GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Military Readiness, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

June 1999 MILITARY 

READINESS

Readiness Reports Do 

Not Provide a Clear 

Assessment of Army 

Equipment

GAO/NSIAD-99-119

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Leter

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282327 Letter

June 16, 1999

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On the basis of your concerns about the combat readiness of U.S. military 

forces as the individual services deal with reductions in force size and the 

expanding demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance 

operations, we reviewed the equipment readiness in active duty Army 

units. As requested, this report addresses whether active duty units 

(1) have the equipment required to conduct their wartime missions, (2) are 

keeping their equipment in good condition, and (3) can sustain the 

equipment in a two major theater war as required by the National Military 

Strategy.

Results in Brief While details are classified, a high percentage of active duty Army units 

have the major equipment items they need for their wartime mission. 

Moreover, Army information shows that units are maintaining the bulk of 

their equipment in a fully mission capable condition. Despite these positive 

indications of readiness, current readiness reporting systems are not 

comprehensive enough to reveal all readiness weaknesses. For example, 

they do not show operational limitations that have been caused by 

extensive shortages of support equipment essential to effective, sustained 

use of major equipment items. Units could deploy without this equipment 

and could perform their basic combat missions, but they would be limited 

in their capability, flexibility, or sustainability. Additionally, the Army has 

stated that its equipment is aging and becoming increasingly difficult to 

maintain and maintenance managers at units we visited told us that their 

mechanics are devoting increasing amounts of time to keep equipment 

operating. These problems are not reflected in readiness data, which show 

units are able to keep their equipment serviceable. We have reported that 

serviceability rates do not provide a good assessment of equipment 

condition because equipment that is old, unreliable, and difficult to 

maintain may still be reported serviceable. While maintenance problems 

may exist, the Army does not have data that clearly shows either what its 

equipment problems are or how units are affected.

Letr
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Two factors suggest that the Army could have difficulty sustaining 

equipment in the event of two nearly simultaneous military operations. 

First, there is a significant shortage of maintenance personnel with the 

right skills and tenure. As a result, unit maintenance personnel are working 

longer and harder to keep equipment in a fully mission capable condition. 

Second, Army officials are concerned that shortages of war reserve repair 

parts could seriously affect the operational availability of many of the 

Army’s primary weapon systems. Army officials report they have started 

efforts to fund critical shortages.

We are making recommendations intended to improve the reporting of 

(1) auxiliary equipment shortages in Unit Status Reports and (2) equipment 

condition in congressional readiness reports.

Background The Army’s system for reporting the current status of Army units to the 

National Command Authority, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, is the Unit Status Reporting 

System. Each month, or more frequently when changes occur, over 

1,400 active duty Army units provide information on their status in four 

measured resource areas: personnel, equipment on hand, equipment 

serviceability, and training. A unit’s overall status is measured by a “C” 

rating, which ranges from C-1 (best) to C-5 (worst). Units also provide 

narrative remarks to support and clarify data. The Unit Status Report data 

feed into the Department of Defense’s (DOD) system for reporting 

readiness to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Status of Resources and Training 

System (SORTS).

Equipment readiness is indicated in two Unit Status Report resource areas; 

equipment on hand status and equipment serviceability status. Equipment 

on hand indicates whether units have their principal weapon systems and 

major equipment items compared to their wartime requirements. Principal 

weapon systems and equipment are identified in a unit’s Table of 

Organization and Equipment1

 by an equipment readiness code of P or A. 

Items coded P are central to an organization’s ability to perform its 

doctrinal mission and are known as pacing items (e.g., tanks in a tank 

battalion). The majority of units have two pacing items, and at most a unit 

would have four pacing items. In total, the Army has categorized about 

1A Table of Organization and Equipment prescribes the normal mission, organizational structure, and 

personnel and equipment requirements for a tactical military unit.

Letr
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120 separate weapon systems and equipment items as pacing items. A unit’s 

equipment inventory on-hand status is reflected in an S-level that ranges 

from S-1 (best—having most or all its equipment) to S-4 (worst—missing 

significant amounts of equipment).

Units also report how much auxiliary equipment they have compared to 

their wartime requirement, but this information is not considered in 

determining a unit’s equipment on-hand status. Auxiliary equipment is 

essential to support principal weapon systems and provide mission 

sustainment support.2

 It includes items or systems required for 

transporting, maintaining, supplying, servicing, protecting, enhancing, or 

backing up principal weapon systems, such as unit maintenance 

equipment; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense equipment; support 

vehicles; mess equipment; and camouflage nets. Units identify the number 

of auxiliary equipment items in their Table of Organization and Equipment 

and determine a status rating for each item in accordance with Army 

Regulation 220-1. For example, a unit reports a status rating of S-1 if it has 

90 percent or more of its requirement for a specific auxiliary equipment 

item; S-2 if it has 80-89 percent of its requirement; S-3 if it has 65-79 percent 

of its requirement; and S-4 if it has less than 65 percent of its requirement. 

The unit then identifies the number of equipment items at each S-level in 

the Unit Status Report remarks. To illustrate, if a unit is required to have six 

radios, six sets of night vision goggles, and six aircraft tool kits and has five 

radios, five sets of night vision goggles, and four tool kits on-hand, it would 

be S-2 for radios (5/6=83 percent), S-2 for night vision goggles 

(5/6=83 percent), and S-3 for tool kits (4/6=67 percent). In its Unit Status 

Report, the unit would report that two equipment items are at S-2 and one 

equipment item is at S-3. It would not report the specific types or amounts 

of equipment missing. However, the commander is expected to narratively 

report any mission limitation that is caused by shortages of auxiliary 

equipment in the remarks section of the Unit Status Report and reflect this 

limitation in his mission accomplishment estimate. The mission 

accomplishment estimate is the commander’s subjective assessment of the 

unit’s ability to execute that portion of the wartime mission it would be 

expected to perform if alerted or committed within 72 hours of the date of 

the report.3

2

The term auxiliary equipment as used in this report includes both auxiliary and auxiliary support 

equipment.

