NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SHANE STEVENS-EL,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY,

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0307 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. LC2020-000241-001

The Honorable Daniel J. Kiley, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Shane Stevens-El, Phoenix

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 3-1-2022
STEVENS-EL v. ADES

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Shane Stevens-El ("Father") appeals the denial of his objection 

to the withholding of unemployment benefits pursuant to a child support 

order. For the following reasons we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father is the biological parent of a child born in 2010. In 2012, 

the Arizona Department of Economic Security ("ADES") petitioned to 

establish child support.1 The superior court held a hearing and Father 

appeared. At the hearing, the court and parties discussed jurisdiction and 

Father agreed to cooperate with the State. The child's mother, however, 

was not present and the court granted ADES's request to dismiss the 

petition without prejudice. Four months later, ADES filed a new petition

in the same cause number. In 2013, the superior court held another hearing,

but father did not appear. The superior court noted Father "received notice 

of this hearing by personal service" and issued a child support order. Two 

years later, ADES moved to modify the order due to Father's 

unemployment. At a July 2015 hearing on the petition to modify, Father 

appeared by phone and consented to the reduced child-support obligation. 

¶3 In June 2020, ADES notified Father that a portion of his 

unemployment benefits would be withheld to satisfy his child-support 

obligation. Father disputed that he owed child support and requested that 

ADES "cease and desist all collection activity." Father also argued that the 

2013 child support order was void. Treating Father's response as a request 

for an administrative review under A.R.S. § 25-522, ADES affirmed the 

1 We take judicial notice of documents filed in Father's family court 

case, FC2012-051832, and relied upon by the superior court. See In re Sabino 

R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 4 (App. 2000) (holding appellate court can take 

judicial notice of trial court records).
STEVENS-EL v. ADES

Decision of the Court

3

withholding order. Father appealed the ADES decision to superior court 

pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-904 and 25-522(F).

¶4 The superior court affirmed ADES's decision, concluding that 

(1) Father failed to show that the 2013 child support order was void for lack 

of personal jurisdiction, (2) the court commissioner had authority to issue 

the order, and (3) Father's remaining claims were frivolous.

¶5 Father timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§§ 12-120.21, -913.

DISCUSSION

I. Collateral Attack on the Child Support Order. 

¶6 To challenge the 2020 ADES withholding order, Father

collaterally attacks the 2013 child support judgment. Father argues that the

withholding order is invalid because the 2013 child support order is void 

for lack of personal jurisdiction.

¶7 A collateral attack on a judgment "is an effort to obtain 

another and independent judgment which will destroy the effect of the 

former judgment." Cox v. Mackenzie, 70 Ariz. 308, 312 (1950); see also Schuster 

v. Schuster, 51 Ariz. 1, 4 (1937) (noting a collateral attack is one where the 

action seeks "an independent relief or result" (citation omitted)). Unless a 

judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, the judgment cannot be collaterally 

attacked even if it is "erroneous or wrong, so that it could be reversed on 

appeal or set aside on direct attack." Walker v. Davies, 113 Ariz. 233, 235 

(1976) (citation omitted). Further, "[t]he general rule . . . is that a judgment 

may not be collaterally attacked unless the absence of jurisdiction appears 

from the record." Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. S. Union Gas Co., 76 Ariz. 373, 377 

(1954); see also Walker, 113 Ariz. at 235 (holding that "if the trial court had 

jurisdiction to render the particular judgment given, the judgment is valid 

on its face and is not subject to collateral attack" (cleaned up)). Accordingly, 

our review is limited to determining if the child support orders are void for 

lack of jurisdiction.

¶8 Father's jurisdiction argument is premised on an alleged lack 

of service of ADES's second petition to establish child support. Amended 

complaints or petitions must be served upon each party in a proceeding. 

Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 569, ¶ 17 (App. 2009). But "[t]he rules governing 

service differ significantly depending on whether a party to be served has 

made an 'appearance.'" Id. at ¶ 18; compare Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 41 (service 

of petition), with Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 43 (service of other documents).
STEVENS-EL v. ADES

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 Father appeared in the case at the 2012 child support hearing. 

See Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hosp., Inc., 119 Ariz. 448, 452 (1978) ("It is a 

rule of ancient and universal application that a general appearance by a 

party who has not been properly served has exactly the same effect as a 

proper, timely and valid service of process."). Because Father appeared,

and the record does not reflect that Father contested jurisdiction at that 

time, the court acquired personal jurisdiction over Father. See State ex rel. 

Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 29, ¶ 8 (2003) ("[A]ny action on the 

part of a party except to object to personal jurisdiction that recognizes the 

case as in court will constitute a general appearance.").

¶10 But we do not need to decide whether the court continued to 

have personal jurisdiction over Father by virtue of his appearance in 2012.

2

Supra ¶ 9. Father appeared in the case again in 2015 and, although he filed 

a document entitled "Declaratory Void Judgment" prior to the hearing,

3

during the hearing he consented to a reduction in his support obligation

and, therefore, waived any objection to personal jurisdiction. See Tarr v. 

Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 349, 351 (1984) (noting participation in a pending 

case, other than to contest personal jurisdiction, subjects parties to the 

court's jurisdiction); see also Jones v. Cochise County, 218 Ariz. 372, 379, ¶ 23 

(App. 2008) (noting cases finding waiver by conduct where party asserted 

lack of personal jurisdiction in answer but did not move to dismiss and 

participated in subsequent litigation on the merits). On this record, Father 

has waived any claim the superior court lacked jurisdiction to issue the 2013 

child support order. See Burton, 205 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 8; see also Jones, 218 Ariz. 

at 379, ¶ 23 (noting that even properly raised defenses can be waived by 

subsequent conduct); Montano, 119 Ariz. at 452 (rejecting jurisdictional 

claim based on insufficient process when raised after an initial appearance 

and answer).

2 Father incorrectly argues that the 2012 dismissal was a final 

judgment. See Workman v. Verde Wellness Ctr., Inc., 240 Ariz. 597, 600, ¶ 7 

(App. 2016) (holding "an order dismissing without prejudice is not a final 

judgment"); see also Union Interchange, Inc. v. Van Aalsburg, 102 Ariz. 461, 464 

(1967) ("A dismissal without prejudice does not go to the merits of the 

plaintiff's cause and does not bar plaintiff from later filing on the same 

cause of action.").

3 The document noted that it was an "Affidavit And Notice Of 

Dismissal" but was "Not To Be Construed As A 'Motion.'" Accordingly, 

Father did not move to dismiss the case or set aside the 2013 order before 

appearing at the 2015 hearing. 
STEVENS-EL v. ADES

Decision of the Court

5

¶11 Father also claims that the 2013 order is void because the court 

commissioner lacked authority to enter the order. But a court commissioner 

is authorized to preside over child-support cases and enter child-support 

orders. A.R.S. § 12-298. When a court commissioner acts within the 

authority granted by statute, their orders have the same force and effect as 

those entered by superior court judges. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 96(a)(6); see also 

Green v. Thompson, 17 Ariz. App. 587, 590 (1972) ("The commissioner's 

jurisdiction is narrower than that of a regular superior court judge, but 

within the confines of that authority, he acts as a superior court judge.").

Because the commissioner's order establishing child support is within his

authority, the order has the same effect as if entered by a superior court 

judge. 

II. Father's Remaining Arguments. 

¶12 Father also argues that he did not contract to provide child 

support and thus has no "legal duty" to do so. But in Arizona, "every person 

has the duty to provide all reasonable support for that person's natural and 

adopted minor, unemancipated children." A.R.S. § 25-501(A). This duty "is 

not founded upon contract, expressed or implied, but on the natural and 

legal duty of a father to support his minor children." Indus. Comm'n v. Oden, 

68 Ariz. 234, 238 (1949); see also Smith v. Saxon, 186 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1996) 

("A parent may not form a valid and enforceable contract which releases 

the parent from all obligation to support his or her minor children."). 

Accordingly, we reject Father's argument. 

¶13 Finally, Father argues that there is no federal "right" to child 

support. As he correctly notes, there generally is no individual federal right

to compel ADES to collect child support. Blessings v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 

343-44 (1997); see also Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989)

("Title IV–D does not create any enforceable right."). But this case arises 

under state law, see A.R.S. § 25-505 (permitting ADES to issue income 

withholding orders), and Father's reliance on federal cases is misplaced.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.