Report to the Honorable

Ben Nighthorse Campbell,

U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

August 2001 INTERNATIONAL

CRIME CONTROL

Sustained

Executive-Level

Coordination of

Federal Response

Needed

GAO-01-629
Page i GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Letter 1

Results 2

Concluding Observations 8

Recommendation for Executive Action 9

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 10

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 15

Appendix II U.S. Framework for Addressing International Crime 20

Appendix III Extent of International Crime 28

Appendix IV Selected Federal Entities’ Roles in Responding to

International Crime and Coordination of the Response 38

Appendix V Combating Corruption 65

Appendix VI Technical Assistance Programs 75

Appendix VII Measures of Effectiveness 81

Appendix VIII Comments From the National Security Council 94

Appendix IX Comments From the Department of Justice 96

Appendix X Comments From the Department of State 98

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix XI Comments From the U.S. Agency for International

Development 100

Appendix XII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 102

Tables

Table 1: International Crime Control Strategy: Overarching Goals

and Implementing Objectives 22

Table 2: Categories and Extent of Major International Crimes

Identified As a Threat to U.S. Interests 29

Table 3: Federal Entities With Significant Roles in Combating

International Crime 38

Table 4: Types of International Crimes or Activities Handled by

Sections or Offices in Justice’s Criminal Division 40

Table 5: Jurisdiction for Criminal Activity at U.S. Seaports 57

Table 6: International Crime Control Strategy Goal and Objectives

That Address Corruption 65

Table 7: U.S. Worldwide Rule of Law Assistance by Region, Fiscal

Years 1993-98 72

Table 8: Federal Entities with a Role in Providing Rule of Law

Assistance Programs 73

Table 9: Similarities Between Justice Objectives and Strategies and

the International Crime Control Strategy 85

Table 10: Similarities Between Treasury Objectives and Strategies

and the International Crime Control Strategy 87

Table 11: Similarities Between State Goals and Strategies and the

International Crime Control Strategy 89

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

COE Council of Europe

CSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOJ Department of Justice

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center

FATF Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
Page iii GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCPA Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

GRECO Group of States Against Corruption

ICC International Chamber of Commerce

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy

INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

 Affairs

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization

IPR Intellectual Property Rights

IRS Internal Revenue Service

IRS-CI Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation

NCIC National Crime Information Center

NSC National Security Council

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OAS Organization of American States

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control

OIG Office of Inspector General

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

OPDAT Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PCC Policy Coordination Committee

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PME Performance Measures of Effectiveness

SCG Special Coordination Group on International Crime

UN United Nations

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USNCB U.S. National Central Bureau

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 1 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

August 13, 2001

The Honorable Ben Nighthorse Campbell

United States Senate

Dear Senator Campbell:

This report responds to your August 2000 request that we review the

nature and extent of the federal response to international crime—

including drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, public

corruption, and other criminal activities that transcend national borders.

Such crimes threaten American citizens and communities, businesses and

institutions, as well as global security and stability. International crime and

its impact on the United States—and the importance of having a

coordinated and effective federal response—have been of longstanding

interest to you and other members of the Senate Appropriations’ Foreign

Operations Subcommittee.

Specifically, in response to your request, this report provides overviewlevel information on the following topics:

• The U.S. framework for addressing international crime.

• The extent of international crime.

• Selected federal entities’ roles in responding to international crime and

issues related to the coordination of the response.

• U.S. efforts to combat public corruption internationally.

• U.S. programs for providing technical assistance to other nations to

combat international crime.

• Issues related to measures of the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat

international crime.

To address these topics, we interviewed responsible officials at and

reviewed relevant documentation obtained from the National Security

Council (NSC); the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State; the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID); and their components. As

agreed with your office, we focused our efforts on these five entities and

their components because of the breadth of the international crime topics

and the extensive scope of the response. Accordingly, the information in

this report does not reflect the full extent of the federal response to

international crime. Also as agreed with your office, given the number and

the breadth of the topics covered, our work focused on developing

overview information rather than analyzing each topic in depth. As further

agreed, we did not review any classified documents. We conducted our

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

work from October 2000 to July 2001 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I presents more details

about the scope and methodology of our work.

Fueled by global markets, more open borders, and improvements in

telecommunications, international crime has become a growing worldwide

problem. In 1995, the President identified international crime as a threat to

the national interest of the United States. Prior to and since then, the

federal government has been engaged in a crosscutting effort to address

various types of such crime, including money laundering, terrorism, and

public corruption. Despite the multiagency nature of the federal response,

no sustained executive-level coordination—for which NSC has the

designated responsibility—has been apparent. Furthermore, in the past,

the government has neither tracked nor prioritized the billions of dollars in

spending on certain elements of the response, such as combating

terrorism. In addition, because of the absence of governmentwide,

outcome-oriented performance measures, the effectiveness and impact of

the response are unclear. Our prior work on other national issues that

involve crosscutting responses—ranging from employment training to

counterterrorism—shows that, ultimately, achieving any meaningful

results requires firm linkages of strategy, resources, and outcome-oriented

performance measures. Otherwise, scarce resources are likely to be

wasted, overall effectiveness will be limited or not known, and

accountability will not be ensured. Accordingly, we are recommending

that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs take

appropriate action to ensure sustained executive-level coordination and

assessment of the multiagency federal efforts in connection with

international crime.

Presented below is summary information about each of the topics that we

studied. More detailed information about each topic is presented in

appendixes II through VII, respectively:

• U.S. framework for addressing international crime. The U.S.

government’s framework for addressing international crime was the result

of several developments. For example, in October 1995, recognizing that

international crime presented a direct and immediate threat to national

security, Presidential Decision Directive 42 (PDD-42) directed the

development of an effective U.S. response. As a key part of the response,

in May 1998, the President announced the U.S. government’s International

Crime Control Strategy, which was formulated with input from multiple

law enforcement agencies and was intended to serve as a dynamic,

evolving roadmap for a coordinated, long-term attack on international

Results
Page 3 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

crime. The strategy consists of 8 overarching goals (e.g., “counter

international financial crime”) and 30 implementing objectives (e.g., “seize

the assets of international criminals through aggressive use of forfeiture

law”) and was intended to complement and not supplant related strategies,

such as the National Drug Control Strategy. The crime control strategy has

not been updated since its inception to reflect changes in the threat from

international crime. In April 2001, in response to our inquiry, NSC officials

told us that the issue of international crime and the framework for the U.S.

response were under review by the new administration. The NSC officials

had no estimate of when the review would be completed; however, the

officials said that PDD-42 and the International Crime Control Strategy

were still considered to be in effect during the ongoing review process.

(See app. II.)

• Extent of international crime. While there is general consensus among

law enforcement officials, researchers, and others that international crime

is growing, there is also agreement that measuring the true extent of such

crime is difficult. Nevertheless, several efforts have attempted to gauge the

extent of and the threat posed by international crime to the United States

and other countries. For example, in 1999 and 2000, threat assessments

were prepared to support the International Crime Control Strategy. While

the 1999 threat assessment was classified, a published version of the 2000

assessment1

 provided various indicators or measures of international

crime within five broad categories—(1) terrorism and drug trafficking; (2)

illegal immigration, trafficking of women and children,2

 and environmental

crimes; (3) illicit transfer or trafficking of products across international

borders; (4) economic trade crimes; and (5) financial crimes. Furthermore,

within each of the five broad categories, specific types of crimes were

discussed. Regarding the financial crime category, for example, the

assessment noted that worldwide money laundering could involve roughly

$1 trillion per year, with $300 billion to $500 billion of that representing

laundering related to drug trafficking. The assessment acknowledged,

however, that there is little analytical work supporting most estimates of

money laundering. According to NSC, whether the threat assessment

would continue to be updated periodically is being considered as part of

the new administration’s review of international crime and no decisions

had been made in this regard. (See app. III.)

 1

The 2000 threat assessment was prepared by an interagency group that included

representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency; the Departments of Justice, State,

Transportation, and Treasury; Office of National Drug Control Policy; and NSC.

2

State has now designated this activity as “trafficking in persons.”
Page 4 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• Selected federal entities’ roles in responding to international

crime and coordination of the response. In response to our inquiry,

NSC identified 34 federal entities—including cabinet-level departments

and their components, and independent agencies—that it considered as

having significant roles in fighting international crime. The federal entities

included those that are the focus of this report, namely the departments of

Justice, Treasury, and State, and USAID.3

 Within Justice, for example,

relevant components include the Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration

and Naturalization Service, U.S. National Central Bureau of the

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), U.S. Marshals

Service, and U.S. Attorney Offices. Relevant Treasury components include

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); Customs Service;

Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation; Secret Service; Financial

Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN); the Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center; and the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Within State, the

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has a

significant role, which includes coordinating and funding U.S. training

assistance provided to foreign law enforcement entities; also within State,

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism have roles in combating international crime. To

illustrate the broad interagency nature of international crime control, in

1997 we identified 43 federal entities with terrorism-related programs and

activities.4

 Similarly, 41 federal entities have an interest or are involved in

operations at U.S. seaports; 15 of these entities have some jurisdiction

over criminal activities occurring at these seaports, according to an

interagency commission report.5

Implementation of the International Crime Control Strategy inherently

involves some jurisdictional overlaps, which necessitate coordination

among agencies. To facilitate executive-level coordination of the strategy,

PDD-42 established the Special Coordination Group on International

Crime, composed of high-level officials from relevant agencies and chaired

 3

In addition to those discussed in this report, the federal entities identified by NSC included

the Department of Defense, the Federal Reserve, and the Securities and Exchange

Commission. NSC cautioned that its compilation of federal entities responding to

international crime was not intended to be exhaustive.

4

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better

Management and Coordination (GAO-NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

5

Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (Aug. 2000).
Page 5 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

by a senior NSC official. The Special Coordination Group was to meet

periodically to ensure an integrated focus on the federal response to

international crime. According to State and NSC officials, however, while

the Special Coordination Group met 14 times in 1998, it met infrequently

thereafter. At one point the Special Coordination Group did not meet at all

for about 9 months (between September 1999 and June 2000) because

some of its members were involved in other activities, such as preparing

for year-2000 computer compliance and because of staffing shortages. In

this regard, two NSC staff were assigned to coordinate international crime

matters.

A Presidential directive issued in February 2001 (National Security

Presidential Directive 1, or NSPD-1) reorganized NSC and abolished the

existing structure of interagency groups, including the Special

Coordination Group. The directive did not indicate how the overall

response to international crime would be coordinated at the time under

NSC’s new structure. In April 2001, the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs established a Policy Coordination Committee

(PCC) for International Organized Crime.6

 The PCC is to be comprised of

officials at the Assistant Secretary level from relevant federal entities and

is to be chaired by the NSC Senior Director for Transnational Threats. The

PCC is to coordinate policy formulation, program oversight, and new

initiatives related to a number of international crime issues, including

arms trafficking, trafficking in persons, and foreign official corruption.

According to NSC, one of the PCC’s priorities is to evaluate the 1998

International Crime Control Strategy.

Various other departmental and agency-level coordination mechanisms—

such as coordination centers, interagency coordinators, and working

groups—have been established over the years to address specific types of

international crimes. For example, Justice and State recently created a

center for combating trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. (See

app. IV.)

• Efforts to combat public corruption internationally. The

International Crime Control Strategy addresses corruption in two

contexts. One context involves efforts to eliminate the use of bribes in

transnational business activities, such as government contracting. In this

context, an international anti-bribery agreement adopted by the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

 6

In February 2001, NSPD-1 established 17 other geographic and functional PCCs.
Page 6 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

represents an effort to eliminate bribery of foreign public officials in

business transactions. This agreement—the OECD Convention on

Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business

Transactions—entered into force in 1999. The Convention generally

requires signatory nations to criminalize bribes to foreign public officials

made to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the

conduct of international business. Essentially, the Convention, according

to State, reflects the long-term U.S. interest in creating a level playing field

among the world’s major trading nations by internationalizing the antibribery principles of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (P.L. 95-213),7

which the United States enacted in 1977. The Departments of State and

Commerce are required to provide the Congress with annual reports on

the implementation of the OECD Convention. In its third annual report,

issued in July 2001, Commerce noted that progress has been made on the

first priority of ensuring that all signatories deposit an instrument of

ratification with OECD. As of July 2001, 33 of the 34 signatories to the

Convention had deposited instruments of ratification and 30 have

legislation in place to implement the Convention. The report pointed out

that the United States continued to have concerns about the adequacy of

countries’ legislation to meet all commitments under the Convention.8

The strategy’s other context on public corruption involves rule of law

assistance, which focuses on U.S. support for legal, judicial, and law

enforcement reform efforts undertaken by foreign governments.

Generally, proponents view such assistance as being especially important

in that widespread corruption among justice and security officials can

potentially destabilize governments. In a 1999 report to congressional

requesters, we noted that the United States provided at least $970 million

in rule of law assistance to countries throughout the world from fiscal

years 1993 through 1998. Four regions—Latin America and the Caribbean,

Africa, Central Europe, and the New Independent States—received about

80 percent of the total.9

 Our 1999 report also noted that at least 35 federal

entities—consisting of 7 cabinet-level departments and 28 related

agencies, bureaus, and offices—had a role in providing the assistance.

Furthermore, the report recognized that, due to longstanding

congressional concerns about ineffective coordination, in February 1999,

 7

Codified at 15 U.S.C., 78dd-1, et seq., 78ff.

8

U.S. Department of Commerce, Addressing the Challenges of International Bribery and

Fair Competition: July 2001 (July 2001).

9

Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-98

(GAO/NSIAD-99-158, June 30, 1999).
Page 7 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

State appointed a rule of law coordinator to work with all the relevant U.S.

governmental entities.10 More recently, in April 2001, we reported that—

after 10 years and almost $200 million in funding—rule of law assistance to

12 countries of the former Soviet Union had shown limited results.11 We

recommended that program management be improved by implementing

requirements for projects to include specific strategies for (1) achieving

impact and sustainable results and (2) monitoring and evaluating

outcomes. (See app. V.)

• U.S. programs for providing technical assistance. Much of the

technical assistance that the United States provides to other nations for

fighting international crime involves training, particularly training at law

enforcement academies established abroad. For instance, State

Department-funded academies have been established in Europe, Southeast

Asia, and Southern Africa, and plans are underway to establish an

academy to serve Central America. Also, the Department of Justice strives

to strengthen justice systems abroad through training and assistance in

developing criminal justice institutions provided through two programs—

(1) the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

and (2) Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training. In

addition to training, federal agencies—particularly Justice and Treasury—

help foreign nations combat international crime by providing technical

assistance through specialized support services and systems, such as

computerized databases and forensic laboratories. For example, the

National Tracing Center—operated by ATF—traces firearms for foreign

law enforcement agencies, as well as for federal and state agencies. (See

app. VI.)

• Measures of the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. There are no standard

measures of effectiveness to assess the federal government’s overall

efforts to address international crime. As one of its objectives, the

International Crime Control Strategy indicated that a governmentwide

performance measurement system for international crime would be

established—similar to the system for measuring the effectiveness of the

nation’s drug control efforts implemented by the Office of National Drug

Control Policy. However, according to NSC officials, no actions were ever

taken to establish such as system. Rather, the task of developing

 10According to State, the rule of law coordinator position lapsed at the end of the Clinton

administration and has not been reestablished.

11Former Soviet Union: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and

Sustainability (GAO-01-354, Apr. 17, 2001).
Page 8 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

performance measures was deferred to the individual federal entities with

roles in combating international crime.

Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),

federal agencies are to prepare strategic and performance plans, which

describe their respective program activities and how effectiveness will be

measured. Regarding international crime, Justice’s, Treasury’s, and State’s

plans each have sections describing their efforts to combat specific types

of crime, along with the performance measures to be tracked. In some

cases, however, these measures do not adequately address effectiveness.

For example, in June 2000, we reported our observations on key outcomes

described in Justice’s performance report and plan.12 Among other things,

we noted that Justice’s performance measures focused on outputs rather

than outcomes and did not capture all aspects of performance.

Furthermore, in a broader context—despite the existence of GPRA-related

reports and plans—there has been no effort to consolidate the various

federal agencies’ results into an overall performance measurement system,

as envisioned by the International Crime Control Strategy.

Another performance measurement mechanism applicable to international

crime involves focusing on selected types of crimes. That is, for a few

types of international crimes, the government has developed separate

strategies that include measures of results and effectiveness. The most

notable such strategy is the National Drug Control Strategy, which

identifies goals, objectives, and performance indicators to measure the

effectiveness of the nation’s war on drugs. Similar national strategies have

been developed for money laundering and counterterrorism. These

national strategies—although focused on specific types of crimes—are

nonetheless similar to the International Crime Control Strategy in that

challenges are presented in developing goals, objectives, and indicators

that adequately measure results and effectiveness. (See app. VII.)

We believe it is appropriate that the new administration is currently

reviewing the existing framework for addressing international crime and

considering options for top-level coordination mechanisms. But, it is also

important for systems to be in place to ensure that crosscutting goals are

consistent, program efforts are mutually reinforcing—and, where

appropriate, common or complementary performance measures are used

as a basis for results-oriented management. In past reports, we have noted

 12Observations on DOJ’s FY 1999 Performance Report and FY 2001 Performance Plan

(GAO/GGD-00-155R, June 30, 2000).

Concluding

Observations
Page 9 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

instances across a wide range of federal programs where a lack of

executive-level coordination has led to inefficient and/or ineffective

programs, including those to combat specific types of international crime

such as terrorism.13 Generally, at the field or operational levels in relation

to specific types or aspects of international crimes, a wide range of interand intra-agency coordination activities arguably are being carried out

routinely. However, these activities cannot take the place of top-level

leadership in setting and implementing an overall strategy to ensure that

priorities are being established, federal goals and objectives are being met,

and governmentwide performance is being measured.

International crime is a complex and multifaceted issue of great national

importance. Accordingly, the U.S. response to international crime involves

a wide variety of federal entities spending a significant amount of time and

money. We recognize that individual federal entities have developed

strategies to address a variety of international crime issues. We also

recognize that for some crimes, integrated mechanisms exist to coordinate

efforts across agencies, and that, at the operational level, law enforcement

and other personnel are working across agencies. However, we believe

that without an up-to-date and integrated strategy and sustained top-level

leadership to implement and monitor it, the risk is high that scarce

resources will be wasted, overall effectiveness will be limited or not

known, and accountability will not be ensured. Accordingly, we note that

the establishment of the PCC for International Organized Crime in April

2001 is a step in the right direction and—on the basis of what is known

about its role and priorities—appears to address some of the coordination

and related issues discussed in this report, such as providing oversight of

international crime issues.

Recognizing the establishment of the PCC for International Organized

Crime and its intended responsibilities and priorities, we recommend that

the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs take

appropriate action to ensure that this PCC provides sustained and

centralized oversight of the extensive and crosscutting federal effort to

combat international crime. Consistent with the coordination and related

issues we have discussed in this report, we recommend that as the

responsibilities of the PCC are defined, they include systematically

 13For example, see Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination

(GAO/GGD-00-106, Mar. 29, 2000) and Managing for Results: Using GPRA to Help

Congressional Decisionmaking and Strengthen Oversight (GAO/T-GGD-00-95, Mar. 22,

2000).

Recommendation for

Executive Action
Page 10 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• updating the existing governmentwide international crime threat

assessment to maintain a thorough understanding of credible existing and

emerging threats;

• updating the International Crime Control Strategy, or developing a

successor—to include prioritized goals and implementing objectives—as

appropriate to reflect changes in the threat;

• designating responsibility for executing the strategy and resolving any

jurisdictional issues;

• identifying and aligning the necessary resources with the strategy’s

execution;

• developing outcome-oriented performance measures linked to the

strategy’s goals and objectives to track and assess progress, identify

emerging challenges, and establish overall accountability; and

• periodically reporting the strategy’s results to the President and the

Congress.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, the Attorney General, the

Secretaries of State and the Treasury, and the Administrator of USAID. In

response, we received comments from NSC’s National Coordinator for

Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism; Justice’s Acting

Assistant Attorney General for Administration; State’s Acting Chief

Financial Officer; and USAID’s Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau of

Management. The comments are reprinted in appendixes VIII through XI

and discussed briefly in the next sections. In addition to their comments,

NSC, Justice, State, and USAID provided technical comments that are

incorporated in this report where appropriate. Treasury did not submit

written comments but provided technical comments.

NSC generally concurred with the thrust of the report’s recommendation,

indicating that the coordination of the federal government’s efforts to

combat international crime should be improved further; that NSC is the

logical choice to provide enhanced coordination and policy direction at

the most senior levels of government; and that comprehensive measures

should be developed to assess the effectiveness of international crime

control programs and form an iterative cycle of regular threat, strategy,

and program reviews. NSC also indicated that the PCC for International

Organized Crime would consider our recommendation as it reviews the

International Crime Control Strategy and works to enhance the

government’s approach to fighting international crime. At the same time,

NSC expressed concern that the report did not adequately reflect a

number of initiatives it led—including the establishment of the Special

Coordination Group and the development of the International Crime

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 11 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Control Strategy—that were aimed at a more integrated U.S. government

approach to fighting international crime. Furthermore, NSC indicated that

the report overstated the Council’s proper role in international crime

control efforts. In this regard, NSC said that senior-level interagency

coordination by NSC and its formal committee structure is only part of the

picture and that the overwhelming majority of coordination at that level—

as well as at the operational level—occurs without any involvement by the

Council.

Regarding NSC’s comment about the report not adequately reflecting the

initiatives undertaken to integrate the government’s response to

international crime, we believe that the report—in keeping with its intent

to provide overview-level information on the subject—adequately

identifies and describes, in a framework context, key components of the

response. These include PDD-42, the International Crime Control Strategy,

the International Crime Threat Assessment, and the now-defunct Special

Coordination Group. Regarding NSC’s comment about its role in

international crime control efforts, the report recognizes that extensive

day-to-day coordination does occur at the operational and executive

levels. The report’s discussion of NSC’s role in coordinating efforts to

combat international crime centers on the delineation of that role in,

among other documents, NSPD-1 and the memorandum establishing the

PCC for International Organized Crime. For example, NSPD-1 states that

the various PCCs shall be the main day-to-day mechanisms for senior

interagency coordination of national security policy issues, of which

international crime control is one.

Justice agreed with the report’s concluding observations regarding, among

other things, the executive branch’s need to prioritize its response to the

increasing threat from international crime. However, Justice expressed

what it characterized as “serious reservations” about the report’s

discussion and recommendation concerning interagency coordination of

the federal response to international crime. Specifically, Justice believed

that the report understated the extent of interagency coordination that has

occurred in the past, especially at the lower levels where, according to

Justice, law enforcement coordination has often led to successful

international criminal investigations and prosecutions. Justice also said

that the report's recommendation for high-level coordination

overestimated the importance of the Special Coordination Group and its

sub-groups. Justice indicated that while high-level interagency

coordination may be useful for general policy matters, such coordination

is generally not appropriate for particular criminal investigations. Finally,

Justice said that the report did not give proper recognition to what it
Page 12 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

characterized as the Attorney General’s “central role” in addressing

international crime, especially in determining whether, and under what

circumstances, to prosecute international criminal conduct. Consequently,

according to Justice, the report’s recommendation appears to be an

intrusion into the “traditional law enforcement responsibilities of the

Attorney General.”

Regarding Justice’s statement that the extent of interagency coordination

is understated, the report is not intended to be an exhaustive

representation of the federal response to international crime and the

coordination of this response. Rather, the report describes the various

means through which coordination occurs—especially at the operational

level—and presents illustrative examples, provided by a variety of federal

law enforcement and other agencies, without reaching any conclusions

about the effectiveness of coordination at this level. Regarding Justice’s

statement that the importance of the Special Coordination Group and its

sub-groups is overestimated, the report discusses the roles and

responsibilities of the Group as envisioned by and delineated in PDD-42

and the International Crime Control Strategy. According to these

documents—which form the framework of the federal response to

international crime—the Group was intended as the high-level mechanism

to ensure an integrated and sustained focus on the federal response to

international crime. Regarding Justice’s statement that the report does not

recognize the Attorney General’s central role in combating international

crime and that its recommendation appears to intrude on his law

enforcement responsibilities, we offer two points in response. First, the

report, reflecting a consensus view, describes Justice’s role in combating

international crime as “significant” and accordingly provides a detailed

description of the relevant responsibilities and programs of its various

components. Second, building upon a mechanism already put in place by

NSC, the recommendation seeks to enhance executive-level coordination

and oversight of the large-scale federal effort to combat international

crime. The recommendation’s specific components—which focus on

strategic-level matters—are not intended to delve into operational-level

matters, such as decisions to prosecute specific instances of international

criminal conduct.

State indicated that it agreed with the basic premise and recommendation

of the report. It further indicated that centrally led coordination—focusing

on general policy rather than particular criminal matters and issues—can

be useful in sorting out and better delineating the many overlapping

responsibilities of federal law enforcement agencies and avoiding

duplications and gaps in anticrime programs that can waste limited
Page 13 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

resources and reduce program effectiveness. State did note that since

some activities discussed in the report, such as nonproliferation and

counterterrorism, involve broader political and national security issues

that extend beyond international crime, they should remain under the

jurisdiction of the appropriate PCC, such as the one for Nonproliferation,

Counter-proliferation, and Homeland Defense. In this regard, we

acknowledge this distinction and, to the extent that they continue to be

considered also as part of the broader context of international crime, defer

to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to determine

the appropriate PCC jurisdiction for activities such as nonproliferation and

counterterrorism.

USAID submitted a letter with technical clarifications, which we included

in the report where appropriate.

As indicated earlier, the Department of the Treasury had no written

comments on a draft of this report. However, Treasury entities provided

technical comments which we incorporated in this report where

appropriate.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed

Services, Finance, Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs, and the

Judiciary; and to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the

House Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, Government

Reform, International Relations, the Judiciary, and Ways and Means. In

addition, we will send copies to the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the

Secretary of State, and the Administrator of USAID. We will also make

copies available to others on request.
Page 14 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss the matter

further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or Danny R. Burton at (214)

777-5600. Other key contributors are acknowledged in appendix XII.

Sincerely yours,

Laurie E. Ekstrand

Director, Justice Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 15 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Our objectives in this review were to develop overview information on the

following topics:

• The U.S. framework for addressing international crime.

• The extent of international crime.

• Selected federal entities’ roles in responding to international crime and

issues related to the coordination of the response.

• U.S. efforts to combat public corruption internationally.

• U.S. programs for providing technical assistance to other nations to

combat international crime.

• Issues related to measures of the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat

international crime.

As agreed with the requester’s office, given the number and potential

breadth of the topics—and the time frames for conducting our review—we

focused on developing overview information rather than analyzing each

topic in depth. Also, while we tried to identify and contact as many

relevant federal agencies as possible, most of our interactions were with

officials in the National Security Council (NSC); the Departments of

Justice, Treasury, and State; the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID); and their relevant components. As such, the

information contained in this report does not represent the full extent of

the federal government’s response to international crime. Nor does the

information represent the full response to international crime by NSC,

Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID—in that some of the information is

based on examples, rather than an exhaustive listing of all relevant

activities or programs.

To obtain background information and other contextual perspectives, we

relied to a considerable extent on publicly available information—such as

published reports or studies—and we also used the Internet to access

information on the Web sites of various federal and other relevant entities.

To obtain additional information about federal entities’ roles and

responsibilities for international crime, we also submitted a data

collection instrument to Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID, and we

submitted written questions to NSC.

As agreed with the requester’s office, our work did not include reviewing

any classified documents. In addition, we did not independently verify or

evaluate the information we obtained, including strategies, threat

assessments, international crime control initiatives, and assistance

program descriptions.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Objectives

Scope and

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 16 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

The following sections present more information about our scope and

methodology for each of the six topics noted earlier.

Regarding the U.S. framework for addressing international crime, we

focused on key documents, such as

• Presidential Decision Directive 42 (PDD-42), which was issued in October

1995 to authorize development of an effective U.S. response to

international crime and

• the International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998)—an integral part of

the response—that was formulated with input from multiple law

enforcement agencies.

For this report, we have defined “international crime” consistent with the

International Crime Control Strategy, the “roadmap” document for federal

law enforcement efforts. The strategy uses the term “international crime”

to describe criminal conduct that transcends national borders and

threatens U.S. interests in three broad, interrelated categories: threats to

Americans and their communities, threats to American businesses and

financial institutions, and threats to global security and stability. Using this

characterization, the strategy (and the subsequent International Crime

Threat Assessment prepared pursuant to the strategy) designate the

following as the major international crimes from the U.S. perspective:

corruption; terrorism; drug trafficking; illegal immigration and alien

smuggling; trafficking in women and children; environmental crimes

(including flora and fauna trafficking); sanctions violations; illicit

technology transfers and smuggling of materials for weapons of mass

destruction; arms trafficking; trafficking in precious gems; piracy; nondrug contraband smuggling; intellectual property rights violations; foreign

economic espionage; foreign corrupt business practices; counterfeiting;

financial fraud (including advance fee scams and credit card fraud); hightech crime; and money laundering.

We discussed the International Crime Control Strategy’s development—

and its continuing significance and use—with officials from various

federal agencies, including NSC; the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and

State; USAID; and their components. We also obtained and reviewed other

key documents that address aspects of the federal government’s response

to international crime, including the proposed “International Crime

Control Act of 1998” (S. 2303), the International Crime Threat Assessment,

and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized

Crime (and supplementary protocols).

U.S. Framework for

Addressing International

Crime
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 17 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

To obtain information concerning the extent of international crime, we

conducted a literature search and interviewed officials of various federal

law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. National Central Bureau of

the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

We also summarized data from the International Crime Threat Assessment

(Dec. 2000), which was prepared by a U.S. government interagency

working group with membership from various federal law enforcement

agencies, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency and NSC.

Furthermore, we reviewed relevant documents from other sources—

including the National Intelligence Council, the United States Commission

on National Security/21st Century, and the United Nations.

Regarding selected federal entities’ roles and coordination, we focused on

identifying and contacting the federal entities responsible for

implementing the basic “framework” document mentioned previously—

that is, the International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998). However, as

also mentioned previously, most of our interactions were with officials in

Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID—and their relevant components. Also,

we contacted NSC to discuss the role of the Special Coordination Group

on International Crime—a team whose members include high-level

officials from, among others, Justice, Treasury, and State.

To obtain additional information about federal agencies’ roles and

responsibilities for international crime, we submitted a data collection

instrument to Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID. Generally, we designed

the instrument to request information about threat assessments, budgets

and staffing, areas of responsibility and authority, interagency and

intergovernmental coordination, performance measures, and foreign

technical assistance. We also met with cognizant officials at these entities

to discuss these issues.

Furthermore, we submitted questions to NSC concerning the agency’s

roles and responsibilities. However, because the issue of international

crime and the framework for the U.S. response were still under review by

the new administration, NSC officials declined to respond to our

questions.

In reference to combating corruption, the International Crime Control

Strategy presents two related objectives:

Extent of International

Crime

Selected Federal Entities’

Roles in Responding to

International Crime and

Coordination of the

Response

Combating Public

Corruption Internationally
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 18 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• Establish international standards, goals, and objectives to combat

international crime, including corruption and bribery.

• Strengthen the rule of law as the foundation for democratic and free

markets in order to reduce societies’ vulnerability to criminal exploitation.

We contacted officials at Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID to identify

and discuss (1) the major obstacles or challenges in implementing these

objectives and (2) what actions were being taken or planned to address

these obstacles or challenges. Furthermore, we

• reviewed testimony presented at a July 1999 hearing before the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe1

 and

• reviewed relevant information from Transparency International, a leading

nongovernmental organization that addresses corruption issues.

We analyzed national and international documents on corruption, bribery,

and the rule of law—including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and

documents associated with (1) the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of

Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, (2) the

First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, and (3) the Council of

Europe’s Criminal Law Convention Against Corruption and the attendant

Group of States Against Corruption.

Also, from several of our recent reports, we summarized data about U.S.

rule of law worldwide funding and federal entities involved in rule of law

assistance programs.

Regarding U.S. technical assistance to other nations to combat

international crime, we contacted officials at Justice, Treasury, State, and

USAID to identify and discuss relevant training programs and other forms

of assistance, such as access to (1) automated criminal history records, (2)

other computerized information systems, or (3) forensic or other

laboratories. However, we did not visit any field or operational sites to

observe training or other assistance programs. Nor did we contact any

recipient nations to obtain the views of foreign government officials or law

enforcement officers.

 1

 Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Congress,

1st Session, “Bribery and Corruption in the OSCE Region” (CSCE 106-1-10, July 21, 1999),

U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C.: 2000).

U.S Programs for

Providing Technical

Assistance to Other

Nations to Combat

International Crime
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 19 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

The International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998) called for the

establishment of a performance measurement system for monitoring

progress in meeting the strategy’s goals and objectives. To determine the

extent to which such a system had been established and was being used—

and, if applicable, to identify and discuss other relevant performance

measures—we contacted federal officials at NSC, Justice, Treasury, and

State.

Also, to identify alternative approaches used for measuring the results of

international crime control efforts, we reviewed department and agency

strategic and performance plans that were prepared pursuant to the

Government Performance and Results Act. That is, we reviewed these

plans to determine whether and to what extent they contained

performance measures for monitoring international crime control efforts.

Furthermore, we reviewed national strategies and related documents for

three specific international crimes to determine whether and to what

extent they contained performance measures. These crime-specific

strategies were the National Drug Control Strategy, the National Money

Laundering Strategy, and the Five-Year Interagency Counter-Terrorism

and Technology Crime Plan.

Measures of Effectiveness

of U.S. Efforts to Combat

International Crime
Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

Page 20 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

The U.S. government’s framework for addressing international crime is

based on various initiatives involving President-directed federal law

enforcement interagency actions, a proposal for additional statutory

authority, and efforts to increase international cooperation:

• In October 1995, recognizing that international crime presented a direct

and immediate threat to national security, Presidential Decision Directive

42 (PDD-42) was issued to authorize the development of an effective U.S.

response.

• Also in October 1995, in a speech at the United Nations (UN), the

President called for increased international cooperation to fight various

aspects of international crime.

• In May 1998, the President announced the U.S. government’s International

Crime Control Strategy, which was formulated with input from multiple

law enforcement agencies and was intended to serve as a roadmap for a

coordinated, long-term attack on international crime.

• Also in May 1998, the White House announced proposed legislation that

was intended to help implement the strategy. In July 1998, Senator Patrick

J. Leahy introduced the proposed legislation—the International Crime

Control Act of 1998 (S. 2303) in the 105th Congress.

• In 1999 and in 2000, as part of the International Crime Control Strategy, a

U.S. government interagency working group prepared and issued

assessments of the threat posed by international crime.

• In December 2000, the United States and many other countries signed the

United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, along with

supplementary protocols on migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons.

On October 21, 1995, President Clinton issued PDD-42 to initiate certain

federal efforts to counter international crime. The general purpose of

PDD-42—as stated in the foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act,

P.L. 106-120, title VIII, section 802—was to order executive branch

agencies to take the following actions:

• Increase the priority and resources devoted to addressing the threat that

international crime presents to national security.

• Work more closely with other governments to develop a global response

to the threat of international crime.

• Use aggressively and creatively all legal means available to combat

international crime.

Specifically, PDD-42 required various agencies, including Justice,

Treasury, and State, to integrate their efforts against international crime

syndicates and money laundering. PDD-42 also established interagency

Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

PDD-42 Issued in

October 1995
Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

Page 21 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

working groups to address aspects of international crime control—such as

efforts to reduce money laundering by strengthening international

cooperation with critical nations. Subsequently, according to a State

Department official, to help implement PDD-42, the National Security

Council (NSC) asked the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State to

take the lead in developing a comprehensive national strategy to attack

international crime.

According to a senior Justice official we interviewed during our review,

the President’s 1995 UN speech—which was delivered the day after PDD42 was issued—can also be considered reflective of the U.S. framework

for addressing international crime. Specifically, on October 22, 1995, in a

speech before the UN General Assembly to mark the organization’s 50th

anniversary, the President called for cooperation in “fighting the

increasingly interconnected groups that traffic in terror, organized crime,

drug smuggling and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.”

1

 The

President indicated, for example, that nations needed to work together to

negotiate and endorse a “no sanctuary pledge” to ensure that organized

criminals, terrorists, and drug traffickers and smugglers have nowhere to

run or hide.

Also, in his UN speech, the President enumerated several steps that the

United States was taking to address international crime. For instance, the

President noted that he had directed applicable U.S. government agencies

to

• identify and work (using sanctions, if appropriate) with those nations that

needed to bring their banks and financial systems into conformity with

international antimoney-laundering standards and

• identify the front companies (and freeze their assets) of the Cali Cartel, the

largest drug ring in the world.

Also, the President said that he had instructed Justice to “prepare

legislation to provide our other agencies with the tools they need to

respond to organized criminal activity.” The resulting proposed

legislation—the International Crime Control Act of 1998 (S. 2303)—is

discussed below.

 1

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President to the UN

General Assembly,” (Oct. 22, 1995).

The President’s UN

Speech Called for

Cooperation in

Fighting International

Crime
Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

Page 22 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Developed with input from multiple federal law enforcement agencies, the

U.S. government’s International Crime Control Strategy was released in

May 1998. As summarized in table 1, the strategy consisted of 8

overarching goals and 30 implementing objectives. It should be noted that

according to the federal officials we interviewed, the strategy—and its

goals and objectives—is intended to supplement and not supplant related

strategies, such as the National Drug Control Strategy.

Table 1: International Crime Control Strategy: Overarching Goals and Implementing Objectives

Overarching goals Implementing objectives

Extend the first line of defense beyond U.S.

borders

• Prevent acts of international crime planned abroad, including terrorist acts, before

they occur.

• Use all available laws to prosecute select criminal acts committed abroad.

• Intensify activities of law enforcement, diplomatic, and consular personnel abroad.

Protect U.S. borders by attacking smuggling

and smuggling-related crimes

• Enhance our land border inspection, detection, and monitoring capabilities

through a greater resource commitment, further coordination of federal agency

efforts, and increased cooperation with the private sector.

• Improve the effectiveness of maritime and air smuggling interdiction efforts in the

transit zone.

• Seek new, stiffer criminal penalties for smuggling activities.

• Target enforcement and prosecutorial resources more effectively against

smuggling crimes and organizations.

Deny safe haven to international criminals • Negotiate new international agreements to create a seamless web for the prompt

location, arrest, and extradition of international fugitives.

• Implement strengthened immigration laws that prevent international criminals from

entering the United States and provide for their prompt expulsion when

appropriate.

• Promote increased cooperation with foreign law enforcement authorities to

provide rapid, mutual access to witnesses, records, and other evidence.

Counter international financial crime • Combat money laundering by denying criminals access to financial institutions

and by strengthening enforcement efforts to reduce inbound and outbound

movement of criminal proceeds.

• Seize the assets of international criminals through aggressive use of forfeiture

laws.

• Enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation against all financial crime by

working with foreign governments to establish or update enforcement tools and

implement multilateral anti-money laundering standards.

• Target safe havens of international fraud, counterfeiting, electronic access device

schemes, and other financial crimes.

Prevent criminal exploitation of international

trade

• Interdict illegal technology exports through improved detection, increased

cooperation with the private sector, and heightened sanctions.

• Prevent unfair and predatory trade practices in violation of U.S. criminal law.

• Protect intellectual property rights by enhancing foreign and domestic law

enforcement efforts to curtail the flow of counterfeit and pirated goods and by

educating consumers.

• Counter industrial theft and economic espionage of U.S. trade secrets through

increased prosecution of offenders.

• Enforce import restrictions on certain harmful substances, dangerous organisms,

and protected species.

Respond to emerging international crime

threats

• Disrupt new activities of international crime groups.

• Enhance intelligence efforts against criminal enterprises to provide timely warning

International Crime

Control Strategy

Announced in May

1998
Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

Page 23 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Overarching goals Implementing objectives

of changes in their organizations and methods.

• Reduce trafficking in human beings and crimes against children.

• Increase enforcement efforts against high-tech and computer-related crime.

• Continue identifying and countering the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures

and new technologies in telecommunications, financial transactions, and other

high-tech areas.

Foster international cooperation and the rule of

law

• Establish international standards, goals, and objectives to combat international

crime by using bilateral, multilateral, regional, and global mechanisms, and by

actively encouraging compliance.

• Improve bilateral cooperation with foreign governments and law enforcement

authorities through increased collaboration, training, and technical assistance.

• Strengthen the rule of law as the foundation for democratic government and free

markets in order to reduce societies’ vulnerability to criminal exploitation.

Optimize the full range of U.S. efforts • Enhance executive branch policy and operational coordination mechanisms to

assess the risks of criminal threats and to integrate strategies, goals, and

objectives to combat those threats.

• Mobilize and incorporate the private sector into U.S. government efforts.

• Develop measures of effectiveness to assess progress over time.

Source: Information formatted by GAO based on the International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998).

The International Crime Control Strategy stated that its goals and

objectives were dynamic and would evolve over time as conditions

changed, new crime trends emerged, and improved anticrime techniques

were developed. However, the strategy has not been updated since its

inception in 1998, even though threat assessments (discussed below) were

conducted in 1999 and 2000.

The International Crime Control Strategy was intended to build on and

complement existing national security and crime control strategies, such

as the National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy.

These strategies are required to be updated periodically to reflect changes

in the threat posed to the national security and other interests of the

United States (see P.L. 105-277, Title VII, section 706(b); and P.L. 99-433,

section 603). Our previous work has shown that the development of a

national strategy to address a specific threat, such as terrorism, first

requires a thorough understanding of the threat. This understanding can

be obtained, in turn, by conducting threat and risk assessments.2

 2

See, for example, Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).

Strategy Has Not Been

Updated Since Its

Inception
Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

Page 24 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

In May 1998, concurrent with the release of the International Crime

Control Strategy, the White House announced a legislative proposal to

help implement objectives in the strategy. In July 1998, Senator Patrick J.

Leahy introduced the proposed legislation—the “International Crime

Control Act of 1998” (S. 2303) in the 105th Congress. According to the

White House, S. 2303 contained statutory provisions intended to “close

gaps in current federal law, criminalize additional types of harmful

activities, and promote a strengthening of both domestic and foreign

criminal justice systems to respond to the new challenges posed by crime

that crosses international boundaries.” Although not enacted by the 105th

Congress, the proposed legislation contained provisions to

• establish jurisdiction in the United States over violent acts committed

abroad against state and local officials while engaged in official federal

business;

• authorize U.S. Customs Service officers to search international, outbound

sealed mail if there is reasonable cause to suspect that the mail contains

monetary instruments, drugs, weapons of mass destruction, or

merchandise mailed in violation of enumerated U.S. statutes, including

obscenity and export control laws;

• strengthen immigration laws to exclude international criminals from the

United States;

• expand the list of money laundering predicate crimes to include certain

serious foreign crimes, such as violent crimes and bribery of public

officials;

• address the problem of alien smuggling by authorizing the forfeiture of its

proceeds;

• provide extraterritorial jurisdiction for fraud involving access devices such

as credit cards;

• expand the authority of the Treasury and Justice departments to transfer

the forfeited assets of international criminals to eligible foreign countries

that participated in the seizure or forfeiture of the assets;

• provide new authority, in cases where there is no applicable mutual legal

assistance treaty provision, to transfer a person in U.S. government

custody to a requesting country temporarily for purposes of testifying in a

criminal proceeding, if both the foreign country and the witness consent;

and

• establish a hearsay exception to admit certain foreign government records

into evidence in U.S. civil proceedings.

Proposed Legislation

to Help Implement

Objectives of the

International Crime

Control Strategy
Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

Page 25 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

In 1999 and in 2000, as part of the International Crime Control Strategy, a

U.S. government interagency working group prepared assessments of the

threat posed by international crime. According to NSC and State officials,

the first assessment—prepared in 1999—was a classified document and

was not available to the public. An unclassified version of the second

assessment was publicly released—International Crime Threat

Assessment, December 2000. This document consists of the following five

chapters:

• Chapter I addresses the global context of international crime, identifying

the factors that have contributed to the growing problem of international

crime.

• Chapter II gives an overview of specific international crimes affecting U.S.

interests.3

• Chapter III addresses worldwide areas of international criminal activity,

especially as source areas for specific crimes and bases of operations for

international criminal organizations.

• Chapter IV addresses the consequences of international crime for U.S.

strategic interests, including the ability to work cooperatively with foreign

governments and the problem of criminal safehavens, failed states, and

kleptocracies.4

• Chapter V gives a perspective on future developments anticipated in

international crime.

 3

We summarized this chapter in appendix III.

4

Examples of kleptocracies, according to the threat assessment, are Nigeria under Sani

Abacha, Zaire under Mobuto Sese Seko, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. In

these cases—characterized by corrosive state-sanctioned criminality and corruption—top

leaders use the resources of the nation solely to enrich themselves and keep themselves

and their cronies in power.

Threat Assessments

Prepared to Support

International Crime

Control Strategy
Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

Page 26 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

In December 2000, the United States and over 120 other countries signed

the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (including two

supplementary protocols5

). Before it comes into force, however, the

Convention must be ratified by at least 40 countries.6

The main purpose of the Convention and its protocols is to enable the

international community to better combat organized crime by harmonizing

nations’ criminal laws and promoting increased cooperation. For example,

nations that sign and ratify the Convention would be required to establish

in their domestic laws four criminal offenses—participation in an

organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption, and obstruction

of justice.

In December 2000, at a signing conference for the Convention and its

protocols, the Department of State’s Under Secretary for Global Affairs

made the following remarks:

“While globalization has brought progress and expanded economic opportunities to the

world, an unfortunate consequence of globalization is transnational crime. ... We must

match the increasingly sophisticated means that organized criminal groups have found to

exploit globalization if we are to win this battle. In particular it takes international

agreements that are global to fight crime that is global.

“The Transnational Organized Crime Convention and its supplementary protocols include

several common themes that characterize successful global agreements. Perhaps most

important, they establish global standards that all countries must meet, and then provide

for flexibility in the manner in which they meet them. For example, the Convention and

Protocols define—for the first time in binding international agreements—organized crime,

migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons; and they require all parties to criminalize this

defined conduct under their domestic law. But they permit individual countries to tailor the

manner in which they implement their obligations to the particular needs of their system.

For example, the Convention recognizes that different countries have different approaches

to the crime that we in the United States label as conspiracy.

 5

The two protocols are (1) Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air

and (2) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially

Women and Children. A third supplementary protocol—Protocol against the Illicit

Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms—was still being drafted at the time that the

Convention and the first two supplementary protocols were adopted by the UN General

Assembly in late 2000.

6

Under terms of the agreement, nations may be a party to the Convention only, but not to a

protocol only.

UN Convention

Against Transnational

Organized Crime (and

Supplementary

Protocols)
Appendix II: U.S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime

Page 27 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

“The international norms established by this Convention and its protocols lead to another

common theme of successful global treaties—namely, they facilitate increased cooperation

among governments, in this case law enforcement officials. Having accepted definitions of

organized crime, migrant smuggling, and trafficking in persons makes international

collaboration on these subjects easier. The Convention and Protocols build on these

definitions, by including numerous mechanisms for cooperation. For example, rather than

going through the time-consuming and expensive process of negotiating bilateral

agreements, countries will be able to rely on these treaties for extradition and mutual legal

assistance. ...

“We have taken the first steps together, and now we must bring these instruments to life as

meaningful tools in our fight against transnational organized crime.”

7

According to an NSC official, the issue of international crime and the

framework of the U.S. response are currently under review by the Bush

administration. The official could not estimate when the review would be

completed. In the meantime, according to this official, the framework for

the response—established primarily by PDD-42 and the crime control

strategy—is still in effect, pending the outcome of the review. In this

regard, it should be noted that, in February 2001, National Security

Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1) was issued to reorganize the structure of

NSC. NSPD-1 abolished the then-existing system of interagency groups but

did not indicate which one, if any, of the 17 newly established policy

coordination committees would coordinate the issue of international

crime and the U.S. response.

In April 2001, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

established a multiagency Policy Coordination Committee on International

Organized Crime (PCC) to be chaired by NSC to provide oversight of the

federal response to international crime. According to an NSC official, one

of the PCC’s first priorities—as part of the administration’s ongoing

review—is to evaluate the International Crime Control Strategy to reflect

any changes in the threat from international crime as described in the

December 2000 threat assessment. The official did not provide a time

frame for completion of the evaluation.

 7

Speech by Under Secretary Frank E. Loy, U.S. Department of State (Dec.13, 2000).

Framework Being

Reviewed by New

Administration
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 28 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

According to law enforcement and intelligence officials, researchers, and

others, the extent of international crime has been growing since the early

1990s —a growth fueled by a number of factors, including the end of the

Cold War and increased globalization of commerce and trade and financial

and communications technology. Criminal organizations have been able to

exploit these developments to their advantage to further illicit activities

and execute financial transactions related to these activities.

While there is general consensus that international crime is growing, there

is also agreement that measuring the true extent of such crime is difficult.

This is mainly because of the clandestine nature of criminal activity and

the fact that criminals are not likely to self-report their activity.

Nevertheless, a number of efforts have attempted to gauge and describe

the threat posed by international crime to the United States and other

countries. These efforts rely primarily on estimates of international crime

activities as developed and reported by, among others, law enforcement

entities, business groups, and researchers.

In December 2000, as called for by the International Crime Control

Strategy, the U.S. government released an International Crime Threat

Assessment. The assessment was developed by an interagency working

group and provided various indicators or measures of international crime

within five broad categories.1

 While the assessment did not address the

crimes in any priority order to indicate severity of the threat to U.S.

interests, the categories were (1) terrorism and drug trafficking; (2) illegal

immigration, trafficking of women and children,2

 and environmental

crimes; (3) illicit transfer or trafficking of products across international

borders; (4) economic trade crimes; and (5) financial crimes. Furthermore,

within each of the five broad categories, the threats posed by specific

types of crimes were discussed. For example, within the financial crimes

category—as shown in table 2, which summarizes the threat assessment—

worldwide money laundering was estimated to be as much as $1 trillion

per year, with $300 billion to $500 billion of that representing laundering

related to drug trafficking. The assessment acknowledged, however, that

 1

The group included representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); U.S. Customs Service;

U.S. Secret Service; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN); National Drug

Intelligence Center; the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, State, and Transportation;

the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP); and National Security Council (NSC).

2

 State has now designated this activity as “trafficking in persons.”

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

International Crime

Threat Assessment
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 29 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

there is little analytical work supporting most estimates of money

laundering.

Table 2: Categories and Extent of Major International Crimes Identified As a Threat to U.S. Interests

International crime categoriesa

Excerpts from the International Crime Threat Assessment regarding the extent

of international crime

Terrorism and drug trafficking Terrorism

• In 1999, there were 169 terrorist attacks against U.S. targets worldwide, a 52-

percent increase from 1998.

Drug trafficking

• In 1999, Americans spent $63 billion on illegal drugs, according to a study

sponsored by ONDCP.

• The estimated total costs of drug abuse in the United States—including health

care and lost productivity—were $110 billion in 1995, the latest year for which

data are available, according to the U.S. National Institute for Drug Abuse (NIDA).

• In 1999, the United States seized some 73 metric tons of cocaine at its borders,

according to the U.S. Customs Service.

• About 875 kilograms of heroin were seized at U.S. ports-of-entry in 1999,

according to Customs Service data.

• In 1999, some 536 metric tons of marijuana were seized entering the United

States, most of which came from Mexico.

Illegal immigration, trafficking of women and

children, and environmental crimes

Alien smuggling

• The U.S. government estimates that 500,000 illegal migrants are brought into the

United States annually by organized alien smuggling networks; another estimated

500,000 enter without the assistance of alien smugglers. Most illegal migrants

enter the United States overland from Mexico or Canada.

• Chinese smugglers, known as snakeheads, often move aliens into the United

States by maritime vessels, including offshore transfers of migrants, but also

transit South and Central America, Mexico, and Canada. The U.S. government

estimates that 30,000 to 40,000 Chinese were smuggled into the United States in

1999.

• The United Nations (UN) estimates that migrant smuggling worldwide involves 4

million people and $7 billion annually, according to a report in December 1997.

Trafficking in women and children

• The U.S. government estimated in 1997 that 700,000 women and children were

moved across international borders by trafficking rings each year. Some

nongovernmental organizations estimate the number to be significantly higher.

• The worldwide brothel industry earns at least $4 billion from trafficking victims,

according to U.S. government estimates.

Environmental crimes

• The tremendous costs for legally disposing of pollutants and dangerous chemicals

have created new illicit business opportunities for criminal organizations, who earn

$10 billion to $12 billion per year for dumping trash and hazardous waste

materials.

• Criminal groups also smuggle environmentally harmful products, particularly

ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons whose legal trade is subject to stringent

international restrictions. The illegal trade of these substances into the United

States and other markets is accomplished through false labeling, counterfeit

paperwork, and bogus export corporations. The size of the global black market for

ozone-depleting substances is estimated by the UN to range from 20,000 to

30,000 metric tons annually, with more than half entering the United States.

• The illegal trade in animal parts—in particular elephant, whale, and hawksbill
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 30 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

International crime categoriesa

Excerpts from the International Crime Threat Assessment regarding the extent

of international crime

turtle parts—and endangered animal species has also become a lucrative

business, particularly for Chinese and other Asian criminal groups. The illegal

trade in exotic birds, ivory and rhino horn, reptiles and insects, rare tigers, and

wild game is estimated to earn criminal groups $6 billion to $10 billion per year.

Illicit transfer or trafficking of products across

international borders

Sanctions violations

• Some states of concern use international criminal networks to help in their efforts

to undermine U.S. and multilateral sanctions aimed at isolating those states from

the global community.

Illicit technology transfers and smuggling of materials for weapons of mass

destruction

• There is no confirmed reporting that organized criminal groups have planned or

attempted to steal nuclear warheads or weapons-usable nuclear material. Known

thefts of weapons-usable nuclear material have primarily been committed by

opportunists with insider knowledge of the facility storing nuclear material but

without buyers identified before the theft.

Arms trafficking

• The U.S. government estimates that military equipment worth several hundred

million dollars is sold annually on the illegal arms market to countries under UN

arms embargoes.

• Drug traffickers and organized criminal groups have increasingly turned to the

illicit arms market in the 1990s.

Trafficking in precious gems

• The lucrative market for diamonds, gold, and other precious gems has attracted

the interest of organized crime groups as well as become the dominant source of

revenue for warlords and insurgent groups in war-torn diamond-rich areas in

Africa.

Economic trade crimes Piracy

• Maritime piracy, which is particularly prevalent off the coasts of Southeast Asia

and Africa, threatens the security of some of the world’s most important sea lanes

as well as the safe and orderly flow of international maritime commerce.

• According to data made available by the U.S. Coast Guard, direct financial losses

incurred as a result of high-seas piracy are estimated at about $450 million per

year.

• Reported incidents of maritime piracy have more than doubled since 1994,

according to data from the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center

based in Malaysia, averaging between 200 and 300 per year over the last 5 years

as compared to an average of less than 100 piracy incidents between 1990 and

1994. These figures, however, understate the extent of the problem because most

piracy attacks go unreported. In particular, incidents involving coastal fishermen

and recreational boaters are heavily under-reported.

Nondrug contraband smuggling

• Nondrug contraband smuggling across international borders—including illegal

import and export of legitimate goods such as alcohol, cigarettes, textiles, and

manufactured products—is a highly profitable criminal activity that typically carries

lighter criminal penalties than narcotics trafficking.

• Colombian drug traffickers often use illicit drug proceeds to purchase cigarettes

that they smuggle into Colombia for black-market sales, avoiding high tariffs and

taxes on legal tobacco imports, according to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms.

• The United States is most often the destination of illicit trade in protected wildlife

and rare plants.

• Commodities smuggled out of the United States are often items restricted for

export by U.S. law and involve munitions list items, firearms, and defense-related
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 31 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

International crime categoriesa

Excerpts from the International Crime Threat Assessment regarding the extent

of international crime

technologies tightly controlled for export by the U.S. government. Other items

frequently smuggled out of the United States include stolen automobiles, dual-use

items, and other goods that are difficult to obtain.

• Illegal trafficking in U.S.-origin firearms has become a security issue of concern

for many foreign governments. The U.S. Customs Service seized nearly $4.6

million in arms and ammunition at U.S. ports-of-entry and exit in 1999.

• In 1997, the FBI Uniform Crime Report estimated that 1.4 million to 1.6 million

automobiles are stolen annually in the United States, of which 200,000 valued at

approximately $20,000 each are illegally transported out of the country—making

the overseas black market for stolen U.S. vehicles worth about $4 billion.

Intellectual property rights (IPR) violations

• Most IPR crimes affecting U.S. businesses involve the theft of trade secrets and

copyright, trademark, and patent violations.

• The American Society for Industrial Security, which conducts a comprehensive

survey of Fortune 500 companies, estimated in 2000 that potential losses to all

American industry resulting from the theft of proprietary information amounted to

$45 billion.

• The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimated that, in 1998, trade

losses suffered by U.S.-based industries due to copyright violations totaled nearly

$12.4 billion, with losses to the motion picture industry of $1.7 billion, the sound

recording and music publishing industry at $1.7 billion, the business software

industry at nearly $4.6 billion, the entertainment software industry at $3.4 billion,

and the book publishing industry at $685 million.

• According to current estimates by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),

counterfeit trademarked products account for approximately 8 percent of world

trade—roughly $200 billion annually. A recent survey of 10 leading apparel and

footwear companies by the International Trademark Association indicated annual

losses of nearly $2 billion. Online counterfeit sales may exceed $25 billion

annually worldwide, according to ICC estimates.

• In 1999, U.S. Customs seized a record $98.5 million in counterfeit imported

merchandise, an increase of $22 million over the previous year.

• The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association estimates that the

pharmaceutical industry loses more than $2 billion annually due to counterfeit

medications sold on the open market.

• The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition estimated in 1998 that product and

software counterfeiting costs the United States more than $200 billion per year in

lost sales, jobs, and tax revenues.

• The World Health Organization estimated in 1997 that at least 7 percent of the

medicines sold worldwide are counterfeit products.

Foreign economic espionage

• The stealing of trade secrets from the U.S. government and from U.S. businesses

through economic espionage, in addition to industrial theft, is a growing threat to

U.S. global economic competitiveness.

• The potential losses to all U.S. industry resulting from economic espionage were

estimated to be about $300 billion, according to a 2000 estimate by the American

Society for Industrial Security, which conducts a comprehensive survey of

industrial theft. This figure is three times what it was a few years ago.

Foreign corrupt business practices

• Foreign corrupt business practices cost U.S. firms billions of dollars each year in

lost contracts. Foreign firms often use bribes to win international contracts. About

half of the known bribes in the last 5 years were for defense contracts, with the

other offers directed at major purchases by governments and parastatal

organizations for telecommunications, infrastructure, energy, and transportation
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 32 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

International crime categoriesa

Excerpts from the International Crime Threat Assessment regarding the extent

of international crime

projects.

Financial crimes Counterfeiting

• International counterfeiting schemes include reproducing financial instruments

such as commercial checks, traveler’s checks, and money orders.

• About half of counterfeit U.S. currency is produced abroad, where many of the

illicit financial transactions by terrorist, drug trafficking, and organized crime

groups take place.

• About one-third of U.S. counterfeit currency distributed in the United States in the

past 3 years originated in Colombia, according to U.S. Secret Service data.

• Counterfeit U.S. currency produced with advanced reprographic capabilities and

distributed in the United States has increased from less than 1 percent in 1995 to

50 percent in 2000.

• While, at present, the production and circulation of counterfeit U.S. currency

present a minimal threat to the U.S. economy, technological advances in

counterfeiting and the extension of counterfeiting knowledge to more criminal

groups may, in some circumstances, undermine U.S. economic interests.

Financial fraud

• Financial fraud crimes have become more prevalent in recent years as greater

amounts of personal and corporate financial information are made available

through computer technology and access devices, such as credit cards, debit

cards, and smart cards.

• In addition, Internet-related financial crime is of growing international concern.

• Regarding financial fraud against businesses, in 1996, the Association of Certified

Fraud Examiners estimated financial losses from fraud perpetrated by domestic

and international criminals in the United States at more than $200 billion per year.

• According to current industry estimates, fraudulent credit cards cost the U.S.

banking industry at least $2 billion annually; losses worldwide are estimated to be

an additional $1 billion each year.

High-tech crime

• According to the joint 2000 FBI-Computer Security Institute survey of security

practitioners in U.S. corporations, financial institutions, universities, and

government agencies, 273 of the respondents cited financial losses of $265.5

million from computer crime—almost double the reported losses of $136.8 million

in 1998. The number of U.S. businesses reporting computer intrusions through

Internet connections rose from 37 percent in 1996 to 70 percent in 1998,

according to the joint survey.

• The Internet has also become the primary means used by international child

pornography rings to disseminate their material worldwide.

• In December 1999, there were about 100 ongoing U.S. Customs investigations

involving the sale of counterfeit goods over the Internet.

• According to a joint FBI-Computer Security Institute survey in 1998, 241 U.S.

business respondents reported $11.2 million in losses caused by computer

financial frauds. Telecommunications fraud from computer attacks cost these

companies an additional $17.2 million in losses.

• IPR violations through the penetration of computer networks are also an

increasing threat to U.S. businesses. In responding to the 1998 survey, U.S.

businesses reported losses of $33.5 million in theft of proprietary information from

computer attacks.

Money laundering

• While international law enforcement, intelligence, and financial experts agree that

the amount of illegal proceeds in the world is huge and growing, there is little

analytical work supporting most estimates of money laundering. A few estimates

have been attempted, but no consensus view has emerged about the magnitude
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 33 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

International crime categoriesa

Excerpts from the International Crime Threat Assessment regarding the extent

of international crime

of money laundering on a global, regional, or national scale.

• According to one recent estimate, worldwide money-laundering activity is roughly

$1 trillion per year, with $300 billion to $500 billion of that representing laundering

related to drug trafficking. A former Managing Director of the International

Monetary Fund has estimated worldwide money laundering at 2 to 5 percent of

the world’s gross domestic product—some $800 billion at the low end of the range

and perhaps as high as $2 trillion.

a

The crime categories are listed in the order presented in the source document, which states that the

assessment addressed: “...the major international crimes identified as a threat to U.S. interests in the

International Crime Control Strategy. This survey does not address them in any priority order

indicating severity of threat to U.S. interests.”

Source: International Crime Threat Assessment (Dec. 2000).

Based on our interviews with NSC and State officials, it is not clear

whether the threat assessment will continue to be periodically updated—

as part of an iterative process—and used to systematically measure trends

and identify new threats posed by various types of international crime.

According to an NSC official, the matter of updating the threat assessment

is being considered as part of the Bush administration’s ongoing review of

the federal response to international crime. Our prior work shows that

because threats to national security are dynamic and countermeasures

may become outdated, it is generally sound practice to periodically

reassess such threats.3

 Our work has also pointed out that national-level

threat assessments—and accompanying risk assessments that attempt to

determine the likelihood of a threat occurring—are decision-making

support tools that are used to establish requirements, develop strategies,

and prioritize program investments to help focus national efforts on

achieving results. As indicated earlier, the December 2000 threat

assessment did not prioritize the types of international crimes it discussed

in terms of the severity of threat they posed to U.S. interests.

In responding to our survey, a number of federal law enforcement officials

indicated that their agencies do not use the December 2000 threat

assessment. The agencies have, instead, developed their own threat

assessments based on information obtained through their own

intelligence. Examples of agency assessments include the following:

 3

See, for example, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998), Combating Terrorism:

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks

(GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 14, 1999), and Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to

Strategies and Resources (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).

Operational Threat

Assessments
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 34 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• Annual assessments developed by the Immigration and Naturalization

Service’s (INS) District Offices that focus on activities such as alien

smuggling.

• Country-specific corruption assessments prepared for the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) by a private firm. For instance, a

March/April 2000 assessment on Nigeria concluded that corruption was

pervasive in the private and public sectors and had become woven into the

fabric of that country’s society.

A forthcoming operational assessment represents a joint effort—among

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the U.S. Customs

Service, and the Canadian government—to determine the nature, size, and

scope of the legal and illegal tobacco trade and the involvement of

organized crime in this trade. According to ATF, this initiative is intended

to identify emerging trends, threats to the legal tobacco trade and

government revenues, and obstacles to effective enforcement.

