alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                              JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                      4,006,000
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       0
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            4,006,000
<PP&E>                                              0
<DEPRECIATION>                                      0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              4,012,900
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          39,600
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                  3,970,800
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                4,012,100
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              124,300
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               54,100
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                67,500
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            69,500
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                   69,500
<EPS-BASIC>                                      1.15
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    1.15



</TABLE>
§ 62.10 What will happen if an individual does not comply with the terms and conditions of participating in the scholarship program? ( a ) If a participant, other than one described in paragraph (b) of this section, fails to accept payment or instructs the school not to accept payment of the scholarship provided by the Secretary, the participant must, in addition to any service or other obligation incurred under the contract, pay to the United States the amount of $1,500 liquidated damages. Payment of this amount must be made within 30 days of the date on which the participant fails to accept payment of the scholarship award or instructs the school not to accept payment.
( b ) When a participant fails to maintain an acceptable level of academic standing, is dismissed from the school for disciplinary reasons, or voluntarily terminates the course of study or program for which the scholarship was awarded before completing the course of study or program, the participant must, instead of performing any service obligation, pay to the United States an amount equal to all scholarship funds awarded under § 62.7. Payment of this amount must be made within 3 years of the date the participant becomes liable to make payment under this paragraph.
( c ) If a participant fails to begin or complete the period of obligated service incurred under § 62.8, including failing to comply with the applicable terms and conditions of a deferment granted by the Secretary, the participant must pay to the United States an amount determined by the formula set forth in section 754(c) of the Act. Payment of this amount shall be made within 1 year of the date that the participant failed to begin or complete the period of obligated service, as determined by the Secretary.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Notes:

1. In Patent and Trademark Office publications and usage the part number is omitted from the numbers of §§ 1.1 to 1.352 and the numbers to the right of the decimal point correspond with the respective rule numbers.

2. For nomenclature changes to part 1, see 68 FR 14335, Mar. 25, 2003; 87 FR 68904, Nov. 17, 2022.

#### § 1.422 Legal representative as applicant in an international application.

If an inventor is deceased or under legal incapacity, the legal representative of the inventor may be an applicant in an international application which designates the United States of America.

[77 FR 48823, Aug. 14, 2012]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
#### White, Jr., Trustee, v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. et al.

*Nogi, O’Malley & Harris,*for plaintiff.

*John W. Bowr,*for defendants.

January 31, 1955.

Robinson, J.,

This matter is before us on preliminary objections which question the venue of the action.

Plaintiffs sued defendant insurance companies, in assumpsit, upon four policies of fire insurance to recover a loss caused by fire to a building owned by the

*185Pocono Hosiery Mills, Inc., and located at 49 Prospect Street, East Stroudsburg, in Monroe County in this Commonwealth. Service of the complaint was made upon the Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth under the Act of May 17, 1921, P. L. 789, amended by the Act of April 27, 1927, P. L. 476, 40 PS §48. The complaint avers a loss by fire in the' premises which defendants refused to pay.

Defendants are foreign fire insurance companies registered to do business in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff, Major Lee White, Jr., is the duly qualified trustee in bankruptcy 'of the Pocono Hosiery Mills, Inc., and the East Stroudsburg National Bank is a banking corporation organized under the laws of the United States with a mortgagee’s interest in the fire insurance.

The complaint alleges that defendant companies at all times herein concerned were “regularly conducting business” in Lackawanna County, had “duly registered to do business in the Commonwealth”, and entered into the Commonwealth and this county “for the purpose of realizing pecuniary profit”.

Defendants argue that the action should be dismissed for lack of venue because the cause of action arose in Monroe County and originating process was not served in Lackawanna County.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide a complete answer to this contention. The action is, of course, transitory. Pa. R. C. P. 2179 *(a)*(2) provides that a personal action against a corporation may be brought in “a county where it regularly conducts business”, and paragraph (5) expressly makes this provision applicable to an action upon an insurance policy brought against an insurance company doing business in the Commonwealth. Pa. R. C. P. 2180 sets out the methods which may be employed to serve process upon a corporation. These methods are set out in the *186disjunctive and where two or more are available any one may be utilized. The methods of service provided for in this rule are cumulative and cannot be considered to exclude one another.

