflicted with the VA’s

disability ratings. But the decision of another governmental 

agency, based on the rules of that agency, does not bind an ALJ 

considering whether the claimant was disabled for purposes of Social Security benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (2016) (“A decision 

by . . . any other governmental agency about whether you are disabled . . . is based on its rules and is not our decision . . . [and] is not 

binding on us.”). We have held that an ALJ is not required to follow 

a VA decision finding a claimant disabled so long as the “ALJ’s decision shows that she considered the other agency’s decision” and 

“substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s decision to 

depart from the other agency’s decision.” Noble v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 963 F.3d 1317, 1330 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, the ALJ gave adequate consideration to the VA’s disability determinations. The 

6 Faison also suggests that the ALJ erred because she failed “to explicitly consider [his] mental impairments when assessing” his residual functional capacity. Appellant’s Br. 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree. The 

ALJ’s decision reflects that she did consider Faison’s mental impairments when 

assessing his residual functional capacity and concluded that the impairments

“cause[d] no more than minimal limitations.” Doc. 8-18 at 25. 

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ALJ’s decision showed that she considered the VA decisions. And 

for the reasons given above, we conclude that substantial evidence

supported the ALJ’s decision to depart from the VA’s ratings when 

assessing Faison’s limitations. 

Accordingly, we affirm the Commissioner’s decision.

AFFIRMED.

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