United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

04-1515 

HEARTLAND BY-PRODUCTS, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Stanley McDermott III, DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP, of New York, New 

York, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Daniel J. Gluck and 

Jerome L. Hanifin, Serko & Simon, of New York, New York. 

Aimee Lee, Attorney, International Trade Field Office, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of New York, New York, 

argued for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant 

Attorney General, David M. Cohen, Director, of Washington, DC, and Barbara S. 

Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office, of New York, New York. 

Of counsel on the brief were Karen P. Binder, Assistant Chief Counsel, International 

Trade Litigation, United States Customs and Border Protection, of New York, New York, 

Yelena Slepak, Attorney, and Allan Martin, Associate Chief Counsel, of Washington, 

DC; and Ellen Daly, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, of Washington, DC. 

Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade 

Judge Judith M. Barzilay 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

04-1515 

HEARTLAND BY-PRODUCTS, INC., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

DECIDED: September 26, 2005 

__________________________ 

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, SCHALL and PROST, Circuit Judges. 

MICHEL, Chief Judge. 

 Heartland By-Products, Inc. (“Heartland”) appeals the order of the United States 

Court of International Trade dismissing its May 2003 complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (Ct. Int’l 

Trade 2004). This appeal was submitted for decision following oral argument on August 

2, 2005. Because we hold that the Court of International Trade has ancillary jurisdiction 

to determine the scope and effect of its prior decision in Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. 

United States, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999), we reverse the order of 

dismissal and remand for further proceedings on the merits. 
BACKGROUND 

This case comes to us by a long and tortuous path. The dispute between 

Heartland and the United States Customs Service (“Customs”)1

 originated in 1995. At 

that time, Heartland, a sugar refiner, requested an advance ruling from Customs 

regarding the classification of its prospective sugar syrup imports from Canada. On

May 15, 1995, Customs issued New York Ruling Letter 810328 (“New York Ruling 

Letter”), classifying Heartland’s prospective imports under subheading 1702.90.40 of 

the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”). Under this

classification, Heartland’s sugar syrup was not subject to the significantly higher duty 

rates imposed under the Tariff Rate Quota (“TRQ”).2

 Having obtained the advance

classification ruling from Customs, Heartland began its import and refining operations in 

the United States in mid-1997. 

About four years later, in response to a petition under 19 U.S.C. § 1516 by a 

number of domestic trade associations, Customs published a notice of its intent to 

revoke the New York Ruling Letter and to reclassify Heartland’s sugar syrup imports 

under a different HTSUS provision, subject to the TRQ. Proposed Revocation of Ruling 

Letter & Treatment Relating to Tariff Classification of Certain Sugar Syrups, 33 Cust. 

Bull. No. 22/23, at 56-57 (June 9, 1999). On September 8, 1999, following a comment 

period, Customs issued a final notice revoking the New York Ruling Letter and 

 1 Effective March 1, 2003, the United States Customs Service was renamed 

the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. Homeland Security Act of 

2002, Pub. L. No. 07-296, § 1502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2308-2309 (2002). 

2 According to Heartland, the non-TRQ duty during the relevant period was

0.35 cents per liter compared to the TRQ rate of 35.74 cents per kilogram, 

approximately 10,000 percent higher than the non-TRQ rate. 

04-1515 2
reclassifying Heartland’s sugar syrup imports, effective November 8, 1999. Revocation 

of Ruling Letter & Treatment Relating to Tariff Classification of Certain Sugar Syrups, 33 

Cust. Bull. No. 35/36, at 41 (Sept. 8, 1999) (“Revocation Ruling”). 

On September 20, 1999, Heartland filed a complaint in the Court of International 

Trade seeking pre-importation review of the Revocation Ruling under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(h) and an injunction preventing Customs from enforcing the Revocation Ruling 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). On October 18, 1999, the Court of International Trade 

exercised its jurisdiction under § 1581(h)3

 to grant Heartland’s motion for judgment on 

the agency record. Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (Ct. 

Int’l Trade 1999) (“Heartland I”). The court declared Customs’ Revocation Ruling 

unlawful and ordered that Heartland’s sugar syrup be classified under subheading 

1702.90.40 HTSUS, the classification established by the New York Ruling Letter. Id. at

1345. Relying on Heartland I, Heartland continued to import sugar syrup into the United 

States. 

