No. 12-14-00336-CV

IN THE 

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS 

AT TYLER, TEXAS 

FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM, Appellant 

v.

DENA MARIE TURNER, Appellee 

Appealed from the County Court at Law of 

Nacogdoches County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Number: C1228635 

APPELLEE’S BRIEF 

Counsel for Appellee: 

Jarett T. LaRochelle 

Texas Bar Number: 24041296 

One Riverway, Suite 1700 

Houston, Texas 77056 

713-907-8668 telephone 

713-840-6351 facsimile 

ACCEPTED

12-14-00336-CV

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

5/26/2015 10:40:11 AM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 5/26/2015 10:40:11 AM CATHY S. LUSK Clerk
2

Identity of Parties and Counsel

Appellee certifies that this is a list of all parties to the trial court’s judgment, 

and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all trial and appellate counsel:

Appellant: FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM

Counsel: Mr. Tom Rorie

State Bar No. 17238000

210 North Street

Nacogdoches, Texas 75961

936-559-1188 telephone

936-559-0099 facsimile

Appellee: DENA MARIE TURNER

Counsel: Mr. Jarett T. LaRochelle

State Bar No. 24041296

One Riverway, Suite 1700

Houston, Texas 77056

713-907-8668 telephone

713-840-6351 facsimile

Oral Argument is Unnecessary

Appellee would allege and show that oral argument is unnecessary herein on 

each of the grounds provided in Rule 39.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, i.e. (a) the appeal is frivolous; (b) the dispositive issues have been 

authoritatively decided; (c) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented 

in the briefs and record; and (d) the decisional process would not be significantly 

aided by oral argument.
3

Table of Contents

Identity of Parties and Counsel..................................................................................2

Oral Argument is Unnecessary ..................................................................................2

Index of Authorities...................................................................................................3

Statement of the Case.................................................................................................4

Issues Presented .........................................................................................................4

Statement of Facts......................................................................................................5

Summary of the Argument.......................................................................................14

Argument..................................................................................................................15

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................31

Prayer .......................................................................................................................32

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................33

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................33

Index of Authorities

Aaron v. Aaron, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 22, 24

(Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] January 31, 2012) 

(mem. Opinion) (Cause No. 14-10-00765-CV)

Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189 16

(Tex.App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d)

Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 22, 23

(Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987)

In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 16

(Tex.2003)

In the interest of M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891 16

(Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet.dism’d). 
4

Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723 16

(Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 2009, no writ hist.). 

Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 16

(Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1971, no writ hist.)

Codes, Rules, and Statutes

TEXAS CONSTITUTION, Article 16, §50(a)(3) 16

TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01(b)(3) 24

TEXAS FAMILY CODE §3.203 16

TEXAS PENAL CODE §22.01 28

Statement of the Case

Appellant Frederick Dawson Graham appeals the Final Decree of Divorce

entered on September 3, 2014, in in Cause No. C1228635, by the Honorable Judge 

Jack Sinz, of the County Court at Law of Nacogdoches County, Texas.

Issues Presented

Appellant Frederick Dawson Graham has presented nine (9) issues:

1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding Appellee an 

ownership interest in the marital residence;

2. Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that the parties were tenants 

in common in the marital residence;
5

3. Whether the Trial Court erred by divesting Appellant of one-half of 

his ownership in the marital residence and awarding that interest to 

Appellee;

4. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to find that the 

residence was not purchased with Appellant’s separate property funds;

5. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion when it disregarded 

Appellant’s allegation that Appellee committed fraud on the community 

estate;

6. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in disregarding evidence 

of benefits received by Appellee during the marriage;

7. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in finding that Appellant 

was at fault in the break-up of the marriage;

8. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion when it ordered 

Appellant to pay spousal support; and

9. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding a 

disproportionate part of the tract adjoining the residence.

Statement of Facts

As indicated in Appellant’s Brief, the parties were married on or about 2007 

and ceased to live together as husband and wife on or about July 1, 2012. 

Appellant’s Brief ignores that Appellee and Appellant lived together and were 
6

looking to purchase a residence together many years prior to their date of marriage. 

(RR Vol. 1, pp. 42-43; RR Vol. 2, pp. 12-13; and Petitioner’s Ex. 1, email dated 

December 26, 2008). During such time, Appellee ceased working on her own 

independent career to enter into an oral business partnership and service 

Appellant’s career. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 40, 146-151). Appellant was able to bill 

clients for the parties’ joint effort at a higher rate than Appellee’s customary rate 

and all business expenses incurred by the couple were reimbursed by the clients. 

(RR Vol. 2, pp. 13, 40, 58, 115, 126, 148). Because Appellee traveled with 

Appellant on his business trips, the Trial Court found Appellee was only available 

to work with and for Appellant and was unable to continue her own, independent 

career as corroborated by witness Kathy Bush-Soule, Appellee’s former client. 

(RR Vol. 2, pp. 148-49). By written correspondence, Appellant acknowledged 

Appellee’s business services consistently from 2004 through 2011. (RR Vol. 2, 

pp. 17-21, 27-29, 115 and Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, email(s) dated May 25, 2004; July 

13, 2004; July 16, 2004; August 2, 2004; August 13, 2004; June 23, 2005; May 2, 

2006; April 27, 2006; May 3, 2006; May 4, 2006; July 12, 2006; July 13, 2006; 

October 18, 2006; April 4, 2007; November 14, 2008; and January 14, 2011). 

Appellant has education, training, and experience in the field of accounting for oil 

and gas production with oil companies in that field, but relied upon Appellee’s 

education, training, and experience in marketing, editing, and drafting of business 
7

communications, presentation design and development, and back office 

administration. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 13-14, 17-21). Appellant’s poor writing and 

spelling skills required Appellee to both edit all communications with clients and 

write the final work products presented for payment to clients. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 13-

14, 17-21, 37-38). 

With respect to the marital homestead, Appellee and Appellant collaborated 

together to find and decide upon the purchase of the Raguet Street residence in 

Nacogdoches in 2006. (RR Vol. 1, pp. 42-43). Appellant admitted on the stand

that Appellee and Appellant were purchasing the residence together. (RR Vol. 4, 

p. 78). Prior to the purchase of the Raguet Street residence, Appellee and 

Appellant had previously attempted to purchase another, more expensive, 

residence in Nacogdoches in 2004. (RR Vol. 4, p. 80 and Petitioner’s Ex. 1, emails 

dated April 29, 2004, May 25, 2004, July 21, 2004, July 30, 2004, August 2, 2004, 

August 17, 2004, August 25, 2004, and two (2) dated September 2, 2004). 

Appellee was the only connection with or inspiration to reside in Nacogdoches. 

Appellant had no independent connection with or incentive to reside in 

Nacogdoches. (RR Vol. 3, pp.74-76 and RR Vol. 4, pp. 77-78).

While the purchase of the Raguet Street residence was five months prior to 

the date of marriage of the parties, the parties had been working, romantically 

involved, and residing together for approximately five years. (Petitioner’s Ex. 1, 
8

email dated December 26, 2008). The entire initial down payment on the Raguet 

Street residence purchase was provided from business revenue generated by the 

combined efforts of Appellee and Appellant and paid from a First Bank and Trust 

of East Texas basic business checking bank account jointly owned by both 

Appellee and Appellant. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 99, 131-133 and RR Vol. 3, pp. 45-52

and Petitioner’s Ex. 6). Appellee worked on and coordinated the entire closing on 

the Raguet Street residence, and Appellant consulted with Appellee on loan 

comparisons, cost savings and financial risk mitigataion. (RR Vol. 2, p. 28-29 and 

Petitioner’s Ex. 1, email dated August 17, 2006). The Appellee testified and 

Appellant conceded that title to the Raguet Street residence was exclusively held in 

the name of Appellant because Appellee’s credit score would have resulted in a 

higher mortgage interest rate. (RR Vol. 4, p 159 and Petitioner’s Exhibit 1; email 

dated August 17, 2006). The payments in reduction of principal on the mortgage 

secured by the Raguet Street residence were made from business revenue 

generated by the combined efforts of Appellee and Appellant. (Petitioner’s 

Exhibit(s) 4, 10, 11, and 12). Any and all inheritance or other separate property 

funds belonging to Appellant, including but not limited to Appellant’s inheritance 

from his father, were deposited into a savings account commingled with other 

funds and then deposited into a money market account and comingled with other 

funds used to pay living expenses for both parties over the years prior to the 
9

purchase of the Raguet Street residence. Appellee produced exhibits that evidence 

the business revenue used to fund the initial down payment and regular monthly 

payments on the mortgage secured by the Raguet Street residence. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 

45-55 and Petitioner’s Exhibit(s) 4, 10, 11, and 12). None of the funds used for the 

initial down payment or regular monthly payments on the Raguet Street residence 

were from funds received from the United Kingdom. (RR Vol. 4, p. 161-63). 

While Appellant’s Brief alleges otherwise, Appellant himself admitted on the stand 

an inability to dispute Appellee’s tracing evidence with respect to the Raguet Street 

residence. (RR Vol. 4, p. 161-63). 

The purchase of the Back Lot to the Raguet Street residence was after the 

date of marriage of the parties. The Appellee testified and Appellant conceded that 

title to the Raguet Street residence was exclusively held in the name of Appellant 

because Appellee’s credit score would have resulted in a higher mortgage interest 

rate. By correspondence to Appellee, Appellant acknowledged the savings 

received from their method of financing the Raguet Street residence only in 

Appellant’s name. It was, however, Appellee who handled the closing 

coordination on the Raguet Street residence and Back Lot closings. Again, the 

parties agreed that title to the Back Lot was recorded exclusively in the name of 

Appellant, although purchased after the date of marriage of the parties, because 

Appellant was able to obtain better financing terms without the joinder of Appellee 
10

on the loan. In full and final payment of the mortgage due and owing on the “Back 

Lot”, Appellant borrowed $15,000 from Robert McCatty and Kathleen McCatty, 

his brother-in-law and sister.

Appellee testified that she never anticipated Appellant would make claim to 

the Raguet Street House or the Back Lot as his separate property. Appellee 

testified that Appellant had promised Appellee to add Appellee’s name to title to 

the Raguet Street residence. For such reasons, Appellee served as the coordinator 

and “general contractor” for extensive repairs and remodeling to the Raguet Street 

residence and also ran the home since the time of purchase. And, Appellee would 

not have performed all of the contracting and remodeling efforts at the Raguet 

Street residence but for the understanding in reliance upon Appellant’s 

representations that it was “their” home. (RR Vol. 3, p. 56). In fact, through 

numerous email correspondences to Appellee, Appellant represented to Appellee 

that he intended the home to be jointly owned, used, and enjoyed. (RR Vol. 2, p. 

56 and RR Vol. 3, pp. 74-77; RR Vol. 4, pp. 78-82, 159; and Petitioner’s Ex. 1; 

emails dated May 25, 2004; July 6, 2004; July 16, 2004; July 30, 2004; August 25, 

2004; September 2, 2004; July 13, 2006; August 3, 2006; August 17, 2006; 

September 26, 2006; December 18, 2006; and October 14, 2008). There was 

certainly no evidence of intent for the Appellee to have no ownership interest in 

the Raguet Street residence or adjoining Back Lot.
11

Appellant admitted on the stand to fabricating, falsifying, and/or 

fraudulently executing documents with the intention that Appellee rely upon the 

truthfulness of the information contained in such documents, both before the 

marriage of the parties, to induce the Appellee into the marriage, and after the 

marriage of the parties, to induce the Appellee to refrain from making claims 

against Appellant. (RR Vol. 1, p. 66, 68 and RR Vol. 3, p. 5-7). Appellee testified 

that she discovered Appellant’s fabrication, falsification, and/or fraudulent 

execution of documents when Appellant left Appellee to return to the United 

Kingdom under false pretenses. (RR Vol. 2, p. 72-76; RR Vol. 3, p. 35; and RR 

Vol. 4, p. 155). At the time of Appellee’s discovery, the parties had not formally 

reached an agreement for divorce.

Appellant further admitted on the stand to lying to Appellee about his 

involvements with a Melody Welsh aka Melanie Welsh as well as the value and 

location of assets. (RR Vol. 1, p. 68 and RR Vol. 4, pp. 156-57). And further, 

Appellant made an admission against his interests via telephone voice recording 

Appellee that Appellant hid assets from Appellee in the United Kingdom. The 

assets Appellant admitted to hiding from Appellee were undisclosed and 

unidentified. For such and other reasons, Appellant’s testimony and evidence were 

found to not be credible. Appellant’s evidence pertaining to his prior marriage to 

Brigid Graham was not credible and the Trial Court was unable to determine or 
12

verify the date(s) or terms of Appellant’s divorce with Brigid Graham. In fact, the 

Trial Court found that Appellant has the use and enjoyment of his prior marital 

residence with his prior wife, Brigid Graham, in the United Kingdom, and access 

to assets and/or funds in an undisclosed amount located in the United Kingdom. 

(RR Vol. 1, pp. 49, 64, 67-68, 70-71, 83-85). 

On March 31, 2014, Temporary Orders were entered in this matter ordering 

Appellant to make monthly payments of temporary spousal support to Appellee in 

the amount of Two Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($2,000.00), on the first (1st) day 

of each month beginning April 1, 2014, and thereafter until further order of this 

Court. Appellant altogether failed to make any payment of temporary spousal 

support to Appellee, in violation of the Temporary Orders entered March 31, 2014.

At trial, the Trial Court found that the marriage has become insupportable 

because of discord or conflict of personalities between Appellee Dena Marie 

Turner and Appellant Frederick Dawson Graham that destroys the legitimate ends 

of the marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of 

reconciliation. The Trial Court further found that Appellant is guilty of cruel 

treatment toward Appellee, including but not limited to acts of assault and/or 

battery on or about April 20, 2012, in February of 2012, in December of 2011, in 

October of 2011, in August of 2011, on or about July 4, 2010, in June of 2010, in 

August of 2009, and in June of 2008. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 45-62, 67-72). Appellant’s 
13

cruel treatment toward Appellee was corroborated by the witness Cheryl Gryder. 

(RR Vol. 2, pp. 154-56, 161). The Trial Court found that Appellee’s discovery of 

Appellant’s fabrication, falsification, and/or fraudulent execution of documents, 

combined with Appellant’s cruel treatment of Appellee, were the fault and cause of 

the divorce. The Trial Court therefore determined that Appellant is at fault in the 

breakup of the marriage and that Appellee is entitled to a disproportionate division 

of the parties’ marital estate.

The Trial Court found that the only evidence that Appellant gifted, 

conveyed, or transferred money to any other person during the marriage of the 

parties is Appellant’s testimony as to providing funds to his prior wife, his 

children, and to Melody Welsh aka Melanie Welsh. The Trial Court found that 

there is no credible evidence that any community funds were used without the 

knowledge or consent of Appellant.

The Trial Court further found that, in the summer of 2012, Appellant made 

available to Appellee the sum of $20,000 to cover expenses while Appellant left 

Appellee under false pretenses to return to live with his prior wife Brigid Graham. 

At the time Appellant made the $20,000 available to Appellee, there was no 

agreement by and between the parties to divorce and settle the marital estate. 

During such time, Appellant used substantial community funds from the First Bank 

and Trust of East Texas bank accounts co-owned by Appellant and Appellee. (RR 
14

Vol. 2, p. 104-105 and RR Vol. 4, p. 12). In fact, Appellee testified that in the 

summary of 2012, negotiations were taking place by and between the parties as to 

the division of the martial estate but that Appellant left Appellee under false 

pretenses to return to live with his prior wife Brigid Graham before any agreement 

could be made. Appellee further testified that prior to the time Appellee 

discovered Appellant’s fabrication, falsification, and/or fraudulent execution of 

documents there remained the possibility of reconciliation and no agreement had 

been reached by and between the parties regarding divorce.

