United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to Congressional

Committees

September 1993 1994 DEFENSE

BUDGET

Potential Reductions,

Rescissions, and

Restrictions to RDT&E

Programs

GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-254792 

September 30, 1993

Congressional Committees

We examined the Department of Defense’s (DOD) fiscal year 1994 budget

request and prior years’ appropriations for selected research,

development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs. Our objectives were

to identify potential reductions to the fiscal year 1994 budget request and

potential rescissions to prior year appropriations. We also identified

potential restrictions the Congress can place on the obligational authority

for certain RDT&E programs. This report summarizes information and

briefings provided to your staffs from May to September 1993. This is one

of a series of reports that examines defense budget issues.

Our review showed that schedule delays, program requirements changes,

and uncertainties have affected RDT&E funding requirements for fiscal year

1994 as well as prior years’ appropriations. As shown in table 1, we

identified potential budget reductions of about $472.6 million and

rescissions from prior years’ appropriations of about $42.7 million. We

also identified approximately $958.3 million in requested funding that the

Congress can restrict.

Table 1: Potential Reductions,

Rescissions, and Restrictions to

RDT&E Programs

Dollars in millions

Agency

Potential 

fiscal year 1994

reductions

Potential 

prior year 

rescissions

Potential

restrictions

Army (app. I) $14.1 $16.8 $21.9

Navy (app. II) 8.4 18.5 •

Air Force (app. III) 415.3 7.4 142.4

Multiservice (app. IV) 34.8 • 27.2

Defensewide (app.V) • • 766.8

Total $472.6 $42.7 $958.3

We focused on program cost, schedule, and performance issues and

examined expenditure documents to determine whether requests were

adequately justified and whether unobligated funds from prior

appropriations should be retained. We also evaluated budgetary

implications of program changes resulting from threat changes DOD

identified. Appendix VI provides information regarding our scope and

methodology.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
B-254792 

We did not obtain written agency comments on a draft of this report.

However, we did discuss the details in this report with Office of the

Secretary of Defense and program officials and incorporated their

comments where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management

and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Louis J. Rodrigues,

Director, Systems Development and Production Issues, who may be

reached on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staffs have any questions. Other

major contributors are listed in appendix VII.

Frank C. Conahan

Assistant Comptroller General

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
B-254792 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Chairman

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Chairman

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Chairman

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Chairman

The Honorable Joseph M. McDade

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Potential Reductions,

Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army

Research,

Development, Test,

and Evaluation

Programs

8

Environmental Quality Technology 8

Line-of-Sight, Antitank 9

Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile 10

Javelin 11

Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition 12

Aviation-Advanced Development 14

Other Missile Product Improvement Programs 14

Appendix II 

Potential Reductions

and Rescissions in

Navy RDT&E

Programs

17

Generic Logistics Research and Development Technology

Demonstrations

17

Advanced Anti-Submarine Warfare Technology 18

Satellite Laser Communications 18

Electronic Warfare Development 19

Appendix III 

Potential Reductions,

Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Air

Force RDT&E

Programs

21

National Aero-Space Plane Technology Program 21

Advanced Cruise Missile Program 23

Defense Support Program-Ground Station Upgrade 24

Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training 24

F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter 26

Night/Precision Attack 27

F-16 Squadrons 28

Spacelifter 29

Appendix IV 

Potential Reductions

and Restrictions to

Multiservice RDT&E

Programs

31

Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System 31

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Contents

Appendix V 

Potential Restrictions

to Defensewide

RDT&E Programs

33

Theater Missile Defenses 33

Theater Missile Defenses (Engineering and Manufacturing

Development)

35

Appendix VI 

Scope and

Methodology

37

Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to

This Report

38

Tables Table 1: Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and Restrictions to

RDT&E Programs

1

Table I.1: Summary of Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Programs

8

Table I.2: Environmental Quality Technology Funding/Request

and Potential Rescission

9

Table I.3: Line-of-Sight, Antitank Funding and Potential

Rescission

9

Table I.4: Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile Request and

Potential Reduction

11

Table I.5: Javelin Funding/Request and Potential Reduction 12

Table I.6: Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition Funding/Request and

Potential Reduction and Restriction

14

Table I.7: Aviation-Advanced Development Funding/Request and

Potential Rescission

14

Table I.8: Other Missile Product Improvement Programs

Funding/Request and Potential Restriction

16

Table II.1: Summary of Potential Reductions and Rescissions in

Navy Programs

17

Table II.2: Generic Logistics Research and Development

Technology Demonstrations Funding/Request and Potential

Rescission

17

Table II.3: Advanced Anti-Submarine Warfare Technology

Funding/Request and Potential Rescission

18

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Contents

Table II.4: Satellite Laser Communications Funding and Potential

Rescission

19

Table II.5: Electronic Warfare Development Funding/Request and

Potential Reduction

20

Table III.1: Summary of Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Air Force Programs

21

Table III.2: National Aero-Space Plane Technology Program

Funding/Request and Potential Restriction

23

Table III.3: Advanced Cruise Missile Funding/Request and

Potential Rescission

23

Table III.4: Defense Support Program-Ground Station Upgrade

Funding/Request and Potential Rescission

24

Table III.5: Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training

Funding/Request and Potential Reduction

26

Table III.6: F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter Funding/Request and

Potential Reduction

27

Table III.7: Night/Precision Attack Funding/Request and Potential

Reduction and Restriction

28

Table III.8: F-16 Squadrons Funding/Request and Potential

Reduction and Restriction

29

Table III.9: Spacelifter Funding/Request and Potential Restriction 30

Table IV.1: Summary of Potential Reductions and Restrictions to

Multiservice Programs

31

Table IV.2: Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System

Funding/Request and Potential Reduction and Restriction

32

Table V.1: Summary of Potential Restrictions to Defensewide

Programs

33

Table V.2: Theater Missile Defenses Funding/Request and

Potential Restriction

35

Table V.3: Theater Missile Defenses Funding/Request and

Potential Restriction

36

Abbreviations

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

DOD Department of Defense

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-Three

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix I 

Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

We identified about $14.1 million in potential reductions in the Army’s

fiscal year 1994 research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)

request, $16.8 million in potential rescissions in the Army’s fiscal years

1992 and 1993 funding, and $21.9 million in potential restrictions to the

Army’s obligational authority for fiscal year 1994 requests. The following

section provides a brief description of our analysis and proposed actions

by program. The proposed actions are summarized in table I.1.

Table I.1: Summary of Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and Restrictions to Army Programs

Dollars in millions

Program

Potential fiscal year

1994 reductions

Potential prior year

rescissions

Potential 

restrictions See page

Environmental Quality Technology • $10.400 • 8

Line-of-Sight, Antitank • 4.000 • 9

Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile $4.933 • • 10

Javelin 2.200 • • 11

Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition 7.000 • $5.000 12

Aviation-Advanced Development • 2.400 • 14

Other Missile Product Improvement Programs • • 16.900 14

Total $14.133 $16.800 $21.900

Environmental

Quality Technology

For fiscal year 1993, the Congress provided about $62.9 million to the

Army for the Environmental Quality Technology program. Included in the

amount was $14.6 million for Biodegradable Packaging Technology. This

program is a joint Department of Defense (DOD), Department of

Agriculture, and industry effort to commercialize biodegradable

packaging.

Results of Analysis The Congress can rescind $10.4 million of the Army’s fiscal year 1993

unobligated funds for the Environmental Quality Technology program

because the Army has not released these funds to the responsible program

office and has not established a requirement for the funds. An Army

official said that these funds are being held for other future requirements.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix I 

Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

Table I.2: Environmental Quality

Technology Funding/Request and

Potential Rescission Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

23 $29.487 $62.875 $21.229

Potential rescission • 10.400 •

Line-of-Sight, Antitank The Line-of-Sight, Antitank weapon system is a kinetic-energy, direct-fire

missile that is mounted on a Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis. The missile

uses high speed and a heavy metal rod, rather than an explosive warhead,

to destroy tanks. The missile is intended to replace the Improved

Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided missile, which is mounted

on a M113 vehicle chassis.

Results of Analysis The Army did not request funds for the weapon system in fiscal year 1994.

However, $4 million can be rescinded from the fiscal year 1993

unobligated funding because the Office of the Secretary of Defense does

not plan to permit the $4 million to be expended for the weapon system.

The Army had planned to begin Line-of-Sight, Antitank engineering and

manufacturing development in fiscal year 1993. However, the Office of the

Secretary of Defense required the weapon system to continue in advanced

technology development and withheld $47 million of the fiscal year 1993

appropriation—$43 million to fund the program in fiscal year 1994 and

$4 million to be reprogrammed to other uses.

The deputy program manager stated he expects the $43 million to be

released in fiscal year 1994, and he acknowledged that the $4 million was

withdrawn and would not be released. Therefore, the $4 million is excess

to the program’s needs and is available for rescission.

Table I.3: Line-of-Sight, Antitank

Funding and Potential Rescission

Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

56 $27.900 $113.150 •

Potential rescission • 4.000 •

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix I 

Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

Tri-Service Standoff

Attack Missile

The Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile is a joint Army, Air Force, and

Navy program (led by the Air Force) to develop a stealthy conventional

cruise missile. This Army missile variant is expected to carry 22 Brilliant

Antiarmor Submunitions and be launched from the Multiple Launch

Rocket System launcher.

Results of Analysis The Army’s fiscal year 1994 budget request of approximately $89.7 million

for the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile can be reduced by about

$4.9 million because the request exceeds requirements. The obligation

plans for fiscal year 1994 show a planned expenditure of $84.8 million, or

$4.9 million less than the request.

According to program management officials, the Army included

$4.9 million in the overall request in anticipation of congressional

reductions and withholding of funding at higher command levels. The

anticipated withholding included a general reduction by the program

executive office and funds for small business innovative research and

settling closed accounts.

Program management officials told us that the $4.9 million was not excess

to their needs because unforecasted expenses arise. They said, for

example, that the Army is renegotiating the contract that provides Brilliant

Antiarmor Submunitions for the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile’s

operational tests and that the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile program

has to pay for these test articles. They also said that the $1.3 million for

small business innovative research would not be released to the project

office.

However, in the example of the contract renegotiation, we found that the

Army has not determined the amount of the increase nor the fiscal year

that the adjustments will occur. Furthermore, cost estimates used for

preparing budget submissions already include amounts for risk, and other

administrative remedies are available for meeting unexpected funding

needs.

We agree that the project office does not receive the amounts that are

withheld for small business innovative research. However, the authorizing

legislation tasked the Army, not the project office, to provide funding for

small business innovative research.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix I 

Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

Table I.4: Tri-Service Standoff Attack

Missile Request and Potential

Reduction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

103 •a • $89.682

Potential reduction • • 4.933

aAmounts appropriated for the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile for fiscal years 1992 and 1993

are classified.

Javelin The Javelin is designed to be a medium-range, portable antiarmor system

for use in rapid deployment operations, rough terrain, and air assault

operations. It is intended to defeat tanks and other targets expected on the

battlefield and to replace the Dragon weapon system in the Army and

Marine Corps inventories. The system will consist of a missile; an

expendable container and launch tube, which will house the missile; and a

reusable command and launch unit for target acquisition and surveillance.

Results of Analysis The Army’s fiscal year 1994 request of about $44.9 million for the Javelin

can be reduced by $2.2 million because the request exceeds requirements

by $2.2 million.

The Javelin project manager agreed; however, he said that 5 percent was

added in anticipation of congressional reductions and appropriation

adjustments by the Army and the program executive office. He said the

general congressional reductions and Army adjustments in fiscal year 1993

amounted to 5.4 percent for such items as small business innovative

research and closed accounts. The project manager said, although not a

requirement, the $2.2 million will be needed if similar reductions occur in

fiscal year 1994. The project manager also stated that the amount that is

withheld for small business innovative research is not released to the

project office.

The request can be reduced by $2.2 million because (1) the amount is not

planned to meet program requirements; (2) general reductions do not

occur every year; (3) amounts withheld for closed accounts are

contingency funds rather than actual needs; and (4) the Army, not the

individual projects, is tasked for small business innovative research.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
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Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

Table I.5: Javelin Funding/Request and

Potential Reduction

Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

109 $118.297 $95.929 $44.937

Potential reduction • • 2.200

Brilliant Antiarmor

Submunition

The Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition is designed to be an antiarmor, top

attack submunition that will use an acoustic sensor to initially locate

targets and an infrared seeker to guide the submunition to its target. The

submunition’s primary carrier will be the Army variant of the Tri-Service

Standoff Attack Missile that will be launched from the Multiple Launch

Rocket System launcher. The carrier will deliver the submunition behind

enemy lines to attack tanks and other targets before they can reinforce

front line troops.

The Army was planning to begin a product improvement program for the

submunition in fiscal year 1993. The goal of the product improvement

program is to increase submunition lethality and allow attack of new

targets, including cold, stationary tanks and mobile missile launchers. The

carrier for the improved version will be a longer range version of the Army

Tactical Missile System.

Results of Analysis The Army’s fiscal year 1994 request of about $117 million for the

submunition can be reduced by $7 million because the request exceeds

requirements. The Congress can restrict obligational authority for another

$5 million until the Secretary of Defense determines that the planned

product improvement program is the most effective alternative for

accomplishing the mission.

