GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

August 1999 CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE

Coordination of 

Nonmedical Chemical 

and Biological R&D 

Programs

GAO/NSIAD-99-160

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282700 Letter

August 16, 1999

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Since the Persian Gulf War, Members of Congress have raised concerns 

regarding the adequacy of technology used by the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to detect, identify, prepare for, and protect troops against chemical 

and biological (CB) weapons.1

 In 1993, the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160) directed the Secretary of Defense to 

take actions designed to improve the Department’s CB defense capabilities, 

including coordination and integration of all CB defense programs into 

what is now the CB Defense Program. More recently, concerns that 

terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to CB devices 

led Congress to authorize the federal government to improve domestic 

capabilities to respond to such incidents. With the initiation of these 

domestic preparedness programs in fiscal year 1997, federal research and 

development (R&D) efforts to develop nonmedical CB defense technology 

expanded considerably, and they continue to grow.2

 According to the White 

House, the President’s fiscal year 2000 budget request includes over 

$10 billion to combat terrorism. Almost $1.4 billion is for programs 

specifically aimed at terrorist threats from chemical, biological, 

radiological, or nuclear weapons, an amount that exceeds the funding of 

less than $1 billion for military programs to counter CB threats. 

1

See Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems

(GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar. 29 1996) and Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address 

Low-Level Exposures (GAO/NSIAD-98-228, Sept. 23, 1998). 

2

Nonmedical technologies refer to technologies for detecting, identifying, protecting against, or 

decontaminating personnel and equipment of CB agents. By contrast, examples of medical R&D include 

the development of prophylactics such as vaccines, medical diagnostics for determining exposure to 

chemical or biological agents, and therapeutic drugs or procedures for countering the effects of 

exposure.
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Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

In response to your request, we examined the coordination of federal R&D 

efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to CB defense. 

Specifically, we (1) identified federal programs that conduct nonmedical 

CB defense-related R&D and (2) described the existing mechanisms for 

coordinating these programs. A companion report, Chemical and Biological

Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act

Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, Aug. 16, 1999), examines the extent of 

DOD’s application of the Government Performance and Results Act’s 

outcome-oriented principles to the CB Defense Program.

Results in Brief Four federal programs that currently fund R&D of nonmedical CB defense 

technologies are: 

• Department of Defense’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program,

• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Biological Warfare 

Defense Program,

• Department of Energy’s Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation 

Program, and 

• Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by the Technical 

Support Working Group. 

All these programs pursue R&D ranging from applied research to prototype 

development. Two of these programs, the Chemical and Biological Defense 

Program and Biological Warfare Defense Program, develop technologies 

primarily for military warfighting applications. The other two programs 

develop CB defense technologies primarily to assist civilians responding to 

terrorist incidents. 

The current formal and informal program coordination mechanisms may 

not ensure that potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for 

collaboration are addressed. Coordinating mechanisms lack information 

on prioritized user needs, validated CB defense equipment requirements, 

and how programs relate R&D projects to these needs. In particular, 

domestic preparedness needs are specified with significantly less detail
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Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

than military needs.3 Furthermore, two programs—those in the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Department of Energy—do 

not formally utilize user requirements in planning their R&D goals. More 

detailed information about user needs, validated CB defense equipment 

requirements, and how user needs relate to R&D projects may allow 

coordination mechanisms to better assess whether overlaps, gaps, and 

opportunities for collaboration exist. 

Agency officials are aware of the deficiencies in the existing coordination 

mechanisms and some have initiated additional informal contacts in 

response. Informal coordination between the Department of Defense and 

the Department of Energy has been particularly active.

We are making no recommendations at this time. 