The government, joined by the United States Beet Sugar Association, which had 

intervened as a defendant below, appealed the Court of International Trade’s decision 

 3

 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) provides: 

The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any

civil action commenced to review, prior to the importation of the goods 

involved, a ruling issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to 

issue or change such a ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of

duty, marking, restricted merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks,

vessel repairs, or similar matters, but only if the party commencing the civil 

action demonstrates to the court that he would be irreparably harmed 

unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial review prior to such 

importation. 

04-1515 3
in Heartland I.

4

 We reversed, reasoning that Customs’ persuasive interpretation of the 

relevant HTSUS provisions merited deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.

134 (1944). Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(“Heartland II”). This court’s decision did not specify the date as of which the TRQ rates 

would apply to Heartland’s sugar syrup entries. Our decision issued on August 30, 

2001, nearly two years after the decision was reviewed. The following day, Heartland 

ceased importing sugar syrup into the United States. 

After denying Heartland’s petition for rehearing, this court issued its mandate on 

December 4, 2001. Customs, however, did not wait for the mandate to issue before 

commencing full-scale liquidation and reliquidation of Heartland’s sugar syrup entries at 

the TRQ rates. Beginning on October 5, 2001, Customs liquidated some 1,225 entries

prior to the issuance of the mandate. Customs continued to liquidate and reliquidate 

Heartland’s entries after the mandate issued. 

Heartland responded by filing a motion for entry of judgment on December 13, 

2001, asking that the Court of International Trade determine the effective date of its 

ruling in Heartland I and thus the propriety of Customs’ actions. Heartland alleged that

§ 1581(h) conferred jurisdiction on the trial court to consider the scope of its ruling in 

Heartland I and argued that, under 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c),5

 the higher TRQ duties became 

applicable no earlier than 60 days after the issuance of the appellate mandate. 

 4

 The government did not seek to stay Heartland I pending appeal. 

5

 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) provides, in relevant part: 

(c) Modification and revocation. A proposed interpretive ruling or decision 

which would-- 

04-1515 4
In December 2001, Heartland began to file protective protests under 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1514, administratively challenging Customs’ allegedly premature liquidations and 

reliquidations of its sugar syrup entries at the TRQ rate. 

The Court of International Trade heard oral argument on Heartland’s motion for 

entry of judgment on January 23, 2002. At oral argument, counsel for the government 

represented that Heartland may establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)6

 by

protesting the liquidation or reliquidation of a single entry and that Customs “would 

likely” suspend action on Heartland’s other entries pending court proceedings. In view 

of this representation, the trial court advised the parties to work together to settle the 

jurisdictional issue. Heartland promptly contacted the government, suggesting that it 

deny a protest of a single entry, which Heartland would contest under § 1581(a), while 

Customs deferred taking any action on all other pending entries. Customs, however,

proposed denying three representative entries, the first reliquidated prior to the issuance

of the mandate, the second reliquidated after the issuance of the mandate, and the third 

liquidated after the issuance of the mandate. On February 15, 2002, two days after 

 

(1) modify (other than to correct a clerical error) or revoke a prior

interpretive ruling or decision which has been in effect for at least 60 days;

or 

(2) have the effect of modifying the treatment previously accorded 

by the Customs Service to substantially identical transactions; 

shall be published in the Customs Bulletin. . . . The final ruling or decision 

shall become effective 60 days after the date of its publication. 

6

 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) provides: 

The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any

civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in 

part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 

04-1515 5
Heartland questioned the necessity of denying three rather than just one entry, Customs 

resumed liquidating and reliquidating Heartland’s entries at the TRQ rate. 

On February 26, 2002, the Court of International Trade denied Heartland’s

motion for entry of judgment. Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 

2d 1317 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002) (“Heartland III”). The court vehemently rejected the 

government’s argument that § 1581(h) covers only prospective rather than actual 

entries, “even when the actual entry was the prospective entry contemplated by the 

court when it took jurisdiction of the case, and by the ruling that was the subject of 

[Heartland’s] complaint.” Id. at 1330. The Court of International Trade explained that 

“[w]hile the jurisdictional predicate for § 1581(h) requires that the entries be prospective, 

this must be distinguished from the effect of a judicial decision which can only be useful 

if it is applied to real entries.” Id. The court thus ruled that it continued to have 

jurisdiction to adjudicate issues pertaining to the actual entries covered by Heartland I: 

“To force an importer to seek relief under § 1581(h) to establish its rights, and then force 

it to litigate again when it seeks to enforce those rights with actual entries, would make 

§ 1581(h) superfluous as an avenue of relief.” Id. at 1331. The trial court also observed 

that because its decision in Heartland I remained binding and enforceable until the 

issuance of the appellate mandate, “[a]ny action by Customs that applies the 

[Revocation Ruling] prior to the issuance of the mandate directly flouts the authority of 

this court over rulings under § 1581(h).” Id. 