3

See Army Regulation 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, ch. 8.
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Equipment serviceability indicates how well units are maintaining their onhand reportable equipment. On-hand reportable equipment consists of the 

unit’s pacing items and any other equipment systems or individual items 

controlled by materiel condition status reports. In total, about 570 

equipment systems and items are controlled by materiel condition status 

reports (comprising about 8 percent of the total equipment in the Army’s 

inventory).4

 The serviceability rate is a percentage based on the number of 

days reportable equipment is available to the organization and fully able to 

do its mission compared to the number of days it could have been 

available. A rate is calculated for (1) each pacing item and (2) all pacing 

items and reportable equipment in aggregate. A unit’s overall status is the 

lower of the two serviceability rates. Pacing items again receive special 

emphasis because of their major importance to a unit. The unit’s equipment 

serviceability status is reflected in an R-level that ranges from R-1 

(best--equipment other than aircraft are fully mission capable and available 

to the unit 90 percent or more of the days in the period or aircraft are fully 

mission capable 75 percent or more of the days in the period) to R-4 

(worst--equipment other than aircraft are fully mission capable less than 

60 percent of the days in the period, or aircraft are fully mission capable 

less than 50 percent of the days in the period).5

In its fourth quarter, fiscal year 1998 Quarterly Readiness Report to the 

Congress, DOD also reported on a number of other equipment condition 

indicators. These indicators include (1) the percentage of equipment 

reported out of service due to maintenance or supply problems (not 

mission capable maintenance and not mission capable supply) for 16 major 

Army systems, (2) average equipment age for 15 major Army systems, and 

(3) depot maintenance requirements for 10 systems.

4

The Army’s reportable equipment items are identified in Army Regulation 700-138, app. B.

5

See Army Regulation 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, para. 6.5.
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Most Active Duty Army 

Units Have Their Major 

Equipment but Lack 

Essential Support 

Equipment

A review of Unit Status Report data for September 1998 showed that a large 

percentage of active duty Army units had their principal weapon systems 

and major equipment items.6

 Status levels for this equipment have 

increased notably over the past few years. However, many units do not 

have all the auxiliary equipment needed to support their major equipment 

and provide mission sustainment support. Army officials believe shortages 

can be made up before deployment but acknowledge that in two nearly 

simultaneous conflicts some later deploying units may have to deploy 

without all of their authorized auxiliary equipment. Units without all 

authorized auxiliary equipment would still be able to perform their basic 

mission, but they may suffer limitations in their capability, flexibility, and 

sustainability.

Units Have Their Principal 

Weapon Systems and Major 

Equipment Items

We reviewed the equipment on-hand status of 1,483 active duty units as 

reported in September 1998 and found that most units reported either an 

S-1 or S-2 status for on-hand equipment. A unit reporting an S-1 status has 

the equipment needed to accomplish all missions for which it was designed 

with no additional resources. S-2 units have the equipment needed to 

undertake most of the full mission for which they were designed but may 

experience isolated decreases in flexibility for mission accomplishment. 

These units will require little, if any, assistance to compensate for 

deficiencies. S-3 units will require significant equipment to compensate for 

deficiencies but can undertake many portions, but not all, of the full 

mission for which they were designed. S-4 units need significant additional 

equipment to accomplish their assigned wartime mission.

Data for the past 7 years also show that equipment on-hand status levels 

have increased notably in active duty units for this time period. Since 1992 

the number of units reporting equipment on-hand status levels below S-2 

has decreased significantly. This seems logical given the downsizing of the 

force from 18 divisions to 10 divisions and the flow of excess equipment to 

remaining units. Under the Army’s first to fight, first equipped strategy, 

priority for equipment available from downsizing would generally go to 

units scheduled to deploy early in a conflict.

We did not identify any aggregate Army data systems that would allow us to 

corroborate the reliability of equipment on-hand data in unit status reports. 

6

Precise numbers are classified.
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However, we reviewed and compared unit property records at three 

brigade-sized commands in the continental United Status to the equipment 

on-hand data in their Units’ Status Reports.7

 We found that the property 

book records generally supported the reported equipment on-hand status.

Units Do Not Have All Their 

Required Auxiliary 

Equipment

Our analysis of Unit Status Report data for September 1998 showed a large 

percentage of active duty units had significant shortages of auxiliary 

equipment. Some of the significant auxiliary equipment shortages are 

identified in table 1. Applying the Army’s equipment on-hand criteria to 

auxiliary equipment, over 62 percent of the units reporting auxiliary 

equipment would have an S-3 or S-4 status.

Table 1: Examples of Auxiliary Equipment Shortages in U.S. Forces Command Units

Note: Shortage computations include substitute items.

Source: U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), June 1999.

Officials from the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

said that the shortages exist for a number of reasons, including recent 

increases in requirements for some items, slowed procurement funding, 

and units’ use of operations and maintenance funds for higher priorities. 

Many auxiliary equipment items, for example, must be purchased with 

operations and maintenance funds. Officials said that units tend to delay 

purchasing items they may not consider critical when their funding is 

insufficient. This appeared to be the case at the three brigades we visited 

where items that were purchased with operations and maintenance funds 

comprised 28 to 53 percent of the missing auxiliary equipment. The high 

percentage of missing items that must be purchased in this way does not 

conclusively prove that inadequate funding is the cause. For example, some 

7

The number of units visited was not sufficient to meet the requirements for a statistically valid sample.

