The g overnme nt has repr esente d that it is no l ong er se ekingrestra int over the B rown 1 Br others Ha

rriman a ccounts located in Lux embourgbeca use it conce des that the Court has no jurisdiction to restrain those ac counts. See Tr anscr ipt of Marc h 3, 2009 Hea ringat 3-5. Nonethele ss, beca

use the g overnme nt previously soug ht -- and the Court previously enter ed -- a restra ining or der a g ainst the those ac counts, the Court includes them in the ca ption of the ca se. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA
IN RE : Any and all f

und s or otherassets in Brow n Brothers Harrim an & Co. Acc ount #8870792 in the nam e of Tiger Eye Investm ents Ltd.; Anyand a ll funds orot he r as se ts in a ny a nd al l Acc ounts h eld at UBS AG and UBS S ecurit ies LLC, St am for d, C T, byorc ont ain ing anyint e r e sthe ld by or contr olled by Dan iel Valente D antas and /or Ve r oni c a V ale nt e Da nt as , Op por tu nit y G r oup, Oppo r tu nit y F und, O ppor tu nit y U nique F und, inc ludin g butnotlim it e d t o A c c ount#W A3 59 02 5 a nd WA 62 80 69 in t he nam e of Oppo r tu nit y F und; Anyand a ll funds orot he r as se ts in t he foll owing accounts at Brown B rother s Harrim an (L u x emb o u rg ) S . C. A. : A cc o u n t # 6 4 5 9 6 4 8 i n th e n a me of B rown B rother s Harrim an (Luxem bourg) S.C.A. as Cus to dia n forOppo r tu nit y F und; Ac c ount #6459747 in the name of B rown B rother s Harrim an (Luxem bourg) S.C.A. as Custodian for Op portunity F und F BO Op por tu nit y F und- Re se r ve ; A c c ount #6459606 in the name of B rown B rother s Harrim an (Luxem bourg) S.C.A. as Custodian for Op portunity Uniqu e F und , Inc.; Acc ount #6450209 in the nam e of TP SA I nve st m e ntCo r por at ion . Civil Action No. 08-m c-0807

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Be fore the Court is the g overnme nt's a pplication for a

10-day temporar y restra ining order
. To rule on that a

pplication, the Court must resolve a matter of f irst impression: the 1-2-

interpre tation of a statute that g ives fede ral c ourts jurisdiction to restrain prope rty "subje ct to a fore ign f orfe iture or c onfiscation judg ment." 28 U .S.C. § 2467(d)(3). The Opportunity Fund (" Fu n d ") , a t ar geto f t h e r es tra i n i n g o rd er s o u gh th er e, h as o b

j ec t edt o th e go v ern m en t 's application. The Fund is re strained by three order s curr ently

in place a

nd would also be a ffe cted
wer e the Court to g rant the g overnme nt's a pplication for a

new 10- day

temporar y restra ining
or de r. Th e F un d o bje c ts o n s e ve ra l g ro un ds , in c lud ingan a rgume nt t hat, g ive n th e re le va

nt f a c ts, the Court lacks jurisdiction under § 2467( d)(3) to issue a re straining order . As descr ibed in the analy sis below, the Court ag ree s. Although the g overnme nt makes strongpolicy arguments for the authority

it seeks, ultimately

it is asking this Court to provide what Cong ress -- for whatever
rea son -- fa iled to provide in the statute. He nce, the g overnme nt's a pplication for a

10-day temporar y restra ining or der is denie d and the r estrainingorder s now in place will ag ain be dissolved. BACK GR OUND The g overnme nt's a

pplication arises out of c riminal proce eding s pendingin Bra zil . A g e ne ra l f amil iari ty wi th t ho se pr oc e e din g s is he lpf ul. On July 4, 20 08 , s e ve ra l in div idu a ls, inc lud ingDa

nie l V a le nte Da

nta s, we re arr e ste d in

B ra zil. Af

fi davit of Ric ard o A nd

ra de Sa a di ¶ 55. The a rre sts trigg ere d a fa

r-r eac hing B razilian investigation into various financial c rimes alleg edly committed by

the ar rested individuals and the entities they control. I d. ¶¶ 55- 56. Acc ordingto the Br azilian investigators, Mr . Dantas ha d cre ated thre e funds - - includingthe Opportunity

Fund - - to purcha se seve ral public c ompanies beingprivatized in Bra zil . I d. ¶ 31. One of those funds is located in B razil and the other two, inc luding the O pportunity Fund, a re located " offshore ." I d. ¶ 33. The inve stigation appare ntly uncover ed fa cts sug g esting that the-3-

Opportunity

Fund violated a

host of Br azilian securities laws. See id. ¶¶ 34-53. The investigation -- which a

ppear s to be ong oing - - has c aused the Br azilian courts to issue three
re str a ini ngor de rs . T he fi rs t w a s is su e d in July 20 08 , w hil e the oth e r t

wo we re iss ue d in

late F e br ua ry 20 09 . N on e of

tho se or de rs are fi na l. N on e the le ss, on F e br ua ry 26 , 2 00 9, Rita

M. Glavin, the Ac ting Assistant Attorney Gene ral (" AAAG" ), found " that it is i n the intere st of justice to CERTI FY the reque st of the Gover nment of the F eder ative Republic of B razil for
en fo rc em en to f [ th o s e] th re e r es tra i n i n g o rd er s . " S ee M em o ra n d u mi nS u p p o rt o f U n i t edS t at es 's Application for a