In responding to our inquiries, several federal law enforcement and other

officials identified a number of challenges in accurately and reliably

determining the extent and impact of international crime. These

challenges included (1) the reluctance among agencies to share

information; (2) insufficient human resources deployed in foreign

countries to gather information; (3) the accuracy of information supplied

by some countries; (4) the clandestine and consensual nature of criminal

activity (e.g., public corruption); (5) the use of sophisticated technology by

criminals to avoid detection; and (6) the absence of a single designated

entity to act as the lead or coordination authority on

information/intelligence matters.

A number of other sources have attempted to assess and quantify the

threat posed by international crime. For example, the President’s

December 1999 National Security Strategy For a New Century4

 identified

international crime—such as terrorism and drug trafficking—as a threat to

U.S. interests. The strategy outlined a number of actions, including the

deployment of interagency teams to respond to terrorist incidents,

designed to counter such crime.

 4

The National Security Strategy is required annually by section 603 of the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433).

Other Sources Assess

Threat Posed by

International Crime
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 35 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Also, a December 2000 report by the National Intelligence Council

(NIC)5

—titled Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With

Nongovernment Experts—concluded that between now and 2015, one of

the three main challenges facing countries would be to combat criminal

networks and their growing reach. The report noted that criminal

organizations would become increasingly adept at exploiting the global

diffusion of information, as well as financial and transportation networks.

As an example of criminal activity, the report estimated that corruption

costs about $500 billion annually—the equivalent of about 1 percent of

global gross national product—in slower growth, reduced foreign

investment, and lower profits.

The April 2000 Phase II Report on a U.S. National Security Strategy for the

21st Century, issued by the United States Commission on National

Security/21st Century,6

 noted that international criminality—such as

terrorism and drug trafficking—affected the global environment in which

the United States acted. The report concluded that it was in the significant

interest of the United States that international criminality be minimized.

A 1999 UN report—Global Report on Crime and Justice—estimated the

extent of a variety of international crimes, such as the theft of art and

antiquities ($4.5 billion to $6 billion annually) and theft of intellectual

property, such as software ($7.5 billion annually). In a related matter, the

UN has initiated a 5-year project (Sept. 1999 to Aug. 2004) to assess the

activities of organized crime groups worldwide and the level of danger that

these groups pose to society.

 5

NIC is comprised of senior experts from the intelligence community and outside of

government. The experts are to concentrate on the substantive problems of particular

geographic regions of the world and of functional areas, such as economics and weapons

proliferation. NIC provides information to assist policymakers as they pursue foreign

policy priorities.

6

The congressionally mandated Commission was established by the Defense Department to

provide the first comprehensive review of the national security environment, processes,

and organizations since the National Security Act of 1947. The Commission’s mandate was

to identify threats emerging early in the 21st century and to recommend changes to the

national security structure to meet those threats.
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 36 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Congressional testimony by various intelligence and law enforcement

officials has also highlighted the threat posed by international crime. For

example, in a February 2001 statement on the worldwide threat before the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of Central

Intelligence stressed that terrorism and drug trafficking, among other

things, posed a real, immediate, and evolving threat to the United States.

The Director also added that these two threats were intertwined since, in

some instances, profits from drug trafficking funded terrorist operations.7

Testimony in April 1998 by the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign

Operations indicated that international crime posed an immediate and

increasing concern for the United States and the worldwide law

enforcement community.8

 Furthermore, at a March 2000 hearing before the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)9

 on the

impact of organized crime and corruption on democratic and economic

 7

 See Statement by Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, before the Senate

Select Committee on the “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World,”

(Feb. 7, 2001).

8

 See Statement for the Record of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

on International Crime before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Senate Committee

on Appropriations, (Apr. 21, 1998).

9

See Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th

Congress, 2nd Session, “The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and

Economic Reform” (CSCE106-2-7, Mar. 23, 2000), U.S. Government Printing Office

(Washington, D.C.: 2000). CSCE is a joint House-Senate independent government agency

created in 1976 to encourage and monitor the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Final

Act (also known as the “Helsinki Accords”), especially in the areas of human rights and

democratization.

Congressional

Testimony on

International Crime

Threat
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

Page 37 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

reform, several witnesses commented, among other things, that organized

crime and corruption were significant threats to the political, economic,

and social stability of countries in Southeast Europe and Central Asia.
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 38 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

In response to our inquiry, as shown in table 3, the National Security

Council (NSC) identified 34 federal entities—including cabinet-level

departments and their components, and independent agencies—that it

considered as having significant roles in combating international crime.

NSC cautioned that its compilation of federal entities was not intended to

be exhaustive.

Table 3: Federal Entities With Significant Roles in Combating International Crime

Federal entity

• Department of State

• Department of the Treasury

• Department of Defense

• Department of Justice

• Department of Agriculture

• Department of Commerce

• Department of Labor

• Department of Transportation

• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

• Office of Management and Budget

• United States Trade Representative

• Office of National Drug Control Policy

• Central Intelligence Agency

• NSC

• U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

• Federal Reserve

• Joint Chiefs of Staff

• United States Coast Guard

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

• National Security Agency

• Defense Intelligence Agency

• Customs Service

• Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

• Marshals Service

• Secret Service

• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)

• Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

• Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

• United States Army

• United States Navy

• United States Marine Corps

• United States Air Force

• Securities and Exchange Commission

• Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 39 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Note: Beginning with the Department of State and ending with DEA, entities are listed in accordance

with NSC’s order of protocol. The Marshals Service through FinCEN are not listed in any particular

order.

Source: NSC.

Given the large number of federal entities with a role in international

crime (detailed in table 3), as agreed with the requester, this appendix

presents an overview of the role of selected federal entities in responding

to international crime and the coordination of the response. The specific

federal entities are the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State;

USAID; and their respective components. NSC—as directed by

Presidential Decision Directive 42 (PDD-42), discussed in appendix II—is

to serve as the overall coordinator of the federal response to international

crime. Because the focus of our work was limited to these particular

entities, the information in this appendix does not reflect the full extent of

the federal response. However, this appendix presents a number of

examples to illustrate the federal response to specific types of

international criminal activity (such as terrorism) and at particular

physical locations (such as ports of entry).

Department of Justice components that have roles in addressing

international crime include the Criminal Division, FBI, DEA, INS, the U.S.

National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization

(USNCB/INTERPOL), and the U.S. Marshals Service.

Justice’s Criminal Division is responsible for developing, enforcing, and

supervising the application of all federal criminal laws except for those

specifically assigned to other divisions. Fourteen offices or sections within

the Criminal Division have responsibilities for international crime or other

related activities, as table 4 indicates. All sensitive federal international

criminal matters are coordinated through the Criminal Division. According

to a Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General, responding to

international crime is an increasingly critical responsibility for the

Criminal Division. In this regard, in a 1999 speech, the then Assistant

Attorney General stated that well over half his time was devoted to issues

and cases that have foreign policy and national security implications.

Furthermore, according to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, while

precise estimates are difficult, over the past few years, about 40 to 50

percent of the Division’s workload has been associated with international

crime matters. Examples of the Criminal Division’s workload related to

international crime include

Department of Justice

and Its Components

Criminal Division
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 40 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• prosecuting cases involving international crime—such as organized crime,

drug trafficking, money laundering, and international terrorism—often in

cooperation with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices;

• negotiating—in cooperation with State and other departments—and

implementing bilateral and multilateral treaties with other countries, such

as agreements for mutual legal assistance and maritime boarding

agreements, and the recent United Nations Convention against

Transnational Organized Crime; and

• providing training and other technical assistance to the law enforcement

and justice sectors of foreign countries.

Table 4: Types of International Crimes or Activities Handled by Sections or Offices in Justice’s Criminal Division

Criminal Division section or office Type of international crime or activity

Alien Smuggling Task Force • Alien smuggling

Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section • Asset forfeiture

• Money laundering

Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section • Child pornography

• International parental kidnapping

• Sex tourism

• Trafficking of women and children

Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section • Computer/high-tech crime

• International intellectual property rights

• Mutual legal assistance requests in electronic evidence cases

• Treaties in the high-tech area

Fraud Section • Bank fraud

• Internet fraud

• Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

• Mail fraud

• Securities fraud

• Wire fraud

Internal Security Section • Espionage

• National security

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program • International law enforcement training programs

• Law enforcement institutional development

Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section • Controlled substance offenses

• Drug trafficking organizations

Office of International Affairs • Extraditions (for all federal and state crimes)

• Mutual legal assistance requests/treaties (for all federal and

state crimes)

• Negotiation of international law enforcement treaties,

conventions, and agreements

Office of Overseas Development, Assistance and Training • Justice sector technical assistance

Office of Special Investigations • Crimes against humanity (jurisdiction over immigration aspects)

• World War II-era war crimes

Organized Crime and Racketeering Section • Organized crime

Public Integrity Section • Campaign financing

• Public corruption

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section • Crimes against humanity (criminal jurisdiction)

• Genocide

• International kidnapping
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 41 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Criminal Division section or office Type of international crime or activity

• Terrorism

• Torture

• War crimes

Source: Department of Justice, Criminal Division.

The FBI is Justice’s principal investigative arm and is charged with

investigating all violations of federal law, except for those assigned by

statute to another agency. According to the FBI Director, the Bureau’s

response to international crime consists of three key elements—

maintaining an active overseas presence, training foreign law enforcement

officers, and facilitating institution building. Within this context, the FBI

identified five of its components as having roles in responding to

international crime. These components are (1) Criminal Investigative

Division, (2) International Training Assistance Units, (3) National

Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), (4) International Operations

Section, and (5) the International Terrorism Operations Section.

Examples of the international crime initiatives undertaken by FBI

components include the following:

• Project “Millennium.” The FBI and law enforcement agencies from 23

other countries have provided INTERPOL with the names and profiles of

thousands of subjects involved in Eurasian organized crime in order to

establish a worldwide database. The database is intended to allow

participating countries to cross-reference and coordinate leads involving

Russian and Eastern European organized crime members.

• U.S.-Mexico Fugitive Initiative. This initiative—involving the FBI,

Justice, and the government of Mexico—is designed to improve

procedures for obtaining provisional arrest warrants for fugitives who

have fled to the United States from Mexico.

• Plan Colombia. Under the umbrella of this broad-ranging initiative, the

FBI and Justice are assisting Colombia in developing a program to

investigate kidnappings. The program includes establishing a Colombian

law enforcement task force consisting of specially trained investigators.

The task force is intended to work with the FBI when appropriate, such as

when cases involve U.S. nationals.

• Middle Eastern Law Enforcement Training Center. The Center is a

joint law enforcement training initiative between the FBI and the Dubai,

United Arab Emirate police department. The Center—funded entirely by

the Emirate’s government—is being established to address

transnational/cross-border crimes within the Middle East region;

according to FBI, these crimes have an impact on the United States.

Working with police officials in the region, the FBI identified a number of

Federal Bureau of

Investigation
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 42 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

crime issues to be addressed by the Center’s training, including

corruption, counterterrorism, organized crime, money laundering, drugs,

cybercrime, and illegal immigation.

DEA is responsible for enforcing the federal drug control laws and is the

single point of contact for coordinating international drug investigations

for the United States in foreign countries. DEA’s primary responsibilities

include investigating major drug traffickers operating at interstate and

international levels and working on drug law enforcement programs with

its counterparts in foreign countries. According to DEA, targeting

international drug trafficking organizations and their direct affiliates is one

of its highest priorities. In July 1999, we reported on the major

enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches that DEA

implemented in the 1990s to carry out its mission, including efforts to

target and investigate national and international drug traffickers.1

According to DEA, four of its components have roles in responding to

international crime: (1) the Office of International Operations; (2) the

Office of Domestic Operations; (3) the Financial Operations Section,

which deals with money laundering; and (4) the Office of Training, which

trains drug enforcement officials in other countries. These components are

involved in implementing provisions of the National Drug Control

Strategy. These provisions entail, among other things, the implementation

of interdiction and international programs. For example, DEA participates

in the Southwest Border Initiative—a cooperative law enforcement

effort—to combat Mexico-based drug trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico

border. Internationally, DEA is involved in counternarcotics efforts with

the governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Thailand, among others.

INS is charged with the administration and enforcement of U.S.

immigration laws, including facilitating entry of those legally admissible

into the United States and deterring the entry of those seeking to enter

illegally. According to INS, four components within its Office of Field

Operations have roles in responding to international crime. These

components are (1) the Office of International Affairs; (2) the Office of

Intelligence; (3) the Investigations Division, including the Smuggling and

Criminal Organizations Branch, the INS component of the Organized

Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, the National Security Unit, and the

 1

Drug Control: DEA’s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s (GAO/GGD-99-108, July 21,

1999).

Drug Enforcement

Administration

Immigration and

Naturalization Service
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 43 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Fraud Section; and (4) the Border Patrol. Examples of the international

crime initiatives undertaken by these components include the following:

• National Border Patrol Strategic Plan. In effect since 1994, this is the

Border Patrol’s attempt to deter illegal entries into the United States

between ports of entry.

• Southeast European Cooperative Initiative. This is an interagency

initiative to assist Southeastern European countries with, among other

things, combating cross-border crime as it relates to alien smuggling.

• Nigerian Crime Initiative. This interagency initiative is intended to

ensure the sharing of intelligence and providing training on Nigerian

criminal enterprises and removing Nigerian criminal aliens from the

United States.

• Operation “Crossroads.” This is an interdiction operation being

conducted along the Southwest Border in the Arizona Corridor (the area

between Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona). The operation has branches

stretching into Mexico and Central America.

The U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB) of the International Criminal

Police Organization—as the U.S. component of the broader INTERPOL

network—is intended as a point of contact for American and foreign

police seeking assistance in criminal investigations that extend beyond

their national boundaries. USNCB’s staff is composed of representatives

from various federal law enforcement entities, including Customs, ATF,

Marshals Service, and DEA. In addition to providing operational

coordination and training at the international, federal, and state level,

examples of the services USNCB provides and the projects it is involved in

include the following:

• International Notice Program. USNCB disseminates subject lookouts

and advisories through the circulation of INTERPOL notices. The colorcoded notices communicate various kinds of criminal information. For

example, the Red Notice (International Wanted Notice) informs member

countries that a warrant has been issued for a person whose arrest is

requested with a view to subsequent extradition.

• Project “Rockers.” This 28-country INTERPOL project is targeting

outlaw motorcycle organizations involved in criminal activities. The

project’s main objective is to identify the organizations and their

membership and to collect information on their criminality for analysis

and dissemination to affected countries.

The Marshals Service is responsible for, among other things, apprehending

federal fugitives and maintaining custody of and transporting federal

U.S. National Central

Bureau of the International

Criminal Police

Organization

U.S. Marshals Service
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 44 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

prisoners. The International Investigations Unit, within the Investigative

Services Division, has responsibility over international crime matters.

Specifically, according to a Marshals Service official, this unit is

responsible for (1) apprehending fugitives (foreign and international),2

 (2)

escorting extradited international fugitives back to the United States, and

(3) training foreign police officers. For example, according to this official,

the Marshals Service trains foreign police officers in investigating and

apprehending fugitives. The training is held in the United States and is

funded by the State Department.

Treasury components that have roles in addressing international crime.

include the Office of Enforcement; the U.S. Customs Service; ATF; the U.S.

Secret Service; IRS Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI); the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); FinCEN; and the Office of Foreign

Assets Control (OFAC).

Treasury’s Office of Enforcement has responsibility for several functions

that relate to international crime control. These functions include

• coordinating all Treasury law enforcement matters, including formulation

of law enforcement policies;

• providing oversight, monitoring, and/or guidance to Treasury enforcement

bureaus—Customs, ATF, Secret Service, IRS-CI, and FLETC—and

FinCEN;

• ensuring cooperation between Treasury law enforcement and other

federal departments and agencies; and

• negotiating international agreements to engage in joint law enforcement

operations and exchange financial information and records.

Within its dual missions of enforcing laws and regulating commercial

activities, Customs has significant responsibilities for ensuring that goods

and persons enter and exit the United States legally. Within these

missions, Customs’ strategic plan3

 identifies specific goals and objectives

—such as disrupting the illegal flow of drugs and money—that are linked

to international crime.

 2

According to a Marshals Service official, a foreign fugitive is one who has committed a

crime in another country and has fled to the United States. An international fugitive is one

who has committed a crime in the United States and has fled to other parts of the world.

3

U.S. Customs Service: Strategic Plan (Fiscal Years 2000-2005).

Department of the

Treasury and Its

Components

Office of Enforcement

U.S. Customs Service
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 45 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Three of Customs’ principal components have a role in responding to

international crime. These components are (1) the Office of Investigations;

(2) the Office of International Affairs, and (3) the Office of Field

Operations. Within these offices, a number of divisions and other units

have roles in responding to international crime. According to Customs,

within the Office of Investigations, 10 divisions are actively involved in

responding to various types of international crime. The divisions are (1)

Investigative Services, (2) Covert Operations, (3) Special Operations, (4)

Financial Investigations, (5) Fraud Investigations, (6) Strategic

Investigations, (7) CyberSmuggling, (8) Smuggling Investigations, (9)

Intelligence, and (10) Air and Marine.

Within the Office of International Affairs, three units have a role in

responding to international crime. The units are the (1) Operations

Division, (2) the Training and Assistance Division, and (3) the Policy and

Programs Division. Within the Office of Field Operations, three units have

roles in responding to international crime—(1) Outbound Enforcement

Team, (2) Anti-Smuggling Division, and (3) Trade Programs.

Examples of international crime initiatives undertaken by various

Customs components include the following:

• Industry Partnership Programs. These programs—the Carrier Initiative

Program, the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, and the Americas

Counter Smuggling Initiative (training program)—are designed to deter

and prevent narcotics from being smuggled into the United States via

commercial cargo and conveyances. These programs are also designed to

enlist industry support in activities related to narcotics interdiction.

• Border Coordination Initiative. This initiative is a border management

strategy involving Customs, INS, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S.

Department of Agriculture. The initiative is intended to increase

cooperation among federal entities along the Southwest border of the

United States to more efficiently interdict illegal aliens, drugs, and other

contraband. The initiative has six core parts, including developing joint

port management and community partnership plans.

ATF enforces federal laws and regulations relating to firearms, explosives,

arson, alcohol, and tobacco. ATF units that have international crime

responsibilities are (1) the International Programs Branch, (2) the Alcohol

and Tobacco Diversion Branch, and (3) the International Training Branch.

ATF has a number of international crime-related responsibilities and

initiatives. For example, ATF’s Traffic in Arms Program is an enforcement

effort to combat the illegal movement of U.S.-source firearms, explosives,

and ammunition in international traffic. Also, ATF traces U.S. alcohol and

Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 46 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

tobacco products recovered in foreign countries to identify individuals

and/or organized crime groups involved in the purchase and smuggling of

these items. In this regard, ATF assists foreign countries by assessing their

tax systems as they relate to alcohol and tobacco products and educating

foreign officials in how such products are regulated in the United States.

ATF’s National Tracing Center helps foreign law enforcement trace U.S.-

sourced crime firearms. According to ATF, this trace information enables

it to identify and target subjects responsible for illegally trafficking

firearms in the United States.

Furthermore, ATF’s International Response Team is the result of an

agreement with the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service. The

agreement originally provided for ATF investigative assistance at fire and

post-blast scenes on U.S. property abroad, where the Diplomatic Security

Service has investigative responsibility. The agreement has since been

expanded to include responses in which ATF would provide

technical/forensic assistance and oversight in arson and explosives

investigations to foreign governments on their territory. Such requests for

assistance are to be relayed to ATF through the Department of State, after

receiving authorization from the U.S. ambassador of the affected country.

The Secret Service carries out two distinct missions: protection and

criminal investigations. The investigative mission expanded from

enforcement of U.S. counterfeiting statutes to include other financial

crimes, such as financial institution fraud, computer fraud, financial

identity theft, access device fraud, and computer-based attacks against the

national’s financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure.

According to the Secret Service, these types of crimes have become

increasingly international in nature, given the seamless interaction among

monetary and economic systems around the world. Within the Secret

Service’s Office of Investigations, the following branches and divisions

have roles in combating international crime: (1) International Programs

Branch, (2) Financial Crimes Division, (3) Counterfeit Division, (4)

Forensic Services Division, and (5) Investigative Support Division.

In its strategic plan for fiscal years 2000-2005,4

 the Secret Service

established an investigative strategic goal of reducing crimes against the

nation’s currency and financial system. The goal comprises four strategic

objectives, all of which have a link to international crime: (1) reduce

 4

U.S. Secret Service: Strategic Plan (FY 2000-2005).

U.S. Secret Service
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 47 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

losses from financial crime, (2) reduce transnational financial crime, (3)

enhance foreign and domestic partnerships, and (4) support the protective

mission. To meet these objectives, the Secret Service is engaged in a

number of activities. Examples of these activities include implementing

the International Currency Audit Plan. Under this plan, the Secret

Service—along with representatives from the Federal Reserve Board, the

Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New

York—are to study the use of foreign currency abroad and develop

estimates of counterfeiting levels outside the United States. Also, through

the use of specialized task forces—such as the West African Task Force

and the Asian Organized Crime Task Force—the Secret Service is targeting

international organized crime groups and the proceeds of their criminal

enterprises.

IRS-CI’s mission is to investigate violations of the Internal Revenue Code

and related financial crimes, such as money laundering, in order to

enhance deterrence and compliance with tax laws. According to IRS-CI,

tax evasion and money laundering are closely related and can involve

similar activities. Money laundering can usually be considered as tax

evasion in progress because illicit funds are rarely reported on subsequent

tax returns. With the globalization of the world economy and financial

systems, many of the complex evasion and money laundering schemes are

employing international components, such as offshore banks, trusts, and

corporations in “tax haven” countries. Although IRS-CI does not have

specific jurisdiction over international crimes, the complex evasion and

money laundering schemes require it to document evidence of the

international movement of funds.