Nonetheless, the Court of International Trade declined to exercise its jurisdiction 

under § 1581(h) to determine the temporal effect of its ruling in Heartland I, stating that 

a “better alternative” was available to Heartland in this case, namely, jurisdiction under 

04-1515 6
28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). Id. at 1335. The court reasoned that while it had “the option of

ruling on the applicability of § 1625(c) to some of the entries covered by [Heartland’s] 

motion” — specifically, those entered and liquidated prior to December 11, 2001 — it 

would be unable to consider all of the relief requested by Heartland, given the unclear

factual record and the uncertain status of other entries in the liquidation process. Id. at 

1334. The protest process, the court explained, would allow the development of a clear 

factual record. Hence, the court concluded that “[i]n this case, to maintain jurisdiction

under § 1581(h), or extend it under § 1581(i), when another more comprehensive 

avenue is available is unwise.” Id. at 1335. The Court of International Trade thus

entered judgment in accordance with the appellate mandate and dismissed the 

complaint. 

Heartland did not appeal Heartland III. Several months later, Heartland renewed 

its proposal that Customs deny the protest of a single entry to establish jurisdiction 

under § 1581(a). Heartland had filed two such protests, dated March 1 and March 8, 

2002, each covering only a single entry. Despite Heartland’s renewed proposal, on 

December 3, 2002, Customs denied four pending protests, totaling approximately $10 

million in TRQ duties. Customs denied one additional protest worth $26 million in TRQ

duties on February 27, 2003. None of these protests included the single-entry protests 

filed by Heartland. 

On May 29, 2003, Heartland filed a second complaint in the Court of International 

Trade, challenging Customs’ retroactive imposition of TRQ duties on Heartland’s sugar

syrup entries imported in reliance on Heartland I. Both counts of the complaint, the first 

styled under § 1581(h) and the second under § 1625(c), sought declaratory judgment as

04-1515 7
well as a preliminary and permanent injunction. On July 28, 2003, the government 

moved to dismiss Heartland’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the 

alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On July 1,

2004, almost one year later, having heard no oral argument, the Court of International 

Trade dismissed Heartland’s complaint. Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 341 

F. Supp. 2d 1284 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) (“Heartland IV”). 

The Court of International Trade determined that it lacked jurisdiction under both 

§ 1581(h) and § 1581(i).7

 With respect to § 1581(h), the court concluded that it could no 

longer exercise jurisdiction because it “formally relinquished jurisdiction” under that

provision when it denied Heartland’s motion for entry of judgment and dismissed the 

original case in Heartland III. The present action, the trial court reasoned, “[w]hile

 7

 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) provides: 

(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International 

Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception 

set forth in subsection (j) of this section, the Court of International Trade 

shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the 

United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the 

United States providing for-- 

(1) revenue from imports or tonnage; 

(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of 

merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue; 

(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation 

of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health 

or safety; or

4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters 

referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h)

of this section. 

. . . . 

04-1515 8
involving the same parties, entries and underlying dispute as Heartland III . . . is an 

entirely separate, new cause of action. Therefore, Heartland carries the burden of reestablishing the jurisdiction of this court to survive the government’s motion to dismiss.” 

Id. at 1287. The trial court next determined that no new basis for § 1581(h) jurisdiction 

existed. The Court of International Trade found that Heartland could not satisfy the 

requirements of § 1581(h) anew, as all of its entries had already been imported, and no 

prospective entries were in dispute. 

Turning to § 1581(i), the trial court observed that this “catch-all” jurisdictional 

provision “may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of section 

1581 is, or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other 

subsection would be manifestly inadequate.” Id. at 1289. Here, the court explained, 

Heartland’s alleged inability to pay “ruinous” duties on the protested entries did not

alone render a remedy under § 1581(a) manifestly inadequate. Id. (citing, inter alia, 

Am. Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 

The court thus found jurisdiction under § 1581(i) unavailable. Finding no subject matter 

jurisdiction to adjudicate Heartland’s complaint, the Court of International Trade 

dismissed the action. 