Request Exceeds Requirements The Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition project office included about

$7 million in the request in anticipation of congressional and higher

command reductions to the appropriation before release to the project

office. Submunitions program management officials stated that fiscal year

1993 reductions included a 3-percent general reduction, 1.5 percent

designated for small business innovative research, and amounts withheld

for closed accounts. However, the request can be reduced by $7 million

because (1) the funding was not planned to meet program requirements;

(2) general reductions do not occur every year; (3) the Army, not the

individual projects, is tasked to provide funding for small business

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix I 

Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

research; and (4) amounts withheld for closed accounts are contingency

funds, rather than actual needs.

The project manager stated that all funds requested were required for the

program. He stated that the total requirement for contractor funding for

fiscal year 1994 was uncertain because the contract was being

renegotiated. The deputy project manager reiterated that the project office

does not control the funds that are used for small business innovative

research ($1.8 million for the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition) because

the Army removes the funding before the appropriation reaches the

project office.

We agree that the requirements for program funding are uncertain.

However, program documents did not support a requirement for the entire

$117 million. In addition, program officials informed us that the contract

renegotiation will include a decreased scope of work as well as a program

stretchout. Furthermore, we note cost estimates on which budget

submissions are based include amounts for risk.

We also agree that the project office does not receive the amount of funds

that are withheld for small business innovative research. However, we

note that authorizing legislation indicates that the Army, not the individual

project office, is tasked to provide funding for small business innovative

research.

Product Improvement Program The Army requested $13.1 million to continue a study for an improved

warhead and seeker. However, the Army has not determined that the

submunition improvement is the most efficient and effective alternative

for accomplishing the mission. There are other alternatives that the Army

and the other services have proposed for at least a part of this mission. For

example, the Army Tactical Missile System improvement is designed to,

among other tasks, engage mobile missile launchers, and the Air Force’s

Joint Direct Attack Munitions Program is also to accomplish that task. An

official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for

Research, Development, and Acquisition said that the systems were

complementary, rather than duplicative. The Congress, thus, can restrict

obligational authority for the product improvement program until the

Secretary of Defense determines the most cost-effective system(s) for that

mission.

The project manager said that $8.1 million for fiscal year 1994 would be

required to complete the initial study and provide data needed to assess

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix I 

Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

the cost-effectiveness of alternatives. If the Congress wishes to fund

studies from the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition’s appropriation,

$5 million of the request can be restricted until the alternatives are

assessed.

Table I.6: Brilliant Antiarmor

Submunition Funding/Request and

Potential Reduction and Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

127 $118.286 $114.835 $117.008

Potential reduction • • 7.000

Potential restriction • • 5.000

Aviation-Advanced

Development

For fiscal year 1993, the Congress provided approximately $16.3 million to

the Army for Aviation-Advanced Development. Included in this amount

was $11.1 million for Aviation Life Support Equipment, $2.4 million more

than the Army had sought. This project provides for the engineering

development of support equipment that is needed for Army air crews’

survival on the battlefield.

Results of Analysis Unless the Congress remains convinced that these funds are needed, the

Congress can rescind $2.4 million of the Army’s fiscal year 1993

unobligated funds for Aviation-Advanced Development because the Army

has no plans to expend these funds for the program for which they were

provided. A project official said there were no requirements for these

funds.

Table I.7: Aviation-Advanced

Development Funding/Request and

Potential Rescission Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

89 $13.681 $16.304 $10.759

Potential rescission • 2.400 •

Other Missile Product

Improvement

Programs

The Army included funding for the Army Tactical Missile System in its

request for other missile product improvement programs. The missile

system is a surface-to-surface missile capable of destroying targets in the

rear area of an enemy’s defense. The missiles are fired from a modified

Multiple Launch Rocket System launcher and are intended for use

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix I 

Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

primarily against surface-to-surface missile sites; air defense systems;

command, control, and communication sites; and other high-value military

targets.

The Army plans to begin a product improvement for the missile system in

fiscal year 1994 in order to engage similar targets at longer ranges as well

as mobile missile launchers. The program’s goal is to provide more

accurate information to the missile’s guidance system and increase the

speed and range of the missile.

Results of Analysis The Army’s fiscal year 1994 request of approximately $66.4 million for

other missile product improvement programs includes $25.8 million for

the Army Tactical Missile System. The Congress can restrict obligational

authority for $16.9 million of that amount until the improvement program

is determined to be the most cost-effective method of accomplishing the

mission.

The $25.8 million request includes $8.9 million for a DOD analysis—Joint

Precision Strike Demonstration—and $16.9 million for efforts related to

the improvement program. However, the Army has not determined that the

improvement is the most cost-effective solution for accomplishing the

mission. There are other alternatives that the Army and the other services

have proposed for at least part of this mission. Two alternatives are the

Army’s improvement to the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition program to

engage mobile missile launchers and the Air Force’s Joint Direct Attack

Munitions program. Therefore, the Congress can restrict obligational

authority for $16.9 million until the Secretary of Defense determines that

the product improvement program is the most efficient and effective

system for accomplishing the mission.

The deputy project manager agreed that the improvement program has

common targets with other improvement programs, yet he and other Army

and Air Force officials maintained that the systems are complementary

rather than duplicative. The deputy also said that (1) funding would not be

required for the Army Tactical Missile System improvement program until

December 1993 and (2) a cost-effectiveness analysis would be completed

by that time.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix I 

Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and

Restrictions to Army Research,

Development, Test, and Evaluation

Programs

Table I.8: Other Missile Product

Improvement Programs

Funding/Request and Potential

Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994a

154 $54.420 $4.729 $66.438

Potential restriction • • 16.900

aOur review of this budget line included only the $25.8 million for the Army Tactical Missile System

budget request.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix II 

Potential Reductions and Rescissions in

Navy RDT&E Programs

We identified about $8.4 million in potential reductions in the Navy’s fiscal

year 1994 RDT&E request and about $18.5 million in potential rescissions in

the Navy’s fiscal years 1992 and 1993 funding. The following section

provides a brief description of our analysis and proposed actions by

program. The proposed actions are summarized in table II.1.

Table II.1: Summary of Potential Reductions and Rescissions in Navy Programs

Dollars in millions

Program

Potential fiscal year

1994 reductions

Potential prior year

rescissions Potential restrictions See page

Generic Logistics Research and Development

Technology Demonstrations • $1.484 • 17

Advanced Anti-Submarine Warfare

Technology • 2.824 • 18

Satellite Laser Communications • 14.226 • 18

Electronic Warfare Development $8.361 • • 19

Total $8.361 $18.534 •

Generic Logistics

Research and

Development

Technology

Demonstrations

This line item funds development studies to demonstrate the feasibility of

using advanced technology to improve future operations in Navy logistics

areas. One of the studies, the Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts, is

to evaluate the technologies that a depot maintenance facility uses and to

demonstrate that the use of advanced technologies can reduce

manufacturing costs and lead times for spare and replacement parts. The

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard maintenance facility is scheduled for a Rapid

Acquisition of Manufactured Parts study.

Results of Analysis The Congress can rescind about $1.5 million of the Navy’s fiscal year 1993

funds of approximately $28.5 million for a Rapid Acquisition of

Manufactured Parts study of the maintenance facility at the Philadelphia

Naval Shipyard because the study is not appropriate. The Philadelphia

Naval Shipyard is scheduled for closure under the 1991 Defense Base

Closure and Realignment Commission process.

Table II.2: Generic Logistics Research

and Development Technology

Demonstrations Funding/Request and

Potential Rescission Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

25 $17.838 $28.549 $13.720

Potential rescission • 1.484 •

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix II 

Potential Reductions and Rescissions in

Navy RDT&E Programs

Advanced

Anti-Submarine

Warfare Technology

The Navy is shifting its focus from “blue water” anti-submarine warfare to

shallow water anti-submarine warfare to address regional conflict

scenarios. The Advanced Anti-Submarine Warfare Technology program is

designed to transition technology developments into existing and future

systems to ensure that U.S. naval forces maintain their technological

advantage with a minimal investment.

Fiscal year 1993 funds of about $74.8 million provided for seven

technology transition projects. These projects were (1) Undersea Warfare

Advanced Technology Demonstration (approximately $13.9 million),

(2) Critical Sea Tests (approximately $27.8 million), (3) Advanced

Deployable Array (approximately $3.6 million), (4) Advanced Collection

Technology (approximately $10.5 million), (5) Anti-Submarine Warfare

Target ($2 million), (6) Low Frequency Technology (approximately

$14.2 million), and (7) Shallow Water Anti-Submarine Warfare System

(approximately $2.8 million).

Results of Analysis The Congress can rescind approximately $2.8 million of the Navy’s fiscal

year 1993 funds for the Shallow Water Anti-Submarine Warfare project

because the project duplicates ongoing work. According to Navy program

officials, the Shallow Water Anti-Submarine Warfare project duplicates

projects such as those in the Undersea Surveillance and Weapons

Technology program.

Table II.3: Advanced Anti-Submarine

Warfare Technology Funding/Request

and Potential Rescission Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

26 $50.908 $74.838 $49.172

Potential rescission • 2.824 •

Satellite Laser

Communications

In fiscal year 1992, the Congress provided $10 million to study the

feasibility of using laser technology to communicate with submarines. In

fiscal year 1993, the Congress provided an additional $15 million and

directed the Navy to use the total amount of $25 million to (1) plan and

execute a fleet demonstration of a laser communications system between

an aircraft and a submarine and (2) plan a follow-on submarine laser

communications system, to include the evaluation of effectiveness and

cost of satellite versus those of aircraft.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix II 

Potential Reductions and Rescissions in

Navy RDT&E Programs

Results of Analysis Unless the Congress remains convinced that these funds are needed, the

Congress can rescind the fiscal year 1993 funding of about $14.2 million

for satellite laser communications because the Navy does not plan to use

the funds for the purposes for which they were provided.

The program executive officer for the Satellite Laser Communications

program told us that the Navy has adequate submarine communications

capabilities and does not need additional systems. He also told us that the

Navy had informed the Congress that it would not use fiscal years 1992

and 1993 funds for laser communications development and that the

development of laser technology as another means for submarine

communications is no longer advisable.

Table II.4: Satellite Laser

Communications Funding and

Potential Rescission Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

32 $10.000 $14.226 •

Potential rescission • 14.226 •

Electronic Warfare

Development

The Electronic Warfare Development program includes several projects

that are directed at the development of electronic warfare systems for the

Navy. One project involves the development of the AN/ALQ-165 airborne

self protection jammer, which is designed to provide defensive

electromagnetic countermeasures for the self-protection of the F/A-18E

aircraft.

Results of Analysis The Navy’s fiscal year 1994 budget request of about $128.9 million for the

electronic warfare development program can be reduced by

approximately $8.4 million because the Navy’s budget justification

documents show that this amount was for the AN/ALQ-165 airborne self

protection jammer project. The project was terminated in late 1992

because the Navy’s August 1992 operational evaluation report found that

the AN/ALQ-165 jammer was neither operationally suitable nor

operationally effective. In December 1992, the Assistant Secretary of the

Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition directed that all

AN/ALQ-165 jammer production contracts be terminated.

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Potential Reductions and Rescissions in

Navy RDT&E Programs

Table II.5: Electronic Warfare

Development Funding/Request and

Potential Reduction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

109 $73.674 $134.377 $128.850

Potential reduction • • 8.361

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We identified about $415.3 million in potential reductions in the Air

Force’s fiscal year 1994 RDT&E request, about $7.4 million in potential

rescissions in the Air Force’s fiscal years 1992 and 1993 funding, and about

$142.4 million in potential restrictions to the Air Force’s obligational

authority for fiscal year 1994 requests. The following section provides a

brief description of our analysis and proposed actions by program. The

proposed actions are summarized in table III.1.

Table III.1: Summary of Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and Restrictions to Air Force Programs

Dollars in millions

Program

Potential fiscal year

1994 reductions

Potential prior year

rescissions Potential restrictions See page

National Aero-Space Plane Technology

Program • • $30.000 21

Advanced Cruise Missile Program • $6.373 • 23

Defense Support Program-Ground Station

Upgrade • 1.000 • 24

Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training $38.375 • • 24

F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter 325.800 • • 26

Night/ Precision Attack 46.710 • 35.500 27

F-16 Squadrons 4.400 • 23.000 28

Spacelifter • • 53.906 29

Total $415.285 $7.373 $142.406

National Aero-Space

Plane Technology

Program

The National Aero-Space Plane Technology Program is a joint DOD and

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) technology

development and demonstration program. The program’s goal is to

provide the technological basis for future space launch and hypersonic

flight vehicles by developing critical or enabling technologies, such as a

scramjet engine. DOD and NASA intended to demonstrate these technologies

by building and testing the X-30, a manned experimental flight vehicle. The

Air Force, the lead agency, has requested approximately $43.3 million in

fiscal year 1994, while NASA has requested $80 million.

Results of Analysis The Congress can restrict obligational authority for $30 million of the total

of about $123.3 million requested for fiscal year 1994 pending decisions on

the aerospace plane program’s future direction and resolution of

programmatic and funding concerns. The balance of the request is

sufficient to complete efforts already started.

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Under previous plans, a decision had been scheduled for September 1993

on whether to enter the program’s next phase and begin building the X-30.

However, large increases in the baseline program’s projected cost (from

the original estimate of about $3.1 billion in 1986 to $17 billion in

January 1992), funding constraints, and many technical concerns caused

DOD and NASA to reconsider entering the next phase and led to efforts to

restructure the current contract and associated technical efforts.