At the conclusion of trial, the Trial Court found that Appellee has incurred 

reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees in excess of $10,000.00, and that 

Appellee is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees from 

Appellant. The Trial Court further found that, for violation of the Temporary 

Orders entered March 31, 2014, Appellant is ordered to pay to Appellee $8,000.00, 

as outstanding support under such Temporary Orders through trial.

Summary of the Argument

Appellant challenges the Final Decree of Divorce entered on September 3, 

2014, in in Cause No. C1228635, by the Honorable Judge Jack Sinz, of the County 

Court at Law of Nacogdoches County, Texas. Appellant contends that the Final 

Decree of Divorce entered against him should be reversed and that judgment 

should be rendered that Appellee has no ownership interest in the Raguet Street 
15

residence. Appellant further contends that the division of the community property 

and spousal support issues should be remanded with additional instructions to (a) 

consider the evidence with regard to expenditures made by Appellee with 

community funds, (b) financial benefits received by Appellee during the marriage, 

(c) the disproportionate division of the Back Lot to the Raguet Street residence; 

and (d) the award of temporary spousal support by order of the Trial Court dated 

March 31, 2014. The record shows, however, that Appellant’s points of error are 

frivolous and unsubstantiated by the evidence. Specifically, the evidence 

demonstrates that the initial down payment and mortgage payments on the Raguet 

Street residence were not from Appellant’s separate property funds; that no 

expenditures by Appellee of community funds were without Appellant’s consent or 

knowledge; that Appellant’s wrongful acts are relevant, material, and rise to the 

level of fault in the breakup; that Appellant has access to undisclosed, unidentified 

funds in the United Kingdom which enable him to pay support to Appellee; and 

that Appellant’s fault in the breakup justifies a disproportionate award to Appellee.

Argument

Point 1. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Appellee an 

ownership interest in the marital residence.

Point 2. The Trial Court did not err in finding that the parties were tenants in 

common in the marital residence.
16

Point 3. The Trial Court did not err by divesting Appellant of one-half of his 

ownership interest in the marital residence and awarding that interest to 

Appellee

As conceded in Appellant’s Brief, the Trial Court does not abuse its 

discretion unless a decision is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it amounts to a 

clear error. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex.2003). Without abusing its 

discretion herein, the Trial Court divided marital property as it deemed right based 

on the credible evidence and facts presented. Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 

(Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1971, no writ hist.). As provided in the Trial Court’s 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, there exist reasonable bases for the 

unequal division of the property of the parties herein. Knight v. Knight, 301 

S.W.3d 723 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 2009, no writ hist.). Further, such 

reasonable bases exist in light of findings founded on sufficient facts and evidence. 

Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189 (Tex.App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d); and In 

the interest of M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet.dism’d). 

Under the inherent authority of Section 3.203 of the Texas Family Code and 

Article 16, Section 50(a)(3) of the Texas Constitution, the Trial Court has just and 

equitable discretion over the marital residence. 

In an attempt to dismiss Appellant’s fault and lack of credibility, Appellant’s 

brief mischaracterizes the situation and status of assets in the months leading up to 
17

the filing of divorce. Specifically, Appellant’s brief alleges that Appellee obtained 

benefits to which she was not entitled during the time that Appellant had 

abandoned her to return to his former wife in the United Kingdom. As indicated in 

the reporter’s record and Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 

Appellant’s testimony and evidence were found to not be credible. (RR Vol. 1, p. 

28; RR Vol. 3, pp. 69, 126; and RR. Vol. 4, p. 25-27, 145, 200-01). 

Contrary to the factual allegations contained in Appellant’s brief, Appellee 

and Appellant lived together and were looking to purchase a residence together 

many years prior to their date of marriage. (RR Vol. 1, pp. 42-43; RR Vol. 2, pp. 

12-13; and Petitioner’s Ex. 1, email dated December 26, 2008). During such time, 

Appellee ceased working on her own independent career to enter into an oral 

business partnership and service Appellant’s career. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 40, 146-151). 

Appellant was able to bill clients for the parties’ joint effort at a higher rate than 

Appellee’s customary rate and all business expenses incurred by the couple were 

reimbursed by the clients. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 13, 40, 58, 115, 126, 148). Because 

Appellee traveled with Appellant on his business trips, the Trial Court found 

Appellee was only available to work with and for Appellant and was unable to 

continue her own, independent career, as corroborated by witness Kathy BushSoule, Appellee’s former client. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 148-49). By written 

correspondence, Appellant acknowledged Appellee’s business services 
18

consistently from 2004 through 2011. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 17-21, 27-29, 115 and 

Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, email(s) dated May 25, 2004; July 13, 2004; July 16, 2004; 

August 2, 2004; August 13, 2004; June 23, 2005; May 2, 2006; April 27, 2006; 

May 3, 2006; May 4, 2006; July 12, 2006; July 13, 2006; October 18, 2006; April 

4, 2007; November 14, 2008; and January 14, 2011). Appellant has education, 

training, and experience in the field of accounting for oil and gas production with 

oil companies in that field, but relied upon Appellee’s education, training, and 

experience in marketing, editing, and drafting of business communications, 

presentation design and development, and back office administration. (RR Vol. 2,

pp. 13-14, 17-21). Appellant’s poor writing and spelling skills required Appellee 

to both edit all communications with clients and write the final work products 

presented for payment to clients. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 13-14, 17-21, 37-38). 

