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RICKY A. MORNEAU v. STATE OF

CONNECTICUT ET AL.

(AC 35423)

DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Flynn, Js.

Argued October 22, 2013—officially released May 20, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Domnarski, J.)

Ricky A. Morneau, self-represented, the appellant

(plaintiff).

Michael K. Skold, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The plaintiff, Ricky A. Morneau,

appeals following the granting of a motion to dismiss

filed by the defendants1in the case. The self-represented2 plaintiff raised a variety of issues and subissues

in his appellate brief, contending that the court improperly granted the motion to dismiss. The defendants

counter that (1) certain causes of action set forth in

the plaintiff’s complaint never were presented to the

General Assembly and therefore were not encompassed

in the waiver of sovereign immunity authorized by the

General Assembly, (2) all but one of the remaining

causes of action were untimely and were public emoluments in violation of article first, § 1, of the Connecticut

constitution, (3) the sole remaining cause of action

against two prosecutors properly was dismissed

because of absolute judicial immunity, and (4)the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. We agree

with the defendants, and, therefore, affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are necessary for our resolution of this appeal.3

In May, 2007,

the plaintiff commenced a three count lawsuit in the

United States District Court forthe District of Connecticut. In that federal action, the plaintiff alleged that state

Marshals Louis C. Aresco and Louis Corneroli had

refused to serve process for him. The plaintiff also

claimed that he had sent a letter complaining about

the two marshals to then Attorney General Richard

Blumenthal and that the letterthereafter was forwarded

to the State Marshal Commission.4 After conducting an

investigation, the State Marshal Commission dismissed

the plaintiff’s complaint. See Morneau v. State, United

States District Court, Docket No. 3:07-cv-00-819-JBA (D.

Conn. July 7, 2008). The plaintiff further alleged that

the state, Aresco, Corneroli, Blumenthal, and the State

Marshal Commission violated his rights to due process

and equal protection, and conspired to violate those

rights. The District Court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s

claims, rendered judgment in favor of the defendants

and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

any state law claims. Id.

On August 24, 2009, the plaintiff commenced an

action in the Superior Court premised on allegations

that state Marshal Albenie Gagnon had overbilled the

plaintiff for services and made false statements, the

State Marshal Commission had denied his request for

certain documents, made pursuant to the Freedom of

Information Act, General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., and

the state had violated motion deadlines. The plaintiff

subsequently added state Marshal Timothy J. Bennett

as a defendant. The state successfully moved to dismiss

the action on the basis of sovereign immunity; however,

the action against the two marshals remained.5 The

court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to obtain
permission to sue the state from the Claims Commissioner and thus the plaintiff’s claims were barred by

sovereign immunity. The August 24, 2009 action is not

the subject of this appeal.

On September 8, 2009, the plaintiff filed a claim6 with

the Claims Commissioner, requesting permission to sue

the state. In his claim, the plaintiff alleged: (1) overbilling by state marshals in violation of General Statutes

§ 52-70;7

(2) mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341

et seq.; (3) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et

seq.; and (4) violations of due process and equal protection by various state actors.8

The state filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter

alia, that the Claims Commission lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because the claim presented by the plaintiff

was untimely. On May 3, 2010, the plaintiff filed an

objection to the motion to dismiss, and included a ‘‘chronology of events’’ in support of his opposition. The

Claims Commissioner issued a memorandum of decision on May 21, 2010. He noted that the plaintiff alleged

that he had been overbilled by state marshals on two

separate occasions and that these improper actions

occurred in or about August, 2007. Relying on General

Statutes § 4-148 (a),9

the Claims Commissioner determined that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely, and therefore he lacked subject matterjurisdiction and dismissed

the entire claim. See General Statutes § 4-158 (a) (1).

In accordance with § 4-158 (b), the plaintiff asked

the General Assembly to review the decision of the

Claims Commissioner dismissing the claim. On June 8,

2011, the General Assembly issued a Substitute Joint

Resolution No. 34 (resolution) vacating the decision of

the Claims Commissioner and authorizing the plaintiff

‘‘to institute and prosecute to final judgment an action

against the state to recover damages as compensation

for injury to person or damage to property, or both,

allegedly suffered by the [plaintiff] as set forth in said

claim. Such action shall be brought not later than one

year from the date of the final adoption by the General

Assembly of this resolution.’’

The plaintiff then commenced the present action with

a six count complaint, alleging: (1) violations of 42

U.S.C. § 198310 by the defendants; (2) conduct by the

Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the State’s

Attorney, the State Marshal Commission, Gagnon and

Bennett that constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) that the conduct of Gagnon and Bennett violated the federal RICO statute and the state

Corrupt Organizations and Racketeering Activity Act

(CORA), General Statutes § 53-395; (4) that the conduct

of Gagnon and Bennett violated the Connecticut Unfair

Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-

110a et seq.; (5) that the conduct of the attorney general’s office, the state’s attorney’s office and the State
Marshal Commission constituted vexatious litigation in

violation of General Statutes § 52-568; and (6) that the

plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief against the

State Marshal Commission. The plaintiff sought monetary damages in counts one through five, and injunctive

relief in count six.

Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 10-3011 and 10-31, the

defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint filed

by the plaintiff. Specifically, the defendants argued that

the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the basis

of sovereign immunity, absolute immunity and the

plaintiff’s lack of standing.12 After hearing argument,

the court issued a memorandum of decision granting

the defendants’ motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s

complaint. The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, which

the court denied. This appeal followed.

Before addressing the specifics of the plaintiff’s

claims on appeal, we set forth the legal principles

regarding a motion to dismiss. ‘‘The standard of review

for a court’s decision on a motion to dismiss is well

settled. A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether,

on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to

dismiss will be de novo. . . . When a . . . court

decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial

motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of

the complaint in their most favorable light. . . . In this

regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in

the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied

from the allegations, construing them in a manner most

favorable to the pleader. . . . The motion to dismiss

. . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes

the existing record and must be decided upon that

alone.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v.

Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 200–201, 994 A.2d 106 (2010);

Bagg v. Thompson, 114 Conn. App. 30, 37–38, 968 A.2d

468 (2009).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly

determined the scope of the legislative waiver of sovereign immunity. The defendants counter that the trial

court properly concluded that the resolution of the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity only for the

causes of actions that had been raised before the Claims

Commissioner and that any other actions are barred by

sovereign immunity. Specifically, the defendants maintain that the court properly dismissed (1) aspects of

count one regarding the actions and omissions of Attorney General George Jepsen, Assistant Attorney General

Philip Miller and the State Marshal Commission,13 (2)

count two, negligent infliction of emotional distress,

(3) count four, CUTPA violations, and (4) count five,

vexatious litigation. We conclude that the trial court

properly granted the motion to dismiss with respect to
these causes of action.

As an initial matter, we set forth the relevant legal

principles regarding sovereign immunity.14 ‘‘Sovereign

immunity relates to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction

over a case, and therefore presents a question of law

over which we exercise de novo review. . . . In so

doing, we must decide whether [the trial court’s] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record. . . . The

principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under

our case law. . . . It has deep roots in this state and

our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient

common law. . . . Not only have we recognized the

state’s immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its

officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the

state is, in effect, against the state. . . . Exceptions to

this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our

jurisprudence. . . .

‘‘[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is

not absolute. There are [three] exceptions: (1) when the

legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary

implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign

immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory

or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim

that the state or one of its officers has violated the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an

action seeks declaratory orinjunctive relief on the basis

of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority. . . . For a claim made pursuant to the

first exception, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign

immunity should be strictly construed. . . . Where

there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they

are given the effect which makes the least rather than

the most change in sovereign immunity. . . . In the

absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to

support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity

grounds is proper.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Paragon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 130

Conn. App. 211, 221–22, 23 A.3d 732 (2011); see also

Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn.

56, 65–66, 23 A.3d 668 (2011); Bacon Construction Co.

v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d

348 (2010).

A brief discussion of the procedure that a claimant

must follow to obtain permission to sue the state for

monetary damages will facilitate our analysis. Our

SupremeCourt expressly has stated that a plaintiff seeking monetary damages against the state must first obtain

authorization from the Claims Commissioner. Miller v.
Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 317, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). The

Claims Commission is required by statute to make a

record of each claim. General Statutes § 4-153. The

Claims Commissioner may deny or dismiss the claim,

order immediate payment of a claim not exceeding

$20,000, recommend to the General Assembly payment

of a claim exceeding $20,000 or grant permission to sue

the state.15 See General Statutes §§ 4-158 (a) and 4-

160 (a). A claimant may seek review by the General

Assembly in certain cases where the Claims Commissioner has denied or dismissed the claim requesting

permission to sue the state. General Statutes § 4-158

(b) (1). If such request for review is made, the Claims

Commissioner must submit the claim, a copy of the

Claims Commissioner’s findings and a hearing record

ofthe claim to the GeneralAssembly forreview. General

Statutes § 4-159 (a) (2). The General Assembly will then

either confirm the decision of the Claims Commissioner; see General Statutes § 4-159 (b) (1) (A); or

vacate the decision, order payment of the claim in a

specified amount or authorize the claimant to sue the

state. See General Statutes § 4-159 (b) (1) (B).

Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-147,16 the plaintiff

filed notice of his claim with the Claims Commissioner

on September 8, 2009. The plaintiff also sent the Claims

Commissioner a copy of a letter that he had written to

Blumenthal, regarding the plaintiff’s intention to seek

legal recourse against the state on the following bases:

(1) overbilling by state marshals, (2) mail fraud by state

marshals in violation of federal law, (3) violation of

RICO, (4) violation of Connecticut and federal due process and equal protection rights and, (5) conspiracy.

As a remedy, the plaintiff sought monetary damages in

excess of $15,000, interest and costs, equitable relief

and permission to sue the state. The Claims Commission granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the

plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff successfully obtained a

legislative reversal of the decision of the Claims Commissioner. The joint resolution of the General Assembly

provided: ‘‘That the decision of the Claims Commissioner . . . ordering the dismissal of the claim against

the state in excess of seven thousand five hundred

dollars of [the plaintiff], is vacated and the claimant is

authorized to institute and prosecute to final judgment

an action against the state to recover damages as compensation for injury to person and damage to property,

or both, allegedly suffered by the claimant as set forth

in said claim. Such action shall be brought not later

than one year from the date of the final adoption by

the General Assembly of this resolution.’’ (Emphasis

added.)

The plaintiff then commenced this action, and in his

operative complaint set forth the following causes of

action:(1) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by various state

actors, (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress by

various state actors, (3) RICO and CORA violations by
state marshals, (4) CUTPA violations by Bennett and

Gagnon, (5) vexatious litigation against the attorney

general’s office and the State Marshal Commission for

raising groundless or vexatious defenses in various proceedings, and (6) injunctive relief.

The trial court concluded that the resolution of the

General Assembly authorizing the plaintiff to bring his

lawsuit against the state was a waiver of sovereign

immunity and therefore was to be construed narrowly.

It then determined that there was nothing in the plaintiff’s initial claim to the Claims Commissioner that

would support the distinct legal elements for the causes

of action of negligent infliction of emotional distress,

violations of CUTPA and vexatious litigation, as well

as the specific § 1983 claims against the attorneys general and the State Marshal Commission. We agree with

the analysis of the trial court.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides a strong

presumption that the state is immune from suit or liability. Hicks v. State, 297 Conn. 798, 801, 1 A.3d 39 (2010).