According to IRS-CI, its International Strategy complements the overall

U.S. strategy to combat the growing trend of international financial crimes.

In this regard, IRS-CI participates in the Financial Action Task Force for

Money Laundering (FATF).5

 IRS-CI assists FATF in the development and

implementation of strategies and laws that are intended to deter

international financial crimes and enhance compliance with U.S. tax laws.

 5

 FATF was established in 1989 by the G-7 summit in Paris in response to then growing

concern over money laundering. FATF’s mission includes monitoring the implementation

of the “Forty Recommendations,” a set of countermeasures that the task force designed to

be used against money laundering. The recommendations cover the criminal justice system

and law enforcement, the financial system and its regulation, and international

cooperation. FATF has 29 countries—such as Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Turkey, and

the United States—and 2 regional organizations—the European Commission and the Gulf

Co-operation Council—as members.

Internal Revenue Service
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 48 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

As part of its international strategy, IRS-CI assigns special agents

(attaches) in foreign posts that it considers “strategic,” such as Canada,

China, Colombia, Germany, and Mexico. The attaches are responsible for,

among other things, assisting IRS-CI special agents in gathering and

developing foreign evidence related to investigations under IRS-CI’s

jurisdiction and training host government personnel on financial

investigative techniques. In this regard, as part of Plan Colombia

(discussed earlier), IRS-CI is providing financial investigation training to

Colombian law enforcement officials and prosecutors.

FLETC serves as an interagency law enforcement training organization for

more than 70 federal agencies. FLETC also provides services to state,

local, and international law enforcement agencies. In its strategic plan,6

FLETC noted that training must be closely linked to changing law

enforcement challenges, issues, and needs. For one area of change—the

nature of crime itself—FLETC identified three types of internationalrelated crime that law enforcement training must address: terrorism (both

foreign and domestic groups), internet-related crime (including money

laundering), and organized crime (including foreign organizations).

In an effort to help combat international-related crime, FLETC offers a

range of training programs to foreign law enforcement agencies. Most of

these programs are offered at FLETC’s training campuses. Some are

exportable to user locations or are available at respective International

Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA). Under agreement with the

Department of State and administered by FLETC’s International Programs

Division, this training focuses on the following three areas:

• Law and democracy. Current initiatives under the United States Law and

Democracy Program provide technical assistance and training to law

enforcement personnel in Russia, Ukraine, and other Eastern European

and Central Asian countries. The program funds training to combat whitecollar crime, financial and computer crimes, and illegal narcotics

trafficking. The program also supports human rights, free market

economies, and the building of democratic systems and institutions.

• Antiterrorism assistance. The antiterrorism training programs

conducted by FLETC and funded by the Department of State’s Office of

Antiterrorism Assistance provide technical assistance and training to

foreign law enforcement in an effort to combat world terrorism.

 6

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC): Strategic Plan (2000-2005).

Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 49 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• International academies. The ILEAs in Hungary, Thailand, and

Botswana offer opportunities for foreign prosecutors, police, and criminal

investigators to interact with their U.S. counterparts. U.S. trainers share

operational methods, investigative techniques, criminal trends, and

current law enforcement issues with foreign law enforcement personnel.

While FLETC provides support for the efforts of all of the ILEAs, it has

lead responsibility for the Botswana academy and will also be responsible

for a fourth academy planned for Central America.

FinCEN’s mission is to (1) support law enforcement investigative efforts

and foster interagency and global cooperation against domestic and

international financial crimes; and (2) provide U.S. policymakers with

strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide money-laundering

developments, trends, and patterns. Within its overall mission, FinCEN’s

strategic plan7

 identifies a number of strategic objectives, including

preventing, detecting, and prosecuting money laundering and other

financial crimes; and establishing and strengthening mechanisms for the

global exchange of information to combat money laundering and other

financial crimes.

Regarding international cooperation, FinCEN is to work closely with other

components of the U.S. government and its global partners to counter the

threat of transnational crime to financial institutions and governments.

FinCEN activities include, for example, the following:

• Developing Financial Intelligence Units. FinCEN supports the

development of Financial Intelligence Units in other nations to help

facilitate the exchange of information in support of anti-money laundering

investigations. These units—of which FinCEN is one model—have been

established in various countries around the world to protect the banking

community, detect criminal abuse of the financial system, and ensure

adherence to laws against financial crime.

• Implementing the National Money Laundering Strategy. FinCEN

supports Treasury’s initiatives highlighted in the 2000 National Money

Laundering Strategy.8

 Among other things, these initiatives include

providing training and assistance to nations implementing counter-money

laundering measures. FinCEN also plans to expand support of Treasury

 7

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: 2000-2005 Strategic Plan.

8

The National Money Laundering Strategy was developed jointly by Treasury and Justice

(the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section).

Financial Crimes

Enforcement Network
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 50 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

initiatives concerning (1) efforts to identify those international

jurisdictions that pose a money laundering threat to the United States and

(2) expertise and analysis related to correspondent banking and offshore

financial services.

• Participating in the Financial Action Task Force. FinCEN supports

Treasury’s efforts to promote the adoption of international anti-money

laundering standards, such as those of the FATF. Formed by the G-7

Economic Summit of 1989,9

 the FATF is dedicated to promoting the

development of effective anti-money laundering controls and enhanced

cooperation in counter-money laundering efforts among its membership

around the world.10

Created in 1950, OFAC administers and enforces economic and trade

sanctions against targeted foreign countries, terrorism sponsoring

organizations, and international narcotics traffickers in accordance with

U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. In its role, OFAC acts under

Presidential wartime and national emergency powers to impose controls

on transactions and freeze foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction. Such

sanctions are designed to immobilize assets and deny the targeted country,

groups, or individuals access to the U.S. financial system and the benefits

of trade and transactions involving U.S. businesses and individuals.

Examples of OFAC’s activities include administering prohibitions

contained in congressionally mandated programs involving terrorism and

narcotics—these include those required by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, P.L. 104-132 and the Foreign

Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, P.L. 106-120, Title VIII.

The State Department’s role in addressing international crime is both

diplomatic and programmatic. In carrying out this role, the State

Department’s primary focal point for all international narcotics and

international criminal matters is the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau for

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). For drug

control and anticrime issues, the Department’s Bureau of International

Organization Affairs works with INL in coordinating interactions with

agencies of the United Nations system. Furthermore, State’s geographic

 9

The Group of Seven (G-7) originated in 1975 to provide a forum for discussion of

economic issues among the leading industrialized nations—Canada, France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1998, the name was changed to

G-8 when Russia was integrated into the group.

10In addition to Treasury components, Justice and State components also participate in the

Financial Action Task Force.

Office of Foreign Assets

Control

Department of State

and Its Components
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Coordination of the Response

Page 51 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

bureaus—such as the Bureau of European Affairs, and the Bureau of

South Asian Affairs—have responsibilities in guiding U.S. diplomatic

operations in their respective areas. The Office of the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism—within the Office of the Secretary of State—is

responsible for the overall supervision of international counterterrorism

activities. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security manages multiple anticrime

efforts and, according to State, is the primary point of contact for host

nations’ law enforcement entities in their efforts to work collaboratively

with the United States in combating international crime. The Office of the

Legal Adviser, in coordination with Justice’s Office of International Affairs,

is responsible for negotiating and bringing into force bilateral and

multilateral agreements that provide for the extradition of fugitives and for

assistance and cooperation by law enforcement authorities in criminal

cases in U.S. or foreign courts.

INL has broad responsibility for federal law enforcement policy and

program coordination in the international area. INL funds various bilateral

and multilateral international drug and crime control programs to

accomplish its goals and objectives. In this regard, INL administers an

annual budget of over $200 million in assistance—appropriated under

annual Foreign Operations bills—to foreign countries. INL played a central

role in developing the 1998 International Crime Control Strategy. In 1999,

INL organized and coordinated the Vice President’s Global Forum on

Fighting Corruption. This effort included participants from 90 nations and

various multilateral and nongovernmental organizations. Since that time,

INL has continued to coordinate a number of international anticorruption

initiatives and activities.

According to State, INL’s most important initiative in terms of funding is

counternarcotics assistance in support of Plan Colombia, a combination of

interdiction, eradication, and alternative development as well as rule of

law and development assistance. State has sent to the Congress a proposal

entitled the Regional Andean Initiative which expands key parts of Plan

Colombia, primarily the rule of law and economic development portions,

to Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

Regarding future initiatives, INL plans to pursue efforts to establish an

ILEA for Central/South America, in addition to those already established in

Budapest, Bangkok, and Gaborone (Botswana). According to INL, due to

endemic widespread poverty, weak police and judicial infrastructure, and

governmental corruption, Africa is a fertile ground for a growing

international crime threat. A new graduate-level facility is set to open in

Roswell, New Mexico, in September 2001.

Bureau for International

Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs
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Coordination of the Response

Page 52 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

A second initiative is to establish a reserve of up to 2,000 civilian police

officers, similar in concept to the National Guard. According to INL, the

United States currently contributes over 700 civilian police officers

worldwide to international law enforcement operations. INL is to respond

to requests by directing a contractor to recruit, select, and train U.S. law

enforcement personnel for missions. In this endeavor, police officers are

to volunteer but remain in their regular jobs until called for active duty. A

third initiative involves the creation of an interagency Migrant Smuggling

and Trafficking in Persons Coordination Center designed to develop

strategies and coordinate intelligence and other information.

The Bureau of International Organization Affairs is charged with

developing and implementing the policies of the U.S. government with

respect to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies, as well as within

certain other international organizations. The Bureau is to engage in what

is known as multilateral diplomacy to promote and defend the various

overlapping interests of the American people. More specifically, with

respect to international crime-related issues, the Bureau is to support

efforts in the areas of

• nonproliferation, nuclear safeguard, arms control, and efforts to combat

terrorism, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking;

• democratic principles and the rule of law in government and politics; and

• human rights, including the advancement of women’s rights.

On a less global scale, State’s geographically defined bureaus—for Africa,

East Asia and the Pacific, Europe, the Near East, South Asia, the Western

Hemisphere, and the New Independent States11—are to guide the

operation of the U.S. diplomatic missions within their regional jurisdiction.

These bureaus are to work closely with U.S. embassies and consulates

overseas and with foreign embassies in Washington, D.C. Unlike the

Bureau of International Organization Affairs—which engages in

multilateral diplomacy—the geographic bureaus are to coordinate the

conduct of bilateral foreign relations. For example:

 11Although it functions as a geographic bureau, the New Independent States is located

separately under the authority of the Office of the Special Advisor for the New Independent

States. This office is responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S.

foreign policy in the 12 countries of Eurasia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Bureau of International

Organization Affairs

Geographic Bureaus
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

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Coordination of the Response

Page 53 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• Europe. The Bureau of European Affairs12 is responsible for developing,

coordinating, and implementing U.S. foreign policy on a variety of issues

dealing with national security, economic prosperity, democracy, human

rights, protection of the environment, halting the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction, and combating terrorism and international crime. A

key policy goal is the establishment of an integrated system to enhance

regional stability and security, involving the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, cooperation with Russia, the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and the treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

• Western Hemisphere. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is

responsible for managing and promoting U.S. interests in the region by

supporting democracy, trade, and sustainable economic development, and

fostering cooperation on issues such as drug trafficking and crime, poverty

reduction, and environmental protection. A key initiative supported by the

Bureau is “Plan Colombia”—an integrated strategy for promoting the

peace process, combating the narcotics industry, reviving the Colombian

economy, and strengthening Colombia’s democratic society.

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has the primary

responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S.

international counterterrorism policy. The office chairs the Interagency

Working Group for Counterterrorism—to develop and coordinate policy—

and State’s own task force on counterterrorism to coordinate the response

to international terrorist incidents that are in progress.13 According to

State, in order to ensure better interagency coordination, officers from the

FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency are detailed to the office. In

addition, the office coordinates U.S. government efforts to improve

counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments, including the

policy and planning of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program. This

program is intended to provide assistance, including training and

 12According to State, as of July 2, 2001, the Bureau of European Affairs was merged with

that of the New Independent States to form the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.

13The Interagency Working Group for Counterterrorism is sponsored by NSC. The group

oversees a number of subgroups that coordinate certain terrorism-related research and

development activities, exercises, international consequence management, and

transportation security. In addition to State, members of the group include the

Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury; also, the

Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the FBI, and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (within Defense).

Office of the Coordinator

for Counterterrorism
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 54 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

equipment, to foreign countries to enhance the ability of their law

enforcement personnel to deter terrorism and terrorist groups from

engaging in international terrorist acts.

In addition to its security and protection roles both domestically and

abroad, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is responsible for the

investigation of passport and visa fraud, which are often linked to the

movement of international criminals. The Buraeu also coordinates State’s

anti-terrorism and anticrime “Rewards” efforts; coordinates investigative

leads overseas for State and other U.S. federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies; and provides anti-terrorism training to both U.S.

and foreign government law enforcement agencies.

USAID has a twofold purpose of furthering U.S. foreign policy interests in

expanding democracy and free markets, while improving the lives of the

citizens of the developing world. In doing this, USAID is the principal U.S.

agency to provide assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying

to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. Although USAID is

an independent federal government agency, it receives overall foreign

policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

With respect to narcotics and crime control, USAID is responsible for

designing and implementing development assistance programs—for

example, assistance to drug-producing countries to diversify their

economies away from dependency on illegal drugs and towards open

market economies. In the short term, USAID is responsible for alleviating

the economic and social dislocation resulting from successful drug control

programs. In the longer run, USAID’s mandate includes strengthening

democratic institutions and the respect for human rights. USAID sponsors

anti-drug education programs designed to build institutions overseas to

address the growing problem of drug abuse. USAID also funds justice

programs to strengthen host nation capability to prosecute criminal cases

in court and to develop and implement laws to deter criminal elements.

USAID identified four of its bureaus and five of their components—offices

or centers—and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as having roles

in combating various types of international crime. The four bureaus (and

their relevant offices or centers) are the (1) Bureau for Policy and Program

Coordination (which includes the Office of Program Coordination and the

Office of Policy Development and Coordination); (2) Bureau for Global

Programs (which includes the Center for Democracy and Governance and

the Center for Economic Growth); (3) Bureau for Europe and Eurasia; and

Bureau of Diplomatic

Security

U.S. Agency for

International

Development
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 55 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

(4) Bureau for Humanitarian Response (which includes the Office of

Transitional Initiatives). The Center for Democracy and Governance is an

example representative of USAID’s efforts against international crime.

To further support and advance USAID’s democracy and governance

program, the Center for Democracy and Governance was founded in May

1994. The Center is to help USAID field missions design and implement

democracy strategies, provide technical and intellectual leadership in the

field of democracy development, and manage some USAID programs

directly. The Center is organized along the lines of USAID’s strategic

framework for democracy and governance. The framework has four

objectives: (1) rule of law (strengthening legal systems); (2) elections and

political processes (conducting elections and developing political parties

and educating voters); (3) civil society (promoting a politically active civil

society); and (4) governance (promoting accountable and transparent

government institutions).

Under the rule of law objective, the Center’s efforts to strengthen legal

systems—in conjunction with the activities of USAID missions—fall under

three interconnected priority areas, each of which is to integrate human

rights concerns: supporting legal reform, improving the administration of

justice, and increasing citizens’ access to justice. For example, the Center

is represented on an advisory committee, which was established to

enhance interagency communication and coordination in the areas of

police and prosecutor training and development.

With respect to the governance objective, the Center is to concentrate on

the following five areas: legislative strengthening, decentralization and

democratic local governance, anticorruption, civil-military relations, and

improving policy implementation. For example, the Center has provided

financial support to Transparency International, a nongovernmental

organization dedicated to generating public support and action for

anticorruption programs and enhancing transparency and accountability

in governments worldwide. Overall, USAID has anticorruption activities in

54 countries; and the Center manages country-specific, anticorruption

programs valued at $19 million.

In addition to its efforts against corruption, USAID has activities that are

designed to address other types of international crime and support the

1998 International Crime Control Strategy. For example, to counter

narcotics, USAID has implemented “alternative development” programs in

several coca-producing countries, such as Peru and Bolivia. Such

Center for Democracy and

Governance

USAID Efforts Against

Other Types of

International Crime
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 56 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

programs are intended to strengthen the coca-producing areas’ licit

economies and improve their social and economic infrastructure.

According to USAID, since 1995, the areas used in Peru for coca

cultivation have declined by 70 percent. USAID also supports efforts

against trafficking in precious gems, violations of intellectual property

rights, environmental crimes, trafficking in women and children, and

financial fraud. In addition, the USAID OIG’s Investigations and Audit

Divisions have investigated incidents of financial fraud related to the

agency’s developmental, humanitarian, and reconstructive aid programs

around the world. According to USAID, recent successful OIG

investigations of entities involved in financial fraud related to USAID

programs in the United States and overseas have resulted in the recovery

of more that $100 million in fines.

Discussed below are examples that illustrate the federal response to

specific types of international criminal activity—such as corruption and

terrorism—and at particular physical locations—such as ports of entry.

The federal response in these areas includes numerous entities within

Justice, Treasury, and State, as well as various other federal departments

and agencies.

Regarding specific types of international crime, in an earlier report, we

identified at least 35 federal entities—consisting of 7 cabinet-level

departments and 28 related agencies, bureaus, and offices—that had a role

in providing rule-of-law assistance to fight corruption during fiscal years

1993 to 1998.14 Appendix V provides a complete listing of the 35 federal

entities.

In terms of the response to terrorism, we previously identified 43 federal

agencies, bureaus, and offices that have terrorism-related programs or

activities.15 These entities included the departments of Justice, Treasury,

and State and their components (as discussed in this appendix), as well as

other federal entities such as NSC and the Central Intelligence Agency.

 14Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-1998

(GAO/NSIAD-99-158, June 30, 1999).

15Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better

Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Examples of the

Federal Response to

Specific Types of

International Crime

and at Specific

Physical Locations

Response to Specific Types

of Criminal Activity
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 57 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

In August 2000, responding to an April 1999 Executive Memorandum from

the President, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.

Seaports issued a report detailing, among other things, the missions and

authorities of federal entities handling crime at seaports.16 Many of the

crimes cited by the Commission—such as terrorism and alien smuggling—

fit our definition of “international crime.” On the basis of its review of 12

of the 361 U.S. seaports, the Commission identified 10 federal

departments, 25 of their components, and 6 other federal entities that are

involved or interested in seaport operations. Fifteen of these—including

the Departments of Treasury and State,17 the FBI and Customs, and EPA—

were also identified as having jurisdiction over and a role in combating

criminal activity at the seaports reviewed.

Table 5 presents information about the types of criminal activity

encountered at seaports and the relevant federal (and state and local)

entities with jurisdiction over these activities.

Table 5: Jurisdiction for Criminal Activity at U.S. Seaports

Criminal activity Agencies with jurisdiction

Terrorism FBI, Coast Guard, Customs Service, INS, Treasury, ATF, and state/local agencies

Crime against shipping, piracy FBI, Coast Guard, ATF, and state/local agencies

Smuggling (importation) strategic/sensitive:

Weapons of mass destruction and components

Controlled substances

Arms and munitions

Monetary instruments

Child pornography

Counterfeit U.S. currency

Precursor and essential chemicals

Customs Service, FBI, DEA, ATF, Coast Guard, Secret Service, and state/local

agencies

Alien smuggling, unlawful entry, stowaways INS, Coast Guard, and FBI

General smuggling (importation):

Art and artifacts

Endangered species and wildlife

Chlorofluorocarbons

Prohibited or restricted merchandise

Commercial merchandise and alcohol

Customs Service, FBI, Fish and Wildlife Service, EPA, Food and Drug

Administration (FDA), ATF, Coast Guard, and state/local agencies

Cargo theft:

Inside seaport

Customs Service, FBI, and state/local agencies

 16Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (Aug.

2000).

17 According to State, it has a policy role in a number of the types of criminal activity, in

addition to the one identified by the Commission, namely “smuggling (exportation).”

Response to Criminal

Activity at Specific

Physical Locations
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 58 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Criminal activity Agencies with jurisdiction

Customs custody

Outside seaport

Outside Customs custody

Cargo control:

False manifesting

Diversion

Substitution

Customs Service, FDA, EPA, DEA, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and

Department of Commerce

Trade crime:

Revenue fraud

Intellectual property rights

Textile transshipment

Antidumping/countervailing duties

Child, forced, or indentured labor

Trade agreements

Country of origin marking

Customs Service, Department of Commerce, and FBI

Other serious criminal activity:

Extortion

Bribery

Racketeering

Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations

Money laundering

Tax evasion

Alcohol and tobacco diversion

FBI, Customs Service, DEA, IRS, ATF, and state/local agencies

Health and safety:

Tainted foodstuffs and alcohol

Pharmaceutical drugs

Insects

Dangerous organisms

Customs Service, FDA, EPA, U.S. Department of Agriculture, FBI, DEA, Coast

Guard, and Fish and Wildlife Service

Environmental:

Hazardous cargo

Nonindigenous species

Ballast water exchange

Deliberate discharge (pollution)

Coast Guard, EPA, FBI, Customs Service, and U.S. Department of Agriculture

Smuggling (exportation) strategic/sensitive:

Weapons of mass destruction and components

Ballistic delivery systems

State-of-the-art critical technology

Military hardware and equipment

Dual-use equipment

Monetary instruments

Arms and munitions

Precursor and essential chemicals

Customs Service, Department of Commerce, Department of State, DEA, ATF, FB I,

Coast Guard, and IRS

Smuggling (exportation):

Stolen vehicles

Stolen property

Stolen securities

U.S. trade secrets

Economic espionage

Customs Service, FBI, Coast Guard, and state/local agencies

Economic sanctions and embargoes: Customs Service, Treasury, and Department of Commerce
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 59 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Criminal activity Agencies with jurisdiction

Trading with the Enemy Act

Other

Bribery (government officials) The official’s agency and the FBI

Assault on federal officer The officer’s agency and the FBI

Source: Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (Aug. 2000).