Item Units reporting shortages Number of items short

Telephone cable 335 6,481

Night vision goggles 214 8,835

Binoculars 174 1,129

Generator set 148 493

Global positioning system 136 1,246

Chemical agent monitor 114 521

Battery charger 38 112
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items may not have been available through the supply system. Equipment 

managers at the Army’s Tank and Automotive Command also said that 

reductions in procurement funding particularly affect auxiliary equipment 

because funding priority generally goes to principal weapon systems and 

major equipment.

The Army’s Unit Status Report regulation states that a unit commander that 

lacks equipment, including auxiliary equipment, that he deems combat 

essential should address the shortages in the narrative remarks section of 

the report and consider the effect of these shortages, among other factors, 

in formulating the mission accomplishment estimate.8

 However, our review 

of the September 1998 Unit Status Reports found that commanders rarely 

identified impacts related to auxiliary equipment shortages even in cases 

where our analysis showed significant amounts of equipment were missing. 

For example, 74 units that we identified as S-4 for auxiliary equipment also 

reported an overall unit status of C-1 (the unit could perform its full 

wartime mission). As mentioned previously, units do not identify the 

specific auxiliary equipment they are missing so we could not question the 

commanders’ subjective assessment.

Shortages of some auxiliary equipment are likely to have little effect on unit 

operations. For example, sign painting kits and wristwatches are auxiliary 

equipment that would not likely affect mission accomplishment. Other 

auxiliary equipment may be needed only in certain operating environments. 

For example, winterization kits for UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters may not 

be needed in Southwest Asia, and electrical distribution equipment may not 

be needed by units moving into large, preestablished bases. Other auxiliary 

equipment, such as battery chargers, generators, and mine detectors, 

however, may limit a unit’s capability, flexibility, or sustainability.

FORSCOM officials generally discount the effect of auxiliary equipment 

shortages on mission accomplishment. They report that units with 

auxiliary equipment shortages would still be able to perform their basic 

warfighting mission. Additionally, they said they carefully review unit 

equipment before deployments and make up any equipment shortages 

deemed necessary for the mission. For example, during Operations Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm, to rectify shortages, FORSCOM officials said that they 

extensively transferred equipment between units and bought equipment 

such as generators, cellular phones, facsimiles, secure telephones, and 

8

 See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, paras. 5-13c(2), 8-1, and 8-3.
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other electronic devices from the commercial market prior to deployment. 

Although FORSCOM plans to continue this general approach in rectifying 

shortages, no definitive plans exist specifying how this will take place. 

Given the magnitude of the shortages, transferring equipment between 

units may be problematic.

The Army’s description of auxiliary equipment as either essential to 

support principal weapon systems or provide unit sustainment support 

seems to be contradicted by the large amounts of equipment missing and 

the absence of any reported effect by Army units.9

 It is understandable that 

units can and do function without all required equipment items. However, 

at some point the synergy built into a unit begins to be reduced when large 

amounts of equipment are missing. Shortages of maintenance equipment, 

in particular, create questions about a unit’s ability to sustain its primary 

weapon systems at a wartime pace of operations. Given the number of 

units with shortages, one would expect to see some acknowledgment of a 

capability, flexibility, or sustainment limitation in at least some units. The 

absence of any recognized effect demonstrates either that the equipment is 

not essential or that commanders are not appropriately considering 

potential limitations to their units. Additionally, in February 1993, we 

reported on the impact of equipment shortages during the Gulf War 

mobilization.10 During that conflict the Army transferred equipment 

between units to rectify shortages but found that filling shortages became 

more difficult as the operation progressed and more units were mobilized. 

As equipment became scarcer, some equipment shortages could not be 

filled, and as a result, some units were deployed without all of their 

equipment. Our report stated a number of instances in which units were 

hampered in their ability to perform their required mission by the 

equipment shortages.

Army Data Do Not 

Provide a Clear Picture 

of Equipment 

Condition

Despite the Unit Status Reports for September 1998 that showed that 

equipment serviceability rates were high, the Army reported in its 

Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress for the fourth quarter of fiscal 

year 1998 its concern that its equipment is aging and becoming increasingly 

difficult to maintain. Maintenance managers at units we visited also said 

that their mechanics are working harder to keep equipment operating. 

9

See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, App. B.

10Reserve Forces: Aspects of the Army’s Equipping Strategy Hamper Reserve Readiness

(GAO/NSIAD-93-11, Feb. 18, 1993).
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Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

However, these problems are not reflected in high equipment readiness 

rates. We have previously reported that serviceability rates do not provide a 

good assessment of equipment condition because equipment that is old, 

unreliable, and difficult to maintain may be reported serviceable.11

However, we could not determine the extent to which Army units are 

affected by equipment problems because the Army does not have data that 

identifies either its unreliable equipment or how units are affected.

Serviceability Data Show 

Units Are Maintaining 

Equipment

In addition to showing quantities on hand, the Unit Status Reports measure 

equipment readiness by how well units maintain their on-hand reportable 

equipment. The Army’s goal is that 90 percent or more of ground equipment 

be in a fully mission capable status, which means the equipment can 

perform all of its combat missions without endangering the lives of crew or 

operators.12 Aircraft units have a goal of 75 percent or higher fully mission 

capable. Unit Status Report data for September 1998 showed that the 

majority of the 1,483 active duty Army units reporting were achieving the 

Army’s goals.13 According to commanders at the units we visited, meeting 

the Army’s serviceability goals is a command priority and the condition of 

pacing items and other reportable equipment is closely monitored at all 

command levels. 