Background In the last decade, concerns about the possible use of CB weapons led both 

Congress and the executive agencies to implement new or expanded 

programs to address these threats. In 1993, Congress established DOD’s CB 

Defense Program in an effort to coordinate and integrate across the 

military all CB defense programs from R&D through procurement.4

 DOD 

initiated a stand alone R&D program in biological defense within the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in fiscal year 1997, 

and in October 1998 it established the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to 

administer the CB Defense Program as well as to address other emerging 

military threats. Following the use of a chemical agent by terrorists in 

Japan, civilian-oriented programs emerged through Congress’s passage of

3

In Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs

(GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999), we found that there is no assessment that would provide a basis for 

clearly defined and prioritized equipment requirements based on threat and risk, and there is little 

consensus among federal, state and local officials on the types of equipment needed for civilians to 

prepare for a CB terrorist incident. Moreover, in 1998 we reported that some local jurisdictions were 

deciding on equipment purchases without the benefit of formal threat and risk assessments based on 

valid threat data. See Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help

Prioritize Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998); Combating Terrorism: 

Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16,

Oct. 2, 1998); and Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program

Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

4

P.L. 103-160, sec. 1701, Nov. 3, 1993.
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Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.5 This act 

initiated a set of domestic preparedness programs, including R&D 

programs, for improving domestic capabilities to respond to terrorism 

involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.

Four Federal Programs 

Fund Nonmedical R&D 

Addressing CB Threats

Four federal programs that currently fund nonmedical R&D addressing CB 

threats are: 

• DOD’s CB Defense Program, 

• DARPA’s Biological Warfare Defense Program, 

• Department of Energy’s (DOE) CB Nonproliferation Program, and 

• Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by the Technical 

Support Working Group (TSWG). 

The objective of DOD’s CB Defense Program is to enable U.S. forces to 

survive, fight, and win in chemically and biologically contaminated 

environments. DARPA’s program funds R&D projects supporting 

revolutionary approaches to biological warfare defense, emphasizing 

high-risk, high-potential technologies. DOE’s program funds R&D to 

develop advanced technologies to enable the United States to more 

effectively prepare and respond to the use of CB weapons. Finally, TSWG is 

an interagency working group whose mission is to facilitate interagency 

R&D for combating terrorism primarily through rapid research, 

development, and prototyping.6

 The TSWG’s subgroup on Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures oversees, among 

other activities, the development of techniques to detect, protect from, and 

mitigate CB weapons.

These programs conduct R&D in similar areas as well as in support of 

similar user communities. In all four programs, R&D activities include 

applied research and initial prototype development; two programs, DOD’s 

CB Defense Program and DOE’s CB Nonproliferation Program, also engage

5

This act was contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV of P.L. 

104-201, Sept. 23, 1996) and is commonly referred to by its sponsors’ names: Senators Nunn, Lugar, and 

Domenici.

6

TSWG is funded primarily through the Counterterror Technical Support Program within DOD.
B-282700

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

in basic research.7 The R&D funded by DOD’s and DARPA’s programs 

support the development of technologies principally for military 

warfighting applications. The end users of such technologies may be a 

single military service, such as the Army, or multiple services. The R&D 

conducted by DOE’s program and by the TSWG’s Subgroup on Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures support the 

development of technologies for civilian end users, which include federal, 

state, and local emergency response personnel. 

The funding for nonmedical R&D in the DARPA and DOE programs has 

been increasing, and combined are projected to be greater than nonmedical 

R&D funding for DOD’s CB Defense Program for fiscal years 2000-2001. 

The funding levels of basic research, applied research, and prototype 

development for these programs are shown in figure 1 for fiscal years 

1996-2001. 

7

Basic research involves the investigation of fundamental scientific knowledge, such as the basic 

physical properties of CB agents. Applied research refers to scientific investigation directed toward a 

technical goal, such as developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed detection technologies. 

Applied research generally tests such technologies within a controlled laboratory environment. 

Prototype development involves developing a piece of equipment in order to show the practical utility 

and feasibility of a technology. In general, the initial prototype must be able to perform in an 

environment similar to that in which it will ultimately be used, though it may not be able to withstand 

all the stresses of operational use. Two other types of R&D activities, conducted primarily by DOD, are 

Demonstration/Validation and Engineering and Manufacturing Development. These two activities are 

part of DOD’s acquisition cycle, and include the testing and evaluation of technologies.
B-282700

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 1: Actual and Projected Funding for Nonmedical Basic Research, Applied 

Research, and Prototype Development Addressing Chemical and Biological Threatsa

a

All funding amounts are in then-year dollars.

b

DOD and DARPA budgets include only nonmedical R&D in the DOD budget activities of basic 

research, applied research, and advanced technology development. The fiscal year 1997 DOD CB 

Defense Program budget excludes DARPA funds, which were consolidated into the CB Defense 

Program for fiscal year 1997 only.

c

Our figures for TSWG’s budget only include funding originating in DOD for the Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures Subgroup. Funding for fiscal years 2000-2001 is 

estimated assuming the same annual percentage change as total TSWG funding from DOD.

