THE CONTROVERSIAL PARDON OF

INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE MARC RICH

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 8, AND MARCH 1, 2001

Serial No. 107–11

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

THE CONTROVERSIAL PARDON OF INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE MARC RICH

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75–593 PDF 2001

THE CONTROVERSIAL PARDON OF

INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE MARC RICH

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 8, AND MARCH 1, 2001

Serial No. 107–11

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

——— ———

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Chief Counsel

KRISTI L. REMINGTON, Senior Counsel

JASON FOSTER, Counsel

M. SCOTT BILLINGSLEY, Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on:

February 8, 2001 .............................................................................................. 1

March 1, 2001 ................................................................................................... 279

Statement of:

Dozoretz, Beth, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee ...... 303

Fink, Robert ...................................................................................................... 439

Holder, Eric, former Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice .................................................................................................................. 192

Libby, Lewis ...................................................................................................... 438

Quinn, Jack, counsel to Marc Rich, former counsel to President Clinton;

Beth Nolan, former counsel to the President; Bruce Lindsey, former

assistant to the President and deputy counsel to the President; and

John Podesta, former White House chief of staff ....................................... 309

Quinn, Jack, counsel to Marc Rich, former counsel to President Clinton;

Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg, Jr., former assistant U.S. attorney, Southern

District of New York; and Martin Auerbach, former assistant U.S.

attorney, Southern District of New York .................................................... 43

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Barr, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia:

Executive Grant of Clemency ................................................................... 133

Exhibit 1 ..................................................................................................... 208

Exhibit 45 ................................................................................................... 259

Exhibit 63 ................................................................................................... 247

Exhibit 67 ................................................................................................... 250

Exhibit 127 ................................................................................................. 349

Exhibit 136 ................................................................................................. 494

Information from the U.S. Attorney’s Manual ........................................ 125

Letter dated February 6, 2001 ................................................................. 136

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana:

Exhibit 137 ................................................................................................. 394

Letter dated February 7, 2001 ................................................................. 3

Prepared statements of ............................................................................. 7, 284

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, exhibit 138 .............................................................................. 402

Davis, Hon. Jo Ann, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia:

Exhibit 65 ................................................................................................... 265

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 277

Davis, Hon. Thomas M., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Virginia, exhibit 155 ................................................................................. 416

Fink, Robert, prepared statement of ............................................................... 440

Holder, Eric, former Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 196

LaTourette, Hon. Steven C., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio:

Article dated February 5, 2001 ................................................................ 150

Exhibit 15............................................................................................... 115, 322

Exhibit 58 ................................................................................................... 460

Exhibit 62............................................................................................... 227, 463

Exhibit 67 ................................................................................................... 465

Exhibit 69 ................................................................................................... 229

Exhibit 79............................................................................................... 223, 473

Exhibit 89 ................................................................................................... 185

Page

IV

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by—Continued

LaTourette, Hon. Steven C., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio—Continued

Exhibit 96 ................................................................................................... 221

Exhibit 101 ................................................................................................. 117

Exhibit 102 ................................................................................................. 122

Exhibit 130 ................................................................................................. 447

Exhibit 135............................................................................................. 368, 468

Lewis, Hon. Ron, a Representative in Congress from the State of Kentucky, exhibit 73 ........................................................................................... 179

Morella, Hon. Constance A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, exhibits 97 and 98 .................................................................. 170

Podesta, John, former White House chief of staff, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 319

Putnam, Hon. Adam H., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Florida:

Exhibit 67 ................................................................................................... 371

Exhibit 72 ................................................................................................... 373

Quinn, Jack, counsel to Marc Rich, former counsel to President Clinton:

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 47

Previous testimony submitted .................................................................. 310

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut:

Exhibit 63 ................................................................................................... 305

Exhibit 152 ................................................................................................. 330

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California:

Exhibit 135 ................................................................................................. 480

Minority staff report ................................................................................. 11

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 39

Weinberg, Morris ‘‘Sandy’’, Jr., former assistant U.S. attorney, Southern

District of New York, prepared statement of ............................................. 94

Wilson, James C., chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform:

Exhibit 62 ................................................................................................... 434

Exhibit 69 ................................................................................................... 508

Exhibit 70 ................................................................................................... 510

Exhibit 137 ................................................................................................. 514

(1)

THE CONTROVERSIAL PARDON OF

INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE MARC RICH

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Burton, Barr, Morella, Shays, Horn,

Davis of Virginia, Souder, LaTourette, Ose, Lewis, Jo Ann Davis of

Virginia, Platts, Cannon, Putnam, Otter, Schrock, Waxman, Lantos, Towns, Kanjorski, Mink, Norton, Cummings, Kucinich, Davis

of Illinois, Tierney, Allen, and Schakowsky.

Also present: Representatives Hutchinson and Jackson-Lee.

Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; James C. Wilson, chief

counsel; David A. Kass, deputy counsel and parliamentarian; Mark

Corallo, director of communications; M. Scott Billingsley, John

Callender, and Andre Hollis, counsels; Pablo Carrillo, Jason Foster,

and Kimberly A. Reed, investigative counsels; S. Elizabeth Clay

and Nicole Petrosino, professional staff members; Kristi Remington, senior counsel; Gil Macklin, professional staff member and

investigator; Robert A. Briggs, chief clerk; Robin Butler, office manager; Michael Canty and Toni Lightle, legislative assistants; Josie

Duckett, deputy communications director; Scott Fagan, staff assistant; Leneal Scott, computer systems manager; John Sare, deputy

chief clerk; Danleigh Halfast, assistant to chief counsel; Phil

Schiliro, minority staff director; Phil Barnett, minority chief counsel; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy chief counsel; Michael Yang,

minority counsel; Michael Yeager, minority senior oversight counsel; Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk; Jean Gosa and Earley

Green, minority assistant clerks; and Teresa Coufal, minority staff

assistant.

Mr. BURTON. If we could ask everyone to take their seats, we will

try to ask everyone in the audience to be as quiet as possible. The

acoustics in this room, like all committee rooms, is not as good as

we would like. It’s better than it used to be. If you could bear with

us, we would appreciate it.

We have a capacity audience here today, so the conversation is

really a problem.

Well, once again, good morning, a quorum being present, the

Committee on Government Reform will once again come to order.

2

I ask unanimous consent that all Members’ and witnesses’ written opening statements be included in the record. And without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and extraneous or tabular material referred to be included in the record. And

without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that a set of exhibits which was shared

with the minority prior to the meeting be included in the record.

And without objection, so ordered.

[NOTE.—The complete set of exhibits used in both hearings is

printed at the end of this volume.]

Mr. BURTON. I also ask unanimous consent that questioning in

this matter proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule XI and committee rule 14, in which the chairman and ranking minority member allocate time to members of the committee as they deem appropriate for extended questioning not to exceed 60 minutes, equally

divided between the majority and the minority. Without objection,

so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that questioning in the matter

under consideration proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule XI

and Committee Rule 14, in which the chairman and the ranking

minority member allocate time to committee counsel as they deem

appropriate for extended questioning, not to exceed 60 minutes divided equally between the majority and the minority. And without

objection, so ordered.

Let me clarify that just a little bit. I talked to Mr. Waxman, the

ranking minority member, and we have agreed that the extended

questioning will be 60 minutes in total for each side, 30 minutes

for the majority, 30 minutes for the minority; and then for counsel

on each side, limited to 30 minutes. All other questioning will be

under the 5-minute rule.

I now recognize my colleague, Mr. Waxman—excuse me 1 second.

[Pause.]

Mr. BURTON. Today, we’re going to be looking into the pardon of

Marc Rich. A few weeks ago on his last day in office, President

Clinton pardoned 140 people. Some of these pardons were probably

meritorious. Others we think were not. The Marc Rich pardon has

been particularly controversial.

Our position is simple. The American people deserve to know the

facts. At this point in time, we don’t know all the facts. That’s why

we’re holding this hearing.

Last night we received some news that I find troubling. Mr.

Rich’s ex-wife, Denise Rich, it’s been well reported that she gave

$1 million to Democratic campaigns over the last decade. It’s also

been well reported that she sent the President a letter asking for

this pardon. She also talked to the President about the pardon. We

asked Mrs. Rich, through her lawyer, to answer a number of questions. Last night, we received a letter from her lawyer stating that

Mrs. Rich is going to take the fifth amendment and not respond to

our questions.

I ask unanimous consent that this letter be placed in the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. I find it very, very troubling that in a case like this,

where the public simply wants an explanation, a central figure

would take the fifth amendment.

But that’s not all. We were also informed by Mrs. Rich’s lawyer

that Mrs. Rich has given, ‘‘an enormous amount of money to the

Clinton Presidential Library.’’ We want to know how much is ‘‘enormous.’’ That’s something else we need to find out and how

that plays in the overall scheme of things.

Let’s step back and take a quick look at why Marc Rich and his

pardon was controversial.

In 1983, he was indicted on more than 50 counts of wire fraud,

tax evasion, racketeering and violating the Iranian oil embargo. He

was accused of evading $48 million in taxes. It was the largest tax

fraud case in U.S. history. He faced up to 300 years in prison if

he was convicted on all counts.

Mr. Rich fled the country, went to Switzerland and elsewhere to

avoid prosecution. He renounced his U.S. citizenship and took up

residence in Switzerland for 17 years. His companies were found in

contempt of court and fined $20 million for defying a judge’s order.

All told, they paid $200 million in penalties. His aides were caught

smuggling subpoenaed documents out of the country in trunks; I

believe it was on a Swiss airplane.

He was a subject of hearings in this committee in 1991 and 1992.

At that time, the Bush administration was accused of not doing

enough to try to bring Marc Rich to justice. And at that time, the

House was controlled by the opposition party, the Democrat Party,

and as we feel today, they thought that more needed to be done to

make sure that Mr. Rich be brought to justice.

On the surface, this doesn’t look like a very good case for a pardon. So the question we have is, ‘‘How did it happen?’’ We asked

this same question some time ago about the 14 Puerto Ricans who

killed police in New York, who blew up restaurants with innocent

citizens in them, and was involved in the largest armored car robbery in history. We didn’t receive any information about that pardon either from the White House, and we just want an explanation.

I think the American people would like to know what happened.

We don’t know all the facts yet, and that’s one of the main reasons we’re here today. However, this much seems clear: There is

a procedure that is usually followed to consider pardons; in this

case, that procedure was not followed.

There is a pardon attorney at the Justice Department. Pardon

applicants are submitted to the pardon attorney for review. After

they’ve been thoroughly reviewed, the Justice Department then

makes a recommendation and the application is sent to the President for a decision. In this case, none of that happened. Mr. Rich

is represented today by Jack Quinn.

Mr. Quinn was President Clinton’s White House counsel. They

had a very close relationship. On December 11th, Mr. Quinn delivered Mr. Rich’s application directly to the White House. It was

never sent to the pardon attorney. And it was never reviewed by

the Justice Department.

Why not? Why did the President make such an important decision without getting input from the pardon attorney or the prosecutors or the Justice Department?

5

We know from reading the newspapers that Mr. Quinn contacted

the Deputy Attorney General, Eric Holder, to tell him that he was

going to submit the application.

What did Mr. Holder do with that information? Did he contact

the pardon attorney? Did he tell the prosecutors in New York who

were responsible for the case? The fact is that we don’t know exactly what Mr. Holder did. Mr. Quinn has suggested in the press

that Mr. Holder was at least neutral, leaning toward this application, and that he may have communicated this to the White House.

We haven’t heard from Mr. Holder yet, but we want to have his

side of the story as well.

Mr. Quinn and Mr. Holder are here today to testify voluntarily.

We appreciate the fact that they’ve come, and we look forward to

getting some of this information. We also want to know what advice was given to the President.

The White House had this application for over a month before

the pardon was granted. What kind of a process did they follow?

Is there a file there that we should have? What kind of information

did they ask for? Who did they consult? We asked the counsel to

the President, Beth Nolan, to testify today. We asked one of the

President’s closest advisors, Bruce Lindsey, to testify. They both

turned us down, which I find very disappointing. But we will get

their testimony some other time.

Did the White House ask our intelligence agencies for information about Mr. Rich? And this is very important: They did not. This

week we learned that the White House apparently didn’t even

bother to consult intelligence agencies. Why not?

Mr. Rich was publicly reported to have traded with just about

every enemy of the United States they have had over the last 20

years, and many of those countries were embargoed. One case that

stands out glaringly is Iran. We had hostages over there at the

time that Mr. Rich was trading with them. He violated the embargo.

He was working with the Iranians selling their oil, and our hostages, American citizens, were languishing under very difficult circumstances for a long, long time at that time.

The President should have taken an hour to get a briefing from

our security agencies and from our intelligence agencies. Twenty

minutes would have been enough.

After having been briefed by our intelligence agencies, my legal

staff informed me about some of the things that were in those intelligence briefings. I believe that this pardon has been raised to

a higher level because of the things that are in those intelligence

reports.

We’ve asked that some of this information be declassified. I know

many members of the media wants to know what’s in those intelligence reports; and we’re going to try to get them declassified so

the American people can know exactly what happened, and I hope

they will be. If those reports are declassified, I think it will be clear

that the President failed to get all the facts that he should have

before he pardoned Mr. Rich, or he ignored them.

We have two additional witnesses that I haven’t mentioned. Appearing on our first panel will be Sandy Weinberg, Jr., and Martin

6

Auerbach. They were prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in

New York. They worked on the Rich case.

Mr. Quinn has raised a number of issues with the indictments

brought by the U.S. Attorney General’s Office. On CNN last night,

Mr. Quinn said that ‘‘the indictment that was brought was really,

truly worthless.’’ We asked Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach to be

here today to talk about and defend their work.

We’re looking forward to their testimony. I again want to thank

all of our witnesses for being here.

I want to admonish the lawyers for the witnesses that only the

witnesses may testify. The attorneys may consult with their clients

for as long as needed, but under our procedures, only the witnesses

may testify.

Let me stop here and wrap up my opening statement. It’s obvious right now we have a lot more questions than answers. We have

witnesses here who are prepared to answer questions, so I want to

move forward.

I now yield to Mr. Waxman for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

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Mr. WAXMAN. Over the last 8 years, President Clinton and his

administration have been the target of a remarkable number of

false accusations. In turn, these accusations have received a staggering amount of media attention. I’ve often spoken out about the

unfairness of these smears, and at the end of the last Congress, I

even compiled an analysis that attempts to collect many of the

reckless accusations in one report.

I ask unanimous consent that this report be made part of this

record. This report is entitled ‘‘Unsubstantiated Allegations of

Wrongdoing Involving the Clinton Administration.’’ Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. WAXMAN. As this report documents, the President and his

aides did not deserve many of the criticisms they received over the

last 8 years. But a President does deserve criticism when he makes

a mistake. And in this case, I think that is what former President

Clinton did when he pardoned Marc Rich and Pincus Green.

It’s true that the power to issue Federal pardons rests solely with

the President. There is no role for the Congress or the courts. The

only check on the abuse of this power is the judgment of the President.

The best use of Presidential pardons is for correcting injustices

against those with little power or money. In fact, President Clinton

did exactly that in many instances.

One good example is Derrick Curry. In 1989, Mr. Curry, a young

black college student, was sentenced to 20 years in prison with no

chance of parole for his first drug offense. The judge who sentenced

Mr. Curry reluctantly sentenced him to 20 years in prison because

he had no choice under the Federal sentencing guidelines.

Pardons are particularly appropriate, as well, for those who have

accepted punishment, have demonstrated a true repentance and

have subsequently done good works for society. For a President

leaving office, it can be an invaluable opportunity to put aside public opinion polls and act courageously.

The Marc Rich pardon meets none of these criteria. It’s clear

from the materials that Jack Quinn prepared that Mr. Rich had a

credible legal argument against prosecution, but that argument

should have been made in our courts.

The Rich pardon is a bad precedent. It appears to set a double

standard for the wealthy and the powerful, and it is an end run

around the judicial process.

Think about it for a minute. One week Marc Rich is on the Justice Department’s list of the Ten Most Wanted, and the next week,

he’s given a Presidential pardon. This makes no sense. Something

has to happen in between. This gap can’t be bridged in just one big

jump. But under the current system, the President is allowed to

make bad judgments that all of us disagree with when he issues

pardons. That’s how the system works.

For example, questions were raised when, just before leaving office in 1993, President Bush pardoned Aslam Adam, a Pakistani individual who had been convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute $1 million worth of heroin. Both the prosecutor

and the judge who sentenced Mr. Adam reportedly did not want

him freed.

Questions were also raised when on December 24, 1992, thenPresident Bush pardoned former Secretary of Defense Caspar

Weinberger. Mr. Weinberger was being investigated by the independent counsel, Lawrence Walsh, regarding the Iran-Contra matter and was scheduled for a trial on January 5, within a month.

Independent Counsel Walsh called the pardon ‘‘terrible’’ and ‘‘grossly wrong,’’ but President Bush had the power to issue that pardon.

When a President makes a bad judgment, whether it’s former

President Bush or former President Clinton, it’s appropriate for us

in the Congress to raise questions and express our views.

There is a crucial distinction, however, between bad judgment

and a Presidential scandal.

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Here is the key issue this morning. Is this a case of bad judgment, or is it a case involving bribery, corruption or criminal conduct? To date, I see plenty of bad judgment, but no evidence of

criminal wrongdoing has been presented to us to this point.

I see no indication that we’re going to get any evidence along

those lines. This distinction is important to how this committee

proceeds. Unless there is compelling evidence of illegal conduct by

former President Clinton, the committee should not embark on a

search for another scandal. The committee should put away its subpoenas and shelve its endless document requests.

I do want to make note for the record that the chairman indicated that Beth Nolan refused to come and cooperate with the committee. Beth Nolan, as a White House counsel for former President

Clinton, served admirably with great distinction in that position.

And she is out of the country on vacation. She has not indicated

her unwillingness to come before us or to assist the committee, but

that she was unable to be with us today.

Well, in the spirit of bipartisanship, I’m withholding judgment on

today’s hearings until we get the testimony from the witnesses. But

if there’s no evidence of wrongdoing, if there’s only evidence of

clearly bad judgment by President Clinton, which I sincerely see in

his action, I will strongly object if this committee embarks on another wild goose chase.

Everyone is eventually going to have to come to grips with the

fact that President Clinton is no longer President. There’s been a

cottage industry—and this committee has been part of it—for Clinton scandals. Well, this cottage industry at some point is going to

have to go out of business. We’ve got other matters before us that

deserve very, very careful attention as part of this committee’s

oversight and investigative responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman, I have no quarrel with your holding this hearing

today, because we ought to get the evidence before us. Let’s get

that evidence. If it simply shows bad judgment—I don’t want to say ‘‘simply,’’ but if it shows bad judgment, I think we ought to recognize that President Clinton is to be criticized by us all for the judgment that he made. But if it’s a bad judgment by the President,

the Constitution gives him that authority to make that judgment,

and we ought to let that matter rest.

I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentleman from California.

Are there further comments from members of the committee?

The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, as we begin this hearing, I urge all

the members of this committee to keep its purpose in mind. This

hearing should be about whether President Clinton acted within

his authority and followed the law in granting a pardon to Marc

Rich, period.

This hearing should not be about relitigating the Marc Rich case.

Our job should be to review the circumstances around the pardon

and sort through the allegations that have been made in a fair and

impartial way.

I want to remind all of my colleagues that Bill Clinton is no

longer the President of the United States, in case you’re not aware.

If people do not approve of this pardon, history will judge Bill Clinton and we should not waste a lot of time on this matter.

This committee has spent a great deal of time investigating and

investigating and investigating the Clintons and the Clintons’ past,

when we should have been working on a prescription drug bill for

our seniors who, in many instances, have to make a decision as to

whether to purchase their medication or buy food, due to lack of

income.

I hope this hearing will be the end of these partisan pursuits. We

can all speculate about whether or not we would have granted the

pardon had we been the President of the United States. But that

is not important today. The President has the authority to grant

pardons, and the framers of the Constitution gave him that right.

Let’s be clear, the pardon has already been granted, and there’s

nothing that any of us can do to revoke it, overturn it or stop it.

For those reasons, let’s make this a positive exercise today.

From what I have seen in the witnesses’ testimony and press accounts, the process worked properly in this case. Jack Quinn did

his job as a lawyer. Eric Holder did his job representing the views

of the Justice Department in being responsive to the White House.

The White House Counsel’s Office did its job reviewing the pardon

applications in making a recommendation to the President.

President Clinton did his job thoughtfully reviewing the pardon

applications, considering all the facts, seeking the counsel of his advisors in the Justice Department and making a decision which he

acknowledged was a close call.

A number of people have questioned this pardon because it was

not first considered by the Justice Pardon Office. While that is

probably the best course of action as a general rule, this case is not

unique in this regard. Nothing in the law requires that a pardon

first be reviewed by the Justice Department because of the President’s absolute power to pardon. The policies, procedure and processes are entirely at the President’s discretion. A number of the

pardons which President Clinton granted were not considered by

the Department of Justice first.

I look forward to hearing the witnesses’ testimony and hope that

my colleagues will focus on process and the facts, rather than on

relitigating this case in pursuing the President and the parties involved in a partisan manner, as we have done so many times in

the past. I hope we do not go down that road today.

42

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Towns.

Is there anyone on the majority side?

Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wasn’t going to speak, but now that I’ve heard from Mr. Waxman and Mr. Towns, I do want to make an observation. I think it’s

a good thing that we will focus on process today, and I don’t think

it’s the intention of anyone on the majority side to relitigate the

Marc Rich matter.

One of the things that I think concerns me and is a proper subject for the jurisdiction of an oversight committee in the U.S. Congress has to do with the matter of ethics and, in particular, the

ethics commitments made by people who serve not only the legislative branch but also the executive branch. And I, for one, was surprised when I saw Mr. Quinn on television representing Mr. Rich.

I do have some questions about how it is that a former representative of the executive branch can then lobby his own boss while circumventing the Justice Department to achieve a result for a client.

And if everything is copacetic and there’s no difficulty with that,

based upon the policy that was written in the Executive order in

1993, then I do think it’s an appropriate search for this committee

to perhaps come up with a better revolving-door policy for both the

executive branch and the legislative branch that perhaps makes

the revolving door a little more difficult to revolve through in as

quickly a fashion.

I hope we do study that as well and, perhaps, can come up with

some legislative solutions that if they don’t remove impropriety at

least what is perceived by many, including myself, to be the appearance of impropriety; and I thank you and yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. Clay.

Mr. CLAY. Mr. Chairman, as a newly elected Member of Congress

and a new member of this committee, I am pleased to be here

today for our first full committee meeting.

While I can appreciate the fact that our committee has chosen

to be the focal point for the examination of the pardon process, I

am struck by the fact that the U.S. Constitution grants the President the absolute and unlimited power to grant commendations

and pardons. This pardon power is not subject to any restrictions

by Congress.

The President’s power is at his sole discretion, and he is not required to follow Federal regulations or procedures for the pardon

process. And so while some may disagree with the judgment made

to pardon Marc Rich, we have no standing to interfere with or alter

the underlying Presidential authority.

As to allegations that the pardon was the result of campaign contributions or influenced peddling. It must be noted that there is

currently no evidence or nexus to support such.

Thank you for the opportunity.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Clay. If there is no further discussion, let me just make one brief comment. We will be joined by Ms.

Jackson-Lee, who said she may have a few questions, and we in

the past have tried to accommodate non-members of the committee.

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And we have Mr. Asa Hutchinson here, too. So we have a long

schedule today. But if they do have questions at the end of the 5-

minute round, first round, we will try to accommodate them.

Do we have any further comments? Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Mr. Chairman, let me just say I don’t

think we have had—certainly, the President’s power here to pardon

is something that we can’t overturn. I don’t think anybody—but we

have any—that anybody assumes that we can do that. But we do

have, I think, oversight responsibility in a case like this.

The fact of the matter is, from the ex-wife, there was furniture,

and several thousand dollars worth of furniture, given to the President. There were huge campaign contributions. Whether there is a

linkage or not, we have a responsibility, I think, to act and look

at that in a pardon that I don’t think any of the law enforcement

agencies that have examined this have seen any merit in this at

all.

At one point, $100 million was offered to settle this and the Justice Department had turned it down. So I think we have a responsibility to look at this, to understand what happened. Maybe we

can learn from this. Maybe there will be legal changes as a result

of this. I don’t think anybody is talking about overturning it, but

the oversight responsibility, we have it, and I think we need to use

it in this particular case.

Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentleman from Virginia. Any further

comments? If not, would the three witnesses please rise and raise

your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Quinn has asked if he could give a little longer

opening statement because of the gravity of the hearing the situation. We have no objection to that. Mr. Quinn, we will try to accommodate you as well as Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach. So, Mr.

Quinn, you’re recognized.

Mr. QUINN. Chairman Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Could you pull the microphone close to you because

sometimes these mics don’t pick it up. Thank you.

Mr. QUINN. It appears to be on. Can you hear me? OK.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t have to get right up against it, but you

know.

STATEMENTS OF JACK QUINN, COUNSEL TO MARC RICH,

FORMER COUNSEL TO PRESIDENT CLINTON; MORRIS

‘‘SANDY’’ WEINBERG, JR., FORMER ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK; AND MARTIN

AUERBACH, FORMER ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Mr. QUINN. Chairman Burton, Representative Waxman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide information about the pardon of Marc Rich. During the past several weeks, America has heard the voices of a great

many people who disagree with this pardon. Probably all of you are

among those who have expressed their disagreement or disappointment.

I am well aware that I have a near impossible challenge today

in trying to convince you of the merits of the pardon, but I do welVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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come the opportunity to sit before you and to answer your questions about the case that I made and the process I followed.

I acted here as a lawyer who believes in the merits of the case

that I made. I acted as a lawyer who vigorously and ethically pursued my client’s interests, as I’m required to do under the canons

of ethics, and I acted as a lawyer who followed a process that included, not excluded, the U.S. Department of Justice.

I took on Marc Rich as a client nearly 2 years ago after careful

review of his case and in the belief that in the American legal system any person accused of wrongdoing is entitled to representation

by a lawyer who advocates his position honestly, ethically and conscientiously. That is what I did. Nothing more, and nothing less.

I appreciate the responsibilities of this committee, and while I

agree with President Bush that a President’s constitutional right to

grant pardons is unfettered and that the Congress cannot impose

its own process on that prerogative, I also appreciate that it is

helpful to your oversight responsibilities to understand as best as

I can help you understand what happened in this particular case.

In that regard, I have cooperated with you, consistent with my

ethical obligations to my client, by providing information and documents, and I assure you I will continue to be cooperative and as

helpful as I can be.

I want to emphasize at the outset that the process I followed was

one of transparency at both the Department of Justice and the

White House. In filing my pardon petition, I included in this big

document the views of the prosecutors, most particularly in the

form of the indictment that they lodged against my client.

On more than one occasion, I urged the White House counsel to

seek the views of the Justice Department. I did so because I

thought that was the professional way to proceed. And because I

had worked with Deputy Attorney General Holder in the past, I

had and continued to have enormous respect for him and for his

legal judgment, and I was confident that before any decision was

made on this matter his views and perhaps those of others at the

Justice Department would be sought.

In point of fact, I believed the consultation by the White House

with Mr. Holder would help me make my case, because for over a

year since October 1999, I had a series of communications orally

and in writing with him about Mr. Rich’s case. I knew that he was

familiar with the allegations in the indictment and I had taken

pains to familiarize him with the case we put together disputing

the allegations in the indictment.

But most importantly, what I hoped he could convey to the White

House was the sense that Marc Rich and his lawyers were at an

absolute impasse with the Southern District and that this matter

would not and could not be resolved short of a process such as a

pardon.

As I think you know by now, I personally notified Mr. Holder in

his office on November 21, 2000 that I would be sending a pardon

application to the White House. I told him then that I hoped I

could encourage the White House to seek his views and he said I

should do so. I then delivered this 2-inch thick pardon application

to the White House on December 11th, more than 5 weeks before

the pardon was granted.

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While the application was under consideration, I wrote to Mr.

Holder on January 10th of this year and asked him to weigh in at

the White House, expressing the hope that he would support my

application. I hoped for his support. I didn’t know whether he—it

would be forthcoming or not, but I hoped he would support it.

Still later, I called Mr. Holder on the night of January 19th. I

told him that the Rich pardon application was receiving serious

consideration at the White House and that I understood that he

would be contacted before a decision was made. I understand from

him and from the former White House counsel, Beth Nolan, and

from the former President that Mr. Holder was indeed consulted.

I believe that the views he expressed in that consultation was significant to the decision that was made.

The process this pardon followed gave the President the time and

the opportunity to weigh his decision carefully. For over 5 weeks,

the White House had time to consider the views of White House

attorneys, the Justice Department, and anyone else with whom it

might choose to discuss the matter in order to make a judgment

on the merits.

As to the merits, you have before you my pardon application, and

I understand that the gentlemen to my left disagree with me strenuously about this. But I remain to this day absolutely and

unshakably convinced that the prosecutors constructed a legal

house of cards in this indictment.

At the heart of this case is a tax charge that I do believe is

meritless. That tax charge formed the basis for attendant fraud

charges and that in turn formed the basis for one of the very first

uses in a case of this kind of the Federal racketeering statute, a

use, by the way, which you should know the Department of Justice

does not condone any further. It was this misuse, I believe, of

RICO on top of the misuse of RICO predicates and underlying all

of it a tax and energy case that I think did not have merit that

made this indictment wanting.

The case was fundamentally flawed. I believe that, and I argue

that. I argued it first with the Souther District. I attempted to persuade the Main Justice here in Washington and the Southern District to consider the arguments we made on the law and to reopen

discussions with us representing Mr. Rich.

That conversation and other contacts that I had with the Department of Justice are reflected in the documents that I have provided

to the committee, and they are summarized in appendix B to my

testimony.

My notes of November 8, 1999 reflect a telephone conversation

in which I was told that some senior Department of Justice officials

thought that the refusal of the prosecutors in New York to meet

with Mr. Rich’s attorneys was ill-considered and in fact ridiculous.

Subsequently, I was told that senior officials—some senior officials at the Department of Justice had come to believe that the equities were on our side. Nevertheless, the prosecutors from the

Southern District refused to discuss the case with us.

And given this intractable impasse, we decided in October of this

year to seek a pardon. I decided to file a pardon application directly

to the White House because I knew that pardons are sometimes

initiated at the White House and not at the Department of Justice.

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I would point out to you that in today’s Los Angeles Times, it’s

reported that some 47 of these applications were initiated at the

White House without going through any process at the Department

of Justice. As Mr. Waxman indicated earlier, that was true, not

just in this administration, but it has happened in previous administrations.

But to be sure, I was confident that, at some point, the White

House would consult with the Department of Justice. And based on

the earlier conversations I had throughout the course of a year, I

believed that the Deputy Attorney General would not necessarily

endorse a pardon, but I believed that he would at least confirm

that we had reached an unresolvable stalemate with the Southern

District.

Now, as has been stated here by several of the Members, the

Constitution grants the pardon authority only to the President, not

to the pardon attorney, not to the Deputy Attorney General, and

not to the White House counsel.

Indeed, the pardon attorney reports to the Deputy Attorney General. And one of the major functions of the Deputy Attorney General is to serve as the departmental liaison with the White House

staff and the Executive Office of the President, including specifically with respect to pardons. I informed that official of my petition. I encouraged the White House counsel to seek the views of

that official. I did this over a period of 2 months, having briefed

him about the case for more than a year before that.

President Clinton properly gave serious consideration to Mr.

Rich’s pardon application. In my discussion with him about this application, we talked about the case and the law and nothing else.

President Clinton in that conversation demanded that Mr. Rich

waive all procedural defenses related to the transactions in question so that he could be potentially subject to civil penalties such

as those faced by others who were involved in similar transactions

and went through civil enforcement proceedings with the Department of Energy, that this case should have been handled that way

years ago.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while you may disagree with the

President’s decision, I believe the facts establish that I represented

my client’s interest fairly, vigorously and ethically. I carried out

this representation, keeping both the Department of Justice and

the White House informed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[NOTE.—The complete pardon petition is printed at the end of

this volume.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Quinn follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you Mr. Quinn. Mr. Weinberg.

Mr. WEINBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr.

Waxman, other members of the committee, my name is Morris

‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg. I served as an assistant U.S. attorney from

1979 to 1985 in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District

of New York, and from approximately December 1981, when I

started the investigation against Marc Rich, until October 1984,

when his companies pled guilty to, between them, 70-plus counts

of various Federal felonies and tax evasion and paid the United

States a couple of hundred million dollars, I was the lead prosecutor on the Marc Rich case.

With me today is Martin Auerbach, who was also an assistant

U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York, and for the

last year or so of that investigation helped me and worked with me

on the case.

Between us, I think that we are the two most knowledgeable people from the prosecution side about the Marc Rich investigation.

Both of us are—have been for many years white collar criminal defense lawyers. I practice in Tampa. Mr. Auerbach practices in New

York City. I’m with a Washington-based law firm Zuckerman

Spaeder, and for many years I have represented, like Mr. Quinn

has and others, people that are under investigation or been indicted by the United States.

I might also add, Your Honor, that I am—Mr. Chairman, that I

am not here today to do several things. Although I have very

strong, as you will see, disagreements with what Mr. Quinn has

said about the merits or, in his view, the lack of merits of the case,

I am not here today to question Mr. Quinn’s motives with regard

to this pardon and this pardon application. I’ve represented many

people. I understand what it is to represent people. I understand

that when one does it, one has to characterize the facts in the light

most favorable to your client. I understand that.

I am also, Your Honor, and—Mr. Chairman, as—along with Mr.

Auerbach, a lifelong Democrat. We are not here for any political

purpose. We are not—we have no political motives in this case. I

grew up in Tennessee. I’ve been a Democrat my entire life. I am

not here for that purpose. We are here, I am here to talk about—

to talk about why in my opinion—to talk about my outrage basically because we feel this outrage we have is seeded in our intimate knowledge of the facts of this investigation and the facts of

this case.

We are here today upon your invitation, and we appreciate it, to

provide some background regarding the prosecution of Mr. Rich

and Mr. Green. In particular, we are here to express our outrage

at the pardons of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, who for the past 17

years have been international fugitives in what is the biggest tax

fraud case in the history of the United States.

As international fugitives who renounced their American citizenship in 1983 for the specific purpose of avoiding extradition on

these charges, we do not believe that Mr. Rich or Mr. Green should

have been candidates for pardon.

We are particularly distressed because, despite what Mr. Quinn

has said today, it appears that the President received no input

from anyone who had any knowledge of the particulars of this prosVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ecution from the prosecution side. It is my belief and understanding that no one from the U.S. Attorneys’s Office in the Southern

District of New York was contacted, no one from the IRS, the

agents from the FBI. Certainly I was not contacted, Mr. Auerbach

was not contacted. And I have been contacted over the years every

time another lawyer or law firm has come in to try to negotiate a

resolution, I have always been contacted by the Southern District

to receive my input. None of that happened apparently in this case.

Not surprisingly, this application for pardon is a one-sided account. You know, it’s an advocate’s piece. It’s—I have done advocate pieces like this over the last 15 years. But in our opinion, it

wholly and completely mischaracterizes the circumstances and

facts surrounding the Marc Rich case. If either of us had been

given the opportunity, we would have told President Clinton about

the actual facts of this investigation, the actual facts of the prosecution, what this prosecution was really about and why it had so

much merit and why there were probably two no more unsuited

people for a Presidential pardon than Marc Rich and Pincus Green,

and why in our opinion this pardon was so unwarranted.

The pardon application itself and Mr. Quinn’s remarks and his

prepared remarks and his remarks today and what I’ve heard him

say on television demonstrate, I believe, an utter lack of contrition

and remorse on the part of Mr. Green and Mr. Rich for their criminal conduct, for their renunciation of their U.S. citizenship, for the

fact that they fled justice 17 years ago.

Instead, the pardon application states that Mr. Rich, Mr. Green

and their companies, which incidentally pled guilty with some of

the best counsel in the United States in 1984, it says, quote, that

Mr. Rich, Mr. Green and their companies are—have—were wrongfully indicted nearly 20 years ago, have complete defenses to the

indictment, are victims of an injustice, have had an unfair and unwarranted treatment.

It alleges that Mr. Green and Mr. Rich were somehow, quote,

singled out and prosecuted for, quote, mere civil offenses and that

they have suffered terrible hardships in their 20 years of fugitivity

in Switzerland as a result of this prosecution.

It dismisses wholly the fact that, in 1984, Mr. Rich’s two companies pled guilty to all those counts and paid $200 million worth of

fines by merely suggesting, according to the application, that the

pleas were the result of government overreaching and a business

decision to save the companies.

Now, while the philanthropy of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green over the

past 20 years is admirable, it does not erase, in my opinion or Mr.

Auerbach’s opinion, the gravity of their criminal conduct or the importance of the prosecution then and the prosecution now.

As set forth below, the prosecution was based on numerous witnesses from within Marc Rich’s companies, current employees and

former employees. People to the level of the CFO were witnesses

in this case, as well as witnesses from third party companies that

were co-conspirators in these crimes.

It was the overwhelming nature of the evidence, in my opinion,

that caused Mr. Rich and Mr. Green to flee 17 years ago. It was

not, as Mr. Quinn says, a legal house of cards or a meritless prosecution or a civil case. Because surely Mr. Rich and Mr. Green,

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who were represented by Edward Bennett Williams, that wonderful

lawyer, in my opinion the greatest lawyer of his time, surely Mr.

Rich and Mr. Green would not have fled, would not have risked so

much, would not have undergone all of the obstruction that happened during that investigation that made the case so famous,

surely that they would not have paid $200 million and had their

companies plead to a meritless case, surely they would not have

done that if they had an absolute defense to the case and they believed that back in 1983 or 1984.

It would have been nice in 1983 or 1984 if Mr. Williams or any

of the other lawyers that was representing Marc Rich, Pincus

Green and their companies had come to us and said Sandy or Martin or John Martin, who was the U.S. attorney through most of

this, this case is, in our opinion, just a civil case. It’s meritless.

You’ve got it all wrong. There is a Swiss tax treaty. We had advice

of counsel.

None of those arguments were raised in 1983 or 1984 and were raised only after the case was over, they had pled $200 million,

they had fled the jurisdiction, and then they were trying to come

in 10 years later, 15 years later and, in my opinion, buy their way

out of having to face the merits of the case by saying that the case,

you know, had no merit.

That isn’t the way that the judicial system is supposed to work.

You know, how can Mr. Quinn say that, in 2001, Marc Rich and

Pincus Green wouldn’t have gotten a fair trial in the Southern District of New York. He is certainly not suggesting that one of the

many judges there wouldn’t have given him a fair trial. I mean, if

this case was so meritless, why didn’t they come back? Why didn’t

they face the charges?

I mean, the fact of the matter is they didn’t come back because

they knew that the charges were so overwhelming, in my opinion.

But it’s even worse than that. The evidence is as strong today, in

our opinion, as it was 17 years ago, in 1984, and I have forgotten

a lot of things in the last 20 years and I got sent the minutes from

the plea that took place in 1984.

And I was standing in court with Peter Fleming, one of the wonderful lawyers that was representing Marc Rich, and Peter

Zimroth, another terrific lawyer that was representing Marc Rich,

and the companies were pleading guilty that day, and there were

more people in the room than there are today because it was a historic plea, it was a very big plea, the biggest resolution at the time

ever.

And those lawyers stood in court that day, in Federal court in

front of a Federal judge, and they entered in behalf of the two companies guilty pleas to 38 counts on behalf of Marc Rich Co. A.G.

and 40 felony counts on behalf of Marc Rich Co. International. And

they stood there, and they told the Federal judge that the pleas

were voluntary, that’s what the lawyers said, that’s what the transcript said, and that they were not the result of any threats or extortion.

They told the Federal judge that Marc Rich’s company in the

United States had hidden, in their words, when they were making

the allocution, as they call it, when they were telling the judge

what the companies had done wrong, they told the Federal judge

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that Marc Rich’s company in the United States had hidden millions

of dollars of income from crude oil transactions, had hidden it from

the IRS, had hidden it from the Department of Energy, had evaded

millions of dollars in taxes, and had filed numerous false documents with the Department of Energy with regard to the income

which was illegal.

In addition, they paid $200 million in taxes and penalties. And

if the case is so weak, I mean what in the world were those lawyers

thinking at that time, as described in the pardon application. They

would have never pled guilty, they would have never paid those

fines. Whatever the reason for the pardon, Mr. Chairman, and

members of the committee, whatever the reason, surely the reason

was not the merits of the case. Because this case, you know, had,

in my opinion, and I believe in the opinion of Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green, who fled, and the opinion of their lawyers who allowed the

guilty pleas to go down and who told the Federal judge that they

had, in fact, committed those crimes, I mean the fact of the matter

is the case was full of merit. And it is just I believe incredible that,

20 years later, I’m sitting here and hearing that the case was without merit and it was a legal house of cards.

I am not going to read the details of my testimony, which I understand is here, about the investigation, but I’ll just summarize a

few things. The reason, in my opinion, that Mr. Quinn has said and

others have said in the application that there was a hysteria that

grew up around the case and that somehow I, who I think was 31

at the time, and other prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office

were creating a media event, the case was an important case to

begin with.

It was the biggest tax fraud in the history of the United States.

But it was like any other case until Mr. Rich and Mr. Green began

to attempt to obstruct the investigation during the investigation

stage. And a series of events happened that made it such a famous

case. It started with us subpoenaing Marc Rich’s Swiss records.

And it was—it was—it set jurisdictional precedent. We took the position that we had jurisdiction in the United States over a Swiss

company, and we litigated that. Everything in this case was litigated to the hilt. We litigated it.

We went to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and we won.

And the judge on this case was Leonard Sand, who is the judge

today that is trying the Osama bin Laden case in New York as we

sit here today. He is a terrific Federal judge, and he ruled we had

jurisdiction. He ruled that the companies should turn over the documents. And the company refused to turn over the documents. So

he found the companies in contempt and ordered a $50,000 a day

fine which, at the time, was I think the biggest fine ever. And the

lawyers for the company told Judge Sand, we are not going to pay

the fine, and we are not going to turn over the documents.

So that was story No. 1. That was a front page story, and it ran

forever as the press was following the $50,000 a day fine.

And then right on top of that, it turned out we discovered that

Marc Rich had attempted to secretly sell his only U.S. asset, which

was this American subsidiary. And when we found out about that,

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ion that it was a fraudulent attempt to keep assets, you know, out

of our control and to avoid paying the $50,000 a day fine.

And ultimately the Second Circuit ruled that it was fraudulent

and even found that the attorney-client privilege on the crime

fraud exception was dispensed with and that we were able to talk

to the attorneys for Marc Rich about the sale and found out how

fraudulent it was.

And when the fines began to accumulate—and these were all

being reported on a regular basis, when the fines began to accumulate, we negotiated a deal with the companies to turn over the

records and pay the fines up to date, and we inked that in Judge

Sand’s apartment one Friday night.

I thought it was over with and that we would go with the investigation, and 4 days later we got a tip from somebody in Marc

Rich’s New York office that they were smuggling documents out of

the country—subpoenaed documents out of the country in steamer

trunks. And we reeled a Swiss Air flight in from the runway and

there were two steamer trunks, and they were unmarked and they

were chock full of subpoenaed records. And that was the steamer

trunk affair, and that was another front page story.

And then the indictment proceeded, and there was an enormous

amount of attention for the indictment, and then Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green became fugitives. And all of these things made the case, you

know, an internationally reported case. But it was their conduct,

not our conduct, that was being reported at the time.

When we finalized our investigation after the indictment, the

companies vigorously litigated the charges. They filed dozens of

pretrial motions, hundreds of pages of legal briefs. They raised

every conceivable defense except the defense that we are hearing

now.

They never argued that it wasn’t taxable income, that it did not

constitute tax evasion, and never argued that they had advice of

counsel. And then there was plea negotiations with the companies

when it became clear that the individuals weren’t coming back. We

sought to extradite them. The Swiss Government wouldn’t extradite them, and we ended up accepting guilty pleas from the companies.

As I close, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, and members of the

committee, the case against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was very

strong and continues to be very strong. The government would

have called witnesses from Marc Rich’s companies who would have

described in detail the huge tax fraud and energy fraud scheme.

Like any fraud case, anyone I have ever participated in as a

prosecutor or defense lawyer, the evidence was rife with false documents, inflated invoices, sham transactions, off the record, off the

book deals. The conspirators in this case kept track of the illegal

profits, which was about $100 million, in handwritten journals in

what was described by themselves and on these journals as the pot.

As alleged in the indictment, the evidence included meetings between these co-conspirators and Marc Rich regarding the pots and

the scheme to funnel the illegal profits out of the country to offshore accounts. In addition, Mr. Green and Mr. Rich’s fugitive status was further evidence of their consciousness of guilt.

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Now, 17 years later, the pardon application asserts that the acts

alleged were civil, not criminal, and that the conduct in which the

companies pled guilty and for which Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were

indicted was perfectly innocent intercompany transactions protected by U.S.-Swiss tax treaty.

If the transactions were considered legitimate at the time, one

wonders why it was necessary to create the pots, use inflated invoices, use sham transactions to funnel the profits out of the

United States.

And as I said before, it’s unlikely with the best defense lawyers

in America that Marc Rich and Pincus Green would have risked everything to become fugitives if it was just a civil misunderstanding.

In truth, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, in my opinion, have forfeited

their right to question the merits of this case in their pardon application by becoming fugitives, by renouncing their citizenship, by

having their companies plead guilty to the scheme 17 years ago.

Whatever the debate about their pardons, if should not, and I

agree with what the Congressman should say—has said, it should

not, the debate should not be over the merits of the case against

him. Those merits were clear then. They are clear today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberg follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Weinberg. That was very thorough.

Mr. Auerbach.

Mr. AUERBACH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Waxman, distinguished members of the committee, I come today to express the outrage I share

with Mr. Weinberg and I believe with many other Americans over

President Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Mr.

Quinn has suggested to the committee and to the Nation that we

had a legal house of cards. Well, if we did, it was all aces. We had

extraordinary testimony, extraordinary cooperation from people

within Marc Rich’s organization, which demonstrated the guilt to

which his companies pleaded guilty.

The notion that this pardon was, quote, on the merits, as has

been said by our former President, a man who I voted for twice,

is simply incorrect. The merits of this case were unquestionably in

the government’s favor.

Mr. Quinn has said that, in presenting the pardon applicant, he

presented the views of the prosecutors. But when one reads the

pardon application, one sees the indictment, which does express the

charges, but does not set forth the facts.

One of the linchpins of the attack on the case is an analysis that

was done 10 years ago by two very distinguished tax professors and

was presented to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in December 1990, directed to the distinguished prosecutor who went on to become himself a professor at Columbia Law School and now, with the advice

and consent of the U.S. Senate, sits on the Federal bench in New

York.

The transmittal letter that came with that analysis says it all

and betrays the problem, the fundamental flaw in the pardon application as it was applied to Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, and that is

a complete absence of a knowledge of the facts, the true facts of

this case, the facts that led the companies to plead guilty.

When that analysis was sent 10 years ago, the professors who

wrote it said, and this is in tab C to the pardon application, quote,

making no independent verification of the facts but accepting the

statements thereof made to us by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green’s lawyers.

And that is the problem. The President relied on the facts as described to him by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green’s lawyers, making no

independent investigation.

Since 1983, when I began working on this case, I have had numerous conversations, both as a prosecutor and after leaving the

U.S. Attorney’s Office, about the merits of this case. Mr. Rich and

Mr. Green reached an impasse with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, not

because the U.S. Attorney’s Office was unreasonable and was unwilling to listen to their arguments and analysis, they reached an

impasse because of the facts.