We identified a group responsible for the executive-level coordination of

international crime. We also identified a number of coordination

mechanisms at the operational level focusing on specific types or aspects

of international crime, as well as particular geographic areas. Various

officials we contacted identified challenges involved in coordinating the

response to international crime. Our prior work has stressed the need for

sustained executive-level coordination of crosscutting efforts that address

national issues.

Regarding coordination of the overall federal response to international

crime, PDD-42 established the Special Coordination Group on

International Crime (SCG) to ensure sustained and focused attention on

international crime fighting. The SCG was comprised of high-level officials

from relevant federal entities, including Justice, Treasury, and State and

was chaired by a senior NSC official. A number of subgroups—one for

each of the types of international crime enumerated in the crime control

strategy—were also formed. Because the SCG’s and its subgroups’

proceedings—and any results and products—are classified, they are not

discussed in this report.18 Separately within NSC, the National Coordinator

for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism—as Special

Assistant to the President—is intended to be responsible for interagency

coordination on issues related to international organized crime.19 In

addition, the Office of Transnational Threats is intended to be the NSC

point of contact on international narcotics issues. According to an NSC

 18In commenting on a draft of this report, USAID noted that much of the information

discussed and exchanged by the SCG Sub-group on Diplomatic Initiatives and Institutional

Development was unclassified.

19In addition to international organized crime, the National Coordinator is responsible for

interagency coordination on issues related to computer security, protection of critical

infrastructure assets, counter-terrorism, continuity of government operations, national

security special events, and preparedness for and responses to the use of weapons of mass

destruction, including defense against chemical and biological weapons.

Coordination of

Response to

International Crime

Executive-Level

Coordination of Response

to International Crime
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 60 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

official, two NSC staff were assigned full-time to international crime

coordination matters.

In response to our review, a number of officials identified some challenges

faced by the SCG in implementing its role. For example, according to State

and NSC officials, the SCG was to meet periodically to discuss matters

related to the response to international crime. After meeting 14 times from

about mid-1998 through mid-1999, the SCG did not subsequently meet very

frequently. Specifically, according to an NSC official, the SCG did not meet

at all for almost 9 months—from about September 1999 to June 2000—in

part because some of its members were involved in other activities, such

as working on year 2000 computer compliance matters; and in part,

because of staffing shortages. According to this official, the SCG met four

times each in 1999 and 2000. This official also noted that the coordination

of the federal response to international crime—given its scope and

number of participants—could be further improved. In this regard, he

stated that the SCG had been a step in the right direction toward

improving coordination and had worked reasonably effectively in certain

instances. Separately, USAID officials pointed out that while SCG was an

effective way to share information among agencies, it lacked the authority

to broker differences between agencies or between headquarters and field

units.

The SCG was abolished by National Security Presidential Directive 1

(NSPD-1)—which was issued in February 2001 by the new

administration—and the directive did not designate a specific successor at

that time. In addition, absent naming a successor for the SCG, the directive

did not identify which of the 17 geographic and functional Policy

Coordination Committees (PCC) it established were to handle

coordination of federal efforts against international crime.20 Subsequently,

as discussed briefly in appendix II, in April 2001, the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs—as part of the Bush

administration’s ongoing review of international crime, terrorism, and

critical infrastructure—established a PCC for International Organized

Crime. This PCC is to be comprised of officials at the Assistant Secretary

level from relevant federal entities and is to be chaired by the NSC Senior

 20According to NSPD-1, the PCCs are to be the main day-to-day entities for interagency

coordination of national security policy. These committees would be responsible for

managing the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple

agencies of the U.S. government. Geographic PCCs include those for the Western

Hemisphere and the Near East/North Africa. Functional PCCs include those for

international development and humanitarian assistance and arms control.
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 61 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Director for Transnational Threats. The PCC is intended to coordinate

policy formulation, program oversight, and new initiatives related to a

number of international crime issues not directly related to

counterterrorism, including arms trafficking, trafficking in women and

children, and foreign official corruption.21 According to an NSC official, as

its first task, the PCC is expected to evaluate the 1998 International Crime

Control Strategy to reflect changes in the threat from international crime

as described by the December 2000 International Crime Threat

Assessment. This official did not provide a time frame for beginning and

completing the evaluation of the strategy.

Regarding the coordination of specific types or aspects of international

crime, a number of coordination centers, interagency coordinators, and

coordination bodies and working groups have been established in recent

years. For example, State and Justice created a Migrant Smuggling and

Trafficking in Persons Coordination Center to achieve greater integration

and overall effectiveness of the U.S. effort to combat trafficking in persons

and smuggling of migrants. In addition, FBI and Customs formed a center

to fight intellectual property rights violations. Among other things, the

center is to coordinate all U.S. government domestic and international law

enforcement activities involving intellectual property rights and to serve as

the collection point for intelligence provided by private industry. Also, as

discussed in appendix V, in 1999, State appointed a coordinator for rule of

law assistance programs. According to State, the position lapsed at the end

of the Clinton administration and has not been reestablished.

In addition, federal entities identified a variety of mechanisms, working

groups, and organizations and law enforcement entities with which they

coordinate their international crime activities. Within Justice, for example,

the FBI coordinates its activities against financial fraud through the

International Securities Working Group. Furthermore, the FBI coordinates

its activities against various types of international crime with foreign

police organizations—such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police—and

domestic law enforcement entities, such as Customs and INS. The FBI

coordinates its training activities through a variety of means, such as the

International Law Enforcement Academy Steering Committee. DEA

coordinates its drug enforcement efforts through interagency coordinating

groups or committees, such as “Linear” for cocaine and “Linkage” for

 21Other international crime issues to be coordinated by the PCC for International Organized

Crime are intellectual property theft, international fraud, drug trafficking, money

laundering, alien smuggling, and diamond smuggling.

Operational Level

Coordination of Response

to International Crime
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 62 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

heroin. INS’ Border Patrol coordinates its alien smuggling efforts through

the Justice Alien Smuggling Task Force and the Interagency Working

Group on Smuggling and Trafficking.

Within Treasury, for example, Customs coordinates its high-tech crime

efforts with the G-8’s High Tech Crime Sub-Group,22 as well as with DEA

and FBI. Also, Customs coordinates its terrorism efforts through, among

others, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and efforts

against intellectual property crimes through the National Intellectual Law

Enforcement Coordination Council. ATF coordinates its arms-trafficking

efforts with, among others, Customs and INTERPOL. IRS-CI coordinates

many of its anti-money laundering efforts with components of Justice and

Treasury.

Within State, for example, INL coordinates, among other things, with the

Departments of Justice and Defense and others the designation of major

narcotics transit and trafficking countries, and the decisions on the

certification of countries as cooperating with the United States in

connection with counternarcotics efforts. As discussed earlier, the Office

of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates the response to

international terrorism with, among others, FBI and the Central

Intelligence Agency.

Within USAID, the Global Bureau’s Center for Democracy and Governance

coordinates its public corruption activities through the SCG’s Sub-Group

on Diplomatic Initiatives and Institutional Development. Internationally,

USAID coordinates with multinational entities, such as the Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development, and with nongovernmental

entities, such as Transparency International, among others.

In addition to the challenges related to the SCG discussed earlier, various

federal entities identified a number of challenges in coordinating their

efforts against international crime. For example:

• Customs identified an absence of mechanisms to share data in a timely

fashion and restrictions related to the sharing of sensitive information,

especially with the intelligence community.

 22The G-8 Subgroup on High-tech Crime was formed in January 1997 to help enhance the

abilities of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute high-tech and computer-related

crime.

Challenges Involved in

Coordinating International

Crime Efforts
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 63 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• The FBI cited challenges in obtaining evidence from foreign law

enforcement agencies necessary to support U.S. criminal charges, such as

predicate acts for money laundering.

• USAID noted that the large number of actors involved and the diffuse

nature of decisionmaking—between field offices and headquarters and

among the actors—posed particular coordination challenges for

anticorruption efforts.

• State noted the challenge of overlapping responsibilities and competition

of limited resources among federal agencies and the mismatch of

institutions and expertise between U.S. and foreign law enforcement

agencies, including different definitions of crime and the capacity to

“absorb” training.

Our previous work has shown that extensive federal crosscutting

responses to national issues—such as international crime—require a high

level of sustained coordination. Our work has also shown that such highlevel coordination can bring about the required firm linkages of threat

assessments, strategy and prioritization of effort, resource allocation and

tracking, and outcome-oriented performance measures. Otherwise, our

work has concluded, scarce resources are likely to be wasted, overall

effectiveness will be limited or not known, and accountability will not be

ensured. 23 In this regard, we note that the establishment of the PCC for

International Organized Crime is a step in the right direction in seeking to

provide coordination and oversight of the federal response to international

crime. On the basis of the known details about its role and priorities, the

PCC appears to address some of the coordination and related issues we

discuss in this report, such as evaluating the International Crime Control

Strategy in light of any changes in the threat from international crime.

The federal effort to combat terrorism—one of the activities in our

definition of international crime—illustrates some of the challenges

involved in implementing crosscutting responses to complex public

problems and national issues. Specifically, our work pointed out that the

 23See, for example, Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission

Fragmentation and Program Overlap (GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997); Managing for

Results: Using GPRA to Help Congressional Decisionmaking and Strengthen Oversight

(GAO/T-GGD-00-95, Mar. 22, 2000); and Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency

Coordination (GAO/GGD-00-106, Mar. 29, 2000).

Previous Work Has Shown

That Crosscutting

Responses to National

Issues Require High-Level

Coordination
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities’ Roles

in Responding to International Crime and

Coordination of the Response

Page 64 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

counterterrorism effort has been prone to problems with interagency

coordination.24 Our work pointed out, for example, that:

• The federal agencies were not tracking expenditures or developing

priorities for the billions of dollars being invested in an increasing number

of counterterrorism programs.

• These resources and programs, in turn, had not been clearly linked to

sound threat analyses.

• This situation had created the potential for various federal entities creating

their own programs without adequate coordination, with the further

potential for gaps and/or duplication.

In response, we recommended that, among other things, the federal

government conduct sound threat assessments to define and prioritize

requirements and properly focus programs and investments in combating

terrorism.

In commenting on a draft of this report, Justice—as it had done in

commenting on our report that originally raised this issue—disputed the

conclusions that there were major problems with interagency

coordination of terrorism activities and that sound threat assessments

were not being conducted and used to define, prioritize, and address

current terrorism threats. Furthermore, as with the prior report, Justice

reiterated its position that the Attorney General’s Five Year Interagency

Plan on Counterterrorism and Technology Crime included an articulation

of goals, objectives, and time frames and that—together with a number of

presidential directives—the Plan essentially constituted a baseline

national strategy to counter terrorism.

 24See, for example, Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr. 6, 2000) and Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to

Strategies and Resources (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 65 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

As presented in appendix II, the International Crime Control Strategy,

announced in May 1998, consists of 8 overarching goals and 30

implementing objectives. Of these totals, one goal and two implementing

objectives address the topic of corruption, as table 6 shows.

Table 6: International Crime Control Strategy Goal and Objectives That Address

Corruption

Overarching goal Implementing objectives

Establish international standards, goals, and objectives

to combat international crime, including corruption and

bribery.

Foster international

cooperation and the rule of law

Strengthen the rule of law as the foundation for

democratic and free markets in order to reduce

societies’ vulnerability to criminal exploitation.

Source: Excerpt from International Crime Control Strategy.

In response to our inquiries regarding federal efforts to address

international corruption, a senior Department of State official confirmed

that the International Crime Control Strategy has two implementing

objectives that address corruption. Furthermore, in providing perspectives

on the two objectives, the official commented substantially as follows:

• One objective addresses corruption and bribery in the context of

transnational business practices, particularly regarding government

procurement contracts. This context may involve, in a hypothetical

example, bribes resulting in the purchase of French Mirage versus U.S.

F-16 military aircraft. In sum, this section of the strategy addresses the

type of corruption that is of direct concern to competing transnational

businesses.

• The other objective addresses corruption in a broader context—a rule of

law context—wherein corruption among justice and security officials has

a special significance.1

 These officials are charged with upholding the rule

of law for governments, which establishes the basic framework within

which all elements of society, including business, are to operate.

Widespread corruption among justice and security officials can potentially

destabilize governments.

 1

According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the rule of law is

premised on a government being able to provide a predictable and transparent legal

system. Fair and effective judicial and law enforcement institutions to protect citizens

against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts are also a basic part of such a

system.

Appendix V: Combating Corruption
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 66 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

According to Commerce and State Department reports, the bribery of

foreign public officials is a deeply embedded practice in many countries.

For example, in the period from May 1994 through April 2001, Commerce

received reports that the outcome of 414 contracts valued at $202 billion

may have been affected by bribery involving foreign firms. During this

period, U.S. firms are alleged to have lost 101 of these contracts worth

approximately $30 billion because of this corrupt practice.

In recent years, a variety of anticorruption and transparency initiatives

have been considered by various international governmental entities.

Furthermore, a number of legal and business associations and

nongovernmental organizations have had key advisory roles in developing

the various anticorruption initiatives. Of the various initiatives, an

international agreement adopted by the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been described as the

“centerpiece of a comprehensive U.S. government strategy to combat

bribery and corruption” in international business transactions. This

agreement is the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign

Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

In 1977, the United States enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

(FCPA), 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1, et seq., 78ff, which makes it unlawful to bribe

foreign government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining

business. Subsequently, partly as a result of U.S. leadership efforts to

create a level playing field among the world’s major trading nations, an

international anti-bribery agreement was created and entered into force in

1999. This agreement—the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of

Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions—obligates

its parties to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in order to

obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of

international business.2

 In effect, the OECD Convention internationalizes

the principles in the FCPA. The State Department’s Assistant Secretary for

Economic and Business Affairs has described the OECD Convention as

 2

As enacted in 1977, FCPA’s antibribery provisions covered only issuers with securities

registered under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and all other U.S. nationals and

companies (defined as “domestic concerns”). In 1998, the Congress amended FCPA to

conform to the requirements of the OECD Convention. Because the OECD Convention

requires state parties to criminalize bribery by “any person,” the Congress expanded

FCPA’s coverage to include all foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of a

foreign bribe while in the United States. See S. Rep. No. 105-277 and Signing Statement for

the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, P.L. 105-366, reprinted in

1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 771-772.

Corruption:

Transnational

Business Context

Development of the OECD

Convention
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 67 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

“our principal weapon for combating a particularly damaging form of

corruption, the payment of bribes to foreign officials in international

business transactions, sometimes referred to as the ‘supply side’ of

bribery.”

The OECD Convention provides a mechanism for monitoring—through a

peer review process following the model used by the FATF—the quality of

the implementing legislation enacted by each participating nation and the

effectiveness of efforts to enforce relevant national laws. Also, under U.S.

law, the Departments of State and Commerce are required to provide the

Congress with annual reports on the implementation of the OECD

Convention.3

 State and Commerce submitted their most recent annual

reports in June 20014

 and July 2001,5 respectively. The State and

Commerce reports presented similar key points and findings. For instance,

in its July 2001 report, Commerce noted that:

• Further progress has been made on the first priority of ensuring that all

signatories ratify the OECD Convention and enact implementing criminal

legislation prohibiting the bribery of foreign government officials. Thirtythree of the 34 signatories had deposited instruments of ratification and 30

had legislation in place to implement the Convention. As of June 4, 2001,

Brazil, Chile, Ireland, and Turkey had not ratified and/or enacted

implementing legislation.

• Countries that have ratified the Convention had generally taken a serious

approach to fulfilling their obligations on criminalizing the bribery of

foreign government officials. During the Phase I monitoring procedure in

the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery, all 28 signatories with

implementing legislation have had such legislation reviewed. On the basis

of its own review of implementing legislation, the U.S. government is

concerned that some countries’ legislation—particularly, that of France,

Japan, and the Untied Kingdom—may be inadequate to meet all of their

commitments under the Convention.

 3

The State Department’s reports are required by Paragraph (c)(1) of the Senate Resolution

of Advice and Consent (dated July 31, 1998) to ratification of the Convention. Commerce’s

reports are required by the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,

Pub. L. 105-366, section 6.

4

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Battling International

Bribery 2001 (June 2001).

5

U.S. Department of Commerce, Addressing the Challenges of International Bribery and

Fair Competition: July 2001 (July 2001).
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 68 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• Since the Convention had been in force for only a short time, it was still

too early to make judgments regarding the effectiveness of enforcement

measures. According to Justice’s Criminal Division, the OECD’s Working

Group on Bribery will embark later this year upon Phase II of the

monitoring procedure. Phase II reviews will focus on the quality of

enforcement under each signatory’s implementing criminal legislation.

As mentioned previously, in addition to the OECD Convention, a variety of

other anticorruption and transparency initiatives have been started by

various international governmental entities, including the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of

American States (OAS), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum,

the Global Coalition for Africa, and the United Nations. An example of

these initiatives is OSCE’s Charter for European Security, Rule of Law, and

Fight Against Corruption.

Furthermore, key advisory roles in developing the various anticorruption

initiatives have involved a number of legal and business associations and

nongovernmental organizations—such as the American Bar Association,

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the International Chamber of Commerce

(ICC), and Transparency International.6

 An example of these initiatives is

ICC’s Rules of Conduct and Bribery, which are to apply to business

conducted across borders.

More information about these various initiatives is presented in a May

2000 brochure prepared by the State Department, in consultation and

cooperation with other federal entities.7

 The brochure was developed as

an outreach effort to provide U.S. companies and business associations

with information about the benefits of corporate anti-bribery policies, as

well as give guidance on the requirements of U.S. law and the OECD

Convention.

 6

Transparency International is a global nongovernmental organization. Its stated principal

goal is to increase government accountability and curb international and national

corruption.

7

Department of State (in consultation and cooperation with the Departments of Commerce,

Justice, and the Treasury; the U.S. Office of Government Ethics; and USAID), Fighting

Global Corruption: Business Risk Management (Department of State Publication 10731)

(May 2000). This publication was revised and updated in May 2001.

Other Anticorruption

Initiatives
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 69 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

In recent years, in addition to the OECD Convention focusing on

transnational bribery, a number of broad-based multilateral regional

initiatives against corruption have been developed. According to Justice’s

Criminal Division, efforts in this area in Europe and the Western

Hemisphere are currently the most developed. In this regard, the United

States has provided assistance worldwide to support the development of

democratic principles and institutions, although the effectiveness of some

of this assistance has been recently questioned.

In 1999, the Council of Europe’s (COE) Criminal Law Convention Against

Corruption was opened for signature. In general, the COE Convention

obligates state parties to criminalize a wide variety of domestic and

international bribery offenses and related money laundering offenses, as

well as to adopt asset forfeiture and international legal assistance

measures. The COE Convention also provides that the Group of States

Against Corruption (GRECO) shall monitor parties’ implementation of the

Convention. GRECO is a peer review mechanism through which members

evaluate each other’s implementation of the COE Convention as well as a

variety of preventative measures against corruption. The United States

signed the Convention and joined GRECO in fall 2000. A number of

Eastern and Central European countries—such as Romania, Croatia,

Georgia, and Latvia—have also joined GRECO.

Several U.S. government agencies are providing corruption experts to

participate in GRECO evaluations of other countries. The Departments of

Justice and State expect that over time, the GRECO evaluations will not

only encourage internal reforms but also help the United States and other

donor countries better target anticorruption technical assistance.

In 1996, negotiation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption

was completed. The Convention obligates state parties to criminalize

domestic bribery, including the fraudulent use or concealment of property

derived from such acts of bribery, and to criminalize transnational bribery,

if consistent with the state’s constitution and legal system. It also

encourages state parties to the Convention to adopt a broad range of

preventive measures, including open and equitable systems for

government hiring and procurement, standards of conduct for public

servants, financial disclosure registration systems for certain public

servants, and anticorruption oversight bodies.

Twenty-two OAS countries, including the United States, have ratified the

Convention. In May 2001, the state parties to the Convention concluded

Corruption: Rule of

Law Context

Council of Europe

Inter-American Convention

Against Corruption
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 70 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

negotiation of a follow-up mechanism whereby international teams of

experts are to review the level of implementation by each party. The

mechanism was established by the state parties to the Inter-American

Convention by means of a declaration signed on the margins of the June

2001 meeting of the OAS General Assembly.

Additional anticorruption efforts, outside the framework of a formal

instrument, are reflected in the First Global Forum on Fighting

Corruption, which was hosted by the Vice President and held in

Washington, D.C., in February 1999. Forum participants—from 90

governments—agreed to a final conference declaration that called on

governments to (1) adopt principles and effective practices to fight

corruption, (2) promote transparency and good governance, and (3)

establish ways to assist each other through mutual evaluation.

During May 28-31, 2001, 143 countries attended the Second Global Forum

on Fighting Corruption at The Hague in the Netherlands. The Forum was

hosted by the Dutch government and co-sponsored by the United States.

The U.S. Attorney General led the U.S. delegation.

These global efforts have been characterized as important for securing

public integrity and controlling corruption among government officials,

especially those responsible for maintaining the rule of law.

In the early 1980s, as a way to support democratic principles and

institutions, the United States began helping Latin American countries

improve their judicial and law enforcement organizations. Until 1990, such

assistance was provided primarily to Latin American and Caribbean

countries. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, the United

States has also provided rule of law and related assistance to Central and

Eastern Europe and other regions of the world.8

Generally, the phrase “rule of law assistance” refers to U.S. efforts to

support legal, judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts undertaken by

foreign governments. The term encompasses assistance to help reform

legal systems (criminal, civil, administrative, and commercial laws and

regulations) as well as judicial and law enforcement institutions

 8

The Freedom Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511) and the Support for Eastern European

Democracy Act of 1989 (P. L. 101-179) provided for U.S. assistance to the former Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe.

Global Forum Against

Corruption

U.S. Rule of Law Funding

Worldwide
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 71 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

(ministries of justice, courts, and police, including their organizations,

procedures, and personnel). Also, the term includes assistance ranging

from long-term reform efforts, with countries receiving funding over a

period of years, to one-time training courses provided to the police or

other law enforcement organizations.

In a 1999 report to congressional requesters, who asked us to identify the

amount of U.S. rule of law funding provided worldwide (by region and

country) in fiscal years 1993-98, we noted that such data were not readily

available for various reasons, including the following:

• The departments and agencies involved did not have an agreed-upon

definition of what constitutes rule of law activities.

• Some entities could not provide funding data for all the years of interest

nor had other problems in compiling the information we requested.9

Nonetheless, based on data that cognizant departments and agencies made

available, our 1999 report presented a funding summary (see table 7) and

made the following observations:

• The United States provided at least $970 million in rule of law assistance

to countries throughout the world during fiscal years 1993-98. Some

assistance—ranging from $138 million for Haiti to $2,000 for Burkina

Faso—was provided to 184 countries.

• Over the 1993-98 period, the largest recipient of U.S. rule of law assistance

was the Latin America and Caribbean region, which accounted for $349

million, or more than one-third of the total assistance.

• However, in the more recent years of the period, Central European

countries received an increasing share. In 1998, for instance, the largest

regional recipient was Central Europe, which accounted for about onethird of all rule of law assistance.

 9

Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-98

(GAO/NSIAD-99-158, June 30, 1999). In another report, Foreign Assistance: U.S. Rule of

Law Assistance to Five Latin American Countries (GAO/NSIAD-99-195, Aug. 4, 1999), we

discussed assistance provided to Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and

Panama.
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 72 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Table 7: U.S. Worldwide Rule of Law Assistance by Region, Fiscal Years 1993-98

Dollars in millions

Regiona

Countries receiving

rule of law assistance

Rule of law

funding amount

Percentage

total funding

Latin American and the Caribbean 40 $349.1 36.0

Africa 45 145.8 15.0

Central Europe 15 144.9 14.9

Newly independent states of the former Soviet Union 12 142.4 14.7

Near East 17 65.1 6.7

East Asia and the Pacific 28 41.0 4.2

South Asia 6 16.9 1.7

Western Europe 21 15.4 1.6

Mulitregionalb activities Not applicable 49.8 5.1

Total 184 $970.5c100.0c

a

Based on information provided by the Department of State, we grouped countries receiving rule of

law assistance into eight geographical regions.

b

The term “multiregional” denotes rule of law assistance provided to several countries in two or more

regions or when such assistance was not broken out by recipient countries.

c

Details do not add to total due to rounding.

Source: Summary of U.S. agencies’ rule of law funding data, as we reported in Foreign Assistance:

Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-98 (GAO/NSIAD-99-158, June 30, 1999).

In our 1999 report, we also noted that at least 35 federal entities—

consisting of 7 cabinet-level departments and 28 related agencies, bureaus,

and offices—had a role in providing rule of law assistance programs.

These entities are listed in table 8.10

 10 State indicated that in addition to its components listed in table 8, the Bureau of

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

are involved in rule of law assistance. The latter became effective on July 2, 2001, when the

Bureau of European Affairs and the Secretary’s Office of Newly Independent States were

merged.

U.S. Departments and

Agencies Involved in Rule

of Law Assistance
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 73 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Table 8: Federal Entities with a Role in Providing Rule of Law Assistance Programs

Departments and

independent agencies Component agencies, bureaus, and offices

Department of State • Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs

• Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism

Assistance

• Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

USAID

U.S. Information Agency

a

Department of Justice • Criminal Divisionb

• International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance

Program

• Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development,

Assistance and Training

• DEA

• FBI

• INS

Department of the

Treasury

• ATF

• Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

• Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

• IRS

• U.S. Customs Service

 - Office of International Affairs

 - Office of Investigations

• U.S. Secret Service

Department of

Commerce

• International Trade Administration

• National Telecommunications and Information

Administration

• Office of General Counsel, Commercial Law Development

Program

• U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

Department of

Transportation

• U.S. Coast Guard

Department of Defense • U.S. Air Force

• U.S. Army

• U.S. Marine Corps

• U.S. Navy

Department of Energy

a

In October 1999, the U.S. Information Agency was merged with the Department of State’s Office of

International Information Programs.

b

The Criminal Division’s training programs are discussed in appendix VI.

Source: Summary of information we presented in Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding

Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-98 (GAO/NSIAD-99-158, June 30, 1999).

Regarding overall responsibility for coordinating rule of law programs and

activities, our 1999 report noted that:
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Page 74 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• There have been longstanding congressional concerns that rule of law

coordination efforts among the numerous departments and agencies in

Washington, D.C., were ineffective.

• Thus, in February 1999, State appointed a rule of law coordinator, whose

principal mandate is to work with all the relevant U.S. governmental

entities to develop a framework for future U.S. international rule of law

assistance efforts.11

• In addition, the coordinator is to be the principal U.S. liaison to other

donors and private sector organizations involved in rule of law activities.

In April 2001, we reported on rule of law assistance to 12 countries of the

former Soviet Union.12 We concluded that—after 10 years and almost $200

million in funding—such assistance had produced limited results. Also, the

report

• questioned the sustainability—the extent to which the benefits of a

program extend beyond its life span—of the rather limited results that had

been achieved; and

• attributed the lack of impact and sustainability to a number of factors,

such as limited political consensus on reforms in recipient countries, a

shortage of domestic resources for many of the more expensive

innovations, and weaknesses in the design and management of assistance

programs by U.S. agencies.

The report recommended that program management be improved by

implementing requirements for projects to include specific strategies for

(1) achieving impact and sustainable results and (2) monitoring and

evaluating outcomes.

 11According to State, the position lapsed at the end of the Clinton administration and has

not been reestablished.

12Former Soviet Union: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and

Sustainability (GAO-01-354, Apr. 17, 2001).

Our Report on Assistance

to Former Soviet Union

Countries
Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs

Page 75 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Much of the technical assistance that the United States provides to other

nations for fighting international crime involves training, particularly

training at law enforcement academies established abroad. The

Department of Justice’s technical assistance efforts include two units

within the Criminal Division—(1) the International Criminal Investigative

Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and (2) the Overseas Prosecutorial

Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT)—which attempt to

strengthen police and legal systems in foreign countries. Justice, Treasury,

State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provide

a number of other training programs. In addition to training, U.S. technical

assistance includes providing foreign nations with information from

computerized law enforcement databases and investigative and forensic

services. An example of such assistance is the U.S. National Central

Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization’s

(USNCB/INTERPOL) Notice Program.

The International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) are a cooperative

effort among the Departments of State (which provides funding), Justice,

and Treasury. To accomplish overall coordination of the ILEAs

domestically, a Policy Board was established that is comprised of

members from each Department and appointed by the Secretary of State,

the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury. The mission of

these academies has been to support emerging democracies; help protect

U.S. interests through international cooperation; and promote social,

political, and economic stability by combating crime. ILEAs also are to

encourage strong partnerships among regional countries to address

common problems associated with criminal activities. ILEAs have been

established in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Southern Africa, and plans are

underway to establish an ILEA in the western hemisphere to serve Central

America and the Dominican Republic. State plans to open a graduate-level

ILEA in Roswell, New Mexico, in September 2001.

In 1995, the United States and the government of Hungary cooperated to

create the first ILEA in Budapest, Hungary, under FBI leadership. This

ILEA’s purpose is to train law enforcement officers from Central Europe

and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The

academy offers two categories of courses:

• Core course. An 8-week core course—a personal and professional

development program—focuses on leadership, personnel and financial

management issues, ethics, the rule of law, and management of the

investigative process. Annually, according to the State Department,

Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs

International Law

Enforcement

Academies

ILEA Europe
Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs

Page 76 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

approximately 250 to 300 mid-level police officers and managers receive

this training, which is provided by various U.S. agencies and Hungarian

and Western European law enforcement agencies.

• Specialized short-term courses. These courses provide law

enforcement officers with training on combating various types of crime—

for example, organized crime, financial crime, corruption, nuclear

smuggling, illegal migration, and terrorism—including training on

prosecuting criminal cases. Annually, according to the State Department,

about 500 police, prosecutors, immigration specialists, and others

participate in these courses.

ILEA Southeast Asia—located in Bangkok, Thailand—opened in March

1999, under DEA leadership. Like the ILEA Budapest program, the purpose

of the Bangkok ILEA is to strengthen regional law enforcement

cooperation and improve performance. According to the State

Department:

• This academy’s curriculum and structure are similar to those of ILEA

Budapest, with the exception of a shorter core course (6 weeks).

• In 1999, over 700 law enforcement personnel representing 10 countries

participated in courses at the academy.

In July 2000, the State Department announced an agreement with the

Government of Botswana to establish the ILEA for Southern Africa in

Gaborone, under the leadership of FLETC. Similar in overall format to the

other academies, ILEA Southern Africa is to follow the model developed

for ILEAs in Budapest and Bangkok by providing

• courses on a wide range of law enforcement skills, including police

survival, forensics, basic case management, fighting organized crime,

supervisory police training, police strategy, narcotics identification and

evidence handling, customs interdiction, illegal migration, and public

corruption; and

• a permanent location from which to address special topics, such as stolen

vehicles, money laundering, crimes against women, domestic violence,

terrorism, and other critical topics such as human rights and policing.

In September 2001, State will open a new ILEA in Roswell, New Mexico.

This new facility, which will be open to graduates of the regional ILEAs,

will offer shorter-term (4 weeks versus 8 weeks) advanced training with a

greater focus on an academic versus practical or operational curriculum.

ILEA Southeast Asia

ILEA Southern Africa

ILEA Roswell, New

Mexico
Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs

Page 77 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Tailored to the regional needs of officials from Central/South America,

pilot courses of ILEA Western Hemisphere have already been conducted

at a temporary site in Panama. However, activities have been suspended

until a permanent location can be selected.

Two Justice units—ICITAP and OPDAT—are to work in tandem to

strengthen justice systems abroad.

The purpose of ICITAP—functionally located in Justice’s Criminal

Division—is to provide training and development assistance to police

organizations worldwide. That is, the mission of ICITAP is to support U.S.

foreign policy and criminal justice goals by helping foreign governments

develop the capacity to provide modern professional law enforcement

services based on democratic principles and respect for human rights.

The program was first created in 1986 to train police forces in Latin

America on how to conduct criminal investigations. ICITAP’s activities

have expanded worldwide since then and now consist of two principal

types of assistance projects:

• developing police forces in the context of international peacekeeping

operations and

• enhancing the capabilities of existing police organizations in emerging

democracies.

Specific ICITAP activities or projects are to be initiated at the request of

the National Security Council and the Department of State, in agreement

with the foreign governments requesting the assistance. Priority is to be

given to countries in transition to democracy, where unique opportunities

exist for major restructuring and refocusing of police and investigative

resources toward establishment of the rule of law.

Regarding funding, according to Justice, ICITAP is unique among federal

law enforcement assistance programs in that ICITAP is not listed as a “line

item” in Justice’s budget. Rather, most of ICITAP’s budget consists of

project-specific funding, which is provided to Justice by the Department of

State and USAID. For fiscal year 2000, according to Justice’s Criminal

Division, ICITAP received $6.6 million for the Latin American Regional

Program and $23.6 million for training and development projects in Africa,

the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Far East. According to State, it

ILEA Western Hemisphere

Training:

Strengthening Legal

Systems Abroad

ICITAP: Development

Assistance to Law

Enforcement

Organizations
Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs

Page 78 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

has proposed to Justice that ICITAP be transferred to State. State believes

that such a transfer would improve the linkage between policy and

implementation, provide better financial and administrative support, and

strengthen ICITAP’s ability to respond to fast developing situations

abroad.

Created in 1991, the Office of OPDAT (also in Justice’s Criminal Division)

provides justice-sector institution-building assistance, including training of

foreign judges and prosecutors, in coordination with various government

agencies and U.S. embassies. Although part of the Criminal Division,

OPDAT programs are funded principally by the Department of State and

USAID.

OPDAT programs take place in South and Central America, the Caribbean,

Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the new independent states of the

former Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia and the Pacific

Region. In many of these countries, OPDAT has placed “Resident Legal

Advisors.” The advisors are experienced prosecutors who are intended to

interact with local justice-sector officials and direct OPDAT assistance

projects. These projects seek to strengthen the legislative and regulatory

criminal justice infrastructure within the host country, and enhance the

capacity of that country to investigate and prosecute crime more

effectively, consistent with the rule of law.

Furthermore, USAID—through its Center for Democracy and

Governance—has an agreement with Justice regarding OPDAT. The

agreement allows USAID missions around the world to access the Office

of OPDAT for help in activities such as

• conducting justice sector assessments,

• reviewing laws and legislation,

• designing rule of law programs, and

• providing other technical assistance.

OPDAT: Strengthening

Criminal Justice Systems

Abroad
Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs

Page 79 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Federal agencies—particularly Justice and Treasury—help foreign nations

combat international crime by providing technical assistance in the form

of access to and use of specialized support services and systems, such as

computerized databases and forensic laboratories.1

 The following

descriptions are examples—and not a complete or exhaustive listing—of

this type of assistance.

Examples of Justice support services and systems that foreign law

enforcement entities may access or use for combating international crime

include the following:

• Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Crime

Information Center (NCIC). NCIC, the nation’s most extensive

computerized criminal justice information system, consists of a central

computer at FBI headquarters, dedicated telecommunications lines, and a

coordinated network of federal and state criminal justice information

systems. The center provides users with access to files on wanted persons,

stolen vehicles, and missing persons, as well as millions of criminal history

information records contained in state systems. Data in NCIC files are

exchanged with and for the official use of authorized officials of the

federal government, the states, cities, and penal and other institutions, as

well as certain foreign governments.

• Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) El Paso Intelligence

Center (EPIC). Established in 1974, EPIC is a multiagency tactical drug

intelligence center managed by DEA. EPIC’s mission is to support

counterdrug efforts through the exchange of time-sensitive, tactical

intelligence dealing principally with drug movement. Today, EPIC’s focus

has broadened to include all of the United States and the Western

Hemisphere where drug and alien movements are directed toward the

United States. Through information sharing agreements with federal law

enforcement agencies, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the 50

states, EPIC can provide requesters with real-time information from

different federal databases and EPIC’s internal database.

• INTERPOL’s Notice Program. Through the circulation of international

notices, INTERPOL disseminates subject lookouts and advisories to

member country police forces. These notices, color-coded to designate

their specific purposes, are published at the request of a member country.

INTERPOL members (such as USNCB) then receive and distribute the

 1

For a variety of purposes, Justice and Treasury also provide technical assistance to state

and local law enforcement agencies. See appendices III and IV in Crime Technology:

Federal Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement (GAO/GGD-99-101, June 7, 1999).

Access To and Use of

Specialized Support

Services and Systems

Department of Justice

Support Services and

Systems
Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs

Page 80 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

notices among appropriate law enforcement authorities within their

respective countries. Ten different types of notices exist to communicate

various kinds of criminal information. For example, a “red notice”

indicates a wanted fugitive—that is, a subject for whom an arrest warrant

has been issued and where extradition will be requested.

Examples of Treasury support services and systems that foreign law

enforcement entities may access or use for combating international crime

include the following:

• Customs’ National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination

Center. Located at Customs Service headquarters in Washington, D.C.,

the center’s core staffing consists of Customs Service and FBI personnel.

The center’s responsibilities include (1) coordinating all U.S. government

domestic and international law enforcement activities involving

intellectual property rights (IPR) issues and (2) integrating domestic and

international law enforcement intelligence with private industry

information relating to IPR crime. According to Customs, particular

emphasis is given to investigating major criminal organizations and those

using the Internet to facilitate IPR crime.

• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms’ (ATF) National Tracing

Center. Through its National Tracing Center, ATF traces firearms for

federal, state, and foreign law enforcement agencies. The firearms are

traced from the manufacturer to the retail purchaser for the purpose of

aiding law enforcement officials in identifying suspects involved in

criminal activity. By examining patterns in aggregates of traces, gun

tracing can help identify opportunities for intervention on the supply side

of illegal firearm markets. Such intervention can then reduce further

trafficking and associated violent crime. For example, ATF’s Project

LEAD—an automated data system that tracks illegal firearms—is designed

to help identify recurring patterns of illegal firearm suppliers, both in the

United States and across international borders, and provide evidence for

prosecution.

• Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) support of

financial intelligence units. FinCEN supports the development of

financial intelligence units in other nations to help facilitate the exchange

of information to assist anti-money laundering investigations, detect

criminal abuse of the financial system, and ensure adherence to laws

against financial crime. Working together, these financial intelligence units

have created a secure communication network—developed by FinCEN—

which permits the units and FinCEN to post and access information about

money laundering trends, financial analysis tools, and technological

developments.

Department of the

Treasury Support Services

and Systems
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 81 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Existing frameworks for measuring the effectiveness of federal efforts to

address international crime include (1) the International Crime Control

Strategy, (2) Government Performance and Results Act1

 (GPRA) strategic

and performance plans prepared by federal departments and agencies, and

(3) crime-specific national strategies. As we have previously reported, for

any given program area, virtually all the results that the federal

government strives to achieve require the concerted efforts of two or more

agencies.2

The International Crime Control Strategy represents a national strategic

plan for combating international crime and reducing its adverse impacts

on the American people. The strategy articulates 8 overarching goals and

30 related objectives as a blueprint for a coordinated, long-term attack on

international crime. Each of the eight general goals is associated with a

number of specific implementing objectives—with the expectation that

achieving the objectives will result in reaching the overall goal. To further

describe how the objectives will be achieved, the strategy outlines specific

programs and initiatives that will be carried out to address each identified

objective.

To illustrate, goal 2 of the stragegy is “Protect U.S. borders by attacking

smuggling and smuggling-related crimes.” Four implementing objectives

are associated with achieving this goal:

• Enhance our land border inspection, detection, and monitoring

capabilities through a greater resource commitment, further coordination

of federal agency efforts, and increased cooperation with the private

sector.

• Improve the effectiveness of maritime and air smuggling interdiction

efforts in the transit zone.

• Seek new and stiffer criminal penalties for smuggling activities.

• Target enforcement and prosecutorial resources more effectively against

smuggling crimes and organizations.

Furthermore, for each of the four objectives, the strategy identifies

programs and initiatives that are to take place to carry out the objective.

 1

Under GPRA (P. L. 103-62, Aug. 3, 1993), federal agencies are to develop (1) long-term

strategic plans describing their general program goals for major functions and operations

and (2) annual performance plans describing how the agencies will meet their program

goals and establishing performance targets for program activities.

2

Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination (GAO/GGD-00-106, Mar. 29,

2000).

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

International Crime

Control Strategy
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 82 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Regarding the first objective, for example—“Enhance our land border

inspection, detection, and monitoring capabilities”—these programs and

initiatives include the following: (1) implementing the Southwest border

strategy,3

 (2) deploying new detection and identification technology, and

(3) cooperating with the private sector.

Under goal 8 of the International Crime Control Strategy (“Optimize the

full range of U.S. efforts”), one of the objectives is to develop measures of

effectiveness to assess progress over time. Specifically, the purpose of this

objective is to establish a system to measure progress on the major goals

of the strategy, provide feedback for the strategy refinement and system

management, and assist the administration in resource allocation.

Moreover, as stated in the strategy, the goals and objectives are dynamic

and are expected to evolve over time as conditions change, new crime

trends emerge, and improved anticrime techniques are developed.

As described in the strategy, the performance measurement system is to

be designed to quantify the measurement of results in the following areas:

• Disrupting major criminal organizations.

• Reducing criminal activity at our borders.

• Improving coordination among U.S. agencies.

• Improving coordination with other nations against criminal targets.

• Increasing adoption of international standards and norms to combat

crime.

• Securing passage and implementation of major anticrime conventions

internationally.

• Reducing incidence and costs to the United States of intellectual property

theft and economic crime.

• Improving the coordination of international investigations into and

prosecutions of high-tech crime.

• Strengthening international capabilities against smuggling and raising the

cost of smuggling activities to smugglers.

• Strengthening international cooperation against alien smuggling and

reducing the flow of illegal migrants to the United States.

• Fighting money laundering and financial crime.

 3

In 1994, the Attorney General announced a five-part strategy to strengthen enforcement of

immigration laws. The strategy’s first priority was to strengthen enforcement along the

Southwest border. See, Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy

Implementation (GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19, 1999).

Performance Measurement

System Required by

Strategy
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 83 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

• Increasing the number of nations that extradite nationals and that provide

mutual legal assistance.

• Combating illicit smuggling in firearms.

• Combating illicit trafficking in women and children.

• Decreasing the production and distribution of child pornography.

• Combating corruption and improving the administration of justice in

foreign criminal justice systems.

• Achieving the other goals and objectives of the strategy.

In describing the prescribed measurement system, the International Crime

Control Strategy compared it to a similar performance measurement

system being created and implemented by the Office of National Drug

Control Policy (ONDCP) to measure the effectiveness of the nation’s war

on drugs. That system—ONDCP’s Performance Measures of Effectiveness

(PME)—was established in February 1998 and is designed to implement

the National Drug Control Strategy and measure the effectiveness of the

nations’ drug control efforts through a framework of measurable goals,

objectives, and targets.4

 Additional details on these performance measures

appear later in this appendix.