RestrainingOrde r (" Gov' t App. Mem." ), Exhibi t 1. This Court became involved with this m atter in late Dec ember 2008. On Dec ember

23, 2008 and De cembe r 29, 2008, the g overnme nt filed emer g ency applications for

restra ining or ders ag ainst the above -ca

ptioned entities. The Court issued those re straining order s on Dec ember 30, 2008. The g overnme nt sought a third restra ining or der on January 9, 2009, which the Court enter ed on January

15, 2009. The a

pplications, eac h of which r elied on the Saa di Affidavit, we re filed ex parte by

the g overnme nt. Each a

pplication assure d the Court of its jurisdiction to enter such orde rs under

28 U.S.C. § 2467(d)(3) a nd pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(j)(1)( A). B ut on Fe bruar y 9, 2009, the Opportunity Fund f iled an eme rg ency

motion to di ssolve the re straining
or de rs . T he F un d a

rgue d th at th e Court

la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n und e r § 24 67 (d )( 3) to e nte r t ho se order s in the first place . Moreove r, eve n if the Court did have jurisdiction, the F und contende d, the g ov e rnme nt a

nd the Court

did no t f oll owthe pr oc e dure s se t out in § 9 83 (j ) i n is su ingtho se order s, as they

wer e statutorily

require d to do. And the Fund obje cted to the Court re lying on e x parte aff idavits to which it had no way to respond. The issues were fully briefe d and the Court he ld a mot ion s h e ari ngon

F e br ua ry 18 , 2 00 9. On

F e br ua ry 24 , 2 00 9, the Court

dis so lve d th os e-4-

or de rs -- e ff

e c tiv e at 1: 00 p. m. o n F e br ua ry 27 , 2 00 9 - - b e c a

us e the y we re no t is su e d in
acc ordanc e with the proc edure s set out in § 983(j). See F eb. 24, 2009 Or der ( dkt ent. #25). The Court did not reac h the Fund' s other ar g uments at that time. On Fe bruar

y 27, 2009 -- but bef

ore the restra ining or ders dissolved -- the g overnme nt filed a motion for a

10-day temporar y restra ining or der pur suant to § 983(j)(3) . At the same time, the g overnme nt filed an a pplication for a

longe r-ter

m restra ining or der pur suant to § 983(j)(1) (B ). The g overnme nt no longe r re lies on the Saadi Aff idavit to just ify

the re straining order s; instead, it relies on the B razilian restra ining or ders a nd the AAAG ' s cer

tification of them. Also on Fe bruar y 27, 2009, the Court stay ed the dissolution of its previous three r estrainingorder s and order ed the F und to respond by Marc h 2, 2009. The Court held a hear ing on Ma

rch 3, 2009 a

nd provided e ach pa

rty with a final opportunity

to submit briefs a

nd to supplement the rec ord by Marc h 4, 2009, which they did. Each pa

rty then also submitted additional information on Marc h 5, 2009. The re cord - - albe it hastily and somewhat sporadica lly compiled -- is now c omplete. AN AL YSI S I. Statutory F ram ework Th e pr inc ipa l st atut e at is su e is 2 8 U .S. C. § 24 67 . It pr ov ide s f e de ra l di str ic t c ourt s w ith jurisdiction to consider applications filed by the United States on beha lf of a f oreig n nation "se ekingto enforc e [a] foreig n forf eiture or confiscation judgment as if the judgme nt had bee n enter ed by

a cour t in the United States." § 2467( c)( 1). The statute define s "f oreig n forf

eiture or
c on fi sc a tio n ju dg me nt" a s " a fi na l or de r o f a

fo re ig n n a tio n c omp e lli nga pe rs on or e nti ty . . . to pay a sum of money

repr esentingthe proc eeds of an off ense . . . or

[] to forfe it property

involved in or trac eable to the commission of such offe nse." § 2467(a) (2).-5-

Section 2467(d)( 3) wa s added a s part of the U.S.A. Patriot Act in 2001. See Pub. L . No. 10 7- 56 , § 32 3, 11 5 St at. 3 92 (O c t. 2 6, 20 01 ). Th e te xt fo llo ws : (3) P rese rvation of p roperty.-- (A ) I n ge ne r al. --To pr eser ve the availability

of prope rty

subject to a fo re ig n f or fe iture or

c on fi sc a tio n ju dg me nt, the Go ve rnme nt m ay a pp ly fo r, and the c ourt may iss ue , a re str a ini ngor de r p ur su ant t o s e c tio n 9 83 (j ) of tit le 18 , at any

tim e be fo re or

a ft e r a n a pp lic a tio n is fi le d p ur su ant t o subsection (c )(1) of this section. (B) Evidence. --The court, in issuing a restra ining or der unde r subpar ag raph ( A)-- (i) may re ly on inf or matio n s e t f

or th i n a n a ff ida vit descr ibing the nature of the proce edingor investigation underwa

y in the fore ign c ountry , and setting f orth a re asonable basis to believe that the proper ty to be re strained will be named in a judgme nt of forf

