18-3336 Mastromonaco v. County of Westchester, et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32 .1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRON IC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated Term of the Unite d States Court of Appeals for th e Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the
9 th day of October, two thousand nineteen.

Present: GUIDO CALABRESI, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges

.

_____________________________________________________

DEREK MASTROMONACO,

Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v. 18-3336-cv

COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, TIMOTHY JOYCE, INDIVIDUALLY, GEORGE WINSMAN, INDIVIDUALLY, ROBERT PA VONE, INDIVIDUALLY, JOHN DOE NO. 1, JOHN DOE NO. 2., JOHN DOE NO. 3, NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS, INTENDED TO BE
POLICE OFFICERS OF THE WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, INDIVIDUALLY,

Defendants-Appellees

. 1

_____________________________________________________
Appearing for Appellant: William Martin, Ma rtin + Colin, P.C., White Plains, N.Y.

Appearing for Appellee: John M. Nonna, Westc hester County Attorney (David H. Chen, Westchester County Attorney’s Office, on the brief ), White Plains,
N.Y.

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the of ficial caption to conform with the caption above.2 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Briccetti,
J. ).

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of said Dist rict Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED

.

Appellant Derek Mastromonaco appeals from the October 4, 2018 de cision and order of
the United States District Court for the S outhern District of New York (Briccetti, J. ) dismissing Mastromonaco’s Section 1983 action and grantin g Defendants-Appellees summary judgment on
Mastromonaco’s claims of an un lawful stop, false arrest, unlawf ul search, unlawful detention and confinement, excessive bail, unlawful imprisonment, malici ous prosecution, and Monell claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underl ying facts, procedural history, and specification
of issues for review.

We review de novo a district cour t’s grant of summary judgment. See, e.g.

, Jova v. Smith

, 582 F.3d 410, 414 (2d Cir. 2009). To be entitled to su mmary judgment, “the movant [must] show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) . A “dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’. . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could re turn a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “In dete rmining whether there are ge nuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve al l ambiguities and draw al l permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Johnson v. Killian , 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotati on marks and citation omitted).

I. Unlawful Stop

Mastromonaco’s first argumen t is that he was unlawfull y stopped. “[A]n officer may,
consistent with the Fourth Ame ndment, conduct a brief, investigat ory stop when th e officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion th at criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). This standa rd is met where an officer can “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warr ant [the] intrusion.” Terry , 392 U.S. at 21; see also United States v. Bailey

, 743 F.3d 322, 332 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The circ umstances necessary to justify a Terry stop are a reasonable basis to think that the person to be detained is commit ting or has committed a criminal offense.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “When evaluating the reasonableness
of a Terry stop, the reviewing court must consider th e totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop . . . through the eyes of a reasonable and cau tious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” United States v. Bayless , 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

We agree with the district court that Sergeant Pavone ha d “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that Mastromonaco was engaged in criminal activity when he stopped Mastromonaco in a school parking lot. Sergean t Pavone testified that the park ing lot was an area known for criminal activity, that it was ev ening after the school day had c oncluded, and that Mastromonaco’s
car was secluded and at a considerable distance away from any other campus activities. He also3 stated that Mastromonaco and hi s companion were reluctant to make eye contact with him as he drove past in a marked police ca r and attempted to drive away abruptly in the middle of the
conversation. The record contradi cts Mastromonaco’s contention that any of these facts were in dispute.

We agree with the district court that these facts are sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See Wardlow , 528 U.S. at 124 (“Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasona ble suspicion. . . . Headlong flight—wherever
it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”); id. at 123 (“the fact that the stop occurred in ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contex tual considerations in a Terry analysis” (citation omitted)).

II. False Arrest and Unlawful Search

Mastromonaco’s second argument is that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him, search his car, and conduct a pat-down search of his person. “Probabl e cause is a complete
defense to a constitutional claim of false arrest.” Betts v. Shearman , 751 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)). “Probable cause to arrest exis ts when the officers have knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances th at are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in th e belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Zellner v. Summerlin , 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir. 20 07). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the re asonable conclusion to be draw n from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford , 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004).

We find that Mastromonaco’s cl aims of false arrest and unlaw ful search are meritless for substantially the same reasons gi ven by the district court in its thorough analysis. Mastromonaco’s contention that Sergeant Pavone simply fabricated the smell of marijuana is wholly unsupported by the record. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. , 542 F.3d 290, 310 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A party opposing summary j udgment does not show the exis tence of a genuine issue of fact to be tried merely by maki ng assertions that ar e conclusory, or based on speculation.” (internal citations omitted)). We agree with the district cour t that the smell of marijuana in Mastromonaco’s
car and Mastromonaco’s erratic be havior in suddenly driving away was, at a minimum, enough to establish arguable probable cause to arrest Mastromonaco.

III. Unlawful Detention

Mastromonaco also argues that he was unlaw fully detained because he was not arraigned
within 48 hours of his arrest. We disagree. As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment requires that judicial determinations of probable cause be made within 48 hours of arrest. See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin , 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).

The record clearly demonstrates, however, th at Mastromonaco was in fact arraigned at
Westchester Medical Center w ithin 48 hours of his arrest. See App’x at 152 (affidavit of the court
clerk of the Justice Court of the Town of Cortlandt stating that an officer of the Rochelle Bail Agency informed the Justice Court on the day of Mastromonaco’s release that Mastromonaco was arraigned at the hospital); App’x at 154 (deposition of Justice Ponz ini characterizi ng his role as4 performing arraignments at the hospital); App’x at 241-42 (deposition testimony of Mastromonaco asserting that he was never arraig ned, but also stating that he c ould not recall when or where he was arraigned, or if bail was set in the hospital); App’x at 420 (deposition testimony of Mastromonaco’s father, stating that Mastromonaco was arraigned while Mastromonaco was in the hospital). Additionally, we agree with the district court that Justice Ponzini had the authority to arraign Mastromonaco at the hospital under New York law. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 170.15(1). We therefore find that this argument lacks merit.

IV. Monell Claim

Last, Mastromonaco argues that the di strict court imprope rly dismissed his Monell claims. We find that this argument lacks meri t. It is well-settled that a Monell claim cannot succeed without an underlying constitutional violation, and here there is no constitutional violation. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).

We have considered the remainder of Mast romonaco’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the or der of the district court here by is AFFIRMED. Each side to
bear its own costs.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk