U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

99–010

" ! SENATE 107th Congress

2d Session

REPORT

2002

107–133

PHONY IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS

VIA THE INTERNET

REPORT

PREPARED BY THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

FEBRUARY 4, 2002.—Ordered to be printed

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Staff Director and Counsel

HANNAH S. SISTARE, Minority Staff Director and Counsel

DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

TED STEVENS, Alaska

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

LINDA J. GUSTITUS, Chief Counsel and Staff Director

KIM CORTHELL, Minority Staff Director

EILEEN M. FISHER, Investigator to the Minority

MARY D. ROBERTSON, Chief Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1

I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 5

A. Summary of Investigation .............................................................................. 5

B. Methods of Using the Internet to Find False Identification Materials ...... 7

C. Earliest Websites Offering False Identification Information ....................... 8

D. Legal Framework ............................................................................................ 9

(1) Federal Legislative History ...................................................................... 9

(2) Loopholes Caused by Advances in Technology ....................................... 11

(3) Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000 ............................ 12

II. The Subcommittee Investigation ....................................................................... 13

A. Methods of Providing False Identification Materials by Internet Sites ..... 13

(1) Some Websites Offer False Identification Information and Tools ........ 14

(2) Some Websites Offer to Manufacture False Identification .................... 14

B. Types of False Identification Materials Available on the Internet ............. 15

(1) Templates and Other Tools ...................................................................... 15

(2) False Identification Documents ............................................................... 17

(a) State Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards ............................. 17

(b) Other Identity Documents .................................................................. 18

(c) ‘‘Breeder’’ Documents ........................................................................... 20

C. Marketing Practices ........................................................................................ 20

(1) Message Boards and Chat Rooms ............................................................ 20

(2) Deceptive Practices ................................................................................... 22

(3) Search Engine Placement and Keywords ............................................... 24

D. Disclaimers Have Little or No Legal Impact ................................................ 25

(1) Claims of Novelty ...................................................................................... 25

(2) Disclaimers Do Not Discourage Sales ..................................................... 26

(3) Operators Use Disclaimers as a Shield ................................................... 27

(4) Legal Challenges to Disclaimers .............................................................. 29

E. Role of the Internet ......................................................................................... 30

(1) The Internet Allows Instantaneous and Anonymous Sales and

Transfers of False Identification ............................................................. 30

(2) Website Operators Disguise Their Names and Locations ..................... 33

F. Websites Offering False Identification Materials Facilitate Other Crimes 35

(1) Identity Theft ............................................................................................ 37

(2) Recent Terrorist Acts May Have Been Facilitated by False Identification ...................................................................................................... 38

(3) Infiltration of Federal Facilities Using Phony Identification ................ 39

III. Case Studies ...................................................................................................... 40

A. The Sellers ....................................................................................................... 40

(1) Robert Sek: theidshop.com ....................................................................... 40

(a) Business ............................................................................................... 40

(b) Products ............................................................................................... 41

(c) Subcommittee Purchase ...................................................................... 41

(d) Disclaimer ............................................................................................ 41

(2) Brett Carreras: fakeid.net ........................................................................ 43

(a) Business ............................................................................................... 43

(b) Products ............................................................................................... 43

(c) Disclaimer ............................................................................................ 44

(d) Related Websites ................................................................................. 44

(3) Tim Beachum: bestfakeids.com ................................................................ 45

(a) Business ............................................................................................... 45

(b) Products ............................................................................................... 45

(c) Subcommittee Purchase ...................................................................... 46

(d) Disclaimer ............................................................................................ 50

Page

IV

(4) Tim Catron: fakeidzone.com ..................................................................... 50

(a) Business ............................................................................................... 50

(b) Products ............................................................................................... 50

(c) Disclaimer ............................................................................................ 51

(d) Other Online Activities ....................................................................... 51

(5) Josh Dansereau ......................................................................................... 52

(a) Business ............................................................................................... 52

(b) Products ............................................................................................... 52

(c) Disclaimer ............................................................................................ 53

(d) Legal Situation .................................................................................... 53

B. The Buyers ....................................................................................................... 54

(1) Thomas Seitz ............................................................................................. 54

(a) Legal Situation .................................................................................... 54

(b) Internet Activities ............................................................................... 54

(c) Creating False Documents .................................................................. 56

(2) Thana Barlee ............................................................................................. 57

(a) Background .......................................................................................... 57

(b) Internet Activities ............................................................................... 57

C. Referrals ........................................................................................................... 58

IV. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 59

A. General Services Administration Smart Card Technology for Federal

Facilities .......................................................................................................... 59

B. Law Enforcement’s Response to Crimes Using False Identification ........... 60

C. Implementing New Legislation ...................................................................... 61

(1)

PHONY IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS

VIA THE INTERNET

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The proliferation of false identification has become a serious public safety issue. False identification documents and credentials can

enable criminals to commit a host of crimes ranging from identity

theft to bank and credit card fraud and allow them to fund larger

and more dangerous criminal activities. Phony identification can

also enable criminals to obtain bona fide, yet unsupported and unauthorized, identification documents such as driver’s licenses.

Moreover, criminals may be able to evade law enforcement by hiding behind their false identities. Failing to curb the spread of false

identification can have grave consequences, in fact, evidence indicates that some associates of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization

may have used false identification and immigration documents.

Also alarming is the ease with which General Accounting Office

(GAO) investigators were able to breach security at 21 of the most

secure buildings in the United States, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

and several airports by claiming—falsely, using easily-obtained

phony identification—that they were armed law enforcement officers. GAO investigators displayed fake law enforcement badges and

phony credentials that they themselves had crafted using graphics

software and images culled from Internet websites, and which bore

little resemblance to the genuine articles. When the investigators

presented themselves at security checkpoints, they were waved

around metal detectors and were not screened.

In a similar operation at sensitive Defense Department facilities

in May 2001 commissioned by Senator Susan M. Collins, GAO investigators easily penetrated the sites using readily-obtainable

false identification—thus demonstrating their vulnerability to unauthorized access by criminals and terrorists. GAO’s findings in

these multiple penetration tests demonstrate that, in addition to

the lax security measures in place at Federal facilities and airports,

the Internet and computer technology allow nearly anyone easily to

create convincing identification cards and credentials.

In December 1999, under the chairmanship of Senator Susan M.

Collins, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations began a 5-

month investigation into the availability of false identification via

the Internet. The Subcommittee’s investigation was prompted in

part by an e-mail message received by a Subcommittee investigator

that solicited her to purchase counterfeit driver’s licenses. The Subcommittee began investigating to determine the extent to which

false identification could be obtained via the Internet and found

2

that there are a myriad of websites offering false identification materials.

The Subcommittee examined more than 60 websites offering

false identification materials, issued 11 subpoenas for documents

and depositions, and interviewed more than 40 witnesses. The Subcommittee also conducted an undercover operation to purchase

false identification materials—and received, in turn, several high

quality products, including a counterfeit Oklahoma driver’s license.

Based on the results of this undercover operation, the Subcommittee focused its attention on three website operators each of

whom offered high quality products that could be used to produce

credible false identification and credentials.

The Subcommittee’s investigation found that false identification

materials are distributed over the Internet through a number of

methods. Some websites offer to make identification documents for

customers which are then delivered by mail. Others offer the computer files, known as ‘‘templates,’’ necessary to manufacture false

identification documents. Customers may purchase access to the

templates and download them to their own computers, or purchase

a computer disk containing the template files. Still other operators

simply offer the templates for free.

Templates are typically graphic files which can be manipulated

to hide and/or reveal images and text. Individuals can also add images and text, such as photographs or signatures, to templates in

order to customize them. To make a driver’s license, for example,

an individual would insert a photo and signature, and type in the

desired name and address. The individual would then print the

document, and laminate it, thereby creating a highly realistic false

identification document. A single software template can be used an

infinite number of times, by an infinite number of individuals, and

can be transmitted via computer disk, or in an instant via the

Internet.

As a result of its investigation, the Subcommittee has drawn

three general conclusions. First, many Internet sites offer a wide

variety of phony identification documents, some of which are of

very high quality and include security features commonly used by

government agencies to deter counterfeiting. These include driver’s

licenses from all 50 States, birth certificates, Social Security cards,

military identification cards, student identifications, diplomas,

press credentials, and Federal agency credentials such as those

used by the FBI and CIA. The Subcommittee also found products

such as Social Security number generators, bar code generators,

and instructions for creating holograms.

Second, the disclaimers that can be found on many websites are

at odds with the marketing strategy pursued by the operators of

those websites. The Subcommittee found that operators frequently

attempted to shield themselves by claiming that their products

were ‘‘for novelty purposes only.’’ At the same time, however, operators commonly implied that their products were so authentic in

appearance as to be illegal—something they clearly considered to

be a marketing asset. For example, the Subcommittee found one

website that offered a ‘‘New Identity Kit’’ purporting to contain

‘‘[e]verything you need to create a new identity for fun!!’’ yet which

encouraged Internet users to order quickly, ‘‘before we are shut

3

1Phony IDs and Credentials Via the Internet: An Emerging Problem: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th

Continued

down by the authorities.’’ Another website operator informed his

customers that his products were for ‘‘entertainment and educational purposes only,’’ yet urged them to use the documents on

his website to get a job.

Third, the Internet has played a leading role in fostering the

manufacture and the sale of high quality false identification, and

has made these products available to a vast customer base with

virtual anonymity for both the sellers and the buyers. This has, in

turn, presented significant challenges for law enforcement. For example, one operator, in an attempt to disguise his true location,

registered his website in the Philippines and provided an e-mail

address that appeared to originate from another small country in

the South Pacific. (The Subcommittee determined through his billing records, however, that he was actually located in Kansas.)

The Subcommittee’s investigation culminated in a hearing, entitled Phony IDs and Credentials Via the Internet—An Emerging

Problem, which was held on May 19, 2000. The hearing witnesses

were K. Lee Blalack, II, then-Chief Counsel and Staff Director of

the Subcommittee; Agent David C. Myers from the Identification

Fraud Coordinator for the State of Florida’s Division of Alcoholic

Beverages and Tobacco (now Lieutenant Myers); Thomas Seitz, a

convicted felon; and the Hon. Brian Stafford, Director of the U.S.

Secret Service.

In his hearing testimony, Mr. Blalack outlined the scope of the

Subcommittee’s investigation, and discussed the Subcommittee’s

case studies of Brett Carreras, Tim Beachum and Tim Catron, who

sold false identification materials over the Internet. Lieutenant

Myers provided an overview of Internet sales of false identification

documents, and detailed several investigations of website operators

that he and his team had led, and that the Subcommittee also examined. Thomas Seitz testified about the false identification documents he was able to obtain over the Internet, and the crimes he

was able to commit using these phony documents. (These actions

resulted in his conviction on four felony counts, a 3-year State sentence and a 7-month Federal sentence.) Finally, Director Stafford

testified about the proliferation of Internet crime and how the

Internet facilitates identity theft and other serious crimes through

the use of false identification documents. He also outlined the role

of the U.S. Secret Service in trying to curb such activity.

The Subcommittee’s hearing made clear that technological developments during the past few years have significantly increased the

dangers associated with the production and marketing of phony

identification documents. Today, both the necessary skills and materials are well within the reach of a growing number of people. As

then-Chairman Collins noted in her opening statement:

‘‘These counterfeit documents are relatively easy to manufacture. With only a modest understanding of the Internet

and $50 worth of supplies purchased from an arts and

crafts store, one can design authentic-looking identification

documents within a few hours or even minutes.’’ 1

4

Congress, 2nd Session (May 19, 2000) [hereinafter ‘‘Hearing record’’], at 2 (remarks of Senator

Collins). 2 Id. at 4 (remarks of Senator Carl Levin). 3 Id. at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant David C. Myers).

Moreover, it is becoming even easier to obtain and create false

identification documents, which can then be used for a wide variety

of improper and illegal purposes. Senator Carl Levin noted in his

opening statement, for example, that false identification documents

are

‘‘often now being used to carry out improper or criminal

activities—to obtain fraudulent loans, to evade taxes, to

establish a new identity, to steal another individual’s identity, to defraud Federal and State Governments, to misrepresent one’s residence or place of birth or age for any

variety of purposes.’’ 2

Indeed, a criminal can use phony identification documents and

credentials as so-called ‘‘breeder’’ documents, as a means of gaining

access to bona fide identification materials. Seitz obtained a phony

birth certificate, for instance, to obtain a State identification card,

which while itself authentic (insofar as it was properly issued by

the relevant authorities), was based on false supporting documents

and contained false information. Through these means, Seitz obtained unauthorized yet ‘‘authentic’’ documents, which are particularly difficult to detect. These ‘‘authentic’’ documents can then be

used to commit a host of crimes, including bank fraud, as Seitz unfortunately demonstrated. Although at the time of this report investigations into the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 2001, are

still in the early stages, it appears that some individuals associated

with these acts may also have used false supporting documents to

obtain ‘‘authentic’’ false identification.

The Internet has visibly changed the false identification industry. In his testimony before the Subcommittee, Lieutenant Myers

estimated that 30 percent of the false identification documents his

office seized during the year 2000 had been obtained via the Internet—up from only about 1 percent just 2 years previously. Moreover, Lieutenant Myers expected this figure to rise to between 60

and 70 percent for 2001.3 Indeed, Trent Sands, the author of a recent book on false identification, claims that the Internet should be

credited with reviving the false identification business:

‘‘The Internet has breathed new life into the world of false

identification. Many new companies are springing up to

meet the needs of those who want documentation saying

they are someone else. * * * The robust health of the mailorder and Internet identification business is in stark contrast to the situation of just a few years ago.’’

Since the Subcommittee began its investigation and began contacting website operators, most of the individuals examined, including Tim Catron and Tim Beachum, have removed their websites

from the Internet. Others, such as Brett Carreras, have curtailed

their activities. The Subcommittee has also made referrals of potential violations of Federal and State law to the appropriate members of the law enforcement community, urging authorities to inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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4This issue first came to the Subcommittee’s attention when Subcommittee Investigator

Eileen Fisher received an unsolicited e-mail message entitled, ‘‘Authentic Confidential ID’s!!’’ The e-mail message stated as follows:

‘‘Ever wanted a driver’s license that pases [sic] all the ‘‘tests’’? Now you can have a Driv- er’s License from any State no questions asked! Former employees of the Department of

Motor Vehicles are now making Driver’s licenses exactly 100% like the ones the DMV

makes, complete with Holgrams [sic] and Magnetic Strips.’’

The message asked Investigator Fisher to send $15 in payment for the fake driver’s license.

See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 22. The individual responsible for this e-mail, Greg

Dodson, agreed to a consent judgment on May 19, 2000, in a lawsuit brought by ASD.com in

the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The terms of the consent judgment

require Dodson to pay statutory damages under the Tennessee anti-spamming statute of

$10,000 plus attorney’s fees.

vestigate further the activities of several individuals involved with

manufacturing and distributing false identification documents.

Nevertheless, operators continue to spring up to take the places of

those who have closed their websites and offer false identification

and credentials over the Internet, although most of these new operators are located abroad.

Accordingly, the Subcommittee considered means of curbing this

emerging problem, and in July 2000, then-Chairman Collins introduced legislation designed to address the problem of counterfeit

identification documents. This legislation, the Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000 passed the Senate and the House

of Representatives and was signed into law on December 28, 2000.

This statute, Public Law 106–578, effected a number of changes in

current law, including: (1) establishing a multi-agency coordinating

committee charged with encouraging more enforcement of existing

criminal laws by dedicating investigative and prosecutorial resources exclusively to this emerging problem; (2) modernizing several portions of existing Federal law to ensure that it is suited to

the Internet age and the technology that is associated with it; and

(3) making it easier to prosecute those criminals who manufacture,

distribute, or sell counterfeit identification documents by closing

the legal loophole that had allowed them to use easily-removable

disclaimers in an attempt to shield their illegal conduct from prosecution through a claim of ‘‘novelty.’’ Through aggressive law enforcement activity, and continued Congressional attention and

oversight, the Subcommittee hopes and anticipates that it will be

possible dramatically to decrease the number of crimes committed

using false documents.

I. Introduction

A. Summary of Investigation

The Subcommittee’s investigation was prompted in part by an email message received by a Subcommittee investigator that solicited her to purchase counterfeit driver’s licenses.4 The Subcommittee began investigating to determine the extent to which

false identification could be obtained via the Internet. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that there are a myriad of

websites offering false identification materials.

From mid-December 1999 to mid-May 2000, the Subcommittee

discovered approximately 60 websites offering to manufacture and

sell false identification documents or to provide the means to manufacture false identification documents. These sites were not hard

to find: the Subcommittee located them by using major search enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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5See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 9 (false Oklahoma driver’s license). 6Templates are computer files that are frequently used to manufacture false identification

documents. See Section II.B.(1).

gines, examining the links on websites, and reviewing messages

posted on several discussion boards. The websites primarily offered

to manufacture or provide information about State driver’s licenses,

with some operations offering to manufacture or provide information about birth certificates, government identification cards, Social

Security cards, college transcripts, and other identification documents.

The Subcommittee then reviewed in great detail approximately

15 websites that offered false identification information. These

websites were selected based on the type and quality of documents

offered, the methods used to sell such documents, and the physical

location of website operations. As part of the Subcommittee’s review, the Subcommittee placed orders under an assumed name to

seven websites for the false identification products that they offered. The Subcommittee received materials from three of the

websites. A summary of these orders and results is provided in

Table 1:

Table 1—Orders of False Identification Materials

Company/Individual Product Ordered Cost Result

American Photo Company a .............. Georgia driver’s license

with hologram.

$225 No product received.

NoveltyID4Ua ..................................... Social Security card ....... $58 No product received.

Mike Burton ...................................... Maine driver’s

license

$75 No product received.b

The ID Shop/Robert Sek ................... Oklahoma driver’s

license.

$100 Received false identification card closely resembling an Oklahoma driver’s license.

J&J Enterprises/Josh Dansereau ....... Connecticut driver’s license.$58 No product received.c

Bestfakeids/Tim Beachum ................ Novelty ID Kit $30 Downloaded files containing identification

documents.

Fakeid.net/Brett Carreras ................. Monthly access to premium files.$12.95/

month

The Subcommittee had access for several

months to these materials, which included templates for 13 State driver’s licenses, the seal of the Department of

Health and Human Services (which is

used on a Social Security card), and a

template for a Canadian driver’s license.

a It appears that the same individual, John Carroll, operates both companies, and possibly several others including phonyid.com.

bWhen Subcommittee investigators contacted Burton, he admitted that he did not send the requested fake driver’s license because he was

attempting to defraud customers by taking their money without shipping the goods promised. Following the Subcommittee’s referral of this

case to the appropriate law enforcement authorities in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, Burton was charged with petty theft by fraud and fined approximately $200. He also disestablished a website he had operated offering instructions on how to alter a driver’s license, shredded his own

altered Wisconsin driver’s license at the direction of authorities, and returned $75 to the Subcommittee.

c Dansereau was arrested by Florida agents in November 1999. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee’s money order was deposited into his account in February 2000. In June 2000, Dansereau signed a notarized affidavit confirming his statement to the Subcommittee that since his

arrest he has returned all orders for false identification documents.

The identification materials the Subcommittee received took different forms. After the Subcommittee mailed to the operator of one

website a photograph representing a fictitious person with an address in Oklahoma, asking that the false identification document

be delivered to an address in Maryland, the Subcommittee received

a high quality identification card 5 that closely resembled a driver’s

license of the State of Oklahoma. (This false identification document is further described in Section III.A.(1).) The Subcommittee

used a credit card to purchase access to templates 6 and informaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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7The Internet is also called the World Wide Web, a term which is often shortened to simply ‘‘the Web.’’ It is a linked collection of electronic documents stored on computers called servers. 8 Netnames Int’l Ltd., Netnames (visited June 4, 2001) http://www.netnames.com. 9 Computer Industry Almanac, Internet Users/Wireless Users (visited June 4, 2001) http://

cyberatlas.internet.com. 10Websites, or pages, are located by an ‘‘address’’ known as a domain name, an Internet Protocol (IP) address, or a Universal Resource Locator (URL). This address is sometimes called the

Continued

tion from two other websites that can be used to manufacture false

identification documents. These websites are described in Sections

III.A. (2) and (3) of this report. The Subcommittee also obtained

templates and other information on false identification from

websites that did not charge for their products.

The Subcommittee experienced difficulty in locating and obtaining the cooperation of the operators of several of the websites

under review. As detailed in Section III.E.(2) of this report, many

of those responsible for these websites hid their associations with

the website or, when identified, were unwilling to provide verifiable

information to the Subcommittee. Some websites appear to be operated by individuals or companies located outside the United States,

making it difficult for the Subcommittee to compel the production

of information.

In the cases of several websites, the Subcommittee found the

sales of false identification materials to be significant, as illustrated in Table 2:

Table 2—Revenues/Orders of Websites Offering False Identification Materials

Company/Individual Est. Dates of

Operation

Dates of Revenue/

Order Information Revenues Orders

The ID Shop/Robert Sek ................................................ 11/30/99–2/00 11/30/99–2/00 $1,000,000 a 21,000 a

fakeid.net/Brett Carreras .............................................. 7/28/98–present 10/18/98–12/22/

98

$8,239 b 621b

Bestfakeids/Tim Beachum ............................................ 3/17/99–5/00 c 3/17/99–3/24/00 $31,305 d 1,294 d

Infoworld/Jeremy Martinez ............................................ 10/99–5/00 c 1/1/99–3/30/00 $23,728 d 1,177 d

fakeidzone/Tim Catron .................................................. 10/98–2/00 11/99–1/00 $12,250 b 652 b

J&J Enterprises/Josh Dansereau ................................... 6/99–9/99 6/99–9/99 $3,000 d –

$250,000 a

100 e

a Estimates from law enforcement reports.

b Information provided by Verotel, the company recording billing information.

cWebsite was operational as of May 19, 2000. However, it appears to have been taken down at some point between the Subcommittee’s

hearing and the release of this report. d Company-supplied information.

e Dansereau claimed that he manufactured about 100 false identification documents. Law enforcement officials believe Dansereau failed to

provide products to many customers.

B. Methods of Using the Internet to Find False Identification Materials

The Internet offers users an ever expanding multitude of information.7 With over 35 million domain names registered as of June

4, 2001,8 the Internet provides users with an opportunity to find

information on virtually any subject. Individuals across the world

are using the Internet in ever increasing numbers, with one source

estimating the number of Internet users worldwide as 414 million

in 2000 and predicting an increase to 1.17 billion by the year

2005.9

The vast array of information sources on the Internet means that

most Internet users do not know the location of websites that may

contain information on a topic of interest to them.10 Internet users

8

name of the site, its address, or its location. Entering the URL of a web page through a web

browser or clicking on a link allows the user to access that page through its server. 11 A ‘‘search engine’’ is a web page that uses computer technology to find and display other

web pages relating to the information requested. 12See e.g., Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 28 (search results for term ‘‘fake ID’’ when using

Excite.com search engine, http://www.Excite.com). 13See ‘‘Blur of Insanity,’’ (last visited Dec. 15, 2000), at http://www.blurofinsanity.com. 14See ‘‘Fake ID Conversation,’’ http://www.carreras.net/discus (post by ‘‘Allfree’’ on Oct. 15,

1999). 15 A ‘‘template’’ is the term given to a document, often in the form of a computer file that is

able to be manipulated, and may contain both graphic images and text, and that closely resembles the common features of an official identification document. 16See ‘‘Fake ID Conversation,’’ http://www.carreras.net/discus (post by ‘‘Webhost’’ on Oct.

16, 1999).

thus routinely search for information using ‘‘search engines,’’ 11 programs which automatically search large sections of the Internet in

order to provide the user with a list of websites likely to contain

information relevant to the user’s request. After the user has entered one or more words describing the subject matter of interest,

these search engines use different techniques to identify websites

with a high probability of containing the requested information.

Search engines may identify relevant websites through comparison

of the user’s word description with terms on a website or with descriptive terms, frequently called ‘‘keywords,’’ provided by the creator of the website in order to guide or attract users to the website.

Based on this comparison, search engines provide an Internet user

with a list of websites. This list is often arranged in order of likelihood of containing relevant information, and may provide a short

description of the information included on each site. The search engine results page displays the address of each page found as a result of the search, and allows the user to move directly to each site

with a simple click of the mouse.12 As the Subcommittee demonstrated, these user-friendly and often very powerful search techniques make it easy for Internet users to discover and access

websites offering a variety of false identification documents.

C. Earliest Websites Offering False Identification Information

The ever-changing nature of the Internet, and the fact that web

pages are often not preserved for later retrieval, prevent documentation by the Subcommittee of the earliest websites created

containing information about false identification materials. Website

‘‘domain names’’ are often sold or transferred to different individuals or companies, and may be used for an entirely different purpose at different times. The Subcommittee’s investigation was thus

unable to determine with great certainty which operators first used

the Internet to offer false identification information.

The earliest information about manufacturing false identification

appears to originate from three websites. A site named ‘‘Blur of Insanity,’’ which currently describes itself as ‘‘The #1 College Entertainment Website,’’ 13 is mentioned on an Internet discussion

board 14 as having been one of the first sites to display identification templates.15 According to other messages on a discussion

board,16 an individual using the name ‘‘Cycore’’ provided information about false identification materials on a site offered on a web

page provided through America OnLine (AOL)—at least until that

company allegedly dismantled the site. A third site, ‘‘fake-id.com,’’ operated by John DeMayo, was registered with Network Solutions

9

17See generally, Federal Identification Fraud: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee

on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 97th Congress, 2nd Session

(June 15–16, Sept. 23, 1982).

on October 2, 1997. This site reportedly contained a variety of templates and information about the driver’s licenses of many different

States. Individuals obtaining these templates and information

about the formats of State driver’s licenses would then have the ingredients needed to manufacture false identification. Although the

Subcommittee was unable to obtain specific information about the

false identification information presented on these early websites,

it does appear that the use of the Internet to manufacture and

market counterfeit identification documents dates at least to the

mid-1990s.

D. Legal Framework

(1) Federal Legislative History

Almost 20 years ago, in the fall of 1982, the Subcommittee held

3 days of public hearings examining the use of counterfeit identity

documents to defraud Federal benefit programs.17 These hearings

came on the heels of a series of reports demonstrating the growing

problems caused by false identification. Following the hearings,

Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 and 1738. These two laws are

the primary Federal statutes that relate to the availability of false

identification on the Internet. Section 1028 imposes penalties for

the production or use of false identification documents, as well as

for the possession of document making implements with the intent

to use them for an illegal purpose. Section 1738, which was repealed in 2000, imposed a misdemeanor penalty for possessing certain identification documents that do not bear a specified disclaimer.

Section 1028 imposes felony sanctions of between 3 to 25 years

in jail, depending how the false identification document is used, for:

• the knowing, unauthorized production of an identification document, or false identification document;

• the transfer of an identification document or false

identification document, knowing that it was stolen or

produced without lawful authority;

• the possession with intent to use unlawfully or to

transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents (other than those issued lawfully for the use of

the possessor) or false identification documents;

• the possession of an identification document (other

than one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor)

or a false identification document with the intent that

such document be used to defraud the United States;

• the possession, production, or transfer of a documentmaking implement with the intent that the implement

be used in the production of a false identification document or another document-making implement;

• the possession of an identification document that is or

appears to be an identification document of the United

10

18 18 U.S.C. § 1028. 19 18 U.S.C. § 1738(a). 20 Id. at § 1738(b).

States, which is stolen or produced without lawful authority, knowing that the document was stolen or that

its production was unauthorized; and

• the unauthorized transfer of a means of identification

of another person with the intent to commit, aid, or

abet any unlawful activity that violates Federal law or

is a felony under State law.

Section 1028 applies only where (1) the identification document or

false identification document is or appears to be issued by or under

the authority of the United States, or the document-making implement is designed or suited to making such an identification document; (2) the offense involves the knowing possession of an identification document (other than one lawfully issued for the use of the

possessor) or a false identification document intended to be used to

defraud the United States; (3) the prohibited production, transfer,

possession or use is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; or

(4) the means of identification, identification document, false identification document, or document-making implement is transported

in the mail.18

Section 1738 made it a misdemeanor punishable by up to 1 year

in jail for anyone in the business of furnishing identification documents, acting in furtherance of that business, to use the mails for

the

‘‘mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of, or [transportation] in interstate or foreign commerce, any identification document * * * (1) which bears a birth date or age

purported to be that of the person named in such identification document; * * * (2) knowing that such document

fails to carry diagonally printed clearly and indelibly on

both the front and back ‘‘NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT’’ in capital letters in not less than 12-point type.’’ 19

An ‘‘identification document’’ is defined as ‘‘a document which is of

a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals and which is not issued by or under the authority of a government.’’ 20

(2) Loopholes Caused by Advances in Technology

The Subcommittee found that the substantial majority of false

identification prosecutions have been brought under § 1028, while

no prosecutions have been brought specifically under § 1738, perhaps because § 1738 provided only for misdemeanor penalties.

Moreover, the Subcommittee’s review of the case law under § 1028

did not find any prosecutions involving the sale of false identification documents over the Internet. Witness testimony at the Subcommittee’s hearing indicated, however, that the number of crimes

committed involving false identification is growing, and that the

number of prosecutions has not kept pace. Not only did the statute

need updating, the Subcommittee concluded, but law enforcement’s

attention also needed to be refocused on this crime.

11

21See generally United States v. Alejandro, 118 F.3d 1518 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Rohn, 964 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1992). 22 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1). 23See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 10 (Fake ID Man Message Board http://

pages.eidosnet.co.uk/fakeidman/ (post by ‘‘Mexican311’’ on Mar. 17, 2000)). This post details

the ease with which the disclaimer on the identification card may be removed. 24 Id. at 22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

Under § 1028, the courts have looked to statutory language, past

decisions, and legislative history to determine the appropriate

scope of the terms ‘‘identification document’’ and ‘‘document-making implement.’’ The cases indicate that the term ‘‘identification

document’’ applied to completed and blank birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and Federal and State identification cards.21 The statutory definition of a ‘‘document-making implement’’ included

‘‘any implement, impression, electronic device, or computer

hardware or software, that is specifically configured or primarily used for making an identification document, a false

identification document, or another document-making implement.’’ 22

The case law suggests that this language has been applied to a

wide range of materials outside the Internet context, but it is unclear whether the existing statutes would cover computer files or

false-identification software template files. Specifically, it was unclear whether templates, which are used in a large number of those

false identification documents transmitted over the Internet, constitute a document or a document-making implement—or whether

they were covered at all under the original statutory definitions.

The Subcommittee concluded that new legislation was needed to

ensure that such computer technology is within the ambit of the

statute, particularly because it is the method of choice of today’s

false identification manufacturers.

The Subcommittee found that people producing false identification cited the disclaimer language in § 1738 in claiming to be operating in compliance with the law. For example, Robert Sek of

‘‘theidshop’’ required that his customers sign an agreement not to

tamper with the product he sent them. He then mailed his customers an identification card sealed in an easily-removable plastic

pouch that bore the requisite disclaimers. The identification card

inside the pouch bore merely a disclaimer in tiny print.23 Through

these means, Sek sought to insulate himself from liability by creating a product that appeared to comply with § 1738, but in fact

was easily alterable to circumvent the statute.

For these reasons, it was apparent following the Subcommittee

hearing that the statutory definitions of prohibited items needed to

be updated to cover today’s technology, and that law enforcement’s

attention need to be refocused on false identification crimes. Speaking from his position as one on the front lines of the effort to curb

phony identification documents, for example, Lieutenant David C.

Myers, the Identification Fraud Coordinator for the State of Florida’s Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, testified to the

difficulties he encountered, noting that false identification website

operators keep reappearing on the Internet, a problem he suspected rises from loopholes in the current legal code.24 After hearing this, Senator Collins noted:

12

25 Id. at 30 (remarks of Senator Collins).

‘‘I am more convinced than ever that we need a crackdown by all levels of law enforcement on this area and

that we need to evaluate very closely whether Federal law

and penalties are sufficient to deter the proliferation of

these websites.’’ 25

(3) Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000

On July 26, 2000, Senator Collins introduced S. 2924, the Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000, in an effort to curb

the proliferation of websites that distribute counterfeit identification documents and credentials over the Internet. The bill was intended to accomplish this by promoting a coordinated effort to improve the Federal Government’s ability to stem the use of false

identification documents, creating a law enforcement coordinating

committee to focus on false identification, updating existing law to

reflect technological advances, and encouraging law enforcement to

prosecute this serious and growing problem. On December 15,

2000, after incorporating several minor modifications to the version

that had previously passed the Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Internet False Identification Prevention

Act of 2000. Thereafter signed by the President, this bill became

Public Law 106–578 on December 28, 2000. It entered into effect

on March 28, 2001.

Among its provisions, the new law authorizes a multi-agency coordinating committee to investigate and prosecute the manufacture

and distribution of false identification documents. The coordinating

committee includes representatives from the Treasury Department,

the Justice Department, the U.S. Secret Service, the FBI, the Social Security Administration, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This coordinating committee is expected to operate like the Office of Internet Enforcement at the Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC), except that it would file criminal

rather than civil actions and would be a multi-agency organization.

This coordinating committee shall exist for at least 2 years, with

the President having the authority to continue it for such additional time as may be deemed necessary. At the end of each year

of the coordinating committee’s existence, the Attorney General

and Secretary of the Treasury shall report to the House and Senate

Judiciary Committees on the investigation and prosecution of

crimes involving false identification, and make recommendations

for more effective investigation and prosecution.

Second, the new law was designed to amend § 1028 in order to

bring this primary law on false identification in line with current

technology in several ways. The legislation modifies the existing

definition of ‘‘document-making implement,’’ for example, to include

computer templates and files that are now frequently used to create counterfeit identification documents from the Internet.

Third, the new law aims to close a loophole which allowed a person to transfer (e.g., through a website or e-mail), either false identification software templates or actual finished documents. The

law’s new provision thus expands the definition of ‘‘transfer’’ to include selecting, placing, or directing the placement of an identificaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
13

26 Id. at 21–22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

tion document, false identification document, or document-making

implement in an online location where it is available to others.

This should ensure that offering a false identification document or

template for download on a website is considered an illegal act.

Fourth, the new law repeals § 1738, thus ending individuals’ ability to use alterable disclaimers in legally producing identification

documents that include the age or birth date of an individual. The

effect of repeal of § 1738 is that it will no longer be legal to manufacture and sell false identification products even if they display

the previously-required ‘‘NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT’’

disclaimer. As the Subcommittee’s hearing revealed, this type of

disclaimer can be fashioned so as to be easily removable on both

computer templates and counterfeit identification documents. It is

now illegal to produce, possess, or sell any identification document

that resembles an identification document issued by any government entity; any such activity will be a felony.

It is the Subcommittee’s hope that this new law will also focus

attention on the growing problem of Internet-facilitated false identification. This alone may help rein in the more visible operators,

for shedding light on this industry does appear to be at least a temporary deterrent. Lieutenant Myers testified at the hearing, for example, that:

‘‘Probably the biggest impact that we have had on the

Internet as I monitor it and have for many years is the

work done by your own Subcommittee’s investigators. They

had a dramatic impact on those on the Internet. Not even

knowing their investigation was going on, I could see that

the activity on the Internet as it related to false ID was

going through some changes.’’ 26

The Subcommittee hopes that the combination of its work on the

subject and the legislation to curb the manufacture and distribution of false identification documents over the Internet, along with

renewed attention from law enforcement will decrease the number

of crimes committed using the false documents.

II. The Subcommittee Investigation

A. Methods Of Providing False Identification Materials By Internet Sites

The Subcommittee’s investigation found two primary methods by

which the operators of websites provide false identification materials: some simply provide their customers with the tools they need

to produce their own false identification. These products are generally mailed in disk form to the customer, or more frequently,

transmitted via the Internet, or available for downloading. Other

website operators produce a completed false identification document for their customers themselves, which they deliver to the customer through the mail.

14

27See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 32b (Tim Catron, Fake ID Zone (visited Jan. 3, 2000)

http://www.digitalhideout.com/idkit.html) (original punctuation and spelling preserved). 28Fake ID Archive (visited Apr. 21, 2000) http://www.fakeids.cjb.net. 29Polyvinylchloride, commonly known as PVC, is a widely used type of plastic. PVC is frequently used to make cards such as identification badges and credit cards.

(1) Some Websites Offer False Identification Information and

Tools

Some website operators offer to mail customers a disk containing

computer files. The operator of fakeidzone.com, Tim Catron, used

the following language to promote his products:

‘‘Our novelty id kit’s allows anyone to make a new identity.

Maybe you would like to be able to spot fake id’s [sic] for

your job, or you need a new novelty birth certificate, or

maybe you want to make some money selling novelty id’s.

Everything you need is right here! You will get full instructions with details on how to use your kit—as well as

hundreds of templates, and tech support if needed.’’ 27

These website operators usually require payment by mail and provide the disk via return mail. Such sites are frequently unable or

unwilling to use a third party for billing, and customers using such

sites may not have credit cards or prefer to send their payment

using untraceable methods such as cash or money order.

The operator of the website fakeid.net, Brett Carreras, promoted

his site as ‘‘[t]he world’s first and finest site devoted solely to fake

ID information.’’ This website contained free information such as

State seals, coded numeric information on State issued identification, and templates that would assist an individual to create false

identification. Fakeid.net also sold membership access to ‘‘premium’’ files containing high quality templates of State driver’s licenses. Website operators offer files for the customer to download,

maintain accounts with credit card or billing companies, and customers charge their purchase to a credit card, pay by telecheck, or

pay through their telephone bill. Once the billing company has confirmed the purchase, an authorization code is provided to the customer for access to the files containing the information about false

identification documents.

Other websites offer, without charge, files available for downloading that contain false identification materials. For example,

one website operator promoted the products offered with the following statement: ‘‘Welcome to the Fake ID Archive! Here you will

find everything you will need to make your own Fake ID.’’ 28 The

Fake ID archive’s product list included high quality, layered templates that customers could use to manufacture false identification.

While the operators of these websites appear to be offering their

products for free, their sites may generate income by linking to

other web pages whose owners pay a fee for directing potential customers to them.

(2) Some Websites Offer to Manufacture False Identification

Some websites offer to make identification documents for customers. The operator of theidshop.com, Robert Sek, offered to provide customers with PVC plastic identification cards 29 that closely

resembled State driver’s licenses. The Subcommittee purchased a

15

30See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 31 (Robert Sek, PVC Plastic Id’s (visited Jan. 27,

2000) http://www.theidshop.com). 31 Josh Dansereau, Gallery (visited Nov. 9, 1999) http://www.fakeid1.com/gallery.htm

(original punctuation and spelling preserved). 32 Identification documents are sent by return mail, at least, when the operator of the website

is not simply defrauding customers of their money by providing no product whatsoever. As noted

in Table 1, for example, the website operated by Mike Burton was designed to elicit orders for

false identification products that Burton never intended to provide. Such activity is not a false

identification crime, but instead constitutes simple fraud.

phony Oklahoma driver’s license from Sek, and found that the

identification was high quality, and closely replicated a bona fide

Oklahoma driver’s license. The Subcommittee’s purchase is detailed

in Section III.A.(1). Sek’s web page described his products as follows:

‘‘The ID Shop is proud to be the first Id website to ever

offer PVC plastic holographic ID’s. These are the highest

quality novelty ID’s money can buy. They also come with

many added security options such as holograms.’’ 30

The operator of fakeids.org, Josh Dansereau, similarly promoted

his products as follows:

All of are ID’s are the new plastic credit card style, they

come with a working magnetic strip at no extra charge. No

one will question these Ids, even put to the book test***

they pass. We get e-mails everyday about how great they

work. Our Ids are made to very strict standards, you will

be completely satisfied.31

These websites ask the customer to send the information that he

or she wants on the identification document along with a picture,

signature, and payment. The operator of the website manufactures

the new identification, makes no attempt to verify that the information is true, and sends the customer the false identification document via return mail.32

B. Types of False Identification Materials Available on the

Internet

(1) Templates and Other Tools

Some websites offer template and other tools that aid individuals

in the manufacture of false identification documents. Templates are

computer files that are frequently used to manufacture false identification documents. Templates are typically layered graphic files

that can be manipulated to hide and reveal images and text.

Layering a template enables the customer to replicate closely a feature on a State driver’s license, such as a signature or seal, that

appears to cover a portion of a picture, as each layer contains a

portion of the entire image, such as the seal or signature. Individuals can also add images and text such as photographs or signatures to templates in order to customize them. To make a driver’s

license, for example, an individual would insert a scanned photograph and signature, and type in the correct name and address.

Then the individual would print the document and laminate it. Because templates are merely electronic code indicating the graphic

patterns of the desired document, one template can effectively be

used an infinite number of times, by an infinite number of individVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
16

33See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibits 4 and 5. Exhibits 4 and 5 show, respectively, a template for a Maine driver’s license without a photo in the photo layer, and a template for a Maine

driver’s license with a photo in the photo layer. 34 Hearing record at 2 (remarks of Senator Collins). 35 Id. at 20–21 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers); see also, e.g., Jeremy Martinez, New Identity

Kit (visited Dec. 10, 1999) http://www.newid.ultramailweb.com. 36See e.g., Brett Carreras, Fake ID.Net (visited May 12, 2000) http://www.fakeid.net.

uals, and can be transmitted easily via computer disk, or virtually

instantaneously over telephone lines via the Internet.

In the case of the older versions of the Maine driver’s license, for

example, both the State seal and the signature of the Secretary of

State overlap the picture of the license holder. This is a security

feature that helps prevent the physical alteration of an actual license by the simple expedient of replacing the original picture,

since such tampering would cover a portion of the seal and signature. A layered computer template allows a new picture to be inserted ‘‘under’’ the seal and signature so that it duplicates an official license. A simple ‘‘mouse click’’ in the program deletes the seal

and signature block. After the user inserts the desired picture, the

seal and signature block are simply reapplied as a layer above the

picture.33 In this manner, users are able to defeat many of the security features that authorities have put in place.

With sophisticated templates and printers available, it is within

the reach of a growing number of people to produce false identification and credentials. As Senator Collins noted in her opening statement at the Subcommittee hearing:

‘‘These counterfeit documents are relatively easy to manufacture. With only a modest understanding of the Internet

and $50 worth of supplies purchased from an arts and

crafts store, one can design authentic-looking identification

documents within a few hours or even minutes.’’ 34

Some websites offer other security features or devices that, when

added to a template, result in a more realistic identification document. Websites provide bar codes, or computer programs that generate a bar code, which may then be used as part of a counterfeit

driver’s license. Lieutenant Myers noted in his testimony at the

hearing that website operators are keeping pace with the security

features that States have been adding to their identification documents. ‘‘Things like bar codes and even two-dimensional bar codes

that some States are going to,’’ he noted, ‘‘are easily generated off

the Internet. There are several sites that assist you in generating

these security features.’’ 35 Other websites reproduce the seal or

flag used by States on their driver’s licenses.36

Other websites provide a computer program that enables the

user to generate a realistic driver’s license number. Many States

use special coding in their driver’s license numbers, allowing

verification of the license by matching the driver’s license number

with certain characteristics of the owner. For example, the first letter of the driver’s license number may correspond to the first letter

of the owner’s last name. Other digits may correspond to the month

and year of birth, sex, or eye color. These websites offer a program

17

37See e.g., Tim Catron, Fake ID Zone http:www.digitalhideout.com/idkit.html; Jeremy

Martinez, New Identity Kit http://internetwebhosting.com/newid/iddownload; Novelty Fake

ID Info CD (item 286156827) http://www.ebay.com. 38See e.g., Jeremy Martinez, New Identity Kit (visited Dec. 10, 1999) http://www.

newid.ultramailweb.com. 39See, e.g., Hearing record at Exhibit 31. 40 Hearing record, supra, at 13 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers). 41 Id. at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

that replicates a driver’s license number that corresponds to the

code of the State selected for a phony driver’s license.37

Other websites offer Social Security number generators or explain the method used by the Social Security Administration in

issuing actual Social Security numbers. This numerical coding, corresponding to the State and year of birth, provides another method

to verify the apparent identity of an individual. Such information,

when available and used by those manufacturing false identification documents, can be used to create a Social Security number

that appears to match a counterfeit identity.38

(2) False Identification Documents

(a) State Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards

The Subcommittee found that many websites offer to manufacture, or provide information that would allow the customer to manufacture, a document that would closely replicate the driver’s licenses of various States. Most such websites are illustrated by pictures of the products that they offer,39 usually images of State driver’s licenses. These images often include the picture of an individual or appear to be actual licenses, with either the picture or

name of the individual removed. In other instances, the images

shown are copied from samples appearing in a book published for

law enforcement and private sector businesses that describes the

features of State driver’s licenses and identification cards.

The Subcommittee’s investigation found that the quality of the

materials manufactured or offered by each website varied considerably. Some websites produced documents that closely replicated the

driver’s license of a State in graphic images, size, shape, format,

color, typeface, and placement of features such as State seals and

signatures, while others clearly bore little resemblance to the genuine article. Lieutenant Myers noted in his testimony that phony

identification documents are available via the Internet for all 50

U.S. States and many government agencies.40 Websites manufacturing high quality identification documents frequently attempt to

duplicate security features such as ‘‘ghost’’ pictures, holograms, and

bar codes or magnetic stripes. These security features are very valuable to manufacturers, as they contribute to the realistic look of

the counterfeit document.

As Lieutenant Myers testified at the hearing, these security features now pose little difficulty to counterfeiters:

‘‘Some of the features on the license * * * such as the what

we call a ghost image picture, those were very, very difficult to reproduce in years past due to the technology that

we had at that time. Now it is very simple.’’ 41

In fact, Lieutenant Myers added, ‘‘our [law enforcement] training

programs have to be updated virtually every month to come up

18

42 Id. at 21 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers). 43 Id. at 20 (remarks of Senator Collins). 44Trent Sands, Fake ID by Mail and Modem, at 23 (2000). 45 Hearing record, supra, at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers). 46 Chris Hibbert, What to do When They Ask for Your Social Security Number (Apr. 5, 1997)

http://www.faqs.org/ (Internet FAQ Consortium, Internet FAQ Archives, Usenet FAQs, Filename privacy/ssn-faq).

with new technologies that are being used.’’ 42 No longer are individuals who devote many hours of study and practice the only ones

able to reproduce these once effective security features. Senator

Collins observed during the hearing that

‘‘Many States, such as Connecticut, have added * * * security features * * * for example, one of the security features

is the shadow picture and the bar code. But my staff was

able to replicate that in a way that makes it virtually indistinguishable from a real Connecticut license.’’ 43

Some websites also offer documents that closely resemble a State

driver’s license, but are missing one or more security features.

Such documents are still quite effective for commercial activities

and also might be used to obtain other authentic documents, because only trained personnel are likely to notice the subtle differences. Trent Sands, author of the book, Fake ID by Mail and

Modem, advises his readers to capitalize on this lack of training:

‘‘Mail order documents can be used effectively in situations

where the ID cannot be verified by the person you are presenting it to. Consider the case of where an individual

wants to open a bank account * * *. The bank clerk will

accept the document without any problem if it looks

real.’’ 44

Moreover, there are a multitude of State identification cards in

circulation, employing a wide variety of security features. This is

a serious problem about which Lieutenant Myers testified at the

hearing, noting that

‘‘there are over 200 active State identification cards and

driver’s licenses due to the fact that most States have an

ID card and driver’s license and have valid older formats

also. So in order for a law enforcement person to be able

to recognize all these features in areas like Florida, where

we have a lot of out-of-State people, it is almost impossible

to have everyone at the expert status in order to identify

all these types of legal identification.’’ 45

(b) Other Identity Documents

Some websites actually offer to manufacture a counterfeit Social

Security card. The card issued by the Social Security Administration is not intended to be an identification document, and thus contains only an individual’s name and Social Security number. Older

Social Security cards feature no real security features, although recently issued cards are more resistant to forgery.46 The Subcommittee also found a wide range of other identity documents

available from websites, such as press credentials, a travel agent

19

47 Hearing record, supra, at 13 and 22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers). 48See generally, Breaches of Security at Federal Agencies and Airports: Hearings before the

Subcommittee on Crime, House Committee on The Judiciary, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 25,

2000). 49See U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports,

GAO/T–OSI–00–10 (May 25, 2000) (statement of Robert H. Hast) [hereinafter ‘‘Hast statement’’]. 50This investigation demonstrated such a serious security vulnerability that the Defense Department classified the previously-unclassified GAO report at the SECRET level in the wake

of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks upon New York City and Washington, D.C. For this

reason, it is not possible to provide any more details of the operation here. 51David Simcox, Secure Information: The Weak Link in Immigration Control (May 1989)

http://www.npg.org/forms/secure—id.htm (quoting Rev. Theodore Hesburgh). 52 Id.

card, a tax exempt card, a gun owner’s permit, and a resident activity coordinator certificate.

Even more alarming is the availability online of government

agency credentials. Lieutenant Myers noted that most law enforcement credentials are ‘‘much easier to copy and counterfeit than

driver’s licenses.’’ Unlike driver’s licenses, most law enforcement

credentials are ‘‘merely a picture stuck on a card and laminated.’’ 47

The Subcommittee learned that in general, law enforcement credentials frequently use fewer security features than do State driver’s licenses.

Several investigations have shown the ease with which such

technology can be used to gain unauthorized access to a variety of

sensitive areas. This problem was highlighted at a House Judiciary

Subcommittee hearing held on May 25, 2000,48 for example, which

detailed how investigators from the U.S. General Accounting Office

(GAO) Office of Special Investigations (OSI) used credentials they

had made using the method described above by Lieutenant Myers

to gain easy access to 19 secure Federal sites and 2 commercial airports.49 In a similar operation at certain sensitive Defense Department facilities in May 2001 commissioned by Senator Collins, GAO/

OSI investigators penetrated the sites using easily-obtainable false

identification—thus demonstrating their potentially catastrophic

vulnerability to unauthorized access by criminals or terrorists.50

GAO’s findings in these multiple penetration tests demonstrate

that, in addition to the lax security measures in place at Federal

facilities and airports, the Internet and computer technology allow

nearly anyone easily to create convincing identification cards and

credentials.

Various reviews of the security of identification documents have

long noted the problems caused by the variety of different identification documents used in the United States. Reverend Theodore

Hesburgh, past chairman of the Select Commission on Immigration

and Refuge Policy, once described the United States as a ‘‘document forgers’’ paradise.’’ 51 According to one 1989 estimate, basic

civil documents are issued by over 7,000 jurisdictions:

‘‘The lack of uniformity, uneven quality, and relaxed rules

of issuance of many of these documents guarantees widespread abuse. Falsified or stolen vital statistics records become ‘‘breeder documents’’ for a chain of false documents

that open the doors to highly prized entitlements—legal

resident status for illegal aliens, social security, food

stamps, unemployment compensation, and guaranteed student loans.’’ 52

20

53Sands, supra, at 5. 54 A breeder document is a document that can be used to obtain other valid forms of identification. 55 Hearing record, supra, at 18 (testimony of Thomas W. Seitz); see also id. at Exhibit 12

(Seitz’s fake birth certificate, W–2 form, and New Jersey identification card).

(c) ‘‘Breeder’’ Documents

The Subcommittee found various Internet sites that offer a variety of other types of identification documents or information that

could be used to create other false identification documents. Several websites offer to provide false birth certificates, for example,

which can be then completed to create a new identity or be used

for identity theft. Sands cautioned his readers in Fake ID by Mail

and Modem,

‘‘The smart use of a fake ID is as a stepping stone to a new

identity with REAL documents. It may be necessary to use

high quality fake ID in the interim to rent a mailing address or open a bank account, but the final goal should be

to dispense with the fake ID as soon as possible.’’ 53

Birth certificates, when accepted as authentic, can thus be what

are called ‘‘breeder’’ documents,54 allowing the individual who creates a false birth certificate to obtain authentic identification documents from an authorized government agency. In one case reviewed by the Subcommittee, which is explained in further detail

in Section III.B.(1), Thomas Seitz obtained a blank birth certificate

from a website, completed the birth certificate with the biographical information of another person, and used it to obtain a valid

identification card from the State of New Jersey. Seitz explained

his reasons at the Subcommittee hearing:

‘‘[T]he birth certificate is sort of the key. That is the preferred document of identity that most agencies, DMV and

other government agencies, like to see. That, coupled with

a second form, the W–2, enabled me to go to the New Jersey Department of Motor Vehicles and present those documents and they would, in turn give me the top document

there, which is a genuine photo identification card.’’ 55

The Subcommittee found a number of templates for documents

that are not typically issued by government organizations. These

supporting identification documents, while not as universally accepted as a driver’s license or birth certificate, allow individuals to

obtain other legitimate identification documents. For example, an

individual could use a false press pass or travel agent card to obtain a legitimate library card or account with a telephone company

bearing the desired false identification. With those cards and account information, or the names and addresses that appear on

bills, the individual could then obtain other more universally accepted forms of identification.

C. Marketing Practices

(1) Message Boards and Chat Rooms

Websites that offer false identification materials or documents

market their products in a variety of ways. Some appeal to those

seeking to change their identity. For example, the home page of

21

56See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 6 (Tim Catron, Fake ID Zone http://

www.digitalhideout.com/idkit.html). 57Forum alt.2600.fake-id http://www.deja.com/group/alt.2600.fake-id (post by ‘‘Cybersario’’ on Dec. 15, 1999). This individual presented him/herself as a Phonyid.com customer. 58See Domain Watch (visited Dec. 17, 1999) http://www.domainwatch.com (posting history

for jccamh@aol.com). 59Forum alt.2600.fake-id http://www.deja.com/group/alt.private.investigator (post by

‘‘Cybersario’’ on Aug. 25, 1999) 60Forum alt.2600.fake-id http://www.deja.com/group/alt.2600.fake-id (post by ‘‘Cybersario’’

on Nov. 30, 1999).

photoidcards.com offers customers the opportunity to ‘‘[d]isappear

completely and start a new life!’’ Some sites tout the ability of the

customer, using the materials supplied by the company, to create

a wide variety of false identification materials. The site

fakeidzone.com markets products to younger age groups, offering

not only driver’s licenses that would allow a juvenile to purchase

alcohol, but also college transcripts and college diplomas.56

Internet discussion boards are a free and easy means of advertising both products and websites. A posting to the newsgroup

‘‘alt.2600.fake-id’’ by an operator of phonyid.com, referring to himself as ‘‘Cybersario,’’ stated as follows:

‘‘Don’t get ripped off ordering from those scam sites on the

net, order from the company that has been selling online

since 1994. Phonyid.Com has been featured in everything

from High Times to ABC News. We supply the highest

quality ids and we are the only site which offers actual

State holograms. Before you purchase a fake id do a little

research and you will find that Phonyid.Com is the most

trustworthy supplier of fake ids on the net.’’ 57

The Subcommittee’s investigation indicated that the operators of

Phonyid.com posted as many as 600 messages on a variety of topics

on news group message boards.58 Messages posted on discussion

boards reach large numbers of people quickly at minimal or no cost

to the individual posting the message. Moreover, they target the

desired audience of people who are Internet and computer savvy,

and who may be interested in purchasing products online, or in

using computer files such as templates.

Most of the individuals posting comments on the discussion

boards sign their messages ‘‘anonymous’’ or make use of obvious

pseudonyms. This allows individuals who sell false identification

products to post messages purporting to be from their own ‘‘satisfied customers.’’ Again using the ‘‘Cybersario’’ pseudonym, for example, the operators of Phonyid.com posted a number of messages

in an attempt to assure potential buyers of their site’s authenticity.

In one instance, they posted a message saying ‘‘http//www/

phonyid.com. The ids cost about $200.00 but they are realistic.’’ 59

In another case, a posted message read:

‘‘Phonyid.com has really good ids. I use them when I need

to pick up something when I am carding....has worked

everytime [sic] so far. I think the price is high but what

i use them for it doesn’t really matter, i am getting rich

anyway.’’ 60

In a third instance, a message was posted saying:

22

61 Id. (Post by ‘‘Cybersario’’ on Jan. 5, 2000). 62Fakeidman’s Discussion Forum http://network54.com/Hide?Forum (re-post entitled ‘‘You

were not scammed, THEY WERE BUSTED!!,’’ posted on Apr. 3, 2000). 63Loren Marceau, Home Page (visited Dec. 12, 2000) http://www.photoidcards.com. 64Loren Marceau, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Feb. 4, 2000)

www.photoidcards.com/faq.html.

‘‘This site has the best id cards. Just got my id with

hologram and it is the [deleted]. Cards only $150.00 but

the hologram makes it worth it. I back these guys

100%.’’ 61

Using similar tactics, an individual styling himself ‘‘IMO’’ posted

comments about several of the websites that had recently closed,

again, possibly in an effort to boost the legitimacy of the sites:

‘‘Perhaps you people are unaware but all the major id sites

have had their offices raid [sic] within the past few

months. I would hold off on ordering for a little while, because the site you order from might be the next one busted. It started with Noveltyid4u.com, they got busted about

21⁄2 months ago when the secret service raided them for

making false government documents. Phonyid.com got

busted about 2 months ago for making counterfeit driver’s

licenses and passports.’’ 62

The Subcommittee believes that the individual or group of individuals responsible for the above series of postings are the operators

of the website. Furthermore, the Subcommittee placed orders with

two websites, American Photo Company and Noveltyid4u.com, that

the Subcommittee now believes were operated by a small group of

individuals and may have been wholly fraudulent. The Subcommittee never received any product in return for the $283 it sent

these two websites, nor, it suspects, did many other of these sites’

would-be customers.

(2) Deceptive Practices

Website operators frequently use deceptive advertising to entice

potential customers. Some make claims about the credentials of

their employees, while others tout features of their cards that are

likely to be untrue. Experience at a State department of motor vehicles (DMV) is one of the main lures the website operators employ.

For example, photoidcards.com, a company based in Canada,

claims that ‘‘all id cards are professionally designed by an ex-DMV

staff,’’ and that photoidcards.com has ‘‘25 years of experience working with DMV offices worldwide.’’ 63 In fact, photoidcards.com includes commentary from the aforementioned alleged ‘‘former DMV’’

employee, who says of the photoidcards.com products that ‘‘the finish and design of virtually every aspect is outstanding.’’ 64 Website

operators tout the services of ‘‘former DMV’’ staff to attract customers, since many of the security features of State issued driver’s

licenses and the methods of making them are known only to DMV

employees.

Website operators also claim that their products have certain

hard-to-duplicate security features that are in high demand and

lend authenticity to the counterfeit documents. For example, many

websites boast that their fraudulent identification documents bear

23

65See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 30 (Josh Dansereau, Home Page (visited Jan. 3, 2000)

http://www.freehosting2.at.webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/gallery.htm). 66 Josh Dansereau, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Jan. 27, 2000) http://

www.freehosting2.at.webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/faqhelp.htm. 67Welcome to Idnow.com (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.idnow.com/faq.html. 68See Hearing record, Exhibit 31. 69 Jeremy Martinez, New Identity Kit (visited Jan. 20, 2000) www.vsub.com/newid./htm.