eiture at the conclusion of suc h proce eding ; or (ii) may reg ister and e nforc e a r estrainingorder that has bee n issued by

a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction in the fore ign c ountry

and ce rtified by

the Attorney Gene ral pursua

nt to subsection (b)(2)
. (C ) L im it on g r ounds forobj e c ti on. --No pe rson may object to a restra ining or der unde r subpar ag raph ( A) on a ny g round that is the su bje c t of pa ra lle l li tig a tio n invo lvi ngthe same pr op e rt y that is pendingin a fore ign c ourt. The Patriot Act made sever al other c hang es to § 2467 as we ll. The notice provisions in §§ 2467(b)( 1)(C) a

nd 2467(d)( 1)(D) wer e ame nded to incorpor ate due proce ss require ments. Mo re ov e r, langua g e wa s a dd e d to the de fi nit ion of " fi na l f or fe iture or

c on fi sc a tio n ju dg me nt" in § 2467(a) (2) to re quire " dual forf eitability " - - i.e., re quiring the ac ts forming the basis of the fore ign judg ment to be illeg al under both foreign and U.S. law. In amendingthe def inition of "f oreig n forf

eiture or confiscation judgment," howeve r, the Patriot Act did not re move the-6-

require ment that such a judg ment be a " final orde r." II. Interplay Between 28 U.S.C. § 2467(d)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 983(j) In dissolving the re straining order s on Fe bruar y 24, 2009, this Court addressed the int e rp lay be tw e e n 2 8 U .S. C. § 24 67 (d )( 3) and 18 U. S.C. § 9 83 (j ). Th e Court e xami ne d th e pla in languag e of § 2467( d)(3) , which provide s that "the court may issue[] a re straining order pursuant to s e c tio n 9 83 (j ) o f t itl e 18 ." Th e Court fo c us e d o n th e phra se " purs ua nt t o, " ho ldi ngthat it "r equire s the g overnme nt and this Court to follow the procedur es set out in § 983(j) whe n seekingand issuing r estrainingorder s under § 2467( d)(3) ." F eb. 24, 2009 Or der at 2 (citing Bla ck' s L aw Dic tionary

1250 (7th ed. 1999)) . The Court held that whatever the merits of the go v ern m en t 's i n t er

p re t at i o no f t h e p h ra s e - - " s o m et h i n g l i k e 'gu i d edb y th e p ri n ci p l es s etfo rt hi n '" -- mig ht be from a

policy perspe ctive, the statutory languag e wa s unambig uous. I d. at 2. Moreove r, the Court noted that while " the provisions of § 983(j) do not mesh pre cisely with the restra ining or der c ontemplated under § 2467(d)( 3)," the § 983(j) pr ovisions certainly provided a
wo rk a ble pr oc e dure fo r i ssu ing§ 2 46 7( d) (3 ) r e str a ini ngor de rs . I d. 2- 3. Th e Court a dh e re s to its previously -ar

ticulated interpr etation of the inter play betwee n 28 U.S.C. § 2467(d)(3) a nd 18 U.S.C. § 983(j). Be cause the g overnme nt and this Court did not comply with the proce dures se t out in § 983(j) in issuing the pre vious restrainingorder s, those order s will ag ain be dissolved. In its curre nt applications for f irst a 10-da

y and then a

longe r duration restrainingorder , the g overnme nt has proce eded unde r § 983(j), which sets out three proce dures f or issuing restra ining or ders. F irst, a cour t may issue a re straining order

upon the g overnme nt's f

iling of a civil forfe iture complaint. See 18 U .S.C. § 983(j)(1)(A) . Second, a c ourt may issue a re straining
or de r u po n th e g ov e rnme nt' s e x part e a pp lic a tio n, wi tho ut n oti c e or op po rt un ity fo r a he ari ng , ifFor the long er dur ation restra ining or der it also see ks, the g overnme nt proce eds under § 2 983(j)(1) (B ). -7- the c ourt is p e rs ua de d " that th e re is p ro ba ble c a us e to b e lie ve that th e pr op e rt y wi th r e sp e c t to
w h ic hth e o r d e r

is s o u g h t i s s u

b je c t t o c iv il f

o r f e it ur e an d th a t p r o v is io no f

n o ti c e w il l j e o p ar d iz e the ava ilability

of the prope rty

for f orfe iture." I d. § 983(j)(3) . Third, a c ourt may issue a restra ining or der, " eff

ective f or not more than 90 da

y s, unless ext ended by

the cour t for g ood
cause shown," if it determines, " afte r notice to pe rsons appe aringto have a n interest in the proper ty and opportunity

for a hear ing," that there is a " substantial probability " that the g ov e rnme nt w ill pr e va il o n th e iss ue of fo rf e iture , th a t th e pr op e rt

y wi ll n ot b e pr e se rv e d a

bs e nt a
re str a ini ngor de r, and

that th e ne e d to pr e se rv e the pr op e rt y " outw e ig hs the ha

rd sh ip o n a

ny pa rt y ag ainst whom the order

is to be entere d." I d. § 983(j)(1) (B ). The g overnme nt asks the Court to gr ant its application for a 10-day temporar y restra ining order pursuant to the sec ond methodology outlined above - - i.e., pursua nt to § 983(j)(3). The 2 Fund r esponds that the g overnme nt cannot mee t the require ments of § 983(j)( 3) bec ause the proper ty to be re strained is not " subject to civil forfe iture." But the Court ne ed not addr ess that argument beca