Historical Unit Status Report data also show that units have generally 

maintained their major equipment at the fully mission capable goals over 

time. For example, table 2 shows the quarterly mission capable rates for 

16 major Army equipment items that were being maintained at 90- and 

75-percent rates from October 1994 through August 1998. Mission capable 

rates for some equipment occasionally fell below the goals. However, we 

see no pattern that would suggest an increasing problem.

11Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement System

(GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994).

12 See AR 220-1, Sept. 1, 1997, Glossary, Section II, Terms; and AR 700-138, Sept. 16, 1997, para. 1-6.

13Precise numbers are classified.
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Table 2: Mission Capable Rates for 16 Major Equipment Items 

Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th quarter, fiscal year 1998.

Serviceability Data Do Not 

Provide a Good Assessment 

of Equipment Condition

Although overall serviceability rates are high as shown in table 2, 

serviceability data do not provide a complete assessment of equipment 

condition. Our 1994 report on the ability of DOD’s readiness reporting 

system to provide a comprehensive assessment of overall readiness stated 

that C-ratings represent a snapshot of readiness in time but by design do 

not address long-term readiness or signal impending changes in the status 

Equipment item

Oct.

1994

Mar.

1995

Oct.

1995

Mar.

1996

Oct.

1996

Mar.

1997

Oct.

1997

Mar.

1998

Aug.

1998

Aircraft systems: Availability goal 75 percent

CH-47D Chinook cargo 

helicopter 75 78 74 75 76 73 77 73 75

AH-64 Apache attack 

helicopter 78 82 83 80 82 84 86 83 81

OH-58D Kiowa Warrior 

helicopter 83 76 79 84 82 85 87 87 87

UH-60 Blackhawk 

helicopter 78 73 78 78 81 81 82 85 79

Ground systems: Availability goal 90 percent

M1A1 Abrams tank N/A N/A N/A 93 92 92 92 93 90

M1A2 Abrams tank N/A N/A 0 28 84 95 84 90 92

M2 Bradley Fighting 

Vehicle 91 94 94 95 95 95 94 95 92

M3 Armored Cavalry scout 

vehicle 91 93 93 94 92 91 93 91 94

M109 Self-propelled 

howitzer 95 95 95 96 96 96 97 96 97

M198 Towed howitzer 95 95 90 93 94 94 91 94 93

HEMTT [Heavy expanded 

mobility tactical truck] 89 89 90 88 89 89 90 89 88

HMMWV [High mobility 

multipurpose wheeled 

vehicle] 94 94 95 94 95 94 95 94 93

MLRS [Multiple launch 

rocket system] 94 93 94 94 95 96 95 94 95

TOW2 HMMW [High 

mobility multipurpose 

wheeled vehicle] 97 97 97 98 96 96 97 96 98

Patriot missile system 97 97 96 95 96 92 94 95 92

Avenger ground to air 

missile system N/A 99 98 99 96 98 98 97 98
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of resources and for equipment, this continues to be the case. Specifically, 

equipment that is old, unreliable, and difficult to maintain may be reported 

serviceable. For example, Army officials told us that the Armored Vehicle 

Launched Bridge and the Armored Combat Earthmover are examples of 

systems that are complex, difficult to maintain, and/or aging in the Army 

inventory. The Army is in the process of replacing the Armored Vehicle 

Launched Bridge with the Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge. Despite these 

problems, serviceability rates for these systems generally are in the 86- to 

92-percent range. While the Army’s goal is for units to maintain ground 

equipment above 90-percent availability, slight decreases below this goal do 

not by themselves indicate problems. For example, as shown in table 2, the 

M1A2 Abrams tank’s rates were below the goal during four quarters, even 

though the Abrams is among the Army’s newest and most modern 

weapons. Maintenance managers told us that they can maintain high 

serviceability rates, even for problem equipment, through intense 

investments of time. However, the effort required to keep equipment 

serviceable is not reflected in readiness reports.

Other Army Equipment 

Condition Indicators Do Not 

Support Reliability or 

Maintenance Problems

Our review of other Army equipment condition indicators, including the 

expanded equipment condition indicators recently provided in DOD’s 

Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, revealed that the indicators 

do not effectively identify and highlight the Army’s equipment problems. To 

the contrary, most of the indicators show few equipment problems.

The Army maintains that its equipment is becoming increasingly difficult to 

maintain. If units are experiencing problems with unreliable equipment, the 

problems should be reflected in increasing amounts of equipment reported 

as “not mission capable-maintenance.” “Not mission capable-maintenance” 

is reported when equipment cannot perform its mission because of 

maintenance underway or needed. Units report equipment out of service 

for maintenance through the Unit Level Logistics System, and the Army 

aggregates and stores this data at the Army Materiel Command’s Logistics 

Support Activity (LOGSA).

As shown in table 3, Army data from October 1994 through August 1998 for 

16 key Army systems show no increase in the percent of equipment not 

mission capable and no downward trends that would indicate worsening 

conditions. Officials at the units we visited explained that the data might 

not be a good indicator of reliability problems because available personnel 

work not only their regular schedules but also evenings and weekends to 

keep maintenance backlogs low. However, the Army does not collect 

workload data for individual equipment systems that would illustrate 

increasing workloads.
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Table 3: Percent of Equipment Not Mission Capable Maintenance 

Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th quarter, fiscal year 1998.

We also analyzed data in the Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center’s 

Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS) for 

indications of equipment reliability problems. The OSMIS database is the 

Army’s source of historical operating and support cost information for 

more than 350 systems that are in tactical units—Active, Guard, and 

Reserve. Generally, increasing operating and support costs should be an 

indicator of growing reliability problems. However, our analysis of 

operating and support cost data shows few problems with increasing 

operating and support costs. For example, we compared fiscal year 1992 

repair parts costs (consumables and net reparables) per hour flown or mile 

driven for 20 active duty aviation, tactical wheeled vehicle, artillery and 

missile, and combat systems (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) to the 

fiscal year 1996 repair parts costs. We found that costs decreased for

Equipment item

Oct.

1994

Mar.

1995

Oct.

1995

Mar.

1996

Oct.

1996

Mar.

1997

Oct.

1997

Mar.

1998

Aug.

1998

CH-47D Chinook cargo 

helicopter 22 19 23 21 21 24 20 23 23

AH-64D Apache attack 

helicopter 17 14 14 13 14 13 12 13 16

OH-58D Kiowa warrior 

helicopter 11 15 13 14 16 12 11 11 11

UH-60D Blackhawk 

helicopter 16 22 18 18 15 15 15 12 19

M1A1 Abrams tank N/A N/A N/A 1 2 3 1 2 4

M1A2 Abrams tank N/A N/A 50 70 8 3 8 5 4

M2 Bradley Fghting Vehicle 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3

M3 Armored Cavalry scout 

vehicle 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 4 2

M109 Self-propelled 

howitzer 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0

M198 Towed howitzer 2 3 7 2 3 3 2 4 5

HEMTT 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 5 6

HMMWV 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 4

MLRS 3 4 2 3 3 2 2 3 3

TOW2 HMMWV 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1

Patriot missile system 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 3 3

Avenger ground to air 

missile system N/A 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 0
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15 systems (75 percent), increased for 4 systems (20 percent), and 

remained stable for 1 system (5 percent). A comparison of fiscal year 1993 

and 1996 repair parts costs for the same 20 systems similarly showed that 

14 systems (70 percent) had lower repair parts costs while 6 (30 percent) 

had higher. We also compared annual repair parts costs for another 9 

systems where usage data were not available, such as communications and 

engineering equipment, and artillery systems. Without usage data, annual 

repair parts costs are a less precise measure of reliability but generally 

show how much the equipment is being repaired. Repair parts costs 

decreased between fiscal year 1992 and 1996 for seven systems and 

increased for two. A comparison of fiscal year 1993 and 1996 repair parts 

costs for the same nine systems showed that five systems had lower repair 

parts costs while four had higher.

Army officials told us that OSMIS data might not support possible 

reliability problems because there is not a direct correlation between 

equipment operation and repair parts usage. However, they agree that if 

equipment is being repaired more frequently, it should be indicated by the 

data. They speculated that repairs might be down because some equipment 

is being used less.

Our analysis of historical data from October 1994 through August 1998 for 

the Army’s top 16 systems shows some variance in equipment out of service 

while awaiting repair parts, but overall the data does not indicate 

increasing problems in repair parts availability. 
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Table 4: Percent of Equipment Not Mission Capable Supply 

Source: Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 4th quarter, fiscal year 1998.

Maintenance officers at two units we visited told us that they had not 

experienced problems with the availability of repair parts. However, at the 

7th Transportation Group maintenance officers reported difficulties 

obtaining parts for some older ships in their fleet. The 7th Transportation 

Group has several boat companies that transport cargo, troops, and 

vehicles between ship and shore, or from one port to another port. 

Additionally, although units were reducing the number of repair parts in 

their inventories, unit supply managers’ told us they were not having any 

more difficulty obtaining spare parts than in the past. Nonetheless, units 

visited reported that they occasionally obtained parts by removing them 

from other equipment items rather than waiting for the supply system to 

provide them. A FORSCOM official, however, told us that he believes that 

the practice of “controlled substitution” has not increased notably.

Equipment item

Oct.

1994

Mar.

1995

Oct.

1995

Mar.

1996

Oct.

1996

Mar.

1997

Oct.

1997

Mar.

1998

Aug.

1998

CH-47D Chinook cargo 

helicopter 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 2

AH-64D Apache attack 

helicopter 5 4 3 7 4 3 2 4 3

OH-58D Kiowa Warrior 

helicopter 6 9 8 2 2 3 2 2 2

UH-60D Blackhawk 

helicopter 6 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 2

M1A1 Abrams tank N/A N/A N/A 6 6 5 7 5 6

M1A2 Abrams tank N/A N/A 50 2 8 2 8 5 4

M2 Bradley Fighting 

Vehicle 6 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5

M3 Armored Cavalry scout 

vehicle 6 5 5 5 7 8 6 5 4

M109 Self-propelled 

howitzer 3 4 4 2 3 3 2 3 3

M198 Towed howitzer 3 2 3 5 3 3 7 2 2

HEMTT 7 8 7 8 8 7 7 6 6

HMMWV 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 3

MLRS 3 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 2

TOW2 HMMWV 2 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 1

Patriot missile system 0 1 2 1 2 6 4 2 5

Avenger ground to air 

missile system N/A 1 1 0 2 2 1 2 2
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We also analyzed equipment age because keeping equipment past its useful 

life may lead to unacceptable operating and support costs and a decrease in 

wartime operational effectiveness. As shown in table 5, the equipment ages 

for 15 major systems reported in the expanded Quarterly Readiness Report 

to the Congress shows that most major systems are within their estimated 

service life.