With respect to the marital homestead, Appellee and Appellant collaborated 

together to find and decide upon the purchase of the Raguet Street residence in 

Nacogdoches in 2006. (RR Vol. 1, pp. 42-43). Appellant admitted on the stand 

that Appellee and Appellant were purchasing the residence together. (RR Vol. 4, 

p. 78). Prior to the purchase of the Raguet Street residence, Appellee and 

Appellant had previously attempted to purchase another, more expensive, 

residence in Nacogdoches in 2004. (RR Vol. 4, p. 80 and Petitioner’s Ex. 1, emails 

dated April 29, 2004, May 25, 2004, July 21, 2004, July 30, 2004, August 2, 2004, 
19

August 17, 2004, August 25, 2004, and two emails dated September 2, 2004). 

Appellee was the only connection with or inspiration to reside in Nacogdoches. 

Appellant had no independent connection with or incentive to reside in 

Nacogdoches. (RR Vol. 3, pp.74-76 and RR Vol. 4, pp. 77-78).

The parties do not disagree that purchase of the Raguet Street residence was 

prior to the date of marriage of the parties. The evidence demonstrates, however, 

that while the purchase of the Raguet Street residence was five months prior to the 

date of marriage of the parties, the parties had been working, romantically 

involved, and residing together for approximately five years. (Petitioner’s Ex. 1, 

email dated December 26, 2008). The evidence shows that the initial down 

payment on the Raguet Street residence purchase was provided from business 

revenue generated by the combined efforts of Appellee and Appellant and paid 

from a First Bank and Trust of East Texas basic business checking bank account 

jointly owned by both Appellee and Appellant. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 99, 131-133 and 

RR Vol. 3, pp. 45-52 and Petitioner’s Ex(s). 4, 6, 10, 11, and 12). The Appellee 

testified and Appellant conceded that title to the Raguet Street residence was 

exclusively held in the name of Appellant because Appellee’s credit score would 

have resulted in a higher mortgage interest rate. (RR Vol. 4, p 159 and Petitioner’s 

Exhibit 1; email dated August 17, 2006). The payments in reduction of principal 

on the mortgage secured by the Raguet Street residence were made from business
20

revenue generated by the combined efforts of Appellee and Appellant (RR Vol. 2, 

pp. 99, 131-133 and RR Vol. 3, pp. 45-52 and Petitioner’s Ex(s). 4, 10, 11, and 

12). Any and all inheritance or other separate property funds belonging to 

Appellant, including but not limited to Appellant’s inheritance from his father, 

were deposited into a savings account commingled with other funds and then 

deposited into a money market account and comingled with other funds used to 

pay living expenses for both parties. Appellee produced exhibits that evidence the 

business revenue used to fund the initial down payment and regular monthly 

payments on the mortgage secured by the Raguet Street residence. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 

45-55 and Petitioner’s Exhibit(s) 4, 10, 11, and 12). None of the funds used for the 

initial down payment or regular monthly payments on the Raguet Street residence 

were from funds received from the United Kingdom. (RR Vol. 4, p. 161-63). 

While Appellant’s Brief alleges otherwise, Appellant himself admitted on the stand 

an inability to dispute Appellee’s tracing evidence with respect to the Raguet Street 

residence. (RR Vol. 4, p. 161-63). Thus, the Trial Court found that neither the 

initial down payment nor the regular monthly payments on the mortgage secured 

by the Raguet Street residence were funded from Appellant’s money market 

account, i.e. the account claimed to contain separate property funds belonging to 

Appellant. 

Appellee worked on and coordinated the entire closing on the Raguet Street 
21

residence, and Appellant consulted with Appellee on loan comparisons, cost 

savings and financial risk mitigation. (RR Vol. 2, p. 28-29 and Petitioner's Exhibit 

1, e-mail dated August 17, 2006). Appellee testified and Appellant conceded that 

title to the Raguet Street residence was exclusively held in the name of Appellant 

because Appellee’s credit score would have resulted in a higher mortgage interest 

rate. (RR Vol. 4, p 159 and Petitioner’s Exhibit 1; email dated August 17, 2006). 

Appellee testified that she never anticipated Appellant would make claim to the 

Raguet Street House or the Back Lot as his separate property. Appellee also 

testified that Appellant had promised Appellee to add Appellee’s name to title to 

the Raguet Street residence. For such reasons, Appellee served as the coordinator 

and “general contractor” for extensive repairs and remodeling to the Raguet Street 

residence. And, Appellee would not have performed all of the contracting and 

remodeling efforts at the Raguet Street residence but for the understanding in 

reliance upon Appellant’s representations that it was “their” home. (RR Vol. 3, p. 