use, as discusse d below, it ag ree s with the Fund that the Court lac ks jurisdiction under § 2467( d)(3)
. III. Th e Court 's Jurisd iction Under 28 U.S.C. § 2467(d)(3) Analy sis of this st atutory

construction issue beg ins from the pre mise that statutes confe rringjurisdiction on the fede ral c ourts should be " strictly construed." See United States v. Central Eure ka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 178-79 (1958); Har din v. Cit y Title & Esc row Co., 797 F.2d 1037, 1040 ( D.C. Cir. 1986). Moreove r, " [t ]he party invoking f

eder al jurisdiction bear s-8-

the burde n of establishing " that the court ha s jurisdiction to t ake the action it reque sts. See Lujan v. Def ender s of Wildl ife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) . And it is a "unive rsally rec og nized rule of the common law that, a

bsent jurisdiction, a court c an re nder no judg ment . . . ." B uckhannon B d. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virg inia Dep' t of Hea lth and Human Resourc es, 532 U.S. 598, 633 n.6 (citations and inter

nal quotations omitt ed). Working fr om those premises, the Court must interpre t whether 28 U.S.C. § 2467(d)(3) confe rs jurisdiction to gr ant an a pplication for a

10-day temporar y restra ining or der in this case
. The pa rties have identified no prior c ourt dec isions addressingthis iss ue, and this Court has found none. The applicable rules of statutory interpre tation, however , are firmly established. A court " must first determine whe ther the statutory text is plain and unambig uous." Calc ieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. ___, No. 07-526, slip op. at 7 (F eb. 24, 2009) ( citing United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997)). T o interpre t the statutory text , courts beg in by

examining statutory definitions. See B urg ess v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 1577 (2008) (" ' Statutory definitions control the mea ning of statutory words . . . in the usual c ase.' ") (quoting L awson v. Suwannee Fr

uit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S . 198, 201 (1949)) ; Stenbergv. Carhar t, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2 00 0) (" Whe n a

statut e inc lud e s an e xplic it d e fi nit ion , w e mus t f oll owthat de fi nit ion , e ve n if it
va ri e s f ro m th at te rm ' s o rd ina

ry me anin g ." ). Court s sh ou ld a lso loo k to the " ' sp e c if ic c on te xt in which [statutory ] l anguag e is used, and the broade r conte x t of the statute as a whole.' " United States v. Wi lson, 290 F.3d 347, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ( quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil C o., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). Unless g iving f ull meaning to the statutory text is absurd, a statute is not
ambi g uo us . L amie v. U. S. T ru ste e , 5 40 U. S. 5 26 , 5 34 (2 00 4) (c iti ngHa rt fo rd Un de rwri te rs Ins . Co. v. Union Pl anter s Ba

nk, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) . "When the w ords of a statute are-9-

unambig uous, then, this first canon is also the last: ' judicial inquiry

is complete.' " Conne cticut Nat' l Ba nk v. Ger main, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (quotingRubin v. United St ates, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981))
. To deter mine whether

§ 2467(d)( 3) is ambig uous, the Court beg ins with the statutory definition. Section 2467(d)(3) (A) grants district cour ts the jurisdiction to i ssue re straining order s "[t]o preserve the ava ilability of prope rty

subject to a for eig n forf

eiture or confiscation judgme nt." Sec tion 2467(a) is the " definitions" se ction of the statute a nd it defines only

two te rm s: " fo re ig n n atio n" and " fo rf e iture or c on fi sc a tio n ju dg me nt. " Th e latte r t e rm is d e fi ne d in fu ll a s f oll ow s: (2) th e t erm"f

o rf ei ture o r c o n fi s ca t i o nj u d gm en t " m ea n s a f i n al o rd er o f afo re i gn nation compelling a per son or entity -- (A) to p ay

a sum of mon e y re pr e se nti ngthe pr oc e e ds of an o ff e ns e descr ibed in Article 3, Par ag raph 1, of the United Nations Convention, any

violation of fore ign la

w that would constitute a violation or an off

ense f or which pr operty

could be f

orfe ited under Fe dera l law if the off

ense w ere committed in the United States, or any fore ign of

fense descr ibed in section 1956(c )(7) (B ) of title 18, or prope rty

the value of

which cor

responds to such pr ocee ds; or (B) to forfe it property

involved in or trac eable to the commission of such of fense
. 28 U.S.C. § 2467(a)(2) . Acc ordingto the Fund, the de finition of "f orfe iture or c onfiscation judgme nt," c oupled with the jurisdictional g rant in § 2467(d) (3)( A), mea ns unequivoca lly

that U.S. courts only

have jur isdiction to enter re straining order s based on f oreig n judgme nts if the fo re ig n ju dg me nt i s f

ina l. The g overnme nt responds that a f oreig n judgme nt need not be f inal beca use the jurisdictional gr ant applies whe n proper ty is "subjec t to" a f