Heartland timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(5). 

DISCUSSION 

Heartland makes three main arguments on appeal. First, it contends that the 

Court of International Trade erred by not treating Heartland’s complaint as “an 

independent action” for relief from the judgment of dismissal in Heartland III under Court

04-1515 9
of International Trade Rule 60(b).8

 Such an action, Heartland argues, does not require 

an independent basis for jurisdiction. Second, Heartland asserts that the Court of 

International Trade had continued to possess jurisdiction under § 1581(h) to determine 

the scope of its ruling in Heartland I. This inherent authority, Heartland maintains, did 

not terminate upon the court’s dismissal of the original action in Heartland III. Third, 

Heartland claims the trial court had jurisdiction under the catch-all provision in § 1581(i). 

To that end, Heartland challenges the trial court’s determination that jurisdiction under

§ 1581(a) was not “manifestly inadequate,” rendering § 1581(i) jurisdiction unavailable

as a matter of law. 

The government responds that Heartland’s complaint fails to seek relief from the 

judgment in Heartland III under Rule 60(b), as the complaint mentions neither Rule 

60(b) nor Heartland III. In reply to Heartland’s argument that the Court of International 

Trade continued to have jurisdiction under § 1581(h), the government asserts that the 

court forever relinquished jurisdiction over the original action when it dismissed 

Heartland III, and that the present action constitutes an entirely new, separate case, 

requiring an independent jurisdictional basis. Finally, the government defends the trial 

court’s finding that the alleged adequacy of § 1581(a) rendered jurisdiction under 

§ 1581(i) unavailable, arguing that financial hardship alone does not make jurisdiction 

under § 1581(a) “manifestly inadequate.” 

 8

 Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant part: 

This rule does not limit the power of the court to entertain an independent

action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant

relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28 

U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 

procedure for obtaining relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 

prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. (Emphasis added). 

04-1515 10
We review decisions of the Court of International Trade dismissing for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Xerox Corp. v. United States, 289 F.3d 792, 794 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). We begin with Heartland’s argument that the Court of International 

Trade continued to have jurisdiction under § 1581(h) to determine the scope and effect 

of its decision in Heartland I, an argument that we accept. 

The Court of International Trade concluded that because it “formally relinquished 

jurisdiction” over the original action in Heartland III, jurisdiction under § 1581(h) was no 

longer available. Indeed, in Heartland III, the trial court “declined” to exercise

jurisdiction under § 1581(h) despite correctly finding such jurisdiction did lie. Mindful of

the fact that Heartland IV, not Heartland III, is before us on review, we nonetheless note 

that the Court of International Trade did not have the authority to simply decline to 

exercise jurisdiction conferred by § 1581(h). Such an exercise is not optional. See New 

Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“federal 

courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been 

conferred”). Having assured itself of § 1581(h) jurisdiction over at least some of the 

entries, the trial court should have deferred ruling on the government’s motion to

dismiss pending clarification of the factual record as to other entries or dismissed the 

action without prejudice pending such clarification, rather than entering judgment that 

finally dismissed the action. 

In Heartland IV, despite acknowledging that Heartland’s second action involved 

the same parties, the same entries, and the same underlying dispute as Heartland III, 

the court nevertheless seemed to treat as legally dispositive the fact that it had “finally

relinquished” jurisdiction over the original case in Heartland III. The central issue in this

04-1515 11
appeal is thus whether the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction to review the 

scope of its prior decision in Heartland I, despite its dismissal in Heartland III of the 

original action of which the prior decision was part. We have had occasion to examine 

the underlying question in United States v. Hanover Insurance Co., 82 F.3d 1052 (Fed.

Cir. 1996). There, the United States commenced an action against Hanover, a surety, 

in 1992 to recover unpaid antidumping duties and interest from 1978. The Court of

International Trade granted Hanover’s motion to dismiss the action as barred by the six 

year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). Despite the dismissal,

Customs continued to demand payment and threatened Hanover with administrative 

sanctions, including directing all district and regional directors not to accept any

merchandise covered by bonds underwritten by Hanover and requesting that the 

Treasury Department remove Hanover from the list of approved sureties pursuant to 19 

U.S.C. § 1623. Hanover sought redress from the Court of International Trade by filing a

motion for civil contempt, arguing that the threatened administrative actions

contravened the court’s order dismissing the case as time-barred. 

