1 2 2

- 3040

- cv Li v. Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC D ATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1 held at the Thurgood Marshall Unit ed States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 2 City of New York, on the

- 29 th day of June , two thousand twenty

- three. 3 4 PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, 5 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 6 JOSEPH F. BIANCO , 7 Circuit Judges

. 8

------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 YU CHAN LI , 10 11 Plaintiff

- Appellant , 12 13

v. No. 22

- 3040

- cv 14
15 APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE NEW YORK 16 SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 17 STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY 18 LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION, 19 SARAH CARROLL, MARK A. SILBERMAN, 20 JOHN WEISS , CLAVA BRODSKY, 21 22 Defendant s

- Appellee s

. 232 1

------------------------------------------------------------------ 2 3 FOR PLAINTIFF

- APPELLANT: M ARC H. G ERSTEIN , New 4 York , NY 5
6 FOR CITY DEFENDANT S

- APPELLEE S : K ATE F LETCHER , Of 7 Counsel, New York City 8 Law Department 9 (Richard Dearing, 10 Rebecca L. Visgaitis, Of 11 Coun se l, on the brief ), on 12 behalf of Sylvia O. Hinds

13 Radix, Corporation 14 Counsel of the City of 15 New York, New York, 16 NY 17 18 FOR STATE DEFENDANTS

- APPELLEES: K WAME N. A KOS A H , 19 Assistant Solicitor 20 General (Barbara D. 21 Underwood, Solicitor 22 General, Ester 23 Murdukhayeva, Deputy 24 Solicitor General, on the 25 brief ), on behalf of Letitia 26 James, Attorney General 27 for the State of New 28 York, New York , NY 29 30 Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the 31
Southern District of New York ( P. Kevin Castel , Judge ). 32
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 333 AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED

. 1

Yu Chan Li appeals from a November 7, 2022 judgment of the United 2
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ( Castel , J. ) dismissing 3
her complaint alleging various constitutional violations arising from her public 4
hearing before the Landmarks Preservation Commission (“LPC”) and 5
subsequent proceedings that she initiated in New York state court

. We assume 6
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior 7
proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to 8

affirm. 9

Li file d the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Appellate 10

Division of t he New York Supreme Court and the State of New York 11
(collectively , the “State defendants”), as well as the LPC and various city officials 12
(collectively , the “City defendants ” )

. She a lleg es that the defendants violated her 13
procedural and substantive due process rights during the LPC hearing and in the 14
state court proceedings, and that both the New York City Landmarks 15

Preservation Law and New York Civil Practice Law & Rules § 5701 are 16

unconstitutional

. The District Court dismissed Li’s claims against the State 17

defendants as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and her claims against the 184 City defendants as precluded under the collateral estoppel doctrine. We review 1

the District Court’s findings of fact for c lear error and its legal conclusions de 2

novo

. See Brokamp v. James , 66 F.4th 374, 386 (2d Cir. 2023). 3

A t the outset, we note that Li does not challenge the District Court’s 4
determination that her claims against the State defendants are barred by the 5

Eleventh Amendment. See Appellant’s Br. 6 n.5 , 19. We therefore affirm the 6

District Court’s dismissal of Li’s claims against the State defendants , including 7

her constitutional challenge to § 5701. 8

All that remains are Li’s claims against the City defendants : (1) he r 9
procedural and substantive due process claims concerning the LPC hearing , and 10
(2) her challenge to the constitutionality of the Landmarks Preservation Law. 11

T he District Court ruled that Li is collaterally estopped by a final judgment of the 12
New York Supreme Court from relitigating her claims against the City 13

Defendants

. “Collateral estoppel

. . . prevents parties or their privies from 14
relitigating in a subsequent action an issue of fact or law that was fully and fairly 15
litigated in a prior proceeding.” Phoenix Light SF Ltd. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon , 66 16
F.4th 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine applies 17

where: “ (1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding ; (2) the issue 185 was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding ; (3) the parties had 1
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue ; and (4) the resolution of the issue 2
was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits. ” Wyly v. 3

Weiss , 697 F.3d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 2012) ( quotation marks omitted )

. 4

W e agree with the District Court that Li’s claims against the City 5

defendants are barred by collateral estoppel

. The New York Supreme Court has 6
already considered and rejected Li’s claim that the LP C hearing violated her 7
procedural due process rights

. S ee Joint App’x 21

– 22 , 99

– 101 ; see also 8
Appellant’s Br. 25 (“The New York Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff

- Appellant’s 9

claim that it did not have an adequate opportunity to effectively present legal 10

arg ument at the LPC’s [hearing].”)

. It further rejected Li’s argument that the 11
LPC’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, see Joint App’x 98

– 99, which lies at 12

the heart of her substantive due process claim , see Harl e n Assocs

. v. Inc. Vill

. of 13

Mineola , 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir. 2001)

. And it also determined that the 14

Landmarks Preservation Law i s constitutional. See Joint App’x 102

– 03

. L i does 15

not dispute that the se issues were fully litigated and decided by the New York 16
Supreme Court or that their resolution was necessary to support a valid and final 17
judgment on the merits. And insofar as Li argues that she did not have “a full 186 and fair opportunity to litigate” because she “has not had the opportunity to 1
appeal an adverse finding , ” Jenkins v. City of New York , 478 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 2
2007) (quotation marks omitted) , we disagree . Here, even though Li ultimately 3
failed to perfect her appeal to the Appellate Division , she nevertheless had the 4
opportunity to appeal directly from the state court’s initial adverse ruling. 5

Under these circumstances , we conclude that Li’s claims against the City 6
defendants are precluded by the collateral estoppel doctrine

. We therefore 7

aff irm the District Court’s dismissal of Li’ s claims against the City defendants. 8
Li also suggests that we must reverse or vacate the District Court ’ s ruling 9
even if it correctly determined that her claims are barred by collateral estoppel, 10
because holding ot herwise would itself violate her procedural due process rights. 11
But her arguments in support of that proposition simply restate her claim that 12
the LPC violated her due process rights. That claim , as we have explained, is 13
barred by collateral estoppel. Nor does the application of collateral estoppel 14
cause a deprivation of due process rights, since the doctrine itself requires that 15
litigants are afforded “ a full and fair opportunity to litigate ” b efore it can apply. 16
Wyly , 697 F.3d at 141

. 177 We have considered Li’ s remaining arguments 1 and conclude that they are 1
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is 2

AFFIRMED. 3

FOR THE COURT: 4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 5 6

1 To the extent that Li also asks us to consider the constitutional implications of the state court judgment itself, rather than the constitutional implications of the LPC hearing that the state court addressed in its decision , we lack subject matter jurisdiction to do so

. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty Bd. of Elections , 422 F.3d 77, 83

– 92 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine).