## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

U.S. Ban k National A ss’n v. Prabhakaran , 2013 IL App (1st) 111224

Appellate Court Caption U.S. B ANK NATI ONAL ASSOCI ATI ON, as Trustee for Credit Suisse Fi rs t Bo s t o n He at 2 0 0 5 -5
, P l ai n t i ff -A p p el l ee , v

. J E AN J

. PRABHAKA RAN, Def

endant- Appellant.

District & N o. First District, Six th Division Docke t No. 1-11-1224

Rule 23 Order

filed Rule 23 Order
withdrawn Opinion filed November 30, 2012

Fe bruar y 6, 2013
Fe bruar y 15, 2013

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Ba sed on defe ndant’s participation in plaintiff’s fore closure proce eding s from their beg inning, she was not entitled to use her peti tion under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedur e as an alternative means of seeking relief afte r the confirmation of the judi cial sale of her proper ty , espec ially in view of the languag e of section 15-1509(c ) of the Mortg ag e For eclosure L aw ba

rring such re lief.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 07-CH-21109; the Hon. J ohn C. Griffin, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Ba rbosa L aw Group, P

. C

. , of C hicag o (Ray mond Ba rbosa, of counsel), for a ppellant.

L ocke L ord L L P, of Chicag o (Hugh S. Ba lsam, Simon Fleisc hmann, and Ryan M. Holz, of counsel), f or appe llee.

Panel J USTI CE REYES delivered the judgment of the c ourt, with opinion.* Presiding J ustice L ampkin and J ustice Hall concur red in t h e j u d g ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In this mortg ag e fore closure action, the d ef en d an t , J ea n J

. P rabha

kara n, appea ls the circ uit court of Cook County ’s denial of her petition to vacate the fore closure judgme nt and confirmation of sale pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (Code) (735 I L CS 5/2-1401 (West 2008 ))

. T h e defe ndant alleg es the confirmation of sale was void beca use the plaintiff, U.S. Ba

nk, N.A. (U.S. Ba

nk), as trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston Heat 2005-5 (Credit Suisse), acc epted ad d itional pay ments from the defe ndant afte r the judgme nt of fore closure was enter ed. The defe ndant also asser ts she prese nted a meritorious defe nse in her section 2-1401 petition. F or the rea sons that f ollow, w e aff

irm the judgme nt of the c ircuit court.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On August 8, 2007, Americ a’s Servicing Company (ASC) filed a complaint to forec lose

a mortg ag e ag ainst the defe ndant pursuant to sections 15-1504(a )(1) through (a) (3 ) of the I llinois Mortg ag e For eclosure L aw (F orec losure L aw) (7 3 5 I L CS 5/15-1504(a) (1)- (a) (3) (West 2006)). ASC alleg ed, inter alia
, that the defe ndant was in defa ult of her residential mortg ag e loan in an amount of unpaid principal totaling $130,116.91. ASC brought the suit

as the leg al holder of the indebtedness and attache d to the complaint a copy of the mortg ag e. The mortg ag e identified the defe ndant as the mortg ag or, the CI T Group/Consumer Financ e, Inc., as the l ender
, and Mortg ag e Electronic Reg istration Sy stems, Inc., as the mortg ag ee. The complaint later was amende d to ref lect that the corr ect plaintiff at the time of filing the lawsuit was U.S. B ank, as truste e for Credit Suisse. ¶ 4 A specia l proce ss serve r from Provest, L L C, persona lly serve d th e d ef en d ant with the fore closure complaint on August 10, 2007, at the subject proper ty , 1412 South 6th Avenue in May wood, I llinois

. The defendant, repr esente d by counsel, answere d the complaint and

*J ust ic e Rodol fo Gar ci a ori ginal ly parti ci pat ed in the dis pos it ion of thi s cas e. J ust ic e Gar ci a is no lon ger wit h the app el la te cou rt . The re for e, J ust ic e J ess e Rey es wil l serve in his st ead and has

re ad the b ri ef

s a nd r eco rd andpar ti ci pat ed i n t he d is pos it ionof th is ca se. -2-asser ted s he was not in defa

ult on the l oan unti l U.S. Ba nk ref used t ender of her mortg ag e pay ments. ¶ 5 On J anuar

y 18, 2008, U.S. Ba

nk moved for summary judgme nt, asser ting the defe ndant’s

answe r failed to raise a genuine issue o f m at er i al fac t. In support of i ts motion, U.S. Ba nk submitt ed an aff

idavit of judgme nt detailing the defa ult. The aff

iant, J amie Padmore, aver red that the defe ndant “fa iled to make pay ments in acc ordanc e with the Note sued on here in and the loan is due for the 03/01/2007 pa y ment. Plaintiff e lected to a cce lerate the indebtedness pursuant to the terms of the Mortg ag e and Note, and there is due and owing as of Marc h 11, 2008,” a total of

$147,263.31. ¶ 6 The defe ndant responde d to the summary judgme nt motion on May 28, 2008, asser ting “ong oing mortg ag e pay

ments wer e made by the Def endant to the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s assigns on an ong oing basis to and including Fe bruar y 2008.” The defe ndant contende d the
p l ai ntiff failed to acc ount for those pay ments and instead applied them to the defe ndant’ s

acc ount “in an escr ow defic iency .” The defe ndant responde d that “copie s of all remittance s and verific ati o n o f pay

ments made to the Cook County Assessor” wer e attache d in an exhibi t. Five money

order s and four chec ks with pay ments made to ASC betwee n J anuar y 2007 and De cembe r 2007 we re attached a s unverifie d exhibi ts. ¶ 7 On June 4, 2008, U. S

. Ba n k re p l i ed i n s up p ort of its summary judgme nt motion, contendingthe def

endant’ s response w as not supported by aff idavit. U.S. Ba

nk argued the defe ndant’s failure to include an aff idavit in her response require d the circ uit court to admit the fac tual matters asser

t ed in the plaintiff’s aff

idavit and, thus, no g enuine issue of fac t

rema ined as to the de fenda nt’s defa ult. ¶ 8 The circ uit court grante d U.S. Ba nk’s summary judgme nt motion on J une 10, 2008. The
court also enter ed a judgme nt of fore closure on the same date. The defe ndant did not appea l these finding s. ¶ 9 The proper

ty was subsequently sold to U.S. Ba nk on Dec ember 23, 2009 by judicial sale. On J anuar

y 5, 2010, the circ uit court confirme d the sale and ent er ed an in rem defic iency judgme nt of $100,479.39. The defe ndant did not appea l the court’s order confirming the sale. The judicially appointed selling office r executed a judicial sale deed to U.S. Ba nk on J anuar

y 19, 2010. ¶ 10 On Marc h 15, 2010, the defe ndant filed a pro s e m o t i o n t o stay possession, asserting “modification agree ment in play since Oct. 20, 2009 making new instalament [ sic ] pay ments $1,300.14 per agree ment. First pay ment due and paid J an. 1, 10.” The defe ndant attache d to her motion an October 20, 2009 corr esponde n ce from ASC notifying the defe ndant of “upcoming chang es to your adjustable rate mortg ag e loan interest rate and p aym en t

. The interest rate chang e date for your loan is Dec ember 01, 2009, with a new pay ment eff ective date of J anuar

y 01, 2010.” The corr espondenc e indicated the “new total pay ment (including

escr ow, if applicable ) due on J anua ry 01, 2010 is $1,300.14.” Also attache d to the defe ndant’s mot i o n was a Marc h 4, 2010 corr espondenc e from ASC indicating that it was ref unding the $1,300.14 pay ment made by the defe ndant “bec ause they do not repr esent the total amount due on your ac count.” ¶ 11 The defe ndant appea red in court on Marc h 15, 2010 and cla i m ed s h e was not give n

-3-notice of the fore closure proce eding s. The circ uit court stayed p o s s es s i o n until April 30,

2010. ¶ 12 In response to the defen d an t ’s m o t i o n to stay possession, U.S. Ba nk submitt ed to the
court proof of service of proce ss upon the defe ndant, the appea ranc e of defe nse counsel (who had not withdrawn from the ca s e)
, plaintiff’s notice of motion for judgme nt to defe nse counsel, the response defe nse counsel filed on the defe ndant’s behalf
, the plaintiff’s notice of sale, and notice of motion for order approving sale. U.S. B ank also attache d an aff idavit

aver ring that the defe ndant did not have a loan modification agree ment with the plaintiff in October 2009 or at any point there afte r. Ac co rd i n g to the aff iant, Eliz abeth Mathis, vicepresident of loan documentation for Wells Fa rg o Home Mortg ag e (Wells Fa rg o), U.S. Ba

nk “wa s revie wing the l oan for a possi ble workout plan i n September 2009. This was the last attempt the defe ndant made to contac t the Plaintiff and try any workout options. Any and all
pay ments made afte r September 2009 when the defe ndant was denied a workout plan due to not providing r equire d information wer e re turned.” ¶ 13 On April 27, 2010, new counsel appea red for the defe n d an t

. T h e ci rc u i t court stayed possession for the de fenda nt for an a dditional 21 day s on April 30, 2010. ¶ 14 On May 20, 2010, the defe ndant filed a petition to vacate judgme nt pur suant to section 2-1401. The defe ndant contended the circuit court’s summary j u d gment order was invalid and void “bec ause afte r the entering of the judgme nt, [U.S

. Ba nk] continued to acc epted [ sic ] mortg ag e pay

ments from [the defe ndant] until September 2009.” The defe ndant argued that U.S. Ba nk was unjust ly enric hed at the ex pense of the defendant. “Fa ilure t o set aside thi s defa ult judgme nt will amount to a miscarriag e of justice, uncons ci o n ab l e and a double windfall to [U.S

. Ba

nk] from J une 2009 through September 2009

. ” The petition did not inclu d e an y p ro o f of pay ment by the defe ndant to U.S. Ba nk from June 2009 through September 2009. The only pay ments attache d to the petition wer e made by the defe ndant to Wells Fa rg o/ASC beg inning on October 31, 2009 and ending on May 1, 2010. The defe ndant

asser ted U.S. Ba

nk “should be estopped from asser ting any further rights under the terms of the judgme nt enter ed on J une 8, 2008.” The defe ndant claimed a “go o d and meritorious defe nse to [U.S. Ba

nk’s] cause of action and diligent in pr omptly there afte r prese nting this petition to the Court.” The defe ndant also attache d to her petition an aff idavit reiter ating U.S. Ba nk was unjustly enri ched, the summary judgme nt enter ed was without any fault or neg lige nce of the defe ndant, and the defe ndant has a valid defe nse to U.S. Ba nk’s fore closure action. ¶ 15 In response to the defe ndant’s section 2-1401 petition, U.S. Ba nk claimed the def

endant “ca n no longe r attack judgme nt in this c ase beca use the judicial deed has been delivere d to the succe ssful bidder and as a result, any claim by her is barr ed” as a matter of law pursuant to section 15-1509(c ) o f t h e For eclosure L aw. U.S. Ba nk also argued that section 2-1401 does not apply beca

use the For eclosure L aw provides the exclusive proce dure for fore closure of mortg ag es in I llinois

. Acc ord ing to U.S. Ba nk, “The Code of Civil Procedur e also
g overns, but wh ere any Article of the Code of Civil Procedur e is inconsistent with the [Forec losure L aw], the [F o re cl osure L aw] preva ils,” citing section 15-1107(a), which provides “any other Article of the C ode of Civi l P ro ce du re shall apply unless inconsistent with this Article and, in case of such inconsistency
, shall not be applicable to actions under

-4-this Article.” 735 I L CS 5/15-1107(a) (West 2008). U.S. Ba nk arg ued that the defe ndant not only failed to e stablish that acceptance of postjudgme nt pay ments was wrong ful or unj ust, but a lso f ailed to e stablish that such acc eptanc e provided a basis to invalidate an otherwise
proper fore closure. U.S. Ba nk further asser

ted the defe ndant’s aff

idavit was ent i re ly conclusory

and did not attest to any

of the fa cts set forth in her petition. ¶ 16 The defe ndant replied U.S. Ba nk failed to disclose to the circ uit court that the succe ssful bidder of the proper

ty was U.S. Ba

nk. Acc ording to the defe ndant, U.S. Ba nk “continues to

acc ept mortg ag e pay

ments by Def

endant knowing full well that it no l o n ger owns the
proper ty

. S u ffice it to say that Plaintiff has committed fra ud on Def

endant by acc epting
pay ments on the proper

ty it no longe r owns.” The defe ndant claims she sent U.S. Ba nk a total

o f $12,000, but was returne d only $1,300 of that money

. The defe ndant argued, “In t h e interest of

justice, fairne ss and equity
, Plaintiff’s judgme nt on fore closure should be vacated and set a side.” ¶ 17 On Marc h 25, 2011, the circ uit court heard argument on the defe ndant’s section 2-1401 petition. The court denied the defe ndant’s petition, from which the defe ndant timely appea ls.

¶ 18 ANALYSI S ¶ 19 The defe ndant argues that the circ uit court err ed by denying her section 2-1401 petition beca use “the judgme nt of for eclosure did not contain S. Ct . Rule 304(a) languag e and was
not final and appea lable until afte r the ap p ro v al of the judicial sale.” The defe ndant also challeng es the court’s summary judgme nt ruling

. She contends her answe r to the fore closure complaint raised a g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to whether a defa ult occur red under the mortg ag e. T h e defe ndant claims the m oney order s and checks included in the record were sufficie nt to defe at summary judgme nt. The defe ndant additionally aver s that her section 2- 1401 petition is notbarr ed by the For eclosure L aw a

nd prese nts a meritorious def ense. ¶ 20 U.S. Ba

nk responds that the defe ndant’s section 2-1401 petition was properly denied f or

a nu mber of rea sons. U.S. Ba nk initially notes that the defe ndant chose not to appea l t h e order grantingsummary

judgme nt, the fore closure judgment, or the order confirming

sale. Four months a fter the confirmation of sale and the selling of fice r’s issuanc e of the judicial deed to U.S. Ba

nk, the defe ndant filed her section 2-1401 petition, now alleg ing that the fore closure was void on grounds of unjust enric hment, wai v er , and estoppel beca use U.S. Ba nk acc epted postjudgment pay ments from her. U.S. Ba

nk asser ts the defe ndant abandone d her unjust e nrichment a

rgument here , but is now attempting to re vive a pr evious argument that she was not in defa

ult at the time of fore clos u re

. U.S. Ba nk argues that the issue of whether the defe ndant was in de fault at the time of fore closure should be forf eited beca use she fa iled to raise it in her se ction 2-1401 petition and ra ises it on appeal f or the first ti me. I n a d d ition to forf

eiture, U.S. Ba

nk contends the defe ndant’s section 2-1401 petition is barr e d

as a matter of law under section 15-1509(c ) of the For eclosure L aw. Finally
, U.S. Ba n k

asser ts the defe ndant has failed to establish the require ments of a meritorious section 2-1401 petition. ¶ 21 The defe ndant misstates the proce dural posture of this c ase by arguing the judgme nt of fore closure did not contain Rule 304(a) (I ll. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (e ff. Fe b. 26, 2010)) languag e

-5-and, there fore
, was not a fin al j u d gm ent for purposes of appea l. A mortg ag e fore closure

judgme nt is not final and appea lable until the circ uit court enter s an order approving the sale and direc ting the distribution of the proper ty

. See In re Marriage of Verdung
, 126 I ll. 2d 542, 555-56 (1989). In this case , the circ uit court enter ed an order confirming sale on J anuar y 5, 2010 and the deed on the proper ty was executed in favor of U.S. Ba nk on J anuar

y 19, 2010. Acc ording ly , the orde r conf irming sa le re ndere d this case f inal and appe alable. ¶ 22 Section 2-1401 petitions provide relief from fi n al o rd er s an d judgme nts afte r 30 day s from entry there of. 735 I L CS 5/2-1401 (West 2008). The defe ndant filed her section 2-1401 petition well after 30 day s from the order confirming sale and distribution of the property

. A petitioner is entitled to relief under section 2-1401 if the petition sets forth specific fac tual alleg ati o n s supporting eac h of the following elements: “(1) the exis tence of a meritorious defe nse or claim; (2) due diligenc e in prese nting the defe nse or claim to the circ uit c ourt in the orig inal action; and (3) due diligenc e in filing the s ec t i o n 2 -1401 petition for relief .” Fiala v. Schulenbe rg , 256 I ll. App. 3d 922, 929 (1993). ¶ 23 Our supreme court has held that, whe n a cir cuit court de nies a section 2-1401 petit ion, the standard of revie w to be applied is de novo

. People v. Vincent
, 226 I ll. 2d 1, 14 (2007). We also revie w the rele vant sections of the For eclosure L aw applicable to the dispositi on of this c ase. “The car dinal rule of interpre ting statutes, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islatur e. ” McName e v. Fede rated Equipment & Supply Co. , 181 I ll. 2d 415, 423 (1998). “The plain languag e of a statute provides the most reliable indicator of leg isl at i v e intent, and courts will not depar t from that languag e by rea ding into it exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that conflict with the express leg islative intent. Statutory constructio n i s a qu est ion of law that this court revie ws de novo .” County of Cook v. Illinois Fraternal Order ofPolice Labor Council
, 358 I ll. App. 3d 667, 673 (2005). ¶ 24 The defe ndant’s initial argument that the circ uit co u rt erre d b y gra n t i ngsummary jud gm ent in favor of U.S. Ba nk beca use a g enuine issue of fac t exis ted as to whether a defa ult occur red is raised for the first time on appea l. The defe ndant chose not to appea l the court’s summary judgme nt ruling

. The defe ndant’s section 2-1401 petition and her reply to U.S. Ba nk’s response make no mention of the is sue of whether a default o cc urr ed prior to the entry of the fore closure judgme nt. Arguments not raised befor e the circ uit court are fo rf eited and cannot be raised for the first time on appea l. Village of Ros el l e v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
, 368 I ll. App. 3d 1097, 1109 (2006). Acc ording ly
, the defe ndant has for feited he r argument on this iss ue. ¶ 25 We next turn to the defendant’s a ssertion that her se ction 2-1401 petit ion is not barr ed by section 15-1509( a) of

the For eclosure L aw. Sec tion 15-1509(a) provides:
“Af ter (i) confirmation of the sale, and (ii) pay ment of the purcha se price and any other
amounts require d t o be paid by the purchaser at s ale, the court (or, if the court shall so order
, the person who conducte d the sal e o r such person’ s succe ssor or some persons specific ally appointed by the court for that purpose)
, shall upon the reque st of the holder of the cer tificate of sale *** promptly execute a deed to the holder or purcha ser sufficie nt to convey ti t l e. Such deed shall identify the court and the caption of the case in which

-6-judgme nt was enter ed aut h o ri z i n g issuance of the deed. *** I f the deed issues to a grante e prior to the e x piration of the pe riod for a ppealingthe conf

irmation of sale, a

nd the grante e convey s title to a nother party within that period, that other party will not be deeme d a bona fide purcha s er unless and until such period expires without an appea l having been filed or, an appea l having been filed, such appea l is denied or withdrawn.” 735 I L CS 5/ 15-1509(a) (West 2008). The defe ndant arg

ues “a n appea l of a for eclosure action is anticipated by 15-1509(a ) and a 2-1401 Petition provides the proce dure to reque st the trial court to revie w its final judgme nt in the case .” ¶ 26 U.S. Ba

nk respond s t h at s ec t i o n 1 5 -1 5 0 9 (c ) o f the For eclosure L aw barr ed the defe ndant’s section 2-1401 petition as a matter of law beca use the selling office r had alre ady delivere d a deed to U.S. Ba nk following the circ uit c ourt’s order confirming the sale of the
proper ty

. Acc ording to U.S. Ba

nk, “Rea ding section 15-1509(a ) with section 15-1509(c ), it is rea sonable to conclude that the issuance of the deed before the time to appea l has expired would not bar a mortg ag or from appea ling the confirmation of sale.” (Emphasis in orig inal.) Section 15-1509(c ) states, “Any vesting of title by *** deed pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 15-1509, unless otherwise specifie d in the judgme nt of fore closure, shall be an entire bar of (i) all claims of parties to the fore closure ***.” 735 I L CS 5/15-1509(c) (West 2008). “De livery of the deed executed on the sale of the rea l estate, even if the purcha ser or holder of the cer tificate of sale is a party to the fore closure, shall be sufficie nt to pass t h e title there to.” 735 I L CS 5/15-1509(b) (West 2008). U.S. Ba nk argues applying section 2-1401 petitions to the appea l provision in section 15-1509(a) of the For eclosure L aw would “nullify section 15-1509( c) and leave purcha sers at fore closure sales without repose and forever at risk of sec tion 2-1401 attacks.” ¶ 27 A close rea ding of the plain and sim p l e l an gu age o f s ec t i o n 1 5 -1509(a) does not contemplate the relief the defe ndant seeks. The defe ndant misint erpr eted section 15-1509(a) and only direc ts the court’s attention to the section of the statute that involves the appea l of the confirmation of sale. Notably
, in order for that portion of the clause to apply
, the grante e (in this case, U .S. B ank), must attempt to convey title to another party befor e expiration of the period for ap p ealing the confirmation of sale, which did not occur here

. See 735 I L CS 5/15-1509(a) (West 2008) (“I f the deed issu es to a grante e prior to the expiration of the period for appea ling the confirmation of sale, and the grantee conve ys title to another party withi n that period
, that other party will not be deeme d a bona fide purcha ser unless and until such period expires without an appea l having been filed or, an appea l having been filed, such
appea l is denied or withdra wn.” ( Emphasis added.) ). ¶ 28 In any event, the defe ndant did not file an ap p ea l ch all eng ing the J anuar y 5, 2010 confirmation of sale within the 30-day period require d by I llinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (1). I ll. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (1) (eff

. May 30, 2008) (“The noti ce of appe al must be filed with the clerk o f the circ uit court within 30 day s afte r the entry of the final judgme nt appea led from ***.”). A section 2-1401 petition is not a timely appeal; it is a new action in the circ uit court that seeks vaca tion of a final judgme nt. See Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education
, 201 I ll. 2d 95, 102 (2002) (“The filing of a section 2-1401 petition is considere d

a new proce eding , not a continuation of the old one .”).

