[Cite as State v. Garland, 2020-Ohio-6712.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

KURTIS TYLER GARLAND, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-190712 

TRIAL NO. C-17TRC-23371 

 

 

 O P I N I O N.

 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause 

 Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 16, 2020 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Engel & Martin L.L.C and Mary K. Martin, for Defendant-Appellant. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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CROUSE, Judge.

{¶1} After an “ignition interlock device violation” under R.C. 4510.46(A)(2), 

the trial court revoked defendant-appellant Kurtis Garland’s driving privileges for 

seven years from the date of his offense of operating a vehicle while under the 

influence of alcohol (“OVI”). Garland has appealed, arguing in one assignment of 

error that the trial court erred in imposing a seven-year license suspension. For the 

reasons discussed below, the sole assignment of error is sustained in part and 

overruled in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court to impose a license 

suspension not greater than six years. All other aspects of the trial court’s judgment 

are affirmed. 

Factual Background 

{¶2} Garland was arrested on June 10, 2017. He pled guilty to OVI in 

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) in November 2017. At the time of his offense, 

because it was his second OVI in ten years, R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(b)(iv) permitted a 

license suspension between one and seven years. At his plea hearing, the court 

notified Garland of the maximum penalties he could face. “For this offense,* * * your 

right to drive can be suspended up to five years * * *.” In December 2017, the court 

suspended Garland’s license for three years from the date of his offense, June 10, 

2017. 

{¶3} In June 2018, the court modified Garland’s license suspension by 

allowing him to drive provided he had OVI plates on his vehicle and an ignition 

interlock device installed. In October 2019, Garland registered a positive reading of 

.063 on the interlock device, which constituted an “ignition interlock device 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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violation” under R.C. 4510.46. The state filed notice pursuant to R.C. 4510.46(B) 

and 4510.13(A)(8) to revoke Garland’s driving privileges, and a hearing was held. 

The trial court revoked Garland’s driving privileges for seven years from the date of 

his offense. 

Sole Assignment of Error 

{¶4} We review misdemeanor sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Griffin, 2020-Ohio-3707, ___N.E.3d___, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.). 

{¶5} First, Garland contends that because the trial court advised him at the 

plea hearing that the maximum possible license suspension was five years, the court 

could not suspend his license for more than five years for the ignition-interlockdevice violation. 

{¶6} Garland is not contending that his guilty plea was not knowing and 

voluntary due to the fact that the court misinformed him of the maximum license 

suspension. Rather, he contends that the court’s mistake at the plea hearing limited 

its ability to increase the license suspension for the ignition-interlock-device 

violation to only five years. But that is not the law. 

{¶7} R.C. 4510.46(C)(3) states that after an ignition-interlock-device 

violation, the trial court may increase the original license suspension “by a factor of 

two.” Because Garland’s original suspension was three years, the court could not 

have imposed a suspension greater than six years for the interlock-device violation. 

The state concedes that the court abused its discretion in suspending Garland’s 

license for seven years, and agrees that six years is the maximum suspension allowed 

by statute. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶8} Next, Garland contends that the trial court violated his right to due 

process and against double jeopardy by imposing multiple punishments for the same 

crime. 

{¶9} “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments 

for the same offense in successive proceedings.” State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 

2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 24. “If a defendant has a legitimate expectation 

of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy 

clause.” Id. 

{¶10} Garland argues that he had a legitimate expectation of finality in his 

sentence and thus the increased license suspension was prohibited by the Double 

Jeopardy Clause. We find that Garland did not have a legitimate expectation of 

finality because his license suspension had not concluded at the time of the ignitioninterlock-device violation. R.C. 4510.46 specifically permits a trial court to extend a 

license suspension upon a finding of an ignition-interlock-device violation. There is 

no double-jeopardy issue here. 

{¶11} Lastly, Garland argues that on the “notice pursuant to R.C. 4510.46(B) 

and 4510.13(A)(8),” the court did not check the box indicating that his license 

suspension was being increased, and so he was not given proper notice. We find his 

argument to be meritless. The unchecked box would have increased his suspension 

without a hearing. The box that was checked indicated that the court was holding a 

hearing regarding Garland’s ignition-interlock-device violation. Rather than increase 

his license suspension without a hearing, the court gave Garland the benefit of a 

hearing. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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Conclusion 

{¶12} The sole assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. 

The cause is remanded to the trial court to impose a license suspension not greater 

than six years. All other aspects of the trial court’s judgment are affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 

MOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.