Mr. Rich and Mr. Green are commodities traders. By its nature,

that is a gambling profession. And there is an old song about the

gambler which says, you have to know when to hold, know when

to fold up, know when to walk away, know when to run. And they

ran, and they ran because of the facts. And they couldn’t come back

because of the facts.

And it was only by circumventing a process that they had gone

through years and years and years ago and continue to go through,

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a process which involved a careful consideration of their arguments

against the facts of the case that allowed them to come back.

Now, the one card we did not have was the get-out-of-jail-free

card. Mr. Rich and Mr. Green now have that card. And I believe

that one of the functions that this committee can perform is not

only the function of looking at the Presidential pardon process and

encouraging the current President and all Presidents who follow

him to never again make the mistake for whatever reason it was

made by Mr. Clinton in pardoning fugitives who have turned their

back on the United States, who have engaged in conduct pleaded

guilty to by their companies that constituted thumbing their noses

at American laws in times of crisis, the energy crisis.

In 1973 and 1974, I had the privilege of working for the House

Commerce Committee, and I will never forget the hearings that

were held with respect to the energy crisis. It was a crisis of great

proportion for the American people. A response was crafted by government, perhaps an imperfect response, but a real response. Mr.

Rich and Mr. Green chose to evade the law with respect to those

controls. They chose to make illegal profits at a time when Americans were suffering under extraordinarily high energy prices.

When we had a hostage crisis in Iran, we attempted to respond

to that by having legislation and regulation. Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green, as alleged in the indictment, chose to put their personal

profits ahead of the needs and the laws of the United States. The

notion that a President of the United States in the future might

make the same mistake and act on a pardon application that may

reflect the prosecutor’s views but not present to him the facts is a

mistake I would urge this committee to ensure never happens

again.

The other thing I would ask this committee to do in its oversight

function is to look to the future. Mr. Rich and Mr. Green announced long ago that they have renounced their citizenship. We

took the position that they were still citizens of the United States,

still subject to our jurisdiction and extradition. But they took the

position that they were citizens of the world. If they, in fact, renounce their citizenships and are no longer Americans, then I believe they have no absolute right to return to this country. And I

think that this committee should call upon the State Department

and the White House to consider whether Mr. Rich and Mr. Green

are welcome in America, or whether that their complete contempt

for the laws of the United States and for the courts of the United

States, as reflected in the conduct that Mr. Weinberg described,

which led them to pay $21 million in contempt fines, fines they

preferred to pay rather than produce documents—and I believe

that if those documents had demonstrated their innocence, those

documents would have been on our doorstep before we asked for

them. I believe that we have to look at their contempt and say, if

you are not American citizens and have no right to be here, you

are not welcome here.

Alternatively, if they are U.S. citizens free to come and go as

they please, then we have to look at their civil liabilities.

Mr. Quinn wrote to the President saying that Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green would waive all the procedural obstacles to the government

pursuing them with respect to civil liabilities arising from the

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transactions for which they were indicted. That, Mr. Chairman, is

a completely hollow promise. It is utterly meaningless. It is less

than ice in winter. It is an empty glass.

The civil liabilities in this case were fully extinguished in 1984

when Marc Rich and Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co. International

Limited paid $150 million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were corporate civil liabilities.

We have been accused of being reckless and overreaching. We did

not charge Marc Rich and Co. A.G. with tax evasion because it was

not a U.S. taxpayer. We did charge Marc Rich and Co. International Limited with tax evasion. It pleaded guilty, and it satisfied its tax liabilities. That civil liability is gone.

With respect to the Energy Department and the energy regulations, that civil liability is gone. That was never an individual liability of theirs. It was a corporate liability. Their liability was a

criminal liability.

And so I would ask the committee to ensure that, if they are welcome to return to the United States, that we do everything in our

power to hold them responsible for any liabilities they may have,

including, of course, tax liability for the past 17 years.

It is my impression, perhaps incorrect, but I believe not, that for

the past 17 years, they have taken the position that they are not

U.S. citizens and need not pay U.S. income tax. During that period,

as one of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green’s lawyers informed me several

years ago, they went from owning the second largest commodities

trading company in the world to owning the largest commodities

trading company in the world, which Mr. Rich and Mr. Green proceeded to sell at enormous personal profit. If they made such profits and have not paid their taxes, I hope this committee will ensure

that they do so.

One last thing I would say, when you make a deal with the devil

you ought to get paid. I don’t know what the deal was or whether

there was a deal that led to Mr. Rich’s and Mr. Green’s pardon. I

see the fingerprints of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green in the way that this

was approached because, in the course of our investigation, in the

course of watching his contact over the years, I have come to understand the way Mr. Rich and Mr. Green do business and why

they had been such phenomenally successful commodities traders.

They do information arbitrage. They take advantage of the fact

that the guy on the other side of the table doesn’t know what they

do.

It happened here again. They take advantage of building special

relationships with people in government, which they can then exploit, sometimes at the cost of those people’s own allegiance to their

true employers.

I’m not suggesting that Mr. Quinn is anything other than a deeply loyal American. I believe we all are, but I am suggesting that

Mr. Rich and Mr. Green exploited one of the techniques that made

some so successful and so rich.

If in fact one of the compelling parts of the pardon application

was the charity that they have bestowed, and I assure you that at

the time that they had been indicted we were aware that particularly Mr. Green, was an extremely charitable person. Mr. Green is

a deeply observant religious man. His religious beliefs preclude him

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from making money between sundown on Friday and sundown on

Saturday. And so he chose to have his profits go into a charitable

trust for that period. I applaud that. I think that is wonderful. But I do not believe that the $220 million of charity that is reflected in this pardon application wipes out their guilt. What it

does suggest, however, is that, if we have made a deal with the

devil, there is a good way for him to pay. Not only should the tax

liabilities, if they are American citizens, be fully satisfied, but I call

on them both to increase their charity. They offered to pay $100 million to settle these matters. I call

upon them, I call upon this committee, I call upon the Congress

and the people of the United States to say to them now prove that

you are truly charitable men. Prove that you are not simply looking

for a way to buy yourself back into somebody’s heart. Put up the

money now. If you don’t owe the civil liabilities that Mr. Quinn was

prepared to have you satisfy, establish charitable foundations. Put

that money on the table now so that at least the American people

can receive some benefit from the extraordinary wealth that you

achieved by turning your back on American law.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Auerbach. It was very interesting

testimony.

We will now go to the 30 minutes on each side.

Mr. Shays, we will recognize you for the first 10 minutes on our

side.

Mr. SHAYS. Good morning, gentlemen. This committee, the Government Reform Committee, and the Governmental Affairs Committee in the Senate has had approximately 80 people refuse to testify before this committee exercising their fifth amendment rights,

and now Denise Rich is just one more person added to that number. And, Mr. Quinn, I may have a lot of feelings about what you

did, but I think it takes a lot of guts to be here, and I appreciate

you being here.

Mr. QUINN. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. There are some who believe, and I am one of them,

that former President Clinton appears to have pardoned two traitors to their country and our country, and I want to just deal with

the part of the indictment that people refer to as trading with the

enemy.

Mr. Quinn, you claimed in the pardon application that the Southern District of New York dropped the trading with the enemy

charges against Mr. Rich’s companies because they somehow lacked

merit. Is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Quinn, you argued in your petition for pardon

that because the trading with the enemy charges against the company were dropped the charges against Messrs. Rich and Green

should have been dropped also; is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. Well, the central argument on this point, sir, is that

the regulations in question do not reach individuals who are engaged in such trading on behalf of foreign corporations.

Mr. SHAYS. Is it your position that your clients did not trade with

Iran or that it was not illegal if they did?

Mr. QUINN. The latter.

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Mr. SHAYS. That it was not illegal if they did?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Did they trade with Iran?

Mr. QUINN. It was my understanding that there was such trading but that it was on behalf of foreign corporations, and that being

the case, the regulations in question did not reach that conduct.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Weinberg, could you explain why the charges

against the company for trading with Iran were dropped?

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes. When Mr. Rich and Mr. Green became fugitives, we were left with trying a case against two corporations and

a third individual who was a principal of this company called Listo.

His name was Clyde Meltzer. By the way, he did not get a pardon,

even though he ended up being the one person that pled guilty in

this case. But because Mr. Meltzer was not involved in any of the

trading with the enemy charges, it created a real problem for trying the case without Marc Rich and Pincus Green there because

Mr. Meltzer took the position that he was entitled to a severance

and that there would have to be two trials.

So in order to avoid having two trials, we superseded the indictment and took the trading with the enemy counts out of the RICO

charges as they applied to the companies and dismissed them as

to the companies and told the court that, if we tried this case, we

would not have those counts that Mr. Meltzer believed were so inflammatory to him that he would not get a fair trial. But we also

made it clear that the charges would remain outstanding as to the

individuals.

But just in response to what Mr. Quinn said, we charged that

these—these trades were made by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green from

their New York office. I mean, that’s what the indictment charges

and that is what the proof would have been, and that we were very

confident that the U.S. laws and regulations prohibited Americans

from making deals and, regardless of whether the deal was for

their Swiss company or their American company, but they couldn’t

in the United States make deals that caused U.S. money to go from

U.S. banks to the Iranians, which in this case we would have proven I believe.

So we felt strongly about the charges. We dismissed them as to

the company because we wanted to have one trial and not two.

Mr. SHAYS. So it’s your testimony that you certainly wouldn’t

have dropped it as it related to the individuals?

Mr. WEINBERG. No. It really applied more to the individuals because it was the individuals in this case that were American citizens. It was the individuals in this case that actually did the deals.

It was the individuals that were the—you know, had violated, you

know, the trading with the enemy counts.

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Shays, may I add one——

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Mr. QUINN. As you can see, as I hope you will see through the

course of this hearing on this and a number of other points, we disagree. I do not believe that those regulations reached this conduct.

I want—and I am going to try in the course of this hearing to comment on as many of the harsh things said by these gentlemen as

I can. But I do want to single out one particular aspect of this, and

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that is this, the fact that this gentleman renounced his U.S. citizenship. And—— Mr. SHAYS. I’d like to come back to that. We will come back unless it relates directly to this point.

Mr. QUINN. Well, it is going to be a simple point.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. QUINN. I want to be clear that I did not recommend he do

that. I would never recommend that any American do that. I do not

condone that. But I want you to know that I do not think that fact

was pertinent to the charges against him.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. This is a fugitive from justice who was a U.S.

citizen, who then left after being prosecuted, renounces his U.S.

citizenship.

Mr. QUINN. Well—— Mr. SHAYS. Let me just go on.

During the last 20 years, did Marc Rich or his companies trade

with Qadhafi or Libya?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know the answer to that, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Should it make any difference to you if he did?

Mr. QUINN. The pardon application goes to the legal merit or

lack of merit of the indictment. I did not act here as a character

witness for these people. I took on the indictment within its four

corners.

Mr. SHAYS. I only have 10 minutes, so I would like you to be precise here. I’m saying, should it have made any difference? The answer is yes or no.

Mr. QUINN. I think not.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you try to find out whether he did?

Mr. QUINN. No, because I had no information that it might have

been the case.

Mr. SHAYS. Did Mr. Rich trade with Iran when U.S. hostages

were being held captive?

Mr. QUINN. I do not know the precise answer to that question.

It is my belief that he traded with Iran. I can’t tell you right now

when that occurred.

Mr. SHAYS. Should it make any difference to you if it did?

Mr. QUINN. Again, I approached this as a lawyer concerned with

the indictment that was before me and whether or not it should

stand. I was not here to be a character witness. I was here to take

on four points—— Mr. SHAYS. It didn’t make any difference to you. Should it have

made a difference to the President of the United States?

Mr. QUINN. It is something he well may have taken into consideration, certainly. I mean, the President in——

Mr. SHAYS. In the last 12 years, did Marc Rich or any of his companies trade embargo—excuse me, did they trade with Iraq, with

Iraqi oil?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. SHAYS. Should it make any difference to you if this was true?

Mr. QUINN. If it didn’t go to the allegations of this indictment,

it would not, in my view, have undermined the legal case we made

against the indictment.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you try to find out if it did, if they did?

Mr. QUINN. No, because again I——

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Mr. SHAYS. So the answer is no?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. SHAYS. No. Then the next question is: Should it have made

a difference to the President of the United States?

Mr. QUINN. Again, I think the President could and should take

into consideration whatever information he chooses to take into

consideration. I can speak only to the information I provided to

him.

Mr. SHAYS. You felt no obligation to tell the President whether

Marc Rich or Mr. Green may have traded with Libya, traded with

Iran, or traded with Iraq; and you don’t think you had any obligation to infirm the President of that?

Mr. QUINN. I know what my obligation as a lawyer was. It was

to argue this case forcefully. And by the way, as I think you know,

the Prime Minister of Israel, whom one would expect to have been

concerned if those sorts of nefarious trade dealings were under

way, would not have been as vocal as he was in support of this pardon.

Mr. SHAYS. During the trade embargo of South Africa, during the

days of apartheid, did Marc Rich or his companies trade with the

South African Government?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. SHAYS. Should it make any difference to you that he did?

Mr. QUINN. It would not have made any difference to whether or

not this indictment had merit.

Mr. SHAYS. Should it make a difference to the President of the

United States?

Mr. QUINN. Again, I think the President could and should take

into account whatever information he chose to.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you know whether Rich or his companies traded

with Cuba?

Mr. QUINN. I do not.

Mr. SHAYS. Were any of Mr. Rich’s assets or any assets of his

company frozen for illegal trading with Cuba?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. If, in fact, Marc Rich or Pincus Green were traitors to the United States, should they be pardoned?

Mr. QUINN. With all due respect, I think it’s an unfair question,

because I did not believe that they were traitors.

Mr. SHAYS. No, you said, you said that it wasn’t part of your request in the pardon. You didn’t say whether or not you believed

that, because you didn’t check. You have an indictment trading

with the enemy, and you basically said that was irrelevant and

shouldn’t apply.

Mr. QUINN. I said that the charge was without merit because the

regulations in question do not reach a situation in which individuals are trading on behalf of a non-U.S. company.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just real briefly make one comment; that is,

I think, when a pardon is looked at in addition to the charges

brought against people like these gentlemen, they ought to look at

what they’ve done since then to see if there is any contrition. And

they did deal with those countries just mentioned during the emVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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bargoes. So there was no contrition whatsoever. They went on with

the same modus operandi that they had before. So there was no

contrition, and I can’t understand why that wasn’t taken into consideration.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, can I have you yield 1 second?

Mr. BURTON. Real quickly.

Mr. SHAYS. I point out, in the process, they made a fortune.

Mr. BURTON. A fortune.

Mr. SHAYS. And in the process, they didn’t declare those taxes.

Mr. BURTON. That’s right.

I have one question, then I’ll yield to my colleague, Mr.

LaTourette.

If these gentleman, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, had a good case,

why did they flee the country and why did they try to smuggle subpoenaed documents out in steamer trunks that were only caught

because there was a tip? I mean, if there was no case, if this was

a house of cards, why did they flee the country? And why did they

try to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the country?

Mr. QUINN. Let me answer you in several parts. First of all, it

is my understanding that when they were indicted they were outside the country. Second, what they did was fail to return to the

country after the indictment. That is my understanding.

Second, it is also my understanding that the U.S. Government

has never alleged that their absence is in and of itself unlawful.

Third, with regard to the documents, what I have been told is

that those documents were going to Switzerland for the purpose of

being reviewed for privilege by the lawyers.

That is their answer, sir.

Mr. BURTON. I’m sure the counsel that was involved in the prosecution would like to respond real briefly.

Would counsel like to respond real briefly?

Mr. AUERBACH. A couple of things, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would note that when you look at the pardon application,

point one is not a discussion of the legal merits of this case, but

of who these men are and why they are entitled to come back. It’s

not until you get to page 20 of the pardon application that you

begin to reach a discussion of the merits of this case.

With respect to the documents that were being slipped out of the

country, the suggestion was never that those were being reviewed

for attorney-client privilege. It was simply that it would be more

convenient for counsel to review them in Switzerland then to review them in New York.

Now, we had tons and tons of documents delivered to us. These

two steamer trunks were slipping out. We didn’t get a call from

them saying, you know, we’ve got some people over in Zug with

nothing better to do than to look at documents; would you mind if

we took them over there outside of the jurisdiction at the time

when we’re in contempt for refusing to produce documents from

Switzerland?

So when we get down to the merits of this case, I’m afraid Mr.

Rich and Mr. Green do not win.

Mr. WEINBERG. As far as fugitivity is concerned, very briefly, I

think it’s a distinction without a difference. They weren’t indicted.

They were well aware of the investigation. There were negotiations

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on with Mr. Williams that had been reported before the indictment,

the $100 million offer. They chose not to come home. There were

arrest warrants outstanding.

They renounced their citizenship to avoid extradition. They became citizens of Bolivia at the time. These are fugitives, and I still

believe that a fugitive that has renounced his citizenship should

not be at the top of the list of people that are considered for the

ultimate act of mercy that the Constitution reserves to the President, which is a pardon power.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Weinberg.

Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the counsel how

much time remains of our side’s 30 minutes?

Mr. BURTON. Because I kind of interrupted there, I think you

have about 71⁄2 minutes, let’s say.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Could I ask that counsel notify me when we

have 10 left, because I want my friend, Mr. Barr, to have a full 10

minutes to explain what is on his mind.

Mr. BURTON. I will yield my 5 minutes to you in the second

round since I took your time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much.

Mr. Quinn, I want to begin where Mr. Weinberg just left off, because there’s a couple of things about this that concern me, and it

has to do with definitions.

I mentioned in my opening remarks, when we get to the second

panel and you’re joined by Mr. Holder, I want to talk to you about

some definitions that have been used in interpreting Executive

Order 12834. But for this round, I want to talk about the issue of

fugitivity.

Apparently, as I understand the media accounts and other

things, and maybe if you could refer to exhibit No. 15 in the committee hearing exhibits, apparently there was a conversation between you and Bruce Lindsey in Belfast, Ireland.

[Exhibit 15 follows:]

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Mr. LATOURETTE. One of the things that was of concern to the

Clinton administration was the fact that somebody was telling

them at least that Marc Rich and Pincus Green were fugitives from

justice. And in response to that conversation, you apparently felt

compelled to send Mr. Lindsey at the White House a letter on December 19, 2000, and in particular say, ‘‘I want to followup on an

issue you raised in our conversation while in Belfast on the subject

of the pardon for Marc Rich and Pinky Green. You expressed a concern that they are fugitives, and I told you that they’re not. Here’s

why. Rich and Green were, in fact, residing in Switzerland when

they were indicted in September 1983.’’ I think that’s what Mr. Weinberg was just addressing, sort of the

distinction without a difference. And here’s why it’s troubling.

We had a hearing in this committee last year where we had a

former Cuban intelligence official, and he explained to us that it

was his belief that Fidel Castro helped pay for and orchestrate the

largest armored car robbery in the history of the United States; $7

million was taken. And then Fidel Castro, according to this witness, helped smuggle the person out of the United States and back

to Cuba. And if we can go to exhibit 101 in the committee’s documents, like your client, he wound up on the Top Ten list of those

most wanted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His name is

Victor Manuel Gerena.

[Exhibit 101 follows:]

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Mr. LATOURETTE. And the conduct on that occasion was that he

took two security employees hostages at gunpoint, handcuffed

them, bound them and injected them with an unknown substance

to further disable them. However, the indictment for Mr. Gerena

wasn’t issued until he was safely back in Cuba.

Now, if we take your definition of what a fugitive is in your letter

to Mr. Lindsey, it would appear that the FBI has made another

mistake by putting this fellow on the Most Wanted list because he’s

not a fugitive either.

Now how can you say that that’s the definition of fugitivity?

Mr. QUINN. Well, sir, the facts as stated in my letter are, I believe, accurate. It has not been my impression that Mr. Weinberg

or any other representative of the U.S. Government alleged that

their failure to return was itself criminal. And you and I are perhaps using different definitions of fugitivity, and I accept that, but

I do not understand their absence to have been criminal.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Mr. QUINN. The purpose of my letter was to make that point.

Mr. LATOURETTE. But apparently—I mean, again, as I read it—

and I will let Mr. Weinberg jump in here in a minute. I used to

do this, not as skilled as these fellows; I used to be a simple county

prosecutor, and I guess when I had a defendant who was facing

300 years, throwing in a fugitive from justice, securing a year and

a half really didn’t mean a whole lot to the guy.

But the fact of the matter is, if we take your definition, and

Bruce Lindsey seemed to be worried about the fact that you were

asking a fugitive from justice to receive a Presidential pardon, your

answer to them is, hey, good news, Bruce, he’s not a fugitive because he was already over in Switzerland.

And I would assert to you that if Marc Rich wasn’t a fugitive

then neither is Mr. Gerena. We had a famous case here a couple

years ago where a fellow fled to Pakistan after murdering a CIA

agent in the parking lot, and he wouldn’t have been a fugitive.

The last observation, and maybe you can then tell me what the

difference is. Mr. Weinberg was talking about you’re not his first

lawyer; Mr. Rich, he had Edward Bennett Williams a great, great

lawyer, and if we could just go to a written a biography when this

case is mentioned, and if you could go to exhibit 102, maybe. The

excerpt from Mr. Williams’ biography reads that, as follows: ‘‘Williams was standing in the office of Marvin Davis in Los Angeles

when he heard the news that his client was on the lam. According

to Davis, Williams shouted into the phone, ‘You know, something,

Marc, you spit on the American flag. You spit on the jury system.

Whatever you get, you deserve. We could have gotten the minimum; now you’re going to sink.’ ’’

It appears that one of Mr. Rich’s former lawyers seemed to think

that he was a fugitive from justice and undeserving of any favorable treatment and, certainly, a pardon, I would suggest, by the

American justice system. And I guess—how do you—how have you

reached a different conclusion than Mr. Williams as to the

fugitivity question?

[Exhibit 102 follows:]

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Mr. QUINN. Well, again, sir, my position on fugitivity is laid out

in that letter to Lindsey.

But to the point that I reach a different conclusion about this

case than Mr. Williams did, I learned about this case in excruciating detail from such people as Lewis Libby, who is now Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, Larry Urgenson.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I understand your arguments on the merits,

but Mr. Williams is talking about the issue of fugitivity here. He

said that your client, ‘‘spit on the American flag’’ was his conclusion. You reach a different conclusion.

Let me ask Mr. Weinberg. Mr. Weinberg, do you think that fellow was a fugitive from justice?

Mr. WEINBERG. He is a fugitive from justice. What Mr. Quinn is

talking about when there’s an outstanding arrest warrant for you

and you’ve been indicted and you know about it and you don’t turn

yourself in, you’re a fugitive whether you took a vacation to Switzerland, because he was living in New York at the time.

But whether you took a vacation to Switzerland and chose not

to come back, or not, you’re a fugitive. What he’s saying is that he

didn’t commit the crime of bail jumping, because there wasn’t bail

set, because he hadn’t been indicted when he chose apparently not

to come back. He’s a fugitive. Up until the pardon, there were arrest warrants.

The marshals have been quoted recently as saying he was one

of the Top Ten list. They tried many times to capture him. There

have been a number of extradition requests. He chose not to come

back; he’s a fugitive.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Auerbach.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. LATOURETTE. May I ask Mr. Auerbach the question?

How do you feel about this fugitivity issue?

Mr. AUERBACH. There’s no question that Marc Rich and Pincus

Green were fugitives and knew it. We sought their extradition from

Switzerland. If you look at our agreement with their companies

with respect to their guilty pleas, they specifically provided that we

would wait to see whether the Swiss were going to grant our extradition requests, because if they were, we reserved the right to go

ahead to trial as they did. And it was only when it was clear that

they were not going to get extradited as fugitives that we proceeded.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you.

I yield to you, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weinberg, I think you in one phrase or one sentence really

summed up why we’re here. Nobody in this room seriously believes

that we’re here because all of us on this committee and the American people don’t understand that there are other important things

that Congress needs to be doing. Congress is doing those things.

If members on the other side want to work on health care for the

elderly and prescription drugs, then they ought to be on those committees. That’s not what brings us here today. What brings us here

today is, as you said in your testimony, how our judicial system is

supposed to work. That is really what brings us here.

