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i 

97–821 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–66] 

OUTSIDE VIEWS ON THE STRATEGY FOR 

IRAQ AND SYRIA 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 18, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

SPENCER JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Crocker, Ambassador Ryan C., Former Ambassador to Iraq and Syria ............. 4 

McLaughlin, John E., Former Acting Director of Central Intelligence ............... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Crocker, Ambassador Ryan C. ......................................................................... 54 

McLaughlin, John E. ........................................................................................ 43 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 65 

(1) 

OUTSIDE VIEWS ON THE STRATEGY FOR 

IRAQ AND SYRIA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 18, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:26 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ Thornberry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. And I appreciate the patience of our witnesses and guests while we had a vote. 

But the good news is, now we should be uninterrupted for the rest 

of our hearing. The committee meets today to get some outside expert perspectives on the strategy moving forward against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in Iraq and Syria. And members 

should know that this hearing will be complemented by some further roundtable discussions with some former military leaders, as 

well as a hearing with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs scheduled for December 1. Of course, all of these 

hearings were scheduled before the Paris attacks, but they only 

add urgency, I think, to the subject before us. 

I think all of us probably agree that this problem has festered 

and gotten worse over time, so that easy solutions do not exist. At 

the same time, throwing up our hands and saying it is too hard is 

not really an option. I think most of the American people believe 

that the President’s statements that this is the JV [junior varsity] 

team, or that the threat is contained, don’t find those credible. And 

so I am hopeful that with a series of hearings and roundtables, we 

can help shed a little light on a better path forward to deal with 

this situation in all of its complexity. 

So let me yield to Mr. Smith for any comments he will make before I turn to our witnesses. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer statement, which I will just submit for the record. But I think this hearing is perfectly appropriate to really think broadly about what is 

our strategy. And I think it is not just against ISIS, but all of the 

groups affiliated with that ideology, Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko 

Haram, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. This is an ideology that we need 
2 

to figure out how to defeat. For a long time it was Al Qaeda. Gosh, 

10 years ago, no such thing as Al Qaeda in Iraq or ISIS. Now they 

are the great threat. And I agree with the chairman, I think this 

is a very significant threat, precisely because they have the same 

willingness that Osama bin Laden had to reach out and try to attack Western targets wherever they can find them. This is in our 

vital national security interests to figure out how best to contain 

this. But I think the lesson that has been learned is the ability of 

the United States to go militarily into a Muslim country and pacify 

it, if you will, and force it into a different direction. And Ambassador Crocker is very familiar with those struggles and those difficulties. 

The issue isn’t could we, in the short term, militarily defeat 

ISIS? Certainly. You know, we could, with our Western allies, have 

a force that could, you know, destroy them in the short term. But 

in the long term, do we create more of them? Do we then create 

a situation where we have even more of the Muslim world against 

us? How do we thread that needle? And I think that is the key. 

And what I want to hear most from our witnesses, how do we find 

allies in the Muslim, Sunni Muslim world in particular, since these 

groups are Sunni, and how do we assist them in defeating groups 

like ISIS and Al Qaeda, and convincing their populations that 

these are groups not to be supported and not to be joined? 

How, in essence, does the Muslim world, do places like Iraq and 

Syria, offer a better alternative going forward? And a big part of 

this is this part of the world has a massive youth bulge, huge youth 

population, and almost no jobs. Nothing for these people to do. 

That makes these sort of ideologies even more attractive. 

So a comprehensive solution is needed. I think we have two great 

witnesses here to offer us that perspective. And I look forward to 

their testimony. I thank the chairman for the hearing. With that, 

I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Let me, again, express 

our appreciation to both our witnesses for being here. John 

McLaughlin, as members know, was the deputy director and then 

the acting director of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] during 

the crucial beginning time of this fight against terrorists, shortly 

after 9/11. He now teaches at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced 

International Studies. 

Ryan Crocker has been a Foreign Service Officer for 30-something years, ambassador to a whole variety of countries, including 

Iraq and Syria, and is now the dean at the George Bush School 

down in College Station. So we are very grateful to both of you for 

being here. I think the ranking member is exactly right, we are 

looking for the broader strategic perspective on what we are facing. 

Without objection, your full written statements will be made part 

of the record. And I will turn to you first, Mr. McLaughlin, for any 

comments you would like to make. 
3 

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. McLAUGHLIN, FORMER ACTING 

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Chairman Thornberry and members of the 

committee, I appreciate the opportunity to share my views today. 

I always enjoyed visiting this committee back when I worked at 

CIA for 30 years. And as a U.S. Army veteran with service in Vietnam, I understand the importance of the work you do. The United 

States confronts, in Syria and Iraq, the most complex set of national security problems I have ever seen, in a way, unprecedented 

even for the Middle East. At least six region-wide conflicts converge 

in these two countries: Persian versus Arab, Sunni versus Shia, 

modernizers versus traditionalists, terrorists versus regimes, terrorists versus terrorists, and great powers versus great powers. 

You know, at the center of this is the most vicious and capable terrorist group I have ever seen. 

My last 4 years in government, as the chairman alluded, were 

focused on the battle against Al Qaeda in the post-9/11 period. The 

battle against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] will be 

harder because ISIL has at least six strengths that Al Qaeda never 

had. First, it has an ambitious strategy focused on establishing 

concentric circles of influence and operational activity well beyond 

its Syrian base. Second, it possesses territory extensive enough to 

credibly claim a caliphate. Third, it has money in the hundreds of 

millions of dollars that buys expertise, loyalty, weapons, training, 

and influence. Fourth, it has barely impeded access to the West by 

virtue of the 4,500 Western passport holders in its ranks. Fifth, a 

narrative far more powerful than Al Qaeda’s, promising jobs, families, fellowship, and power to people to whom it appeals. Its recruiting emphasizes these things, not the brutality we see on television. 

Finally, unlike Al Qaeda, it has won grudging acquiescence in 

many areas it controls by providing rudimentary public services. So 

any effort to form a counter-ISIL strategy and settle the Syrian 

conflict has to begin with an appreciation of the realities we face. 

First, time matters. Timetables slip for offensives to reclaim 

Mosul or Ramadi or to train fighters. Meanwhile, 1,000 fighters a 

month join ISIL. Its roots grow deeper. Second, the interests of 

major powers have to be reconciled. A Syrian settlement is unlikely 

without some Russian, Iranian, and perhaps Saudi acquiescence or 

cooperation. Third, progress will be impossible without meeting the 

grievances of abused and alienated Sunni populations, which constitutes 70 percent of Syria, about 20 percent of Iraq. 

Fourth, substantial territory must be reclaimed from ISIL to 

erode the image of invulnerability and its claim to a caliphate. And 

fifth, air power is important, but probably won’t be enough. 

So in light of those realities, what are the elements of a successful strategy? First, be clear about priorities. Trying to get rid of 

Assad and ISIL at the same time led us into what I would call a 

catch-22 cul-de-sac. Hurting one invariably helps the other. Time 

to say destroying ISIL comes first, and we will do the necessary to 

achieve that. Now, in making these recommendations, I want to be 

clear, I don’t have access to the data and the capabilities of the 

Joint Staff. So many of the things I am about to say here are aspirational. They would need careful planning. And I don’t minimize 

the difficulty. 
4 

But second, we can, more robustly, arm forces that have shown 

success against ISIL, such as the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. Third, 

increase the intensity of the air campaign and the number of U.S. 

special operators in theater, empowering them to go forward with 

trusted forces to advise and assist with targeting, something we did 

in the early days of the Afghan war. Fourth, move, finally, to establish a safe zone in Syria for fighters and refugees, as General 

Petraeus has suggested, defended by coalition aircraft with U.S. 

advisers present, and with a warning to Assad to stay out. 

Fifth, and most challenging, lead in the formation of a multinational force that could bring the air and ground components of 

our strategy into better balance. And finally, in the Vienna talks 

on the political solution for Syria currently taking place among 19 

nations, seek traction on what must be the single element of consensus among them that none can see benefit in having another 

failed state, another Libya, if you will, in the heart of the Middle 

East. 

Finally, let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying it is impossible to overestimate the importance of vigorous engagement with 

Baghdad for a government more inclusive of Sunnis and all Iraqi 

elements. Otherwise, Iraq can neither survive as a unitary state 

nor field an effective fighting force. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, FORMER 

AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ AND SYRIA 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Smith, members of the committee. It is a privilege to be 

before you today on issues of such great consequence. It has been 

a very grim 3 weeks. The downing of the Russian airliner, the 

bombings in Beirut, the horrific attacks in Paris, make it clear to 

all of us the enormous threat that the Islamic State poses. These 

attacks come against a backdrop of chaos and violence unprecedented in the modern history of the Middle East, which I date back 

to the end of World War I. 

Three states have failed completely: Syria, Libya, and Yemen. I 

would argue that Iraq is very, very close. And with the failure of 

states, we have seen the rise of nonstate actors, most prominently 

Islamic State, but also Al Qaeda, Iranian-backed Shia militias in 

Iraq, and a host of others. The stability of the entire region is at 

risk, as are some core U.S. interests, the security of our friends in 

the region, including Israel, the flow of oil to our allies around the 

world, and our own security. As we saw so tragically in Paris and 

in Beirut, as my friend and former wingman Dave Petraeus said, 

what happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. 

The emergence of Islamic State and other nonstate actors has its 

roots in an even larger problem, the pervasive failure of governance 

in the region. The history of the modern Middle East is a history 

of failed ‘‘isms’’: colonialism, monarchism, Arab nationalism, Arab 

socialism, communism, authoritarianism. We can hope Islamic 

State’s twisted form of Islamism is the next to fail, but hope is a 

poor policy. John McLaughlin said something very important. Is-
5 

lamic State gets this. They know it is not just about the bloody 

sword, it is about picking up the garbage. Wherever they move in, 

they attempt to establish services, a very brutal but predictable 

form of justice, and above all, to demonstrate that unlike the regimes that came before them in Syria and Iraq, they are not personally corrupt. 

If you want to look for an indicator on the longevity of ISIS or 

Islamic State, look to how they govern in the areas they control. 

I say this to situate recent developments in a larger context, and 

to underscore how enormously complex these problems are. If there 

are any fixes at all, they will not be quick. There are things that 

we can and should do, I believe, short of deploying ground forces. 

I agree with John McLaughlin, we need to ramp up our air campaign significantly, to actually degrade Islamic State. 

We need to go after their resources. We need to go after their 

money, as we did with Al Qaeda in Iraq when I was there. The targeting of their oil infrastructure, I think, is an important step in 

this direction. I have argued for some time that we need to establish no-fly zones, covering safe zones, as John McLaughlin and 

Dave Petraeus have both said. This is important as a humanitarian 

step to stop the wholesale slaughter by the Assad regime of Syria’s 

own citizens. It is also important politically at two levels. First, it 

will weaken the Assad regime. It will not bring it down, but it will 

weaken it. And it might cause Assad and his backers, Syria and 

Russia—I am sorry, Iran and Russia, to recalculate and perhaps 

move them toward a negotiating posture that would actually make 

the only solution that is possible come into focus, which is a political settlement. 

The second point for behind a no-fly zone is it would be a signal 

to the region, particularly to Syria’s Sunnis, that all the bombs are 

not falling on Sunni heads, even if they are ISIS. So this is going 

to have to be a very carefully calculated process. We have got to 

fight a Sunni group that is fighting us. We also have to signal that 

we understand and are taking steps to protect a Sunni population 

from a regime that is killing so many of them. 

Implicit in this is my belief that Russia and the Iranians are absolutely not our allies. Any perception of U.S. association with Russia or Iran in a fight against Islamic State is going to turn the 

Sunni world in Syria and outside of it even further against us. As 

John McLaughlin says, there is a broader conflict here, hot and 

somewhat a cold war. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two principal 

protagonists: The Persians, the Shia; the Arabs and the Sunnis. 

Russia and Iran are squarely on one side of that divide. We have 

to be careful we are not perceived as joining them there. 

I have argued for a substantial increase in Syrian refugee admission after thorough vetting. This blunts the Islamic State narrative 

that we are the enemies of Arabs and Muslims, and it increases 

our leverage with others who can do more, either on resettlement 

or financially. And it is a way, Congressman Smith, that I believe 

we can start to pull Arab and Muslim states more toward us, to 

have that serious conversation we so badly need to have about 

what the future of the area is as we look ahead. 

A couple of other points. John Allen, one of the greatest officers, 

in my view, ever to wear a military uniform, is stepping down as 
6 

our envoy to the anti-ISIS coalition. I would urge that the next 

envoy be a Presidential envoy, not an envoy of the Secretary of 

State. If we want to say that we are serious about this, the weight 

of the White House needs to be behind our point person in this 

struggle. Dave Petraeus and I have argued that there are other 

steps that we can take. Move our military headquarters from Kuwait to Baghdad. If we are fighting a war, we need to be on the 

battlefield. And in terms of civil-military cooperation, as I saw with 

Dave Petraeus, Ray Odierno, and John Allen, when my military 

counterpart was just across the hall, it certainly made the necessary unity of effort and objective that much easier. 

Mr. Chairman, the center of gravity for Islamic State is in Iraq. 

That is where it emerged, and that is where its key leaders are 

from. It grew in the sectarian canyons that were created as Iraqi 

Sunnis were increasingly alienated from the sectarian Shia government influenced by Iran. So John McLaughlin and I would, I think, 

agree completely, the primary focus of our efforts has to be political, and it has to be getting at some of these root issues of a sense 

of disenfranchisement and isolation of Sunnis within their own 

states. U.S. reengagement, at a sustained and high level, can make 

a difference in Iraq. I learned through two long hard years that different Iraqi factions cannot compromise among each other. They 

simply cannot because of the legacy of literal blood between them. 

But what they can do is give us something that we can then take 

to another faction and leader and start to put together transactions 

that they all want, or many of them want, that they can’t do on 

their own. We are the indispensable actor. We played that role during my time in Iraq, 2007 to 2009. I urge that we play it again. 

I am calling, therefore, not for the deployment of the 101st Airborne, but for the deployment of the Secretary of State to go out 

to Baghdad and to sit there for a week or 10 days, banging heads 

together, seeing what compromises can be forged. The Iranians are 

doing it all the time. We need to do it as well. 

So U.S. leadership cannot solve the problems of the Middle East 

or anything close to it, but it can make a difference. Most crucially, 

it can make a difference in preserving Iraq and Syria as unitary 

states. I know this is an issue of concern to this committee. It is 

my view that de facto partitioning favors only Islamic State and 

Iran and its proxies. A division into a Kurdistan, a jihadistan controlled by Islamic State, and a Shiastan dominated by Iran in Iraq 

may be to the interests of those parties; it is not to the U.S. interests. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker can be found in 

the Appendix on page 54.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Lots of interesting comments. I 

would like to follow up, but I will try to restrain myself to just a 

couple questions. I think everybody acknowledges that the military 

alone cannot solve the problem of Iraq, Syria, or ISIS. But I would 

appreciate it if each of you could briefly comment on the role you 

think military action could and should play. Mr. McLaughlin mentioned that time slippage is a factor. When we say we are going to 

do something, we don’t take the town—or the town is not taken, 

then that reduces credibility. I know Dr. Kissinger, among others, 

have argued that ineffectual military action actually helps ISIS, be-
7 

cause they are seen to withstand bombing, or whatever it is that 

we do, and it strengthens their prestige. So could each of you briefly comment on the role the military action, not just by us, but military action should play in this conflict? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, with the caveat 

that I am not sitting in the Joint Chiefs, and therefore, don’t have 

access to—basically, what I am trying to say is at the end of the 

day, any military action you plan is difficult, complicated, and has 

to be carefully thought through. With that caveat—so I don’t want 

to seem breezy about this. With that caveat, I guess my thought 

is you cannot settle these problems militarily, but you cannot settle 

them without a significant military component, in my judgment. 

We are now at the point of weighing what should that component 

be? It may be that air power can do a lot of the job if it is precise, 

if it is effective. But it seems to me that the military piece of this 

is somewhat out of balance between air and ground. So I can’t, 

without a lot of time and data, make an estimate of what numbers 

we are talking about here, or what the composition of a force 

should be. But even if, for example, you were to take through air 

power to destroy ISIL in one of these towns, let’s say Mosul or 

Ramadi or Fallujah, someone still has to go into that town on the 

ground, and see what is there and take it over and organize it. And 

that could be Iraqis, but probably they can’t do it themselves. 

And in addition to that, you know, I just respect the judgment 

of a lot of military people who say, and it accords with my own instincts here, that at some point, you have got to meet these people 

on the ground with a larger force than we are currently meeting 

them. Now, the Kurds in the north, the YPG [Kurdish People’s Protection Units] inside Syria, is doing very well with our assistance. 

The Iraqi Kurds, of course, have retaken Sinjar with our assistance. Those are good signs. I don’t think they are enough. And I 

don’t think that the pace of this campaign is such that time will 

permit us to go with a slow strangulation policy if there is a prospect of more attacks like we have seen in Paris, Turkey, Lebanon, 

and elsewhere, and particularly if they are intending to come here. 

One final comment on this. Maybe at the center of the military 

component here is the effectiveness of Iraq’s forces. I mean, the 

ambassador says, and I agree, that in many ways Iraq is the center 

of gravity here even though ISIL’s headquarters are in Syria. But 

the Iraqi forces have to take back these towns, perhaps with our 

assistance. Unless there is a political reformation, if you will, in 

Iraq that convinces Sunnis they are part of this country, those 

Iraqi forces, to the extent they are effective, will be effective largely 

through Shiite militias, backed by and augmented by Iran. 

So that is not a good outcome. Essentially, we are yielding this 

part of the Middle East to Iran, with bad consequences. So that is 

another military piece of this that happens to be very closely woven 

with the political part. So bottom line in all of this, military component is important. I think it needs to be increased in terms of 

ground forces. The intensity of the air campaign needs to be looked 

at. And the Iraqi piece of this needs to take priority, starting at the 

political level. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I would agree with John McLaughlin that 

there is no military solution to this problem. However, military ac-
8 

tion can establish conditions and a context that are more favorable 

to a political settlement eventually than the circumstances now. 

You know, that is the logic behind my suggestion that we ramp up 

the air campaign to significantly degrade ISIS. We can’t defeat 

them from the air. But I do believe we can degrade them and 

should. And at the same time, degrading, if you will, the Assad regime’s ability to murder its own citizens. The establishment of safe 

zones under a no-fly zone could do that. It could also bring buyin at a level we haven’t had before from both Turkey in the north, 

that has long advocated for this, and Jordan in the south. A safe 

zone would have to be secured. They would be the ones to secure 

it. 

But we have to show we are serious. If we are prepared to say 

we will enforce the no-fly zone, then we can turn to them and say, 

and you have got to do your bit on the ground. And then we see 

where we are if we take those two steps. That could change the climate. It will certainly put us in a position to be better able to make 

the judgment about what other steps may be necessary than we 

are right now. So that is where I would start. 

In Iraq, I cannot underscore the point strongly enough that this 

isn’t about reclaiming territory from Islamic State so much as it is 

about seeing whether some basic political accords are possible that 

will make Iraqi Sunnis feel, once again, that they are part of this 

state and have a future in it. 

I had a conversation with the speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, 

a Sunni. As his position indicates, he has bought into the new 

order in Iraq, unlike many other Sunnis. But he said that anyone 

who expects Iraqi Sunnis to stand against ISIS is first going to 

have to persuade them that life will be better under an Iraqi Government than it is under the Islamic State now. And given the sectarian nature of the Iraqi Government now, that is a hard case to 

make. 

So that fundamental political dynamic has to change. It isn’t 

going to happen by itself. It can only happen if the U.S. is directly 

engaged as a catalyst. Because right now, it isn’t Iraqi Security 

Forces who are in the vanguard in many of these clashes, it is Shia 

militias. And for Iraqi Sunnis, that is the ultimate nightmare. And 

there is another issue, the Kurds. It is absolutely the case that 

they have fought hard and well in both northern Syria and in 

northern Iraq. But the Kurds are not the answer to a strategy to 

liberate Sunni Arab areas. 

In many of those areas, the Kurds are viewed with just about as 

much suspicion as the sectarian Baghdad government is. So we 

have got to be very careful how far and where we go with the 

Kurds. So again, there are military steps we can take that can 

change the political context. I can see that more clearly in Syria. 

In Iraq, if we are going to significantly ramp up our effort, we have 

to look at what force is going to hold. Because if it is a force that 

is perceived by Sunnis to be Shia-dominated and Iran-oriented, we 

might be better off never having cleared it in the first place. 

The CHAIRMAN. No one can speak with greater authority about 

the internal political dynamics of Iraq than you. Thank you. Mr. 

Smith. 
9 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I have a couple other questions, but just 

following up on that point. The root cause of the problem here is 

we don’t have a legitimate Sunni force in Syria or Iraq that—well, 

that exists, basically. You mentioned the problem with the Kurds, 

you mentioned the problem with the Iraqi Government. And when 

you are going to get into the Sunni portions of Syria and Iraq, you 

are going to need a legitimate Sunni force to hold it. 

And you listed all the problems with the existing forces. I would 

merely submit that 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 U.S. troops down on the 

ground going into Ramadi or going into Fallujah or any of these 

towns doesn’t change that dynamic. And as hard as it would be for 

a Shia militia to hold a Sunni town or a Kurdish-backed force to 

hold a Sunni town, I would submit it would be even harder for a 

Western force to hold a Muslim town. And that is the frustration 

that we find ourselves in. But leaping into that mess and simply 

making it worse at the cost of greater lives and more money is 

something I would be very, very cautious about doing. 

Now, the struggle is, like I said, where are the Sunni—forget the 

word moderate, where are the anti-ISIL Sunnis who could actually 

hold? That is what we have got to find. That is where we have got 

to get to. That is not going to happen tomorrow or next month or 

even next year. That is going to take a lot of time. You were there 

for the Sunni Awakening, largely because of Al Qaeda’s overstepping its bounds, and also, a lot of very, very good work by the Marine Corps in terms of building relationships with the tribes. I 

mean that is the kind of thing that needs to happen. A U.S.-led 

force is going to be no more welcome in these Muslim towns than 

the Kurds and the Shia, in my opinion. 

Two issues I want to raise. One is on the refugee issue. And 

aren’t we playing right into ISIS’s hands by saying, you know, keep 

the refugees out, we don’t trust them? When, in fact, I think what 

is interesting is if you look at what actually happened in Paris, 

there is not really any evidence that any of the people who perpetrated those attacks were refugees. It is fascinating they found 

this passport, which, by the way, there is a duplicate of that passport that was forged by somebody else someplace else. So it appears not even to be a legitimate passport. And also, you know, 

find it interesting that, you know, a suicide bomber would think to 

take his passport with him on the mission. It seems like a rather 

odd choice. And it seems likely that ISIS, which has been trying 

to drum up opposition to these refugees, could easily have planted 

it. And certainly it is to their benefit if we are seen as hostile to 

refugees. I know you have written about this, Ambassador Crocker. 

I have one other line of questioning. If you could quickly hit on that 

and how it affects this overall fight if we appear unwilling to accept 

Syrian refugees? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Congressman. As I have stated on a number of occasions going back some time, I think it is important for the United States to be able to demonstrate to Sunni 

Muslims that this is not a confrontation between the West, led by 

us, and Sunni Islam. It is a confrontation between all of the civilized world, including the vast majority of Sunni Arabs, and a 

hateful terrorist group that has terrorized and killed far more 

Sunni Arabs than it has any other group. I think it is important 
10 

to stake that out to kind of defeat the persistent Islamic State narrative that this is the West, the Crusaders against the true faith. 

We need to take that away from them. This is an important way 

to do it. Now, nothing is more important than the security of our 

country. 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. 

Ambassador CROCKER. So this has to be done in a way that gives 

us confidence that anyone trying to get to this country for malign 

purposes can be screened out. There are no absolute guarantees. 

Mr. SMITH. No. And there is no absolute guarantees if you forget 

refugees. People come to this country for any reason for that matter, I don’t know if we screen them—or domestic. I mean, as I 

pointed out, in Paris, it was Belgian and French citizens, born 

there, who were radicalized who moved in this direction. So we 

have to be very, very diligent to protect our country, not just from 

refugees, but from, you know, gosh, our own citizens, or anybody 

who is here for any reason to make sure that they are not being 

radicalized. 

That happens with regrettable frequency, and our jails are full 

of homegrown radicals that fortunately we were able to catch in 

most instances. I want to ask one other question about this whole 

debate about whether or not—about who we are fighting. And this 

came up during the Bush administration, actually, that there was 

a reluctance to use any Islam, Islamist, Islamic, anything that sort 

of gave our enemy the title of being affiliated with the Muslim religion. Because we do not, as you very articulately stated, want ISIS 

to be able to claim that they are defending the Muslim world 

against Western aggression. And that is the reason why both the 

Bush administration and the Obama administration have gone to 

great lengths to not give ISIS, to not say that they are Islamic terrorists or Islamic radicals or whatever, that they are violent extremists. 

However, I think that looking at the broader issue, aside from 

just ISIS or Al Qaeda, the idea of whether or not we are at war 

with radical Islam, you know, there are a lot of Salafists and 

Wahhabis and others who right now don’t support violence against 

the West or violence against anybody, but I still think their ideology is a big problem. And they wind up funding those people. 

So how do we work with allies like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 

and others who have, at the same time, given sympathy to the very 

ideology that threatens us, even if the ideology they support tries 

and frequently fails to stop short of the violence element? How 

should we handle the issue of who we are fighting and whether or 

not we bring religion into it? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. To me, I think you can do this without bringing religion into it. I think the whole debate over what we label 

these people is overblown and gets in the way. I mean, we have all 

said it, it is absolutely true, Islam is not a violent religion. There 

is a portion of Islam that is perverted by these people and that 

works with social conditions that are conducive to recruiting alienated young people, end of story. It is the reality. We shouldn’t really spend a lot of time on what we want to label it, it seems to me. 

It is a perverted sect of Islam that causes this, end of story. And 

we went through this at the time of 9/11, because prior to 9/11, we 
11 

had trouble getting the kind of cooperation that we wanted from, 

for example, Saudi Arabia. After 9/11, we still struggled with it. 

About 2003, there were compound bombings in Saudi Arabia 

and—— 

Mr. SMITH. Until it hit home—— 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Until it hit home. But I must say, to give the 

Saudis their credit, once it hit home, at least at an official level in 

terms of our dealings with the government, people like Muhammad 

bin Nayef and others who were and still are in charge of counterterrorism, they swiveled, and they were good partners, very good 

partners. And they have since helped in a number of ways, including warning us on a couple of occasions. Recall the incident in 

which they warned us of a—according to the press—warned us of 

a bomb that was being placed on a FedEx plane and so forth. 

So they are pretty good partners in this. But, you are absolutely 

right, we are all paying the price, and they are paying the price 

for policies that they and others followed years ago, which are having now unintended consequences. That is the reality of it. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to let other people get in here. I will just say 

I don’t believe that those policies have been completely abandoned 

by that part of the world. It is not a matter of years ago. I think 

they still are too, too open to a more radical interpretation of their 

religion that creates a larger problem. And that is something we 

need to work with our allies to confront. With that, I will yield 

back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country and for being 

willing to help us today. The two phrases that I picked out that you 

indicated, one was that the U.S. was an indispensable actor, if I 

understood that correctly. And the second one was that Iraq was 

the center of gravity for ISIS. As we look at the realization that 

a military component cannot, in and of itself, settle this problem, 

we all know, and I think all of us have always known you need the 

political and the economic and diplomatic. But you have also indicated that you cannot settle it without a significant military component. So that we can make sure we have learned from our mistakes 

and don’t commit them going forward, what was the impact of not 

having a significant military component in Iraq in terms of allowing the strengthening of ISIS? 

Ambassador CROCKER. An important question, Congressman. In 

2011, of course, we withdrew all of our military forces from Iraq. 

But in my view, that was not the most significant withdrawal. 

Really in 2011, we also pulled back from serious, sustained political 

engagement with Iraqi political leaders. You can argue we 

shouldn’t have to do this, shouldn’t be in the middle of somebody 

else’s internal affairs, but it is a hard truth that the Iraqi political 

system will not function in any positive manner unless there is 

someone in the middle between and among the different factions. 

So it wasn’t the withdrawal of U.S. combat power that I think 

set us on such a grim road from 2011 until today, so much as it 

was a withdrawal of U.S. political engagement. And that is why I 

have urged, for some time, and I am sure Secretary Kerry wonders 

what he ever did to me, but I would like to see him out there, 
12 

backed up by the President, with a series of phone calls, not just 

to the prime minister, but to political leaders of every faction to try 

to get them to the point where they can pass, for example, national 

guard legislation, which has been stalled in parliament now for 

months. That would permit provinces to raise their own national 

guards, which would be paid and equipped by the central government, but much like our own National Guard system, would be 

under the authority of a provincial governor. That is how you get 

your hold force for places like Mosul and Ramadi. But it can only 

happen if the politics work. The politics manifestly will not work. 

Mr. FORBES. Would it be unfair to say that it would be difficult 

to make the politics work, even had we had that kind of engagement, if we didn’t have at least a significant military component to 

buttress that politics? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is very hard to know, sir. Yes, I argued 

for and would like to have seen a long-term military presence, precisely for the reasons I think you are suggesting, not so much for 

the combat power they would bring, but as an indication that we 

are serious about what goes on in Iraq, we have got our men and 

women in this game in harm’s way. You better pay attention. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you give us a snapshot of what 2011 looked like 

with ISIS then compared to today? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I would have to go back 2 years further 

to 2009, because that was when I left Iraq. Through a sustained 

civil-military, multi-agency effort, we had beaten back Al Qaeda 

pretty soundly. But even with the surge, we couldn’t quite eliminate them. There were little pockets in Mosul, up the river valley 

to the Syrian border. We could never quite get at it. Or if we did 

get it, they would recreate. And this was because, in spite of the 

progress that was made, lingering sectarian divisions in the country. Well, those divisions widened into canyons after 2011. And 

that is what we are dealing with today. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for 

being here. Good to see you, Mr. Ambassador. I wanted to follow 

up briefly with the discussion that you had earlier, because we 

know that the issue of refugees has also morphed into how we fight 

ISIS right now. And so, I wanted to—just speaking to the narrative 

if we were to move in a fairly strong push to push back refugees, 

whether it is seen as incremental by us, perhaps, but not necessarily interpreted that way elsewhere, how do you see that assisting ISIS, actually, if we were to do that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It reinforces their narrative that the Islamic State is the only force that will defend the faith and defend 

the believers in the faith, but that the West are the successors of 

the Crusaders, they are fundamentally the enemies of all rightthinking Muslims. So it is in that sense that I think it can feed 

that narrative. It was very interesting when Angela Merkel, when 

she was asked this, I think in September, when she took a public 

position basically saying refugees, Syrian refugees are welcome in 

Germany. 

Well, my colleagues tell me that ISIS kind of got really spun up 

over that, and on their social media saying it is all a plot. They 
13 

don’t mean it. They are just trying to lure you in so they can destroy you later once you have surrendered yourself to this Crusader 

government. It suggests that they saw that as a threat. So, you 

know, that would be my thought on this. Am I laying this out there 

as if we do, they will? No, I can’t say that for certain. I think it 

is, though, an issue we should take into account as we consider this 

very serious problem. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And Mr. Ambassador, you actually identified a fairly 

large number of refugees to make the point that, in fact, we are 

not turning our back on those who are fleeing ISIS. Where did you 

come up with that number? Why would that be something to propose? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is just that, it is a number. I sit on the 

board of Mercy Corps International. Mercy Corps, along with its 

companion organizations, you know, developed that number with 

no more science than I did, basically. A number big enough to say 

we are serious. You know, 100,000 would still be symbolic given 

the magnitude of these flows. I mean there are a million Syrian 

refugees in Lebanon right now, or over, in a country of 4 million 

people. So even if we went up to 100,000, in the face of the biggest 

refugee crisis since World War II, it is a gesture, but an important 

one. And it would establish us as being able to lead an international response to a global problem, which we are not doing now. 

We need to do it. This is not a European crisis, it is not a Middle 

Eastern crisis, it is a global crisis, and it is our crisis. We need to 

be in this fight as well as other ones, in my view. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. McLaughlin, do you concur generally 

with that point of view? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I do. I do concur. I think the other message 

it sends that ISIS would not like is you are welcome here. ISIS 

would like you to think you are welcome only in their caliphate. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. One of the other issues that we grapple 

with is we are not very patient when it comes to strategies. And 

one of the things you also point out is overreacting, and how really 

counter that is to what we are actually trying to achieve. So I wonder if you could just speak to that very briefly. You mentioned several elements of that, a no-fly zone that could reshape the context 

more favorably, not necessarily from the air, but in other contexts. 

What do you think is the single most important thing that we could 

do that sort of helps people to understand it is a patient move, but 

it is also one that makes a difference? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is a great point, Congresswoman. In 

my long experience in the Middle East, I came to understand painfully that our allies, from Pakistan to North Africa, have come to 

fear our impatience. We are here today in a big way and we are 

gone tomorrow. And our adversaries have come to count on it. So 

it is a great way to frame it. What we really need to do is establish, 

in the eyes of allies and adversaries both, that we are engaged and 

we are engaged for the long term. These are our interests as well 

as the region’s. We are going to be involved. We are not going to 

throw up our hands and go home. 

So that needs to be—in any step we take going forward, that has 

to be the message we articulate, that this is part of U.S. engagement in the region for the long term. And we need to do that, obvi-
14 

ously, in concert with regional powers and with our allies around 

the world. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Director McLaughlin, thank you for being here. Ambassador Crocker, thank you. And 

I have had the extraordinary opportunity to visit, Ambassador 

Crocker, you in Baghdad, also in Kabul, and to visit with you 

around the Middle East. And every time I have been there, I have 

seen your great appreciation of the citizens of those countries. In 

particular, I was there for the earthquake relief in Muzaffarabad 

in Pakistan. It is very clear that you are representing American interests, but it is on behalf of the people in the countries that you 

were serving in. I also share very much the point that you just 

made, and that is, that we need to have a consistency, we need to 

have a long-term approach. And that is why there are two quotes 

that come to mind to me that the American people need to know. 