During our review, we found that no progress has been made towards

establishing the performance measurement system described in the

International Crime Control Strategy. According to a National Security

Council (NSC) official, the set of performance measures envisioned under

the strategy was never implemented. Rather, the decision to devise and

implement performance measures was left up to the individual

departments and their components. In response to our inquiries, the NSC

official indicated that he was unaware of any specific measures used by

departments or their components to gauge the success of their efforts to

combat international crime, especially in the context of the strategy.

Generally speaking, however, the official noted that the concept of

measuring performance is farther along in the area of counterdrug efforts

than for any other types of international crime.

 4

For more information about ONDCP’s performance measurement system, see Drug

Control: ONDCP Efforts to Manage the National Drug Control Budget (GAO/GGD-99-80,

May 14, 1999).

No Progress Towards

Measuring Effectiveness of

Federal Efforts to Address

International Crime
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 84 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

In lieu of the performance measurement system envisioned in the

International Crime Control Strategy, strategic and performance plans

required by GPRA present an alternative approach for measuring the

effectiveness of the federal government’s international crime control

efforts. For example, we have previously reported that GPRA offers a

framework for addressing crosscutting federal programs (such as

international crime control) and could be used by the Congress, the Office

of Management and Budget, and the agencies to ensure that such

programs are being effectively coordinated.5

 Furthermore, we noted that

agencies could use the GPRA planning processes to consider whether

agency goals are complementary and common performance measures are

needed.

Our recent reports on agencies’ GPRA reports and plans indicate that

agencies are still challenged to develop meaningful goals, objectives, and

indicators that adequately measure their own program results and

effectiveness. Furthermore, despite the potential benefits, there has been

no governmentwide effort by NSC or others to consolidate information

from agencies’ GPRA plans into a single plan measuring the government’s

overall results on international crime control. The following sections

discuss in more detail how the strategic and performance plans of Justice,

Treasury, and State address international crime and the extent to which

these plans measure program performance.

The Department of Justice’s 2000-2005 strategic plan identified 7 strategic

goals and 34 related strategic objectives. For each of the strategic

objectives, the plan further outlined various strategies for achieving the

objectives. Among the goals most directly linked to international crime are

goal 1 (“Enforcing federal criminal laws”) and goal 4 (“Administering

immigration laws”). Although the plan does not discuss the International

Crime Control Strategy or identify linkages between the two strategies,

Justice highlighted several international crimes—including terrorism,

worldwide drug trafficking, and immigration/border control—as key

global challenges that it expected to focus its work on over the next 5

years. Table 9 illustrates how selected objectives and strategies in Justice’s

strategic plan address similar overarching goals and implementing

objectives in the International Crime Control Strategy.

 5

Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination (GAO/GGD-00-106, Mar. 29,

2000).

Federal Agencies’

GPRA Plans

Department of Justice
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 85 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Table 9: Similarities Between Justice Objectives and Strategies and the International Crime Control Strategy

Justice objective Justice strategy

International Crime Control

Strategy overarching goal

International Crime Control

Strategy implementing

objective

Deter and detect terrorist

incidents by developing

maximum intelligence and

investigative capability

• Identify, investigate, and

prosecute suspected terrorists

around the world

• Prevent and deter debilitating

damage to U.S. infrastructure

Extend the first line of defense

beyond U.S. borders

Respond to emerging

international crime threats

• Prevent international crime

planned abroad, including

terrorist acts

• Continue identifying and

countering vulnerabilities of

critical infrastructure

Reduce white collar crime in

order to minimize negative

social and economic impacts

• Investigate and prosecute hightechnology crimes

• Investigate and prosecute

international price- fixing

cartels

Respond to emerging

international crime threats

Prevent criminal exploitation of

international trade

• Increase enforcement efforts

against high- tech and

computer crime

• Prevent unfair and predatory

trade practices in violation of

U.S. law

Secure the ports of entry, land

borders, and sea coast of the

United States against illegal

entry

• Prevent and deter illegal entry

by implementing a

comprehensive border

enforcement strategy

Protect U.S. borders by

attacking smuggling and

smuggling-related crime

• Enhance land border

inspection, detection, and

monitoring capabilities

through enhanced resources,

coordination of federal

efforts, and cooperation with

the private sector

Deter illegal immigration and

immigration-related crimes

and remove individuals

unlawfully in the United States

• Disrupt and dismantle alien

smuggling and trafficking

organizations

Respond to emerging

international crime threats

• Reduce trafficking in human

beings and crimes against

children

Note: Justice’s objectives and strategies were judgmentally selected to illustrate areas where

Justice’s strategic plan addressed similar goals and objectives outlined in the International Crime

Control Strategy.

Source: Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 2000); and

International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998).

While Justice’s strategic plan provides overall direction and framework, its

annual performance plan links the broadly stated goals and objectives

with specific annual performance goals or targets. For example, for the

strategic goal “Secure the land border, ports of entry, and coasts of the

United States against illegal immigration,” Justice’s 2001 summary

performance plan identified an annual goal to effectively control the

border and thwart international alien and drug smuggling. This annual goal

is to be measured by three performance indicators: (1) increased

operational effectiveness within identified Southwest border zones, (2)

interception of mala fide travelers and migrants (i.e., persons attempting

illegal entry) en route to the United States, and (3) offshore prosecutions

assisted by INS aided by fraudulent document detection.

Regarding performance measurement, in June 2000, we reported our

observations on key outcomes described in Justice’s GPRA performance
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 86 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

report and plan.6 Two of these key outcomes were most directly related to

international crime: (1) less drug- and gang-related violence and (2) U.S.

borders secure from illegal immigration. Overall, we found that Justice’s

performance plan did not contain sufficient performance goals and

measures to objectively capture and describe performance results or

measure progress towards desired outcomes. We reported that Justice’s

performance measures were more output-oriented than outcome-oriented

and did not capture all aspects of performance. Also, we noted that Justice

had not stated performance goals in some instances. For the international

crime-related outcomes, we reported mixed results. For example, the

performance measures for drug- and gang-related violence did not cover

the full range of issues that the goal covers, and the performance measures

also tended to be more output-oriented than outcome-oriented.

The Department of the Treasury’s 2000-2005 strategic plan identified 14

strategic goals and 40 related strategic objectives, grouped into 4 broad

departmental missions. The goals most directly linked to international

crime control—money laundering and financial crime, border control, and

violent crime and terrorism—are associated with Treasury’s law

enforcement mission. Although the plan does not discuss the International

Crime Control Strategy or identify linkages between the two strategies,

Treasury highlighted linkages between its own strategic plan and other

national crime control strategies, such as the National Money Laundering

Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy. Table 10 illustrates how

selected objectives and strategies in Treasury’s strategic plan address

similar overarching goals and implementing objectives in the International

Crime Control Strategy.

 6

Observations on DOJ’s FY 1999 Performance Report and FY 2001 Performance Plan

(GAO/GGD-00-155R, June 30, 2000).

Department of the

Treasury
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 87 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Table 10: Similarities Between Treasury Objectives and Strategies and the International Crime Control Strategy

Treasury

objective

Treasury

strategy

International Crime Control

Strategy overarching goal

International Crime Control

Strategy implementing

objective

Dismantle domestic and

international money

laundering networks

• Work with federal, state, and

local agencies to implement

the National Money

Laundering Strategy

• Pursue bilateral and

multilateral measures to

strengthen anti-money

laundering regimes in the

international arena

Counter international financial

crime

• Combat money laundering by

strengthening enforcement

efforts to reduce inbound and

outbound movement of

criminal proceeds

• Enhance bilateral and

multilateral cooperation

against financial crime by

working with foreign

governments

Deny the smuggling of illicit

drugs at land borders,

airports, and seaports

• Identify, disrupt, and dismantle

drug smuggling organizations

by enhancing high- impact

investigations and

strengthening interdiction

• Shield U.S. borders from

foreign drug sources by

utilizing air and marine

resources to interdict drugs in

the source, transit, and arrival

zones

Protect U.S. borders by

attacking smuggling and

smuggling-related crime

• Enhance land border

inspection, detection, and

monitoring through greater

resources, coordination of

federal efforts, and

cooperation with the private

sector

• Improve the effectiveness of

maritime and air smuggling

interdiction in the transit zone

Strengthen the capability to

fight terrorist threats to the

United States

• Prevent the entry of weapons

of mass destruction into the

United States

• Foster increased interagency

cooperation and information

sharing to prevent and

respond to terrorist activities

Extend the first line of defense

beyond U.S. borders

• Prevent international crime

planned abroad, including

terrorist acts

• Intensify activities of law

enforcement, diplomatic, and

consular personnel abroad

Note: Treasury’s objectives and strategies were judgmentally selected to illustrate areas where

Treasury’s strategic plan addressed similar goals and objectives outlined in the International Crime

Control Strategy.

Source: Department of the Treasury Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2000-2005 (Sept. 2000); and

International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998).

Treasury’s strategic plan generally describes the department’s overall

goals, objectives, and strategies. The plan also forms the baseline for the

development of the Treasury components’ strategic and performance

plans—which contain additional details on the specific performance goals

and measures. For example, for the strategic objective “Deny the

smuggling of illicit drugs,” there are two related bureau strategic goals: (1)

reduce the amount of illegal drugs entering the United States and (2)

effectively use asset forfeiture as a high-impact law enforcement sanction

to punish and deter criminal activity. Progress towards these goals is to be

measured via two performance goals—one to be reported by the Customs
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 88 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Service (seized drugs) and one by the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (seized

property).

Regarding performance measurement, in June 2000, we reported our

observations on key outcomes described in Treasury’s GPRA performance

report and plan.7

 Among these key outcomes, two—for Customs and the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)—were most directly

related to international crime: (1) reduced availability and/or use of illegal

drugs and (2) criminals are denied access to firearms, and firearms-related

crime is reduced. Overall, we reported that it was difficult to determine

Treasury’s progress towards these two outcomes because performance

measures were generally output measures. At the agency level, for

example, we noted that Customs’ performance measures for illegal drugs

had historically been output-related—such as, pounds of narcotics seized

and number of drug seizures. Customs recognized that measures for some

of its goals did not fully measure achievement of the goals and also

indicated that it was working to develop outcome measures to better

demonstrate the impact of its activities.

Regarding firearms, we noted that ATF’s performance measures had also

been primarily output-related (e.g., number of firearm traces, average

trace response time, and number of persons trained). However, ATF’s

performance plan contained a refined measure of “future crimes avoided,”

as a way to measure progress towards reducing the risk of violent crime

by estimating the number of crimes prevented through the incarceration of

criminals and the elimination of crime gun sources.

The Department of State’s 2000 strategic plan identified 16 strategic goals,

which were grouped into 7 areas of national interest. For each strategic

goal, the plan further outlined strategies for achieving the goal, as well as

State’s specific responsibilities for each of the strategies. For those

strategies that involved the cooperation of multiple agencies, the plan also

identified the “lead” U.S. government agencies involved. Although the plan

does not discuss the International Crime Control Strategy or identify

linkages between the two strategies, it does identify how State’s strategic

planning process has considered other national and agency strategic

plans—such as the National Security Strategy and the National Drug

Control Strategy. Table 11 illustrates how selected goals and strategies in

 7

Observations on Treasury’s FY 1999 Performance Report and FY 2001 Performance Plan

(GAO/GGD/AIMD-00-231R, June 30, 2000).

Department of State
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 89 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

State’s strategic plan address similar overarching goals and implementing

objectives in the International Crime Control Strategy.

Table 11: Similarities Between State Goals and Strategies and the International Crime Control Strategy

State

goal

State

strategy

International Crime Control

Strategy overarching goal

International Crime Control

Strategy implementing

objective

Reduce the threat to the

United States from weapons

of mass destruction (WMD)

Reduce incidence and

severity of international

terrorist attacks

• Combat nuclear smuggling,

especially in the Newly

Independent States

• Defend against threats or use of

WMD and cyberwarfare by

terrorists

Extend the first line of defense

beyond U.S. borders

Respond to emerging

international crime threats

• Prevent international crime

and terrorism planned

abroad, before they occur

• Increase enforcement

against high-tech and

computer-related crime

Facilitate travel to the United

States, while deterring entry

by those who abuse or

threaten system

• Coordinate among federal

agencies to increase border

security, identify and prevent

the entry of criminals and

terrorists, inhibit illegal

immigration, and counter alien

smuggling

Protect U.S. borders by

attacking smuggling and

smuggling-related crime

• Enhance land border

inspection, detection, and

monitoring through greater

resource commitment, further

coordination of federal

agency efforts, and

increased cooperation with

the private sector

Minimize the impact of

international crime on the

United States and its citizens

• Preclude criminals engaged in

illegal, transnational activities

from fraudulently obtaining or

using U.S. passports of visas to

facilitate their criminal activities

in the United States

Deny safe haven to

international criminals

• Implement strengthened

immigration laws that prevent

international criminals from

entering the United States

and provide for their prompt

expulsion when appropriate

Open political systems to

democracy, rule of law, good

governance, and respect for

human rights

• Through assistance,

exchanges, and international

broadcasting, encourage the

development of democratic

systems and the rule of law

Foster international cooperation

and the rule of law

• Improve cooperation with

foreign governments and law

enforcement through

collaboration, training, and

technical assistance

• Strengthen the rule of law in

order to reduce societies’

vulnerability to criminal

exploitation

Note: State’s goals and strategies were judgmentally selected to illustrate areas where State’s

strategic plan addressed similar goals and objectives outlined in the International Crime Control

Strategy.

Source: U.S. Department of State Strategic Plan (Sept. 2000); and International Crime Control

Strategy (May 1998).

In its strategic plan, State identified various indicators to measure

performance towards each goal. For example, regarding the national

security goal “Reduce the threat to the United States from weapons of

mass destruction,” State identified 12 performance indicators. However,

these indicators were not associated with any particular strategy, such as

combating nuclear smuggling. Rather, the 12 indicators—taken as a
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 90 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

whole—measure progress towards the overall goal of reducing the threat

from weapons of mass destruction.

Regarding performance measurement, in June 2000, we reported our

observations on key outcomes described in State’s GPRA performance

report and plan.8

 Among these key outcomes, three were most directly

related to international crime: (1) eliminate threats from weapons of mass

destruction, (2) reduce international crime and availability and/or use of

illegal drugs, and (3) reduce international terrorism. Overall, we found that

State’s performance plan provided more detail on goals and measures than

in previous years, but there were still some limitations. We reported that:

• Goals and measures were presented by individual bureau, making it

difficult to obtain an agencywide perspective or sense of priority.

• Assessing performance against the many targets listed would be timeconsuming and likely inconclusive about whether tangible results were

achieved.

• There was no discussion about whether State coordinated with the

numerous partner agencies listed in the plan.

For the international crime-related outcomes noted above, we reported

mixed results. For example, regarding one of the expected outcomes—

”Eliminated threats from [WMD]”—State’s performance plan covered a

more complete range of activities than it planned to undertake to achieve

the goal, as compared to prior years. However, some of the goals and

measures did not provide valid indicators of progress. For example, one of

the performance goals was to “be authoritative, relevant, and timely,” and

measures were to “use technology and report on specific activities such as

producing and maintaining [Internet] web pages.” Regarding the response

to international terrorism, the performance plan referred to using

diplomatic pressure, enlisting cooperation, and developing new

technologies as general ways to address this goal. However, training was

the only performance goal reported for this desired outcome.

Furthermore, while the plan more clearly identified goals and measures

for this outcome compared to prior years, some goals and measures would

be difficult to quantify, such as the status of U.S. policies in various

international forums.

 8

Observations on State’s FY 1999 Performance Report and FY 2001 Performance Plan

(GAO/NSIAD-00-189R, June 30, 2000).
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 91 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

In addition to the International Crime Control Strategy, the federal

government has developed national crime control strategies that focus on

specific types of international crimes. Like the International Crime Control

Strategy, these strategies are interagency in nature and identify national

goals or objectives. However, they are specifically focused on a particular

type of crime or related set of crimes. This approach can also provide a

framework—not unlike GPRA—for developing performance indicators for

measuring the effectiveness and results of efforts to combat specific types

of international crime. Even with this targeted approach, however, the

government is still challenged to develop crime-specific strategies

containing meaningful goals, objectives, and indicators that adequately

measure program results and effectiveness.

Probably the most well-known of the national crime control strategies is

ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy, which identifies long-range

national goals and measurable objectives for reducing drug use, drug

availability, and the consequences of drug abuse and trafficking. The

development of this strategy was mandated by the Congress in 1988, when

it created ONDCP in order to set priorities, implement a national strategy,

and certify federal drug control budgets for the nation’s war on drugs. The

Congress later expanded ONDCP’s mandate to require the establishment

of a drug control performance measurement system.

In 1998, ONDCP established the PME system—to provide performance

goals, objectives, and targets designed to implement the strategy and

measure the effectiveness of the nation’s drug control efforts. The PME

system also identified intermediate and long-term impact targets—for

example, “Reduce the Availability of Illicit Drugs by 25 Percent in 2002”—

as a way to measure the strategy’s overall impact on drug demand and

supply, as well as the consequences of drug abuse and trafficking. ONDCP

is required to report to the Congress annually on the implementation of

the PME system. As noted above, the performance measurement system

envisioned by the International Crime Control Strategy was compared

with the PME system.

Jointly developed by Treasury and Justice in 1999, the National Money

Laundering Strategy outlined a comprehensive, integrated approach to

combating money laundering in the United States and abroad, through

both law enforcement and banking supervision. This strategy defined a

framework of objectives and “action items” (performance goals) designed

to advance four broad goals: strengthen domestic enforcement, enhance

the engagement of banks and other financial institutions, provide more

Crime-Specific

National Strategies

Drug Control

Money Laundering
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 92 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

effective assistance to state and local governments, and bolster

international cooperation.

In 2000, an updated version of the strategy was released, setting forth a

broad array of action items organized in a consolidated, governmentwide

plan. Each action item included a designation of the government

office/official accountable for implementation and for meeting specified

goals and milestones. For example, under goal 1 of the strategy—

“Strengthen domestic enforcement to disrupt the flow of illicit money”—

one of the action items is to promote cooperation with the governments of

Colombia, Aruba, Panama, and Venezuela to address black market

currency exchanges. Treasury’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Enforcement Policy is identified as the lead official responsible for

establishing a multilateral task force to examine the issue and recommend

policy options to the appropriate government officials.

To address the national and international problem of terrorism, Justice

developed the Five-Year Interagency Counter-Terrorism and Technology

Crime Plan in 1998, with funds appropriated by the Congress for this

purpose. The resulting document was intended to serve as a blueprint for

coordinating national policy and operational capabilities to combat

terrorism in the United States and against U.S. interests abroad. The plan

involved the implementation of three strategies: (1) identify, investigate,

and prosecute suspected terrorists; (2) ensure domestic preparedness; and

(3) prevent and deter damage to the U.S. information infrastructure. As

discussed in appendix IV, Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62) had

previously created within NSC the Office of the National Coordinator for

Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism to oversee and

report on the federal government’s efforts in such areas as

counterterrorism, protection of critical infrastructures, and preparedness

and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction.9

Despite this effort, questions remain about whether the counterterrorism

plan functions as a true national strategy. A federally funded advisory

panel, supported by research from the RAND Corporation, recently

concluded that the plan could not be considered a national strategy

because it did not synchronize existing government programs or identify

future program priorities needed to achieve national objectives for

 9

PDD-62 and PDD-63, issued simultaneously in May 1998, elaborated the federal

government’s response to combating terrorism and protecting critical U.S. infrastructures,

respectively.

Counterterrorism
Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

Page 93 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

domestic preparedness for terrorism.10 Among other things, the panel

recommended creating a comprehensive strategy that was truly national in

scope, appropriately resourced, and based on measurable performance

objectives. We reached a similar conclusion in our recent report on the

federal response to terrorism.11 We concluded that the counterterrorism

plan, either taken alone or with other documents, did not constitute a fully

developed national strategy. We further reiterated the need for a federal or

national strategy that clearly identifies a desired outcome, provides a goal,

and allows measurement of progress toward that goal. As discussed in

appendix IV, in commenting on a draft of this report, Justice still considers

the counterterrorism plan to be a baseline national strategy to combat

terrorism.

 10Second Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities

for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: Toward a National Strategy for

Combating Terrorism (Dec. 15, 2000), better known as the Gilmore Panel.

11Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities;

Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000).
Appendix VIII: Comments From the National Security

Council

Page 94 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix VIII: Comments From the National

Security Council
Appendix VIII: Comments From the National Security

Council

Page 95 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime
Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 96 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix IX: Comments From the

Department of Justice
Appendix IX: Comments From the

Department of Justice

Page 97 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime
Appendix X: Comments From the Department of State

Page 98 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix X: Comments From the

Department of State
Appendix X: Comments From the Department of State

Page 99 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime
Appendix XI: Comments From the U.S. Agency

for International Development

Page 100 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix XI: Comments From the U.S.

Agency for International Development
Appendix XI: Comments From the U.S. Agency

for International Development

Page 101 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime
Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 102 GAO-01-629 Federal Response to International Crime

Laurie E. Ekstrand, (202) 512-8777

Danny R. Burton, (214) 777-5600

David P. Alexander, Seto J. Bagdoyan, Nancy A. Briggs, Philip D. Caramia,

Christine F. Davis, James M. Fields, Anthony L. Hill, and Bethany L.

Letiecq also made key contributions to this report.

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments

(440003)
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