Although the legislature is statutorily authorized to

waive sovereign immunity by vacating a denial of permission to sue from the Claims Commissioner, that did

not occur in the present case with respect to the § 1983

claims against the attorneys general17 and the State Marshal Commission for failing to comply with a formal

written opinion by the Office of the Attorney General,

the negligent infliction of emotional distress, CUTPA

and vexatious litigation claims found in portions of

count one, and all of counts two, four and five of the

plaintiff’s complaint.

The language of the joint resolution expressly waived

sovereign immunity only for the claim presented to

the Claims Commissioner. The causes of action in the

subsequent complaint discussed in this part of our opinion were not included in the proceedings before the

Claims Commission and never were addressed or considered by the General Assembly. Instead, the plaintiff

first raised these particular legal theories in this complaint. Moreover, our review of the materials before the

Claims Commission, and then the General Assembly,

reveals no allegation that would support the elements

of these distinct causes of action. For example, the

elements for negligent infliction of emotional distress

are: ‘‘(1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress; (2)

the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result

in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress.’’ Carrol

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444, 815 A.2d 119

(2003).18 The materials submitted by the plaintiff to the

Claims Commissioner contain nothing to indicate that

these elements were presented to the General Assembly. We note that § 4-147 provides in relevant part that
the notice to the Claims Commissioner ‘‘shall be for

informational purposes only and shall not be subject

to any formal or technical requirements, except as may

be necessary for clarity of presentation and facility of

understanding.’’ (Emphasis added.) While the plaintiff

was not required to set forth a formal declaration of

the particular causes of action he soughtto bring against

the state, he needed to include information that would

clarify the nature of the waiver sought and ensure that

the Claims Commissioner, and subsequently the General Assembly which, reviewed the action of the Claims

Commissioner, would have an understanding of the

nature of that waiver. See, e.g., Burgess v. State, 50

Conn. Supp. 271, 281–82, 920 A.2d 383 (2007) (where

claimant raised allegations of wilful and malicious

behavior and negligence, but failed to include any mention of nuisance before Claims Commissioner, and General Assembly did not mention that cause of action in

its resolution, there was no basis to conclude General

Assembly had waived sovereign immunity for that particular cause of action, and court described nuisance

allegations as afterthoughts of counsel and subject to

granting of motion to dismiss).

Moreover, as we noted previously, ourlaw recognizes

that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity are

strictly construed. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.

Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). Where

there is any doubt about its meaning or intent, we

should give it the effect that makes the least rather than

the most change in sovereign immunity. Id., 712. We

note that the rationale of Sarges v. State, 26 Conn. Supp.

24, 209 A.2d 886 (1965), bolsters our analysis. In Sarges,

the plaintiff obtained permission to sue the state for

$20,000 in damages. Id., 25. In his lawsuit, however, the

plaintiff sought to recover $75,000. The state successfully prosecuted a plea in abatement on the ground that

the suit for damages was in excess of those for which

permission to sue was granted. Id. Relying on the principle of strict construction of statutes that allow lawsuits

against the state, the court reasoned that ‘‘[n]othing can

be taken by implication against the state.’’ Id., 27. It

further noted that the permission to sue the state was

related to the $20,000 requested and that ‘‘[s]uch authorization was no carte blanche authority to the plaintiff

to sue for any amount that he might choose.’’(Emphasis

added.) Id., 28; see also 184 Windsor Ave., LLC v. State,

Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No.

CV-03-4018076 (May 16, 2008) (concluding that claim

for damages could not exceed amount sought in notice

of claim to Claims Commissioner); Calvert v. State,

Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 105317 (March 10, 1995) (14 Conn.

L. Rptr. 110) (same); cf. Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 199,

211, 558 A.2d 977 (1989) (General Assembly rejected

Claims Commissioner’s recommendation that no award

should be made on plaintiff’s claim, but that did not
imply legislative grant of authority to sue state).

We agree with the trial court that the General Assembly never waived sovereign immunity with respect to

these causes of action. Absent such a waiver, the general presumption applies, and the defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., ChiefInformation

Officer v. Computers Plus Center, Inc., 310 Conn. 60,

91, 74 A.3d 1242 (2013); Lagassey v. State, 268 Conn.

723, 732, 846 A.2d 831 (2004). We conclude, therefore,

that the court properly granted the motion to dismiss

with respect to the part of count one regarding the

§ 1983 allegations against the attorneys general and the

State Marshal Commission for refusing to comply with

a formal written opinion from the Office of the Attorney

General, the count alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress (count two), the count alleging CUTPA

violations (count four), and the count alleging vexatious

litigation (count five).

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly

concluded that the resolution of the General Assembly

was an unconstitutional public emolument with respect

to his remaining § 1983 allegations against Gagnon, Bennett and the State Marshal Commission19 in count one

and the count alleging federal RICO and state CORA

violations (count three). The defendants counter20 that

the resolution did not contain a statement of public

purpose and benefited only the plaintiff, and therefore

the court properly determined that it violated the Connecticut constitution. We agree with the defendants.

Section 4-148 (a) sets forth the time frame in which

a claimant must present a claim to the Claims Commissioner. Specifically, that subsection provides that ‘‘no

claim shall be presented . . . but within one year after

it accrues. Claims for injury to person or damage to

property shall be deemed to accrue on the date when

the damage or injury is sustained or discovered or in

the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, provided no claim shall be presented more

than three years from the date of the act or event complaint of.’’ General Statutes § 4-148 (a).