-7-¶ 29 The defenda nt did not provide thi s court with any persua sive authority sug g es t i n g that

we c an apply

section 2-1401 petitions to the re levant portions of sec tion 15-1509(a) of the For eclosure L aw. This court has dealt with the issue in a simil ar context involving motions for defa ult judgme nt under Code section 2-1301(e ) (735 I L CS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2008)), which provides that the circuit court may , in its discretion, before final order or j udg ment, set aside any defa

ult and may on motion filed within 30 day s afte r entry there of set aside any final order or judgme nt upon any terms and conditions that shall be rea sonable. In Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Barnes
, 406 I ll. App. 3d 1, 2 (2010), the defe ndant
appea led the circ ui t co u rt’s denial of her petition to vacate the fore closure judgme nt and confirmation of sale. “ ‘The For eclosure L aw g overns the mode of proce dure for mortg ag e fore closures in I llinois [citation] and ‘any i n co n s istent statutory provisions shall not be applicable [citation] .’ ” Id

. at 4 (quoting 735 I L CS 5/15-1107(a) (West 2008)). Section 15- 1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw provides that, afte r the fore closure judgmen t an d judicial sale, the circ uit court shall confirm the sale unless the court finds that (i) a require d notice

was not g iven, (ii) the terms of the sale wer e unconsciona ble, (i i i ) t he sale was conducte d fra udulently
, or (iv) justice was otherwise not done. 735 I L CS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2008). T h e B arnes court rec ognized that section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw was m o re restric tive and, thus, inconsistent with section 2-1301(e ) beca use it limit s the circ uit court’s discretion to ref

use confirmation of the sale to the four statutory grounds. The Barnes court denied the de fenda

nt relief unde r sec tion 2-1301(e) , rea soning:
“I f section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw did not preva il over section 2-1301(e ) of the Code, then the latter would evisce rate the former beca use parties could thwart section 15-1508(b) by filing petitions to vacate nonfinal judgme nts even afte r fore closure sales have been held. Such a pract i ce wo u ld undermine the sales proce ss beca use bidders would have no confide nce that sales would be confirme d. There fore
, defe ndant could not

uti li ze section 2-1301(e ) of the Code to circ umvent section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw afte r [the plaintiff] filed its motion to approve the sale.” Barnes
, 406 I ll. App. 3d at 5. ¶ 30 Fr om a procedura l posture alone, the i nstant case prese nts a more c ompelling e x ample

o f an attempt to circ umvent the For eclosure L aw beca use here
, the judicial sale was completed and confirmed b y the circ uit court on J anuar y 5, 2010. The defe ndant did not challeng e the confirmation of the sale within the 30-day period to appea l. There is simply no I llinois authority to support the defe ndant’s argument that she can utiliz e section 2-1401 to circ umvent section 15-1509(a) or section 15-1509(c ) of the For eclosure L aw afte r the circ uit
court confirme d the sale of the proper ty

. I f there is no relief available to the defe ndant under section 2-1301(e ), it f

ollows log ically that there can be no relief under section 2-1401. It is undisputed that the defendant was a part y t o t h e fo rec losure from its inception and cannot rely upon section 2-1401 as an alternative reme dy once the circ uit c ourt confirme d the sale of the proper

ty

. The clea

r and unambiguous langu age o f section 15-1509(c ) of the For eclosure L aw bars the defe ndant’s claims in her section 2-1401 petition and is dispositi ve. 735 I L CS 5/15-1509(c) (West 2008) (“Any ves t ing of title by *** deed pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 15-1509, unless otherwise specifie d in the judgme nt of fore closure, shall be an entire bar of (i) all claims of parties to the fore closure ***.”). We need not rea ch

-8-the issue of whe ther he r sec tion 2-1401 petition raises a meritorious defense

.

¶ 31 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 32 Ba sed on the fore go i n g, t h e d ecision of the circ uit court of Cook County to deny the defe ndant’s section 2-1401 petition is aff irmed. Section 15-1509(c ) of the For eclosure L aw bars the de fenda

nt’s claims in her se ction 2-1401 petition.

¶ 33 Affir

med.

-9-