And that is that President Bush, on July 12, George W. Bush, on 

July 12, 2007, quote, ‘‘To begin withdrawing before our commanders tell us that we are ready would be dangerous for Iraq, for 

the region, and for the United States. It would mean surrendering 

the future of Iraq to Al Qaeda. It would mean we would be risking 

mass killings on a horrific scale. It would mean we would allow the 

terrorists to establish a safe haven in Iraq to replace the one they 

lost in Afghanistan,’’ end of quote. 

And then President Barack Obama on December 14, 2011, he 

claimed and announced, quote, ‘‘Everything that American troops 

have done in Iraq, all the fighting and all the dying, the bleeding 

and the building, and the training and the partnering, all of this 

has led to this moment of success. We are leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq,’’ end of quote. 

It bothers me that there is simply not—that proves your point of 

a lack of consistency. In line with that, what do you see the political difficulties in Iraq of Prime Minister Abadi, what he is facing? 

And what role does the former Prime Minister Maliki play in 

progress, or lack of progress, in the country? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, we recall 

we first met a decade ago in Islamabad, and then later in Kabul 

and in Baghdad. You go to only the best places. 

Mr. WILSON. You are the great public servant. Thank you. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I believe that Prime Minister Abadi, who 

came to office at the height of the Islamic State storm into Iraq, 

understands what needs to be done and wants to do it, wants to 

take the steps that will bring the Sunni community into Iraqi society and the Iraqi state. But he is in a dangerously weak position. 

The rise of the extremist Shia militias, and these are, if anything, 

as evil as Islamic State. They are commanded in two cases by individuals who kidnapped and murdered U.S. service members in 

Iraq. They just didn’t do a video of it. They are now in command 

positions. 

Does Prime Minister Abadi like it? Absolutely not. Can he do 

anything about it? No, he really can’t. Again, which is why I think 

our engagement is so important. The Iranians are running the 

show right now for all major purposes in Iraq. They do not have 
15 

a stable unitary Iraq as their goal. They have the opposite. They 

would like to see its permanent division, because that would give 

them the ultimate victory in the Iran-Iraq war that eluded them 

in 1988. ISIS is not the strategic threat to Iran in Iranian eyes, it 

is Iraq. Because Iraq almost overran them in 1980. And a vicious 

ground war took up the next 8 years. So they want a divided Iraq. 

That is in their interest. It isn’t in ours. Prime Minister Abadi is 

not in a position to push back against them. Our sustained engagement might make a difference. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And my time is up. Director 

McLaughlin, you had indicated, too, about including the Sunnis in 

the regime. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much 

the thoughtful testimony you are both giving today. And to think 

over and over again you reinforce the complexity of the challenge 

that we face. But we all know that, bottom line, we do have a fundamental obligation in this very complex environment to best protect our country and be sure that we keep this country and our 

people safe. And given the dynamics of the Middle East, it does 

raise a lot of questions. I appreciate, Ambassador Crocker, that you 

have a lot of confidence in our Secretary Kerry, that in your testimony, you have suggested that he should become more engaged in 

Baghdad, that we as a country, through him, have an important 

role to play in bridging some of the divides between the different 

elements of the fight. But much of his attention is now turned to 

Russia. And I am curious as to your thoughts, both of your 

thoughts, really, as to whether or not Russia is changing its calculations at all given the downing of their jet and their seeming 

openness, at least through Mr. Lavrov, to engage in some way with 

Secretary Kerry, what you see as the possibilities there. 

You suggested, I think, Ambassador Crocker, we have to be very 

wary that what they seek is something quite different. But I would 

be curious as to your thoughts. Is there a diplomatic option here, 

at least in the context of Syria, that at least might slow the outflow 

and the humanitarian crisis that we are witnessing? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, one thing I learned about Russia over 

my career is, the Russians will follow their own interests. So we 

always have to ask what are their interests in all of this? They approach this rather rationally and unemotionally. 

And in this case, I think Putin got involved in the Middle East 

for a number of very hardheaded reasons. One, he wanted to show 

the world that Russia is still a great power. Two, he has accomplished one of his goals, I think, which is to distract us somewhat 

from Ukraine. It would be very hard now to really muster a consensus on Ukraine in the aftermath of what we are seeing. Number 

three—here is an interesting point—he actually has, in some ways, 

as big a problem with ISIL as we do, maybe bigger. 

The head of the Russian security service, their internal service, 

FSB, said that there are about 2,400 Russians fighting with ISIS. 

Most of them probably come from the part of Russia called the 

Caucasus, places like Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, and so forth. 

And we saw a couple of people socialized in that environment show 

up at the Boston bombing, if you recall. 
16 

So he has to worry that people fighting for ISIS in Syria will go 

back to a part of Russia where he, in his early days, fought a war 

to keep Chechnya within the Russian Federation. So that is another interest he has. 

Now, whether this inclines him to be our partner in all of this 

is hard to gauge, but I think—here is the way I would think about 

it—maybe Ambassador Crocker and I may differ a little on this— 

I think that we may have to work with him, if he is willing, in a 

limited sense, limited time-wise and issue-wise, in much the way 

that—because this is the Middle East. Nothing works like this. It 

is always like this. It is always a little crooked, a little off base. 

So in this case, we should have no illusions that we are making 

an alliance with him, or anything like that, but if we can find a 

way to gain Russian cooperation without sacrificing too much of 

our own interests, I don’t see that that is counterproductive. And 

in my testimony, I said, I think it is going to be hard to get a political solution in Syria without Russian acquiescence or cooperation. 

Just because they—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. I want to give Ambassador Crocker just a moment. 

I am about out of time, but I appreciate your comments thus far. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, I will just wrap it up by saying that, 

that the Russians have sufficient influence in Syria; that unless we 

find a way independently, or through other means to destroy 

Assad, where we don’t have to deal with that factor anymore, the 

factor of a Syrian Government that has to be somehow brought to 

the table and managed through a transition, Russia is going to 

have some sort of voice in that, which, of course, is another interest 

of his, another reason why he went into Syria to make sure that 

he didn’t lose his base at Tartus and the land installation he has 

at Latakia. 

So that is my general perspective on this, which is proceed with 

caution, but get what you can in terms of interests. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I am sorry, Ambassador Crocker, we won’t be able 

to hear you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I bet we will come back around to that question 

because it is a very important issue in solving all this. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. McLaughlin, Ambassador Crocker, thank you 

for being here. 

Ambassador Crocker, I appreciated your briefings that I, too, received in Iraq when you were there, and I appreciated your dedication. Your written statement is incredibly helpful. I mean, there 

are three things that I think are points that need to be emphasized: And one is that when you left Iraq in 2009, that you could 

never have imagined how it looks today, even in your worst nightmares; and two, you state further on in that paragraph, on page 

2, ‘‘Withdrawal of our forces and a virtual end to sustained political 

engagement in Iraq after 2010 did not end the war. It simply left 

the field to our enemies.’’ 

And then you end that paragraph with, ‘‘This is an unacceptable 

threat to the United States national security.’’ I think that is why 

everyone is so concerned is because of the clarity of that this is, in 

fact, an unacceptable threat to our national security. 
17 

Now, there are three things that we could debate that I think 

would be meaningless debates, and one of which is whether or not 

we use the word ‘‘Islamic’’ extremists or ‘‘Islamic’’ terrorists. I think 

ISIS and ISIL resolves that for us. The ‘‘I’’ in ISIS and ISIL is Islamic. 

The debate on the issue of refugees should really be a debate 

about the fact that the failure of our policies has resulted in these 

refugees because they are not safe at home. It is not the issue of 

our compassion to those that flee the Syrian regime and flee ISIS, 

because neither of them have compassion for them and are trying 

to kill them. The issue is how do we have compassion for them to 

provide safety in the area of Syria and Iraq and stability where 

they can stay at home. 

And another debate I think that is meaningless is the issue of 

boots on the ground or not on the ground, because that somehow 

has become a threshold litmus test of whether or not you have a 

correct policy. The correct policy is having a policy and a strategy 

for defeating ISIS and ISIL. 

And so I am going to turn to you and your great expertise, in 

the time that you spent in Iraq. I appreciate the comments that 

you have made. But in order to determine boots on the ground or 

not boots on the ground, we have to have a strategy. You certainly 

indicated it is going to take diplomacy. I agree. I think Secretary 

Kerry should go and do as you have said and dedicate himself to 

this. 

But there does have to be a military component. And what are 

some of the elements that you would see, sir, in that military strategy? Because I think there is great frustration in the American 

public as we hear that there are attacks now happening to ISIS 

and ISIL training camps, that we have known where they are, but 

no one is attacking them. Logistic supply lines, sales of oil, other, 

you know, operations of ISIS and ISIL are going without challenge. 

So clearly, the strategy that we are doing is not working, and is 

threatening our national security. What are just some of the basic 

elements that we are not doing that you believe should be that 

overall military strategy as policy elements? Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Congressman. 

The two that I think are important for us to do and do swiftly 

is, first, amp up significantly the air campaign against Islamic 

State. Paris changed a lot of things, and I think it should certainly 

change how we look at a target list. Let’s look at it again. If there 

are key facilities for Islamic State that we have identified, we need 

to go nail them. And, again, money counts. 

I hope that we are significantly ramping up an effort to figure 

out how they are making it and cut it off, whether that is politically or militarily inside Iraq or inside Syria. They are making a 

lot of money out of oil. Well, they have got to move the oil somehow. We should be able to figure out how and just absolutely stop 

it. 

The second thing, as I suggested, is the establishment of no-fly 

and safe zones. And I don’t mean to be glib about this. I mean, 

there is risk associated with that. There is cost associated with it. 

I am in the enviable position for the first time before this com-
18 

mittee where I am not responsible for anything, but you are. So 

these are thoughts. 

But I think that the establishment of no-fly and safe zones could 

bring in our Arab and—or Jordanian and Turkish partners in a 

way they are not engaged now, including with the possibility of a 

ground component. It could set the Russians back, getting at the 

Congresswoman’s question. It would be fundamentally a military 

step, but it would have political significance. 

Both of these together could then change the political environment we are looking at now that might make a political approach 

that is hard to imagine imaginable. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Walz. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both again. You have been incredibly helpful. 

I think, I find the need to do this, if we are quoting quotes about 

what happened to set our policy going forward, I just want to remind people of two. March 16, 2002, from Vice President Cheney: 

Things have gotten so bad in Iraq from the standpoint of the Iraqi 

people, we will be greeted as liberators; I think we will go relatively quickly. Weeks rather than months, he predicted, significant elements of the Republican Guard will step aside. 

Later, June 20, 2005: The insurgency in Iraq is in the last 

throes; this will be over during the Bush Presidency. 

Certainly mistakes have been made. Certainly things have been 

quoted. If we are using these things, we better learn from what 

was said as we are going forward. And I appreciate both of you for 

your thoughtfulness on that. You have always been there. You are 

giving us great testimonies today. With that, I think, as Members 

of Congress, it is important to keep that in mind. 