56). In fact, through numerous email correspondences to Appellee, Appellant 

represented to Appellee that he intended the home to be jointly owned, used, and 

enjoyed. (RR Vol. 2, p. 56; RR Vol. 3, pp. 74-77; RR Vol. 4, pp. 78-82, 159; and 

Petitioner’s Ex. 1; emails dated May 25, 2004; July 6, 2004; July 16, 2004; July 

30, 2004; August 25, 2004; September 2, 2004; July 13, 2006; August 3, 2006; 

August 17, 2006; September 26, 2006; December 18, 2006; and October 14, 2008). 
22

There was certainly no evidence of intent for the Appellee to have no ownership 

interest in the Raguet Street residence or adjoining Back Lot.

The most relevant authority to permit the Trial Court to determine that the 

Raguet Street residence was jointly owned by the Appellee and Appellant is found 

in Aaron v. Aaron, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

January 31, 2012) (mem. Opinion) (Cause No. 14-10-00765-CV) and Harrington 

v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987). In the 

Aaron case, the husband challenged the trial court’s findings and conclusions that 

the residence, acquired prior to marriage, was jointly owned by husband and wife 

prior to marriage. The trial court in the Aaron case found that even though title 

was acquired prior to marriage and held in the husband’s name alone, the husband 

and wife jointly owned the house, each owning a one-half, undivided separate 

property interest in the house. The Court of Appeals in the Aaron case affirmed 

the trial court’s judgment. The present case is similar to the Aaron case in that the 

parties looked for and decided upon the Raguet Street residence together, it was 

purchased in the husband’s name solely due to the wife’s poor credit, and the 

residence was used, enjoyed, and represented to be jointly owned. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 

75-77; RR Vol. 4, p. 159; and Petitioner’s Ex. 1; emails dated May 25, 2004; July 

6, 2004; July 16, 2004; July 30, 2004; August 25, 2004; September 2, 2004; July 

13, 2006; August 3, 2006; August 17, 2006; September 26, 2006; December 18, 
23

2006; and October 14, 2008). In the Harrington case, the husband challenged the 

trial court’s findings and conclusions that the residence was purchased by the 

parties as tenants in common, pursuant to an oral partnership, taking title in the 

husband’s name for convenience and credit purposes only. See Harrington, 742 

S.W.2d at 723-24. The Harrington court acknowledged the wife’s plea that an oral 

partnership existed in the parties’ purchase and ownership of the residence, 

entitling her to an undivided one-half interest. See id. The wife’s testimony that 

she agreed to the husband applying for the loan and taking title in his name alone; 

combined with her lack of concern that he would ever assert that the property was 

his alone, their referring to the property as “our home”, and the wife’s 

contributions to improving the house, established that there was never any 

indication of intent for the wife to have no ownership interest. See Harrington, 

742 S.W.2d at 725. The present case is similar to Harrington in that the evidence 

clearly demonstrates that, as a result of the Appellee’s credit, the parties both 

benefitted from securing a mortgage and taking title solely in the Appellant’s

name, both parties continually referred to the residence as “our home”, and both 

parties contributed to improving the house. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 74-77; RR Vol. 4, pp. 

78-82, 159; and Petitioner’s Ex. 1; emails dated May 25, 2004; July 6, 2004; July 

16, 2004; July 30, 2004; August 25, 2004; September 2, 2004; July 13, 2006; 

August 3, 2006; August 17, 2006; September 26, 2006; December 18, 2006; and 
24

October 14, 2008). Appellant’s Brief altogether ignores these significant, 

contributing factors which justify the Trial Court’s decision. Again, conveniently, 

Appellant’s Brief mischaracterizes the evidence by falsely alleging separate 

property funds were used to acquire the Raguet Street residence and completely 

fails to acknowledge the admitted benefit both parties received from financing the 

acquisition without consideration of Appellee’s poor credit. Nothing in 

Appellant’s Brief justifies derogation from the reasoning provided in the Aaron

and Harrington cases. Notwithstanding such fact, Appellant falsely claims that 

such cases are against public policy. 

Appellant disingenuously cites Section 26.01(b)(3) of the Texas Business 

and Commerce code with reference to “agreement made on consideration of 

marriage or on consideration of nonmarital conjugal cohabitation”. Such section is 

altogether inapplicable herein because none of the agreements to which Appellant 

makes issue are “on consideration of marriage”. Thus any public policy 

discussions contained in Appellant’s brief are superfluous and irrelevant. 

Point 4. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find that the 

marital residence was not purchased with Appellant’s separate property 

funds

The evidence demonstrates, however, that the initial down payment on the 
25

Raguet Street residence purchase was provided from business revenue generated 

by the combined efforts of Appellee and Appellant and paid from a First Bank and 

Trust of East Texas basic business checking bank account jointly owned by both 

Appellee and Appellant. (RR Vol. 2, p. 99, 131-133; RR Vol. 3, pp. 45-54; and 

Petitioner’s Ex. 6). The payments in reduction of principal on the mortgage 

secured by the Raguet Street residence were made from business revenue 

generated by the combined efforts of Appellee and Appellant (RR Vol. 3, pp. 45-

55 and Petitioner’s Exhibit(s) 4, 10, 11, and 12). Any and all inheritance or other 

separate property funds belonging to Appellant, including but not limited to 

Appellant’s inheritance from his father, were deposited into a savings account 

commingled with other funds and then deposited into a money market account and 

comingled with other funds used to pay living expenses for both parties over the 

years prior to the purchase of the Raguet Street residence. Appellee produced 

exhibits that evidence the business revenue used to fund the initial down payment 

and regular monthly payments on the mortgage secured by the Raguet Street 

residence (Petitioner’s Exhibit(s) 4, 10, 11, and 12). None of the funds used for the 

initial down payment or regular monthly payments on the Raguet Street residence 

were from funds received from the United Kingdom. In fact, Appellant admitted 

on the stand an inability to prove any tracing information for the payments on the 

Raguet Street residence. (RR Vol. 4, p. 161-63). Thus, the Trial Court found that 
26

neither the initial down payment nor the regular monthly payments on the 

mortgage secured by the Raguet Street residence were funded from Appellant’s 

money market account, i.e. the account claimed to contain separate property funds 

belonging to Appellant. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 45-55 and Petitioner’s Exhibit(s) 4, 10, 

11, and 12). 

Point 5. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it disregarded 

Appellant’s allegation that Appellee committed fraud on the community estate

Contrary to the allegations made in Appellant’s brief, the evidence 

demonstrates that Appellant was aware and consented to the expenditures for 

which he makes complaint on appeal, i.e. remodeling Appellee’s aunt’s house, 

since such efforts and expenses were expended by both Appellant and Appellee 

(RR Vol. 1, p. 16; RR Vol. 2, p. 69; and RR Vol. 4, p. 143). In fact, the evidence 

demonstrates that Appellant was not only aware and consented, but that he actually 

benefited from staying in the aunt’s residence while obtaining medical assistance 

nearby. (RR Vol. 2, p. 69 and RR Vol. 4, p. 111). As for fraudulent expenditures 

of the community estate, the only credible evidence was that Appellant spent 

substantial sums to visit the United Kingdom and his prior family. (RR Vol. 2, p. 

104-105 and RR Vol. 4, p. 12). 
27

Point 6. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by disregarding evidence 

of benefits received by Appellee during the marriage

The evidence demonstrates that the benefits received by Appellee during the 

marriage were in acknowledgment and compensation for the business services 

rendered by Appellee for their joint business enterprise. (RR Vol. 1, p. 47). By 

written correspondence, Appellant acknowledged Appellee’s business services 

consistently from 2004 through 2011. (RR Vol. 2, p. 115; RR Vol. 3, pp. 71-73;

and Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, email(s) dated May 25, 2004; July 13, 2004; July 16, 

2004; August 2, 2004; August 13, 2004; June 23, 2005; May 2, 2006; April 27, 

2006; May 3, 2006; May 4, 2006; July 12, 2006; July 13, 2006; October 18, 2006; 

April 4, 2007; November 14, 2008; and January 14, 2011). Moreover, the 

evidence demonstrates that Appellant made transfers and/or withdrawals of 

community funds without the knowledge and/or consent of Appellee. (RR Vol. 4, 

p. 12). Altogether, the evidence demonstrates that Appellant’s expenditures of 

community funds and/or benefits received exceed Appellee’s corresponding 

expenditures and/or benefits.

Point 7. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant at 

fault in the breakeup of the marriage

It is uncontroverted that Appellant is guilty of cruel treatment, assault, and 
28

battery of Appellee. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 47, 54, 56, 60-61, 67-68, 70-71). Such 

evidence is corroborated by witness testimony. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 155-56). While 

the Appellant attempts to dismiss these examples of cruel treatment, assault, and 

battery, Appellant seems completely unaware that a “touch” is what constitutes 

battery while assault only requires the threat of a “touch”. See §22.01 TEXAS 

PENAL CODE. Thus, while attempting to dismiss the incidents of Appellant’s 

assaulting Appellee, Appellant’s Brief merely argues that many of the incidents of 

assault do not rise to the level of battery. Such disingenuous arguments by 

Appellant are immaterial and irrelevant. The evidence also clearly demonstrates 

that Appellant abandoned Appellee for several months in 2012, under false, 

deceptive pretenses. (RR Vol. 2, p. 72-76; RR Vol. 3, p. 35; and RR Vol. 4, p. 

155). The evidence further demonstrates that it was during this period of 

abandonment in 2012, that Appellee was able to investigate and confirm the 

forgeries and fraud perpetrated by the Appellant upon the Appellee, to discover 

Appellant’s extramarital solicitations, and to reach the final conclusion that the 

marriage was irreconcilable. (RR Vol. 2, p. 77-96, 102-03; and RR Vol. 4, pp. 

156-57). Considering the Appellant’s lack of credibility and admissions of lying to 

Appellee and hiding money from Appellee in the United Kingdom, Appellant was 

correctly found at fault. (RR Vol. 1, p. 28 and RR Vol. 3, pp. 69, 126). Similarly, 

Appellant’s admissions of forgery and falsifying documents are significant factors 
29

in the finding of Appellant at fault. (RR. Vol. 4, p. 25-27, 145, 200-01). For such 

reasons, Appellee is justly entitled to a disproportionate award against Appellant

and spousal maintenance.