Table 5: Average Age of the Army’s Top 15 Systems

Sources: Estimated service life data were obtained from FORSCOM and Army Materiel Command 

officials. Average age data were obtained from the Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, 

4th quarter, fiscal year 1998. N/A indicates data were not available.

Another indicator of aging equipment is the Army’s equipment 

recapitalization program that extends the service life of equipment through 

depot rebuild or technology insertion. Extending the service life of 

equipment is sometimes necessary when production and fielding rates for 

new equipment are insufficient to prevent fleet aging from becoming a 

chronic problem. Some of the recapitalization programs we identified that 

address problems with aging equipment include engineer support 

equipment, construction equipment, Paladin M109 Howitzer, UH-60A 

Blackhawk helicopter, UH-1 Iroquois utility helicopter, HEMTT, HMMWV, 

 2 1/2-ton truck, 5-ton truck, line-haul tractors, engineer tractors, and 

materiel handling equipment.

Equipment item

Estimated

service life

Average

 age

M1A1 Abrams tank 20 9.3

M1A2 Abrams tank 20 1.5

M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle 20 11.2

M109 Self-propelled howitzer N/A 6

M198 Towed howitzer N/A 12

MLRS N/A 9.2

Patriot missile system N/A 10.5

Avenger ground-to-air missile system N/A 8.7

HEMTT 20 years 11.5

HMMWV 14 years 8.1

TOW2 HMMWV 14 years 11.8

AH-64 Apache attack helicopter 20 11.2

OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter 20 8.2

CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopter 20 10.8

UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter 20 11.6
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Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

Army officials acknowledge that serviceability rates and other condition 

indicators currently reported provide a limited picture of equipment 

condition. However, identifying predictive condition indicators for the 

large variety of equipment in the Army is complex. They said that Army 

commands independently monitor numerous additional information 

sources to supplement data reported in Unit Status Reports. These sources 

include reports from Logistics Assistance Offices at all installations and 

item managers at the commodity commands. This information is generally 

not reported to higher commands. They report that this information is 

sufficient to provide assurance on current readiness issues but 

acknowledge its weakness for identifying longer term equipment condition 

problems.

The Army May 

Experience Problems 

Sustaining Its 

Equipment

The Army may have difficulty sustaining its equipment in the event of two 

nearly simultaneous military operations, the most demanding scenario, 

because of significant shortages of maintenance personnel and war reserve 

repair parts stocks. The war reserve repair parts stocks are intended to 

support Army units during wartime until logistics supply lines can be 

established from the United States. The amount of repair parts that should 

be stocked is based on the Army’s most demanding scenario, two nearly 

simultaneous theater wars, and considers repair part utilization rates for 

major equipment items, on-hand general issue stocks, on-hand war reserve 

stocks, and the amounts industry can provide.

Units Are Short Some 

Maintenance Skills

Unit commanders we visited reported the availability of maintenance 

personnel with the right skills and tenure was the units’ most significant 

equipment readiness problem. Army-wide shortages of personnel, frequent 

deployments to peacekeeping missions, and the assignment of personnel to 

tasks outside their military specialty were the primary reasons cited. These 

shortages create risks in the Army’s ability to sustain its equipment in the 

event of two nearly simultaneous theater wars.
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Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

The units we visited had 97 to 99 percent of their authorized enlisted 

personnel at the time of our visits. However, high unit manning rates do not 

fully reflect the extent of maintenance personnel shortages in the units or 

the impact of these shortages on the units’ ability to accomplish critical 

wartime tasks. Further, high manning rates do not capture the rank 

(enlisted versus noncommissioned officers), skill, and experience 

imbalances that affect their maintenance operations. FORSCOM data 

shown in table 6 show that these imbalances are prevalent.
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Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

Table 6: Personnel authorized and assigned by grade for a sample of occupations

Source: FORSCOM, February 1999.

Military occupational specialty

Enlisted

(E-1 through E-4)

(auth/assigned)

Noncommissioned officers

(E-5 through E6)

(auth/assigned)

Senior noncommissioned

officers

(E-7 through E-9)

(auth/assigned)

44B Metal worker 361/386

107%

112/93

83% Not applicable

44E Machinist 105/96

91%

104/87

84%

3/2

67%

45B Small arms/artillery repairman 213/206

97%

47/37

79% Not applicable

45D Self-propelled field artillery turret 

mechanic

49/80

163%

62/21

34% Not applicable

45E Abrams tank turret mechanic 264/330

125%

85/68

80% Not applicable

45K Armament repairman 297/227

76%

192/158

83%

67/61

91%

45T Bradley Fighting Vehicle system turret 

mechanic

142/262

185%

113/58

51% Not applicable

52C Utilities equipment repairman 533/474

89%

229/226

99% Not applicable

52D Power generation equipment 

repairman

1389/1208

87%

505/471

93% Not applicable

62B Construction equipment repairman 651/635

98%

398/351

88%

81/98

121%

63B Light wheel vehicle repairman 3234/2844

88%

1867/1748

94%

593/521

88%

63D Self-propelled field artillery system 

mechanic

224/177

79%

145/149

103%

50/47

94%

63E M1 Abrams tank system mechanic 390/580

149%

381/251

66%

136/140

103%

63G Fuel/electrical system repairman 191/198

104%

45/48

107% Not applicable

63H Tracked vehicle repairman 666/764

115%

643/475

74%

474/464

98%

63S Heavy wheel vehicle mechanic 1189/1003

84%

398/369

93% Not applicable

63T Bradley Fighting Vehicle system 

mechanic

980/1161

119%

616/439

71%

127/134

106%

63W Wheel Vehicle repairman 1582/1488

94%

361/364

101% Not applicable

63Y Track vehicle mechanic 269/277

103%

127/105

83% Not applicable
B-282327

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

Commanders of units visited reported similar personnel shortages. Some of 

the significant shortages reported follow.