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Some on the other side might think that simply because we are

at the core of this discussion talking about a constitutional authority, that there’s nothing that any of us can do about it. Once the

President exercises anything that is a power under which the Constitution he has, then we all have to just back away and bow down

and say, yes, sir, we can’t look into this, it’s black magic, we have

to go away and just accept what you’ve done.

I think all of us here, whether anybody is willing to admit it or

not, understand that’s not the way our system of government operates. We have an obligation here, the same as you and Mr.

Auerbach have an obligation, as does Mr. Quinn, to see that justice

is done, to uphold our system of laws, our system of checks and balances.

And if, in fact, there’s evidence, as there is in this case, that the

system has not worked, that it perhaps has been subverted in some

way, then we have a legitimate reason to look into it, to try and

at least bring to the attention of the American people that something wrong has gone on here, and if steps can be taken, to take

those steps.

Also, in looking at the grant of executive clemency or a pardon,

we’re not operating in a vacuum here. We’re not operating as if

President Clinton is the first person ever to extend grants of clemency or to grant pardons. There is, in fact, a long history of documentation.

There is a very clear process and procedure which every prior

President until this President at the 11th hour of his administration has followed. There are documents that lay out that process

and procedure such as, for example, the U.S. attorneys manual.

I ask unanimous consent to include these pages from the U.S. attorneys manual that relate to grants of clemency and pardons in

the record.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BARR. And we look, for example, even at Mr. Quinn’s own,

very-well-put-together, two or three, whatever it is, inches of papers in his petition, the last two tabs of which I and J, I believe,

include a number of former documentations from a number of

former Presidents regarding grants of clemency and executive pardons.

In every one of those, the President lays out the case for the

American people, why he believes that this pardon is in the interests of justice.

Now, we may agree or disagree with it, but it’s all there; it’s on

the record. The former President has chosen to operate, as he has

so many times in the past, with utter disdain and disregard for the

process whereby the American people are deemed to have a right

to know what is going on, because that’s the only way we can tell

if justice is, in fact, being done.

I would also ask unanimous consent to include in the record the

executive grant of clemency signed by former President Clinton on

January 20th in this case.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BARR. And also a letter from the Department of Justice

dated February 6, 2001, which lists some 44, it looks like, individuals listed in the prior document—— Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

Mr. BARR [continuing]. Who did not submit petitions.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BARR. As to at least those people, I think a very legitimate

question can be raised whether their pardons or grants of clemency

are not valid, are void ab initio, because in his rush to judgment

or his effort to obfuscate or not answer questions or lay out for the

American people what President Clinton did in this case is simply

list dozens upon dozens of individuals, including Messrs. Rich and

Green, without giving any reason or any details and simply saying

that he hereby grants a full and unconditional pardon to all of the

following named persons for those offenses against the United

States described in each such request.

The question apparently that some folks, including perhaps some

of us, will look into is as to all of the people who did not submit

a request, there can’t be a pardon, because we don’t know the

terms of it.

Mr. Rich, however, did submit a petition, a very lengthy petition,

and one that lays out in great detail, as you described, Mr.

Weinberg, his position.

There’s nothing necessarily wrong with that. That is how the

pardon or executive clemency process starts, and that’s virtually

every case—not every case, but most cases.

What happened thereafter though is very unusual. There is no

documentation from the Department of Justice. There is no documentation from the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency,

the Department of State, all of which are agencies that in the case

of a fugitive, a foreign fugitive from justice, as to whom very serious allegations in evidence have been raised regarding trading with

the enemy and so forth, that normally would be consulted. That’s

a very serious question.

Why was the President so eager to grant Mr. Rich a pardon without looking into any of these matters? These are, in fact, very serious. And this is the reason why we’re having this hearing and why

we will have the petition or the next panel.

I have some specific questions, but I think we will probably have

some additional time, Mr. Chairman, to go into specific questions.

Mr. BURTON. We will, and I will try to see that we yield to you

what time you need.

Mr. Waxman, you’re recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

It’s clear from the testimony that we received from this point

there’s a strong difference of opinion on this panel regarding the

merits of pardoning Marc Rich.

Mr. Weinberg, you clearly believed that Mr. Rich does not deserve a pardon.

Mr. WEINBERG. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Auerbach, you agree with Mr. Weinberg on

that?

Mr. AUERBACH. Absolutely, Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Quinn, you obviously disagree with the prosecutors? You feel that the pardon was justified on the merits; is

that your position?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, based on what I’ve heard on this matter, I

would have to agree with the prosecutors on the merits of this pardon. It seems to me that the arguments against granting Mr. Rich

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a pardon outweigh the arguments in favor of granting him a pardon. If I were considering this matter, I wouldn’t have reached this

conclusion.

There is a tremendous difference, however, between a bad judgment and criminal conduct. Some people believe that the Clinton

administration acted illegally or corruptly in granting the pardon.

I’m not sure that the evidence sustains this theory.

The evidence, in my opinion, sustains a theory that the President

used incredibly bad judgment.

Mr. Quinn, of the witnesses here today, you had the most extensive firsthand knowledge about the President’s consideration of the

pardon. You had direct contact with the President regarding the

matter.

Do you have any reason to believe that the President’s conduct

in the pardon was in any way criminal or corrupt?

Mr. QUINN. Absolutely not. And in point of fact, as I said earlier,

and I would like to repeat it, not a single word of the conversation

I had with him about this matter had to do with anything other

than the merits of this case.

And if I may, it’s very hard in this format to be able to respond

to everything that is being thrown up here. And, again, I’m going

to try to weave into my answers some of the responses to the comments that lead you to the conclusion you just articulated, but I

would like to make this point.

No. 1, the two tax authorities whose opinion was central to my

effort, Professor Martin Ginsburg of Georgetown and Bernard

Wolfman of Harvard, they accepted the allegations in the indictment as being true when they did their analysis. That is how I

read and understand their opinion.

Second, the prosecutors to my left conveniently never chose to

talk about RICO. There have been references here to these defendants being exposed to being jailed for 300 years. The reason for

that was because of the RICO charge. In 1989, the Department of

Justice said that in precisely this sort of case it’s inappropriate to

rely on the racketeering statute.

Third, what they didn’t tell you is that another agency of the

U.S. Government, the Department of Energy, saw this case in precisely the opposite way that they did. The Department of Energy

analyzed these transactions in a proceeding against ARCO. ARCO

is the oil company here with which Mr. Rich was doing most of his

trading. ARCO paid millions of dollars of fines because it had failed

to link the domestic transactions in which they were engaged with

foreign oil transactions.

The prosecutors, in concluding that Rich evaded taxes on $100

million completely overlook or reject the reality that those transactions were linked to foreign transactions that involved Rich paying significantly more for oil than it was worth; and that results

in a very significant reduction of that $100 million. This is admittedly enormously complex.

But the point I want to make here is that this case was about

tax evasion, mailing wire fraud, RICO, and the violation of the

IEPA regulations involving trading with Iran. The RICO count

could never have been brought today. The Department of Justice’s

policy prohibits the use of RICO in a case like this. The mail and

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wire fraud cases could not be brought today under a line of cases

beginning with McNally in the Supreme Court of the United

States.

The tax evasion case—and I understand that these gentlemen

want to dismiss the analysis of Ginsburg and Wolfman, or dismiss

the view of the U.S. Department of Energy about what was going

on in these transactions, but there is another side to these charges;

and the point in response to your question is whether at the end

of the day you believe that their view of it is better than my view.

What I assure you is that it is my view and that discussion occupied the communication I had with the President, and it was clear

to me that he had read this material.

Mr. WAXMAN. Where did the President get this material, from

you?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. I filed this petition on December 11th.

Mr. WAXMAN. And do you know whether he had any other input

in reaching his conclusion than the petition you filed?

Mr. QUINN. Yes. I’m confident he had other input. I’m confident

of that from several facts. One, among other things, his former

Chief of Staff, Mr. Podesta, said on Nightline that this was a matter that was, in fact, vigorously debated in the White House over

a period of time. I don’t know whether he said 10 days or 2 weeks,

something to that effect.

Second, I knew in the course of dealings I had with the White

House Counsel’s Office that they were engaged in discussions with

him.

And then, third, as I think you know, I believe, that—admittedly

late, but that at some point in the process the White House Counsel’s Office consulted with the Department of Justice, in fact, with

the senior person at the Department of Justice with the responsibility for being liaison with the White House on pardon matters.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, in the next panel we’re going to go into some

of the issues of whether the President had the benefit of the analysis of others who could advise him on the merits of this case.

Mr. QUINN. That’s right. Right. I can’t tell you, by the way,

whether the intelligence agencies—I don’t know the answer to the

question who else may have participated in his deliberations on

that. I know part of the story.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, it’s my view that if a President is going to

make a decision like this, he should have the input from all the

sources and all the information that is relevant to his decisionmaking.

Your obligation as a lawyer for your client is not to provide all

of that information, but to represent your client’s case; isn’t that

correct?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. And I do feel that the application was filed

at a time that permitted—that would have allowed any consultation that one would deem necessary or appropriate.

Mr. WAXMAN. I don’t know whether the President got all the information he should have had before he made this decision. My

guess is, maybe he didn’t. I gather the President’s decision was

made because he saw the merits as you do.

From my point of view, it’s a complicated matter. My impression

from the testimony I have received is that isn’t the conclusion I

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would have reached had I been the President of the United States,

but I’m not the President.

President Clinton had the constitutional authority to evaluate

this. If he didn’t fully evaluate it, we should be critical of him. If

he made a bad decision on the merits, we should be critical of him.

But the question, it seems to me, other than being critical of his

conclusion, is, was there any wrongdoing in reaching that conclusion.

It seems to me, Mr. Quinn, from your answers you believe that

the President acted properly. One can disagree with the conclusion

that he reached, but not with the fact that he used his best judgment; isn’t that correct?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Was there any quid pro quo for gifts or campaign

contributions?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t believe so. I never had a conversation with

him about those matters. I saw no evidence of that being on his

mind when he spoke to me about the merits of this case. He said

nothing about it. And in point of fact, to a very great extent, I

didn’t know about it. So it just wasn’t part of the dialog that I had

with him.

And I have seen in my dealings with him, with the Department

of Justice and with lawyers at the White House, simply no evidence

of any of them having been mindful of those things.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Weinberg or Mr. Auerbach, are you aware, either of you, of any direct evidence that corruption was involved in

President Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich?

Mr. WEINBERG. Neither of us would. We’re in private practice.

All I can say is that from my perspective, and I’ve said this before,

I can see no legitimate reason to grant two people that were international fugitives who had renounced their citizenship with the evidence which is so overwhelming. I won’t get into the facts. But

what Mr. Quinn just said is really preposterous based on what the

evidence was at the time, you know, inflated invoices, off-the-record

transactions, people talking about pots, I mean all of that.

If that were the case, if the case were that this had no merit to

it, then one does wonder why the only alternative, according to Mr.

Quinn, is a Presidential pardon. I mean, why not just come back

and try the case? But——

Mr. WAXMAN. You just don’t see how he could have reached that

conclusion on the merits, that’s your view. Mr. Quinn has a different view.

The President had to make his decision. You think his decision

was incorrect. You don’t have any information, however, that he

reached that conclusion based on any direct evidence of wrongdoing

or corruption, do you?

Mr. WEINBERG. No. You don’t have the right people here to—I

mean, I’m talking about for me or Mr. Auerbach to weigh in on

that, it would have been nice to hear the other side of the story.

If I were the President, if I got to argue both sides, I would never

lose a case as a trial lawyer.

And in the President’s case, you would have hoped that he would

have heard from somebody that knew something about the case

from the prosecution’s side.

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Mr. WAXMAN. I would have hoped so, too. I fully support that position.

Mr. WEINBERG. I’m confident that he didn’t.

Mr. WAXMAN. You’re confident he did not?

Mr. WEINBERG. I’m confident that he did not, from my conversations with people in the Southern District, you know, and various

other people that were involved in the case.

Mr. WAXMAN. You may well be right, and I have a limited

amount of time, so I’m going to interrupt. You may well be right

that he didn’t get all sides argued as fully as he should have. He

was making a last-minute decision. There was a long list of pardons that he had to consider, some of which he denied, many of

which he granted. I don’t know how many he had before him.

But we have had other Presidents who made last-minute decisions on pardons for which we genuinely have been critical—President Bush’s pardon of Caspar Weinberger, who was going to go to

trial within weeks. And there are other pardons that were granted

that we could look at and say, how could the President have ever

reached that conclusion. It doesn’t make sense. It doesn’t appear to

be correct on the merits. But unless there’s some wrongdoing, all

we can say is what terrible judgment the President exercised.

I want to yield some of my time to my colleagues. Mr. Towns. Let

me yield to you 5 minutes.

Mr. TOWNS. I will be very brief.

Someone raised the question of ethics, Mr. Quinn, and I would

like to ask you, did you feel you violated the ethics ban by contacting the White House about the Marc Rich pardon?

Mr. QUINN. Absolutely not. And I will be happy to explain why.

Mr. TOWNS. Please, yes.

Mr. QUINN. I should tell you, in advance, that I was one of the

principal authors of that ethics regulation, and so I certainly believe I know what was intended by everything in this regulation,

having had a major hand in writing it.

This regulation specifically does not prohibit you from communicating or appearing with regard to a judicial proceeding or a

criminal or a civil law enforcement inquiry, investigation or proceeding or with regard to an administrative proceeding, to the extent that some communications or appearances are made after the

commencement of and in connection with the conduct or disposition

of the judicial proceeding.

Let me go back to the beginning of it. It allows you to communicate with regard to a judicial proceeding, etc. It doesn’t say you

can communicate in a judicial proceeding; it says you can communicate with regard to such a proceeding.

There’s no doubt in my mind that my communications on this

matter were covered by this exception. I specifically discussed this

with the White House counsel at the time, and when I drew to her

attention this exception, the discussion was over.

She appeared to be satisfied that my appearance in this matter

was covered by this exception. She is a person of terrific legal talent and integrity, and I am confident that if she disagreed with my

interpretation of this, she would have immediately brought it to my

attention.

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Mr. TOWNS. Let me ask you this: When you discussed this pardon with President Clinton, did you know the specifics of the pardon application? Did you share everything with him?

Mr. QUINN. What I can tell you, Congressman, is the conversation with him reflected a familiarity with the arguments I had

made. And in point of fact, whether Mr. Weinberg thinks it was a

good idea, a bad idea, a hollow promise or a meaningful promise,

we talked about the fact that ARCO—and God knows why they

didn’t indict ARCO, which they didn’t, which was involved in these

transactions, which in fact structured these transactions, that

ARCO with regard to these transactions was subjected to civil enforcement proceedings at the Department of Energy.

He was sufficiently aware of the argument I made that it was he

who said, but these guys—this happened a long time ago, and they

may have statute of limitations defenses or such things; and it was

at that point that I said, if you want, I will write a letter committing to waive those defenses.

In short, the conversation with him—and, again, these gentlemen and all of you may disagree whether he made the right conclusion or not, but I can tell you that based on the conversation I had

with him, it certainly appears to me—and I have no reason to

think otherwise—that he was focused on the arguments that I

made. I weighed them and evaluated them, and he made this judgment on the merits.

Mr. TOWNS. So people that are saying, you only gave him one

side of the story, you know, what do you say to them?

Mr. QUINN. Well, look, as Mr. Barr said a few minutes ago, I’m

an advocate.

Yes, I provided a document and argument as an advocate. But

I think everyone understood I was being an advocate. And let me

remind you, I did include the indictment. I didn’t obscure the indictment; I included it in my petition. It was in the documents I

filed with the White House.

And between the filing of the application on December 11, 2000,

and the granting of the pardon, on more than one occasion, I urged

the White House Counsel’s Office to seek the views of the Department of Justice. I did not do anything to circumvent them or keep

them out of the process. I encouraged them to seek the views of the

Department of Justice.

Now, should I have called Mr. Weinberg up and said, guess what,

I’m seeking a pardon; I hope you will get up here and argue

against it? Of course not. But I do not believe that I did anything

less than what was professionally responsible and ethically required.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Towns.

I want to yield to Mr. Kanjorski 5 minutes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach, you obviously have very strong

emotions on this case and you expressed that. You had the opportunity to read Mr. Quinn’s petition?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes.

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes.

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Mr. KANJORSKI. Do you feel that is a fair and adequate representation of the facts and circumstances that the President should

have had before him to make this analysis?

Mr. WEINBERG. No.

Mr. AUERBACH. Absolutely not. It is like looking at half the scoreboard and thinking you know the score in the game.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Do you think there’s any question, whether it

doesn’t rise to the level of an advocate?

Mr. WEINBERG. No. Let me make myself clear.

From an advocate’s point of view, and I’ve been in Mr. Quinn’s

position on a number of occasions, the piece he put together is an

advocate’s piece. The problem is, in my opinion, it completely

mischaracterizes what the merits of the case were.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So you had the information in your files that

should have been before the President, and therefore it was up to

Mr. Holder, the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, to

again call and get that information so that the President would be

adequately prepared to see both sides of the issue?

Mr. WEINBERG. What typically——

Mr. KANJORSKI. It’s not the President’s fault that the facts

weren’t before him. Somebody failed to provide the information, it

would seem to me.

Mr. WEINBERG. I think you will hear today what would typically

happen, in a case like this particularly, that was such a high-profile case with a fugitive, that they would seek something in detail

from the Justice Department about the case.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Well, this fugitive thing does disturb me. You

have very strong feelings that you have a definition of ‘‘fugitive,’’

and Mr. Rich and Mr. Green fit that definition. Mr. Quinn in his

petition denies that he was a fugitive. That seems to me to be a

very substantial piece of information that the President should

have had before him.

You make that point, and I think—at least on that point, you

agree that there’s something misleading in the petition here?

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, it’s not so much the petition, it’s that letter

which I hadn’t seen before.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Isn’t that an exhibit to the petition?

Mr. WEINBERG. I don’t know that it was an exhibit to the petition.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I thought Mr. LaTourette laid it out very well.

I thought he indicated it was a stark contrast in legal definition between what you categorized these two gentlemen to be and what

Mr. Quinn categorized.

Mr. WEINBERG. Right. If there’s an arrest warrant out for any of

us and we know about it and we don’t turn ourselves in, we are

fugitives.

Mr. KANJORSKI. You made a point to say that Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green have a habit of knowing how to exploit people and personalities and political relationships?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is correct.

Mr. KANJORSKI. After all, that’s what we’re here for, to find out

whether there was anything wrong or improper, or bad judgment,

as Mr. Waxman indicated.

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On the third page of Mr. Quinn’s testimony, he talks about several other lawyers—maybe I should direct this more to you, Mr.

Quinn—Mr. Garment, who served President Nixon as his White

House counsel; Larry Ferguson, who held a senior position in the

Reagan Justice Department; and Lewis ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby. Not being

at the Washington bar, I don’t know any of the three gentlemen.

Mr. Libby, I do know, who now serves as the chief of staff to the

Vice President of the United States in the present time.

What is the last time that these people were engaged in transactions representing Messrs. Rich and Green?

From what I read in your testimony, it looks like right up to the

period when you were preparing the petition, you were receiving

information, or relying on facts and information, from these lawyers; or am I to assume that you threw the switch-eroo on them

and talked to Mr. Rich? I don’t quite understand.

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. Let me answer you this way.

Since I became involved in this case, sometime I believe in the

spring of 1999, in that period—in the year 1999 when we were approaching the Department of Justice and the Southern District of

New York of the people—and if you look at appendix A of my testimony, there’s a list of all of these lawyers—— Mr. KANJORSKI. Let me understand you: You were having somebody in the Justice Department contact the Southern District, or

you were?

Mr. QUINN. I wrote a letter to the Southern District at the suggestion of the Justice Department.

Mr. KANJORSKI. This was for preparation of the legal judgment

you were going to make as to what course to pursue, whether you

were going to go for some settlement of the transaction pending in

New York and present it at that time or to go for the pardon?

Mr. QUINN. Correct. In 1999 we were focused on trying to work

out a resolution of this matter with either Main Justice or the

Southern District. And in that period of time of the people listed

in appendix A, I worked with Ms. Behan, Mr. Fink, Mr. Green, Mr.

Libby, and Mr. Urgenson. And, in fact, Ms. Behan was a partner

of mine at the time, but all the other gentlemen are the lawyers

who basically educated me initially about the case.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Do they continue to represent Mr. Rich, or up

until the time they took official capacity?

Mr. QUINN. Well, today, Mr. Libby is in government.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I understand. But up until the time he went into

the government, was he still actively representing Mr. Rich?

Mr. QUINN. He may have—he may have been part of the campaign. I don’t know precisely when, but yes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I’m not trying to highlight them, but except it’s

very peculiar, not peculiar for Washington, but anywhere else in

the United States. All of these lawyers seem to be on the Republican side of the spectrum, as opposed—I think you’re on the Democratic side, aren’t you, Mr. Quinn?

Mr. QUINN. I’m not going to crack a joke. I was told not to do

that. But, yes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. The point I’m trying to make is, obviously Mr.

Rich and Mr. Green were exercising their incredible intellectual

ability to figure out how to play the game, and they realized that

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the Republicans wouldn’t probably have the entree to the White

House or the President that a Democrat who had just recently been

chief counsel to the President would have.

Mr. QUINN. Well, Congressman——

Mr. KANJORSKI. I think that’s the suggestion the two witnesses

are making. And the point I’m trying to make is, I sort of react—

Jack, you know I like you, and I don’t want you to take this incorrectly.

I react to this idea that nobody seems to be at fault here for an

awful lot of substantial misinformation of facts and information

that should have been presented to the President of the United

States in making this determination.

Everybody is sort of saying the pot is hot, but it’s not my pot,

and you are kicking it up and finally, yes, he’s the decisionmaker,

there’s no question about it. But the important thing is whether

there was criminality, whether he made bad judgment, as Mr.

Waxman indicated or what happened, and we can’t quite get to

that, unless we attack this one other issue.

In your mind, you said you were an advocate. I find it very difficult knowing your relationship to the White House and with the

President that you were able to penetrate the natural defenses of

a high official. No different than if my chief of staff or former legislative director who was a lawyer and left my office would come to

me to present a petition, I would make the assumption that it

wouldn’t be just an advocate’s position, that they would arm me

with the negatives also. Or they would make certain at least that

they in their own mind were going to be certain that I would gain

that information that was important to make that judgment.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Kanjorski, I am going to reclaim my time because we only have a few minutes left.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Let me frame the question. Did you then or do

you now in retrospect feel that your position and your ability to

penetrate the natural defenses of the President may have caused

him the difficulty of not getting the full and thorough information

that he should have had to make a good judgment in this case?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, I do not. And if I may just add a sentence

or two, I don’t think anyone thought I was acting as anything other

than an advocate. And let me remind you, I urged them to seek the

views of the Department of Justice.

I should not be the one looked to to present the views of these

prosecutors. I was representing Mr. Rich. I did not discourage anyone from contacting the Department of Justice, the Southern District, the IRS or anyone else. In fact, I urged them to seek the

views of the Department of Justice.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Quinn, you were part of a team of lawyers representing Mr. Green and Mr. Rich?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. And Mr. Kanjorski talked about others on that

team, including a large number of prominent Republicans—Leonard Garment, William Bradford Reynolds, ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby, who is

now Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff. You were part of a

team, and they obviously were hiring prominent lawyers with some

political connections, but just prominent lawyers.

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Were you hired solely for the pardon issue, or were you part of

the team dealing with Mr. Rich’s problems much before it ever

came to the issue of a pardon?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, I was hired in, I believe it was the spring of

1999, to work on the effort to try to achieve resolution, either at

Main Justice or in the Southern District.

Mr. WAXMAN. And that did not involve the President of the

United States or your special relationship, whatever it might have

been?

Mr. QUINN. It did not. Look, I would like to think that people

think I’m a pretty good lawyer, and I would like to think that people believe that my experience in government has equipped me

with an understanding of how best to pursue a client’s interests.