oreig n judgme nt. Under theT h e go v ern m en t 's re fe re n ce s t o d i ct i o n ary d ef i n i t i o n s ar e u n h el p fu l
. Be cau s e B l ac k 's 3 L aw Dic tionary

does not contain a

definition for " subject to," the g overnme nt provides the definition of " confisca

ble." But that wor d contains the suff ix "- able," and henc e is almost by d ef i n i t i o np ro s p ec t i v e. T h e go v ern m en tal s o p ro v i d es th e d ef i n i t i o no f " s u

b j ec t " f ro mW eb s t er 's I INew River side University Dictionary . But that ter

m is too broad and multi-fac eted to provide insight as to the pr ecise leg al question the Court addre sses here . Indeed, the dictionary definitions of " subject" in its adjective for m, and the many

examples of the use of " subject to," neither suppor

t nor definitively

fore close the pr ospective me aningthe g overnme nt urg es. See Webster' s 3d New Int'l Dic tionary 2275 (1993) The B razilian restra ining or ders that the g overnme nt relies upon in its application for a 4 temporar y restra ining or der do not qua lify as " final" order s under the statutory definition of "f orfe iture or c onfiscation judg ment." B ut those restra ining or ders likely would not meet that statutory definition even if Cong ress ha d not expressly included the r equire ment of a f inal order in t he de fi nit ion . Se c tio n 2 46 7( a )( 2) de fi ne s " fo rf e iture or c on fi sc a tio n ju dg me nt" a s a n o rd e r " to -10- g overnme nt's inter

pretation, the term " subject to" is prospective - - eve n under the plain statutory languag e of the term. To support this interpre tation, the g overnme nt points out that other statutes using similar languag e ar e interpr eted suc h that "subje ct to" is prospe ctive. See G overnme nt Post-Hear ing Me m. (" Gov' t Post -HrgMem." ) at 7. F or example, 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)( 1) and 19 63 (b ) a nd 21 U. S.C. §§ 88 1( a ) a

nd 85 3( a ) a ll u se the te rm

" su bje c t to fo rf

e iture ," wh ic h c ourt s interpre t prospectively . I d. (citingUnited States v. Riley , 78 F.3d 367, 368 ( 8th Cir. 1996); United States v. McKinney , 915 F.2d 916, 920 ( 4th Cir. 1990)). B ut, if any thing, these examples support the Fund, not the g overnme nt. The examples demonstrate that Congre ss does, on
occa sion, use the phra se " subject to forf eiture," which is meant prospe ctively . Yet in § 2467, Congr ess has c hosen to use a dif fer ent phra se -- "subje ct to a for eig n forf eiture or confiscation judgme nt" - - and ha s expl icitly define d that phrase in § 2467(a)( 2) to mean a final orde r. On the

3 fac e of the statute, that definition applies to the later -adde d jurisdictional gr ant in § 2467(d)( 3). Henc e, the Court agree s with the Fund that § 2467(d) (3) by definition only

g rants jurisdiction for dis tr ic t c ourt s to iss ue re str a ini ngor de rs ba se d o n f ina l f or e ig n ju dg me nts . 4pay

a sum of money ," § 2467( a)( 2)(A) , or " to forfe it property ," se e § 2467(a )(2) (B ). Such orde rs to pay or for feit ar e norma lly

only enter ed at the c onclusion of a pr ocee ding. Arestra ining or der, in c on tr a st, sim

ply pr e se rv e s th e status qu o, and he nc e is a

te mpo ra ry me a sure e nte re d p ri or

to the conc lusion of a proc eeding
. -11- Such an explicit st atutory definition would in most i nstance s end the inquiry . See Bur g ess, 128 S.Ct. at 1577; S tenber g , 530 U.S. at 942. In this case, howe ver, the g overnme nt argues that the disposition required by the statute is absurd if the definition is taken literally . The Court wi ll the re fo re a lso e xami ne the c on te xt of § 2 46 7( d) (3 ) t o d e te rm ine wh e the r t he statut e is nonsensical if inter

prete d literally . See L amie, 540 U.S. at 534; Wils on, 290 F.3d at 353. The g overnme nt contends that two provisions in particular -- §§ 2467( d)(3) (B )(i) a

nd 2467(d)( 3)(C) -- would be meaning less if a for eig n forf eiture judg ment must be final bef ore a U.S. court has jurisdiction under § 2467(d) (3). Sec tion 2467(d)(3)( B) (i) sets out one kind of e vidence a cour t may consider in r

uling on a g overnme nt application for a restra ining or der: (B) Evidence. --The court, in issuing a restra ining or der unde r subpar ag raph ( A)-- (i) may rely on information set for

th in an aff

idavit describingthe n ature o f t h e p ro ce ed i n g o r i n v es t i gat i o nun d erwa y i nth e f o re i gn country , and settingforth a r easona ble basis to believe that the proper ty to be re strained will be named in a judg ment of for feiture at the conc lusion of such proce eding
. . . . Section 2467(d)( 3)(C) f

orbids a re strained e ntity

from objec ting " on any

g round that is the
subj ectof p aral lel li ti gati on in vo lv in g the s ame pro pert y th at i s p end in g in a f

orei gn cou rt ." Acc ordingto the g overnme nt, §§ 2467(d)(3) (B )(i) a nd 2467(d)( 3)(C) c annot be
re co n ci l edwi thth e s t atu t o ry d ef i n i t i o no f " fo rf

ei ture o r c o n fi s ca t i o nj u d gm en t " as re qu i ri n g a fi n al o rd er . S ec t i o n2 4 6 7 (d )( 3 )( B) (i ) p ro v i d es th ata c o urt m ay co n s i d er an af fi d av i td es cr i b i n g a