Concluding that it had “jurisdiction to determine the effect of, and to enforce its 

own judgments,” and therefore power to determine the legal effect of its prior dismissal,

the court enjoined Customs from further administrative attempts to collect the unpaid 

duties and interest. This court affirmed, explaining: 

Like district courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1994), the Court of International 

Trade has the inherent power to determine the effect of its judgments and 

issue injunctions to protect against attempts to attack or evade those 

judgments. The issue before the court on Hanover’s motion for civil 

contempt was whether Customs’ attempt to circumvent the limitation 

period by resort to administrative actions was contrary to the prior order of 

dismissal. Such an inquiry falls squarely within the court’s inherent power 

to determine the effect of its prior judgments. Where a party’s conduct is

04-1515 12
in violation, or evasive, of a prior judgment, the Court of International 

Trade also has authority to enjoin that conduct regardless of whether the 

conduct amounts to civil contempt. 

Id. at 1054. This inherent power, which flows from a federal court’s original authority to 

render a judgment in the case, has been termed “ancillary jurisdiction.”9 As the

Supreme Court has explained: 

We have reserved the use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent

proceedings for the exercise of a federal court’s inherent power to enforce 

its judgments. Without jurisdiction to enforce a judgment entered by a 

federal court, the judicial power would be incomplete and entirely

inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution. 

Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356 (citation and quotation omitted);10 see also Peter Bay 

Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Stillman, 294 F.3d 524, 533 (3d Cir. 2002) (“There is no 

question . . . that the District Court had jurisdiction to interpret the scope of the 

easement ordered by Judge Young in his 1975 decision. It had the jurisdiction pursuant 

to its inherent power to interpret, and thereby effect, the District Court’s own decrees.”

(citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994))). 

As in Hanover, here, the Court of International Trade had ancillary jurisdiction to 

determine the effect of Heartland I on the sugar syrup entries made in reliance on that

judgment before its reversal by our court. Like the motion for civil contempt in Hanover, 

the complaint at issue in this case alleged that Customs’ liquidations and reliquidations 

 9 A federal court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction “(1) to permit disposition 

by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually

interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its

proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Peacock v. Thomas, 

516 U.S. 349, 355 (1996) (citation and quotation omitted). 

10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1585, the Court of International Trade possesses “all 

the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court of the 

United States.” 

04-1515 13
of these entries at the TRQ rate prior to the issuance of the appellate mandate 

contravened the Court of International Trade’s ruling in Heartland I. The Court of 

International Trade, therefore, had jurisdiction to assess the propriety of Customs’ 

allegedly premature liquidations and reliquidations — purportedly violative of its prior 

ruling in Heartland I — despite the dismissal of the original action in Heartland III. In

other words, the dismissal of Heartland III did not deprive the court of its inherent power 

to examine the effect of or ensure compliance with its own prior ruling in Heartland I. 

While federal courts hold the inherent power to enforce their prior judgments, in 

determining the reach of such power, the Supreme Court has “cautioned against the 

exercise of jurisdiction over proceedings that are ‘entirely new and original,’ or where 

‘the relief [sought is] of a different kind or on a different principle’ than that of the prior

decree.” Peacock, 516 U.S. at 357-59 (finding no jurisdiction because the second suit

involved new theories of liability not asserted in and having little connection with the 

original suit) (citations omitted, brackets in original). In this regard, the government 

insists that Heartland’s second suit is wholly distinct from the original action, thus 

requiring an independent jurisdictional predicate. The original case, the government 

alleges, dealt with the validity of Customs’ Revocation Ruling, while this case 

challenges the application of that ruling through a separate statutory provision, namely § 

1625. The government’s view of the two actions is myopic. Both cases, as the 

government implicitly admits, concern Customs’ Revocation Ruling. As the Court of 

International Trade correctly reasoned in Heartland III, “[t]here is an obvious link 

between the restoration of the [Revocation Ruling] by the Federal Circuit, and 

determining the effective date of its application.” 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1334. Like 

04-1515 14
Heartland’s motion for entry of judgment in Heartland III, this action asks the Court of 

International Trade to determine the reach of its own judgment in Heartland I and 

determine the legality of Customs’ liquidations and reliquidations in view of that 

judgment, a task that is always within the court’s jurisdiction.11 See Hanover, 82 F.3d at

1054. 