Mr. WAXMAN. I’ve known you over the years and I think you’re

an excellent lawyer. I think you make a good case advocating on

behalf of your client. It appears to me that’s what you’ve done successfully.

Some of us have questions of whether the President got the other

side, which we think he should have had, and whether in the judgment he had to make, he made the right judgment. But I have no

question in my mind that you did a good job for your client.

And under the ethics of lawyers, that’s what lawyers are supposed to do: when you’re hired by a client, to advocate their side

of the case.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. We will go now to the 5-minute round.

I will start off with my 5-minute round, and I will yield part of

it to Mr. LaTourette.

First of all, let me say that you’re the one that did have access

to the President, though, and you’re the one that went directly to

him and talked to him, correct?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. OK. The other thing is, did you ever talk to Denise

Rich?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Did you talk to her about the letter that was sent

to the President asking for pardon?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. OK. So you did have correspondence or contact with

her, probably on more than one occasion?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, on a number of occasions.

Mr. BURTON. A number of occasions?

Mr. QUINN. I encouraged her and the daughters to write letters

of support.

Mr. BURTON. Sure, I understand.

Now, Ms. Rich has decided, according to her attorney and in correspondence to us, to take the fifth amendment to the Constitution

to protect herself against self-incrimination. And I think that one

of the things that you said is that other people who have a little

bit more information on what kind of influence may have been exerted on the President should testify to those facts. But you have

no knowledge whatsoever about any influence Ms. Rich might have

been able to exert on the President, other than the letters?

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Mr. QUINN. No. And I know that she mentioned this orally to the

President that she had written.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Mr. QUINN. What I know is that she mentioned it to him and

that she wrote a letter.

Mr. BURTON. I understand. The thing I think that we’re going to

have to do, since she’s exercised her fifth amendment right, is if

we’re going to find out—because in correspondence that she sent to

us, she indicated that she had given or they had—there had been

an extraordinarily large contribution, I think her attorney said

that, an extraordinarily large contribution to the Clinton library.

And so what we will probably have to do is go to the Justice Department and ask that we get her a grant of immunity so she will

have to testify at some point.

I thought I would get that on the record, because I think Ms.

Rich is probably going to be one of the key people to give us all

the information that we need.

Mr. LaTourette, I will yield the balance of the time to you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Quinn, I want to talk a little bit about where Mr. Kanjorski

was and others were, and that’s with this Executive Order 12834,

which you indicated you had something to do with writing, and I

understood that.

Actually, what drew that to my attention more than anything

else, there was a—I don’t know if you saw the Washington Post on

February 5th, but the headline, with a nice picture of you, was ‘‘In

Rich pardon case, did Quinn violate the ethics rule that he wrote?’’ Did you have a chance to read that article, sir?

Mr. QUINN. I did, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. In the article, there’s a fellow, an ethics guru— and everyone is a guru today—there’s an ethics guru up at the

New York University Law School; and we had the opportunity to

chat with him because he’s quoted in here. And his observation and

mine would be, too, if you look at 2(C)—maybe if we can put that

up so everybody can see what we’re talking about—the last paragraph, get up to the last paragraph, C, that’s the one that you were

reading to us before. You have to get to C?

[The information referred to follows:]

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151

152

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Mr. QUINN. Yes, I have it in front of me.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Good. One of the problems is that it talks

about—this is a pretty standard thing. I mean, we have it here in

Congress that our staff can’t leave and lobby us for a year, and

there are exceptions to that.

And as I understand the executive branch, it is 5 years according

to this policy that you wrote that you can’t lobby, and then there

are exceptions to what ‘‘lobby’’ means and you were citing to us an

exception. And the exception that you cited—and it’s quoted in the

article and also in your policy—that it doesn’t include communicating or appearing with regard to a judicial proceeding and then

some other things. But it’s not unqualified. It’s not unqualified.

The question I have for you, the qualification is to the extent

that such communications are made after the commencement of

and in connection with the conduct of a judicial proceeding.

Now, in order for you to have fallen—and just so the record is

clear, when did you leave the White House?

Mr. QUINN. February 1997.

Mr. LATOURETTE. So there’s no question that this conduct was

within 5 years of your leaving the White House?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. In order for your definition, and again we went

around and around on the issue of fugitivity before, and I guess we

disagree what that means, but in order for your exemption or exception to qualify, your communications had to have been made

after the commencement of and in connection with a judicial proceeding. Is it your observation that an application for a pardon by

the President of the United States is a judicial proceeding?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, and that’s not the reading I’m trying to give

this.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Mr. QUINN. And I read the Washington Post article. I understand

the point made by Mr. Gillers who, as I read the piece, was speaking about his knowledge of how these regulations are generally

drafted. I can tell you Mr. Gillers was not involved in drafting this

one, and it seems pretty clear to me that I was communicating

with regard to a judicial proceeding.

And, again, the White House counsel and I had a specific conversation about whether or not I was covered by the Executive

order. When I brought to her attention this exception, she appeared

to be satisfied that my appearance was permissible.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. My time is expired. When I get the

chance, I need to come back to this, because I still have some questions, but I thank you.

Mr. QUINN. By the way, sir, in terms of the qualification you

mentioned, there was, as you’ve heard, an indictment pending in

the Southern District of New York, so there was a judicial proceeding that had been commenced.

Mr. LATOURETTE. But your client was a fugitive from that judicial proceeding?

Mr. QUINN. Well, but it doesn’t say anything about fugitivity in

here. And you also—you know, you left out the reference to the disposition of the judicial proceeding. And I would submit to you that

a pardon is the disposition of a judicial proceeding, if anything is.

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Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. We’re about to go to Mrs. Mink.

Do any of the witnesses need a break for 5 minutes?

Mr. WEINBERG. No.

Mr. BURTON. I mean, I don’t want Mother Nature to be excluded

from the hearing.

Mr. AUERBACH. His team says, take a break.

Mr. BURTON. His team says, take a break. We don’t worry about

the lawyers in the background.

Mr. QUINN. I think we can continue.

Mr. BURTON. What we will do, just for everybody’s information,

after we get through this with panel, we will take about half an

hour so people can grab a bite to eat, then we will get back to the

next panel.

Mrs. Mink, you’re recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The hearing that we’re embarking on is specifically for the purpose of trying to find out the circumstances of this particular pardon, what the nature of the indictments were which are the basis

of this pardon, and to find out whether there were any extenuating

circumstances that could be explained that might justify the pardon, because I think most people were greatly troubled by reading

the newspaper articles about these two individuals.

But I also understand that the committee’s responsibility is basically to try to see whether any criminal conduct was engaged in,

any acts of corruption or fraud on the part of the people that came

together to produce this result. That it is not the purpose of this

committee to alter the pardon.

We have no capacity in that direction. So our inquiry, I think,

is rather limited. I have heard a lot of the questions with reference

to whether, Mr. Quinn, you had provided adequate information to

former President Clinton before he made his decision.

And one of the things that you were questioned about earlier was

to what extent, since you were first engaged as the lawyer in this

particular situation, did you discuss this matter with the Department of Justice, with the U.S. attorneys in the Southern District

of New York or other people representing the so-called prosecutorial attitudes in this case?

And if you could just describe that. I call your attention to one

letter that I have before you in your appendix that you wrote to

the Honorable Mary J. White, December 1, 1999.

Was that your first major inquiry with respect to whether the

U.S. Government had any predisposition whatsoever to negotiate,

to plea bargain, to try to come to terms with what your task was,

to see if there could be any resolution of this matter without going

to court?

Mr. QUINN. Yeah. And I’ve tried to summarize my contacts with

Justice in the Southern District in appendix B.

In essence, initially I had hoped that Main Justice would participate actively in achieving a resolution. I hoped that the Criminal

Division, Tax Division and the Deputy’s Office would either agree

to take this matter on itself for purposes of—— Mrs. MINK. My time is extremely limited. You made all of those

contacts, and the answer was always no, that they would not negoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00162 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
155

tiate; is that an accurate summarization of your work on this case

prior to them coming to the decision that the only way out was a

pardon?

Mr. QUINN. That’s fair, yes.

Mrs. MINK. So this letter to the Honorable Mary J. White was

the only communication in writing or was there a series of letters

that were written to the Department of Justice or to the Southern

District?

Mr. QUINN. Well, there were written communications with the

Southern District going—— Mrs. MINK. Other than to Mary J. White.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. Years back, but not from me, because

the answer I got from the Southern District was basically just a

wave off, saying, forget it, we don’t want to discuss it.

Mrs. MINK. This was your sole correspondence with either the

Justice Department or with the Southern District? I’m just trying

to determine how many documents like this there would be in your

appendix, since I haven’t been able to go through them all.

Mr. QUINN. With respect to the Southern District, this, I believe,

was the only written communication.

Mrs. MINK. OK.

Now, in submitting your application then to the President,

former President Clinton, with respect to the pardon, did you include this letter that you had written to Mary Jo White so that

they would have had the opportunity to understand that you had

exerted—— Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Mrs. MINK [continuing]. All that you could to try to resolve this

case and that, therefore, the last resort was to seek a Presidential

pardon? That’s all I’m trying to establish.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, ma’am, I included my letter, the one you’re referring to. I included the response I got from the Southern District.

I included, as well, the earlier letter that Mr. Urgenson had written and the response he got.

Mrs. MINK. Now I have submitted many—not many, several requests for pardons, either going through the pardoning attorney or

sometimes writing directly to the White House. And I have found

that it’s an extremely difficult process and, in fact, most of the ones

I submitted have been denied. I was very disappointed that in this

recent January 20th announcement none of the ones that I pleaded

for were successful. So I can understand the gravity of the situation.

Now, in arguing for a pardon one doesn’t try to dwell on the egregious crimes that were committed, in this case the egregious circumstances that led to the indictment 20 years ago. What one tries

to look to is were there any extenuating circumstances that might

have altered the situation when one examines the purposes of the

pardon.

And as I read the materials we have been given and listen to the

testimony, the only thing that I can really find is that the Justice

Department changed its viewpoint with respect to RICO prosecutions.

Now, to Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach, does this change of position and policy by the Department of Justice with reference to

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RICO prosecutions in your mind rise to the level of an extenuating

circumstance—— Mr. WEINBERG. No.

Mrs. MINK [continuing]. That should lead to a reconsideration of

the initial indictment?

Mr. BARR [presiding]. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The witnesses can answer the question.

Mr. WEINBERG. No, and there is a very good reason. RICO was

1 count out of 51. The guts of this case was a tax fraud case. It

had to do with $100 million worth of income, which happened to

be illegal as a result of violations of the energy regulations, that

were laundered out of the country. And it was a crime in 1983 to

not pay taxes on $100 million worth of income and to devise a

scheme to avoid paying taxes, and it’s a crime in 2000. It was a

crime in 1983 to violate the energy regulations, and the fact that

there are no regulations anymore doesn’t make the crime any less.

It was a crime to lie about it.

Mrs. MINK. That was really not my point, that it made it any

less. I asked the question as to whether the change in policy justifies consideration of the new circumstances as extenuating.

Mr. WEINBERG. I’ll answer that directly. I think not. If you’re

away for 20 years and you’re fortunate enough to be able to persuade two foreign States not to extradite you, the gloss of time is

always going to change the interpretation of the law. You can look

at indictments that were brought in 1980, and if you examine them

in 2000, the gloss of time is—you’re going to find that the courts

interpret the laws different in 2000 than they did in 1980.

But you’ve got to look at the guts of what the case was about and

these people. And when you look at the guts of what the case was

about and the people, it doesn’t make any difference whether or not

we would bring a RICO charge today. It is whether or not we

would bring a criminal charge today and whether or not it is acceptable to be pardoning folks who have done things like renouncing their citizenship, becoming fugitives, not coming back and making these arguments that they say are so clear. I mean it—was it

justified? And you can’t come in and say, well, 20 years have

passed and, you know, the courts now interpret or the Justice Department interprets the RICO statute differently.

Mr. AUERBACH. May I, Mr. Chairman, very briefly?

Mr. BARR. Yes.

Mr. AUERBACH. I’m afraid that the argument with respect to the

change in RICO policy is as disingenuous as I find the argument

with respect to fugitivity. While it is true that the Justice Department changed its view with respect to tax counts as a predicate for

RICO, it has not changed its view with respect to mail and wire

fraud as a predicate to RICO. And as Mr. Quinn knows, as the indictment reflects, there are both mail and wire fraud counts which

are predicates for RICO.

So I believe that the Justice Department might well approve this

indictment today. And I, in fact, believe that, were they to review

this indictment today, and of course they did review it before it was

brought, there would be money laundering charges in this case.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes.

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Mr. Quinn, Mr. Rich is a citizen of two countries I believe, neither of which are the United States; namely, Spain and Israel. Is

that correct?

Mr. QUINN. That’s my understanding, sir.

Mr. BARR. OK. His colleague in all this, Mr. Green, considers

himself, in addition, a citizen of Switzerland; is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. That is my understanding as well.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. And he also no longer considers himself

a citizen of the United States; is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Mr. BARR. OK. Thank you. On January 10th of this year, Mr.

Quinn, you caused to have sent to the Department of Justice two

letters, one addressed to Mr. Holder from you and the other an attachment thereto, which was a copy of a letter dated January 5th

from you to the President; is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. I know there is some dispute over whether Justice received those. Do you have your copy of the courier receipt that you

would have kept as a very meticulous lawyer at the time you

caused that document to be given to the courier for delivery?

Mr. QUINN. I have a copy of the courier receipt, and it was included in the documents I submitted to the committee. I don’t have

it in front of me.

Mr. BARR. We have—that’s not the document I’m talking about.

The document that the courier company sent back, we do have, and

they attest that they delivered to the Department of Justice. Would

you not have had—at the time you sent the document from your

law firm, as probably all of our offices do when the courier comes

to the office, you hand them the envelope, and you fill it out, and

they give you a carbon copy of the receipt. You don’t have that?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know the answer to that, sir, because I would

have to ask my assistant who handled the engaging the courier

service and having it delivered. I just don’t know the answer. I believe that——

Mr. BARR. If there was some dispute, and this is a very material

element here, when Mr. Holder knew about this, and to what extent. Have you searched your records? I notice there is some activity going on behind you with your lawyers. Do they have a copy of

that, and could you make that available?

Mr. QUINN. Well, if we had any further documentation, I’m confident it would have been included among the materials that we

provided to the committee. So I believe that the only documentation we have is that which we did provide.

Mr. BARR. Do you mind, take a moment to see what your counsel

is handing you.

Mr. QUINN. Yeah. But I don’t know exactly when this was generated. You know this—yeah, whatever we have was provided.

This—this document reflects that someone whose name is K, the

letter K, Gray accepted this document at the Department of Justice, at a Department of Justice office on January 10th.

Mr. BARR. The document that we are talking about here is three

pieces of paper, that’s correct, isn’t it?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I have two, sir.

Mr. BARR. I mean, the documents that were transmitted to DOJ.

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Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. BARR. OK. It is true, is it not, that at no time did you submit

this notebook, this petition to Eric Holder? That’s not what you are

talking about that you sent him on January 10th, correct?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct. May I make one other point about the

underlying document you’re talking about? The letter I sent to him

on January 10th—and I understand there may be some dispute as

to how many days it took to get from one Justice office where——

Mr. BARR. I’m not really worried about that right now.

Mr. QUINN. OK.

Mr. BARR. My concern is that, first of all, that the package apparently was not addressed to Eric Holder. It was just addressed

to the Department of Justice, and the document itself was not the

petition. I think there may be an impression that some people

would like to believe that on January 10th this entire severalinches-thick document was transmitted to Mr. Holder. That’s not

true, right?

Mr. QUINN. That is not true.

Mr. BARR. The only thing you gave him is a letter that said,

quote, I hope you can say you agree with this letter. Your saying

positive things, I’m told, would make this happen. Thanks for your

consideration.

And the letter to which you refer is your letter of January 5th

to the President. That’s all you sent Mr. Holder, correct?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct. But I think one thing you said is not

correct. I’m advised that my assistant addressed the envelope, not

to just the Department of Justice, but to the Deputy Attorney General.

Mr. BARR. So the courier company has made an error here, because their records reflect it was sent just to the Department of

Justice.

Mr. QUINN. Yeah, I think they’re reflecting where they made the

delivery, but the envelope——

Mr. BARR. You apparently didn’t keep a copy of the receipt when

you actually physically gave the document to the courier, at which

time they would normally give the sending person a receipt.

Mr. QUINN. Right. Right.

Mr. BARR. That’s unfortunate, isn’t it?

Mr. QUINN. Well, the point I wanted to make earlier, and I think

it’s important to make now, is I wanted Eric Holder to see this letter.

Mr. BARR. Why didn’t you want him to see the petition?

Mr. QUINN. It’s not that I didn’t want him to see the petition.

Mr. BARR. You didn’t send it to him.

Mr. QUINN. I did not send it to him. I notified him that we were

filing it with the White House. I told him this goes back to November, at the time that I hoped I would be able to encourage communication with him by the White House Counsel’s Office. And I

asked him at that time should I let the White House counsel know

in writing. He said no, just have him call me.

I—remember, Congressman, an awful lot of the materials in this

pardon application either come from the Department of Justice or

I’ve shared in one way or another with the Department of Justice.

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Now, when we get to January 10th, I want him to see this, because I want him to see the case I’m making. I’m hoping that he

will say something supportive. I wasn’t looking to have this letter

misdirected or get to him late. I think the letter reflects the fact

that I wanted him involved in the process.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. Now the Chair recognizes the gentlelady

from the District of Columbia, Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, for 5

minutes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions. One may seem marginal to this proceeding, but it is not as

far as I’m concerned. It’s about an impression that may be left from

the way this matter is being discussed here and in the press.

First, let me say that we have a question of whether or not, and

it’s been raised here before, we have the notion that we best be

leery of prejudgment. Prejudgment, I suppose, is as faulty as bad

judgment even though the facts in this case do lend themselves to

prejudgment, I must say.

I do want to compliment the President of the United States for

the way in which he has left the pardon power free from criticism

from the top. Because what I’m going to ask about has to do with

the pardon power and how we are perhaps educating the public

about that power. I approach this as a constitutional lawyer and

former civil liberties lawyer and must say I’m weary of actions or

impressions cast out on important powers or, for that matter,

rights.

Here I see a huge problem. If this committee has anything to say

to future Presidents, it probably is a word about the transparency

of the process by making it a truly adversarial process. I make everything in my office an adversarial process. If a staff member

comes, I want to hear what the other side is. It’s the only way to

save yourself from getting in trouble.

The President has said something about the time pressure at the

end. I’m sure there were a lot. Mrs. Mink said she called with—

she had some matters that she wanted considered for pardon. I had

one that I called at the last minute on. I wanted the President to

pardon seven Washingtonians who stood up during the D.C. appropriation process and are being retried for saying ‘‘Free D.C.’’ because this Congress insists upon looking at the budget passed in

the District of Columbia, which has nothing to do with any Member

of this body. And I wanted him to consider pardoning those folks.

So, at the last minute, I’m sure there was a rush of pardons.

Mr. AUERBACH. You hired the wrong lawyer.

Ms. NORTON. No. I think that there were probably weightier

matters, and I’m not sure this was one of them.

My concern is whether or not it is the position of anybody here

that a fugitive should never be pardoned. Now, we know that

whenever anyone commits a crime and the police search for them,

we all say turn yourself in. I would always say that. I can think

of very few instances when that would not be said. And in fact, routinely, people do turn themselves in. Even for the most terrible

crimes, they turn themselves in so that they can be judged one way

or the other rather than go on the lam. Of course, most people can’t

go on the lam the way Mr. Rich did.

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But I am concerned, as a person who has lived with American

justice and, of course, studied the history of American justice over

hundreds of years, there would never be a—that we leave the impression that it would never be appropriate for the President to

pardon a fugitive. I’m concerned about that as a Black person. I’m

concerned about that, frankly, having seen the awesome power of

the prosecutor, and I do not believe that prosecutorial power can

never be abused or that it can always be corrected. In fact, I consider prosecutorial power the most awesome power any individual

can hold. It is more awesome than the power of the President of

the United States, as he, himself, learned.

In your discretion is the authority to chart essentially the path

of another person’s life, one way or the other, by saying this or

that. And of course, if you are—if you do justice, as the prosecutor

is supposed to do, then, of course there’s nothing to worry about.

I don’t think the zillions of prosecutors in every part of the United

States can always be counted upon to do that.

So I just want to know if it’s a position of anybody sitting at the

table that it is never—it is never appropriate to pardon a fugitive.

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, I would never say never, because I know

of one other case, and it involves somebody that you know was a— who avoided the draft, you know, during that—during the controversial Vietnam War. And I think the pardon in that case was

appropriate. So I wouldn’t say never.

What I would say is that it’s inconceivable to me that any President would have ever considered the pardon in this case, particularly of someone who had all the resources to defend himself, had

the best lawyers in the country, who renounced his citizenship, and

who didn’t come back and answer these charges, who had his companies plead guilty. And one of the documents that Mr. Quinn

didn’t give the President was the guilty plea allocution when the

lawyers for the Marc Rich Co. stood up in 1984.

Ms. NORTON. Look, my question went simply to correcting the

possible impression. I am not suggesting by any means that this

was an appropriate case for pardon. I do know that people look at

these hearings. I also know that people look at these televised

court proceedings and that these proceedings are on ‘‘Dateline

NBC’’ and ‘‘60 Minutes,’’ and that all the time we hear of cases

where there have been extraordinarily overzealous prosecutors.

And the end of the story is that some poor person was subjected

to prosecution and went through due process. And anybody looking

at that ‘‘Dateline NBC’’ or anybody looking at that ‘‘60 Minutes’’

would have thought that was a case of overzealous prosecutorial

authority.

So I’m certainly not talking about this case. I am telling you you

are educating the American public about what a President can do

or even should do, and I just want that to be on the record.

Now I have another question.

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. The gentlelady’s time has expired about

a minute and a half over. But we’ll get back to you.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Would you like to respond?

Mr. AUERBACH. Over the course of years as a defense lawyer, I

myself have encountered overzealous prosecutors. I don’t believe we

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were that at all. And I believe that since I left the U.S. Attorney’s

Office in 1987, there have been 13 years of other prosecutors who

have had the opportunity to reflect on this case. And Mr. Rich and

Mr. Green, each time they approached the office and I had the opportunity to provide input, were never talking about arranging to

come back and avail themselves of the judicial process. They were

talking about getting a free pass, and we never said to them you

have to come back and go to jail. We said simply you have to come

back and face the charges.

And so whether it is ever appropriate for a President to consider

pardoning a fugitive, I think in a case in which the fugitive is given

an opportunity to negotiate, as tab F to the pardon application reflects, it is a letter to Mr. Urgenson from the Justice Department,

they were amenable to talking about the terms under which Marc

Rich and Pinkie Green could come back to the United States to face

charges, to avail themselves of the judicial system, to make all the

arguments that were made to the President. And that is the problem with this case. They chose not to do that.

Mr. WEINBERG. One sentence. In response to your specific question, Congresswoman, I don’t, and I don’t think anybody on this

panel believes that we should entertain or consider in any way limiting the power of the President to pardon anyone. I mean, that is

the ultimate act of mercy that was left to the President by the

founders. And I don’t think any—this committee or any of us

should tamper with it. We are only here commenting on what we

believe was an ill-considered exercise of that pardon power in this

particular case.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Weinberg. Do you have a real brief

comment, Mr. Quinn?

Mr. QUINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s the position of my client that he remained outside the United States because what Mr.

Weinberg earlier described to you as, in essence, a simple tax evasion case was also made into a RICO case. And he may choose to

say it was only one count in the indictment, but it was the sledgehammer that brought about the current impasse.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Quinn, as I’ve watched you, you tried

to put a good face on this pardon application. But as I look at this

application and as I listen to your testimony, everything about it

seems sleazy. You have a fugitive from justice, and that is clear he

was a fugitive from justice. I think Mr. LaTourette nailed that one

pretty good.

It’s clear he traded with the enemy. But your point is somehow

it’s not illegal. But it’s clear to us that Mr. Rich traded with Libya

when we had the embargo. He traded with Iran when we had the

U.S. hostages being held captive. He traded during the 12 years

with Iraqi—with Iraq when we had our conflict. He traded grain

with the Soviet Union when we had an embargo. He traded with

South Africa with the apartheid government when we had that embargo. He traded with Cuba. And it’s likely that assets were held

in the process. So he’s a fugitive from justice who basically traded

with the enemy.

Now we’ve had some portray you as just a lawyer doing your job,

and I need to understand why I should think of you as just a lawVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00169 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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yer. When President Clinton took office, he said, if you work for the

White House, you don’t lobby the White House for 5 years. You

were the lawyer who had the contact with this President to get him

to do something in my judgment that is unexplainable.

So what I want to know is why should I view you as just a lawyer doing your job when you were counsel to the President and you

were hired specifically because you had his ear?

Mr. QUINN. I was hired initially to deal with the Department of

Justice, not with the President. That’s my understanding of why I

was brought into this matter, and I operated there to try to bring

about a resolution of this.

You and I see this very differently. I accept that. But I think the

job I did was professional. It addressed the indictment. It didn’t address the other matters you’ve raised, which were not the subject

of the indictment.

Mr. SHAYS. But you also served the President of the United

States. Don’t you have some loyalty to the President; and if not to

this President, to the Office of President? I mean, you were advocating that basically someone be given a pardon who was a fugitive

who traded with the enemy, and you said that wasn’t of concern

to you. Then I asked should it be of concern to the President? And

then you said probably. Didn’t you have some obligation to at least

inform him that there were these accusations?

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Shays, when I got into this case, I came to believe, as I believe today, the indictment was flawed. I came to believe much later that was a reasonable basis upon which to request

a pardon. You don’t see it that way.

Mr. SHAYS. I think legally——

Mr. QUINN. I accept that.

Mr. SHAYS. Legally as a lawyer you could justify it. But you

weren’t just a lawyer. You were the President’s former counsel who

I think he held you in some trust. For instance, more misleading

things in your application. I have a university president in my district who has contacted us to say his letter thanking Mr. Rich for

a $25,000 contribution was in no way related to a pardon. He was

doing the pro forma thing. And we know others did the same thing.

That was misleading. You were trying to present this man as a

man of character. But in response to my questions about his character, in fact your entire application is about character, all four corners deals with character. And yet when it comes to trading with

the enemy, you don’t want to talk about character.

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Shays, I presented the facts as I saw them, the

legal arguments that I thought justified this pardon. I encouraged

the White House to seek the views of the Department of Justice.

I started doing that long before January 19th. I did not try to keep

the White House or the President from obtaining information——

Mr. SHAYS. But you tried to mislead——

Mr. QUINN. I did not.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. Because you missed——

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. SHAYS. The way you tried to mislead is you suggested he

wasn’t a fugitive when he was. You suggested that it wasn’t illegal

trade, but it was illegal trade. You’re just trying to say that someVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00170 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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how he wasn’t an American, but he was. And so as an American,

he traded illegally with these countries. That’s misleading.

Mr. QUINN. It might be misleading—— Mr. SHAYS. It’s misleading.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. If you were correct about the underlying

legal argument. But I see it a different way. And I don’t frankly

think it’s fair to attack my character when I—when what I did was

act as an advocate on the basis of a good faith belief I had. You

may not agree with me. I understand you agree with me about

none of that. But I acted professionally and honorably and ethically.

Mr. SHAYS. The president in our university in our district doesn’t

think you acted professionally because he thinks you misused his

letter to give the impression that he was supporting his character.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Quinn, you in an answer earlier, I think it was to one of Mr.

Shays questions, you started to say that you—now correct me if I’m

wrong—you learned—one of the ways you learned about this case

was from Mr. Cheney. Do you remember that?

Mr. QUINN. No, no, no. No, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. What did you say?

Mr. QUINN. I mentioned a number of lawyers who, when I was

initially approached about coming into the case, had educated me

about the background and the legal arguments. One of them happens to be Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff, but his name is

Mr. Libby.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. And what part did he play in informing you

about the case?

Mr. QUINN. A major role. He was one of a number of lawyers,

the other being Mike Green and Larry Urgenson and Bob Fink who

had worked on the case, as I understood it, for at least a decade,

perhaps longer, and with whom I spent a great deal of time having

them walk through all of the particulars of the indictment and educate me about their responses to it.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And the gentleman knows—he’s presently Vice

President Cheney’s chief of staff?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So did he agree with your opinion that these

charges were of such a nature that perhaps he—Mr. Rich should

be pardoned, or did you ever get there?

Mr. QUINN. No. It wouldn’t be fair for me to bring him that far

along, because he was not part—he had gone into the government

at that point. What I can say, I believe, is that he agreed that the

indictment was flawed and that the charges didn’t have merit.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, when you initially came up and you gave

your opening statement, you talked about representing your clients

to the best of your ability based upon the oath that you took. We

all as lawyers take similar oaths in various States. And one of the

things I think that we all try to do, and I was a defense counsel

for about 18 years, is that we believe in fairness. And I’m just wondering, when I look at the—listen to the testimony of Mr. Auerbach

and Mr. Weinberg, for them not to be able to present their side of

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the case, I mean do you think that’s fair? I mean, it sounds like

they were probably the two individuals who were most familiar

with the case, I mean from the prosecutorial side, that is.

Mr. QUINN. Well,——

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I’m not saying it was your duty to bring

them in. I’m just asking, do you think that’s fair for a President

to make a determination when these gentlemen had worked years

with regard to this matter?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t think, sir, it’s really for us to decide whether

it’s these gentlemen or somebody else in the prosecutor’s office. I

encouraged the White House to seek the views of the Department

of Justice. I encouraged those specifically to speak to the official of

the Department of Justice who’s responsible for liaison with the

White House on pardons. And I think that was what in fairness I

needed to do. As to who in the chain of command after that might

be brought into the process I think is not for me to decide.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I see. One of the things that concerns me about

this pardon is that I think anybody who is sitting in this audience

or anybody who is watching this at home, you know, when the little guy, when the Department of Justice comes after the little guy,

the guys that I used to represent, they tear their lives apart, I

mean rip them apart. They can’t afford the Mr. diGenovas, the

great lawyers, as he is and others. They do the best they can. They

spend all of their money. Their reputations are tarnished. Even if

they’re found not guilty, friends are brought in, FBI goes into their

homes, subpoenas are issued.

And when people look at Mr. Rich and others who apparently

goes off to another country, they’ve got the money to do so, and it

appears as if they’re evading the process. The little guys that I represent and the women, you know, they really have a problem with

that, because they sit here and they say, wait a minute, you know,

I’m sitting in jail for 20 years. And it does not even compare. I

mean, I may have done one-millionth of what was allegedly done

here, but I’m sitting in jail. And I didn’t have the money to go off

somewhere else. I didn’t have the money to do that. I didn’t have

the money to hire the big time lawyers. So it does concern me.

And President Bush a few—a week or so ago when he met with

the Congressional Black Caucus said something that I will never

forget. He said he is concerned about the idea that a lot of people,

and he was particularly talking about African American people, believe that there are two systems of justice. And he—it troubled him

that in this American system that he believes in and he supports,

that he knows that there are people who really believe in that.

Then when you see something like this happen, don’t get me

wrong, I understand the President has the right to pardon whoever

he wants to pardon, I understand that, but it does concern me that

we have a situation with folks who will go outside the country and

then are able to basically, for all intents and purposes, evade the

system.

And it’s one thing to go to trial. It’s one thing to stay here and

face the music. It’s one thing to be found not guilty. It’s a whole

other thing, in my opinion, when somebody, because they have the

money, can go outside the country and evade the system. I tell you

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it really concerns me because my constituents have a major problem with that, and I do, too.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired. It’s a powerful

statement there, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Quinn, I believe you recognize these incidents, but you sort

of flip-flopped on the citizenship issue of Mr. Rich. You said on

NBC’s Meet the Press that the client was a citizen, and later you

said to the Wall Street Journal that he was mistaken. And then

you referred the questions about the matter to Robert Fink. Just

what is it? What is he? Is he Bolivian? Is he Spanish? Is he a citizen of the United States? He’s been all three, apparently.

Mr. QUINN. I did misspeak when I was on Meet the Press. Not

purposefully, inadvertently. And upon finding out that I had

misspoken, I promptly faxed a letter to Mr. Russert letting him

know that I had misspoken.

The pardon application itself is accurate as to his citizenship. I

misspoke because at some point in the early days of being involved

in this matter, I had heard discussion about the effort to renounce

his citizenship and the position on the part of the U.S. State Department that in fact the renunciation was, in the Department’s

view, ineffective and that it regards him as a U.S. citizen.

I misspoke because, again, this was not among the elements of

the indictment that I was assisting in trying to resolve. And I

frankly just didn’t have the facts straight when I was on Meet the

Press, and I apologized for that.

I understand—nor, by the way, have I been engaged by Mr. Rich

or anyone else on this aspect of his legal affairs. So I wasn’t working for him on this citizenship issue before, and I’m not working

for him on this issue now.

Mr. HORN. Well, I understand that the pardon application has

his citizenship status listed as Spanish and Israeli.

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. HORN. And was that your doing?

Mr. QUINN. Well, yes. And that was his position.

Mr. HORN. In other words, it wasn’t Mr. Behan’s or Mr. Fink’s.

I take it, you did that.

Mr. QUINN. No, I can’t say that. I mean, who drafted that particular part of it?

Mr. HORN. Yeah.

Mr. QUINN. I did not.

Mr. HORN. Did you do any research to determine whether that

information was accurate and complete?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I never thought I had to do research because

it was my understanding that was how he regarded himself.

Mr. HORN. Well, we’ve got various newspaper columns that says

he’s a citizen of Bolivia. Is that accurate?

Mr. QUINN. Not to my knowledge. But, again, I’m not engaged

to represent him in connection with citizenship issues. And I don’t

want to mislead you. I don’t understand that to be the case. But

I don’t have the knowledge to give you a concrete answer to that.

Mr. HORN. Well, since it wasn’t added on the pardon and it was

only the Spanish and Israelis, but Bolivia was left off——

166

Mr. QUINN. Right.

Mr. HORN [continuing]. I would have my feelings hurt if I was

a Bolivian.

Mr. QUINN. All I can tell you is that the information provided to

me did not include anything about Bolivia.

Mr. HORN. Did you make the President aware that Mr. Rich had

renounced his U.S. citizenship?

Mr. QUINN. I did not.

Mr. HORN. Don’t you think you should have to protect him before

he decides do I give this man a pardon or don’t I?

Mr. QUINN. Again, I didn’t—I understand that, from the point of

view of appearances, we all might agree that is an element that

has helped inflame the reaction to this pardon. I was focused on

the indictment against these men and what I thought to be the

shortcomings in that indictment. So I did not focus on that chapter

of his life, and I did not bring it to anyone’s attention.

Mr. HORN. You’ve said Mr. Rich isn’t a fugitive, and you also say

he renounced his citizenship, I believe. So why would he have been

obtaining other citizenships and renouncing his U.S. citizenship

unless he were running from the indictment?

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, and I’m not trying to be evasive here,

I have not been engaged on these issues. I was focused on the indictment, the charges in it, and the responses that our legal team

had to those charges. I have not been engaged by him to work on

citizenship issues, and I feel uncomfortable making representations

to you that I can’t be certain of.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Auerbach, do you believe attempting to renounce

one’s citizenship should be relevant to considering a pardon application?

Mr. AUERBACH. I certainly do, Congressman. One of the things

that concerns me, and I have great regard for Mr. Quinn, but I

have the impression with respect to a related issue, the issue of

fugitivity that Beth Nolan raised, the concern that Mr. Rich was

in some sense a fugitive, and that Mr. Quinn explained why he was

not. It was hard for me to believe that any of us could think that

in no sense was Marc Rich a fugitive. So there were, I believe, time

after time in this process important factual issues that Mr. Quinn

did not advise the President of, and it may have been because he

was himself unaware of the facts. But I sure wish the President

had the facts when he made his decision.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Weinberg, do you agree with that?

Mr. WEINBERG. I do. The reason, by the way, that he renounced

his citizenship in 1983 and tried to become a citizen of Bolivia,

which was the first place, was to avoid extradition. That was the

whole point, is that he took the position he wasn’t a citizen and

therefore we couldn’t extradite him. And the United States—and

the State Department—it was like an Abbott and Costello thing.

The State Department said, no, we don’t recognize that. Rich and

Green said, no, we’ve renounced our citizenship. That was all part

of their effort to avoid extradition in this case.

Mr. HORN. What would be the implication for the taxes for Mr.

Rich?

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, I’m not——

Mr. BURTON. We’ll let you answer that.

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Mr. WEINBERG. I’m not here to give that kind of advice. But if

Mr. Rich were in fact—I suppose when he heard on television from

Mr. Quinn that he was a citizen, I’m sure it did concern him

whether or not he had a problem over the last 20 years. I suspect

that, without knowing it, that Mr. Quinn got a call the next day

saying, no, I’m not a citizen because I believe that there are some

very significant tax implications if he’s been a citizen all these

years.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Do you think it was the next day or 15 minutes later?

Mr. WEINBERG. I’m not sure.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think it’s clear to all of us who have been observing and listening to these hearings that Presidential power to grant commutation

and pardons is absolute. There is no question about it. The President has the power to make those decisions and that determination, and that Congress likewise has no power to change, alter, or

do anything except know that those decisions have been made.

And so one probably would have asked why the hearing. I think

that question has been asked. I also think that you’ve answered it,

Mr. Chairman. I agree with you that the public has the right to

know, although sometimes, out of these hearings, you wonder what

it is that the public has actually learned. And that is we get a

great many facts, but we also get a great many opinions. I mean,

we get feelings. We get what people think. And of course we all

have a right to what it is that we think and what it is that we feel.

And I think that this has been very instructive, especially to the

current President and to future Presidents that they could use this

discussion when they get ready to make decisions and determinations about future pardons.

One of the things, though, that we also get is we get insinuations; that is, projections and feelings that, because somebody did

one thing, somebody else may have done something else. And the

question of Denise Rich has been brought into the discussion,

knowing that she made contributions to Democratic politics and

that she has supported the Presidential Library.

But I think it’s also important to note that she is the former wife

of Mr. Rich. And while people often part amicably, I would suspect

that there are just as many who don’t. I don’t necessarily know an

awful lot of former wives who are advocates for their former husbands or former husbands who are advocates for their former

wives.

So my question, Mr. Quinn, to you: Is there any reason for you

to believe that there is any connection between the contributions

that Mrs. Rich has made and the ultimate decision to pardon her

former husband?

Mr. QUINN. None of the conversations I had with the President,

anyone working at the White House, or anyone in the Department

of Justice give me any reason to believe that this was decided on

anything other than what the President thought to be the merits.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. I would also like to ask Mr. Weinberg

and Mr. Auerbach if you have feelings about that question as well.

168

Mr. WEINBERG. I mean, I have feelings, but I obviously have no

information. And the problem I have with all of this is that it’s the

appearance. I mean, you know Mr. Quinn’s intimacy with the

President, you know Mrs. Rich’s contributions, in my opinion, the

lack of any merit whatsoever in the application, the fact that he

was a fugitive and renounced his citizenship. I was asked can I see

any legitimate reason for the pardon? And the answer is, no, I

don’t. Do I know that there was anything illegal, any wrongdoing?

No, I don’t.

I have no idea why the President did this. I just don’t think—

I disagree with Mr. Quinn. I really don’t think he did it on the merits of the case because he chose not to apparently seek anything

of any substance from anybody on the prosecution side that knew

about the case.

Mr. AUERBACH. I would note that, as Congressman Cummings

said, part of the problem here is the perception of inequality. And

I have to believe that Denise Rich’s extraordinary contributions

and connection to the White House and Mr. Quinn’s very special

place of trust and confidence in the President’s eyes gave Marc

Rich the kind of extraordinary access to the White House and to

the ultimate decisionmaker that virtually nobody else in the country and perhaps in the world could have achieved. And to have

made a decision in a fashion which seems so insulated from critical

facts is ultimately very troubling.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you. That leads to my second

question, which is simply, there has been a great deal of discussion

about going directly to the White House or appealing directly to the

President as opposed to submitting the petition through the Justice

Department. Is there anything in either one of your minds that

would be legally, morally, or ethically wrong with taking that approach to get the petition in front of the ultimate decisionmaker?

Mr. WEINBERG. From Mr. Quinn’s perspective, in other words,

the perspective of an advocate, no, I don’t. And I also don’t believe,

just so the record is clear here, that, you know, there should be any

limitation whatsoever in the pardon power. In other words, I don’t

think Congress can—I mean, it’s a constitutional right—limit in

any way that power or require the President to go through or require application to be done in a particular way.

I just think the problem in this case is that because it was such

a high profile case and because Mr. Rich on his face was so unsuited for a pardon for the reasons that the various Congressmen

and women have set forth that, at a minimum, I would have

thought that the President would have sought out in some detail

information from the prosecution side as to why in this case this

person who had chosen to thumb his nose at the system for such

a long period of time would get the ultimate act of mercy.

Mr. BURTON. Go ahead.

Mr. AUERBACH. I understand that Mr. Quinn wrote the rules and

perhaps, therefore, has special insight as to how to interpret what

his authority was. But I think that the principle is that one does

develop special relationships of trust and that one ought not to be

drawing on those special relationships so soon after leaving that

position of trust.

169

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Mr. Quinn. If no answer, thank you, Mr.

Chairman. That concludes my questions. I just say I think maybe

these proceedings should be given to all future candidates who run

for President, maybe the first thing they ought to read.

Mr. BURTON. If I might, if the gentleman will yield since he’s out

of time real quickly, one of the things we want to do with this hearing, as the other hearing we had on the Puerto Rican terrorist, is

to make sure that future Presidents do think about all these things

before they make these decisions because Congress will look into

them.

We have been asked by counsel for Mr. Quinn if we would like

to take the 30 minutes now. But if we do that, we want the panel

to return because we do have more questions for this panel. So unless there’s objection.

Mrs. Morella, would you like to go ahead and take your 5 minutes? OK. We’ll allow.

Mrs. MORELLA. Gentleman, will you persevere for 5 minutes?

Mr. BURTON. We’ll allow Mrs. Morella to take her 5 minutes, and

then we’ll take—— Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. One second.

Mrs. MORELLA. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. I know she’s anxious to get started. All I want to

say is that we will take a 30-minute break right after this, and I

would like for everybody to be as punctual as possible because we

do have a lot of ground to cover.

Mrs. Morella.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, in conjunction with my responsibilities as chair of the District of Columbia

Subcommittee, I have a series of meetings within this time, which

is why I very much appreciate the courtesy of allowing me just to

ask a few questions now.

I know a lot has been covered. But I also noted, Mr. Quinn, that

with the pardon application were a list of letters of support of Mr.

Rich. And I—yet I notice in exhibit 97, we have a list of some of

the—maybe exhibit 97 could be put on the screen. It has a list of

those letters of support. And it’s entitled ‘‘Letters Expressing Support For the Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich.’’ But then when information

was brought to this committee in exhibit 98, it says ‘‘Letters of

Support For Marc Rich and Foundation.’’ The same names are

there. So I’m rather curious about why the change of the title, letters of support of the pardon versus letters of support for Marc

Rich and Foundation.

[Exhibits 97 and 98 follow:]

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171

172

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know who made that change. And I accept responsibility for anything filed in my name. I will tell you that, for

the most part, I was not involved in the effort to gather these letters. I became aware after the petition had been filed that some of

these letters were sought simply as testimonials to his charitable

activities and that some of the people from whom they were sought

were not told in advance that these letters were going to be used

from a pardon application. I very much regret that. And to the extent that, as a result, any of that was misunderstood or was misleading, I certainly apologize for it.

Having said that, I do think that they are what they are and

they are—there are a good many of them that are addressed to the

pardons and others which are just addressed to his charitable activities.

Mrs. MORELLA. I know initially when I read about the situation,

I thought, my lord, you have a Prime Minister and you have academia, other foundations writing their letters of commendation actually in support. And then later on, as you’ve alluded——

Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Mrs. MORELLA [continuing]. There were articles in the paper that

said these were simply letters of acknowledgment of contributions

that had in fact been made. But I think my colleague Congressman

Shays, I think, probably referred to one of his constituent groups,

Sacred Heart Academy in Fairfield, CT, actually university, and

the President Anthony Cernera said that it was the—a letter that

was just a routine thank you written in acknowledgment.

Mr. QUINN. Yeah.

Mrs. MORELLA. So I think—maybe this is exactly what you’re

saying, it comes off as very deceptive.

Mr. QUINN. I understand that. Again, I’m accepting responsibility. It’s something I wish I had been aware of at the time. At a

minimum, those letters would have been more accurately described. But I’m not going to make excuses. I’m here to both press

my case, but also take responsibility for anything that shouldn’t

have happened—that happened the way it shouldn’t have. And I

accept responsibility for that.

Mrs. MORELLA. We were certainly disappointed, distressed, felt it

was very deceptive, but I appreciate your commenting on the fact

that you would not have done this.

Mr. QUINN. I certainly would not.

Mrs. MORELLA. And you regret it happened.

Mr. QUINN. I can assure you I did not know it before the fact.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you. I’m done.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentlelady yield since she has a few seconds?

Mrs. MORELLA. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Did you read the letters?

Mr. QUINN. I can’t say I read each and every one of them, no,

sir.

Mr. BURTON. Did you read any of them?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, certainly.

Mr. BURTON. So you knew those letters were in the information

being sent to the President asking for pardon?

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Mr. QUINN. Oh, I knew there were letters being included. There

was no letter that came to my attention before we filed it which

signaled to me that it was something that we might be

mischaracterizing it.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I mean this letter from this university president thanking him for the $25,000, did you read that letter?

Mr. QUINN. I did not.

Mr. BURTON. You did not read that letter. Thank you. Just 1 second.

Mr. QUINN. By the way, since you mentioned the Prime Minister,

the Prime Minister knew what this was about of course.

Mrs. MORELLA. So did he write on behalf of the pardon?

Mr. QUINN. Prime Minister Barak?

Mrs. MORELLA. Barak.

Mr. QUINN. He spoke to the President on several occasions about

it in support of it.

Mrs. MORELLA. And Mr. Rich had given significant contributions

to a number of the foundations in Israel.

Mr. QUINN. Yes. And it’s my understanding that the Prime Minister believed that at least some of his charitable giving in Israel

was constructive in the peace process.

Mr. BURTON. If the gentlelady would let me—yield to me for one

last question.

Mrs. MORELLA. Yes, I do.

Mr. BURTON. One of the things that we want to do is have confidence in what you say, Mr. Quinn. And it’s troubling to me that,

if you were not very thorough in looking at these letters, how can

we have confidence in any of the other things that have dealt with

this issue?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I’m trying to be very careful to testify as to

the—only those things I know about. But the questions——

Mr. BURTON. But you put the petition together and you sent it

to the President.

Mr. QUINN. But not all by myself.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I know, but you were responsible for it. You

were the attorney that was putting it to the President. I mean, you

sent to the President information that you didn’t look at thoroughly, is that what you’re telling us?

Mr. QUINN. I’m not trying to leave you with that impression. I

was focused on the legal arguments in this case. Frankly, the letters of support I thought were necessary and useful but not central

to this petition. So I did not read each and every one.

Mr. BURTON. Well, counsel reminds us that the first 20 pages of

your petition was about the character of Mr. Rich and I think this

was—was this a part of that? This was a part of that. So it seems

that would have been something that you would have taken a good

look at before you sent it to the President.

Mr. QUINN. Right. And I certainly went over carefully the first

20 pages.

Mr. BURTON. OK. We will stand in recess for 30 minutes. I hope

everyone will be back here by about 20 after 2.

[Recess.]

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Mr. BURTON. If everyone would take their seats. Things always

seem to speed up as we get further along, so we may be able to

conclude this by 4, 4:30 with the second panel.

Mr. LaTourette, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that Mr. Quinn is going

to be with us on the next panel, too?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, Mr. Quinn will be on the next panel, too.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It is a long day for you, I’m sorry, Mr. Quinn,

because I want to get back to that Executive order, but while I still

have the prosecutors here, there was a series of questions that I

wanted to ask.

When I was watching the—I don’t know if it was the Sunday

shows or the Tuesday shows or the all-day, all-the-time cable network, a point was made that we should take heart here, because

even though that Mr. Rich wasn’t going to be prosecuted criminally, he was still going to waive any defenses that he had to civil

penalties.

It reminded me a little bit of the impeachment discussion that

was had on Capitol Hill a few years ago. You know, don’t do the

articles of impeachment because the President will face charges

after he leaves office. And the way that I remember the news accounts—and maybe you can help me if I am wrong, Mr. Quinn—

but it seemed to me there was a conversation between you and

then-President Clinton on January 19th, if I understood those accounts right——

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE [continuing]. Where this issue was discussed.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And if we go through it, you submitted your

application. You talked to Bruce Lindsey. He was afraid they were

fugitives. You told him that they weren’t fugitives, based upon your

understanding of what a fugitive was. And then the President said,

well, you know what, I’m a little concerned they are not going to

face any regulation by anybody, so can you fax me over something

that says they will waive any statute of limitations difficulties relative to civil penalties. Is that pretty much what happened?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. So the President was at least of the opinion,

after reading your application, that there still should be something.

And the reason that I wanted to talk about this for just a few minutes is that I saw either a news account, either read it or saw it,

that there is another attorney representing Mr. Rich, a fellow by

the name of Mr. C. Michael Green. Are you familiar with Mr.

Green?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Green is quoted someplace advising the

media saying that Mr. Rich doesn’t have any civil responsibilities

left. And I thought I understood either Mr. Weinberg or Mr.

Auerbach or both saying that this is what we used to call in law

enforcement a soup sandwich. There is no substance to the fact

that there is anything he is coming back for.

175

So, I guess I would ask you, Mr. Weinberg, if he were to come

back is there any civil penalty that now flows as a result of this

investigation to Mr. Rich personally?

Mr. WEINBERG. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were they extinguished in the course of that $150 million or whatever—— Mr. WEINBERG. There never were any personally. Those were

corporate responsibilities that were extinguished when we received

a total of $200 million at the time of this global resolution with the

companies. That is as empty a promise as I have ever seen.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Auerbach, do you have a different opinion?

Mr. AUERBACH. No, it is absolutely correct. This is a hollow

promise.

Mr. QUINN. May I respond?

Mr. LATOURETTE. I was going to ask you next. Do you have a different opinion?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, I do, and I had a different understanding at the

time I made the commitment. I think Mr. Auerbach and Mr.

Weinberg are referring to the tax side of the equation here. Let me

back up a couple of steps.

A central part of the argument for the indictment involved these

transactions with ARCO that I described to you earlier.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right. Right.

Mr. QUINN. And we took the position and continue to take the

position that the basic—one of the central flaws of the indictment

was the failure to understand the linkage between these domestic

and foreign transactions and, indeed, the conclusion of the agency

charged with implementing and overseeing the energy regulation— the price control regulations in question, a conclusion that was precisely contrary to that of the prosecutors in New York, namely that

ARCO and not Rich had failed to properly account for the transactions. In fact, the Department of Energy concluded that Rich

properly accounted for the transactions.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I remember reading that. Is it your—but do

you agree with the—C. Michael Green that Mr. Rich doesn’t have

any civil responsibilities?

Mr. QUINN. I’m trying to get there.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Go ahead.

Mr. QUINN. In this connection, it is certainly my understanding

that they have always maintained they never did anything wrong,

either from the DOE point of view or an IRS point of view. But it

was my understanding when I made that commitment that the Department of Energy could reopen the matter if it chose to. And

that, for example, if they concluded now, contrary to their earlier

conclusion, that Rich improperly accounted, that there could be

penalties that would attach to that, for example, for aiding and

abetting the misreporting of these transactions to the agency.

So the commitment was made in good faith. I don’t know what

the outcome of that proceeding might be or whether it would take

place.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Let me say I don’t have any problem with

what you did in good faith. The question is—the President was concerned about whether this guy was a fugitive. No, he is not a fugitive. The President apparently said, even after reading all of this

176

stuff, knowing he’s not a fugitive, ‘‘I would like him to be subject

to something.’’ So he got a letter saying, OK, if he comes back he

will waive the statute of limitations.

I guess I would go back to you gentlemen. What did the President get when he got that letter saying he would waive that statute of limitations?

Mr. WEINBERG. He got an empty promise. Because there is no individual civil liability for what this indictment was about that I am

aware of, or ever was aware of. I mean, as far as the individuals

were concerned, in my opinion it was never about money. It was

about money as far as the corporations were concerned. But when

Mr. Williams—when Edward Bennett Williams came into my office

before the indictment and offered $100 million to resolve everything and have no charges against Mr. Rich and Green, I told him

then and I think every office told every other lawyer who came in

for Marc Rich, that it wasn’t about money for them.

And that promise, like some of the other things in the application, just is very empty.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Auerbach.

Mr. AUERBACH. Related and beyond this, the civil liabilities were

fully extinguished. They were corporate liabilities. They were fully

extinguished in 1984. And a number of times Mr. Quinn has referred to ARCO and the Department of Energy’s treatment of

ARCO.

I would make several points. First of all, ARCO cooperated with

our investigation. They were a cooperating witness, and Congress

has specifically provided for different treatment for people who cooperate.

Second, with respect to the excerpts that appear at tab E in the

pardon application that are extracts from the Department of Energy proceedings, they refer to the fact that Marc Rich & Co. International accounted for transactions on their books in a particular

way.

One of the points we have made this morning and one of the

points that was evident in the guilty pleas of these companies is

what they put on the books was not the reality, and I do not believe that the Department of Energy ever concluded that Marc Rich

had treated these transactions properly.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Lewis has not yet asked questions. Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Quinn, being an advocate for your client before the former

President, as you said earlier, it isn’t the same as a legal proceeding where arguments are made on both sides of a case. It is different. You know, in those instances, you have the prosecution

make their case and the defense make their case.

So do you feel that when you made your case before the former

President, that as a friend and as a former counsel to the President

that you owed him more information that would allow him to make

a good decision? That wouldn’t put him in the position of probably

where he wouldn’t want to be making a decision like that on his

last day in office and to be remembered for that decision? Is that—

177

do you feel like you maybe should have told him more now that he

could have maybe made a better decision?

Mr. QUINN. I do not think I failed in my responsibility to anyone,

including to the former President. The thing I believe was most important in this regard was that I forthrightly, and on more than

one occasion, urged the lawyers in the White House working for the

former President to contact the Department of Justice. I think that

discharged my responsibility, because I think if there was to have

been a presentation in as much depth as anyone wanted that was

the place it should come from.

Mr. LEWIS. Did the former President ask a lot of questions or did

he ask for more information from you? Do you think he was trusting you totally for the information that he needed? Because evidently he did not pursue this any further with the Justice Department.

Mr. QUINN. I do not believe that he relied entirely on my representation of the case and our arguments against it. It is my impression that there was a robust debate about this in the White

House Counsel’s Office. I’m not privy to—— Mr. LEWIS. Did they have more information to provide the President than what the Justice Department would have?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know, sir. But I do believe that the application was discussed with some thoroughness. I am not privy to those

conversations, and so I don’t know the precise nature of them. But

I am as confident as I can be that the President did hear from people who disagreed with my application.

And, again, I believe I discharged my responsibility to him when

I urged the White House counsel to contact the Department of Justice and when, at the same time, I made efforts to alert the Department of Justice that this matter was being considered and, again,

in the hope that I would get some constructive involvement, positive involvement on their part.

But with both the White House lawyers and the Department of

Justice, I was pushing them to be engaged in this process.

Mr. LEWIS. Do you think the President—and I’m asking you to

make a judgment here—have you talked to the President since that

pardon and how—does he feel like he’s made a mistake now? That

it was a wrong decision? That he shouldn’t have done it because

of the information that is out there now?

Mr. QUINN. That is not my impression. I have spoken to him just

once several days later. And he—the impression I got in that conversation was that he believed he did the right thing, and he was

confident he did it for the right reasons. He thought I should be

more aggressive about getting the particulars of the arguments we

made out to the news media.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield real briefly?

Mr. LEWIS. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. When you refer to you asking them to check with

the Justice Department, now, the Justice Department did not have

your documents, did they?

Mr. QUINN. They did not have them from me, that’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. Did they have them from anybody? You don’t know?

Mr. QUINN. No.

Mr. BURTON. But you did not give them to them.

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Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. All you did was talk to Eric Holder.

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to change

gears a little bit.

Mr. BURTON. We will let you ask one more question, since I interrupted you, and then we will move on.

Mr. LEWIS. OK. In an e-mail, exhibit 73, you wrote to Mr. Rich’s

other attorneys that you had a great concern that ‘‘We’re withholding our very good and compelling petition from the press only to

protect the tax professors who don’t want to be that far out in

front.’’ How were you protecting the tax professors?

[Exhibit 73 follows:]

179

180

Mr. QUINN. Well, from what I understood from other lawyers involved was that the tax professors did not want to be besieged with

media requests and so on. And as a result, there seemed to be some

reluctance—not on the part of the professors but on the part of at

least one other lawyer—to distribute the Ginsburg/Wolfman tax

memo. This was frustrating, because that analysis was critical to

the argument that we made in the pardon petition.

And so in this e-mail I think you see reflected my frustration

that we need to make sure people understand the analysis that

Ginsburg and Wolfman went through and why it was so helpful to

our case.

Mr. LEWIS. Did Mr. Ginsburg express any concern that making

the tax opinion public might harm his wife’s reputation?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, not at all. Not at all. And it’s my understanding that both of those professors absolutely stand by that opinion.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To the prosecutors, as I gather, this process and the fugitive nature of Mr. Rich occurred about in 1984; is that correct?

Mr. WEINBERG. As I understand it, it was—he was indicted in

September 1983, and by that time he just chose not to come back

to the United States.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Now, he was in Switzerland?

Mr. WEINBERG. Apparently, he was in Switzerland. He was living

in New York prior to the indictment, and he had offices in Switzerland and stayed in Switzerland after indictment.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Is it correct that any American citizen who is indicted, or may be indicted shortly, can just get on a plane and go

to Switzerland and it will guarantee that they will not be able to

be brought back to the United States for prosecution?

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, I don’t think that is correct.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Well, then were there particular circumstances

in this case why Switzerland failed to extradite?

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, first of all, we were told that he was one

of the largest taxpayers in Switzerland.

Second—— Mr. KANJORSKI. So money allows judicial process in Switzerland?

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, I believe that had a lot to do with what

happened in 1983 and 1984, yes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Were there attempts after 1983 and 1984 by—

that was the Reagan administration, 4 years remaining, the Bush

administration for 4 years—did the Justice Department or Southern District do anything over that 8-year period?

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. What was the results of that?

Mr. WEINBERG. As I understand, they tried to extradite him from

Israel, both of them, and the Israelis turned down the extradition

request. And there were persistent attempts to apprehend him in

various countries, apparently, as indicated by the marshals.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Were these taken through judicial processes in

these various countries?

Mr. AUERBACH. The judicial process in Switzerland and Israel resulted in the Swiss declining to extradite. And while they did indiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00188 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
181

cate that Mr. Rich and his company were the largest taxpayer in

the canton in which they are located and one of the largest in country, they also took the position that these were violations, crimes

that were not the subject of extradition.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Oh, OK. So there was a judicial vetting in a developed nation of the world that determined that they were not

going to send this fugitive or former American citizen or what have

you back to the United States for prosecution?

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes, if the process had been in England, Germany, a number of other countries, they would have been extradited. But in Switzerland and apparently Israel they were not.

Mr. AUERBACH. Because of the treaty that we have with those

countries that define the crimes for which our citizens can be extradited.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So if you are a commodities operator and you fail

to pay taxes in the United States and make an extraordinary

amount of money, you can go to Switzerland and be quite safe?

Mr. AUERBACH. You might conclude that from the facts of this

case.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Don’t you think it’s possible also that you might

conclude, if you were looking over this petition, that there has been

some sort of a vetting as to whether or not, as Mr. Quinn points

out, the RICO statute was properly applied in a case like this and

the charges that were brought against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green

were not necessarily charges that that nation interpreting were fair

administration of justice?

Mr. WEINBERG. No, I really don’t. I think the main issue in Switzerland was taxes and tax offenses; and, at the time, the extradition treaty did not provide for extradition on tax-related matters.

Mr. KANJORSKI. That nation has been known to change its rules

and laws when pressured to do so, has it not?

Mr. AUERBACH. It has, and it has certainly become amenable to

providing assistance to the United States in areas like money laundering.

Mr. KANJORSKI. We went through a process in this country about

3 or 4 years ago with the Holocaust victims, particularly with Switzerland, and hammered them into coming up with a considerable

amount of money. It is either $3 or $4 billion in funds. Did anyone,

the State Department or anyone else, particularly the Southern

District of New York Attorney’s Office, did they think in terms of

maybe we ought to include in this package that if we can make

them open up the secret bank accounts that we can make them account for 50-year-old money in accounts, that we could make them

give back a fugitive?

Mr. AUERBACH. I think they have become amenable to return fugitives. And what I said before, I believe that if this case were

brought today it would include money laundering charges and we

might well have been able to get people like Rich and Green back

on the basis of those charges. Unfortunately, that was not the law

at time.

Mr. KANJORSKI. When did it become the law and when did we

have that window of opportunity?

182

Mr. AUERBACH. No, I’m saying if this crime was committed

today. If this crime were committed today. One certainly can’t go

back and rewrite the laws as they applied then.

Mr. WEINBERG. Back in 1980, we didn’t have a money laundering

statute that would have covered these offenses. We do now, and it

is likely that we wouldn’t have these same circumstances today because of these other available statutes that could have been used.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, that’s all.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Who do we have next on our side? Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to thank all three gentlemen for appearing before

the committee and Mr. Weinberg, Mr. Auerbach for your service as

prosecutors in giving many years of your professional lives to the

service of your fellow citizens. I thank you.

Mr. Quinn, I also thank you for appearing here. I may disagree

with the belief in the appropriateness of this pardon and that it

shouldn’t have been done, but I certainly respect your good-faith

belief in the appropriateness and the merits of the case that you

have made as an attorney on Mr. Rich’s behalf.

I do have a concern, though, and I want to ask your opinion. In

your testimony, as a fellow attorney, in our duties to the system,

to the court, to the process, you stated, ‘‘Whatever happened to the

American judicial premise that one is innocent until proven guilty?

Whether right or wrong, Mr. Rich thought he could not get a fair

trial because of the tarnish and taint imposed by his prosecutors.’’ I guess I would first contend that every day accused believe that

they cannot get a fair trial and they are going to be hung out to

dry wrongly. And on the American judicial premise that one is innocent until proven guilty, equally important is that the court, either the judge or the jury, will be the decider of guilt or innocence.

Are you worried that as an attorney that you have sent a message that where an accused and his or her attorneys in their hearts

believe were innocent that we don’t have to uphold that premise,

that the court will decide ultimately that we can sidestep the court

and in this case go right to the pardon process? That we’re sending

the message to anyone accused out there that, hey, you don’t think

you can get a fair trial? Instead of using the procedural process

that we provide for ensuring a fair trial, instead you can sidestep

the whole judicial process and go right to the President for a pardon? Isn’t that a concern to you as an attorney that this is the message that we’re sending?

Mr. QUINN. I hope it is not the message of this. I do believe that

this was a very unusual case that had been at an impasse for 18

years and that impasse——

Mr. SHAYS. Could the gentleman just put the mic in front? I’m

sorry.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. That impasse never would have been resolved in any other way. These gentlemen who serve, as I also respect greatly, will disagree with me again very strongly. But I

think that both sides in this thing contributed to this impasse. I

think that the then novel use of RICO in a situation like this was

a sledgehammer that resulted in their failure to return and in the

guilty pleas that came from the companies.

183

I think that, in truth, there was at bottom a disagreement between Rich and the prosecutors about the application of the energy

regulations and their liability under the tax laws. I think the case

was turned into something dramatically different than that when

the RICO charges were put in there.

I do not think that this pardon ill-served the interest of justice,

and I thought it was the right thing to do. I sought it. I would not

have sought it if I thought it ill-served the interest of justice.

I understand—it’s abundantly clear that a good many people

here disagree with me about that. But I believe we pursued it in

good faith, that we pursued it in a fashion that was honorable and

ethical and that in the end that’s how it was decided.

Mr. PLATTS. Mr. Quinn, one of the great tenets of our process,

including our governing process, is the ability to agree to

disagree——

Mr. QUINN. Of course.

Mr. PLATTS [continuing]. And we’ll certainly have to disagree on

the merits of what transpired. But your comment on the 17-year

impasse, it seems to me as one not familiar as the three of you very

much are with the whole history here, that while both sides may

have played a role in that impasse and not given—that the defendant, Mr. Rich, by his company’s paying of $21 million in contempt,

which is an admission of trying to stonewall the judicial process,

that $21 million is a pretty good indication of who had the biggest

responsibility in the impasse continuing for such a long period of

time.

Mr. QUINN. Well, the information provided to me was that the

government was seeking documents in Switzerland, the disclosure

of which would have violated Swiss law, and that they were caught

in something of a Hobson’s Choice in this regard.

Mr. PLATTS. I respect that’s really outside—prior to your

involvement——

Mr. QUINN. It is prior to my involvement, but I want you to know

that, before getting involved, I asked a good many questions and—

including what happened in that regard. And that is my understanding of it as we sit here today.

Mr. PLATTS. My final question, Mr. Chairman, would be there is

nothing that would have prohibited Mr. Rich—that your suggestion

that there was no other course but to seek a pardon—there was another course, and that was to actually stand trial and, if found

guilty, despite the claim of innocence from all the charges, to then

seek a pardon from whoever was in the White House. The pardon

avenue was always available even after standing trial. So you

would at least acknowledge that is another course that could have

been pursued was to stand trial and then, if necessary, pursue a

pardon at that time.

Mr. QUINN. That’s true.

Mr. PLATTS. Again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for your discretion on

the time for me and to all three of our testifiers. As I said, we may

agree on some points with the prosecutors, and with Mr. Quinn respectfully disagree, but I very much appreciate all three of you appearing before the committee. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Mrs. Davis.

184

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. With your permission, I would

like to yield my time to Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentlelady very much.

Mr. Quinn, one of the things that amazes me and one of the

things that probably amazed you about Washington when you were

a White House counsel, is how fast things move in this town. And

one of the fast things that has happened while we’ve been here

today is someone has published a publication reporting on your testimony today and the headline is: ‘‘Quinn says Rich deserved a pardon because of flawed Giuliani prosecution.’’ Now, I went to the bathroom for 5 minutes during this hearing.

Did you ever say that today?

Mr. QUINN. Frankly, I was thinking when we were having lunch,

I don’t think the Mayor’s name has come up in this hearing.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I don’t either. And I have seen that reported

in the press. And to me at least, since he left the campaign trail

and decided not to run against Mrs. Clinton, he seems like a benign character who shows up in Giants’ and Yankees’ turtlenecks

and roots for New York sports teams.

But I want to just read to you what the reporter had to say. Specifically, it said that you argued today that Mayor Rudolph

Giuliani, who was the U.S. attorney in 1983, and you guys are

mentioned, former assistant U.S. attorneys, Martin Auerbach and

Morris Weinberg, Jr., misused the RICO act to indict Rich and

that’s why he deserved the pardon. Did you say that today?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I have certainly pointed to the use of RICO as

dramatically ratcheting up this case and contributing to the impasse. And you were kind enough to point out earlier in connection

with my being on both panels that it is a long day and so I will

confess that there may be some things that have slipped by me,

too. But I don’t think that reference to the Mayor has been part

of this hearing.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I don’t think so either. But I do want to turn

to your January 5th letter to the President of the United States

where you do write, and I think that’s exhibit No. 89 if you want

to follow along in our program, where you talk about the outrageously prejudicial and unfair treatment of him by the then new

U.S. attorney in New York Mr. Giuliani. Is that your conclusion?

That Mr. Rich suffered outrageously prejudicial and unfair treatment at the hands of Mr. Giuliani?

[Exhibit 89 follows:]

185

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Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Fellows, how about you? Mr. Auerbach, Mr.

Weinberg. How do you feel about that?

Mr. AUERBACH. I’m sorry, what’s the——

Mr. LATOURETTE. It’s not 89?

Mr. QUINN. I’m familiar with the letter.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You wrote a letter to the President on January

5th.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And you remember using the words ‘‘outrageously prejudicial’’ and ‘‘unfair treatment by Mr. Giuliani’’?

Mr. QUINN. If you are reading it, I’m confident that’s what it

said.

Mr. WEINBERG. I think that the treatment must have been by me

and not Rudy, because Rudy had very little to do with the case

until at the end of the case when he participated in negotiating the

guilty pleas. Actually, the investigation was done under John Martin. John Martin is now a Federal judge in the Southern District

of New York.

I just want to say that I do not believe that it is fair to characterize anything that we did—and I was a 31-year-old prosecutor

then—during the investigation as unfair. The reason that Mr. Rich

and Mr. Green really found themselves in the position that they

found themselves in is because of the extraordinary things that

they did during the investigation to obstruct it—the contempt fines,

the steamer trucks, trying to sell the American corporation secretly

that the court found was fraudulent. Their fugitivity. I mean, this

extraordinary effort to avoid turning over documents. I mean, the

Swiss Government, quote, seized some documents in Switzerland

so that they couldn’t be turned over; and then they were the safe

haven for Mr. Rich and Mr. Green so they couldn’t be extradited.

I mean, the reason that this case attracted the attention that it

did was not because of Sandy Weinberg. It wasn’t because of Martin Auerbach. It certainly wasn’t because of Rudy Giuliani who

wasn’t even around at the time when all of this publicity was going

on. It was because of the extraordinary things—the extraordinary

I would say misdeeds that took place during the investigation.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Let me ask you this: Are you fellows familiar

with a gentleman by the name of Robert Litt?

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes.

Mr. AUERBACH. Sure.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did Robert Litt have something to do with

this?

Mr. WEINBERG. I will explain to you what Robert Litt had to do

with this. Robert Litt was in the appellate section. Bob is a very

close personal friend of mine and a partner in Mr. Quinn’s old law

firm and was in the Justice Department before this. Mr. Litt

worked in the appellate—there were six appeals in this case. This

person, Mr. Rich, who had these wonderful lawyers involved,

brought six appeals during the investigation. We were in the Second Circuit six times. That’s how aggressively they litigated it. And

Mr. Litt and Mr. Lynch, who one of the letters was to in the early

1990’s who is now a Federal judge, they were both in the appellate

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section and served honorably; and they worked on these extraordinary issues that we had during the investigation.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And Mr. Lynch, if I understand, you are talk

about a fellow by the name of Gerald Lynch?

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. He’s been nominated and he is now on the

Federal bench, an appointment of President Clinton, is he not?

Mr. WEINBERG. As far as I’m concerned, he’s the best lawyer I’ve

ever worked with in my entire life.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And Robert Litt, aside from being a partner of

Mr. Quinn’s at Porter and Arnold, he was also nominated to head

the Criminal Division at the Justice Department during the time

that Mr. Quinn served as counsel to the President. Does that sound

about right?

Mr. WEINBERG. That’s right.

Mr. QUINN. May I add in response?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure, go ahead.

Mr. QUINN. In terms of the basis for my making the statement

I did in the letter, I’m going to read to you three short clips from

the Wall Street Journal.

The first reads: It’s worth taking a second look at Mr. Giuliani’s

first big RICO case. This was the much celebrated 1984 case

against Marc Rich, the wealthy oil trader. A close reading of these

allegations shows that these also effectively reduced the tax

charges. The core of the case is that Mr. Rich wrongly attributed

domestic income to a foreign subsidiary. Again, this sounds like a

standard civil tax issue, not RICO.