Neither is there anything in rule 2180 which modifies or affects the venue provisions of rule 2179. The service of original process on the insurance commissioner as statutory agent of the defendants does not limit the venue to the county where the cause of action arises.

The allegations of the complaint respecting the doing of business here must be taken as true and so taken, it is clear that they are sufficient to lay venue in this county.

Now, January 31, 1955, the preliminary objections to the complaint are overruled. Defendants are allowed 20 days to make answer.
§ 498.66 Waiver of right to appear and present evidence. ( a ) *Waiver procedures.* ( 1 ) If an affected party wishes to waive its right to appear and present evidence at the hearing, it must file a written waiver with the ALJ.
( 2 ) If the affected party wishes to withdraw a waiver, it may do so, for good cause, at any time before the ALJ mails notice of the hearing decision.
( b ) *Effect of waiver.* If the affected party waives the right to appear and present evidence, the ALJ need not conduct an oral hearing except in one of the following circumstances: ( 1 ) The ALJ believes that the testimony of the affected party or its representatives or other witnesses is necessary to clarify the facts at issue.
( 2 ) CMS or the OIG shows good cause for requiring the presentation of oral evidence.
( c ) *Dismissal for failure to appear.* If, despite the waiver, the ALJ sends notice of hearing and the affected party fails to appear, or to show good cause for the failure, the ALJ will dismiss the appeal in accordance with § 498.69.
( d ) *Hearing without oral testimony.* When there is no oral testimony, the ALJ will— ( 1 ) Make a record of the relevant written evidence that was considered in making the determination being appealed, and of any additional evidence submitted by the parties;
( 2 ) Furnish to each party copies of the additional evidence submitted by the other party; and
( 3 ) Give both parties a reasonable opportunity for rebuttal.
( e ) *Handling of briefs and related statements.* If the parties submit briefs or other written statements of evidence or proposed findings of facts or conclusions of law, those documents will be handled in accordance with § 498.17.
****U.S.        Department of Justice****Bureau of Justice Statistics****
| **To the BJShome page**
**Publications**
**What's         new**Juveniles Prosecuted in State Criminal Court Presents findings from the 1994 BJS National Survey of Prosecutors and other BJS statistical series, as well as data collected by the National Center for Juvenile Justice on juveniles proceeded against in State criminal courts.  Among prosecutors' offices handling juvenile cases, almost two-thirds reported transferring at least one juvenile case to criminal court in 1994.  Sixteen percent of the prosecutors' offices handling juvenile cases had written guidelines about the transfer of juveniles to criminal court.  National data on juvenile cases judicially waived to criminal court show that  the percentage of cases waived has remained relatively constant at about 1.47% since 1985. In 1994, 12,300 juvenile cases were judicially waived.   3/97   NCJ 164265
**Acrobat file** (312K) |  **ASCII text file** (26K) **About the source data**  | **Codebooks & Datasets****To order paper version**
 Help for using BJS products**Return to the BJS home page | Go to the top of this page****Bureau of Justice StatisticsU.S. Department of Justicewww.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjsSend comments to askbjs@ojp.usdoj.govPage last revised on *August 12, 1998*** |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### Smith Estate

March 19, 1956.

Shoyer, J.,

By order of this court dated December 9, 1955, the exceptions of Robert Nelson Smith to the supplemental adjudication of Shoyer, J., setting up a total reserve of $15,000 by accumulation from half the annual excess income were “dis*430missed and the supplemental adjudication confirmed absolutely”. The supplemental adjudication was filed September 29, 1955, and affirmed, with modifications, an earlier adjudication of April 16, 1953, which directed the filing of a schedule of distribution, which has not yet been filed. It was expressly provided by the supplemental adjudication that “the adjudication of April 16, 1953, as supplemented, is affirmed, and the account is reconfirmed nisi,”