" pr oc e e din gor

inv e sti g atio n und e rw ay " in a fo re ig n c ountr

y wh ic h s e ts f

or th " a re a so na ble ba sis-12-

to believe that the pr operty to be re strained will be named in a judg ment of for feiture at the conclusion" of the proc eeding . Simi larly , § 2467(d)( 3)(C) de scribes pa rallel litigation "pending in a fore ign c ourt." Both sec tions, the argument g oes, conte mplate ong oing or pending pr oc e e din g s. B ut i f a

" fo rf e iture or c on fi sc a tio n ju dg me nt" mus t be fi na l f or a dis tr ic t c ourt

to have jur isdiction to i ssue a r estrainingorder , then the g overnme nt could never supply evidenc e under § 2467( d)(3) (B )(i) a nd the limitation on obj ections provision in § 2467(d)(3) (C) would be rende red sur

plusag e. The F und proposes a

way to rec oncile the statutory definition of " forf

eiture or
c on fi sc a tio n ju dg me nt" wi th t he se e min g ly

fo rw ard -l oo kin g pr ov isi on s o f § § 2 46 7( d) (3 )( B )( i)
and 24 67 (d )( 3) (C ). Se e F un d' s Po st- He ari ngMe m. at 2. Th e F un d hy po the size s a

sit uatio n in which a f oreig n country

has issued a f

inal judgme nt of forf

eiture or confiscation but enforce ment
o f t h atj u d gm en th as b ec o m e a ni s s u e. A p o s t -j u d gm en tp ro ce ed i n g co u l d en s u e i nth e f

o re i gn country . Duringthe pende ncy of that post-judg ment proce eding , the fore ign c ountry might see k help from the U .S. gove rnment if asse ts in the United States could be used to e ffe ctuate the judgme nt. Under the Fund' s scena rio, the U.S. g overnme nt might, at that point, invoke § 2 46 7( d) (3 ) a

nd su bmi t an a ff

ida vit un de r § 24 67 (d )( 3) (B )( i) to s up po rt a re str a ini ngor de r a s to
s p ec i fi c p ro p erty

th ati s th e s u

b j ec to f t h e p o s t -j u d gm en t(i
. e. , p o s t -f i n al o rd er ) f

o re i gn proce eding . Simi larly , the limitation on obj ections provision from § 2467(d) (3)( C) could be invoked if the e ntity

to be re strained objec ted in the United States on the same g rounds that have be e n r a ise d in

the po st- jud g me nt p ro c e e din g s p e nd ingin t he fo re ig n c ourt . T o b e sure , r e a d in isolation, §§ 2467(d)(3)( B) (i) and 2467( d)(3) (C) would see m to contemplate a br oader application than the F und proposes. B ut coupled with the explicit st atutory definition in-13-

§ 2 46 7( a )( 2) , th e F un d' s p ro po se d r e c on c ili a tio n a pp e ars wo rk a

ble -- e sp e c ia lly

be c a us e po stjudgme nt enforc ement proc eeding s are not altoge ther unc ommon. The ke y question, then, is whether confiningthe statute to scena rios like the one sug g ested by

the Fund r ender s § 2467(d)(3) absurd. I f so, then the Court must consult other canons of statutory construction, such a s the leg islative history . Although the re is no brig ht-line te st f or " a bs ur dit y ," the Sup re me Court

ha s se t f or th s e ve ra l pr inc ipl e s th a t he lp i de nti fy wh a t is
no t a bs ur d. A c on str

uc tio n r e su lti ngin a

n " awk wa rd " or " un g ra mmatic a l" statut e is n ot a bs ur d to the po int of ambi g uit y . L amie , 5 40 U. S. at 53 4. No r i s a n inte rp re tatio n th a t r e nd e rs so me te rm s surplusag e. I d. at 535. A statute is not absurd e ven if the litera l lang uag e is an " appar ent dra fting
e rr or ." I d. a t 53 0. A s tatut e that is na rr ow e r o r b ro a de r t

ha n mi g ht at f

ir st b lus h s e e m se ns ibl e is likewise not absurd. Ma

ryland & D.C. Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Washing ton, 442 F.2d 123, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In any

of these instanc es, the Supreme Court has observe d, "[t]he remedy for any dissatisfaction . . . lies with Congr ess and not with this Court. Congre ss may amend the statute; we may

not." Gr iffin v. Oce anic Constrac tors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982). I f § 2467(d) (3) we re c onstrued litera lly , then cour ts would only

have jur isdiction to i ssue restra ining or ders a s part of post-judg ment enfor ceme nt proce eding s. The g overnme nt argues that th is r e a din g is s o n arr owa s to re nd e r t he statut e a