The program office proposed conducting a series of flight test experiments

and a concurrent ground test effort through the turn of the century. As of

August 1993, however, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, DOD,

and NASA had not reached consensus on the program’s future direction and

appropriate funding level.

In our June 1993 report on the program,1

 we made several

recommendations to the Director of the Office of Science and Technology

Policy, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator of NASA, that, if

implemented, would (1) better focus the program’s long-term objectives

and goals, (2) assure that sufficient funds are budgeted to execute the

program’s next phase, and (3) allow sufficient time to initiate required

contractual action and properly plan future efforts. We also recommended

that the Congress consider restricting DOD and NASA from obligating any

funds appropriated for fiscal year 1994 beyond those necessary to

complete the current efforts until DOD and NASA complete certain tasks. If

implemented, this recommendation would restrict the obligational

authority of $30 million in fiscal year 1994 funds because these funds are

to be used to initiate future development efforts or to conduct additional

testing.

Both NASA and Air Force officials agreed that our recommendations, if

implemented, would provide better program stability and focus. Program

officials had no comment concerning the proposed restriction of the fiscal

year 1994 funding. NASA officials, however, believe restricting the fiscal

year 1994 funds would be a burden to effective planning and contracting.

While this funding restriction can be imposed upon NASA, the Air Force, or

a combination of both, the table shows it applying only to the Air Force.

1

National Aero-Space Plane: A Need for Program Direction and Funding Decisions

(GAO/NSIAD-93-207, June 18, 1993).

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Table III.2: National Aero-Space Plane

Technology Program Funding/Request

and Potential Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

29 $198.114 $141.244 $43.259

Potential restriction • • 30.000

Advanced Cruise

Missile Program

The Advanced Cruise Missile is a subsonic, turbo-fan powered missile

equipped with a nuclear warhead. The Advanced Cruise Missile is

designed to be less detectable and have greater range, accuracy, and

operational flexibility than the Air Launched Cruise Missile. The Air Force

began developing the Advanced Cruise Missile in 1982 and has

experienced significant development and production problems leading to

cost growth and schedule delays. Development of the Advanced Cruise

Missile is complete; however, development continues on depot support

equipment, software, and other items. The Air Force has requested

approximately $25.4 million in fiscal year 1994 Advanced Cruise Missile

RDT&E funds, primarily for depot activation.

Results of Analysis The Congress can rescind about $6.4 million of the Advanced Cruise

Missile program’s fiscal year 1993 unobligated funds because the Air Force

has no identified requirement for these funds. To illustrate the excess, the

Air Force has $7.2 million in unused fiscal year 1992 funds that expire

September 30, 1993.

While acknowledging that they have no current requirements for the

approximately $6.4 million, program officials said these funds should be

retained to fund some future potential requirements. However, about

$6.4 million is available for rescission because the Air Force does not have

a specific purpose for the funds after a full year.

Table III.3: Advanced Cruise Missile

Funding/Request and Potential

Rescission Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

54 $39.300 $19.543 $25.393

Potential rescission • 6.373 •

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Defense Support

Program-Ground

Station Upgrade

The Defense Support Program is a strategic surveillance and early warning

satellite system with an infrared capability to detect ballistic missile

launches. It is designed to provide near real-time detection information to

support DOD’s tactical warning and attack mission. The program is

supported by a network of fixed and mobile ground stations that process

and disseminate information to military commanders worldwide.

In May 1987, the Air Force began procuring new computer hardware and

software for the ground stations. The new equipment was designed to

replace the existing hardware and software and enhance operational

capability and address an evolving threat. However, because of significant

cost growth and schedule slippage, the Air Force terminated this effort,

known as System I and the Ground Computer Change Out programs, in

December 1992. The Air Force now plans to upgrade the computer

software and replace computer hardware.

Results of Analysis The Congress can rescind $1 million from the Air Force’s Defense Support

Program fiscal year 1993 funds. The $1 million in unobligated fiscal year

1993 funds to be used for System I contract termination is not needed.

According to a DOD official, sufficient funds already have been obligated

for the termination of the System I contract. Program officials stated that,

if these funds were to be retained by the program office, the $1 million

should be used as a management reserve to address uncertainties in such

efforts as the Satellite Readout Station Upgrade.

Table III.4: Defense Support

Program-Ground Station Upgrade

Funding/Request and Potential

Rescission Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

84 • $49.081 $66.777

Potential rescission • 1.000 •

Specialized

Undergraduate Pilot

Training

The Air Force’s Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training program

includes funding for the Joint Primary Training System. The training

system is a joint Air Force and Navy venture to replace the services’

primary trainer aircraft (T-37 and T-34, respectively). The program

includes the purchase of aircraft, simulators, ground-based training

devices, instructional courseware, and logistical support. The training

system is to be used to train entry level students in the fundamentals of

flying. The Air Force’s fiscal year 1994 request for approximately

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$44 million includes about $38.4 million for the initial test aircraft and

related costs and $3.2 million for program office support costs.

Results of Analysis The Air Force’s fiscal year 1994 request of approximately $44 million can

be reduced by about $38.4 million because the contract award date for the

initial test aircraft planned for August 1994 is expected to be delayed until

fiscal year 1995.

Several factors have caused some slippage in the planned schedule for

source selection, and further slippage is probable. On July 7, 1993, the

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) issued formal direction to the

Air Force.

• The Under Secretaries directed a one-contract initial acquisition strategy

with the prime contractor responsible for integration of the training

system during development. This is a much different strategy than that

used by the Air Force in establishing its current plans and schedule. The

Air Force had been planning to issue separate contracts for the aircraft

and ground-based training system.

• Some changes and additions to the strategy and source selection process

were also directed that must be met before the Air Force receives

milestone decision authority from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Air Force is now required to (1) develop source selection criteria to

clearly favor proposals involving lowest developmental risk and lowest

total system cost, (2) resolve all test and evaluation master plan issues,

and (3) ensure that the training system’s program is fully consistent with

DOD’s policies on women in combat. On this last point, the training system

must accommodate not less than 80 percent of the eligible female pilot

candidates. An Office of the Secretary of Defense working group is

studying size and design requirements, and this study might result in

changes having to be made in some contractors’ training system

candidates.

This direction came months after the Air Force first developed the

schedule for source selection and established a contract award date in

August 1994. Release of the final request for proposal is now expected in

January 1994—about 3 months later than planned—and other schedule

dates are also likely to slip.

DOD has not yet specified the amount of “missionization” (modifications to

commercial designs needed to meet program requirements) that will be

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Restrictions to Air Force RDT&E Programs

permitted following operational evaluation of candidates and selection of

the prime contractor. Training system program officials said their intent is

to limit such modifications and require that the basic design, engine, and

flying characteristics be standardized at the time of operational evaluation.