Martinez ultimately was shut down by the authorities. 70 Id.

holograms, working magnetic strips, and markings that appear

under ultra violet light. Josh Dansereau of Fakeids.org, for example, promoted his products by stating on his home page that ‘‘all

id’s are digital id cards* with working mag stripes that really

scan.’’ 65 In his ‘‘Frequently Asked Questions’’ section, however,

Dansereau admitted that the magnetic strips are not functional:

‘‘Do you have the credit card type of id with the magnetic stripe

on the back? Yes, our ID’s are the credit card style. The magnetic

stripe on the back is for looks only, it does not really scan, it just

makes the id more realistic.’’ 66 Many States now encode a magnetic strip on the back of their driver’s licenses with an individual’s

biographical information. This is of only limited utility, however, as

most bars, banks and retail stores do not possess the equipment to

test the authenticity of the magnetic strip on an identification

card—and thus to tell a false identification with a non-functional

strip from a real one.

Another prized security feature is the hologram. IDnow.com, for

example, states that ‘‘the holograms we use are DMV issued meaning they will match exactly with an original ID.’’ 67 Theidshop.com

notes in the description of its PVC plastic identification documents:

‘‘The ID Shop is proud to be the first ID website to ever

offer PVC plastic holographic ID’s. These ID’s are the highest quality novelty ID’s money can buy. They also come

with many added security options such as holograms.’’ 68

The difficult nature of obtaining realistic holograms is demonstrated by the high volume of postings on message boards concerning holograms. Most of these postings focus upon how to craft

them or obtain them. Moreover, instructions on how to make a

hologram are also frequently included on the identification kits

that are marketed by many websites. (These instructions offer advice on what sort of reflective gold paint to buy, and how to craft

stencils. Some suggest using gold eye shadow.)

Another deceptive marketing technique frequently employed by

false identification website operators is to urge potential customers

to order before the website is closed down by authorities—thus

building market appeal upon the suggestion that the documents

provided are so realistic that the site is operating illegally. In the

advertising copy designed to promote his ‘‘New Identity Kit,’’ for example, Jeremy Martinez stated that ‘‘We are revealing the secrets

that they don’t want you to know. Order now, before we are shut

down by authorities.’’ 69 Martinez offered products titled, ‘‘99 Ways

to Disappear,’’ and ‘‘Better Ways to Disappear.’’ 70 Promaster

Cards, a website based in the United Kingdom, similarly boasts

about the illegality of its products, noting that ‘‘we continue to be

a major headache to several DMV and Law Enforcement Agencies

24

71Promaster Cards (visited Dec. 20, 1999) http://members.xoom.it/—XOOM/driverid/

page2.html. 72 Id. 73See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 13 (About Promastercard (visited Dec. 20, 1999) http:/

/members.xooPromasm.it/—XOOM/driverid/index.html). 74On bestfakeids.com/splash/splash.html, Tim Beachum also used the ploy that the product price will soon rise: ‘‘The street price on our novelty fake id kit is $99.00, we sell the same

kit online at a discount price of $39.97. If you order our kit before midnight [of a specific date]

you only pay $29.97.’’ The end-of-sale date changes automatically every day so that no matter

when a would-be customer sees the site, the promotion will always appear to be nearly over. 75 Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 17 (Martinez questionnaire response, at 3 (Mar. 30,

2000)). See Federal Trade Commission v. Jeremy Martinez, individually and d/b/a Info World,

Case No. 00–12701, Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief (U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Dec. 5, 2000); ‘‘Fake Ids’’ City News Service (May 18, 2001). Martinez’s

use of keywords, or ‘‘meta tags’’ to lure in potential customers did not go unnoticed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In December 2000, the FTC filed a complaint in the U.S. District

Court for the Central District of California alleging that Martinez deliberately marketed his

website to consumers who were searching the Internet to find false identification documents.

The complaint noted Martinez’s use of such meta-tags as ‘‘illegal id,’’ ‘‘fake id fraud,’’ and ‘‘forging documents.

Pursuant to a May 2001 agreement approved by U.S. District Judge Christina A. Snyder to

settle the FTC lawsuit, Martinez will pay $20,000. He also agreed permanently to shut down

his website, which sold 45 days of access to fake ID templates for $29.99, and contained ‘‘high

quality’’ templates for the creation of fake California, Georgia, Florida, Maine, Nevada, New

Hampshire, New Jersey, Utah, Wisconsin, and New York driver’s licenses. (Martinez’s website

also contained a birth certificate template, programs to generate bar codes—required in some

States to authenticate driver’s licenses—and a program to falsify Social Security numbers.) 76Subcommittee deposition of Timothy Beachum, at 11 (Apr. 5, 2000) (‘‘Beachum deposition’’).

from around the world.’’ 71 Promaster Cards also states that ‘‘we

have been shut down several times by the FBI and Treasury Department under various forgery acts of US law.’’ 72 Finally, the

website boldly adds,

‘‘We are openly admitting that we are breaking State, Federal and several European law [sic] by providing ID that

are exact replicas in every detail of the current IDs provided from the countries in our list.’’ 73

Statements of this type are obviously designed to entice people into

buying products that appear so real that they are outlawed.74 This,

they clearly feel, is precisely what their customers seek.

(3) Search Engine Placement and Keywords

Many websites operators rely on the skillful use of keywords to

place their websites high on search engine results lists. High

search engine placement results in more visitors and, therefore,

more customers. In his written response to a Subcommittee questionnaire, Jeremy Martinez explained the importance of using keywords effectively:

‘‘Since I am good at web promotion in the search engines,

I am able to obtain prime spots in search engines, whereby

surfers find me first and purchase from me instead of

downloading [templates], from the free sites.’’ 75

Tim Beachum, operator of bestfakeids.com, reinforced this point

during his Subcommittee deposition, noting that keywords affect

‘‘relevancy and a search engine ranking.’’ 76 When asked which keywords he uses to market his site, Beachum suggested that he had

found the words ‘‘Novelty Ids, Ids, Ids spelled with different cases,

apostrophe-S, without the apostrophe-S, noveltyfakeIDs as one

word, hyphenated, press pass’’ to be high-return keywords.

25

77 Id. at 141. 78 Josh Dansereau, Gallery (visited Nov. 9, 1999) http://www.fakeid1.com/gallery.htm.

Dansereau also used the keywords ‘‘False, Forging and Illegal’’ to advertise his website. 79 Brett Carreras, fakeid.net (visited Dec. 21, 1999) www.fakeid.net/free.html. The keywords ‘‘forge’’ (or variants) and ‘‘phony’’ (or variants) are each used twice. 80See Extreme Digital (visited Jan. 24, 2000) http://www.eXTRemeTracking. Extreme

Tracking is a service offered by Extreme Digital that tracks visitor traffic to a client’s website.

The information gathered includes the numbers of visitors, geographical and domain information about the visitors, and the keywords visitors used in a search engine to find the client’s

website. Catron made these records public in an attempt to demonstrate the profitability of his

website to potential buyers in connection with his effort to sell the site through an online auction. 81 Id. 82See Tim Beachum, Best Fake ID’s (visited Mar. 13, 2000) http://www.bestfakeids.com.

Beachum acknowledged under cross-examination that he also used

the simple keyword ‘‘fake IDs.’’ 77

In fact, the Subcommittee examined the key words that several

of the website operators used, and discovered that the use of the

word ‘‘fake’’ and its variants appeared much more frequently than

the word ‘‘novelty,’’ despite the website operators’ claims that their

products were solely for ‘‘novelty,’’ ‘‘entertainment,’’ or ‘‘educational’’ purposes. Dansereau, for example, used approximately 22

keywords or phrases to advertise his website. The word ‘‘fake’’ (or

a variant such as ‘‘false’’) appeared 12 times. Dansereau, in fact,

did not use the word ‘‘novelty’’ to advertise his website at all.78

Similarly, Brett Carreras, operator of fakeid.net, used approximately 37 keywords to market his website. The keyword ‘‘fake’’ or

its variants appear 9 times in Carreras’ usage, and the word ‘‘novelty’’ appears only twice.79

Tim Catron, the operator of fakeidzone.com, illustrated the effectiveness of keywords such as ‘‘fake’’ by making the results of his

eXTReMe Tracking service available to the public.80 While nearly

36 percent of the visitors to Catron’s website used the keyword

‘‘fake’’ when searching for false identification on the Internet, less

than two-tenths of one percent used the keyword ‘‘novelty.’’ 81 Despite the fact that the advertising copy on these websites may contain the word ‘‘novelty,’’ the websites clearly target those customers

who are in search of authentic-looking false identification documents.

D. Disclaimers Have Little or No Legal Impact

(1) Claims of Novelty

Websites offering to produce false identification documents occasionally post disclaimers stating that the documents they sell are

for ‘‘novelty’’ use only and should not be used for illegal purposes.

Companies providing templates also frequently require users of

their products to ‘‘agree’’ that they will not use the materials for

illegal purposes. Sites may also require those accessing the information to waive liability against the company for any illegal acts,

and to state that the individual using the site is not a law enforcement officer and will not use the material offered on the site as evidence for any charge of violating Federal, State, or local laws. One

website providing templates seeks to avoid liability by asserting

that the consumer is the one who actually produces the fraudulent

document.82

26

83 Jeremy Martinez, New Identity Kit (visited Jan. 20, 2000) www.vsub.com/newid./a.htm. 84 Beachum deposition, Exhibit 15. 85 Id. at 30. 86 Id. at 74. 87 Robert Sek, TheIDShop.com (visited Dec. 21, 1999) http://www.theidshop.com. 88Subcommittee staff interview with Thana Barlee in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 23, 2000) (hereinafter ‘‘Barlee interview’’).

Many websites purport to sell ‘‘novelty’’ or ‘‘fun’’ products despite

marketing that undermines their claims. For example, Martinez offered a ‘‘New Identity Kit’’ that contains ‘‘[e]verything you need to

create a new identity for fun!!’’ yet he encouraged Internet users

to order ‘‘before we are shut down by the authorities.’’ 83 On his

website, Bestfakeids.com, Beachum continually referred to his product as a ‘‘Novelty fake id kit,’’ but adds as a selling point: ‘‘Get a

job as a Resident Activity Coordinator Guaranteed—good jobs are

so hard to find and the system doesn’t make it any easier.’’ 84 In

his Subcommittee deposition, Beachum noted that it was not his

intention that customers use the certificate to get a job. He claimed

that although ‘‘the whole site is a joke,’’ 85 he wanted his customers

to think that the certificate ‘‘looked like the real thing.’’ 86 Contradictory statements such as these undermine the website operators’ contentions that they do not intend their products to be usable

as authentic identification documents and clearly suggest that they

wish to give regulators (and the Subcommittee) a rather different

impression than would-be customers. Another example is Robert

Sek, who operated ‘‘Theidshop,’’ a producer of high-quality false

identification documents ‘‘with many added security options such

as holograms.’’ Sek frequently referred to his products as ‘‘novelty

Ids.’’ However, he also stated that ‘‘Theidshop’’ was no longer accepting or processing orders from the State of Florida because of

the statewide false identification program there.87

(2) Disclaimers Do Not Discourage Sales

Obviously, the disclaimers on these websites do nothing to prevent illegal use. Many websites have an initial page that states

that users must read the disclaimer in its entirety and agree to its

terms before entering the site. Frequently, however, very little of

the fine print disclaimer is visible without extensive screen

‘‘scrolling,’’ and nothing prevents users from simply hitting the

‘‘agree’’ button and proceeding directly to the main website pages

without reading the disclaimer at all—although this is not uncommon with on-line software licensing and use agreements.

Many Internet users are conditioned to accept or agree to posted

disclaimers without reading them, and may believe that disclaimers are of minimal importance. For example, university student Thana Barlee, who was arrested for making false identification documents for university classmates, noted in an interview

with the Subcommittee that when he originally began searching

the Internet for materials to use, he routinely ignored the disclaimers he read on the various false identification websites. Barlee

added that he would see the disclaimers first, and then move to the

main pages. Barlee told the Subcommittee that he was aware of

the penalties associated with creating false identification but that,

when he was making the documents, he paid no heed to them.88

Seitz also recalled spotting a small disclaimer, and testified that

27

89 Hearing record, supra, at 16 (testimony of Thomas Seitz). 90 Rustheriddler, Temps (visited Dec. 1, 2000) http://hammer.prohosting.com/idtemps/. 91Tim Beachum, Activity Coordinator Training Project (visited Jan. 6, 2000) http://www.

Bestfakeids.com. 92Tim Beachum, Best Fake ID’s (visited Mar. 13, 2000) http://www.bestfakeids.com.

‘‘I frequently came across disclaimers on the individual

sites stating, ‘For novelty use only.’ I cannot think of any

reason why a statement like that would be there. It did

not deter my actions in any way.’’ 89

Not only do website visitors attach little importance to the disclaimers, but some websites openly mock the disclaimers. The following is a disclaimer on the drink.to/idtemps website, operated by

an individual identified as ‘‘Rustheriddler’’:

‘‘All information or files found on this site are for informational, entertainment, or educational purposes only. What

you do with it is your responsibility and only yours, no one

else! If you are a government employee or have anything

to do with the government or law or anything at all, then

you can’t enter this site. You must be at least 3945 years

old and may not be either male, female, or both. If you

have purple skin, red hair with pink stripes, and wear

pink leather pants made from whale skin then you may

enter.’’ 90

Some operators reacted to Subcommittee scrutiny by quickly providing additional disclaimers. Until the Subcommittee contacted

Beachum, for example, his website contained only the briefest of

disclaimers:

‘‘Because our novelty fake id kit is distributed in a digital

format we do not of [sic] refunds. Our kit is sold as is. All

images found on this site is [sic] copyrighted, and can not

be used by any other web site without the written consent

of Best Fake ID’s.’’ 91

After he first spoke with Subcommittee staff, however, Beachum

quickly expanded his disclaimer to note that

‘‘[t]he information contained in this website is strictly for

academic use alone. BEST FAKE ID’s will bear no responsibility for any use otherwise. All information on this web

site is for entertainment and educational purposes only.’’ 92

The Subcommittee found that both the website operators and the

users attach very little importance to these disclaimers—unless,

that is, they realize their activities are being studied by authorities.

(3) Operators Use Disclaimers as a Shield

Some website operators try to protect themselves from any sort

of liability by using disclaimers on the materials they produce. Robert Sek, for example, shipped his false identification documents in

a laminated and sealed pouch printed with the words ‘‘not a government document’’ in red ink on both sides. The document could

be removed intact from this pouch easily and quickly. Sek’s false

identification cards also included a fine print disclaimer stating

that the card was intended for novelty purposes only and that the

28

93 Hearing record, supra, at 23 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers). 94 18 U.S.C. § 1738 (a)(1)–(2). 95 Id. at § 1738(b). 96See id. at § 1738(a). 97 Hearing record, supra, at 19 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).

card is in no way affiliated or associated with any government entity—but this was printed in a nearly unreadable approximately 2-

point font, and placed it in such a way as to resemble the

boilerplate explanation of restrictions found on the backs of many

genuine ID cards. Moreover, in some cases, the disclaimer may be

present, yet remain undetected. As Lieutenant Myers testified at

the hearing:

‘‘The word ‘novelty’ we find on a large percentage of identification cards that come off the Internet. It may be printed

so small that you need a magnifying glass to read it, or it

may be just part of the disclaimer that comes across. I

know of no lawful purpose for someone to use a supposed

novelty ID, and in hundreds and hundreds of cases that

we have investigated, we find that the word ‘novelty’ is

right on the license somewhere. It is just no one can take

the time or has the ability to even detect it.’’ 93

Clearly, these types of illegible or easily removable disclaimers

violate the terms set out in § 1738. As explained in Section I.(D) of

this report, Federal law defines, for practical purposes, what a novelty identification card must look like. Under § 1738, any identification document bearing a birth date or age must ‘‘carry diagonally

printed clearly and indelibly on both the front and back ‘NOT A

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT’ in capital letters in not less than

12-point type.’’ 94 The term ‘‘identification document’’ is defined as

‘‘a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals and which is not issued by or under the authority of a government.’’ 95 The statute provides for imposition of

a penalty of up to 1 year’s imprisonment for transporting in interstate or foreign commerce identification documents that do not

meet these statutory requirements.96 Because it was apparent that

technology allowed some individuals to skirt this law, § 1738 was

repealed by the Internet False Identification Act of 2000. Criminals

can no longer hide behind the shield of such disclaimers.

Virtually all of the identification documents that the Subcommittee examined over the course of its investigation did not satisfy the above definition of novelty identification under Federal

law. Accordingly, the unilateral efforts of the distributors of such

products to characterize them as ‘‘novelty’’ identification in order to

shield themselves from criminal liability are likely to be ineffective

as a legal defense. Seitz, who used false identification documents

to commit a crime, agreed that website operators post disclaimers

merely in an attempt to protect themselves and mask their true intentions:

‘‘They are pretty much trying to cover themselves, in my

opinion, because they do not necessarily go out of their

way to say, go use this for an illegal purpose, but [by posting] the disclaimer, they are probably, in my opinion, trying to cover themselves. It does not discourage anyone.’’ 97

29

98See e.g., Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 23 (Coolcards—Postcards from the Net (visited

Nov. 29, 2000) http://www.coolcards.com). 99See e.g., Hearing record, Exhibit 3 (Idsolution.com (visited Jan. 4, 2000) http://www.

idsolution.com). 100See e.g., Hearing record, Exhibit 27 (FakeID.NetDiscussion Board http://www.

carreras.net/discus (post by ‘‘Webhost’’ on Oct. 13, 1999). 101Tim Beachum, Best Fake ID’s (visited Mar. 13, 2000) http://www.bestfakeids.com.

To be sure, there are true novelty identification sites on the

Internet.98 The Subcommittee’s investigation, however, did not

focus upon such sites because of their obviously novelty nature. For

example, a ‘‘Super Secret Agent’’ card or a ‘‘Backseat Driver’s License’’ is unlikely to assist anyone in committing bank fraud. The

products that these sites offer bear little, if any, resemblance to the

bona fide documents on which they are based. The sites that the

Subcommittee targeted, by contrast, promote their products as

being virtual, if not exact, replicas of bona fide identification documents.

It is also worth noting that some false identification websites do

not carry any disclaimers whatsoever.99 The Subcommittee examined a number of such sites, but could not gain much information

about the operators because, in large part, they appear to be located abroad. (As a result, the Subcommittee was unable to compel

their compliance with a subpoena.) Other sites operating without

disclaimers use anonymous e-mail and free web hosting services,

which do not verify their customers’ contact information. Many persons using such services submit false contact information, making

it—as intended—more difficult to track down the true operators behind such websites. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that some false

identification sites made no effort to shield themselves from scrutiny by a false claim of novelty. (The fact that many such websites

appeared to be located overseas also illustrates the wisdom of repealing § 1738, which clearly seems to have functioned principally

to provide United States-based false identification sites with a patina of legality through the use of ostensible ‘‘novelty’’ disclaimers.)

(4) Legal Challenges to Disclaimers

Several Internet discussion boards that the Subcommittee reviewed included messages on ‘‘novelty’’ identification.100 The Subcommittee found that assertions of ‘‘novelty’’ with regard to the

type of websites the Subcommittee investigated are often understood to be thinly veiled attempts to hide the sites’ true illicit nature. Clearly, the marketing of these websites is very much at odds

with the disclaimers that they post. Tim Beachum’s site was a

prime example. Prior to the time the Subcommittee contacted

Beachum, he had only a single disclaimer posted in fine print on

his website. This disclaimer stood in stark contrast to his more

general claim that, by purchasing his products, customers could

‘‘create fake ids so real that you could fool your own mother.’’ 101

As noted above, it was only after the Subcommittee had contacted

Beachum that he added a clearly worded and prominently displayed disclaimer. Nevertheless, even such prominent disclaimers

would not insulate Beachum from liability even before the repeal

of § 1738, because the birth certificate and driver’s licenses that he

30

102See Josh Dansereau, Fake Id One http://wwwfakeidl.com. 103See Robert Sek, The ID Shop http://www.theidshop.com.

offered do not bear disclaimers within the parameters of the statute.

Law enforcement has investigated and prosecuted website operators who rely on these disclaimers. For example, State and Federal

law enforcement officials have investigated at least two operators

of Internet websites—Josh Dansereau 102 and Robert Sek 103—despite lengthy and prominently displayed disclaimers on their sites

and the presence of at least notional disclaimers on Sek’s product

and on the plastic pouches in which it was delivered. The U.S. Secret Service’s investigation of Sek, which was conducted jointly

with the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, resulted in the

execution of search warrants at Sek’s Austin residence on March

10, 2000. Dansereau was sentenced to a term of probation after

pleading guilty to violating a Florida statute criminalizing the distribution of false identification documents.

Two of the website operators that the Subcommittee examined

closely, Carreras and Catron, invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for refusing to answer

any deposition or interrogatory questions. Both of these witnesses

posted disclaimers on their websites similar to those Beachum utilized.

All in all, the Subcommittee considers the posting of these disclaimers to be a disingenuous and ineffective effort to conceal the

true purpose of such websites—namely, to distribute false identification documents by taking advantage of the speed, relative anonymity, and enormous client base the Internet offers.

E. Role of the Internet

(1) The Internet Allows Instantaneous and Anonymous Sales

and Transfers of False Identification

Before the use of the Internet for commerce, businesses were

largely limited to customers who could contact them (or whom they

could contact) in person, by telephone, or through the mail. This

placed some practical limits upon the size of one’s customer base

and imposed some largely unavoidable capital investment requirements. The Internet, however, makes geographic boundaries and

overhead costs largely insignificant. Particularly in conjunction

with credit-card-based payment systems, a customer in a remote location in one part of the world may now purchase materials from

a business in a remote location in another part of the world, provided that both parties have access to the Internet. Indeed, the customer may not necessarily ever even know where the business is

located, or anything more about it than the address of its website

and whatever information happens to have been posted there. (As

the Subcommittee also found in trying to track down the operators

of false identification websites, the Internet provides powerful

means by which to hide information about site operators.)

Unfortunately, these developments have proven to be a great

boon for the false identification business. When the product purchased over the Internet consists only of computer files such as a

false identification template, for example, it can be delivered alVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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104 Hearing record, supra, at 26 (testimony of Director Stafford). 105 Id. at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers). 106 Id. at 18 (testimony of Thomas Seitz). 107Sands, supra, at 1. 108 Jeremy Martinez, Homepage (visited Jan. 5, 2000) newid.ultramailweb.com.

most instantaneously, increasing the advantages of such transactions as compared to traditional methods of marketing and distribution. According to U.S. Secret Service Director Brian Stafford:

‘‘Most of the false identifications either come from * * * the

template on the Internet or they actually come from true

identities that are scanned and then desktop publishing is

utilized and it is ultimately placed on the Internet, where,

as you know, a button can be pushed and it can be sent

anywhere in the world.’’ 104

Moreover, the quality of the product is not affected by this transmission. As Lieutenant Myers testified at the hearing, ‘‘The graphics that can be produced on the computer, they can be electronically transmitted to anyone in the world in that same quality.’’ 105

(Use of such readily-obtainable templates, of course, is decidedly

superior to traditional false-identification techniques, which may

have involved such crude expedients as using a razor blade or

other instrument to alter identification documents individually.)

For businesses promoting false identification materials, and for

customers seeking such products, the Internet also allows an almost instantaneous transaction. An individual who uses the Internet can locate and produce the desired false identification document in an amazingly short period of time. Thomas Seitz testified

during the hearing that he found the templates and created the

fraudulent birth certificates that he utilized in ‘‘a matter of minutes.’’ 106

Using the Internet thus enables operators to keep their costs and

risks at a minimum, while offering a product of consistently high

quality with unprecedented rapidity and efficiency. All in all, this

has proven to be a business bonanza. In fact, Trent Sands wrote

in Fake ID by Mail and Modem that:

The Internet has breathed new life into the world of false

identification. Many new companies are springing up to

meet the needs of those who want documentation saying

they are someone else. * * * The robust health of the mailorder and Internet identification business is in stark contrast to the situation of just a few years ago.107

Websites selling ‘‘memberships’’ or access to password protected

information may acquire customers who purchase continuing memberships using credit cards that are billed monthly by a third party

with the understanding that the website operator will provide new

information or additional services through the website. One

Website offering access only to ‘‘members’’ promised, ‘‘More Updates Coming Soon! More being added all the time!’’ 108 Such upto-date information can be useful in circumstances where a State

modifies the design of or adds security features to a driver’s license.

Elimination of the distance barriers for transactions involving

false identification materials presents new challenges for law enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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109 ‘‘Foil the Hackers? A Security Maven Discusses the Impossible,’’ Business Week (Mar. 6,

2000), at 32F–32J (interview of Bruce Schneider, Chief Technology Officer, Counterpane Internet Security Inc., San Jose, California). 110 U.S. Department of Justice’s, Report of the President’s Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, at 20 (Mar. 9, 2000). 111 Internet Crimes Affecting Consumers: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Technology,

Terrorism and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 105th Congress, 1st

Session (Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice).

forcement. Bruce Schneider, Chief Technology Officer at Counterpane Internet Security, observed, ‘‘The Net changes the nature of

crime. * * * This is the death of distance: Crime is no longer based

on proximity.’’ 109 Law enforcement agencies in the United States

face particular jurisdictional and other obstacles when criminal activity based in another country affects United States citizens. The

Internet compounds these problems because of its ability to promote commerce and communication between distant locations, combined with the ability to conceal users’ identities.

A report of the President’s Working Group on Unlawful Conduct

on the Internet described the jurisdictional problems facing law enforcement agencies seeking to investigate crimes committed using

the Internet:

‘‘The challenge to law enforcement is identifying that location [of a computer] and deciding which laws apply to what

conduct. The question is how sovereign nations can meaningfully enforce national laws and procedures on a global

Internet. Inconsistent substantive criminal laws are only

part of the problem, for investigative techniques are also

controlled by national (or local) law. For example, law enforcement agencies must consider such issues as transborder execution of search warrants.’’ 110

Concealment of one’s identity provides those engaging in criminal activities another tool to avoid detection by law enforcement. In

a statement delivered to the Senate Judiciary Committee, a Justice

Department official noted that a

‘‘fundamental issue facing law enforcement involves proving a criminal’s identity in a networked environment. In

all crimes—including cybercrimes—we must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but global networks lack effective identification mechanisms. Indeed, individuals on the Internet can be anonymous, and even

those individuals who identify themselves can adopt false

identities by providing inaccurate biographical information

and misleading screen names. Even if a criminal does not

intentionally use anonymity as a shield, it is easy to see

how difficult it could be for law enforcement to prove who

was actually sitting at the keyboard and committing the illegal act. This is particularly true because identifiable

physical attributes such as fingerprints, voices, or faces

are absent from cyberspace, and there are few mechanisms

for proving identity in an electronic environment.’’ 111

33

112 Network Solutions, Registration of idsolution.com (visited Dec. 12, 1999) http://

www.networksolutions.com. 113See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 13. 114 Xoom is owned by NBCi.com. Promaster Cards actually uses an Italian subsidiary of Xoom.

See http://members.xoom.it/—XOOM/driverid/index.html. 115 Hearing record, supra, at 22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

(2) Website Operators Disguise Their Names and Locations

The Subcommittee found that several websites use a variety of

tactics to make it difficult for law enforcement to discover their

identities. Most websites on the Internet use simple addresses,

such as yahoo.com, that allow companies to be easily identified

through Network Solutions, the company responsible for registering most commercial websites in the United States. Domain

names are usually accompanied by registration information that is

publically available. This information normally contains the name

of the company or individuals registering the website, their address, telephone number, and e-mail address.

Some operators of websites that offer false identification materials cloak their identities by providing false or erroneous information when their domain name is registered. For example, one

website offering false identification materials registered its domain

name listing a fictitious address and telephone number in Mexico.112 Other sites operate using free server space from a web host,

usually placing advertisements on the screens of users of such

pages. For example, one website offering false identification material, Promaster Cards,113 uses a web hosting service called

Xoom,114 which prevents public identification of the company or

persons responsible for the site through Network Solutions. Such

actions make it more difficult for law enforcement to contact such

companies about their activities and, if the operations are run from

foreign countries, render apprehension even more difficult.

Companies or individuals may also use a series of different web

hosts and e-mail addresses to remain hidden from detection, akin

to moving the location of a business every few weeks. This practice

would be impossible for conventional businesses with physical locations because the cost would be prohibitive. It is simple to accomplish, however, on the Internet. Lieutenant Myers testified that on

many occasions he has shut down a website, only to find the same

site reappear at a new web address: ‘‘these people will be right

back, and we have found in many cases that we have even arrested

people for [violations of false identification statutes], then we find

them back on the Internet.’’ 115

Websites offering false identification materials also frequently

use post office boxes or the address of a commercial mail-receiving

agency to receive mail. Such addresses can be established using

intermediaries, thus masking the identity as well as the location of

the actual operator of the business. In addition, such addresses can

be quickly changed, and the address change can be made on the

web page in a matter of minutes, allowing website operators to

avoid detection by law enforcement. This method of preserving anonymity works for customers as well. Trent Sands, in his book on

false identification, advises his readers to ‘‘[a]lways use a mail-receiving service to order any document from a false ID vendor.

Never use your real name when ordering documents. Always pay

34

116Sands, supra, at 8 (emphasis in original). 117 Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 25 (FakeIDNet Message Board http://

www.carreras.net/discus (post by ‘‘Risingson’’ on Oct. 13, 1999)) (original punctuation and

spelling preserved). 118For example, the web page of fakeid.net has no company name, address, or phone number. See FakeID.Net http://www.fakeid.net. 119 Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 25.

by money order.’’ He suggests that this safeguard will help protect

the customer from law enforcement crackdowns on false identification manufacturers—which may lead to authorities’ acquisition of

the names of and contact information for illegal manufacturers’ customers.116

Many operators of websites offering false identification materials

use e-mail accounts that can be obtained anonymously, and thus

hinder easy identification of the operator. An individual may obtain

a virtually unlimited number of e-mail accounts from sources that

are free, and may avoid detection by frequently changing e-mail accounts.

Persons using the Internet to distribute false identification documents often use computer technology and features unique to the

Internet to protect their anonymity and avoid law enforcement. For

instance, one individual posted a message on the discussion board

at fakeid.net, advising those who manufacture counterfeit documents how to avoid detection:

‘‘Never work at home, if possible and you have the means,

never work in your own State or sell to people in your own

State. Keep moving. Work out of hotels, your car or an

Apartment in another name. (Laptops essential) Encrypt.

They don’t really need hard evidence, but you damn sure

don’t need to give them any.Keep nothing on hard drives

and clean your free space often. * * * Keep business dealings separate. Ten people don’t need to know you and each

other. You should be known as a different name to each

person. Have a new ID (a real one) on standby. Don’t use

it for [deleted] until you need it. Mandatory.Self explanatory. When you get out of jail you are now a convicted

felon, life is now a [deleted].’’ 117

As the Subcommittee has found with other Internet-related investigations, anonymity is a key element for many of the operators

of websites conducting illegal activities. During this investigation,

the Subcommittee found websites offering false identification documents that never stated the company’s name, address, or telephone

number.118 Some operators of websites request customers to communicate only by e-mail 119 or require a purchase to be made by

credit card over the Internet. Some companies intentionally locate

outside of the United States or use mailing addresses in Canada

or an overseas location in order to insulate themselves from investigation by law enforcement agencies in the United States. The web

page of one company, Promaster Cards, stated as follows:

‘‘Already we have been shut down several times by the FBI

and Treasury Department under various forgery acts of

US law. * * * We have now moved our web site to the UK

but continue to process orders for our clients from around

the world from our studios in the New York area. In the

35

120 Id. at Exhibit 13. 121 Id. at 4 (remarks of Senator Carl Levin). 122 Hearing record, supra, at 26 (testimony of Director Stafford).

next few months we expect to be shut down again but we

will bound back as always from another part of the net.

Hopefully in the UK they will take a little bit longer to

catch on.’’ 120

F. Websites Offering False Identification Materials Facilitate

Other Crimes

While it is a crime in and of itself to manufacture and sell a

counterfeit identification document, false identification documents

can also be used to further engage in other illegal activities. Indeed, this is presumably the principal source of demand for such

documents. When the Subcommittee commenced its investigation

into the increasing availability of false identification and credentials over the Internet, it aimed to curb the use of false identification principally because of the host of other crimes ranging from

underage drinking to credit card and bank fraud to identity theft

that are facilitated by false identification. Senator Levin noted in

his opening statement, for example, that false identification documents are:

‘‘often now being used to carry out improper or criminal

activities—to obtain fraudulent loans, to evade taxes, to

establish a new identity, to steal another individual’s identity, to defraud Federal and State Governments, to misrepresent one’s residence or place of birth or age for any

variety of purposes.’’ 121

This sentiment was confirmed by Director Stafford, who noted that

there is a false identification component to nearly every financial

crimes arrest the Secret Service makes, including bank fraud, credit card fraud, telecommunications fraud and computer fraud.122

Bank fraud and identity theft may be more serious crimes than

the manufacture of false identification, however, it is often the

manufacture of phony identification that allows bank fraud or identity theft to occur. Moreover, as worrisome as crimes such as bank

fraud and identity theft clearly are, in the wake of the terrorist

atrocities of September 11, 2001, it now appears that the dangers

of false identification are greater than most observers have imagined.

The Subcommittee found significant evidence of the criminal motivations of users of false identification from messages posted on

various Internet discussion boards, a forum that has blossomed as

the Internet itself has grown. For example, the following messages

were exchanged on an Internet discussion board about false identification on March 15–16, 2000:

‘‘Who would pay 225$ for an Id with a holo[gram]??? thats

just a waste of money and only losers would pay for it.

And who would buy an id withouht a holo? only losers who

just suck. Wizz is a good guy but if u wanna make money

you should get authentic looking holos and not some

crappy ones that are not part of the state and then mad

people gonna buy. and whoever is stupid enough to buy an

36

123 Id., Exhibit 26 (Fakeidman Is ID List http://www.pages.eidosnet.co.uk/fakeidman/

(post by ‘‘Will’’ and ‘‘Ed’’ on Mar. 17, 2000)) (original punctuation and spelling preserved). 124Fake ID Zone http://www.fakeidzone.com (post by ‘‘tulip’’ on Feb. 21, 2000). 125 Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 27. 126 Id.

Id without a Holo then you’re gonna be [deleted] cause u

will get caught.

Will

Will,

I would have to disagree with you. When i can get them,

i pay $300.00 for them with true holo’s all the time. I have

to have holo’s on mine. Just to give you an idea, i am closer to being 40 years old than being 21 years old. So I am

not using them to buy alcohol or get into clubs. I am using

them at banks.(they have to pass the book check) So to pay

$300.00 for one that looks exact is a no brainer. I would

feel more comfortable paying $300.00 for a quality one,

then trying to save myself some money by buying one for

$25.00 and get nailed. This is one of those things that i

truly believe that you get what you pay for. I do agree

with you regarding the holo’s though, if they are not the

correct ones for that State then don’t even bother putting

them on, you will end up getting your [deleted] thrown in

jail.

—Ed’’ 123

The Subcommittee discovered the following posting on a website

containing a discussion boards that center on false identification

materials:

‘‘+++URGENT+++

‘‘I need an american or canadian fake id, birth certificate

and social security card that will get me from canada to

the u.s. and will make it through immigration and border

patrol

—any State will work

—high priority, money no problem, must be very well done

and professional

—please email me right away at [e-mail address deleted]’’ 124

Another post by the web host of one site offering false identification materials stated as follows: ‘‘There are people out there that

aren’t 17 years old, snaking past that 80-year-old bar guy to snag

a 40 oz. [beer]. There are people out there that craft stuff better

than DMVs and more untraceable.’’ 125 This same post advises

others about tricks to avoid legal problems: ‘‘Use your language appropriately * * * integrate words like ‘‘novelty’’, ‘‘educational’’ and

‘‘informational’’ as often as possible.’’ 126 Such users are clearly anticipating using their phony identification for a host of illegal activities, and are not intending to use their phony identification and

37

127 National Fraud Center, Inc. and Norman A. Willox, Jr., White Paper: Identity Theft: Authentication As a Solution 5 (Mar. 16, 2000) (presented at National Summit on Identity Theft). 128 Hearing record, supra, at 15 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).

credentials ‘‘for novelty purposes only,’’ as the website operators

suggest.

(1) Identity Theft

Identity theft is reported to be one of the fastest growing crimes

in the United States, and led to the introduction of S. 1399, the

Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2001 by Senators Feinstein, Shelby, Corzine, Kyl, and Grassley in September 2001. Identity theft is

possible without false identification documents, but it is much more

difficult.

Individuals who seek to engage in identity theft may find the

Internet a valuable tool. In addition to using the Internet to gain

personal information about an individual whose identity they may

wish to steal, the Internet facilitates identity theft through the production of quality counterfeit identification documents. According

to Norman A. Willox, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the National

Fraud Center,

‘‘The computer and, more recently, the Internet have

brought identity theft to a much more insidious level. They

have allowed the identity thief to obtain personal identifiers of multiple persons quicker; to access higher quality

fake identification tools (driver’s licenses, birth certificates,

social security cards, etc.) and, through e-commerce, to

render the credit transaction completely impersonal. The

potential harm caused by an identity thief using the Internet is exponential.127

Not only was Thomas Seitz, who testified at the hearing about

his use of false identification to commit identity theft, able to gather information on his potential victims by searching the Internet,

but he was also able to obtain online the false identity documents

he needed to commit identity theft. Seitz testified that it was largely because he was able to find personal information about other

people, as well as the means to create false identification, that he

committed the criminal acts for which he has been convicted:

‘‘Although at first I did not have the intent to defraud anyone, I started searching the Internet again and determined

that there were a large number of sites that offered the

means to make false identification and the opportunity

presented itself.’’ 128

In July 2000, the Subcommittee learned of a case in which an individual used false identification that he very likely obtained from

website operator Robert Sek to perpetrate identity theft and a host

of financial crimes. After finding a wallet belonging to Dr. Charles

Glueck, Benito Castro used false identification in Glueck’s name to

commit bank fraud, credit card fraud, and insurance fraud, eventually racking up $35,000 in debt on ten credit cards that Castro obtained in Glueck’s name. Castro told Louisiana State Police Lieutenant Kermit Smith, who investigated the crime, that after he

bought the identification over the Internet, the seller offered him

38

129For more information on the Subcommittee’s undercover purchase, see Section III.A.(1)(c). 130State of Louisiana v. Benito Castro, Case No. 09–00–680 (Nineteenth Judicial District

Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana, Aug. 9, 2000) (Information). More

specifically, Castro was convicted of 10 counts of identity theft under Louisiana Revised Statute

14:67.16(C)(1), one count of theft of over $500 under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:67(B)(1), and

one count of bank fraud under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:71.1. 131Keith O’Brien, ‘‘Identity Thief Gets 10 Years in Jail’’ Times Picayune (Aug. 10, 2000). 132See United States of America v. Ahmed Hannan, Case No. 01–80778; United States of

America v. Karim Koubriti, Case No. 01–80779; United States of America v. Farouk Ali-Hamoud,

a job as a sales representative. The Subcommittee examined Castro’s fake identification and found it to be virtually identical to the

one the Subcommittee bought undercover from Robert Sek, right

down to the disclaimer-bearing plastic pouch in which the identification was packaged.129

Castro’s document, like the Oklahoma identification document

the Subcommittee obtained from Sek directly, was printed on stiff

white plastic, and closely resembled in its design, coloring and

fonts, a Louisiana driver’s license. Again, like the Subcommittee’s

document, this false identification document omitted the words

‘‘driver’s license’’ and included a fine print disclaimer on the back.