Sources: DOD, DARPA, and DOE.

Current Mechanisms 

May Not Ensure 

Effective Coordination 

of R&D Programs

These four programs need to coordinate their R&D efforts because they 

pursue many of the same capabilities and may contract with many of the 

same laboratories to perform R&D work. The current formal and informal 

mechanisms to coordinate among these programs may not ensure that 

potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration are addressed. 

In particular, participation in some current coordination mechanisms is 

Dollars in millions

DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Programb

DARPA Biological Warfare Defense Program

DOE Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program

TSWG Counterterror Technical Support Program

b

c

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fiscal Year
B-282700

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

inconsistent, and information on user needs, validated CB defense 

equipment requirements, and on how programs relate R&D projects to 

those needs is incomplete.

Programs Pursue Similar 

Capabilities and May 

Employ Many of the Same 

Laboratories 

As emphasized in a recent National Academy of Sciences study,8

overlapping R&D activities among different agencies, while common and 

valuable, would be enhanced by effective coordination to reduce potential 

inefficient duplication of effort, prevent important questions from being 

overlooked, and enhance opportunities for collaboration. The National 

Academy of Sciences study advocated a formal process to coordinate areas 

of research that are supported by multiple agencies. 

In the case of R&D to address CB threats, every R&D area is addressed by 

at least two of the four programs we examined. For example, all four 

programs address the capability for biological agent detection and 

identification, and three of the four programs address the capability for 

chemical detection and identification. Furthermore, programs sometimes 

develop similar technologies in pursuing these capabilities, such as mass 

spectroscopy for identifying biological agents. A summary of the R&D 

areas pursued by each program is presented in figure 2.

8

Evaluating Federal Research Programs: Research and the Government Performance and Results Act, 

National Research Council, National Academy Press, 1999.
B-282700

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 2: CB-related Subject Areas Covered by R&D Programs

Note: An X indicates that the program covers the specified R&D subject area, by either funding or 

soliciting for (e.g., through a broad agency announcement) R&D projects in that area. A blank indicates 

that the program does not cover the specified R&D subject area.

Sources: DOD, DARPA, DOE, and TSWG.

In addition, programs may contract with the same groups of laboratories to 

perform R&D. Laboratories in DOD, industry, and academia may perform 

R&D work for three of the four programs, and DOE laboratories may 

perform work for any of the programs. A summary of the relationships 

among the agencies, programs, and potential R&D performers is presented 

in figure 3.

R&D area DOD's Chemical 

and Biological 

Defense Program

DARPA's 

Biological Warfare 

Defense Program

DOE's Chemical 

and Biological 

Nonproliferation 

Program

TSWG's 

Counterterror 

Technical Support 

Program

Biological detection and 

identification

Chemical detection and 

identification

Individual protection

Collective protection

Other basic research 

(e.g., aerosol science, 

genomic sequencing)

Other applied research 

(e.g., threat assessment, 

aerosol technology)

Modeling and simulation

Decontamination, 

restoration, and 

mitigation

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
B-282700

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 3: Summary of Organizational Relationships Among Agencies, Programs, and Potential R&D Performers for Nonmedical 

R&D Addressing CB Threats

Sources: DOD, DARPA, DOE, and TSWG.

Participation in 

Coordination Mechanisms 

Is Inconsistent

Both formal and informal mechanisms are used to coordinate R&D among 

these four programs. One formal coordinating body involved with both 

military and domestic preparedness programs is the Counterproliferation 

Program Review Committee. This Committee, which consists of 

representatives from DOD, DOE, and the intelligence community, is 

responsible for annually reviewing and making recommendations to 

Congress regarding programs related to military as well as terrorist threats 

from non-conventional weapons, including CB threats. In addition, the 

National Security Council has established a coordinating group for 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness, under which there is a 

subgroup for R&D. Other formal coordinating bodies, such as the 

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group and the

CB

Defense

Program

CB Nonproliferation 

Program

Biological 

Warfare 

Defense

Program

Counterterror 

Technical 

Support 

Program

Department of 

Energy

DARPA

Department of 

Defense

DOD labs

Industry labs

DOE labs

Academic labs

DOD labs

Industry labs

DOE labs

Academic labs

DOD labs

DOE labs

Industry labs

Programs

Agencies

Potential 

Performers of 

R&D

TSWG

(interagency)

DOE labs

Academic labs
B-282700

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

National Security Council-sponsored TSWG, oversee narrower ranges of 

activities related to CB threats.9

Many officials cited the importance of informal coordination mechanisms, 

such as informal briefings, scientific conferences, and participation in each 

other’s planning and review meetings.10 Participation in some informal 

coordination mechanisms, however, is incomplete. For example, although 

DOE’s program is aimed at domestic preparedness needs, planning and 

review of DOE projects have not involved potential users from the 

domestic preparedness community. And, moreover, no valid requirements 

have been defined for this community. In the case of DOD’s CB Defense 

Program, although DOE is invited to participate in the R&D planning and 

review meetings, they have not consistently attended. DARPA officials cite 

insufficient staff to attend all potential planning and review meetings. Thus, 

informal coordination mechanisms have not ensured input from end users 

and agencies involved in addressing threats from CB weapons.

Current Coordination 

Mechanisms Lack Complete 

Information on User Needs 

and Requirements 

The current coordination mechanisms utilize only limited information on 

civilian user needs, validated CB defense equipment requirements, and how 

programs relate R&D projects to user needs. Information on user needs 

and defined requirements may allow coordination mechanisms to compare 

the specific goals and objectives of R&D projects to better assess whether 

overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration exist. 

DOD’s CB Defense Program coordinates and consolidates information on 

the warfighting capabilities that military users require. These requirements 

initially take the form of broad needs, such as “individual protection” or 

“contamination avoidance.” From these broad needs, users develop 

detailed system and coordinated performance requirements based on 

analyses of threats and military missions. With information on user needs, 

equipment requirements, and ongoing R&D, consolidation is possible. For 

instance, after the CB defense efforts of each of the four services were 

coordinated through the CB Defense Program, 44 service-specific 

9

The Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group addresses preventing and detecting 

the use of CB threats, but not responding to their use. The TSWG’s scope only includes terrorist, not 

military, CB threats. 

10As an example of the results of informal coordination, program officials repeatedly noted a project for 

detecting CB agents based on “parallel micro separations” that is funded jointly by DOD and DOE at the 

Sandia National Laboratory.
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Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

developmental efforts in the program’s contamination avoidance research 

area were consolidated into 10 joint-service projects. 

Programs have significantly less information on domestic preparedness 

needs than on military needs. While military user needs and requirements 

are coordinated among the military services and are relatively detailed, 

domestic preparedness needs are uncoordinated and scantly defined. For 

example, the InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and 

InterOperability advising the National Domestic Preparedness Office at the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation has developed a Standardized Equipment 

List for first responders. Use of the list is voluntary, however, as there is 

neither a validated set of requirements nor a consensus in the domestic 

preparedness community on needed equipment.11 Two lists of R&D needs 

to improve domestic capabilities to respond to CB incidents have been 

developed, but these lists are short statements of equipment needs without 

detailed performance specifications, and they do not incorporate mission 

and threat analyses.12

The coordinating mechanisms also lack sufficient information on how two 

of the four programs relate user needs to their program R&D goals. Only 

R&D projects conducted by DOD’s CB Defense Program and the TSWG’s 

Subgroup on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Countermeasures are formally tied to user needs. One example of how 

DOD’s R&D efforts are tied to user needs is the use of Defense Technology 

Objectives. Each Defense Technology Objective identifies a specific 

technology advancement that will be developed or demonstrated as well as 

the specific benefits to military operational capabilities from the 

technology advance. In other cases, R&D efforts are tied directly to 

performance specifications as part of the equipment acquisition cycle. In 

the case of TSWG, all R&D projects directly support the user needs 

developed within TSWG; though, as noted above, equipment needs are 

stated without detailed performance specifications, and they do not 

incorporate mission and threat analyses. 

11Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs

(GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).

12A prioritized list of R&D needs to detect, protect from, and mitigate CB weapons is developed by 

TSWG annually; and, in a recent Institute of Medicine study, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: 

Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response, the nonmedical R&D needs of 

civilian health providers were delineated (e.g., personal protective equipment, detection and 

measurement of chemical agents).
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The DARPA and DOE programs, by contrast, do not formally incorporate 

user needs in planning their R&D efforts. Each DARPA R&D area is 

internally developed by DARPA and does not necessarily support a 

documented military requirement. Proposals in each area are evaluated by 

a peer review panel consisting primarily of nongovernment experts, and 

the final decision for funding a proposal is made by the DARPA program 

manager for that R&D area. Similarly, the planning and review of DOE 

projects do not utilize any requirements developed for domestic 

preparedness programs. Project reviews are primarily concerned with 

technical merit, although potential user benefits are considered. Review 

panels consisted primarily of DOE personnel in 1997-98, and are planned to 

consist of non-DOE technical experts in 1999. 

Agency officials are aware of the deficiencies in the existing coordination 

mechanisms, and some have initiated additional informal contacts in 

response. Informal coordination between DOD and DOE has been 

particularly active.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of our report to DOD and DOE. DOD provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated into our report, where 

appropriate. In a written response, DOE stated that they had no comments 

with our report as written. DOE’s response is reprinted in appendix I.

Scope and 

Methodology

The scope of our study was limited to federally funded R&D of nonmedical 

technologies to address CB threats. We did not evaluate any classified 

R&D. 

To address objective (1), to identify federal programs funding R&D in this 

area, we conducted interviews, literature searches, and collected program 

documents. We queried officials from the Department of Defense, 

Department of Energy, the Technical Support Working Group, and the 

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. We also conducted 

searches of Department of Defense databases, governmentwide databases, 

and the Commerce Business Daily. In addition, we reviewed recent 

legislation addressing the threat from chemical and biological weapons to 

both the military and civilians, including legislation establishing new 

programs in this area. Program documents we examined included program 

budgets, strategic and performance plans, annual reports, internal program 
B-282700

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

planning documents, program briefings, and proceedings to program 

review meetings.

For objective (2), to describe the mechanisms for coordinating these 

programs, we interviewed program officials, examined legislation and 

program documents, observed program review meetings, and attended 

scientific conferences. Our interviews included discussions of formal 

coordination mechanisms as well as informal mechanisms. We also 

reviewed legislation establishing formal coordinating bodies and 

documents produced by these bodies. This documentation included annual 

reports, briefing slides, and documentation made available on the world 

wide web. Our assessment of informal coordination included our 

observation of interagency participation in program meetings and scientific 

conferences. We observed a 1999 TSWG requirements determination 

meeting as well as the 1999 DOD Technology Area Review and Assessment 

of CB defense. Scientific conferences we attended included the 1998 Joint 

Workshop on Standoff Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense and 

the 1998 Scientific Conference on Chemical and Biological Defense 

Research. We also obtained proceedings from these and other scientific 

conferences from previous years.

We contacted the following organizations:

• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia;

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Dulles, Virginia;

• Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.;

• Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Washington, 

D.C.;

• Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland;

• Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, Falls Church, Virginia;

• National Domestic Preparedness Office, Washington, D.C.;

• National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, Virginia;

• Nonproliferation and National Security Office, Department of Energy, 

Washington, D.C.;

• Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House, Washington, 

D.C.;

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.;

• Technical Support Working Group, Fort Washington, Maryland;

• U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland; and

• U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
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Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

We conducted our evaluation from November 1998 to April 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days after its 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy. We 

will also make copies available to others on request.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me or

Sushil K. Sharma at (202) 512-3092. Key contributors to this report were 

Weihsueh Chiu and Jeffrey Harris.

Kwai-Cheung Chan

Director, Special Studies and Evaluations
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix I

Comments from the Department of Energy ApenIdxi

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