nu lli ty . G ov ' t Po st- Hr g Me m. at 8. B ut a statut e is o nly

a " nu lli ty " wh e n it

" me ans no thi ng " or

wh e n it ha s " no purp os e ." Se e Re ta il Clerks Int'l Ass' n L ocal No. 455, A FL -CI O v. NL RB, 510 F .2d 802, 805-06 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Her e, § 2467(d) (3) a s written has some pur pose, eve n if it is not as broad a jurisdictional g rant a s the g overnme nt would like. Nor is that purpose of § 2467(d)( 3) inconsistent with the rema inder of § 2467. To be sur e, the Court ac knowledg es the g overnme nt's pr otests that it would be-14-

pref era ble, from a

policy perspe ctive, to interpre t the statute more br oadly . But statutes confe rringjurisdiction on the fede ral c ourts must be strictly construed, se e Centra l Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 178-79, a nd "[t]he party

invoking f

eder al jurisdiction bear s the burden of establishing" that the cour t may take the a ction reque sted, see L ujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Where, a s here , Congr ess has provide d a " definitions" se ction and explicitly define d the key

term --

" fo rf e iture or c on fi sc atio n ju dg me nt" -- to p re c lud e the jur isd ic tio n s ou g ht, that bu rd e n s imp ly cannot be met. When it comes to policy decisions, the Court must defer to the judgme nt of the political, law-makingbodies that cre ated the la w. L amie, 540 U.S. at 542; Griff in, 458 U.S. at 576. I f s tatut or

y te xt is unambi g uo us , a

c ourt ' s c on str

uc tio n o f t

he statut e is c omp le te . Co ur ts need not - - indee d, they

may not -- consult the leg islative history in an attempt to divine Con g re ss' s inte nt. Se e Conne c tic ut N a t' l B ank , 5 03 U. S. at 25 4. He nc e , th e re is n o c a us e he re to
resor t to an assessment of the leg islative history . Nonethele ss, the parties have on short notice compiled what little leg islative history exis ts reg arding§ 2467(d)( 3). Usingthe term " leg islative history " loose ly , the re cord inc ludes: a pape r pre sented by then-Assistant Chief of the Asset For feiture and Money

L aunder ing Sec tion of the Depa rtment of Just ice, Stefa

n D. Cassella, at an In t e r n a t i o n a l S y

mp o s i u mo nE c o n o m i c C r i m e o nS e p t e mb e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 1 ; a

l e t t e r f r o mD an i e l J. Br y ant, then-A ssistant Attorney Gene ral, to the Speaker of the House on Septe mber 25, 2001, attachinga dra ft bill and a sec tion-by -sec tion analy sis of that bill; versions of the bills containing the languag e that ultimately beca me § 2467(d)( 3), beg inning with the introduc tion of H.R. 2979 on October

2, 2001 and endingwith the passag e of the Patriot Act on Octobe r 26, 2001; testimony from a Senate hea

ringon September 26, 2001; a nd a House Report, H. Rept. 107-250-15-

(2001), de scribingcer

tain statutory

provisions that were ultimately incorporated into the Patriot Act. The re cord r evea ls that Mr. Cassella proposed la ng uag e that wa s in most s ubstantive respe cts identical to what beca me § 2467(d)( 3), except that his proposal explicitly g rante d district court jurisdiction to issue restra ining or ders ba sed on non-f inal fore ign f

orfe iture or c onfiscation order s. L ess than two we eks af ter Mr. Casse lla' s prese ntation, the J ustice De partment propose d a bill to C ong ress that include d languag e that wa s substantively identical to the fina l § 2467(d)(3) languag e, but that omitted Mr. Cassella' s lang uag e g rantingexpli cit jurisdiction to is sue restra ining or ders ba sed on non-f inal fore ign f

orfe iture or c onfiscation orde rs. Over the cour se of th e n e x tm o n th , th e l an g u a g e th atu l t i m a t e l y b e c am e § 2 4 6 7 ( d ) ( 3 ) d i d n o tc h an g e m a t e r i a l l y . In oth e r w or ds , w hat th e Justi c e De pa rtme nt p ro po se d to Con g re ss - - b ut n ot what Mr . Ca sse lla p r o p o s e d i nh i s p r e s e n t at i o n- - u l t i m at e l y b e c am e l aw . T h e H o u s e R e p o rtan d th e s e c t i o n - b ysection ana ly sis by

the J ustice De partment only shed minimal light on leg islative intent. The Ho us e Re po rt , f

or e xamp le , s tate s th at § 2 46 7( d) (3 ) " ame nd s [§ 2 46 7( d) ] to i nc lud e a me c ha nis m fo r p re s erv i n g p ro p erty

s u b j ec tt o fo rf

ei ture i na f

o re i gnco un try , " an d

al s o re fe rs t o "p en d i n g" forf eiture pr ocee dings in a

fore ign c ourt. See H. Rep. 107- 250 at 59. This history

is murky at best. Some portions of the re cord, like Mr . Cassella' s paper and the Justi c e De pa

rtme nt' s p ro po se d la

ngua g e , a re no t " le g isl a tiv e " his tor

y a t a ll. Othe r p or

tio ns , lik e the Ho us e Re po rt ' s u se of the wo rd " pe nd ing ," re a lly

on ly re fe r t o th e langua g e in t he statut e itself. And althoug h the House Repor t states that § 2467(d)( 3) provides " a mec hanism for prese rvingproper

