COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-07-00324-CR

NO. 02-07-00325-CR

STEPHEN BERNARD JONES APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY

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OPINION ON REMAND

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A jury convicted Appellant Stephen Bernard Jones of three counts of 

making a false statement to obtain property or credit of more than $200,000 in 

each of two cases.1 Upon his plea of true to habitual allegations, the jury 

assessed his punishment at forty-five years= confinement on each of the six 

counts. The trial court sentenced him accordingly, ordering the sentences to be 

 

1See Tex. Penal Code Ann. ' 32.32 (West 2011).
2

served concurrently. In three points, Appellant argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by allowing him to represent himself, that his multiple convictions 

and sentences under each indictment violate double jeopardy protections, and 

that the evidence is insufficient to show the amount of loss. We affirm the trial 

court=s judgments.

Double Jeopardy

In addressing Appellant’s double jeopardy claim in our original opinion, we 

held that the allowable unit of prosecution was not each false statement in each 

loan application but rather the property or credit sought in each loan application.2 

We therefore vacated four of appellant’s convictions, two in each case.

3

 We then 

restricted our analysis and resolution of his remaining two points to the two live 

counts, overruling each point.4 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, 

reversed our decision on Appellant’s double jeopardy claim, holding that the 

allowable unit of prosecution was in fact each false statement in each loan 

application and that no double jeopardy violation occurred.5 The Texas Court of 

 

2

Jones v. State, 285 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009) 

(Jones I), rev’d, 323 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Jones II). 

3

Id.

4

Id. at 505–07.

5

Jones II, 323 S.W.3d at 893.
3

Criminal Appeals remanded the case to this court to address Appellant’s

remaining points.6

Self-Representation

In his first point, Appellant argues that the trial court reversibly erred and 

abused its discretion by allowing Appellant to represent himself in the joint jury 

trial of the two causes without a written waiver of counsel in those causes in 

compliance with article 1.051 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. For the 

reasons explained in our original opinion,7 we overrule Appellant’s first point.

Sufficiency

In his third point, Appellant contends that the evidence in each case is 

insufficient to support the amount of loss alleged. Since we handed down our 

original opinion, the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a conviction has changed. In Brooks v. State, the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals held that there is no meaningful distinction between the legal 

sufficiency standard and the factual sufficiency standard.8Thus, the Jackson

standard, which is explained below, is the ―only standard that a reviewing court 

should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each 

 

6

Id.

7See Jones I, 285 S.W.3d at 506–07.

8

323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (overruling Clewis v. State, 

922 S.W.2d 126, 131–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
4

element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt.‖9

In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.10

As we pointed out in our original opinion, in the two loan applications 

involved in these two cases, Appellant sought amounts of $680,000 and 

$544,000, respectively.

11

 We also explained,

The statute does not require that a defendant obtain the 

property or credit sought, only that a defendant attempt to obtain 

such property or credit through the use of materially false or 

misleading statements. The amount of property, loan, or credit 

sought, rather than the amount of loss suffered by the complainant, 

determines the severity of the punishment. The State, therefore, 

was required to prove in each case only the amount of the loan 

sought by Appellant when he made the false statements, not the 

amount Appellant received. The State proved that Appellant sought 

property or credit of more than $200,000 in each case.12

We therefore hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s six 

convictions and overrule his third point.

 

9

Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 

(1979)).

10Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton v. State, 235 

S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

11Jones I, 285 S.W.3d at 503.

12Id. at 505 (citations omitted).
5

Conclusion

Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that no double jeopardy 

violation occurred, overruling Appellant’s second point, and because we overrule 

his remaining points as to all six convictions, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT, J.; and DIXON W. HOLMAN (Senior 

Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment).

PUBLISH

DELIVERED: June 9, 2011