Without the filing of the aforementioned schedule of distribution, Robert Nelson Smith .entered his appeal to our Supreme Court from the aforesaid order of December 9, 1955. Article VII, sec. 771, of the Orphans’ Court Act of August 10, 1951, P. L. 1163, 20 PS §2080.771, provides that “An appeal . . . may be taken from a decree of distribution of the orphans’ court which is not final . . . provided the orphans’ court shall certify that the decree is sufficiently definite to determine the substantial issues between the parties”. “Decree of distribution” may be read as synonymous with confirmed adjudication: Earle Estate, 369 Pa. 52, 54, 55 (footnote). Accordingly, we enter the following

*Order*

And now, to wit, March 19, 1956, it is hereby certified, pursuant to article VII, sec. 771, of the Orphans’ Court Act of August 10, 1951, P. L. 1163, 20 PS §2080.771, that the order of this court entered December 9, 1955, confirming absolutely the supplemental adjudication of Shoyer, J., dated September 29, 1955, is sufficiently definite to determine the substantial issues between the parties without the filing of the schedule of distribution directed in the aforesaid adjudication of April 16, 1953.
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...President of Egypt and King of Jordan Visit Iraq

# 									President of Egypt and King of Jordan Visit Iraq							

Press Statement

Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

June 27, 2021

The United States welcomes today’s historic visit to Baghdad by the President of Egypt and King of Jordan.  This visit is an important step in strengthening regional economic and security ties between Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan and to advance regional stability.

 

Tags

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization OperationsBureau of Near Eastern AffairsEconomic AffairsEgyptForeign Diplomats in the U.S.IraqJordanOffice of the SpokespersonStabilization

## Related Articles

-  											 									
Read more
 

Back to Top
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lancelot Robertson, :

Appellant :

:

v. : 1851 C.D. 2015

: Port Authority of Allegheny County :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4 th day of August , 2016, it is ordered that the above

captioned Memorandum Opinion, filed June 9 , 2016 , shall be designated OPINION

and shall be REPORTED.

_______________ ______________________ JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
###### Editorial Note on Part 84

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 84 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

#### § 84.140 Air velocity and noise levels; hoods and helmets; minimum requirements.

Noise levels generated by the respirator will be measured inside the hood or helmet at maximum airflow obtainable within pressure and hose length requirements and shall not exceed 80 dBA.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

DALE DWAYNE FISHER,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

 § 

No. 08-10-00022-CR

Appeal from the

252nd District Court

of Jefferson County, Texas

(TC# 89839)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant waived trial by jury and entered a plea of guilty before the court to the offense of

engaging in organized criminal activity. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02 (Vernon 2003). The trial

court deferred adjudication of guilt, placed Appellant on probation for five years, and ordered that

he pay restitution in the amount of $1,490. Subsequently, the trial court revoked Appellant’s

probation, found Appellant guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity, and sentenced him to

imprisonment for eight years. Appellant then filed his notice of appeal.

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel, however, has filed a brief in which he has concluded

that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, reh. denied, 388 U.S. 924, 87 S.Ct.

2094, 18 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating

why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807

(Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jackson v. State,

485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). 

1
A copy of counsel’s brief has been delivered to Appellant, and Appellant has been advised of his

right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree that the appeal is wholly

frivolous and without merit. Appellant pled true and a plea of true is sufficient to revoke probation. 

See Watts v. State, 645 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Further, appellant was sentenced

within the range of punishment for his offense. TEX. PENALCODE ANN. §§ 12.34(a), 12.35 (Vernon

2003), § 31.03(e)(4)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2010), §§ 71.02(a)(1), 71.02(b) (Vernon 2003). Thus, we

find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.

The judgment is affirmed.

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice

January 26, 2011

Before Chew, C.J., McClure, and Rivera, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