ty subject to forf

eiture in a fore ign c ountry ," that is hardly the kind of cle ar statement of leg islative intent that would warr ant sec ond-guessing the undeniable expression of-16-

leg islative intent contained in the statute itself. Indeed, the term " subject to forf eiture" in the House Repor

t is the very

phrase Congr ess could have used in § 2467(d)( 3) -- as it has in other statut e s - - b ut c ho se no t to . T he re fo re , a s in L amie , " [t]he se un c e rt a int ie s il lus tr a te the dif fi c ult y of re lying on le g islative history here and the a dvantag e of our deter mination to rest our holding on the statutory

text ." 540 U .S. at 542. Henc e, the Court holds that the plain languag e of the statute only confe rs jurisdiction on fede ral district cour

ts when prope rty

is subject to a final for eig n forf eiture or confiscation judgme nt. This interpretation, while na rrowe r than the g overnme nt would like, is compelled by the g overningunequivoca l statutory definition and is neither a bsurd nor inconsistent with the other provisions of the statute. T he Court nee d not rely on any other c anon of statutory construction to re ach this conc lusion. Under this interpre tation, it follows that thi s Court lacks jurisdiction to enter an or der r estrainingproper ty in this case bec ause the three Br azilian orders
are indisputably

not final. Indeed, the Fund c orre ctly points out t hat the Court lacke d jurisdiction to enter a ny restra ining or der in the f

irst place. IV. Whether t he Court Shoul d Decline to Re gister t he Brazilian Orders T h e F un d ar gu es i nth e a l t ern at i v e t h atth e C o urt s h o u l d d ec l i n e t o gra n tth e go v ern m en t 's application eve n if it has jurisdiction. See Fund' s Opp' n to the United States' s Application for a TRO at 14. The F und points out t hat the thre e B razilian order s were all enter ed ex parte a nd that U.S. courts ar e rig htly

skeptical of e x parte proce eding s. The F und also argues that under B ra zilia n la w, its a sse ts w ill no t be re le a se d unti l th e un de rl yingc ri min a l pr oc e e din g s in B ra zil
are c omp le te , w hic h c ou ld t ake y e ars . T he F un d a lso a sse rt s th a t it wo uld be ine qu ita

ble to
con ti nu e res tr ain in g it s as set s. As th e Fun d p oi nt s o ut , i t d idno t r emo ve as set s fr om it s U BS-17-

ac co un t s fr o mJ u l y

2 0 0 8 (w h en th e f

i rs tBr az i l i an re s tra i n i n g o rd er wa s i s s u ed ) t h ro u gh De c e mbe r 3 0, 20 08 (whe n th is C ourt fi rs t e nte re d a

re str a ini ngor de r) . H e nc e , th e F un d ave rs , the g ov e rnme nt h a s ma de no sh ow ingthat th e re is p ro ba ble c a us e to b e lie ve that th e ava ila bil ity of the F und' s assets for f

orfe iture will be jeopa

rdized without a restra ining or der, se e § 983(j)( 3),
or , p ut d if fe re ntl y , th at th e re is a

re a l thre a t of

imm e diate , ir

re pa ra ble inj ur y , s e e F e d. R. C iv. P. 65(b). F inally , the Fund note s that it has, as of the date of this Orde r, had its assets re strained f or 68 da y s e ve n th ou g h th e g ov e rnme nt h a s n ot o bta ine d a pr op e rl y -i ssu e d r e str a ini ngor de r. Som e of these a rguments, if develope d further , might provide an additional basis for denying the g overnme nt's a

pplication. Suffice it to say now that, as it stands today , the re cord is lac king. F or example, give n the time constraints, both sides have submitt ed hastily -compiled e x planations of B ra zilia n la w r e g ard inga

re str a ine d th ir d- pa

rt y ' s o pp or tun ity to b e he ard

the re . T he Court

wi ll not addre ss these ar g uments further here beca

use, as de scribed in de tail above, it has de termined th ati tl ac k s j uri s d i ct i o n . M o re o v er , i nth e e v en tth i s l i t i gat i o nco n t i nu es o nth e go v ern m en t 's
a pp lic a tio n f

or a lon g e r- te rm

re str a ini ngor de r, the pa

rt ie s w ill no do ub t su

pp le me nt t

he re c or d to pr ov ide a mor e inf or me d b a sis fo r a

de c isi on on so me of the se iss ue s. CO NC LU SION Fo r t h e r ea s o n s d es cr i b edab o v e, th e C o urt l ac k s j uri s d i ct i o nt o gra n tth e go v ern m en t 's application for

a 10-da y temporar y restra ining or der. The ref ore, that reque st is denied. Moreove r, the Court has de termined that it lacke d jurisdiction to is sue the re straining order s previously

dissolved but now ag ain brief ly in place. T hose re straining order s, which the Court previously

conclude d wer e not issued in acc ordanc e with 28 U.S.C. § 2467(d)(3) (A) a nd 18 U. S.C. § 9 83 (j ), are dis so lve d e ff e c tiv e a t 1: 00 p. m. o n T ue sd ay , M arc h 1 0, 20 09 . Ase pa ra te-18-

order acc ompanies this opinion. SO ORDERED. / s / J OHN D. B ATES UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT Date: Ma rch 9, 2009