• At the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, only 2 of 8 Bradley 

Fighting Vehicle turret mechanics (25 percent), and 5 of 10 Abrams tank 

systems mechanics (50 percent) were assigned. The brigade also had 

only 28 of 44 motor transport operators (64 percent) assigned.

• At the 7th Transportation Group, only 10 of 15 light wheel vehicle 

supervisors (67 percent) were assigned. The group also had only 20 of 

30 authorized motor transport operators (67 percent).

• At the 18th Aviation Brigade, 17 of 25 authorized light wheel vehicle 

mechanics (68 percent) were assigned. A CH-47 Chinook helicopter 

company within the brigade had 37 helicopter repairman assigned of 

38 authorized but, according to unit officials, 8 repairman could not 

work because of medical problems. The company also had all three 

authorized aircraft powertrain repairmen, but we were told that all three 

were fresh from school and lacked experience.

Army officials told us of several other issues that compound their 

personnel shortage problems. First, over the past few years the amount of 

training provided in Army schools had been reduced and units are expected 

to provide more of the skills-oriented training. Additionally, many 

occupational specialties have been combined and individual soldiers are 

responsible for knowing how to repair more types of equipment than 

previously. These changes have significantly increased the supervisory and 

training workload for unit noncommissioned officers. Second, the burden 

of peacekeeping operations, along with the assignment of personnel to 

tasks outside their military specialties, has also added to noncommissioned 

officers’ workloads. For example, the 7th Transportation Group provided 

one battalion per month to the post for base support activities. Army 

officers told us that reductions in base operating support funding left them 

with no choice but to use soldiers for these tasks. The result, however, has 

been that the maintenance workload tends to focus on a few key 

individuals who must work long and hard to maintain unit equipment 

readiness status. Readiness reporting does not capture this increase in 

work tempo.

Prepositioned War Reserve 

Repair Parts May Limit 

Equipment Sustainability

Sustaining Army equipment in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars 

may also present risks due to shortages of war reserve repair parts. 

According to a contractor study, the operational availability of many of the 

Army’s major weapon systems will decrease significantly by the 60th day of 

an overlapping two-theater war because of a repair part shortage. For
B-282327

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

example, the operational availability of the AH-64 Apache is forecast to fall 

to 44 percent by day 60 of a conflict and the operational availability of the 

OH-58D Kiowa is forecast to fall to 52 percent. Conflicts requiring fewer 

forces than assumed in the study would result in higher operational 

availabilities. Army officials report they have started efforts to fund critical 

shortages. Table 7 shows the Army’s estimated equipment availability in a 

two-war scenario.

Table 7: Availability of Selected Equipment in a Two-War Scenario; 30 Days between 

Wars

Source: Army War Reserve Secondary Items, Final Report – Phase II, Coopers & Lybrand, June 1998.

Numbers in percent

Availability of selected 

equipment Two major theater wars (30 day periods)

30 60 90 120 150

Abrams tank 89 83 61 49 46

AH-64 Apache 56 44 37 31 26

Avenger 84 82 64 46 39

Bradley Fighting Vehicle 76 79 53 44 41

CH-47 Chinook 70 64 57 50 45

Heavy equipment 

transporter 75 54 41 33 29

HMMWV 82 83 61 60 58

HEMTT 84 80 77 58 51

Howitzer 69 52 31 26 24

M113 86 84 66 50 44

MLRS 87 75 40 26 20

Mobile subscriber 

equipment 72 34 35 33 32

OH-58D, Kiowa 65 52 35 25 22

Palletized load system 81 71 45 36 34

SinCgars 89 71 65 52 46

UH-60 Blackhawk 

helicopter 65 62 57 53 52
B-282327

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

Conclusions The Army’s current equipment readiness indicators provide valuable 

information, but they do not provide a comprehensive assessment of 

equipment. In particular, the equipment on-hand indicator does not 

effectively characterize unit conditions as they relate to capability, 

flexibility, and sustainment. Shortages of some auxiliary equipment may 

have little impact on units, while others, such as camouflage nets, night 

vision goggles, and communications equipment, give Army forces a combat 

edge over their possible foes. Current guidance does not emphasize the 

need to assess how auxiliary equipment shortages may affect their wartime 

operations. Over 60 percent of reporting units had significant shortages of 

auxiliary equipment that would likely continue in the early stages of a 

deployment.

The Army’s equipment condition indicators similarly do not support or 

refute the Army’s position that its equipment is aging and becoming 

increasingly difficult to maintain. Army units’ equipment serviceability 

status remains high and stable, and other indicators recently provided by 

the Army in its Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress similarly show 

few equipment problems. The amount of time that equipment is not 

mission capable because of maintenance or supply problems remains low 

and stable, seemingly refuting assertions that equipment is becoming less 

reliable or is plagued by supply problems. Further, age data on major 

systems indicate that most equipment is within its estimated service life. 

This disparity illustrates the limitation of the Army’s equipment condition 

assessment.