 Indeed, requiring Heartland to establish jurisdiction under § 1581(a), including 

the payment of TRQ duties on its denied protests, to receive a determination as to the 

proper scope of the trial court’s original ruling under § 1581(h) would frustrate the 

purpose of the latter provision, which was enacted to provide importers with a means for 

obtaining pre-importation relief without having to pay post-importation duties. As the 

Court of International Trade correctly explained in Heartland III, 

Section 1581(h) is an extraordinary instrument, and a significant exception 

to the procedural requirements traditionally placed on those challenging a 

decision by Customs. Historically, in order to challenge a decision like the 

Revocation [Ruling] at issue in this case, it was necessary for a party to 

exhaust remedies available through the administrative agency by filing a

protest with Customs. Exhaustion in such a case also requires plaintiffs to 

pay any duties owed on the entries in question before filing with this court.

Section 1581(h) allows for bypassing these procedural and monetary 

burdens in specific and narrow circumstances, namely, if the importer can 

demonstrate that it would be irreparably harmed unless given an 

opportunity to obtain judicial review prior to [an] importation. 

223 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (citations and quotations omitted). It would defy reason for

Congress to permit Heartland to obtain pre-importation relief from the Court of 

 11 The government also renews an argument rejected by the Court of 

International Trade in Heartland III, that jurisdiction under § 1581(h) cannot lie without

prospective rather than actual entries before the court, as required by the statute. This 

argument only has force if Heartland were required to establish a new basis for 

§ 1581(h) jurisdiction. Because, as we held above, the Court of International Trade has

ancillary jurisdiction to assess the scope and effect of its prior decisions, the fact that no 

prospective entries are at issue is of no moment. 

04-1515 15
International Trade under § 1581(h), yet require it to invoke an entirely separate and 

less favorable jurisdictional basis, § 1581(a), to resolve the scope of that relief. We will 

not impute such intent to Congress. Moreover, settled precedent, discussed above, 

finds a constitutional basis for ancillary jurisdiction to enforce continually its prior 

judgments under the same jurisdictional basis supporting the original ruling. 

Finally, the government proposes that any harm to Heartland, including the $10 

million duty payment needed to meet the requirements for § 1581(a) jurisdiction, is selfinflicted. That is, Heartland chose to rely on the non-stayed but also non-final judgment

in Heartland I to continue its sugar syrup imports, the government contends, and failed 

to challenge the dismissal of the original case in Heartland III, either by filing a motion to 

vacate the judgment or by appealing to this court. While the government’s argument 

has no bearing on the question of the trial court’s jurisdiction over Heartland IV, we note 

that Heartland had little incentive to pursue a costly appeal from Heartland III, especially 

in the face of the trial court’s directive to work out rulings on protests to invoke 

jurisdiction under § 1581(a) and the government’s representations that it would agree to 

an expedient and affordable means for establishing jurisdiction under that provision. 

Heartland’s current predicament, in part a result of the Court of International Trade’s

erroneous dismissal of its motion for entry of judgment in Heartland III and in part a 

result of the parties’ inability to agree on a feasible jurisdictional mechanism, in no way 

precludes Heartland from having the merits of its complaint heard by the Court of

International Trade. 

In sum, the Court of International Trade erred by holding that it lacked jurisdiction 

to determine the temporal scope of its ruling in Heartland I and the effect of our decision 

04-1515 16
in Heartland II on that ruling. Because we hold that the Court of International Trade had 

ancillary jurisdiction to determine the effective date the higher TRQ rates applied to 

Heartland’s sugar syrup imports and thus the legality of Customs’ actions with regard to 

the disputed imports, we need not reach Heartland’s remaining arguments on appeal,

namely, that the Court of International Trade erred by failing to treat its complaint as an

independent action under Rule 60(b), or that the trial court erred in holding that it had no 

jurisdiction to hear Heartland’s complaint under § 1581(i).12

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Court of International Trade 

dismissing Heartland’s complaint is reversed, and this case is remanded for further 

proceedings on the merits. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

 12 Some precedent indicates that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction might

be committed to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D.

Construction Co., 230 F.3d 489, 496 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, 

given its origins in the courts of equity, traditionally has an equitable and discretionary

character.”). To the extent that the Court of International Trade may possess such

discretion, declining to exercise ancillary jurisdiction in this case would constitute an 

abuse of that discretion. 

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