Program and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials also

acknowledged that the contract award is likely to slip into fiscal year 1995

and agreed that fiscal year 1994 funds could be reduced. Officials said they

needed $3.2 million in fiscal year 1994 funding for program office and test

support costs.

Table III.5: Specialized Undergraduate

Pilot Training Funding/Request and

Potential Reduction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

100 $4.196 $4.392 $43.971

Potential reduction • • 38.375

F-22 Advanced

Tactical Fighter

The F-22 is to replace the F-15 as the Air Force’s next air superiority

fighter. The F-22 entered development in 1991, and the Air Force plans to

request production funding for fiscal year 1996. Plans are to achieve initial

operational capability in 2003.

Results of Analysis The Air Force’s fiscal year 1994 request of about $2,251 million for the F-22

can be reduced by $325.8 million because the projected threat does not

appear to compel a faster pace of development.

F-22 program officials maintain that a reduction of $325.8 million in the

fiscal year 1994 budget request would cause a 6- to 9-month program delay

and an estimated cost increase of $1 billion through fiscal year 2001. DOD

believes that, no matter what the threat, the F-22 will be considerably

more efficient at the air superiority mission than the F-15. However, our

analysis indicates that the performance characteristics of the existing F-15

weapon system are superior to those of the projected threat well beyond

the planned F-22 introduction in 2003. We believe that maintaining the

fiscal year 1993 level of funding would be prudent for this reason and

because of the unknown impact of pending DOD decisions about mission

requirements and affordability of tactical aircraft.

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Table III.6: F-22 Advanced Tactical

Fighter Funding/Request and Potential

Reduction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

102 $1,606.804 $1,925.199 $2,250.997

Potential reduction • • 325.800

Night/Precision

Attack

The Night/Precision Attack program contains the night attack project and

the low altitude navigation and targeting infrared-for-night project. The

first project, night attack, is to develop, test, and evaluate night vision

technologies for future enhancement to F-16 and A-10 aircraft. The second

project, infrared-for-night, is to provide the capability to conduct close air

support and interdiction missions at night and in conditions of limited

visibility with laser guided weapons. The Air Force’s fiscal year 1994

budget request includes approximately $82.2 million for the

Night/Precision Attack program.

Results of Analysis The Congress can reduce the Air Force’s fiscal year 1994 budget request by

about $46.7 million for the Night/Precision Attack program and restrict

obligational authority for the remaining $35.5 million. The Office of the

Secretary of Defense and the Air Force have not reached agreement on

which aircraft should be modified for the close air support mission, how

many should be modified, and what those modifications should be. As a

result, the Congress restricted the Air Force’s fiscal year 1993 funding for

close air support, which includes the Night/Precision Attack program.

Although a Defense Acquisition Board meeting was scheduled to discuss

Air Force plans for the program in December 1992, it was not held because

the Office of the Secretary of Defense requested the Air Force to further

support its planned program. A Board meeting is not currently scheduled,

but an Office of the Secretary of Defense official said one may be held by

December 1993.

The Air Force Night/Precision Attack program manager said the Air Force

requires only $35.5 million in fiscal year 1994 funding to support the

program that the Office of the Secretary of Defense wants or only

$24.4 million to support the program that the Air Force wants. Therefore,

assuming the higher cost program is selected, about $46.7 million is excess

to the fiscal year 1994 needs. Also, the $35.5 million that is needed to fund

the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s program can be restricted until a

decision is made on which program is selected. As of September 22, 1993,

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the differences between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air

Force had not been resolved.

Table III.7: Night/Precision Attack

Funding/Request and Potential

Reduction and Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

104 $3.125 $25.094 $82.210

Potential reduction • • 46.710

Potential restriction • • 35.500

F-16 Squadrons The Air Force’s fiscal year 1994 RDT&E budget request for the F-16 includes

$23 million to define requirements for close air support and $4.4 million

for multirole fighter concept development. The Air Force is considering

the F-16 for the close air support mission of providing support to friendly

forces that are close to enemy forces. The multirole fighter was envisioned

as a future aircraft designed for a variety of missions.

Results of Analysis The Congress can restrict the Air Force’s obligational authority for

$23 million requested in fiscal year 1994 for development efforts related to

modifications of F-16s for close air support because the Office of the

Secretary of Defense and the Air Force have not agreed on which

configuration of the F-16 should be modified for the close air support

mission, how many aircraft should be modified, and what those

modifications should be. Further, the Congress can reduce the request by

$4.4 million for the multirole fighter program because the Secretary of

Defense canceled the program in September 1993.

Close Air Support As a result of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force’s

disagreement regarding the F-16 and the close air support mission, the

Congress restricted all $3.5 million appropriated for the Air Force’s fiscal

year 1993 funding for close air support. A Defense Acquisition Board

meeting was scheduled to discuss Air Force plans for the close air support

program in December 1992, but it was not held because the Office of the

Secretary of Defense requested the Air Force to further justify its planned

program. A Board meeting is not currently scheduled.

Because the fiscal year 1993 funds were restricted by the Congress and the

disagreement still is not resolved, the Congress can restrict the Air Force’s

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Restrictions to Air Force RDT&E Programs

authority to obligate fiscal year 1994 funds. The funds can be released and

the Air Force can proceed with accomplishing early planning tasks, such

as defining its requirements and setting specifications, when the Office of

the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force agree on the close air support

program.

Multirole Fighter In the fiscal year 1993 request for development planning projects, the Air

Force requested $4.9 million to initiate multirole fighter studies. The

Congress denied the request because it believed it was too early to decide

whether an entirely new aircraft should be developed. The Congress stated

that funds approved for development planning could be used for multirole

fighter studies only after the Air Force submitted a detailed justification

and received approval from the Committees on Appropriations.

As a result of the recent DOD bottom-up review, the Secretary of Defense

canceled the multirole fighter program. Thus, the Congress can reduce the

fiscal year 1994 request for funding of the multirole fighter program

because it was canceled.

Table III.8: F-16 Squadrons

Funding/Request and Potential

Reduction and Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

130 $147.661 $109.409 $116.947

Potential reduction (multirole fighter) • • 4.400

Potential restriction (close air

support) • • 23.000

Spacelifter The Spacelifter is a new fiscal year 1994 program established to replace

the National Launch System program that was terminated in fiscal year

1993. The Spacelifter is designed to provide DOD, as well as civil and

commercial users, with a medium-to-heavy launch capability by the first

decade of the next century.

Results of Analysis To prevent premature commitment to a long-term effort on the Spacelifter

program, the Congress can restrict Air Force obligational authority on the

fiscal year 1994 request for approximately $53.9 million. The Air Force and

DOD have not resolved schedule, requirements, and funding/affordability

issues associated with the program.