On August 9, 2000, in the 19th Judicial District Court of Louisiana, Benito Castro pled guilty to 10 counts of identity theft, one

count of theft, and one count of bank fraud.130 Castro, who is the

first man sentenced under Louisiana’s 1999 Identity Theft law, is

currently serving a 10-year term of incarceration at hard labor

without possibility of parole at a Louisiana State correctional facility.131

(2) Recent Terrorist Acts May Have Been Facilitated by False

Identification

The consequences of failing to curb the spread of false identification are grave indeed, and go potentially far beyond simply facilitating under-age drinking—in fact, evidence indicates that some

associates of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization may have used

false identification and immigration documents. False identification

documents and credentials can enable criminals to gain unauthorized access to secure areas in airports and to open bank and credit

card accounts under false identities in order to finance their activities. In addition, phony identification enables criminals to obtain

bona fide, yet unsupported and unauthorized, identification documents such as driver’s licenses. Their efforts to hide behind such

false identities makes it much harder for law enforcement and intelligence officials to identify them.

One week after the horrific September 11 attacks, Federal agents

arrested three men who may be associated with the terrorists’ network on charges of possessing false identification. The identification documents, which are in the name of another individual alleged to be an associate of bin Laden who was arrested later, include a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Form I–94

and a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service alien identification card (both of which have been confirmed as false by the U.S.

Immigration and Naturalization Service), and a United States visa

(which has been confirmed as false by a State Department Diplomatic Service agent). The documents, which the suspects told

agents were false, also included a U.S. Social Security Administration card, and a ‘‘World Service Authority’’ passport.132 In addition,

39

Case No. 01–80780 (each in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Sept. 18, 2001)

(affidavit of Special Agent Robert Pertuso in support of Criminal Complaints), and Tamar

Lewin, ‘‘A Nation Challenged: The Charges: Accusations Against 93 Vary Widely,’’ New York

Times (Nov. 28, 2001), at B6. ‘‘World Service Authority’’ passports are not government-issued.

See www.worldservice.org. 133 Brooke A. Masters, ‘‘Hijackers Exploited DMV Loophole,’’ Washington Post (Sept. 21, 2001),

at A15, and Tamar Lewin, ‘‘A Nation Challenged: The Charges: Accusations Against 93 Vary

Widely,’’ New York Times (Nov. 28, 2001), at B6, and Matthew Barakat, ‘‘Fourth Person

Charged With Helping Hijackers Gain Fake Ids,’’ Associated Press (Oct. 25, 2001), and Alexandra R. Moses, ‘‘Attacks Investigation Points to Pocket of Terrorist Support,’’ Associated Press

(Nov. 17, 2001). 134 John Mintz and Allan Lengel, ‘‘FBI Arrests Liquor Store Clerk,’’ Washington Post (September 21, 2001) at A14. 135 As noted above, this investigation demonstrated such a serious security vulnerability that

the Defense Department classified the previously-unclassified GAO report at the SECRET level.

two of the individuals are alleged to have obtained driver’s licenses

in both Ohio and Michigan, apparently using false supporting documents.

The FBI is investigating whether some of the terrorists who

crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon obtained

bona fide Virginia identification cards using false supporting documents, such as false sworn statements attesting to their Virginia

residency.133 In a case that was opened prior to September 11,

2001, investigators are looking into how approximately 20 individuals in seven States obtained licenses that permitted them to haul

explosives and hazardous materials such as dynamite, gases, and

toxic or radioactive waste. It is unclear what they may have intended to do using these credentials.134

(3) Infiltration of Federal Facilities Using Phony Identification

Shortly after the Subcommittee’s hearing on false identification,

the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime held a hearing on

May 25, 2000, which detailed the results of a GAO undercover operation and underscored the Subcommittee’s findings about the

dangers posed by the widespread availability of false identification.

GAO investigators from the Office of Special Investigations (OSI)

were able to breach security at 21 of the most secure buildings in

the United States, including the CIA, the FBI, and several airports

by claiming that they were armed law enforcement officers. The investigators displayed phony law enforcement badges and phony

credentials that they had crafted themselves using graphics software and images culled from Internet websites, and which bore little resemblance to the genuine articles. When the investigators presented themselves at security checkpoints, they were waved around

metal detectors and were not screened.

In a similar operation at certain sensitive Defense Department

facilities on May 10, 2001 commissioned by Senator Collins, GAO/

OSI investigators penetrated the sites using easily-obtainable false

identification—thus demonstrating their potentially catastrophic

vulnerability to unauthorized access by criminals or terrorists.135

Upon learning that OSI had confirmed the suspected vulnerability

of these facilities, Senator Collins immediately contacted Deputy

Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to notify him of these problems

so that the Department could promptly begin corrective action.

Though such improvements are now underway, GAO’s findings in

these multiple penetration tests demonstrate that Internet and

computer technologies allow nearly anyone easily to create danVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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136 Hast statement, supra. 137 Network Solutions http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/. 138 Affidavit of Clarke Skoby, Special Agent, U.S. Secret Service, at 1 (Mar. 9, 2000) [hereinafter ‘‘First Skoby affidavit’’]. 139 Affidavit of Clarke Skoby, Special Agent, U.S. Secret Service, at 1 (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter ‘‘Second Skoby affidavit’’]. 140 In re A Black Century Fire Safe, Case No. A–00–111M (W. D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2000) (affidavit

of Special Agent Clarke Skoby submitted in support of application for search warrant). 141First Skoby affidavit, supra, at 1. 142 Id. at 3–4.

gerously convincing identification cards and credentials.136 (This

problem is compounded by the vast array of law enforcement identification cards currently in use.)

III. Case Studies

The pages that follow contain brief summaries of the evidence

that the Subcommittee collected over the course of its 5-month investigation about specific websites that manufacture and market

counterfeit identification documents. This report also includes a

brief summary of two instances that the Subcommittee examined

where criminals went online to obtain false identification materials

to further other illegal behavior.

A. The Sellers

1. Robert Sek: theidshop.com

(a) Business

Robert Sek, of Austin, Texas, was born in 1979. In April 1998

Sek used the alias Arthur Biscay (a combination of his middle

name and his parent’s street address) to register the domain name

theidshop.com.137

Sek told Lieutenant Myers that he owned approximately $30,000

worth of equipment which he used to manufacture false identification documents.138 In March 2000, while executing a search warrant at Sek’s Austin residence, authorities seized a computer, photographic quality printer, lamination machine, identification booklets, printed identification cards, customer orders for identification

products, money orders,139 and other evidence—including a Century United safe containing hologram film and approximately

$16,000 in cash.140

Sek told Lieutenant Myers that he sold his products for approximately $50 each, and that he generated approximately $600,000 in

revenue annually. In addition, Sek told Lieutenant Myers that he

made approximately 1,000 false identification documents each

month.141 Indeed, after searching Sek’s trash on January 19 and

February 7, 2000, investigators retrieved approximately 300 envelopes addressed to the ID Shop.142

In addition, Sek told Lieutenant Myers that his operation was

extensive, employing at least 17 sales representatives across the

United States. In fact, Sek advertised for employees on the ‘‘job

openings’’ page of his website, which stated that

‘‘if you are the type of person who likes easy money, then

this job is for you. We currently have 70 sales reps all over

the United States making salaries ranging from $200 to

41

143 Robert Sek, The ID Shop Job Openings http://www.theidshop.com. 144First Skoby affidavit, supra, at 2. 145See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 31; Robert Sek, The ID Shop (visited Dec. 21, 1999)

http://www.theidshop.com/products.htm. 146See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 24 (Robert Sek, Ordering (visited Jan. 27, 2000)

http://www.theidshop.com/ordering).

$2000 a WEEK. The majority of our current sales rep’s

[sic] are college or high [school] students.’’ 143

(b) Products

On his website, Sek advertised identification documents for the

following States: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New

Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming.144 Customers had a

choice of two types of identification cards: a PVC card which cost

$100, with an optional hologram for an additional $20, or a 3M

process card which cost $60. The PVC cards all bore State-specific

backings, while the 3M Process cards all used an identical backing.

(Sek did not offer holograms on the 3M Process cards.) 145

(c) Subcommittee Purchase

During its investigation, the Subcommittee purchased undercover a phony Oklahoma driver’s license from ‘‘The ID Shop’’ for

$100, using a false name and the photograph of Subcommittee Investigator Kirk Walder. The fake license arrived approximately 3

weeks later in a plain white envelope with a return address of ID

Enterprises, located at a postal mail box in Austin, Texas. The document itself appeared to be made of stiff, white plastic measuring

33⁄8 by 21⁄8 inches on which was printed the photograph of Investigator Walder, along with a virtually identical representation of an

Oklahoma driver’s license, including the State seal, but omitting

the words ‘‘driver’s license’’ on its face. The document arrived encased in a clear, flexible plastic pouch which was sealed on all four

sides, but not physically attached to the document. The pouch

measured 3 by 21⁄2 inches. Lining the inside walls of the pouch

were two clear plastic sheets on which were printed diagonally in

red ink ‘‘NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT’’ in approximately

20-point type and in capital letters. Investigator Walder was able

to remove the document from the pouch bearing this disclaimer,

however, simply by snipping open the pouch with a pair of scissors.

This removal process took no more than a few seconds.

(d) Disclaimer

As noted previously, Robert Sek took several calculated steps in

an effort to insulate himself from criminal liability. As part of the

ordering process, Sek’s customers had to sign a contract stating

that they

‘‘understand fully that this instrument (novelty ID) is not

representative of any State government affiliation, either

local, State, or Federal, and is not issued or endorsed by

any State or Federal Government agencies or departments.’’ 146

42

147 Id. 148 Id. 149 Id, supra, at Exhibit 10.

Moreover, the customers had to promise ‘‘not [to] alter or deface

the ID in any way (from its’ [sic] original State when it was

mailed***).’’ 147 In addition, as described above, Sek packaged his

products in the laminated pouches described above bearing the

‘‘NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT’’ disclaimer. Sek also included a disclaimer in approximately 2-point type on the back of

the identification cards themselves. This tiny disclaimer provided:

‘‘I, without reservation or restriction understand fully that

this instrument is not representative of any government

affiliation, either local or State, or Federal, and is not

issued or endorsed by any State or Federal Government

agencies or departments. I understand that this instrument’s sole purpose is for novelty use only. I agree to accept complete responsibility for any fraudulent use of this

instrument as states in the original agreement between

myself and the manufacturer/vendor. The vendor does not

provide any warranties of merchantability for a particular

purpose of noninfringement. The vendor shall not be liable

under any theory or for any damages suffered by the bearer of this instrument. I further attest and affirm that my

signature on the front of this instrument serves as evidence that I, the bearer/purchase, agree to the aforementioned agreement in its entirety.’’ 148

Each of these purported safeguards was easily circumvented. The

customer’s promise to behave appropriately, of course, provided no

guarantee that Sek’s customers would not misuse his products—

particularly since, as we have seen, the market for false identification is apparently based upon their value in facilitating illicit activity. As described above, the plastic pouch bearing the disclaimer

was easily removed. In addition, the fine print disclaimer on the reverse side of the identification card is itself easily removable, perhaps by design, as a message posted on an Internet discussion

board demonstrated:

‘‘OK, the IDShop sends their ID in a white envelope, exactly as they describe on their Web page. When you open

this envelope, the ID has a laminated wrap, extending well

over the edge of the ID. It also has printed, NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT printed across the lamination in

Red. This slip is easy to remove with a scissors, and takes

less than a minute. Next the ID itself has a paragraph on

the back explaining how the ID is not a government document and cannot be used as such, etc. Now everybody is

telling you that this is hard to get rid of, but let me tell

you, from firsthand experience I simply took a tough eraser, one found on the back of a pencil would do fine, and

rubbed it tightly against the words. After a few mins, the

writing starts to fade and in less than 5 minutes the writing is completely gone.’’ 149

43

150Subcommittee staff telephone interview with John DeMayo (Mar. 30, 2000) [hereinafter ‘‘DeMayo interview’’]. 151 Id. 152Letter from Paul Kraaijvanger, Co-founder/Director, and Matt Walker, Controller, Verotel,

to Kirk Walder, Investigator, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Jan. 6, 1999),

at 2. 153 Adobe Photoshop is graphic design software that allows users to edit and create images.

The software uses a system of layers, each containing a different portion of the image. Layers

allow users to overlay one portion of an image over another; for example, a signature can overlay a photograph. Users can also remove or hide layers. Users are able to edit almost all aspects

of an image, including color, size, and transparency, as well as add text. 154These templates are layered, and therefore, able to be manipulated relatively easily using

software such as Adobe Photoshop. 155 Brett Carreras, States (visited Dec. 9, 1999) http://www.fakeid.net/states.

2. Brett Carreras: fakeid.net

(a) Business

Brett Carreras, a graduate of Loyola College in Baltimore, Maryland, was born in 1978. The Subcommittee’s investigation indicates

that Carreras registered the domain name fakeid.net on July 28,

1998. At that time, John DeMayo, a self-professed pioneer in the

Internet false identification business, began directing Internet

users to Carreras’ new site, as DeMayo claimed to be leaving the

false identification business.150 Carreras paid DeMayo a fee for

every thus-referred customer who purchased a product from

Carreras’s site. In late December 1999 or early January 2000,

Carreras bought an additional domain name, fake-id.com, from

DeMayo for $10,000. DeMayo estimated that Carreras earned between $5,000 and $10,000 per month from the website fakeid.net.

(DeMayo told the Subcommittee that fake-id.com was a popular

site and that he had received between 50 and 100 e-mail messages

each day before he sold the site to Carreras.) 151 Billing records obtained by the Subcommittee indicate that, between mid-October

1999 and mid-December 1999, Carreras received 621 orders at his

fakeid.net website that generated roughly $8,239 in revenue.152

(b) Products

As a free service, fakeid.net offered low quality driver’s license

templates in a format compatible with Adobe Photoshop 153 for

all 50 U.S. States. However, the site offered ‘‘premium’’ templates

designed to be used with Adobe Photoshop, including an ‘‘ultimate’’ New Jersey license, an ‘‘ultimate’’ Maine license, as well as

templates for Wisconsin, Utah, Ohio, Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and the Canadian province

of Saskatchewan. These ‘‘premium’’ templates 154 were available to

members for a monthly fee payable by credit card of $14.95.155

After the Subcommittee contacted Carreras, he modified the site,

advising visitors that the templates had been removed and that he

would not answer questions about them. It appears that Carreras

made this statement in an attempt to convince both the Subcommittee and law enforcement that the premium templates,

which were the only revenue-earning portion of the website, had

been removed and that the website was out of business. In fact,

however, the templates were still accessible on the fakeid.net

website through a different series of links for several more months,

although many paying customers may have been unaware that the

templates were still available. Following customer complaints postVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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156See e.g., Fake ID Net Message Board http://carreras.netldiscus (post by ‘‘Anonymous’’ on Mar. 24, 2000; post by ‘‘Reaper’’ on Mar. 25, 2000). 157 Id. (post by ‘‘Webhost’’ on Mar. 27, 2000). 158 Brett Carreras, FakeID.Net (visited Dec. 17, 1999) http://www.fakeid.net/intro.htm. 159 Id. 160 Brett Carreras, Power Point Presentation (visited Feb. 15, 2000) http://carreras.net/welcome. 161 Id.

ed on the fakeid.net message board,156 Carreras posted information

on the message board informing regular customers of this ‘‘back

door’’ to the templates: ‘‘There are all types of members services

availiable [sic] to users who paid and were not able to download

the files. Go to members services, and click on all of the links. take

care.’’ 157

(c) Disclaimer

Initial access to Carreras’ website was through a page containing

the following advisory: ‘‘For my protection, and yours, you MUST

read the below disclaimer BEFORE entering. Thank You.’’ The referenced disclaimer is in a small box, and the only readily visible

portion of the text reads:

‘‘1. This page is to be used purely for reference/education/

novelty purposes.

2. I am at least 18 years of age, and realize that I am

individually responsible for my actions.

3. I understand that the act of downloading information

* * *.’’ 158

Although the viewer may scroll down the text to read it in its entirety, it is not necessary to do so in order to gain access to the rest

of the website. Instead, the visitor may simply click on the following statement: ‘‘LET ME IN!’’ 159

(d) Related Websites

In February 2000 the Subcommittee discovered that the

fakeid.net web host was planning to introduce two new websites in

the near future: Illegalimmigrant.com and fake-id.com. Both domain names are registered to Carreras. Illegalimmigrant.com

would purportedly specialize in ‘‘identity documents such as passports, social security cards, green cards, SSN lists, generators,

prove-it cards, resident alien cards, birth cirtificates [sic] . . . and

many more!’’ 160 At fake-id.com, it was said,

‘‘professionals will create licenses from any State you

choose, based on our custom-made templates, These will be

the finest ID documents on the planet, and will be backed

by the professionalism of FakeID.Net!’’ 161

Notably, these ventures stand in sharp contrast to the information

posted on the ‘‘frequently asked questions’’ page of fakeid.net,

where it was claimed that

‘‘We do NOT sell IDs from this site, nor do we know of

places which sell IDs. Be wary of any site that says you

can buy an ID from them. No site on the internet is endorsed by this site, or recommended by this site’s propriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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162 Brett Carreras, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec. 17, 1999) http://www.fakeid.net/

faq.htm. 163 Beachum deposition, supra, at 26. 164 Id. at 44. 165 Id. at 16–20; see ECD Inc. http://www.ecdinc.com/mb/. 166See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 17.

etors. Furthermore the proprietor of this site has NEVER

created a fake and/or novelty ID.’’ 162

Carreras declined to answer the Subcommittee’s questionnaire

after invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, at his Subcommittee deposition, Carreras invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to every question except

his name, date of birth, and current address.

(3) Tim Beachum: bestfakeids.com

(a) Business

Tim Beachum, who was born in 1969, registered bestfakeids.com

on May 25, 1999, using the company name Executive Computer

Designs, which is located in Virginia Beach, Virginia. As of May 19,

2000, the website was still active, but Beachum had changed some

of the content. By November 2000, however, the website appeared

to have been taken down.

On April 5, 2000, Beachum voluntarily submitted to a Subcommittee deposition. Beachum testified that he established

bestfakeids.com with an unnamed friend after they had a discussion about websites that sell novelty identification documents.163

Beachum had discovered that there were more than 100,000

webpages referring to the subject of false identification. Beachum

opined that, if there were that many websites pertaining to false

identification, there must be a market for the service.164 Throughout his deposition, Beachum provided limited information and

changed some of the answers he had previously provided to the

Subcommittee during telephone interviews.

In addition to bestfakeids.com, Beachum owned ECD Inc., which

he said offered ‘‘electronic information’’ and ‘‘marketing products,’’ Payless Web Hosting, and Bulletproof Marketing, which Beachum

said were not yet operational.165 Beachum could or would not

break down the approximate monthly income that he receives from

each of his websites, although he estimated in his response to the

Subcommittee’s questionnaire that bestfakeids.com provided 90 percent of his website revenue.166

(b) Products

The home page of bestfakeids.com contained a smaller version of

the same logo used by fakeidzone.com. The site promoted its sole

product—online access to a ‘‘fake id kit’’—as follows:

‘‘Novelty fake id’s are quickly becoming a big business online. Although our competitors spend most of the time

claiming to have the best fake id’s, and slandering the

competitions [sic] name. We have decided to take a different approach and let our product speak for itself. We

sell 40+ kits a day—that’s almost 3 times what any other

fake id site sells. Here is why the all new and improved

46

167 Beachum deposition, supra, at Exhibit 15. 168See id. at Exhibits 16–20. 169See id. at Ex’s. 8–11.

‘‘Best Fake ID’s’’ site out sells the competition 3 to 1: We

don’t sell novelty fake ids we show you how to create your

own using your home computer. We provide you with templates and step by step instructions on what you need to

create fake ids so real you could fool your own mother. As

a BONUS you will receive a super high quality birth certificate that can be printed in the privacy of your own

home. You will be given access to download 50+ templates

that you can use to create your own fake ids. Our templates consist of drivers license, gun license, back stage

passes, and much more. As of 12/1/1999 our collection of

templates has been totally updated. Templates are created

and added upon your request! (No other site on the Internet

offers this service). No shipping and handling . . . You will

be given instant access to your fake id kit, and your bonus

birth certificate as well as our online threaded message

board.’’ 167

Beachum supplemented the copy cited above with numerous illustrations of his products, as well as lengthy testimonials, complete

with photos, from what purported to be ‘‘satisfied customers.’’

(c) Subcommittee Purchase

The Subcommittee purchased undercover access to Beachum’s ‘‘kit’’ on February 9, 2000. The kit consisted of several scanned

State driver’s licenses from various States; templates for driver’s licenses from Wyoming, Alabama, and ‘‘Pureto [sic] Rico;’’ a press

pass template; a blank birth certificate from Victory Memorial Hospital in Waukegan, Illinois; and two resident activity coordinator

certificate files.168 Despite the representation on his website, however, the kit did not contain a template for a gun license.

The driver’s license templates allowed an individual to produce

his own driver’s license by filling in the blanks. The Subcommittee

found that it would indeed be possible to produce credible driver’s

licenses from the templates on Beachum’s site.

The press pass template included space for an individual’s photograph and personal information. It also bore a bar code and a background reflecting the legend ‘‘American Press Association.’’ 169

Beachum promoted the press pass on his website with testimonials

from three ‘‘satisfied customers’’ who had supposedly created press

passes for themselves using Beachum’s template, and then used

the passes to gain access to backstage areas at various events.

Under questioning during his deposition, Beachum admitted that

the testimonials were fictitious:

‘‘Q: What is that?

A: It’s a novelty testimonial page for the press pass.

Q: Okay. Are you familiar with the text?

A: Yes. Yes. It looks familiar.

Q: Is any of it true?

A: No.

Q: None of it’s true?

47

170See id. at 91–92. 171 A pixel (from ‘‘picture element’’) is the basic unit of visual information on a computer display or in a computer image. The more pixels an image contains, the clearer the image will be,

and the higher the resolution is said to be. Images that contain few pixels, and thus less visual

information, tend to appear granulated when they are enlarged. Although Beachum never explained fully what he meant by ‘‘pixelated,’’ the Subcommittee understood him to mean that he

had lowered the resolution, and that the image would thus appear on screen, or in print, in

a granulated manner when enlarged. 172 Beachum deposition, supra, at Exhibits 86–88.

173See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 7a.

A: No.’’ 170

Beachum also claimed during his deposition that the press pass

template, like the other files in the kit, was not capable of producing a physical press pass because he had ‘‘pixelated’’ 171 the

template so that when it was printed out, the image would be distorted. The following exchange is excerpted from his Subcommittee

deposition:

‘‘Q: Do you think it’s possible for anyone to actually use

that, your press pass, to get into a concert?

A: No. For a fact, no.

Q: Why not?

A: Well, especially when I printed it, it’s too small. I

mean, you can’t manipulate that.

Q: That cannot be manipulated?

A: Not into a larger format, no.

Q: Again, why not?

A: It would become pixelated.’’ 172

Beachum’s claims that the template would become useless if actually printed, however, were false: The Subcommittee was easily

able to print a press pass that was not distorted.

The Subcommittee learned from officials at Victory Memorial

Hospital in Waukegan, Illinois, that the birth certificate Beachum

offered is an exact replica of a birth certificate format used by the

hospital before 1990.173 The birth certificate depicted a sketch of

the hospital and calligraphic text preceding blanks for the infant’s

name, the doctor’s name, and dates to be filled in by hand after

printing the certificate. The kit included a text file which offered

specific instructions on how best to replicate an authentic birth certificate from Victory Memorial Hospital, including the type of paper

on which to print the certificate, and what types of gold seals to

use. For example, the text notes that:

‘‘* The Administrators [sic] name during the era this certificate was issued was Donald Wasson. The Attending

Physician’s name was W. M. Smith.

* Donald Wasson’s signature is signed with a blue inked

fountain pen.

* All ohter [sic] handwriting is done in black ink with a

fine point pen (i.e. Bic).

* * *

‘‘Now in case you missed it, to the left and right of the picture of the hospital, are BLACK INKED FOOTPRINTS OF

AN INFANT. These foot prints of course are not on the

48

174 Beachum deposition, supra, at Exhibit 7. 175 A digital watermark is digital data embedded either visibly or invisibly into an image or

other type of digital document (film, photograph, etc.) which is designed to make counterfeiting

the document more difficult. 176See Beachum deposition, supra, at 78–79. 177See id. 178 Id. at 48. 179See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 8a (Tim Beachum, Kent State University Certificate).

scan (get you [sic] own damn baby!). The foot prints each

face inward toward the horizontal center of the document,

and lie adjacent to either horizontal side of the picture of

the hospital. Remeber [sic], the footprints face inward (as

in heel near the edge of the document, with toes closest to

the picture.’’ 174

Beachum testified that he intentionally corrupted the background of the birth certificate by adding a ‘‘digital watermark’’ 175

to the certificate file that would cause it to print in a distorted

manner, which he claimed would prevent customers from actually

using it. In the following dialogue excerpted from his Subcommittee

deposition, Beachum explained this purported distortion process:

‘‘Q: After receiving that certificate from that site, did you

make any changes or alterations—

A: No.

Q: —to the certificate?

A: Yes, yes, yes. I digitally encrypted the background of

the certificate.

Q: How did you do that?

A: I forget, but it’s a plug-in from Photo Shop that does

it.

Q: Why did you do that?

A: In case someone tried to increase the dpi, it would

pixelate the picture, the image.

Q: And the purpose of causing the picture to be pixelated

is what?

A: To keep someone from trying to pass it off as a real

thing.’’ 176

In addition, Beachum testified that the certificate had been

pixelated the entire time it was on his website:

‘‘Q: So for the entire time that that file has been on your

website and offered to customers on your website, it’s

had the distortion element you described?

A: Yes.’’ 177

The Subcommittee subsequently determined that Beachum’s testimony was possibly perjurious, since the certificate files on the kit

which the Subcommittee had purchased undercover before

Beachum’s deposition generated actual hard copy documents that

did not bear a digital watermark. Computer experts consulted by

the Subcommittee confirmed that the certificate files had not been

altered in the fashion described by Beachum.

The kit included two activity coordinator certificate files, which

Beachum testified that he created by digitally scanning the original

certificates awarded to his mother.178 One certificate appeared to

be issued by Kent State University,179 while the other was purportVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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180See id. at Exhibit 8b (Tim Beachum, Ohio Resident Activity Coordinator Training Project

Certificate of Attendance). 181 Beachum deposition, supra, at Exhibit 15. 182 A thumbnail is a picture of a graphic image. Thumbnails do not contain enough pixels,

or picture information, to be enlarged or altered without significant distortion. Thumbnails are

only used to indicate what an image looks like, and are not layered templates as described earlier. 183See Beachum deposition, supra, at 70–71.

edly issued by the Ohio Health Care Association.180 Both certificates bore blanks for the user to record the name of the person who

had obtained the certificates, and the date on which the certificates

had been issued. Beachum’s site claimed that the completed certificates would enhance one’s ability to obtain employment as an activity coordinator, which the site described as a person who plans activities for individuals in nursing homes or for pre-school children.

The site claimed that, in order to obtain a genuine certificate, an

individual must take a course costing ‘‘a thousand plus dollars.’’ 181

Despite these representations on his website, Beachum testified

that the activity coordinator certificate files were for ‘‘novelty’’ purposes only. Beachum explained that the certificates were offered

only in ‘‘thumbnail’’ 182 format, and could not be downloaded in

their full sizes. In the following exchange, Beachum insisted that

if a customer were to download and enlarge the certificates, they

would be useless because they would be hopelessly distorted:

‘‘Q: Is it your testimony that those documents, Exhibits 3

and 4, then could not be made to look like authentic

documents?

A: No. No way they could be.

* * *

Q: Why not?

A: I intentionally corrupted the background of all the

documents so that they couldn’t be used.

Q: How did you corrupt the background of the documents?

A: I put a watermark, what is called a digital watermark

in the background to give the paper an intentional

crinkle or wrinkled look.

Q: So it is your testimony that is someone—well, maybe

you could explain for me, if someone tried to print out

these documents, what would happen?

A: It would have a distorted look, like—the background

of this has like a yellow tint to it and it’s a real distorted look in the background. In my opinion, there’s

no way it would look authentic.

Q: How long have you had that distortion on these products?

A: Always.’’ 183

Despite these protestations, however, the Subcommittee successfully printed full-size certificates with the use of software such as

Adobe Photoshop. Thus, it appears as if Beachum may have

committed perjury during his deposition testimony in this respect

as well.

50

184 Id. at Exhibit 11. 185 Id. at Exhibit 12. 186Subcommittee staff telephone interview with Tim Catron (Mar. 23, 2000). 187 Id. 188Letter from Paul Kraaijvanger, Co-founder/Director, and Matt Walker, Controller, Verotel,

to Kirk Walder, Investigator, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Jan. 6, 1999),

at 2. 189See Hearing record, Exhibit 6. 190See id.

(d) Disclaimer

Until the Subcommittee contacted Beachum, his website contained only the briefest of disclaimers:

‘‘Because our novelty fake id kit is distributed in a digital

format we do not of [sic] refunds. Our kit is sold as is. All

images found on this site is [sic] copyrighted and can not

be used by any other web site without the written consent

of Best Fake ID’s.’’ 184

After he first spoke with Subcommittee staff, Beachum expanded

his disclaimer to include the following:

‘‘The information contained in this website is strictly for

academic use alone. BEST FAKE ID’S will bear no responsibility for any use otherwise. All information on this web

site is for entertainment and educational purposes

only.’’ 185

(4) Tim Catron: fakeidzone.com

(a) Business

Tim Catron is a Kansas resident who registered the domain

name fakeidzone.com on October 2, 1998, providing as contact information an address in the Philippines. At this website, Catron offered a kit on a CD–ROM that he called ‘‘Fake ID Kit Ver. 2.0.’’

He told the Subcommitte that he was reselling this kit for Brett

Carreras.186 Catron also said that he had previously ‘‘partnered

up’’ with Carreras, the operator of fakeid.net, and Tim Beachum,

the operator of bestfakeids.com, but that he had recently ceased all

contact with those individuals.187 Catron sold the CD–ROM kit for

between approximately $19.95 and $39.95, payable by cash or

money order. For a 2-month period, however, Catron accepted payment by credit card. Billing records obtained by the Subcommittee

from his credit card processor indicate that, from November 1999

to January 2000, Catron earned $12,250 from 652 transactions.188

(b) Products

The CD–ROM disk that Catron marketed on his website contained more than 100 templates for a wide variety of identification

documents, including driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, green

cards, and high school and college diplomas and transcripts, as well

as what Catron referred to as ‘‘novelty templates’’ for documents

such as a concealed weapons permit.189 Catron’s kit also included

‘‘step by step instructions on what you need to create fake ids so

real you could fool your own mother,’’ 190 as well as instructions for

making both ‘‘a fake drivers [sic] license’’ and a hologram for the

51

191Tim Catron, Fake ID Zone (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.digitalhideout.com/

idkit.html. 192 Id. 193See Tim Catron, Placing a Order [sic] (visited Jan. 5, 2000) http://www.

digitalhideout.com/cashorder.html. 194See Hearing record, Exhibit 6. 195See id. at Exhibit 18 (affidavit of Tim Catron, Apr. 21, 2000). 196Subcommittee staff was unable to find evidence that fakeid.cc was ever operational. 197See E-Bay http://www.ebay.com (description of auction item 244333201, posted Jan. 23,

2000). 198Subcommittee staff telephone interview with Joshua Dansereau (Apr. 4, 2000) [hereinafter

‘‘Second Dansereau interview’’].

driver’s license.191 In addition to such tools as a bar code generator

and a Social Security number verifier, the kit included instructions

on how to ‘‘get a New ID: Complete report shows you how to do

this by adopting the identity of a deceased child or infant.’’ 192 To

complete the kit, Catron sold paper designed for printing diplomas

and birth certificates.193

(c) Disclaimer

Catron posted the following disclaimer at the bottom of his home

page, in fine print:

‘‘Although our fake id kit gives you step by step instructions along with templates on how to produce realistic

looking fake drivers license, birth certificates, back stage

passes, and much more. It is only meant to be a novelty

item. Do not under any circumstances try to pass them for

the real thing. That would be illegal.’’ 194

In addition, Catron referenced the above disclaimer on his order

form, and requested that customers sign the order form as an acknowledgment that they had read and understood the disclaimer.

Despite his novelty claim in the disclaimer, Catron refused to answer the Subcommittee’s questionnaire by invoking his Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He also stated in

an affidavit that he would invoke the Fifth Amendment in response

to every question except his name and address if the Subcommittee

chose to depose him.195

(d) Other Online Activities

In January 2000, Catron attempted to sell his two websites,

fakeidzone.com and fakeid.cc,196 through an online auction at an offering price of $5,000. He noted in the auction description that the

winning bidder would receive the domain names as well as the

graphics and designs for his sites. Catron explained that although

the site had been very profitable, he had decided to sell it in order

to dedicate time to other (unidentified) sites.197 Although it is not

clear whether Catron successfully sold the websites, it does appear

that he is no longer the owner of the domain names.

(5) Josh Dansereau: fake-ids.com

(a) Business

Josh Dansereau is a resident of Tallahassee, Florida, who was

born in 1979. He originally became involved in the false identification business after he created a fake driver’s license for himself.198

In mid-April 1999, Dansereau registered the domain names fakeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
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199 Network Solutions http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/; see also Hearing record,

Exhibit 17 (Dansereau Questionnaire Response, at 1 (undated; returned to Senate Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations, Mar. 27, 2000)). 200Second Dansereau interview, supra. 201David Myers, Draft Training Materials: Joshua Dansereau Case Report 3 (Nov. 12, 1999)

(unpublished report on file with Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Fraudulent

Identification Unit, Enforcement and Training) [hereinafter ‘‘Dansereau Case Report’’]. 202Dansereau Case Report, supra, at 3. 203Second Dansereau interview, supra. 204 Hearing record, supra, at 15 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers). 205See Joshua Dansereau, Gallery (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.freehosting2.at.

webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/gallery.htm. 206Dansereau Case Report, supra, at 3. 207 Joshua Dansereau, Fake ID One Home Page (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.

freehosting2.at.webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/gallery.htm. 208 Joshua Dansereau, Gallery (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.freehosting2.at.

webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/gallery.htm.

ids.com, fakeidshop.com, and fakeids.org. In mid-September 1999

he registered fakeidone.com and fakeid1.com.199 Dansereau used

these five websites, which were mirror sites containing the same

information, in an effort to gain more website traffic.200

Dansereau began selling false identification documents from

fakeids.com in June 1999. He sold approximately 10 to 12 false

identification documents per week at a price of approximately $30

to $35 each.201 Dansereau used a high speed computer and monitor, a state of the art card printer, and a scanner to manufacture

these documents.202 Dansereau told the Subcommittee that he had

made a total of 100 to 200 false identification documents, and as

many as 50 in one peak month alone. Dansereau added that he had

earned a total of approximately $3,000 to $5,000.203 Lieutenant

Myers believes that Dansereau earned closer to $250,000 from his

false identification operation, and noted in his testimony during the

hearing that when his team searched Dansereau’s home, they

found 85 fake identification documents ready to be mailed to customers. Lieutenant Myers noted that these 85 phony identification

documents represented approximately $7,000 in income for

Dansereau.204

(b) Products

Dansereau offered driver’s licenses from all U.S. States with the

exception of Florida.205 Lieutenant Myers described the cards as

high quality and noted that, of the 85 false identification documents his office confiscated from Dansereau, many were for older

adults from a variety of States, including Florida.206 On his

website, Dansereau described his products as

‘‘The best novelty fake ID’s you can buy. When held up to

real State ID’s, it’s hard to tell the difference! You can be

any age you want and you can be whomever you want. If

you’re looking for the most realistic fake ID’s you can buy

that will pass the book test, you have come to the right

place.’’ 207

Dansereau distinguished his false identification documents from

that of his competitors by noting that ‘‘all of are [sic] ID’s are the

new plastic credit card style, they come with a working magnetic

strip at no extra charge.’’ 208 In the ‘‘Frequently Asked Questions’’

section of the website, however, Dansereau acknowledged that the

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209 Josh Dansereau, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.

freehosting2.at.webjump.com/462b02686/fa/fakeids-org/faqhelp.htm. 210 Id. 211 Josh Dansereau, Fake ID One Home Page (visited Jan. 3, 2000) http://www.

freehosting2.at.webjump.com/413a62646/fa/fakeids-org/gallery.htm. 212See Florida Stat. ch. 877.18. 213See Florida Stat. ch. 948.08. 214Dansereau Case Report, supra, at 4. 215Telephone Interview with Joshua Dansereau (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter ‘‘First Dansereau

interview’’]. 216See Hearing record, supra, at Exhibit 19 (affidavit of Joshua Dansereau, June 7, 2000).

magnetic strips were not actually functional.209 Dansereau accepted cash and money orders for his products, and suggested that customers wishing to pay with cash ‘‘wrap the money in a couple

pieces of paper or something.’’ 210

(c) Disclaimer

Dansereau posted a lengthy disclaimer in fine print on the doorway page of his websites. The disclaimer was the same as that

which was posted on Robert Sek’s website, theidshop.com, see Section III.A.(1)(d). In addition, Dansereau posted the following statement on his home page:

‘‘Note: we are not recommending the use of the novelty ids

to purchase alcohol or tobacco. That is illegal. When you

purchase a novelty id. You assume all responsibility for

the misuse of the product.’’ 211

These disclaimers, however, did not prevent Dansereau’s prosecution by the State of Florida.

(d) Legal Situation

On November 12, 1999, Dansereau was charged with a felony for

violating a Florida State law prohibiting the falsification of identification cards or documents purporting to contain an applicant’s

age or date of birth.212 Dansereau pled guilty of the felony charge

and, pursuant to a pretrial intervention agreement,213 was sentenced to serve a 6-month term of probation starting in January

2000. He also forfeited the equipment he used to manufacture the

false identification documents.214

Dansereau told the Subcommittee that he voluntarily shut down

his false identification websites in either January or February

2000,215 although one site, fakeid1.com, appeared still to be functional as of April 2000. Dansereau swore in an affidavit to the Subcommittee that when he shut down his false identification

websites, he began returning orders that he had received to potential customers without opening them.216 On February 4, 2000, as

part of the Subcommittee’s undercover operation, however, the

Subcommittee mailed to Dansereau an order for a fake Connecticut

driver’s license. Despite two e-mail messages sent to addresses

posted on Dansereau’s website inquiring about the order, the Subcommittee did not receive the card and the money has not been returned.

In July 2000, because the Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages

and Tobacco Fraudulent Identification Unit (Florida ABT) suspected that Dansereau was still involved in producing or promoting

false identification documents, his probation was extended until

54

217 Affidavit of Jeff Yonce, Special Agent, Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco

Fraudulent Identification Unit, at 1–2 (Aug. 16, 2000) [hereinafter ‘‘Yonce affidavit’’]. 218See Florida Stat. ch. 877.18. 219Florida v. Joshua Dansereau, Case No. 00–3279 (Florida 2nd Judicial Circuit Court, May

23, 2001), and telephone interview with Special Agent Jeff Yonce, Florida Division of Alcoholic

Beverages and Tobacco Fraudulent Identification Unit (Dec. 1, 2000). 220See New Jersey Stat. ANN. §§ 2C:1a(2),(3). 221See New Jersey v. Thomas W. Seitz, Case No. 99–06–00613–1 (New Jersey Superior Court

Law Division, Sept. 27, 1999). 222Subcommittee staff interview with Thomas Seitz at the Baker County Jail, Macclenny,

Florida (Apr. 6, 2000) [hereinafter ‘‘Seitz interview’’]. 223Seitz interview, supra.