2
§ 224.1 Compliance review. ( a ) *Compliance review by Copyright Claims Attorney.* Upon the filing of a claim or counterclaim with the Copyright Claims Board (Board), a Copyright Claims Attorney shall review the claim for compliance with 17 U.S.C. chapter 15 and this subchapter, as provided in this section.
( b ) *Substance of compliance review.* The Copyright Claims Attorney shall review the claim or counterclaim for compliance with all legal and formal requirements for a claim or counterclaim before the Board, including: ( 1 ) The provisions set forth under this subchapter;
( 2 ) The requirements set forth in 17 U.S.C. 1504(c), (d), and (e)(1); and
( 3 ) Whether the allegations in the claim or the counterclaim clearly do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
( c ) *Issuing finding.* Upon completing a compliance review, the Copyright Claims Attorney shall notify the party that submitted the document in accordance with 37 CFR 222.5 and 17 U.S.C. 1506(f) by— ( 1 ) Informing the claimant or counterclaimant that the claim or counterclaim has been found to comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements and instructing the claimant to proceed with service under 37 CFR 222.5 and 17 U.S.C. 1506(g); or
( 2 ) Informing the claimant or counterclaimant that the claim or counterclaim, respectively, does not comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements and identifying the noncompliant issue(s) according to the procedure set forth in 17 U.S.C. 1506(f).
( d ) *Dismissal without prejudice.* If the original claim and an amended claim were previously reviewed by the Copyright Claims Attorney and were found not to comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, and if the Copyright Claims Attorney concludes, following the submission of a second amended claim, that the claim still does not comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, the claim shall be referred to a Copyright Claims Officer who shall confirm whether the second amended claim complies with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. If the Copyright Claims Officer concurs with the conclusion of the Copyright Claims Attorney, the proceeding shall be dismissed without prejudice.
( e ) *Clearance is not endorsement.* The finding that a claim or counterclaim complies with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements does not constitute a determination as to the validity of the allegations asserted or other statements made in the claim or counterclaim.
( f ) *No factual investigations.* For the purpose of the compliance review, the Copyright Claims Attorney shall accept the facts stated in the claim or counterclaim materials, unless they are clearly contradicted by information provided elsewhere in the materials or in the Board's records. The Copyright Claims Attorney shall not conduct an investigation or make findings of fact; however, the Copyright Claims Attorney may take administrative notice of facts or matters that are well known to the general public, and may use that knowledge during review of the claim or counterclaim.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. George R. HUTCHINSON.

No. 62272.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 18, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1978.

Paul A. Bonin, Garrity, Levenson & Bo-nin, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

TATE, J., dissents.
Proposed Rule: Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas EmissionsMeeting Documentation: SEMIDateStaff Contact InformationName of OrganizationSummary of DiscussionWritten CommentsProvided?Did they alsosubmit to Docket?Date sent to EPACCDJune 9,Kirsten Cappel• Identified below.Participants raised concerns with theSEMI providedNA2010(202) 343-9556cappel.kirsten@epa.gov• EPA Climate ChangeDivision and EPAcontractors: KirstenCappel, EPA; ScottBartos, EPA; DebHarris, ICFInternational.inclusion, in EPA’s proposed rule onElectronics Manufacturing (subpart I), ofSEMI E10-0304ESpecification forDefinition and Measurement ofEquipment Reliability, Availability, andMaintainability (SEMI standard).Participants asserted that EPA incorrectlyused the SEMI standard and that referenceto the standard should be removed fromthe regulatory text. Participants indicatedthat comments would be submitted withrecommendations for regulation text toaccount for uptime without reference tothe SEMI standard.comments.Participants:Alan Crockett, KLA-Tencor, alan.crockett@kla-tencor.comDavid Busing, KLA Tencor, david.busing@kla-tencor.comIan McLeod, SEMI, imcleod@semi.orgJanet Burggraf, Linear Technology, jburggraf@linear.comJay Dietrich, IBM, jdietric@us.ibm.comJoe Van Gompel, MIDAC Corporation, jvangompel@gmail.comJohn Ellis, SEMI, jellsi@semi.orgJonathan Davis, SEMI, jdavis@semi.orgKulraj Bhullor, NeoPhotonics, kulraj.bhullor@neophotonics.comMike Sherer, Sherer Consulting, msherereng@aol.com1Revati Kasmalkar, Tantra Consulting, revati.kasmalkar@yahoo.comSanjay Baliga, SEMI, sbaliga@semi.orgSebastien Raoux, Transcarbon, sraoux@transcarbon.comSusan Turner, SEMI, sturner@semi.orgTim Higgs, Intel, tim.g.higgs@intel.comTracey Christiansen, Polycom,etaetc@gmail.com2