Subsection (b) of § 4-148 provides a legislative exception to the time frame for obtaining a waiver of sovereign immunity. ‘‘The General Assembly may, by special

act, authorize a person to present a claim to the Claims

Commissioner after the time limitations set forth in

subsection (a) of this section have expired if it deems

such authorization to be just and equitable and makes

an express finding that such authorization is supported

by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve

a public purpose. . . .’’ General Statutes § 4-148 (b). In

the present case, the trial court determined that the

plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, other than those against the

attorneys general and the State Marshal Commission,
and his claims that Bennett and Gagnon violated the

RICO and CORA statutes were untimely pursuant to § 4-

148 (a). The courtfurther determined that the resolution

purporting to waive the untimely portion of his claim

constituted an unconstitutional public emolument. The

plaintiff challenges both of these determinations, and

therefore our inquiry is twofold: Whether the court

properly decided that these causes of action were

untimely and, if so, whether it properly concluded that

the resolution did not serve a public purpose and therefore was unconstitutional. We conclude that the court

properly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with

respect to these counts of the plaintiff’s complaint.

A

The first question for this court is whether the trial

court properly concluded that the balance of the plaintiff’s § 1983 allegations against the State Marshal Commission and his allegations that Bennett and Gagnon

violated the federal RICO and state CORA statutes were

untimely. As noted previously, § 4-148 (a) sets forth the

time frame in which claims must be brought to the

Claims Commissioner. In the present case, the plaintiff

sent notice to the Claims Commissioner on September

8, 2009. The court concluded that the plaintiff had

knowledge of actionable harms prior to September 8,

2008, and therefore that his claim was made outside of

the applicable statute of limitations. We agree.

A discussion of Lagassey v. State, supra, 268 Conn.

723, will facilitate our analysis. In that case, the plaintiff,

the executrix of an estate, sought to recover damages

against state employees for medical malpractice. Id.,

725. The Claims Commissioner denied the claim as

untimely, and the General Assembly subsequently

authorized her claim via a special act. Id., 725–26. The

state defendants again sought to dismiss the claim, this

time on the ground that the special act was unconstitutional as an exclusive public emolument in violation of

article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut. Id.,

726. In her appeal, the plaintiff argued that the claim

was not untimely because the one year statute of limitations set forth in § 4-148 (a) did not accrue until she

discovered the injury in the exercise ofreasonable care.

Id., 731.

In its analysis, our Supreme Court considered General Statutes § 52-58421 when it interpreted § 4-148 (a).

‘‘Both statutes provide that the limitation period begins

to run when a plaintiff either sustains or discovers the

injury or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should

have discovered the injury, and both statutes contain

a three year period of repose.’’ Id., 738. It then set forth

the legal standard for determining when the limitation

period commences for actions in negligence: ‘‘The limitation period for actions in negligence begins to run on

the date when the injury is first discovered or in the

exercise of reasonable care should have been discov-
ered. See General Statutes §§ 4-148 (a) and 52-584. In

this regard, the term injury is synonymous with legal

injury or actionable harm. Actionable harm occurs

when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the essential elements of a cause of action. . . . A breach of duty by

the defendant and a causal connection between the

defendant’s breach of duty and the resulting harm to

the plaintiff are essential elements of a cause of action

in negligence; they are therefore necessary ingredients

for actionable harm. . . . Furthermore, actionable

harm may occur when the plaintiff has knowledge of

facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of

the nature and extent of an injury, and that the injury

was caused by the negligent conduct of another. . . .

In this regard, the harm complained of need not have

reached its fullest manifestation in order for the limitation period to begin to run; a party need only have

suffered some form of actionable harm.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lagassey

v. State, supra, 268 Conn. 748–49.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Gagnon received his fees between August

24, 2007, and September 14, 2007. The trial court also

examined the ‘‘chronology of events’’ submitted as part

of the plaintiff’s objection to the defendants’ motion to

dismiss that he filed with the Claims Commissioner. In

that chronology, the plaintiff stated that in May, 2008,

after examining the finances of state marshals, he determined that Gagnon never had claimed the $1329.20 in

fees that he had billed the plaintiff. The plaintiff also

noted that in May, 2008, after conducting his examination, he was aware that some state marshals ‘‘had generated additional income by illegal billing, or by claiming

they performed services which would have been impossible considering the size of income claimed.’’

The trial court concluded that in May, 2008, the plaintiff discovered the injury and suffered actionable harm

because he had knowledge of the specific facts that

put him on notice of the nature of the injury with respect

to Gagnon, and Bennett as well. We agree with this

conclusion. Thus, the claim stemming from the alleged

overbillings by Gagnon and Bennett, which was filed

on September 8, 2009, was untimely. The same analysis

applies to the plaintiff’s remaining claims against the

State Marshal Commission. The chronology submitted

by the plaintiff, in conjunction with the files from the

various underlying legal proceedings, established his

knowledge of the events underlying the claim that the

State Marshal Commission had violated his constitutional rights by dismissing his complaints against Marshals Aresco and Corneroli and denying his Freedom

of Information Act request. These materials established

that the claim was not filed until after the one year

period of limitation had run.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-59522 and the doctrine of contra non

valentem,23 the statute of limitation should not have

begun to run. These specific arguments, however, do

not appear to have been raised before the trial court

and were not addressed in the court’s memorandum of

decision.24 We decline to consider them for the first

time on appeal. ‘‘Only in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will [appellate courts] consider a claim,

constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and

decided in the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 498,

863 A.2d 680 (2005). We conclude, therefore, that the

court properly concluded that the claims against the

marshals and the State Marshal Commission were

untimely.

B

We now turn to the question of whetherthe resolution

passed by the General Assembly granting the plaintiff

permission to bring suit against the marshals and the

State Marshal Commission constituted an exclusive

public emolument in violation of article first, § 1, of the

Connecticut constitution.25 We agree with the trial court

that the resolution did not serve a public purpose and,

therefore, that the resolution was passed in violation

of the Connecticut constitution’s prohibition against

public emoluments.26

‘‘To prevail under article first, § 1, of our constitution,

the state must demonstrate that the sole objective of

the General Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an individual. . . . If, however, an enactment

serves a legitimate public purpose, then it will withstand a challenge under article first, § 1. . . .

‘‘The scope of our review as to whether an enactment

serves a public purpose is limited. [W]hat constitutes

a public purpose is primarily a question for the legislature, and its determination should not be reversed by

the court unless it is manifestly and palpably incorrect.

. . . In determining whether a special act serves a public purpose, a court must uphold it unless there is no

reasonable ground upon which it can be sustained. . . .

Thus, if there be the least possibility that [the special

act] will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare . . . we are bound to uphold it against a constitutional challenge predicated on article first, § 1 [of the

state constitution]. . . .

‘‘In this regard, although a special act passed under

§ 4-148 (b) will undoubtedly confer a direct benefit upon

a particular claimant, we have found a public purpose

if it remedies an injustice done to that individual for

which the state itself bears responsibility. . . . In such

circumstances, the benefit conferred upon a private

party by the legislature may be viewed as incidental to

the overarching public interest that is served in remedy-
ing an injustice caused by the state. . . .

‘‘By contrast, we have consistently held that legislation seeking to remedy a procedural default for which

the state is not responsible does not serve a public

purpose and, accordingly, runs afoul of article first, § 1,

of the state constitution. . . . Similarly, where a special act has allowed a person named therein to bring a

suit based upon a statutory cause of action that would

otherwise be barred for failure to comply with a time

limit specified in the statute, we have ordinarily been

unable to discern any public purpose sufficient to sustain the enactment.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis

altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 290 Conn. 245,

257–59, 963 A.2d 1 (2009); Chotkowski v. State, 240

Conn. 246, 259–60, 690 A.2d 368 (1997); Merly v. State,

supra, 211 Conn. 212–13.

Section 32 of the resolution authorizes the plaintiff,

and only the plaintiff, to commence a lawsuit against

the state for his alleged injuries, as detailed in the claim

presented to the Claims Commissioner. Notably absent

in this case was a declaration that it served a public

purpose, nor can we discern one. It merely provided

the plaintiff with an exclusive and private benefit. ‘‘No

enactment creating a preference can withstand constitutional attack if the sole objective of the General

Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an

individual.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly

v. University of Connecticut Health Center, supra, 290

Conn. 260. Although we are mindful of the heavy burden

assumed by those who challenge the constitutionality

of legislative actions; see id., 257; we conclude that the

court properly determined that the resolution in the

present case violated the state constitution’s prohibition against public emoluments, and correctly dismissed the § 1983 claim against the State Marshal

Commission contained in count one of the plaintiff’s

complaint and the claim alleging RICO and CORA violations by Bennett and Gagnon set forth in count three.

III

We now address the plaintiff’s § 1983 allegations

against Chief State’s Attorney Kevin T. Kane and State’s

Attorney Scott J. Murphy for violating his constitutional

rights by failing to prosecute the state marshals for

larceny, illegal billing and making false statements, as

set forth in count one of the complaint. The court concluded that a prosecutor’s decision not to initiate prosecution is cloaked with absolute immunity.27 On appeal,

the plaintiff appears to argue that his claim against the

two prosecutors was timely pursuant to the continuing

course of conduct doctrine. We agree with the trial

court that this claim fails as a result of absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors with respect to the decision

to not initiate prosecution.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984,

47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976), the United States Supreme

Court held that a state prosecutor acting within the

scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal

prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity and is not

amenable to suit under § 1983. Id., 410. The court reasoned that § 1983 should be read in harmony with

existing tort principles and defenses, rather than in

derogation of them, and that the well settled commonlaw immunity of a prosecutor also applies to § 1983

claims. Id., 418–24; see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S.

325, 334, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983).

The Supreme Court has made it clear that not all

actions of a prosecutor are entitled to such immunity,

but only those that are ‘‘intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process . . . .’’ Imbler v.

Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. 430; see also Mangiafico v.

Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 396 (2d Cir. 2006) (government attorney entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as advocate for state in way that is intimately

associated with judicial process); Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d

81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994)(same). ‘‘A prosecutor’s administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do

not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation

of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not

entitled to absolute immunity.’’ Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed. 2d

209 (1993). When a prosecutor provides legal advice to

the police; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S. Ct.

1934, 114 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1991); performs the investigative

role normally done by a member of the police; Buckley

v. Fitzsimmons, supra, 273; or makes comments to the

media; id., 277–78; he or she is not entitled to absolute

immunity. See also Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d

1245, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (‘‘[t]he courts have drawn

rough boundaries around the class of absolutely-immunized prosecutorial activities, and have treated functions such as filing charges, plea-bargaining, presenting

evidence, and negotiating parole as falling within the

protected sphere, and those such as executing search

warrants, interrogating suspects, disseminating information to the press, and storing evidence as meriting

only qualified immunity’’ [footnotes omitted]), overruled in part on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore,

547 U.S. 250, 126 S. Ct. 1695, 164 L. Ed. 2d 441 (2006).

In describing the role of a prosecutor in Connecticut,

our Supreme Court has stated: ‘‘The functions of a

state’s attorney are not purely those of an executive

officer. As a representative of the people of the state,

he is under a duty not solely to obtain convictions

but, more importantly, (1) to determine that there is

reasonable ground to proceed with a criminal charge

. . . (2) to see that impartial justice is done the guilty as

well as the innocent; and (3) to ensure that all evidence

tending to aid in the ascertaining of the truth be laid
before the court, whether it be consistent with the contention of the prosecution that the accused is guilty.

. . . The state’s attorney, thus, is an officer charged

with important duties and responsibilities in the administration of justice. Such duties of a state’s attorney are

entirely consistent with judicial power as prescribed by

our constitution.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Massameno v. Statewide Grievance

Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 556–57, 663 A.2d 317 (1995).

It also recognized: ‘‘It is in part due to the recognition

that prosecutors are an integral part of the judicial

system that courts have granted absolute immunity

from civil actions to prosecutors. . . . Prosecutorial

immunity derives from the immunity attached to judicial proceedings. . . . Such immunity covers acts that

were performed by a prosecutor as an integral part of

the judicial process.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 567–68; see also Carrubba v.

Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533, 541, 877 A.2d 773 (2005);

Barese v. Clark, 62 Conn. App. 58, 61, 773 A.2d 946

(2001)(‘‘Our Supreme Court, the United States Supreme

Court and the federal courts of appeal have long recognized the existence of, and the need for, prosecutorial

immunity. Such immunity exists to allow prosecutors

at the state and federal level to be free to perform

their essential role in the judicial process without the

possibility of civil liability hanging over their head as

a sword of Damocles.’’).

The remaining question, therefore, is whether the

decision of Murphy and Kane not to prosecute the state

marshals is cloaked with absolute immunity. We conclude that it is, and therefore, the court properly granted

the motion to dismiss. As noted in Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 234 Conn. 556–57,

the determination of whether there are reasonable

grounds to proceed with a criminal charge is a duty of

a state’s attorney that is consistent with the judicial

power prescribed by the Connecticut constitution. This

function is an integral part of the judicial process, and

thus is entitled to absolute immunity. Id., 567. We also

note that the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit expressly held in the Schloss v. Bouse,

876 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1989), that ‘‘absolute immunity

must also protect the [state] prosecutor from [42 U.S.C.

§ 1983] damages suits based on his decision not to prosecute.’’ (Emphasis in original.) See also Barrett v.

United States, 798 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1986) (federal

prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity for decision

not to prosecute); Dacey v. Dorsey, 568 F.2d 275, 276–78

(2d Cir.) (United States attorney absolutely immune

from suit alleging he failed to carry out his duties), cert.

denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2238, 56 L. Ed. 2d 405

(1978). The Second Circuit reasoned that many, though

not all, of the reasons supporting absolute immunity for

the decision of a prosecutorto commence a prosecution

also apply when there is a decision to not prosecute.
Schloss v. Bouse, supra, 290. Applying these precedents

to the present case, we agree with the trial court that

Kane and Murphy were cloaked in absolute immunity

with respect to their decision not to prosecute the state

marshals, and therefore that the court properly granted

the motion to dismiss this cause of action.28

IV

The plaintiff’s final claim is that the court improperly

determined that he lacked standing to seek injunctive

relief29 in the form of a court order eliminating the

present marshal system and replacing it with a framework described in his complaint. The court concluded

that the plaintiff had failed to allege or demonstrate

that he was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

future as a result of improper conduct by state marshals

and that, therefore, he lacked standing to bring a claim

for injunctive relief. We agree with the trial court and

therefore conclude that it properly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss count six of the plaintiff’s complaint.30

‘‘[S]tanding is the legal right to set judicial machinery

in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction

of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or

representative capacity, some real interest in the cause

of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest

in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . Nevertheless, [s]tanding is not a technical rule intended to

keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test

of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept

designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed

by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests

and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights

of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view

fairly and vigorously represented. . . . If a party is

found to lack standing, the court is without subject

matter jurisdiction to determine the cause. . . . A

determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial

court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary

and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally

and logically correct and find support in the facts that

appear in the record.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairchild Heights Residents

Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., 310 Conn. 797,

820, 82 A.3d 602 (2014).

‘‘Standing requires no more than a colorable claim

of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing

by allegations of injury [that he or she has suffered or

is likely to suffer]. Similarly, standing exists to attempt

to vindicate arguably protected interests. . . . Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it

is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically

aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for determining

[classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled

twofold determination: first, the party claiming
aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific,

personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of

the challenged action], as distinguished from a general

interest, such as is the concern of all members of the

community as a whole. Second, the party claiming

aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and

injuriously affected by the [challenged action].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins.,

Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 214–15, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009);

Andross v. West Hartford, 285 Conn. 309, 322–24, 939

A.2d 1146 (2008); Connecticut Associated Builders &

Contractors v. Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 178, 740 A.2d

813 (1999) (‘‘[t]o establish standing to raise an issue

for adjudication, a complainant must make a colorable

claim of direct injury’’).

The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to

allege or demonstrate that he was likely to sufferirreparable harm and that he therefore lacked standing to

bring a cause of action for prospective injunctive relief.

After reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, we agree with

the analysis and conclusion of the trial court. The plaintiff has failed to establish, on a prospective basis, that

he likely would be harmed as a result of illegal conduct

by state marshals. Accordingly, we conclude that the

court properly determined that the plaintiff lacked

standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief as alleged

in count six of the complaint.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendants are the state, former Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Assistant Attorney General Philip Miller, former director of the State

Marshal Commission James Neil, the following members orformer members

of the State Marshal Commission: Dennis F. Kerrigan, Marie Knudsen, William Cote, the Honorable William T. Cremins and Joseph Ubaldi, Chief

State’s Attorney Kevin T. Kane, State’s Attorney Scott J. Murphy and state

Marshals Albenie Gagnon and Timothy J. Bennett. The trial court noted that

Attorney General George Jepsen is listed in the plaintiff’s complaint as a

defendant, but is not listed on the summons.

2

‘‘[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous

of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other

parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party.

. . . Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of selfrepresentation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant

rules of procedural and substantive law. . . . This is because [a] party who,

unskilled in such matters, seeks to remedy some claimed wrong by invoking

processes which are at best technical and complicated, is very ill advised

and assumes a most difficult task. . . . Nonetheless, while the court exhibits

some degree of leniency toward a pro se appellant, it cannot entirely disregard established principles of law.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 85 Conn. App. 854, 861–62, 859 A.2d 932 (2004), cert. denied,

273 Conn. 906, 868 A.2d 748 (2005).

3 Due to the procedural posture of this case, we are mindful that we must

‘‘take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts

necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most

favorable to the pleader.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan,

265 Conn. 301, 305, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).

4 According to its website, the State Marshal Commission, an Executive

Branch commission, ‘‘was created by Public Act 00-99, in 2000. Chapter 78

of the Connecticut General Statutes sets forth the law covering the state

marshal system. Pursuant to [Connecticut General Statutes §] 6-38b the
State Marshal Commission consists of eight members appointed by the

specified executive, judicial and legislative branch authorities. The term for

members is three years. There are also two Ex-Officio members of the

Commission from the State Marshals Advisory Board.

‘‘The State Marshal Commission generally meets monthly to conduct business under its statutory mandate. The Commission implements examination

and appointment procedures as well as training for new appointees. By

statutes, regulations and policies, the Commission also is involved in many

functions, including but not limited to setting training requirements, professional standards, audit policies, disciplinary protocol, restraining order

rotations and administrative procedures for the efficient and fair operation

of the state marshal system.’’ (Emphasis added.) Department of Administrative Services, ‘‘State Marshal Commission,’’ available at http://das.ct.gov/

cr1.aspx?page=107 (last visited May 6, 2014).

5 The plaintiff did not directly appeal from the judgment of the court

dismissing that August 24, 2009 action against the state. Nearly three years

later, the plaintiff filed a motion to open that judgment, which the court

denied. This court recently affirmed that judgment. See Morneau v. State,

148 Conn. App. 68, 83 A.3d 729, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 933, A.3d

(2014). The claims against Gagnon and Bennett in the August 24, 2009 action

remain pending before the Superior Court. On March 14, 2014, the court,

Young, J., entered a scheduling order that included a jury trial date of

January, 2015. See Morneau v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of New

Britain, Docket No. CV-09-5013995 (August 26, 2009), aff’d, 148 Conn. App.

68, 83 A.3d 729, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 933, A.3d (2014).

6 The term ‘‘claim’’ in this context is statutorily defined as ‘‘a petition for

the payment or refund of money by the state or for permission to sue the

state . . . .’’ General Statutes § 4-141.

7 As noted in the defendants’ brief, the plaintiffreferenced General Statutes

§ 50-70. As no such statute exists, this appears to have been a scrivener’s

error. General Statutes § 52-70 provides: ‘‘Each officer serving any process

shall endorse thereon the items of his fees, with the number of miles traveled

by him. If any officer demands and receives on any civil process more

than his legal fees, he shall pay threefold the amount of all the fees demanded

to the defendant in the action in which the illegal fees were exacted, if

such fees have been paid by the defendant, otherwise to the plaintiff in

such action. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any case in

which the fees claimed to be illegal have been taxed and allowed by the

proper authority.’’ (Emphasis added.)

8

In the memorandum of decision in the present case, the trial court

explained the constitutional violations alleged by the plaintiff as follows:

‘‘[T]he state violated the plaintiff’s rights under the due process and equal

protection clauses when: (1) the State Marshal Commission dismissed the

plaintiff’s complaints against Aresco and Corneroli; (2) the State Marshal

Commission failed to provide the plaintiff with certain documents pursuant

to a [freedom of information] request; (3) various state’s attorneys refused

the plaintiff’s demand that they prosecute the marshals for billing theft; and

(4) the state continued to use Gagnon’s services.’’

9 General Statutes § 4-148 (a) provides: ‘‘Except as provided in subsection

(b) of this section, no claim shall be presented under this chapter but within

one year after it accrues. Claims for injury to person or damage to property

shall be deemed to accrue on the date when the damage or injury is sustained

or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, provided no claim shall be presented more than three years from the

date of the act or event complained of.’’

10 Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .’’

11 Practice Book § 10-30 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A motion to dismiss

shall be used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . .

(c) This motion shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law

and, where appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on

the record.’’

12 The plaintiff filed a ‘‘motion to strike’’ the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The court considered this as an objection to the motion to dismiss. See,
e.g., Young v. Bridgeport, 135 Conn. App. 699, 705, 42 A.3d 514 (2012)

(substance of motion controls its outcome rather than title used by party);

Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Charles, 95 Conn. App. 315, 320 n.7, 898 A.2d

197 (same), cert. denied, 279 Conn. 909, 902 A.2d 1069 (2006).

13 The trial court concluded that ‘‘[t]his also applies to certain allegations

set forth in count one against the attorney general and the assistant attorney

general for their alleged failure to bring a civil action against the marshals,

as well as the allegation that the State Marshal Commission refused to

comply with a former written opinion from the Office of the Attorney General. These allegations were not mentioned in the initial notice of claim and

are therefore dismissed.’’

14 ‘‘The source of sovereign immunity power in the state of Connecticut

is the constitution, and it is recognized that a sovereign is immune from

suit on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as

against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lipwich v. Frankel, 44 Conn. App. 651,

656, 691 A.2d 1099 (quoting Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623, 376 A.2d

359 [1977]), cert. denied, 241 Conn. 907, 695 A.2d 538 (1997).

15 General Statutes § 4-160 (c) provides: ‘‘In each action authorized by the

Claims Commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section or

by the General Assembly pursuant to section 4-159 or 4-159a, the claimant

shall allege such authorization and the date on which it was granted, except

that evidence of such authorization shall not be admissible in such action

as evidence of the state’s liability. The state waives its immunity from

liability and from suit in each such action and waives all defenses which

might arise from the eleemosynary or governmental nature of the activity

complained of. The rights and liability of the state in each such action shall

be coextensive with and shall equal the rights and liability of private persons

in like circumstances.’’ (Emphasis added.)

16 General Statutes § 4-147 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person wishing

to present a claim against the state shall file with the Office of the Claims

Commissioner a notice of claim, in duplicate, containing the following information: (1) The name and address of the claimant; the name and address

of his principal, if the claimant is acting in a representative capacity, and

the name and address of his attorney, if the claimant is so represented; (2)

a concise statement of the basis of the claim, including the date, time, place

and circumstances of the act or event complained of; (3) a statement of the

amount requested; and (4) a request for permission to sue the state, if such

permission is sought. A notice of claim, if sent by mail, shall be deemed to

have been filed with the Office of the Claims Commissioner on the date

such notice of claim is postmarked. . . . The Office of the Claims Commissioner shall promptly deliver a copy of the notice of claim to the Attorney

General. Such notice shall be for informational purposes only and shall

not be subject to any formal or technical requirements, except as may be

necessary for clarity of presentation and facility of understanding.’’

17 In paragraph 8 of the first count of his complaint, the plaintiff alleged

that the attorneys general failed to perform their preexisting legal duties

and failed to suppress criminally operated businesses by not enforcing the

CUTPA or civil RICO statutes. In paragraph 9 of the first count, the plaintiff

claimed that he was damaged financially by the failure of the attorney

general’s office to perform those duties and, thus, his state and federal

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated. In

paragraph 10 of the first count, the plaintiff asserted that Miller engaged in

wilful misconduct, and in paragraph 11, he claimed that Miller’s filing of

motions in the underlying proceedings constituted a violation of rule 3.3

(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

18 Additionally, the plaintiff’s claim to the Claims Commission does not

encompass or support his later allegations that the attorneys general or the

State Marshal Commission violated his rights under § 1983, that state actors

violated CUTPA to his detriment, or that the attorney general’s office or

the State Marshal Commission engaged in vexatious litigation against the

defendant.

19 The plaintiff had alleged that the State Marshal Commission violated

his constitutional rights by dismissing his complaints against Aresco and

Corneroli and denying his request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.

20 The defendants also contend that the resolution does not validly waive

sovereign immunity because it does not comply with the requirements of

§ 4-148 (b). That statute provides: ‘‘The General Assembly may, by special

act, authorize a person to present a claim to the Claims Commissioner after
the time limitation set forth in subsection (a) of this section have expired

if it deems such authorization to be just and equitable and makes an express

finding that such authorization is supported by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose. Such finding shall not be subject

to review by the Superior Court.’’

General Statutes § 4-148 (b). Specifically, the defendants argue that ‘‘[t]he

Resolution purporting to authorize the Plaintiff’s action does not comply

with those requirements because: (1) it is not a special act of the Legislature;

(2)it does not include an express finding that such authorization is supported

by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose;

and (3) it authorized direct suit in the Superior Court instead of permitting

Plaintiff to proceed with his claims before the Claims Commissioner.’’

In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that ‘‘[i]n regard to the

defendants’ . . . two arguments [regarding the use of a special act rather

than a resolution and authorizing suit in the Superior Court], case law is

demonstrably unclear as to whether the General Assembly must state its

findings specifically in a ‘special act’ and whether the General Assembly

has authority to allow claims to be submitted directly to the Superior Court.’’

Rather than deciding the case on these bases, the court instead focused on

the constitutionality of the resolution under the public emolument analysis.

We follow the path taken by the trial court with respect to this issue.

21 General Statutes § 52-584 provides in relevant part: ‘‘No action to recover

damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused

by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct . . . shall be brought

but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or

discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years

from the date or the act or omission complained of . . . .’’

22 General Statutes § 52-595 provides: ‘‘If any person, liable to an action

by another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of

such action, such cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such

person so liable therefor at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon

first discovers its existence.’’

23 Contra non valentem is a judicially created doctrine that, inter alia,

appears to be analogous to the doctrine codified in § 52-595. See, e.g.,

Rajnowski v. St. Patrick’s Hospital, 564 So. 2d 671, 674 (La. 1990). Our

research does not reveal any Connecticut case citing to this doctrine.

24 The trial court did consider and reject the plaintiff’s argument that

the continuing course of conduct doctrine tolled the statute of limitations.

Specifically, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not established that

there was an ongoing duty or a special relationship between the plaintiff

and the defendants.

25 Article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: ‘‘All men

when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of

men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.’’

26 In his brief, the plaintiff suggests that the court was biased when it

abused its discretion in concluding that the joint resolution constituted a

public emolument. He further claims to provide five examples of bias or

malice since commencing this action and that ten unnamed members of

the Connecticut Bar Association have violated law, the Rules of Professional

Conduct or judicial canons for the purpose of vexing and troubling his

lawsuit. Although we consider a claim of judicial bias to be of a serious

nature, it must be presented properly to both the trial court and this court.

These references fail to demonstrate how they were raised before and

addressed by the trial court. See Lynn v. Lynn, 145 Conn. App. 33, 37–38,

74 A.3d 506 (2013). We therefore decline to consider this claim. See Antogiovanni v. America’s Homes & Communities Real Estate, LLC, 130 Conn.

App. 286, 290 n.4, 22 A.3d 706, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 939, 28 A.3d 993 (2011).

27 ‘‘Judges are granted absolute immunity from liability for acts taken

pursuant to their judicial power and authority. . . . The concern for the

integrity of the judicial process underlying the absolute immunity of judges

also is reflected in the extension of absolute immunity to certain others

who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process. . . .

Included among these other are prosecutors, administrative law judges and

hearing examiners, grand jurors and witnesses in judicial proceedings.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliva v. Heller, 839

F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988).

28 As a result of our conclusion that the actions of Kane and Murphy are

entitled to absolute immunity, we need not address the plaintiff’s contentions
regarding the merits or timeliness of his claims against the two prosecutors.

29 Our Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[i]njunctive relief is appropriate

only where two conditions are met: the plaintiff must allege and prove that

absent such relief he will suffer irreparable injury; and he must allege and

demonstrate that he has no adequate remedy at law.’’ Connecticut Mobile

Home Assn., Inc. v. Jensen’s, Inc., 178 Conn. 586, 592, 424 A.2d 285 (1979);

see also Advest, Inc. v. Wachtel, 235 Conn. 559, 562–63, 668 A.2d 367 (1995).

30 ‘‘The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is

therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. Practice Book § 10-31

(a).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294

Conn. 206, 213–14, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).