Point 8. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered 

Appellant to pay spousal support to Appellee

The evidence demonstrates that Appellant has made admissions against his 

interests in direct contravention of the allegation made in Appellant’s eighth point 

of error, i.e. that he lied to Appellee and hid assets from Appellee in the United 

Kingdom. (RR Vol. 1, p. 28 and RR Vol. 3, p. 69). The Trial Court acknowledged 

Appellant’s credibility issues. (RR. Vol. 4, p. 25-27 and RR Vol. 4, pp. 145, 200-

01). When it was convenient for Appellant, substantial sums of money were 

transferred from the UK to Appellant for which no debt or repayment obligations 

were commemorated. (RR Vol. 2, pp. 140-42 and RR Vol. 3, pp. 64, 131-32, 136-

37). Appellant has admitted that he has the use and enjoyment of his prior marital 

residence with his prior wife, Bridgett Graham. (RR Vol. 1, pp. 33, 34). Further, 

Appellant failed to provide any credible documentation to dispute that he has 

access to substantial assets in the United Kingdom and repeatedly admitted to 

having accounts and access to funds in the United Kingdom. (RR Vol. 1, pp. 49, 

64, 67-68, 70-71, 83-85 and RR Vol. 4, pp. 149-50, 152). And finally, the 
30

evidence demonstrates that Appellant has access to substantial funds and paid his 

attorney during the period he was obligated to pay spousal support. (RR Vol. 2, 

pp. 140-42 and RR Vol. 3, pp. 64, 131-32, 136-37). For such reason, the Trial 

Court correctly concluded that Appellant has funds with which to pay support to 

Appellee. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 80-81 and RR Vol. 4, pp. 199-200).

Point 9. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a 

disproportionate part of the Back Lot tract adjoining the Raguet Street 

residence

As discussed herein, the Trial Court justifiably found the Appellant at fault 

and accordingly awarded a disproportionate part of the Back Lot tract adjoining the 

Raguet Street residence. As the purchase of the Back Lot to the Raguet Street 

residence was after the date of marriage of the parties, title to the Raguet Street 

residence was exclusively held in the name of Appellant only because Appellee’s 

credit score would have resulted in a higher mortgage interest rate. By 

correspondence to Appellee, Appellant acknowledged the savings received from 

their method of financing the Raguet Street residence only in Appellant’s name. 

(RR Vol. 4, p 159 and Petitioner’s Exhibit 1; email dated August 17, 2006). It 

was, however, Appellee who handled the closing coordination on the Raguet Street 

residence and Back Lot closings. (RR Vol. 2, p. 28-29). Again, the parties agreed 
31

that title to the Back Lot was recorded exclusively in the name of Appellant, 

although purchased after the date of marriage of the parties, because Appellant was 

able to obtain better financing terms without the joinder of Appellee on the loan. 

None of the funds used for the initial down payment or regular monthly payments 

on the Back Lot were from funds received from the United Kingdom. In fact, 

Appellant admitted on the stand an inability to prove any tracing information for 

the payments. (RR Vol. 4, p. 161-63). Thus, the Trial Court found that no funds 

used in payment on the Back Lot were from any account claimed to contain 

separate property funds belonging to Appellant. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 45-55 and 

Petitioner’s Exhibit(s) 4, 10, 11, and 12). As for the outstanding “loan”, i.e. the 

$15,000 Appellant borrowed from Robert McCatty and Kathleen McCatty, 

Appellant’s brother-in-law and sister, the Final Decree of Divorce entered herein 

provides for final payment of same.

Conclusion

As set forth above, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the Trial Court did 

not abuse its discretion. The Final Decree of Divorce entered herein is justified 

and founded on careful considerations of all credible evidence provided herein. 

The Trial Court justifiably concluded that Appellant has credibility issues;

committed relevant, material, and wrongful acts against the Appellee to rise to the 
32

level of being at fault in the breakup of the marriage; and has access to assets 

hidden from Appellee in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Trial Court 

reasonably concluded that the Raguet Street residence and Back Lot were acquired 

by funds obtained by the efforts of both parties; were titled and financed 

exclusively in Appellant’s name solely for the purpose of obtaining better credit 

terms; were used, enjoyed, and represented to be jointly owned; and were 

substantially improved by the efforts of Appellee in justifiable reliance upon 

Appellant’s representations that the property was jointly owned. And finally, the 

Trial Court reasonably concluded that no expenditures by Appellee of community 

funds were without Appellant’s consent, knowledge, participation, or benefit. For 

such reasons, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Appellee a 

disproportionate award.

Prayer

Wherefore, premises considered, Appellee Dena Marie Turner prays that this 

Honorable Court affirm the Final Decree of Divorce entered against the Appellant 

Frederick Dawson Graham on September 3, 2014, under Cause No. C1228635, in 

the County Civil Court at Law of Nacogdoches County, Texas.

Respectfully Submitted,
33

/s/ Jarett T. LaRochelle

Jarett T. LaRochelle

Texas Bar No. 24041296

One Riverway, Suite 1700

Houston, Texas 77056

713-907-8668 telephone

713-840-6351 facsimile

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE DENA 

MARIE TURNER

Certificate of Compliance

This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 

9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a convention typeface no smaller than 14-

point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the 

word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains 

less than 6,000 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Jarett T. LaRochelle

Jarett T. LaRochelle

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice has been 

forwarded to the following parties or their counsel of record in accordance with the 

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 26th day of May, 2015:

Mr. Tom Rorie

State Bar No. 17238000

210 North Street

Nacogdoches, Texas 75961

936-559-1188 telephone

936-559-0099 facsimile
34

/s/ Jarett T. LaRochelle

Jarett T. LaRochelle