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Several issues must be resolved before the program can be initiated. Most

importantly, as noted by the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board,

no strong economic imperative or critical payload requirement drives the

development of a new space launch capability. The report further noted

that launch rates are declining, which will extend the life of the current

Delta, Atlas, and Titan family of vehicles. For example, the Titan IV

program office estimates it can support required satellite launches of

Defense Support Program, Milstar, Follow-on Early Warning System, NASA,

and classified programs through 2014, if its follow-on buy of launch

vehicles proceeds as scheduled.

Also, a validated mission needs statement for the Spacelifter program

should be completed before the program begins its initial development.

According to DOD Instruction 5000.2, DOD entities shall document

deficiencies in current capabilities and opportunities to provide new

capabilities in a mission needs statement. Air Force officials agreed that

the validated document is essential to begin the first phase of the

program—concept exploration. Although the Air Force Space Command

has prepared a draft mission needs statement, an Air Force Space

Command official was unsure when the document would be approved by

the head of the U.S. Space Command.

The Air Force’s obligational authority on the fiscal year 1994 budget

request for approximately $53.9 million for Spacelifter can be restricted

until the Air Force and DOD provide the Congress assurance that schedule,

funding, and requirements issues are resolved.

Table III.9: Spacelifter

Funding/Request and Potential

Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

190 $48.673 $9.435 $53.906

Potential restriction • • 53.906

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Appendix IV 

Potential Reductions and Restrictions to

Multiservice RDT&E Programs

We identified about $34.8 million in potential reductions in the Air Force’s

and about $27.2 million in potential restrictions to the Navy’s obligational

authority for fiscal year 1994 RDT&E requests. The following section

provides a brief description of our analysis and proposed actions by

program. The proposed actions are summarized in table IV.1.

Table IV.1: Summary of Potential Reductions and Restrictions to Multiservice Programs

Dollars in millions

Program

Potential fiscal year

1994 reductions

Potential prior year

rescissions Potential restrictions See page

Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance

System, Air Force $34.838 • • 31

Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance

System, Navy • • $27.217 31

Total $34.838 • $27.217

Advanced Tactical Air

Reconnaissance

System

The fiscal year 1994 request for the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance

System is included in the requests for the Air Force Follow-On Tactical

Reconnaissance System and the Navy Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance

System. The Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System program was

being designed to replace obsolete wet-film photographic reconnaissance

systems that DOD officials stated were not adequate during Operation

Desert Shield/Storm. Aircraft equipped with the reconnaissance system’s

sensor suites were to provide near-real time collection of battlefield

information for tactical use such as bomb damage assessment. The system

was a joint Air Force and Navy program. The Air Force was the executive

service for the development of the program.

Results of Analysis The Congress can reduce the Air Force’s fiscal year 1994 budget request

for the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System by about

$34.8 million because the system’s contract was terminated effective

June 25, 1993, due to cost, schedule, and performance problems. About

$20 million in remaining funds is for developing a replacement program

strategy to meet operational requirements for tactical reconnaissance. In

addition, the Congress can restrict obligational authority for

approximately $27.2 million of the Navy’s fiscal year 1994 request for the

system until the Navy develops a viable replacement program strategy to

meet its operational requirements for tactical reconnaissance and advises

the Congress of that plan.

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Air Force program officials agreed that the Air Force’s fiscal year 1994

budget request can be reduced by approximately $34.8 million. A Navy

program official expressed concern that restricting about $27.2 million of

the Navy’s fiscal year 1994 budget request until a program strategy is

developed might impede Navy efforts to continue testing sensors already

received. However, until the Navy decides what sensors it plans to use, the

Navy may not be testing the sensors that will be selected for the

replacement program.

Table IV.2: Advanced Tactical Air

Reconnaissance System

Funding/Request and Potential

Reduction and Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

138 (Air Force) $87.391 $58.362 $65.338

Potential reduction • • 34.838

46 (Navy) 13.776 14.444 30.358

Potential restriction • • 27.217

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Potential Restrictions to Defensewide

RDT&E Programs

We identified about $766.8 million in potential restrictions to the

Defensewide fiscal year 1994 RDT&E request. The following section

provides a brief description of our analysis and proposed actions by

program. The proposed actions are summarized in table V.1.

Table V.1: Summary of Potential Restrictions to Defensewide Programs

Dollars in millions

Program

Potential fiscal year

1994 reductions

Potential prior year

rescissions Potential restrictions See page

Theater Missile Defenses • • $718.381 33

Theater Missile Defenses (Engineering and

Manufacturing Development) • • 48.457 35

Total • • $766.838

Theater Missile

Defenses

The Missile Defense Act of 1991 established the necessity of a ballistic

missile defense for the United States and its allies and U.S. forces

deployed worldwide. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)

was charged with developing a theater missile defense. To accomplish this

goal, BMDO plans a two-tier defense. The upper tier defense, which will

provide for wide area defense, consists of the Theater High Altitude Area

Defense missile system. The lower tier defense, which will defend critical

assets, will be provided by the Patriot Advanced Capability-Three

(PAC-3) missile system.

The Theater High Altitude Area Defense is a transportable antitactical

ballistic missile system consisting of missiles, launchers, radars, and

tactical operational centers. The Theater Missile Defense-Ground Based

Radar, the radar supporting the Theater High Altitude Area Defense, is a

mobile, ground-based radar that will provide early warning, target cuing,

and missile fire control.

The lower tier mission will be filled by the PAC-3 missile system. The

systems that are competing to be the PAC-3 missile are (1) the Extended

Range Interceptor, which is designed to destroy missiles by colliding with

them, and (2) the Patriot Multimode Missile, which includes seeker and

explosive warhead improvements. BMDO plans to select a system for

engineering and manufacturing development in February 1994.

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Results of Analysis The Congress can restrict obligational authority for about $718.4 million

(approximately $484.3 million for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense

missile and about $234.1 million for the Theater Missile Defense-Ground

Based Radar) of BMDO’s approximate $1.6 billion fiscal year 1994 request

for Theater Missile Defense until a determination is made as to whether

the area defense missile and the radar comply with the Anti-ballistic

Missile Treaty.

Obligational authority can be restricted for BMDO’s entire request for the

area defense missile and the radar because there are questions concerning

whether development of these systems complies with the treaty. In

November 1992, the former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)

expressed concern regarding the area defense missile’s unresolved treaty

status because the treaty may preclude the development of some theater

missile defense system capabilities. Although the treaty does not limit

defenses against theater and tactical ballistic missiles, it does prohibit the

development of mobile land-based systems that could defend against

strategic missiles. The Under Secretary wanted to ensure a compliance

determination as early as possible in the acquisition to minimize the

likelihood of unnecessarily expending funds by designing a system that

does not comply with the treaty.