August 2000. As part of its ongoing monitoring of false identification on the Internet, Florida ABT determined that Dansereau had

not shut down fakeid1.com, despite his assurances to the Subcommittee. Florida ABT then found that Dansereau had continued

cashing and depositing money orders and cashiers checks that he

received from individuals wishing to purchase false identification

from fakeid1.com. As a result, Dansereau was arrested and again

charged with a felony for violating Florida’s false identification

statute in August 2000.217 Dansereau pleaded no contest to one

count of failure to comply with requirements for sale of identification on May 23, 2001.218 He was sentenced to a 3-year term of pro- bation, ordered to pay $808 in court costs, and sentenced to perform 15 days of county work.219

B. The Buyers

(1) Thomas Seitz

(a) Legal Situation

Thomas Seitz, born in 1977, is a resident of New Jersey. In April

1999 local police in New Jersey arrested Seitz on charges of theft

by deception and presentation of false information after he purchased a car on credit using an assumed identity. After pleading

guilty, he was convicted in New Jersey State court of one count of

theft by deception, two counts of forgery, and one count of uttering

forged instruments.220 Seitz was sentenced to a 3-year State term

of incarceration for these four felony convictions.221 On February

22, 2000, Seitz entered a plea of guilty to one count of bank fraud

in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida for the

same conduct that gave rise to the State charge. In June 2000,

Seitz was duly sentenced to a 7-month term of incarceration to be

served concurrently with his New Jersey State sentence, followed

by a 60-month term of supervised release.

(b) Internet Activities

In an interview with the Subcommittee, Seitz said that he is very

experienced with computers and the Internet. Seitz added that he

has been using computers since the sixth grade, that he has

worked as a computer network engineer, and that he was certified

in the use of Microsoft products.222

At the hearing, Seitz testified that he was looking at various

websites and discovered that he could obtain the names and Social

Security numbers of other people from the Internet. Seitz knew

that bank, credit, and tax information is tied often to an individual’s Social Security number,223 and that this information that can

55

224 Names, complete Social Security numbers, and military branch and rank information of

United States military officers under consideration for promotion were available through the

Congressional Record until 1995. Since 1996, most entries—and since 1997, apparently, all entries—have contained only the last four digits of the Social Security number in addition to

name, rank, and military branch information. 225Seitz interview, supra. 226 Id., see also Hearing record, supra, at 16 (testimony of Thomas Seitz). 227 Hearing record, supra, at 19 (testimony of Thomas Seitz).

be put to many uses, including identity theft. Accordingly, he found

names and Social Security numbers on the websites for Congress

and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). By using

search engines on the congressional website, Seitz was able to access the Congressional Record, where he found names, Social Security numbers, and military branches and ranks of members of the

United States military being considered for promotion.224 Seitz also

found names and Social Security numbers of many individuals in

the quarterly reports of publicly traded companies on the SEC’s

website. He focused his information-gathering efforts on at least

two individuals, Joseph A. Parisi and Richard D. Clasen, both of

California. He obtained these individuals’ addresses and telephone

numbers through online directories.225

Seitz then used Internet search engines to obtain information on

fake identification documents, including birth certificates, Social

Security cards, and driver’s license or identification cards. Seitz recalled to the Subcommittee that while he was searching for false

identification materials that he could use in conjunction with the

personal information he had collected on Clasen and Parisi, he visited one site that posed the question: ‘‘Do you need a new identity?’’

Seitz downloaded templates including a birth certificate template

from three or four free sites. Although one website Seitz visited

stated that its products were for novelty purposes only, and another posted a small disclaimer, Seitz testified that he ignored both

statements. Indeed, he wondered why anyone would put such templates on the web in the first place except in order to facilitate precisely the sort of illegal uses the disclaimers purported to disclaim—and for which he himself sought access to them. Seitz could

see, for instance, no legitimate ‘‘novelty’’ use for a false birth certificate.226

Seitz conducted these Internet searches at a local library in an

effort to avoid detection. He told the Subcommittee that he knew

that the Internet Protocol address of a computer that had been

used to visit a particular website could be traced. He explained,

however, that

‘‘I used the computer in a public library to conduct my

search. Dozens of people use the computers there every

day and they also do not necessarily keep logs of who is

using the computer. I had no fear of detection as I was

searching.’’ 227

Using the stolen personal identification data that he had obtained from the SEC website, Seitz submitted 14 fraudulent car

loan applications to Nations Bank via the Internet, including applications in the names of Clasen and Parisi. Seitz sought to obtain

fraudulently a total of $540,000 in loan proceeds, but he received

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228Seitz interview, supra. 229 Id. 230 Id. 231 Id.

checks for only the two loans for which he had applied in the

names of Parisi and Clasen.

(c) Creating False Documents

After the loans were approved, Seitz used his home computer to

complete a fake New Jersey birth certificate template that he had

obtained from the Internet using the library computer. He made

two different birth certificates using the identities of Parisi and

Clasen, printing them on heavy green paper, but omitting the

raised seal that the certificates were supposed to contain. The entire process took approximately 30 minutes. Seitz also obtained

blank W–2 forms from the Internal Revenues Service website, and

completed these documents using the stolen identities.

Seitz then used the counterfeit birth certificate to obtain an identification card in Parisi’s name at the New Jersey Department of

Motor Vehicles (DMV). He chose to obtain an identification card instead of a driver’s license because he knew that only two pieces of

identification were required for an identification card, and that he

would not, in applying for one, have to wait long or take a driving

test. As he anticipated, the DMV issued Seitz an authorized identification card in Parisi’s name very quickly: It took about 30 minutes. Seitz also told the Subcommittee that DMV did not examine

the W–2 forms that he provided as additional support.228

Seitz attempted to use his false identification card in Parisi’s

name to buy a car at a dealership in North Brunswick, New Jersey,

but was unsuccessful because the dealership required an actual

driver’s license in order to make a purchase. Because Seitz did not

possess a driver’s license in Parisi’s name, he abandoned his attempt to buy a car at that dealership.229 Instead, Seitz scanned his

New Jersey license into a computer, and used a software program

to change the identifying information to that of Richard Clasen.

This process took approximately 30 minutes. Seitz did not laminate

this card, but simply printed it and photocopied the printout.230

Armed with this merely photocopied driver’s license, Seitz went to

a different car dealership, located in the Township of Old Bridge,

New Jersey, and selected a new car to purchase. Seitz presented

to the dealership a photocopy of his altered driver’s license, and recited aloud the Social Security number of an individual residing in

California that he had obtained from the Internet. The dealership

employees did not ask to see his W–2 forms or his birth certificate.231

Seitz was thus able to buy a car and drive it off the dealership

lot successfully because the dealership employees did not verify his

documents immediately. Although Seitz applied for, and received

loans from Nations Bank, he was also able to finance the car

through the dealership itself at a lower interest rate. New Jersey

police discovered Seitz’s crime in less than 2 weeks, however, because the number that Seitz inserted into the phony driver’s license he manufactured in Clasen’s name did not match an actual

57

232 Id. 233See http://yohello.freeyellow.com/index.html. 234 Barlee interview, supra. 235Maine has since changed the appearance of its driver’s licenses. 236 Barlee interview, supra.

New Jersey driver’s license number.232 As a result, Seitz’s fraudulent scheme was exposed when the dealership submitted the phony

license number to the DMV to obtain the vehicle’s registration.

State police apprehended Seitz shortly thereafter.

(2) Thana Barlee

(a) Background

Thana Barlee entered a community college in Maryland after he

was expelled from George Washington University during his freshman year in 1999 for manufacturing and selling counterfeit Maine

and New Jersey driver’s licenses in his dormitory room.

(b) Internet Activities

Barlee initially decided to create false identification documents in

September 1999, after he was turned away from a local nightclub

because he was not old enough to gain admission. Upon his return

to campus, he started searching the Internet and discovered a

wealth of information and resources related to false identification

materials. Barlee found free, layered templates and instructions on

a website operated by an individual whom he recalled as ‘‘Mo

Mann.’’ 233 Using these templates and such materials as reflective paint, paper, and lamination packs that he bought for about $40

to $60 at an office supply store, Barlee was able to create a fake

driver’s license that same weekend. Although this first fake license

was sufficiently realistic to enable him to purchase alcohol at a

nearby liquor store, Barlee worked to perfect his techniques over

the next few weeks. He already owned a functional printer, but

with investment backing from several other students, he upgraded

to a higher-quality $600 printer, and bought a lamination machine

as well. Barlee also used the Internet to purchase additional supplies for his operation, such as gold ink for making holograms.234

Barlee initially manufactured New Jersey driver’s licenses because the general consensus on Internet discussion boards was that

New Jersey licenses were the easiest to duplicate. The first weekend that Barlee was in business he sold approximately 15 to 20

phony driver’s licenses to fellow students. He charged $20 to $100

for each license; the price he charged depended upon such factors

as whether he knew the buyer and how quickly the buyer wanted

the license. Barlee decided to diversify his manufacturing operation

to include Maine driver’s licenses because he thought it would look

suspicious for so many college students to present New Jersey driver’s licenses to a bouncer at a night club. He chose to duplicate

Maine licenses because, like New Jersey licenses, they then had a

reputation for being among the easiest to replicate.235 With only

about 20 minutes of experimentation, Barlee produced a high quality Maine driver’s license.236

Barlee told the Subcommittee that he would not have manufactured and sold false identification documents had it not been for

the ease with which the Internet enabled him to do so. On the ‘‘Mo

58

237 Id. 238Rules of Procedure, for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs as Adopted (March 8, 2001), S. Prt. 107–16 (March 2001), at

Rule 19. 239 Bestfakeids (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://www.bestfakeids.com. 240Fake ID Zone (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://wwwfakeidzon.com. 241 Ultimate Id (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://www.ultimate-id.com. 242 New Identity Kit (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://www.newid.ultramailweb.com. 243 Novelty ID 4U (last visited Dec. 10, 1999) http://www.noveltyid4u.com. 244Fakeidman (last visited Nov. 30, 2000) http://pages.eidosnet.co.uk/fakeidman.

Mann’’ website, he found templates he could use to manufacture

phony driver’s licenses; step-by-step instructions for how to make

and improve the quality of false identification documents; and a list

of materials that he would need. Barlee saw the disclaimers on the

websites but ignored them because such disclaimers are commonplace on the Internet.237

C. Referrals

Following the hearing, the Subcommittee referred several of the

individuals and websites it investigated to proper law enforcement

agencies pursuant to Rule 19 of the Subcommittee’s rules of procedure—which provides that when there is

‘‘reasonable cause to believe that a violation of law may

have occurred, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member by letter, or the Subcommittee by resolution, are authorized to report such violation to the proper State, local

and/or Federal authorities.’’ 238

The individuals thus referred include Mike Burton, Josh Dansereau, and the operators of NoveltyID4U.com and Phonyid.com—

all of whom accepted orders and payment from the Subcommittee

yet did not deliver a product. In addition, it is the Subcommittee’s

opinion that the activities of other individuals, including Robert

Sek, Brett Carreras, Tim Beachum, and Tim Catron, warrant further investigation by law enforcement, as these individuals may

have violated United States law. The offenses these individuals

may have committed range from violations of § 1028 to perjury and

mail fraud.

Unfortunately, little has been done in terms of prosecutions, although Josh Dansereau’s term of probation was extended after

Florida law enforcement learned that he had continued cashing

customers’ checks, including the Subcommittee’s. In addition, the

Fond du Lac, Wisconsin Police Department retrieved the $75 that

the Subcommittee had sent Mike Burton for a false driver’s license,

and fined Burton approximately $200. However, it appears that the

law at the time that Brett Carreras, Tim Catron, Tim Beachum,

Robert Sek, and other individuals were operating their websites

was not sufficient to prosecute them. With the exception of Brett

Carreras, the individuals appear to have closed their websites and

moved on to different ventures.

During the course of the Subcommittee investigation of false

identification websites and their operators, at least seven websites

closed down, including bestfakeids.com,239 fakeidzone.com,240 ultimate-id.com,241 newid.ultramailweb.com,242 noveltyid4u.com,243 the

‘‘Fakeidman’’ message board, and promasteridcards.com. 244 In fact,

59

245Promaster Cards (last visited May 19, 2000) http://www.promastidcards.mcmail.com.

hours after the hearing concluded, Promasteridcards.com posted

the following message on its website:

‘‘PromasterCards Ltd creased [sic] trading following the

outcome of the Senate Governmental Affairs Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations on: ‘‘False ID’s and the

Internet’’ [sic] Any orders will be ‘‘returned to sender’’ 19th

May 2000.’’ 245

IV. Conclusion

A. General Services Administration Smart Card Technology for

Federal Facilities

In response to the results of the Subcommittee’s investigation,

coupled with recent terrorist assaults on the United States by individuals whose acts, and the preparation therefor, may have been

facilitated by false identification, and GAO’s findings that detail

the weaknesses of security measures at Federal facilities, the Subcommittee has begun exploring methods of providing identification

that cannot be so readily counterfeited. This exploration led the

Subcommittee to the General Services Administration (GSA), which

is currently in the final stages of developing so-called ‘‘smart card’’ technology.

Smart cards are credit card sized cards that contain a microprocessor. This computer chip is able to store, retrieve and process

a variety of information that may be used for security purposes, including identification, entrance to buildings, and access to computers. The smart card can allow use of a range of biometric measurements for identification purposes, including fingerprints, hand

geometry, iris (eye) scan, face measurements, and voice verification.

Once an individual has enrolled his or her features, they are stored

in a template that may be verified when the individual presents

himself or herself at a security checkpoint. Smart cards can be

used for many military applications as well as Federal employment

applications such as equipment tracking, training updates, medical

information, and accounting functions, thus eliminating the need

for many different cards or forms. Smart cards may contain magnetic stripes, bar codes, and digitized photos.

At the request of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),

GSA first began working on coordinating a government wide adoption of smart cards in 1996. President Clinton’s Fiscal Year 1998

budget demonstrated the administration’s intention that every Federal employee be able to use a single card for building access, travel, small purchases, and other purposes. At this time, OMB directed GSA to work with Federal agencies, including the Department of Treasury and the Department of Defense, to develop a

smart card. The GSA team responsible for this project met with

representatives from industry and government agencies, then

began conducting a pilot program within GSA and other agencies.

On May 19, 2000, GSA awarded a Common Access ID Contract

worth a total of $1.5 billion over 10 years to five firms. Several

Federal agencies have expressed interest in the smart card, including the Veterans Administration, the Department of State, and the

60

246 Id., at 27 (testimony of Director Stafford). 247Subcommittee staff interview with David Myers, Lead Fraud Investigator, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, State of Florida, in Jacksonville, Florida (Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter

‘‘Myers interview’’]. 248 Hearing record, supra, at 20 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

Department of Defense, which has stated that it intends to use

smart card technology for both military and civilian identification

purposes.

One of the smart card’s main strengths is its government-wide

interoperability. It is GSA’s intention that the cards be accepted at

any participating Federal facility, so that, for example, cards issued

by the Department of Defense will be compatible with the security

measures at the Department of State. This should eliminate much

of the confusion and potential for counterfeiting that stems from

the multitude of cards used by Federal agencies, which has been

highlighted by GAO’s recent undercover operations. GSA’s smart

card incorporates cryptographic and biometric technology to encode

an individual’s information in a computer chip.

B. Law Enforcement’s Response to Crimes Using False Identification

It is impossible to quantify the criminal activities that have been

committed using false identification documents obtained via the

Internet. The Subcommittee met with officials from the FBI, the

U.S. Secret Service, the Social Security Administration, and various State law enforcement agencies. These officials indicated that,

when they encounter cases involving false identification documents,

they usually do not investigate the source of the documents, and

frequently do not prosecute the false-identity crime itself because

they concentrate instead on the offense that resulted from the use

of the counterfeit documents. Director Stafford acknowledged that

investigating the source of false identification is not the Secret

Service’s primary tactic in curbing the use of false identification:

‘‘We do not monitor specifically for false identification. We

feel that we prioritize and focus our investigations primarily on crimes that involve false identification, primarily

our core violations. We feel that through prioritizing,

through addressing large dollar amount, high-impact cases

that affect our community, whether it be credit cards or

bank fraud or bank loans, all of which possess some form

of counterfeit or fraudulent identification, that we can

make an impact even with our limited funding and resources in this area.’’ 246

Moreover, anecdotal evidence exists indicating that the Internet

has become a significant source of the false identification documents that are used illegally. Lieutenant Myers estimated that

about 30 percent of the fraudulent identification documents that he

reviewed in 2000 had been created via the Internet.247 This figure,

he said, had risen from slightly less than 1 percent in 1998, and

approximately 5 percent in 1999. In addition, Lieutenant Myers

testified that he expects that 60 to 70 percent of the false identification documents that his office will seize in 2001 will have come

from the Internet.248 (This includes identification documents proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 23:04 Feb 04, 2002 Jkt 099010 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\SR133.XXX pfrm01 PsN: SR133
61

249 Id. at 18 (testimony of Thomas Seitz). 250 Id. at 12 (testimony of K. Lee Blalack, II). 251 Hearing record, at 21–22 (testimony of Lieutenant Myers).

duced by website operators and identification documents produced

through files transmitted over the Internet.)

As shown by the case study of Thomas Seitz, explained in Section III.B.(1), individuals seeking false identification to further

criminal activities are increasingly likely to use the Internet to obtain false identification documents. In fact, Seitz testified that were

it not for the ease of the Internet, he may not have searched for

another source of false identification, adding, ‘‘I do not know any

other places to go to get fake identification as good as on the Internet.’’ 249

It is vital that law enforcement focus its attention on this serious

and growing problem, and in particular make every effort to curb

the manufacture and distribution of false identification documents

because, as K. Lee Blalack, II, then-Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Subcommittee, testified:

‘‘the distribution of these counterfeit identification materials is growing because of the expanding technology of the

Internet. This new technology could very well result in a

flood of phony identification documents and counterfeit

credentials if steps are not taken to curb this emerging

problem. It will be no easy task to maintain the integrity

of the identification documents on which both the government and the private sector rely.’’ 250

C. Implementing New Legislation

It is the Subcommittee’s hope that the Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000, as well the Subcommittee’s hearing,

will focus attention on this emerging problem. Indeed, focusing attention upon this industry can itself help impede its operations.

Lieutenant Myers testified at the Subcommittee’s hearing, for example, that

‘‘Probably the biggest impact that we have had on the

Internet as I monitor it and have for many years is the

work done by your own Subcommittee’s investigators. They

had a dramatic impact on those on the Internet. Not even

knowing their investigation was going on, I could see that

the activity on the Internet as it related to false ID was

going through some changes.’’ 251

Welcome though it is, however, such dissuasion through scrutiny

and public attention is far from enough. The Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000 should help arm law enforcement

officials with the tools needed to curb the manufacture and distribution of false identification documents over the Internet. Diligent efforts by the U.S. law enforcement community to employ

these tools are now needed. As then-Chairman Collins noted during

the Subcommittee’s hearing:

‘‘One of the troubling findings of this investigation is that

law enforcement officials, perhaps understandably, have

focused on the crime committed with the phony IDs, but

62

252 Hearing record, at 27 (statement by Senator Collins).

if we could somehow crack down on the manufacture and

marketing of those IDs, some of the subsequent crimes

would never be committed.’’ 252

Through aggressive law enforcement activity, and continued Congressional attention and oversight, the Subcommittee hopes and

anticipates that it will be possible dramatically to decrease the

number of crimes committed using false documents.

The following Senators, who are Members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, have approved this report:

Carl Levin Susan M. Collins

Daniel K. Akaka Ted Stevens

Richard J. Durbin George V. Voinovich

Robert G. Torricelli Pete V. Domenici

Max Cleland Thad Cochran

Thomas R. Carper Robert F. Bennett

Jean Carnahan Jim Bunning

Mark Dayton

Other Senators, who are Members of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, approving this report are:

Senator Lieberman Fred Thompson

Æ