Finding the right set of equipment condition indicators is complex. Given 

the large variety of equipment items in the Army’s inventory, no one 

common set of indicators is likely to provide a comprehensive assessment 

of equipment condition for all items. Further, expanding the number of 

equipment items that the Army provides information on threatens to be 

burdensome with no assurance that problem systems will be reflected. The 

best alternative may be a report that specifically identifies equipment 

problems, details the readiness impact, and proposes solutions. This would 

enable the Army to succinctly focus on its equipment problems so they can 

be addressed by Army, DOD, and the Congress and provide assurance that 

it knows the true status of its equipment.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Plans and Operations to reemphasize to Army commanders the 
B-282327

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

requirement to identify the operational impact of essential auxiliary 

equipment shortages in the narrative remarks section of the Unit Status 

Report and to properly consider shortages of auxiliary equipment when 

formulating their mission accomplishment estimates. The Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Plans and Operations should instruct commanders to focus more 

broadly on unit capability, flexibility, and sustainability issues in 

formulating their overall unit status and mission accomplishment estimate.

To improve equipment condition reporting, we recommend that the 

Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to 

submit a periodic report to the Congress that highlights the Army’s top 

equipment problems. This report should address more than just the 16 

reportable SORTS systems and should identify major equipment readiness 

concerns and planned corrective actions.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and they are 

included in their entirety in appendix II. DOD concurred with our 

recommendation that the Secretary of the Army should reemphasize to 

Army commanders the requirement to identify the operational impact of 

auxiliary equipment shortages. DOD also concurred with our 

recommendation that the Army periodically report to the Congress on their 

top equipment problems. We used the term periodically to give the Army 

the discretion to report as often as it believed necessary to keep the 

Congress informed. However, it was our intention that a report be 

submitted at least annually. Additionally, in its response to this 

recommendation DOD stated that it believes a report is an appropriate 

process to highlight auxiliary equipment problems. We did not intend this 

report to be limited to auxiliary equipment problems.

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine if units have the equipment necessary to conduct their 

wartime missions, we obtained summary-level information on the Army’s 

equipment on-hand posture as of September 1998 from DOD’s SORTS. We 

also obtained equipment on-hand data for three brigade sized units and 

visited those units to determine if the SORTS data accurately reflected 

actual unit conditions by reviewing and comparing unit property book 

records to the reported SORTS data. These units were the 7th

Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia; 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry 

Division, Fort Lewis, Washington; and, 18th Aviation Brigade, Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. We also used SORTS data to calculate the equipment on-
B-282327

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

hand status for lower priority equipment for all reporting active duty units 

as of September 1998. We then discussed our findings with Army officials in 

the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Operations and Plans, and FORSCOM.

To determine the condition of the Army’s equipment, we analyzed summary 

equipment serviceability data for all reporting active duty Army units as of 

September 1998 and equipment serviceability data for three brigade-sized 

units from SORTS. These units were the same units discussed above. We 

then visited those units to inspect the equipment and maintenance records 

to determine if the SORTS data accurately reflected actual field conditions. 

At the units we met with unit commanders, maintenance supervisors, and 

maintainers to discuss problems they may have in supporting the 

equipment. We also met with personnel responsible for maintaining the 

units’ inventories of repair parts. At Fort Eustis, we met with the 

Directorate for Logistics, who was responsible for providing the 

7th Transportation Group’s direct support maintenance. At Fort Lewis, we 

met with I Corps officials, and at Fort Bragg we met with 1st Corps Support 

Command officials responsible for supporting their respective brigades’ 

equipment to discuss equipment conditions and support problems.

To gather information on Army-wide equipment conditions, we met with 

officials from LOGSA at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, who provided data on 

readiness trends for reportable equipment and age data for Army 

equipment. Officials from the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis 

Center, Falls Church, Virginia, discussed how they track operating and 

support costs for Army equipment with us and provided us data for 

350 Army systems. Officials from the Army Materiel Support Analysis 

Activity, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, discussed their ongoing 

effort to gather mean utilization between failure data for Army equipment. 

We also met with officials from the U.S. Army’s Tank and Automotive 

Command, Warren, Michigan, to discuss information they possess on 

equipment condition. After analyzing the data, we discussed our 

conclusions with officials from the Offices of the Army Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Logistics, Army Deputy Chief of Staff or Operations and Plans, 

DOD Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and 

FORSCOM.

Our information on equipment sustainment was derived from interviews 

with unit commanders at the three bases visited as well as data on specific 

maintenance skill shortages in the respective units. We followed up on the 

data with FORSCOM officials. We obtained our information on repair parts 
B-282327

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

war reserves from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and 

the U.S. Army Materiel Support Analysis Activity. We conducted our review 

from June 1998 to February 1999 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested committees. We are 

also sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense and the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the 

Army. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 should you or your staff have any 

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, National Security and Preparedness
B-282327

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

DOD Comments

28

Appendix II

Major Contributors to 

This Report 

 30

Tables Table1: Examples of Auxiliary Equipment 6

Shortages in U.S. Forces Command Units

Table 2: Mission Capable Rates for 10

16 Major Equipment Items

Table 3: Percent of Equipment Not 12

Mission Capable Maintenance

Table 4: Percent of Equipment Not 14

Mission Capable Supply

Table 5: Median Age of the Army’s Top 15 Systems 15

Table 6: Personnel Authorized and Assigned by 18

Grade for a Sample of Occupations

Table 7: Availability of Selected Equipment in a 20

Two-War Scenario 

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

FORSCOM U.S. Forces Command

LOGSA Logistics Support Activity

OSMIS Operating and Support Management Information System

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApIenxdi
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Lret Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness
Appendix II

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-119 Military Readiness

Major Contributors to This Report ApIenxdi

National Security and 

International Affairs 

Division, Washington, 

D.C.

Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director

William C. Meredith, Assistant Director

Glenn D. Furbish, Evaluator in Charge

Norfolk Field Office Lawrence E. Dixon, Senior Evaluator

Linda H. Koetter, Senior Evaluator

James E. Lewis, Senior Evaluator

(703238) Lret
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