Therefore, the Under Secretary mandated treaty compliance determination

prior to the area defense missile’s final design review, scheduled for

November 1993. He further stated that the area defense missile should not

proceed beyond the final design review until he certifies that it is

compliant with the treaty.

According to a Theater High Altitude Area Defense project official, BMDO

briefed the DOD Compliance Review Group in May 1993. However,

according to the project manager, the group did not document its

conclusions, and the Under Secretary has not certified that the area

defense missile is compliant with the treaty—an action necessary to

proceed beyond the final design review. In addition, the Senate Committee

on Armed Services recently directed the Secretary of Defense to begin

reviewing the Theater High Altitude area defense missile’s compliance

with the treaty.

The determination of the area defense missile’s treaty compliance status

directly impacts the ground-based radar. According to the ground-based

radar deputy project manager, if the missile is not compliant with treaty

provisions, the radar would also be noncompliant because it supports the

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix V 

Potential Restrictions to Defensewide

RDT&E Programs

missile system. By itself, however, the radar is considered treaty compliant

because the aperture of the radar is below the maximum level imposed by

the treaty.

The area defense missile project manager said that restricting all fiscal

year 1994 funding would severely affect program cost and schedule. He

said that sufficient funding would be needed to continue basic program

operations; however, he did not estimate the amount of funding required.

In addition, a ground-based radar acquisition official stated that the radar

also would require sufficient funding to continue basic operations, yet he

did not estimate the amount of funding required. A BMDO official added

that restriction of obligational authority for the entire appropriation for

both systems would delay the final design review, which would cause a

nonrecoverable program slippage. However, the Congress can restrict the

entire fiscal year 1994 obligational authority until BMDO estimates and

justifies the amount of funding required for basic operations. A program

slippage may be preferable over spending funds to develop a system that is

not treaty compliant.

Table V.2: Theater Missile Defenses

Funding/Request and Potential

Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

75 • $1,018.110 $1,636.304

Potential restriction • • 718.381

Theater Missile

Defenses

(Engineering and

Manufacturing

Development)

The Missile Defense Act of 1991 established the necessity of ballistic

missile defense for the United States and its allies and worldwide U.S.

forces. BMDO, charged with developing a theater missile defense, plans a

two-tier defense. The upper tier will provide for wide area defense. The

lower tier, to be used for defending critical assets, will be provided by the

PAC-3 missile system.

The Patriot is a surface-to-air missile system that consists of a radar,

ground support equipment, missile launchers, and missiles. An upgrade of

the Patriot with an improved seeker and explosive warhead, the Patriot

Multimode Interceptor, is competing against the Extended Range

Interceptor for the role of the PAC-3 missile. One of these two missile

development systems will be selected to transition to engineering and

manufacturing and will fulfill the PAC-3 role.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix V 

Potential Restrictions to Defensewide

RDT&E Programs

Results of Analysis BMDO requested approximately $50.4 million in fiscal year 1994 for Theater

Missile Defense engineering and manufacturing development. The

Congress can restrict obligational authority for about $48.5 million until

the PAC-3 missile is selected. BMDO plans to use about $48.5 million for

Patriot multimode missile engineering and manufacturing development.

However, BMDO will not know if Patriot multimode engineering and

manufacturing development funds are required until the decision is made

as to whether the Patriot multimode or the Extended Range Interceptor

will be selected for the PAC-3 role. That selection decision has been

postponed until February 1994.

A BMDO official stated that one congressional authorization committee has

recommended that if engineering and manufacturing development is

delayed, the funding could be used to continue demonstration and

validation. He expressed concern that a restriction would prohibit them

from use of the funds for these efforts. However, the funds were requested

for engineering and manufacturing development, not demonstration and

validation.

Table V.3: Theater Missile Defenses

(Engineering and Manufacturing

Development) Funding/Request and

Potential Restriction Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Budget line 1992 1993 1994

82 • $9.390 $50.410

Potential restriction • • 48.457

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix VI 

Scope and Methodology

We selected for detailed review DOD RDT&E programs that we identified

from our ongoing assignments as well as the survey phase of this

assignment as having cost, schedule, performance, or programmatic

issues. To achieve our objectives, we interviewed program officials and

reviewed program documentation such as budget requests and

justifications, monthly program status reports, correspondence, briefing

reports, and accounting and financial reports. We discussed the facts in

this report with DOD and program officials and incorporated their

comments as appropriate.

We performed our work at numerous DOD and military service locations.

For example, we visited the Air Force Materiel Command,

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Army Missile Command and U.S.

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Huntsville, Alabama; Naval Sea

Systems, Naval Space and Warfare, and Naval Air Systems Commands, and

the Office of the Chief of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia; Air Force

Materiel Command Electronics Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base,

Massachusetts; Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort

Monmouth, New Jersey; Army Tank-Automotive Command, Warren,

Michigan; Army Aviation and Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri; Air

Force Space and Missile System Center, Los Angeles, California; and U.S.

and Air Force Space Commands, Colorado Springs, Colorado. We also

contacted program representatives in the Office of the Secretary of

Defense and the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

We performed our review from October 1992 through September 1993 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Brad H. Hathaway, Associate Director

Thomas J. Schulz, Associate Director

Howard R. Manning, Project Director

John J. D’Esopo

Raymond Dunham

Jack B. Guin

Steven F. Kuhta

Robert D. Murphy

Derek B. Stewart

Robert J. Stolba

William L. Wright, Jr.

Lawrence W. Gaston

Raymond W. Allen

Wanda M. Slagle

Sarah J. Brady

Tana M. Davis

Sharon E. Sweeney

Atlanta Regional

Office

Thomas W. Gilliam

Dayna L. Foster

Marion S. Chastain

Frederick W. Felder

Carol T. Mebane

Angel D. Sharma

Dana S. Solomon

John S. Warren, Jr.

Boston Regional

Office

Edmund L. Kelley, Jr.

Martin F. Lobo

Joseph Rizzo, Jr.

Richard E. Silveira

Cincinnati Regional

Office

Matthew R. Mongin

John M. Murphy, Jr.

Bruce D. Fairbairn

Timothy J. DiNapoli

Leonard L. Benson

Michael F. McGuire

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to This Report

John F. Seidl

George J. Buerger

Henry W. Sudbrink II

Michael W. Aiken

Edward R. Browning

Johnetta Gatlin-Brown

Tom C. Hewlett

Benjamin Jordan

Fred J. Naas

Don M. Springman

Kansas City Regional

Office

Gary L. Billen

Charles O. Burgess

Carole F. Coffey

Milton E. Roedder, Jr.

Lauri A. Bischof

Dora E. Navarro

Karen A. Rieger

Norman W. Trowbridge

Los Angeles Regional

Office

Sam Van Wagner

Dale M. Yuge

Frank Moore

(395216) Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-93-293BR 1994 Defense Budget
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