Ambassador Crocker, my question to you is, are we synchronizing with State Department in all of these elements as we deal 

with, look at Syria, look at Iraq, as you are talking about? Because 

I keep hearing here, and you hear it in this disjointed silo talk of 

military action and everything else. In your experience, do you see 

a synchronized plan, if you will? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I certainly think this would be the time 

to develop one. One thing that Dave Petraeus and I did—we were 

sort of working on this before either of us ever got to Iraq—was to 

establish a joint civil-military team to begin framing a joint campaign plan. We developed it. It was blessed by the White House, 

and it was the plan for the whole of government, all the civilian 

agencies, DOD, and the military. It was, again, our joint campaign 

plan. 

And I think the circumstances now, even less favorable and more 

complex, badly call out for that kind of broad strategy and a unified strategy. In our system, the only way you get there is for the 

White House, the President to say, this is what we are going to 

have. Go out and do it. And I certainly think this is the moment 

to do that. 

Mr. WALZ. Well, I agree, and I think, in candor, that is a fair 

criticism. Because I am trying to understand, one, as you said, 
19 

what the strategy is, and how that nests in the broader strategy 

of national security from the 50,000-foot view, if you will. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. If I could add a point to what the ambassador 

said, with which I completely agree, when we talk about military 

component here, and in my testimony, I do, as the ambassador 

does, recommend some amping up of a number of things. And I 

would underline, I think, that maybe the safe zone would be—to 

answer another question that came here—maybe the most dramatic and consequential thing that could be done, because it would 

be visible, it would be different, it would require leadership, it 

would require risk, it would require coalition activity, and it would 

grab the attention of the region, and it would send a good message 

to Sunnis. 

That said, when we talk about military action, going to your 

point, Congressman, I think we always have to remember to ask 

the question, what comes next? So you have got to go through 

phase one, phase two, phase three, and the important phase, phase 

four. 

What happens when we do amp up our military and we go in 

and we—through one means or another, hard to calibrate here— 

manage to get Mosul back or Ramadi or Fallujah and break down 

Raqqah, what is our plan then? Who goes in? What is the governance structure that we contemplate? Who is in charge of it? What 

is our role in bringing it about? 

So I just urge everyone, even though the two of us seem to favor 

a greater military component, that we all need to step back and 

say, and then what? 

Mr. WALZ. Would it be both your hopes that as Members of Congress, we should all be able to articulate that fairly clearly what 

that would be? Does it trouble you that you do not hear that or you 

see, again, in the midst of all this, and it is certainly rightful to 

be concerned, but as the refugee crisis dominates the discussion as 

opposed to the root cause of the refugee crisis? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, we are in the early days of recalibrating 

our thinking about this, I believe, as a result of Paris. And as I 

said to the chairman just before we began, this feels a lot like post9/11 to me in terms of the barrage of conflicting reports we are getting from the media, and in terms of the emotions we have about 

it and the frustration we feel. 

So even though we feel a greater sense of urgency and should— 

and should—I am the one who said time matters—we need to do 

it with all due deliberation. 

Mr. WALZ. I appreciate that. And I think it goes to my point I 

started with. We need to make sure we don’t go blindly, because 

we do have the advantage of past both successes and failures. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I appreciate it. And I appreciate your expertise. 

I just kind of want to follow up on the last couple of questions. 

On the issue of taking your expertise and being able to look at this, 

kind of, from all the expertise you have and looking at it from the 

outside and saying, you know, here is what really needs to be hap-
20 

pening, but in real time, in this culture and this country and what 

is happening. 

And what is happening right here today in other committees that 

are meeting, talking about what do we do with refugees, talking 

about the difference between what we are all saying and what we 

should be saying and some of the benefits about what you are talking about with refugees and how we look then at all these things 

being projected back. 

What is the role of the President? Because he is saying things 

too. So he is saying, you know, earlier on, these are JV folks. He 

is saying, we have contained these people as early as the morning 

of the attack on Paris. What kind of role does that play? How does 

that play back to ISIL when there is a disconnect to the American 

people? They are watching it. Every night we are watching it with 

them. 

The President is here. We are here. Governors are saying no. 

Federal law, the President says—overrides anything that—and you 

have Americans all over the place, and they are hearing a mixed 

message from all of us. What does that say? What kind of signal 

does that send? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Okay. That is a great point, and it weaves 

in some of the other questions and things we have been talking 

about. We are, of course, a Presidential system. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Correct. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Policies are set at one end of Pennsylvania Avenue, and they are resourced at this end. Our post-9/11 

moment, if you will, that you had described, is actually, this time 

around, maybe a pre-9/11 moment, where we now have the opportunity, as we look at what happened in Paris, and look at what 

could happen here, to say it is a new day. We are going to move 

together in developing and implementing a coordinated policy that 

is truly whole of government, and that involves consultations, 

meaningful consultations with Congress, and we are going to do it 

quickly. Now, that has to be a Presidential initiative. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Correct. And let me just throw one wrinkle in 

this. Because when we are talking about real time, real issues, real 

problems that we deal with right now—I just talked to some of my 

folks that just deployed. They were there for 6 months in Iraq, 

came back, and I was just with them last week. And after the doors 

were shut, and I said, what is really going on? Because we are 

hearing horror stories sitting on HASC [House Armed Services 

Committee]. 

And the rules of engagement keeps coming up. So I talked to fliers, that when it came to trying to engage on a convoy of American 

trucks that were left behind when the Iraqis fled their positions, 

heavy artillery, convoy of ISIL soldiers with artillery in the back, 

the beat is on, they ask if they can engage, and the decision came 

back no. And it does not seem to be just the folks I have talked 

to. 

We have had hearings here on the issue of rules of engagement. 

If the rules of engagement aren’t lined up with what you are talking about in potentially a pre-9/11 event, where else do you start 

and what else can you do if, you know, we are hearing one thing 

from people on the ground and the message from the White House 
21 

seems to be something entirely different, or the message even from 

Secretary Kerry? What do you do with a great divide in between? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think that we realize that Friday the 

13th changed the world, and it needs to change how we think, organize, and act. Let’s look at all of it. What are we doing? What 

are the ROE [rules of engagement]? Do they make sense anymore? 

Are they going to allow us to degrade Islamic State to the point 

where, like Al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, 

they really don’t have the bandwidth to plan complex organizations. How do we get there? This needs to happen. It needs to happen on a whole-of-government basis, and it needs to happen now. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate it. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Crocker, I want to ask two big questions, and I am 

going to try to give you 4 minutes to answer. And you can even 

point me in the right direction if there is not enough time. But to 

follow up on something the ranking member said, you made a really compelling case about how we need to reverse gains that Iran 

has made in Iraq, and roll back their hegemony there, and we can’t 

act on that quickly enough. 

But within the context of the Iran-Saudi Arabia cold war that 

was described earlier, it is hard to see how Saudi Arabia is a much 

better friend than Iran. Their successful exportation of Salafism, 

Wahhabism, the funding that continues to this day, the mess that 

they have helped to create in Iraq, in Syria, the fact that they may 

have a comparable number of beheadings in Saudi Arabia, comparable to ISIS, and the fact that they aren’t really accepting refugees, how do we use our influence with Saudi Arabia? What leverage do we have to get them to be a better actor? 

And then the other question, with 3 minutes and 30 seconds left 

is, can you outline at 30,000 feet a comprehensive strategy for the 

region so that we are not picking one or the other battle, and really 

addressing things comprehensively? You mentioned the modern 

area is 100 years. What is the 100-year look at this? Sorry for the 

short time to respond. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. On Saudi Arabia, yes, we have 

a lot of significant differences with the Saudis that, you know, John 

McLaughlin has alluded to. At the same time, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been a pillar of U.S. policy and engagement in the 

Middle East since the end of World War II. I mean, our policies 

and our engagement were set on the deck of the USS Quincy in 

Great Bitter Lake in early 1945, the historic meeting between 

President Roosevelt and Ibn Saud. 

So before we kick the prop out from under that keystone, we better really think about it. And think, as you said so well, you know, 

that when the Saudis finally got engaged, circa 2003, they did a 

pretty good job cleaning house. We need to build on that. 

There is a fundamental issue there, no pun intended, of Salafism, 

because if you look at the theology of Islamic State, it goes back 

to the same primary source of Ibn Taymiyya, who is the primary 

theological source for Saudi Salafism, as it is for Islamic State 

jihadism. So there are some very tricky issues here. But I think we 
22 

have got to be careful with that relationship, particularly at the 

current time. 

The overarching U.S. strategy, I would say, it is the security and 

the stability of the states in the region, broadly speaking, certainly 

those who have been close to us. They are facing unprecedented 

threats. Let’s look at it across the board. Who needs what from us? 

Lebanon, a country that I spent 6 long, hard years in, including 

during the Beirut Embassy bombing that I survived, they are facing an existential threat through the refugee flows. You know, one 

out of five people in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee. What do they 

need to ensure their own stability? What does Jordan need? What 

do the Kurds need? Under the overarching construct that a stable 

Middle East is a vital U.S. interest, and that it has a lot of components, so that is where I would start. 

It raises issues of economic development, of military cooperation. 

There are a lot of pieces out there. This is the time to knit it into 

a whole. And the construct I would offer is just that, what is necessary for the security and the stability of the region and of our 

friends in it. This is an Arab-Israeli discussion. It is an Arab-Kurdish discussion. It is a critical American discussion. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am struck by the need for strategic thinking, 

now as much as we ever have needed it. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank Mr. McLaughlin, Ambassador Crocker. 

Thanks so much for joining us. 

I wanted to pose a question to both of you as we look at this pretty complex situation. I want to point to two individuals that I think 

have pretty good perspective on there. They spoke at the Reagan 

National Defense Forum. And former Under Secretary of Defense 

Policy Miche`le Flournoy argued to make sure we are putting opportunities and solutions in our hands so that we can influence the 

outcome of any political negotiations, and make sure that we are 

mindful of all the different pieces of how this fits together. 

And Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates argued in a Wall Street 

Journal article saying that we must create a better military balance of power on the ground if we are to seek a political solution 

acceptable to us and to our allies. And as you know, with Russia 

being in there, they seek to influence a political balance there, I 

think, to try to force a choice: It is either Assad or ISIL, obviously 

now with the other forces in the region, both with Iran trying to 

play in that arena and others. 

Give us your perspective on how that balance ultimately plays 

out. What can we do to best predominate in the outcome of what 

will happen, and we will make an assumption that we do, indeed, 

defeat and destroy ISIS and that we are left now with what happens in that power vacuum. Give us your perspective on what we 

should do to make sure the outcomes are different than what has 

happened in Iraq? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, I think we need to be seen and to be the 

leader. There is a struggle for leadership going on here, and I think 

we are two or three beats behind. Just over the last number of 
23 

years, it has just worked that way. And there was a time when the 

U.S. was the power broker and honest broker in the Middle East. 

A lot of what Ambassador Crocker is talking about in Baghdad 

amounts to what I would call the ‘‘Honest Broker’’ rule, the one 

that everyone can come to in a region that is very, very divided. 

We have succeeded in the past when we have forcefully seized that 

role. That is the first thing we need to do. 

The second thing we need to do—we have talked about the military component. I think, you know, we agree we need to do more 

and we need to be seen as the ones organizing that more and 

bringing others along with a concept of what we are going to do 

and where it is going to end, what is the exit—not exit. ‘‘Exit’’ is 

a bad word—what it is going to evolve into. Because I don’t think 

exit is what we want to do in the Middle East. 

Finally—and I am going to stop and let Ambassador Crocker 

have the time here—finally, I think on Assad and the choice that 

Russia is trying to set up, I think clearly they were trying to set 

that up, and perhaps they still are, although their calculations are 

changing a bit, now that they have had a plane taken down. That 

is not going over well in Russia. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. And I think—I cannot prove this to you—but 

I think Putin went in there with the understanding, at some level, 

that Assad cannot rule this country again, the Syria we have 

known. He might have been able to help Assad shrink it down to 

a small patch that he owns, and I think—in the councils being discussed in Russia, people must sit around and say, our goal is not 

to preserve this person. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Our goal is to make sure that when the system changes, we are calling a lot of the shots on who is in. So I 

think he is not wedded to this individual. Now, we have got to find 

a way to get into that—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN [continuing]. Wedge and call the shots. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Ambassador Crocker. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think that is important. I believe that 

military actions along the lines I outlined—air strikes to weaken 

Islamic State, no-fly and safe zones to weaken Assad, and kind of 

shift the dynamics, which now favor Iran, Russia, and Assad—need 

to use military action to shift those parameters. 

Yes, the Russians are going to have to be part of any agreement. 

I would rather us go into the process of trying to make one on 

terms that are less favorable to them, more favorable to us, and I 

think we can do that. 

And I find—for once in my life, I find you irrationally optimistic. 

I never thought I would say that about this great American hero. 

But I would like to believe this about Russia that they are—in the 

wake of the airliner, that they are changing their position. I will 

believe it when I see it. 

I noticed that the air strikes that they launched against ISIS targets, they said in one case, and we hit ISIS targets yesterday, the 

day before, near Idlib in the west. ISIS is nowhere near Idlib. They 
24 

hit the Free Syrian Army, again, in Ararashem. Again, groups we 

support. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. So as not to seem like Pollyanna here, to disappoint the ambassador, I would just rephrase it a little bit to say 

I think Russia may be recalculating its interests here, not really 

changing its desires. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ashford. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you. 

And thank you for being here and thank you for everything you 

have done. This truly is an incredible afternoon for me. And I am 

new, but I did, in February, did go to the Middle East, and we did 

speak with many of the leaders you have talked about. And clearly, 

what was talked about then is what, to some extent, what you are 

talking about now. 

I mean, the national guard issue was very compelling. We talked 

to the minister of defense who said this is a way for us to get national buy-in to what we are trying to do by having the national 

guard form up in each one of the provinces. 

And then, also, King Abdullah talking about the idea of safe 

zones in the desert, outside of the cities that could be developed. 

And none of that seems to have occurred during that 7 or 8 

months. And there are other things that were talked about as well. 

I just have two basic, general questions. One is, when we talk 

about containment versus another strategy that is not containment. I have been thinking about this when we use the word ‘‘containment,’’ is there even a possibility of a containment strategy in 

the Middle East? It is so dynamic and changing so quickly. Both 

of you, maybe that is a very simple question, but I don’t see how 

you can contain something that is changing, especially when you 

have an ISIS, an organization that can do what it did in Paris? 

So, Ambassador. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you. And I would just say very 

quickly, I am very pleased that you went out in February. I know 

what your lives and your schedules are like. I have seen members 

of this committee in hard places. I just can’t underscore strongly 

enough how important CODELS [congressional delegations] to this 

troubled region are in ensuring that America has, through its elected representatives, has an understanding of what the realities are. 

So I hope you will continue to visit. 

Yeah. Again, as Dave Petraeus and I have said, what happens 

in the Middle East doesn’t stay in the Middle East. And that has 

always been true. I was a political counselor in Beirut after the embassy bombing when George Shultz came out as Secretary of State 

and he said he wished he could just build a 10-mile-high wall 

around Lebanon. And whatever happens inside it happens, but it 

doesn’t happen to us. Well, you couldn’t do it then and you can’t 

do it now. 

So you can’t contain Islamic State any more than you could contain Al Qaeda. You have got to go after them wherever they are. 

Again, I do not believe you can defeat or eliminate Islamic State 
25 

by air power, but I think we can certainly mess them up enough 

that it is going to be pretty darn difficult for them to get the bandwidth to plan a complex attack. 

So I don’t see containment as at all a viable option, and very 

dangerous to even talk about it. I don’t see defeat in the cards anytime soon. But, boy, we should be getting after degrade in a very 

major way. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Sir. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I think ‘‘containment’’ is a bad term to use 

with this group. The philosophy that I have always believed in 

when it comes to defeating a terrorist group has three parts: First, 

you have to destroy the leadership; second, you have to deny it safe 

haven; and third, you have to change the conditions that gave rise 

to the problem. 

Okay, with Al Qaeda, we did the first two pretty well. The third, 

that is a bigger whole-of-government, long-term issue changing the 

conditions that give rise to this. With ISIS, we haven’t destroyed 

the leadership, they have a safe haven, and the conditions are all 

in flames. So the idea of containing something that explosive 

doesn’t seem like the right idea. 

I am not sure what containment even means. Seems to me, if you 

bottle these people up, they are still going to keep coming to Paris, 

Brussels, Turkey, perhaps here. 

Mr. ASHFORD. And I think that is what we saw when we were 

there was that containment can’t possibly work. Everyone that we 

talked to said that very thing. 

And then, I don’t have much time left, but the other question 

that always comes to mind when the French talked about we are 

at war with the Islamic State, is that where we are? Is that the 

word? Is that the proper terminology? Very briefly. I don’t have 

much time left. Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, that along with some of the other 

things we have talked about, can be a pretty fruitless linguistic endeavor. We have talked about, you know, is it Islamic terrorism? 

To me, that is an absolute no-brainer. Islamic State named itself, 

and it has got a theology. Same thing, war on terror. To me, it 

doesn’t matter what you call it. You just—— 

Mr. ASHFORD. It is what it is. 

Ambassador CROCKER. You just have to do it. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate your candid remarks. 

When I visited Iraq in 2011 at the drawdown, and when we 

exited Iraq, I had two sons over there serving in the United States 

Army. And it was interesting their take in regards to what occurred just recently with ISIS, and what occurred within Baghdad, 

and particularly what, Mr. Ambassador, you had mentioned, the 

fact that we not only left—took our military out that gave, I think, 

some backbone, at least had some conversations with the Iraqi 

military, because my sons did some train-up with the Iraqis. 

And there was some brigades that were outstanding combat 

units, and there were others that were terribly lacking. But then 

when we pulled out the political engagement, it just seems like 
26 

that was a huge mistake that compounded it because we didn’t 

have troops there to back up, or at least on a training end of it, 

assist the Iraqis. 

I mean, we saw that starting to occur, I think, in Afghanistan. 

The President has since changed that. And I think you hit on 

this—and I will get to a question here in a second, but, Mr. Ambassador, I believe that a question was asked whether or not we have 

a strategy today to both of you. 

Do you see us having a coherent strategy today from the President to outlining, A, what we expect to accomplish; and then B, 

how we are going to accomplish that? Do you see a strategy today 

that is articulable that we are having a hard time with? Do you 

see that today with the President? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I would be just blunt: No, I don’t see a 

comprehensive strategy. And what I was trying to get at in response to Congressman O’Rourke’s very good question, you know, 

maybe it was okay—I don’t think it was, but maybe it was—before 

November 13; it is definitely not okay today. We need that strategy, and the President has to set the course. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I think that is where we struggle is that the 

President does have to set that course as Commander in Chief. And 

particularly, I think where you are seeing all this blowback now in 

regards to the Syrian refugees, you are seeing—now the Governor, 

I think, from Maryland just said they don’t want them—is because 

I think that—maybe this is just my feeble brain saying this—is 

that if we had had a strategy, it might make it more palatable to 

the American people as to what our strategy is, what we expect it 

to look like in regards to accepting those Syrian refugees. 

Because I hear what you are saying, is that if we absolutely say 

no, you know, we are going to create some other problems off in 

the future, whatever. But the American people are going, you 

know, we don’t want them here just because we see no leadership. 

And they are concerned about—and I heard you talk about thorough vetting of the Syrian refugees. 

Now, we sat here when we were talking about the Free Syrian 

Army and how they are going to train them up and how are they 

going to vet those folks, and we are going to have to rely upon 

Saudi Arabia as a vetting process, because we didn’t really have 

the ability to vet within Syria. 

So I think, how do we do that? I mean, how do you assure the 

American people that there is truly—not just words, because the 

President does a great job with that—but truly believe that they 

are going to be safe with those that we allow in? And I don’t have 

a problem with refugees. I mean, that is not my issue. But it is 

how do you make America safer, and how do you convince the 

American people that you are going to do that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I would agree, sir, that the refugee issue 

has to be woven into a larger whole, and I tried to get at that a 

bit, saying this step on refugees that gives us leverage with other 

countries for them to do more to engage them more directly and 

meaningfully on the broader problem, to establish safe zones, north 

and south in Syria, so—— 

Mr. NUGENT. And I think you brought up some good ideas on nofly zone. But I think the difference is in Syria, it would be, I think 
27 

would be difficult for us just because of the ability for the Assad 

regime if they saw that as a move to take them out by doing the 

safe zone. With their ability to strike our aircraft, I would just 

think that we are going to—we are going to ramp up what this 

looks like. And now that you have Russia flying there, I just don’t 

know how—maybe we could have done that earlier, but I don’t 

know how that works today. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Again, part of that larger linked comprehensive discussion. Safe zones, no-fly zones, are linked to the 

refugee issue, are linked to a weakening, not elimination of Assad, 

are linked to a degrading of ISIS, are linked to a political push in 

Iraq. It all has to be sewn together, and that is what I hope we 

are doing right now. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, both, for joining us here today. 

Ambassador, I was a special assistant to General Petraeus when 

you were serving in Iraq. And although I was actually out in the 

field, I reported directly to him, and I can’t tell you what a difference it made, the confidence that you and he brought to the 

troops on the ground with your leadership. So thank you especially 

for that. 

I share your view that the center of gravity here is Iraq with the 

Islamic State. That is where they were able to dramatically expand 

their territory and influence. And I also share your view that it is 

our political withdrawal from the Iraqi Government that essentially set the conditions for them to expand. 

I would like to hear from both of you, how, at this point, we 

should reestablish control or influence in the Iraqi Government? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, it is a whole lot harder to regain influence once you have lost it than to maintain it when you have 

got it, but we must make this effort, in my view. And I have given 

you my initial thought on this: To show we are serious, you send 

America’s top diplomat. And it is not an overnighter. I mean, it is 

days. 

Mr. MOULTON. And I assume we would have to put advisers back 

into the ministries, back into the prime minister’s office as well? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, we would have to look at that. I 

think that was important, but maybe not critical. The critical element was the heavy political lift. 

I will just give you one example, and it gets at Congressman 

Nugent’s question, what happened to the Iraqi military when we 

completely disengaged? Well, General Petraeus and I faced this 

when we were there. Nouri al-Maliki had one criterion for his top 

field commanders. It wasn’t competence. It wasn’t battle experience. It was loyalty, could he be absolutely certain that they would 

not take their division, make a sharp, right turn and overthrow his 

government? 

Mr. MOULTON. Right. 

Ambassador CROCKER. So he would put in some pretty awful people or try to. But because we had advisers out there and were on 

it, we could go in and say, prime minister, not a good idea, here 

is why. When we stopped doing that, he made all of those appoint-
28 

ments. And the Iraqi army turned into the force that just cut and 

ran as soon as Islamic State showed up because they had no 

leadership, because the prime minister, for understandable reasons, in his view, prized loyalty above all, and there was no American counterweight. That is what we have to bring back. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. McLaughlin, do you have anything to add to 

that? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I would just think that—no, I think Ambassador Crocker has authority on this by virtue of his time there and 

his success and his experience. 

The main point I would underline that he made, which I have 

seen time and time again is, it is much harder to get that influence 

back than to keep it when you have it. Now, however, I will just 

elaborate a bit by saying, if we don’t get it back—as I say in my 

testimony, if we don’t get it back, the consequences are Iraq will 

not survive as a unitary state, nor will they ever have an effective 

fighting force, which, in turn, means that Iran will own this problem. 

Mr. MOULTON. Let me propose a very radical idea, and I have to 

confess, I haven’t given this much thought myself. But would there 

be any virtue to saying, Russia, you take Syria; we will take Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, could you sit under a tree until that 

thought passes. It would be delivering the Sunni majority of Syrians into the hands of Assad and Iran backed by Russia, and the 

results of that would make it impossible—— 

Mr. MOULTON. For Iraq as well? 

Ambassador CROCKER [continuing]. For us to do anything in 

Iraq. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Yeah, this is going to be a long, hard slog involving political, military—and I want to emphasize what the ambassador said a number of times—whole of government. The President has to lead. He has to reach out to this branch of the government, which I have been through seven or eight—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Let me just ask one more question because—— 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN [continuing]. Administrations and I see that 

rarely happening. 

Mr. MOULTON. Right. Just a few seconds left, why is it important 

in our fight against ISIS to accept refugees and to continue doing 

so? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I tried to lay out the reasons that—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Right. Mr. McLaughlin, if you could—— 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I think if we refuse to accept them, we send 

a terrible message that will appear in ISIS propaganda. It will say, 

you, Sunnis, you refugees, you people who are fleeing, you are welcome only in the Islamic State in the caliphate. You are not welcome in these materialistic, corrupt countries. We will just play 

into that narrative. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

I was in the Middle East in May, en route to Afghanistan. We 

stopped in Kuwait and Qatar, met with the joint task force leadership, and we were at the air operation center, which I have spent 
29 

time there myself. And they basically told us that, you know, we 

have got them on the defense, and 2 weeks later, Ramadi fell. And 

I am sort of simplifying our long conversations. 

And then last Friday, the President said, we have got them contained, you know, right before the Paris attack. So clearly, you 

know, we have got gaps in intelligence and information. 

Just, Mr. McLaughlin, with all your experience, what can we do 

in order to close some of those gaps and, you know, specifically as 

we are looking at a whole-of-government approach trying to choke 

off their resources, like what else can we do to build capability 

growing in the intelligence? Are there other things we can do short 

term? Long term? Clearly we have gaps. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, ironically, I mean, counterterrorism is 

the thing we have worked probably most intensely on over the last 

12 years. It is the top of the heap in terms of priority. The gap 

issue is always a hard one to understand. In other words, the way 

I would put it is, we collectively, our allies and we, the United 

States, have prevented a lot of terrorist attacks, foiled them, disrupted them. 

They get through sometimes. They got through in Paris. I don’t 

know enough about the reporting that flowed back and forth to 

understand exactly how that happened. I understand, for example, 

there was a paper written here that referred publicly to one of the 

perpetrators, to the so-called mastermind. Some of these people 

were on our lists. 

The only thing I can say to explain this without regrouping my 

colleagues and saying, tell me everything you know, would be that 

in this particular line of work, it is very labor intensive. And particularly when it comes to surveillance, you run out of resources 

real fast, particularly in a country like France, which is relatively 

large, has a—among the Europeans, I would say the French 

counterintelligence—counterterrorism effort is probably the best. 

And yet, they probably simply missed it because they were overwhelmed by the task. 

So there is an urgency that has to always be present. You have 

to check out every lead, and then you have got to go to school on 

your mistakes, go to school on what happened here, which I am 

sure they are going to be doing to ask what more do we need. You 

will see them. They have declared this state of emergency. They 

have very intrusive surveillance laws, as you know, which don’t 

even require court orders, to monitor phones and so forth. 

So I think we have to also step back and ask ourselves, for intelligence as a whole, do we have the balance right in the terms of 

the way we think about it? There is a big debate now, as you know, 

about strong encryption. The whole Snowden thing, I can tell you 

that it had a powerful effect in warning terrorists not about specific 

methods, but about the fact that our surveillance is very good. 

And they have tightened up their communication, so that has 

made the job of intelligence much harder, and when you put—I 

don’t know that strong encryption was involved in the Paris thing 

yet. I don’t know whether we know that, but I have heard Director 

Comey’s testimony about the effect that that has had on our inability to detect certain things here, such as the events that happened 

in Texas, for example. 
30 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. So I am on the Homeland Security Committee, and I was in the task force that was appointed for the last 

6 months just to look at combating the flow of foreign fighters and 

terrorists. And we had 32 findings. We released our report in September. But one of them is related to going into dark space and 

then encryption and the challenges with that. 

And look, we have been trying to raise the alarm bells for a long 

time now. Now, there is obviously a tremendous focus since last 

Friday, appropriately. But my next question, I only have a little bit 

of time left is, we are now focused on ISIS, but we also need to look 

at the region. 

And you mentioned, Ambassador Crocker, the Sunni-Shia rift is 

now a canyon. A lot of our Sunni Arab allies are somewhat ambivalent and bystanding because, you know, they are not convinced 

that ISIS is a threat to them. They see this militant Islam state 

of Iran with America engaging with them and their influence in the 

region through Iraq and Assad, Hezbollah, Hamas, and they really 

think they are the threat. 

So can you just speak to—I just have a little bit of time left— 

you know, the Sunni-Shia rift and how that is impacting the whole 

region? 

Ambassador CROCKER. This is the first time this has happened 

region-wide. Iran and Saudi Arabia used to be allied under the 

Shah, so it is not foreordained that it is this way, but it is this way. 

And that is why I have said several times here, and in my testimony, we have got to be extremely careful not to further fuel the 

perception among the Sunni Arabs led by Saudi Arabia that we are 

really cozying up to Iran. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Because that is not the side of the canyon 

we are going to want to be sitting on given our longer-term interests. That is why, as we wade in with a more intensive campaign 

against Islamic State, we have got to balance that by causing some 

significant pain to Assad and those behind him. 

So this is the problem from hell, trying to calibrate our actions, 

think them through, be sure we don’t leap into motion, we will do 

something, think later, not a good idea right now. This is the moment to reassess post-Black Friday. We need to do it. We need to 

do it quickly, and we need to do it very, very thoughtfully. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. My time is expired. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Ambassador Crocker, you see no strategy. But I see a strategy 

working with coalition partners and local partners like the Kurdish 

forces and the Syrian Arabs to deal with the ground issue, which 

has resulted in about 25 percent of the area that ISIL covered having been recovered. I see a strategy of working with the Turks to 

secure the Turkish border, to prevent the revolving door of radicalized terrorists in and out of Syria. 

I see a strategy of working to cut off ISIL’s financing. I see a 

strategy of working to disrupt and expose the messaging that ISIL 
31 

uses to radicalize and recruit terrorists. I see a strategy of working 

to stabilize the areas that have been liberated from ISIL control. 

I see addressing the issue of air power for the last year in both Iraq 

and Syria. 

That is a strategy. That strategy is being tweaked as events 

occur. So I think it is unfair to say that there is no strategy. I 

think there is clearly a strategy. And another strategy that has 

been employed is to protect our homeland from events such as that 

which happened in Paris last Friday the 13th. And that is what 

Americans fear the most is an attack here on the homeland. 

And what I hear you gentlemen in unison with an old strategy, 

that, quite frankly, contributed to us being at this point where we 

are now, with the ill-fated invasion of Iraq as a response to 9/11, 

you would have us do the same thing now, go into Syria with a nofly zone, or a safe zone, as you call it, Mr. McLaughlin, but what 

it is is actually a no-fly zone. 

And then both of you argued that the U.S. should lead a multilateral ground invasion, both in Iraq and Syria, but you don’t have 

an end game. You don’t tell us how long we are going to be there, 

how much money it is going to take, how many of Americans’ sons 

and daughters will have to be killed and maimed in an endless war 

on foreign shores, us occupying basically. I mean, that is what it 

would result in. 

And those two tactics, or those two strategies, ground war and 

air no-fly zone, do absolutely nothing to stop the development of 

homegrown radicalized terrorists, which is what most Americans 

fear. They fear a terrorist attack here in the U.S. How will what 

you propose prevent or staunch the growth of homeland terrorists 

that would strike Americans here on American soil? How would a 

ground war, thousands of miles away from here, stop that? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. It would not. In order to—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, how can we stop it? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. That, to me, is not exactly a separate problem, 

but it is a problem—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is the main problem. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. It is a problem not closely connected to—there 

is two types of attacks we could have: One is one that would originate here from homegrown; another is one that could come here 

from planning over there. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, how will a ground invasion over there stop 

that? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, I don’t think either one of us are arguing 

for a ground invasion. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I have heard you say you want to lead, you want 

the U.S. to lead, and you want us to lead a multinational force to 

occupy, to basically go in and take and hold land. That is what I 

have heard both of you say throughout this hearing, and I think 

I am the last Congressman to ask a question. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. The way I would—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is all I have heard. A lot of blaming of President Obama and his team for what is happening now on the world 

stage. That is all I have heard. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. You know, before we came in here, Ambassador Crocker and I were talking on the side here, and one of the 
32 

points we made to each other was, having been in government, we 

recognize that government is very hard. It is very hard to do any 

of this stuff we are talking about here. And I know that the President has a logical approach here. I would call it contain and strangle, if I were giving it a name. 

I think what we are all struggling with is Paris happened despite 

that. And I don’t see anything we have said as being inordinately 

critical of the President. What we are saying basically is, is what 

we are doing now adequate to prevent further incidents like that 

and particularly here. And to me, it is not persuasive that the suite 

of techniques we are using now is up to that task. And that is how 

I would put it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is quite easy—— 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. And if we were still in government, we would 

still be struggling with this, I can tell you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is quite easy to sit back and when you are not 

involved and criticize. And that is—certainly, we need to hear from 

voices who disagree, you know. And Congress has a role in this, 

certainly. 

And I am not begrudging you having differences, but I do take 

issue with the scenario that there is no plan of action, the President is weak and indecisive and, therefore, is responsible for what 

is going on now with national security. I cannot let that idea, 

which is being perpetrated on to the American public, to drum us 

up towards another war that we participate in with ground forces. 

I just cannot let that go by without commenting critically, as critically as you all have been of the current policies that are taking 

place now. 

And I thank the chairman for indulging me. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke, you have an additional question. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Crocker, I wanted to return to the dialogue that we 

had earlier. Again, looking at the 100-year period of the modern 

Middle East, and those borders and some of the dynamics were 

formed in the cataclysm of a dying empire and the climax of another empire. 

And right now, 100 years later, we have some extraordinarily unusual events, the greatest mass migration out of that region, perhaps ever, but certainly the greatest mass migration to Europe, 

and greatest displacement since World War II, the attacks in Paris, 

the many failed states, three for certain, perhaps another on the 

brink. 

And I realize it is impossible to answer this adequately in 31⁄2

minutes, but if I boil down your answer about a strategy, it was 

to better support our friends and strengthen preexisting relationships. And I just want to, again, point to Saudi Arabia, with all the 

history there and the historic meeting between the Saud family 

and Roosevelt in 1945 forward, is it time to rethink that relationship? 

Should there be an additional price the Saudis pay for the implicit protection of the United States in terms of accepting refugees, 

being a signatory to the U.N., refugee compact to ensuring that 

they are not exporting this extreme fundamentalism, et cetera, et 

cetera? Just to use Saudi Arabia as one area. 
33 

But I don’t think we could do more of the same and expect a different result. I really feel if there is ever a time to rethink our approach to the Middle East, it is yesterday, and would love to hear 

your thoughts on how we might approach that. 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is an important question, clearly. At 

this time of unprecedented upheaval in the region, and the evolution of an Islamic State threat that I have, in the past, styled as 

Al Qaeda 3.0, I would try to shore things up right now to reverse 

this really terrifying centrifugal spiral downward, and that, in my 

view, means working with our established partners. 

If we can get somewhere to a better place, clearly, a part of ongoing discussions should be, so, let’s sit down and look at how we got 

into the mess we were facing and are trying to resolve. And I think 

there is an important conversation I tried to hint at it, and I don’t 

want to take you into the arcane weeds of Islamic theology, but 

Saudi Salafism and Islamic State jihadism both go back to the medieval Islamic thinker, Ibn Taymiyyah. They split on the concept 

of jihad. For the Salafists, it is defensive, for Islamic State it is offensive. But the point is, jihadism, as practiced by Islamic State is 

an offshoot, if you will, of mainstream Salafism. So how is Saudi 

Arabia going to deal with that? You know, it is the kind of discussion I don’t think we often have with them, but we need to have 

it. Because eventually, as we saw in the 2003 timeframe, you know, 

it comes home. The ultimate goal of Islamic State is to center the 

caliphate on the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. That is what 

they are all about. 

So, in the process of shoring up a region, relying on our traditional relationships, we need to have that conversation. But I 

would not, at this stage, certainly suggest that we give them an ‘‘or 

else,’’ because the relationship is as frayed as I have seen it, frankly. Of all the disturbing things I have seen over this last year, one 

of the most disturbing is something little remarked. And that is the 

fact the Saudis decided to launch an air campaign into Yemen 

without consulting with us. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And yet we are helping them, without going into 

specifics. I mean, there is some cooperation there. And I am out of 

time. I appreciate the chairman’s indulgence. Thank you for your 

answers. I appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Ashford. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one clarification question I would like to ask on refugees. I absolutely agree 

with you that the leadership role in this area is critical, and it is 

part of the entire strategy, is to deal with refugees and deal with 

the other things we have talked about. But what troubled me after, 

and you mentioned, you know, the Friday the 13th changed, Mr. 

McLaughlin mentioned it, changed the dynamics considerably. Is it 

not reasonable to at least make certain that as we bring these refugees into the country, that there be some effort put towards making sure that the validation process is in place, that we are thinking about these various things that are into why someone is 

radicalized and that sort of thing? Is that not reasonable, Ambassador? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is not only absolutely reasonable, it is 

an obligation. The security of our Nation has to be uppermost. And 
34 

clearly, Congress has a role in determining that the measures, the 

checks, the screening is adequate to assure us of that. You are not 

going to get it to 100 percent, but to a reasonable degree. I know 

a fair amount about the vetting process. I helped develop it when 

I was in Iraq, and we were trying to get Iraqis out of harm’s way 

that had worked for us. I personally think it is adequate. 

Obviously, Members of Congress are going to have to satisfy 

themselves that that is the case. It is clearly a set of questions that 

can be asked. And maybe it needs to be tweaked. I don’t know. But 

that is important. I think it can be done, I think it is being done. 

So I would hope that we could move forward for the reasons we 

have cited. This is not only an important humanitarian step, it is 

important politically for the reasons we have adduced. 

Mr. ASHFORD. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I am going to try you all’s patience 

for just a moment more, if you will allow me, and circle back 

around with a couple things we have talked about. But just to try 

to pin you down maybe, for lack of a better expression. Mr. Ambassador, talking about trying to help the Iraqi Government become 

more inclusive, we have a provision in this year’s defense bill, 

which hopefully is about to be signed into law by the President, 

that allows him to directly arm the Kurds and the Sunni tribes if 

they cannot certify that the Iraqi Government in Baghdad is inclusive. I mean, obviously, the purpose of that is to push them to be 

more inclusive out of fear that the Kurds and the Sunni tribes 

would directly receive arms from us. But I guess my question for 

you is, as you watch these things, do you think it is still possible 

for there to be an Iraqi Government that is inclusive of the Sunnis 

and others or have we gone too far with Iranian influence? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is a critical question, Mr. Chairman. 

And I don’t know the answer, which is why I said at the outset 

that we have three failed states, and Iraq teeters. What I do 

strongly believe is we need to find the answer to that question by 

engaging. 

The CHAIRMAN. The only way to know is to try. 

Ambassador CROCKER. The only way to know is to try at a high 

level and over a period of time, which is why I keep urging that 

we do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Fair point. Mr. McLaughlin, I want to go 

back to the catch-22 that you talked about at the beginning, because it seems to me we are already having some de-confliction 

with the Russians. Some will see that as working with the Russians, which is working with the Iranians, and working to keep 

Assad. In any event, removing Assad is a lesser priority. And anything we do along that line and still go after ISIS, does that not 

fuel the perception that we are more anti-Sunni and willing to 

work with the Shia in that endeavor? I mean, I am perplexed by 

this catch-22 also. Assad, ISIS, Sunni, Shia, you go after one versus 

the other, the other benefits. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, acknowledging, again, that it is hard to 

sequence something this complicated. It just seems to me that you 

have to set priorities. And you have to say, in these circumstances, 

it is more important for us right now to degrade ISIS, and not to 
35 

give up the idea of getting rid of Assad. Because the dilemma here 

is you cannot have—I can’t imagine a political solution that preserves Syria and brings in the 70 percent of Syrians who are Sunni 

if Assad is there. So that is the dilemma. But given what we have 

in front of us in terms of realities, I don’t see how we do both at 

the same time. And I assume that is why Secretary Kerry is saying—has said a number of times now, and I believe the Russians 

have also—you can read this between the lines—have said, Secretary Kerry has said Assad doesn’t have to go right away. So you 

look at the Vienna talks, and it appears that the communique ́s that 

have been signed indicate that we have a 6-month period in which 

we try to figure out how do we get to that point of a transitional 

government, or a temporary government, and then an 18-month period during which time a new constitution is written and elections 

occur. 

I am sure this is a fragile agreement. I am sure it is just barely 

hanging by a thread. But I think the table is set for something that 

ultimately moves Assad out, with the priority being to get to a 

point with ISIS first where we have some confidence that that part 

of the equation is under control. That is how I am seeing it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Fair point. We have a late entrant for a 

brief question. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you for indulging my last question here. 

Thank you for your service, both of you, very distinguished careers 

serving our country in various ways. I appreciate that. And maybe 

you have already addressed this. I have been in and out with other 

committees going on and so on. But I want to ask about the tilt 

by this administration toward Iran. I asked John Kerry this one 

time. He denied that there was any tilt toward Iran. And yet all 

of our Gulf State Arab partners, allies, friends, the Israelis, they 

are convinced that there is such a tilt. 

So, even if it is not reality, it is perception at least. I think it 

is reality. Can you comment on that? Has there been a tilt? And 

if so, shouldn’t the administration just come out and say that and 

that they want to see Iran become a regional player and welcomed 

back into the community of nations and be a good guy even though 

there is no evidence that they are going to actually pull that off? 

I am just very, very concerned about this direction. It seems like 

a huge gamble to me. But am I reading this wrong? Or is there actually a tilt going on toward Iran? 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is a very important question. I do not 

perceive a significant tilt by us toward Iran. But perception is reality. And nowhere is that more the case than the Middle East. 

And there is a perception that there is such a tilt, which is why 

I have emphasized in my written testimony, in my remarks today, 

we have got to make it absolutely clear that our goals and Iran’s 

goals in the region could not be more opposite. That the nuclear 

agreement in no way implies that we are a party to Iran’s nefarious policies and actions throughout the region. It is 20 years ago 

this month that a great world leader was assassinated, Yitzhak 

Rabin. 

Before he was killed, he said something that I have always remembered. And it was about—it was the time he was negotiating 

with the Palestinians post-Oslo. He said, ‘‘I will negotiate peace as 
36 

though there were no terrorism, and I will fight terrorism as 

though there were no peace negotiations.’’ Well, we need to fight 

Iranian-backed terrorism as though there were no nuclear agreement. Because that is what the Iranians are doing. They didn’t let 

that agreement, which they wanted, get in the way of all the nefarious things they are doing in Syria and Iraq, and, to a degree, in 

Yemen. Well, we need to meet them with the same determination 

to confront them where they are acting as a very malign player. 

You know, that doesn’t jeopardize the agreement because it 

doesn’t jeopardize the agreement for them as they carry out these 

malign actions. But I feel very strongly we have got to assert ourselves against them, both because of the damage they are doing, 

but also because of the perception in the eyes of our Sunni friends. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Director McLaughlin. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I don’t disagree with anything the ambassador 

said. The only thing I would add is I don’t think there has been 

a tilt toward Iran, perceptions aside. Without knowing precisely 

what is discussed within the administration, though, I think there 

is a hope that somehow in this 15-year period that we buy with the 

nuclear agreement, there is a hope, I am assuming, that there will 

be some kind of transformation inside Iran. There were some bits 

of data you can seize upon to strengthen that hope. Generally proAmerican views of the man on the street, the large numbers of 

women, 40 percent of their university graduates are women. A lot 

of things about Iran that are at odds with the behavior we see on 

the part of their government. I suspect there is a hope among those 

who work on Iran that they may change. But 15 years is not a long 

time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. In this recent intercontinental ballistic missile 

test in violation of U.N. protocols, isn’t that a big concern to us? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, as I viewed their behavior since the nuclear agreement, I haven’t seen anything that strengthens my hope 

that they will change. I think the ambassador has it right. Until 

we see something fundamentally different about them, we have to 

do exactly as Yitzhak Rabin advised. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And to both of you, thank you, again, 

for all of your expertise and guidance in very difficult matters, and 

for your time here today. With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

NOVEMBER 18, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

NOVEMBER 18, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

NOVEMBER 18, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. JOHNSON. We must have a plan in place that addresses the systemic grievances of disenfranchised Sunni populations in Iraq and Syria, whose grievances 

with the Damascus and Baghdad governments have directly contributed to the rise 

of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Without confronting these grievances, 

this region will remain susceptible to further radicalization in the future. As you 

have discussed in your testimony, the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq seems to be 

fueled in part by the grievances of Syria’s Sunni majority and Iraq’s Sunni minority 

against their respective Alawite and Shia controlled governments. With that in 

mind, how can we realistically address those grievances while preserving the 1916 

borders created by European colonial powers after World War I? 

Ambassador CROCKER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. In the effort to garner sustained buy-in from the Sunni communities in the region, how can the lessons from our collaboration in the Anbar Awakening in 2006 and 2007 be applied today? 

Ambassador CROCKER. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Any new plans moving forward must incorporate the interests of 

the wide variety of stakeholders in the region in order to be sustainable in the long 

run. Given that it appears for the first time since World War II that United States, 

our NATO allies, and Russia are contemplating military action against a common 

enemy, what are we doing or can be done to ensure any Russian action does not 

detract from our aims and our allies in a post-ISIS Syria and Iraq but rather complement our own objectives? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Æ