Second clip, again from the Wall Street Journal, ‘‘The Department of Justice should launch a complete review of all U.S. Attorney RICO cases, from Mr. Giuliani’s first RICO expanding case

against Marc Rich in 1984 through the current allegations against

Chicago pit traders and Michael Milken.’’ Third, Wall Street Journal, ‘‘The major prior RICO abuse was

when Rudolph Giuliani, the former U.S. Attorney in Manhattan, in

1984 RICO’d oil trader Marc Rich essentially on tax grounds.’’

It goes on. I wasn’t operating on the basis—in an information

vacuum. Others have characterized the use of RICO in cases like

this, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, as abusive.

Mr. WEINBERG. If I could just say one thing, take 1 second.

Mr. LATOURETTE. As long as the chairman lets me go, you can

talk as long as you want.

Mr. WEINBERG. Just so everybody understands what the process

was. In order to bring—in order for the U.S. Attorney’s Office to

bring a RICO or a tax charge back in 1983 when these gentlemen

were indicted, it had to be approved and reviewed in the Justice

Department. The RICO charge was approved by the RICO section

of Justice, and the tax charge was approved in the Tax Division.

Because of the process, we notified Edward Bennett Williams in

advance of the indictment that we were considering RICO and obviously that we were recommending tax charges. Mr. Williams had

an opportunity to have a review—to set forth all of his arguments

to the Justice Department, not the U.S. Attorney’s Office—we were

beyond that—to the Justice Department both as to the RICO

charge and as to the tax charge. Those arguments were considered

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back in 1983. And the Justice Department, which was—you know,

this was President Reagan’s administration. The Justice Department in 1983 specifically approved filing RICO charges and approved filing the tax charges.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and

thank you, Mrs. Davis.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Waxman, did you want to take some of your

time?

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you. I’ll just take this time to say that we

have had a taste of this case. I can’t say that we have dug into it

in detail. The three of you know it in great detail, and it sounds

to me that whenever you have some of these very complicated

transactions, whether it was the tax evasion or tax avoidance,

there are serious questions. The RICO issues have been quite controversial. You say there might be a money laundering charge

today, but there wasn’t then. I don’t know that this committee can

make a final judgment on the merits.

The President, however, was the one who had to make some

judgment; and he had to make a decision whether to exercise that

unique power that a President has, which is to grant clemency or

grant a pardon. We can disagree with his conclusion or question

whether he had enough information to reach the conclusion.

So, I know the chairman said this is worth doing to give some

signal to all Presidents that when they make this decision it might

be examined by a committee of Congress, but let’s not kid ourselves. I don’t know that we are going to have this President, President Bush’s, decisions as carefully scrutinized as we have, in this

committee, scrutinized President Clinton’s.

For example, if we are looking for things to examine, does anyone think that if the decision in Florida hadn’t been reversed and

that Mr. Gore was determined to be the President that this committee wouldn’t be issuing subpoenas all over the place to examine

what went on in Florida? But we are not looking at that at all,

even though we know that thousands of people were

disenfranchised in Florida and did not get their votes counted,

maybe legitimately, maybe not.

But that’s not the topic that this committee, the majority, has decided to hold hearings on. This committee majority has decided to

hold hearings on an action by President Clinton which many of us

disagree with but which he had the constitutional authority to

take.

In the few minutes I have left, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Auerbach, Mr.

Weinberg, starting with you Mr. Quinn, is there anything that you

want to say that you haven’t had a chance to say? We fire questions and we get this thing in a very piecemeal fashion. Any points

that you think we ought to know about that you don’t feel you have

had a chance to make or that you want to elaborate on?

Mr. QUINN. Well, to be honest with you, I think that you have

heard from the prosecutors, why they brought the charges they did

against Mr. Rich and others. You have heard from me, why we

thought the indictment was flawed. You have in front of you the

indictment. You have the legal arguments laid out in the petition.

I don’t feel I’ve left anything out, frankly, so, no, I don’t think I

need to embellish further the arguments we made.

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Mr. WEINBERG. I guess the one thing that does concern me about

all of this and about the submission, particularly that part of the

submission that talks about how the case was meritless and it was

a house of cards and all that stuff, and it just sort of dismisses everything, you know, whether it’s RICO or the wire and mail fraud

or the tax, whatever it is, it’s all dismissed. The fact that the companies pled guilty that’s dismissed because they had to plead

guilty, according to Mr. Quinn, because they were extorted through

all of this aggressive—— Mr. WAXMAN. But aren’t you just saying that the petition on behalf of Mr. Rich put the best face on everything and ignored the

negative side?

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, I think what I’m saying is that it would

have been, I think, fundamentally fair if we are looking for justice

here, or the exercise of justice, if Mr. Quinn or somebody had pointed out to the President that, when he is told that the companies

pled guilty and he shouldn’t consider that, that actually when the

guilty pleas took place on October 11, 1984, in front of Federal

Judge Shirley Kram, that Marc Rich’s lawyers stood up in court

and told the judge when the judge asked them what did these companies do wrong—and what they said, amongst the things they

said was on page 18 of that transcript: ‘‘beginning in September,

1980, International, which was the Marc Rich company in the

United States, generated millions of dollars of income from crude

oil transactions which International should have disclosed but intentionally did not disclose to the Internal Revenue Service and the

Department of Energy.’’ And then later in here acknowledged that

false documents had been delivered to the Department of Energy,

hiding those illegal domestic profits, and that the company, the

American company, had failed to report millions of dollars of taxable income that they did not pay taxes on.

And so to come in here 18 years later and say that the case was

a sham, the case was meritless, is to say that Peter Fleming, one

of the most distinguished lawyers in New York City and the country, and Peter Zimroth, one of the most distinguished lawyers in

New York, when they stood up in front of a Federal judge and said

those things, having been authorized by their clients in Switzerland to say those things, they were just not telling the truth. And

that’s just not right. It’s not fair.

Mr. WAXMAN. My time is up. But could you let Mr. Quinn respond, and then I am sure we will have to move on.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, and we have heard that now twice. And that’s

an accurate representation of what happened. It is also the position

of my clients that this RICO sledgehammer, which would have destroyed this company, caused them to enter into a plea bargain on

behalf of the company with the prosecutors.

As I stated earlier in my testimony, I’m not the only one who

was of that view. I was one of a long line of respected attorneys

as well thought of as Mr. Fleming, who shared my view about this;

and we discussed earlier who some of those people are.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, just in conclusion,

when Democrats have raised the issue about Florida, we have been

told to get over it, stop whining. Well, it just seems to me if the

approach is that the election is over, what is done is done, then it

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is hard for me to understand the rationale to continue to investigate Bill Clinton if there is no illegality in the Rich pardon. And

it seems very close to a double standard and somewhat partisan

that we spend our time looking for things about Bill Clinton to

criticize and pay no heed to concerns that people have on other

issues like the denial of participation in the electoral process by so

many people in Florida and throughout the country, particularly

those who are minorities and seniors who did not have their votes

counted.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just conclude with this panel that if the

RICO charges were so frivolous then why didn’t they stand trial?

Were they afraid they would be convicted? And I think the case

needs to be made that if they thought they had a meritorious defense and they had the best lawyer in the country and they

thought they could win the case, why did they renounce their citizenship and try to sneak documents out of the country, flee the

country and have been gone 17 years? Why didn’t they stand trial?

Did they think that our judicial system is so corrupt that they

would have been convicted and put in jail on charges that were not

meritorious? Why didn’t they stand trial? They had the best lawyers in the country.

Mr. QUINN. Look, Mr. Chairman, what I think is the honest answer to that is that they were not willing to expose themselves to

300 years in jail over what they thought was a tax and energy dispute.

Mr. BURTON. So they thought they might be convicted? So they

thought they might be convicted?

Mr. QUINN. Of course they must have.

Mr. BURTON. Why did they think they might be convicted?

Mr. QUINN. I think they thought that they were going to be exposed to 300 years in jail for something they didn’t do.

Mr. BURTON. Well, but the point is, if you’re innocent, we have

a very fair system of justice in this country where the laws apply

equally to everybody. According to the prosecuting attorneys, the

people who are bringing this case, they had separate sets of books.

They had a pot they called it, a pot where they stuck their devious

moneys so that the IRS and the government of this country could

not find them. And when all of this was uncovered they tried to

smuggle the documents out of the country. They left the country.

They became fugitives. They changed their citizenship and ran all

over the world.

At one point we know that U.S. Marshals were on their tail, and

they were in a jet plane, and they got messages from someone in

the United States that the U.S. Marshall was in a plane trailing

them, and they turned around and went back to Switzerland. That

doesn’t sound like people who really feel that the justice system in

this country works. There must have been something more to it.

Mr. QUINN. Well, Mr. Burton—Mr. Chairman, let me respond to

it as much of that as I can, very briefly. I wasn’t involved with

them 17 years ago. I hope I can tell you honestly I would never,

ever encourage a client to flee the jurisdiction. I know I can tell you

with complete sincerity I would never condone or encourage the renunciation of one’s American citizenship.

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With regard to this alleged pot of money, this goes to the moneys

that were part of the Department of Energy analysis of these

transactions. And, again, another agency of the Federal Government concluded that Rich and not ARCO had correctly accounted

for these transactions.

I was dealing with the four corners of the indictment in front of

me. I couldn’t rewrite their history, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just—I won’t make any more points about

this. I think we have covered it thoroughly. If Mr. Weinberg or Mr.

Auerbach want to conclude, we will conclude this panel.

Mr. AUERBACH. I will just try to respond to what Congressman

Waxman said and what other people on the committee have said

today, which is that there seems to be a fairly widespread view

that, at a minimum, the President made a mistake when he granted this pardon. And I would say at this point one of the things that

this committee could do is look to the future and look to Mr. Rich

and Mr. Green’s future, and I hope that in your government oversight role you will ensure that the appropriate government agency

do everything within their power to not compound this mistake.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Weinberg, anything else?

Mr. WEINBERG. I just appreciate the opportunity of having appeared here today, and I agree with much of what Representative

Waxman has said. I’m also a Florida citizen. I’m not sure if my

vote counted or not. But I appreciate, Chairman Burton, you looking at this. Because I think that, from my perspective as the prosecutor but as a defense lawyer as well since then, that the system

of justice has really been done a disservice in this case.

That to reward two individuals who, in my opinion, thumbed

their noses at the system from day 1, who committed, I believe, one

of the biggest tax frauds in the history of the United States, who

did everything they could to obstruct our investigation, whether it

was not turning over documents or trying to smuggle documents

out of the country or trying to spirit assets away from the court so

that they couldn’t enforce the fines, who then chose to do what

no—basically, no other citizens in this country can do and that is

find a safe haven. And from a distance for 17 years, you know, try

to put their defense on through a series of lawyers like Mr. Quinn

who, without anybody on the other side, say that this case had no

merit.

For people to be allowed to do that, renunciate their citizenship.

Whether there is some technical defense or not, which I do not believe that there is, to trade with enemies of the United States while

they were American citizens for sure, because that is what was

charged in this case, and whatever they have done since, to reward

people like that with the ultimate act of mercy is an outrage.

And I as the prosecutor, I as a defense lawyer, I as a Democrat,

a lifelong Democrat, I can’t find another word for it. I’m outraged

by it.

I agree with Mr. Waxman. If there is no criminality—and I’m not

sure that this committee can make that determination today—if

there is no criminality, there is nothing you can do about it because

it is an absolute power. But it is an outrage, and it should be—and

I’m proud to be here today to say that it is an outrage, and I do

not believe that Mr. Clinton was given the full and complete story,

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because I happen to believe that he is way too intelligent and

smart to believe that it was appropriate to pardon two people that

did not fit one criteria for pardons.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Weinberg and Mr.

Auerbach.

Mr. Quinn, we will ask you to stay for the next panel.

And we will ask Mr. Holder—is Mr. Holder here?

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, would it be reasonable to ask if we

could take 5 minutes between panels?

Mr. BURTON. Sure, we want to make sure you can do whatever

needs to be done in 5 minutes. We will wait for you. We will stand

in recess for 5 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Quinn has already been sworn.

So, Mr. Holder, would you please stand and raise your right

hand?

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Holder, do you have an opening statement you

would like to make?

Mr. HOLDER. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. All right. Proceed.

STATEMENT OF ERIC HOLDER, FORMER DEPUTY ATTORNEY

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. HOLDER. Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Waxman, members of the committee, I’m happy, though not as happy as I would

have been at 10 o’clock, to have the opportunity to come before you

today to discuss the Justice Department’s role in the pardon of

Marc Rich.

Now, at the outset, I want to emphasize one thing: The career

people in the Department worked very hard to process all of the

pardon requests that came to them in the waning days and hours

of the Clinton administration. They are not to be faulted in this

matter. As for my own role, although I always acted consistent

with my duties and responsibilities as Deputy Attorney General, in

hindsight I wish I had done some things differently with regard to

the Marc Rich matter. Specifically, I wish that I had ensured that

the Department of Justice was more fully informed and involved in

this pardon process.

But let me be very clear, let me be very clear about one important fact. Efforts to portray me as intimately involved or overly interested in this matter are simply at odds with the facts. In truth,

because the Marc Rich case did not stand out as one that was particularly meritorious, and because there was a very large number

of cases across my desk that similarly fit into this category, I never

devoted a great deal of time to this matter, and it does not now

stick in my memory. By contrast, I did spend time monitoring

cases, especially in those last days, involving people who were requesting commutations of disproportionately long drug sentences.

I would like to briefly go through a chronology of the relevant

events so as to explain the Department’s involvement in this matter. I think my first contact with the Rich case in late 1999 when

Jack Quinn, the former White House counsel, called me and asked

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me to facilitate a meeting with the prosecutors in the Southern

District of New York concerning the client of his named Marc Rich.

Mr. BURTON. Do you have copies of your statement, some members of the committee—do we have copies? Can you hand those

out? I’m sorry to interrupt you. Proceed. Thank you.

Mr. HOLDER. This was not an unusual request. Over the years,

other prominent members of the bar and former colleagues, Republicans and Democrats, had asked me to arrange similar meetings

with other offices around the country. Mr. Rich’s name was unfamiliar to me. I believe that Mr. Quinn explained that he wanted

the U.S. Attorney’s Office to drop charges that had been lodged

against his client because of changes in the applicable law and Department policy.

I asked a senior career person on my staff to look into the matter, and ultimately the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to meet with Mr. Quinn. Neither I nor anyone on my staff

ever pressed the prosecutors to have a meeting.

We simply deferred to them because it was their case. In candor,

if I were making the decision as the U.S. attorney, I probably

would have held a meeting. In my view, the government—and the

cause of justice—often gains from hearing about the flaws, real or

imagined, cited by defense counsel in a criminal case. But my only

goal was to ensure that the request for a meeting was fully considered.

Consequently, I gained only a passing familiarity with the underlying facts of the Rich case, and after the prosecutors declined to

meet with Mr. Quinn I had no reason to delve further into this

matter.

On November 21, 2000, members of my staff and the U.S. Marshals Service and I had a meeting with Mr. Quinn and a client of

his. Though it was one of eight meetings I had on my schedule that

day, I remember the meeting because Mr. Quinn’s client had a

good idea about using the Internet to help the Marshals Service

dispose of properties that had come into its possession as a result

of forfeiture actions.

Mr. Quinn has recently stated after the meeting he told me he

was going to file a pardon request on behalf of Mr. Rich at the

White House. I have no memory of that conversation but do not

question Mr. Quinn’s assertion. His comment would have been a

fairly unremarkable one, given my belief that any pardon petition

filed with the White House ultimately would be sent to the Justice

Department for review and consideration.

Mr. Quinn has also recently stated that he sent a note to me

about the Rich case on January 10th. I never received that note.

The correct address of the Justice Department does not appear on

the correspondence. The note ultimately surfaced on the desk of the

pardon attorney on January 18th, less than 48 hours before the

pardon was signed by the President.

On Friday, January 19th of this year, the last full day of the

Clinton administration, when I was dealing with such issues as the

death penalty, pressing personnel matters and, most importantly,

security issues related to the next day’s inauguration, I received a

phone call from Mr. Quinn at about 6:30. He told me that I would

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be getting a call from the White House shortly, and he asked me

what my position would be on the pardon request for Mr. Rich.

I told him that although I had no strong opposition based on his

recitation of the facts, law enforcement in New York would strongly

oppose it. I didn’t use exactly those words. Given Mr. Rich’s fugitive status, it seemed clear to me that the prosecutors involved

would never support the request. But I did not reflexively oppose

it because I had previously supported a successful pardon request

for a fugitive, Preston King, who, in the context of a selective service case, had been discriminated against in the 1950’s because of

the color of his skin.

Shortly after my conversation with Mr. Quinn, I received a phone

call from the White House counsel, Beth Nolan, asking me my position. I’m not sure if it was Ms. Nolan or Mr. Quinn, I just really

can’t remember who brought to my attention that Prime Minister

Barak had weighed in strongly on behalf of the pardon request, but

this assertion really struck me.

With that significant piece of new information, I ultimately told

Ms. Nolan that I was now ‘‘neutral, leaning toward favorable,’’ if

there were foreign policy benefits that would be reaped by granting

the pardon.

Even after my conversation with Ms. Nolan on the evening of

January 19th, I did not think that the pardon request was likely

to be granted given Mr. Rich’s fugitive status. I continued to believe this until I actually heard that his name had been placed on

a list of pardons to be granted by the White House.

I was informed of this list around 11, perhaps midnight, on the

night of the 19th. In retrospect, I now wished I placed as much

focus on the Rich case as I did on other pardons involving people

such as Derrick Curry, Dorothy Gaines and Kemba Smith, all of

whom had received extraordinarily long drug sentences which, I

strongly believe, were not commensurate with their conduct.

Though I’m speculating somewhat, had I known of the reported

meeting that night between the President and counsel for Mr. Rich,

I might have become more active in this matter, even at that late

date, sensing that there was a real possibility that the pardon request might be granted.

On the morning of January 22nd of this year, Mr. Quinn called

me. I returned his call some 4 or 5 hours later. He asked me what

steps needed to be taken to ensure that his newly pardoned client

was not detained by international law enforcement authorities

when he traveled. We talked about how we get detainers removed

from computers and notify Interpol of the pardon, and about similar things of a technical nature. At no time did I congratulate Mr.

Quinn about his efforts. If I said anything to him about his having

done a good job, it was merely a polite acknowledgment of the obvious, that he had been surprisingly successful in obtaining a pardon

for this particular client.

Now, as you can see from these facts, attempts to make the Justice Department, or me, the fall guys in this matter are rather

transparent and simply not consistent with the facts.

I, and others at the Justice Department, had nothing to gain or

to lose by the decision in this matter; we had no professional, personal or financial relationship with Mr. Rich or anyone connected

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to him and, to the best of my knowledge, none of us ever saw the

Rich pardon application. Indeed, it is now clear, and this is admittedly hindsight that we at the Justice Department, and more importantly, former President Clinton, the American public, and the

cause of justice, would have been better served if the case had been

handled through the normal channels.

Now, I have now ended a 25-year public service career. All that

I have from that time is the good work that I hope I have done,

its impact on people and, I hope, a reputation for integrity. I have

been angry, hurt, and even somewhat disillusioned by what has

transpired over the past 2 weeks with regard to this pardon. But

I’ve tried to keep foremost in my mind the meeting I had at my

house with Derrick Curry and his father the week after his sentence was commuted by President Clinton.

I know that my attention to that and similar cases made a difference in the lives of truly deserving people. Of that, I am proud

and I am grateful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holder follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Holder.

Did you review the entire file on Mr. Rich and his partner before

you talked to Beth Nolan and those people at the White House?

Mr. HOLDER. No, I had nothing to review.

Mr. BURTON. Well, then how did you—I mean, you said in your

opening statement that you would have no objection to the pardon.

And I may not quote you exactly but correct me if I’m off a little

bit, you said you would have no objection if it would help our foreign policy interests, or words to that effect?

Mr. HOLDER. What I said was that I was neutral but leaning toward. Neutral to me meant I had no opinion based on what I knew.

I didn’t have a basis to form an opinion.

Mr. BURTON. I understand. But you said you were neutral but

were leaning toward it if it would help our foreign policy interests.

Mr. HOLDER. If there were a foreign policy interest.

Mr. BURTON. If there was a foreign policy interest. How could

you say that if you didn’t review the file and didn’t know all the

facts pertaining to the case?

Mr. HOLDER. Well, I think in saying I was neutral, which is consistent with what I told them before, which——

Mr. BURTON. You said you were leaning toward it as I recall.

Mr. HOLDER. Neutral but leaning toward. Neutral meaning I

don’t have a basis to form an opinion consistent with what I told

him before. The statement I was making, you have to take this in

context, conversations that I had with him before I said that I was

neutral because I didn’t have a basis to make a determination. I

have not seen anything on the pardon.

I’m now saying that I’m neutral consistent with what I said before, leaning toward it if there were a foreign policy benefit. I could

not make the determination if there were foreign policy benefit.

Mr. BURTON. No. No. I understand that. But when you’re talking

about pardoning an individual or individuals who have dealt with

all of the enemies of the United States when they’re embargoed, almost all of them, if not all of them, people who were dealing with

Iran, when we had hostages there in violation of the embargo, people that were indicted and fled the country, I just don’t see how you

can make any kind of a neutral or positive statement or

semipositive statement saying that you would have—you were neutral, but leaning toward it if it would help our foreign policy interests.

It seems to me that it would have been logical to really take a

look at the file and to call the people in New York who prosecuted

the case or tried to prosecute the case before you made any kind

of a comment to the Justice Department.

Mr. HOLDER. Well, I mean you assume, as we say in the law,

facts not in evidence. I did not have in my mind all of the material

that you have just described. The knowledge about the interaction

between Mr. Rich and enemies of this Nation, Iran, Iraq, whatever,

it was not information that I had. The call also comes in at 6:30

or something the night before the requests—the night before the

Clinton administration ends. And as I tried to indicate in my statement, there were a host of other things that we were dealing with

on that night.

202

This is not a matter that had my undivided attention I think at

any point during the time it was being considered.

Mr. BURTON. Well, let me ask you a general question. Did you

seek or talk to Mr. Quinn and ask for his support in any way to

become the Attorney General if there was a Gore administration?

Mr. HOLDER. Sure, we had those kinds of conversations.

Mr. BURTON. So you talked to Mr. Quinn about asking possibly

for his help to become the new Attorney General under a Gore administration?

Mr. HOLDER. We had conversations of that nature, yes.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall, Mr. Quinn, talking to him about his

possibly being the new Attorney General in the Gore administration?

Mr. QUINN. I only recall having a conversation once, and I am

confident that it was not in connection with this or any other business I was doing. Eric Holder is somebody who I have known for

a long time, worked with, have enormous regard for and who has

been a friend.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I understand that. But you can see why that

question would be asked under the circumstances—— Mr. QUINN. Sure.

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. Because of the possible connection between the Justice Department’s nonopposition to the pardon and

the possibility that Mr. Holder might be the next Attorney General.

When did this conversation take place? Do either one of you recall where or when or what was said?

Mr. HOLDER. I don’t remember when the conversation occurred.

Mr. BURTON. Was it in close proximity to the time when Mr.

Rich’s pardon was being discussed?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. My recollection is that conversation took

place earlier in the fall before the election, before the decision to

seek the pardon and certainly before I discussed with him in late

November the fact that we were going to file a pardon application.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Mr. Holder, my——

Mr. QUINN. That’s my recollection.

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. My counsel just said that you have indicated that there was more than one conversation with Mr. Quinn

about becoming Attorney General; is that correct?

Mr. HOLDER. I don’t know how many conversations. I don’t remember—I don’t remember. I remember one conversation that we

had. I don’t know—nothing other than that one sticks in my mind.

I simply don’t know.

Mr. BURTON. Do you remember when that was?

Mr. HOLDER. No.

Mr. BURTON. Was it near the time——

Mr. HOLDER. It was clearly before the election, but I don’t know

how far.

Mr. BURTON. Were there any conversations after the election, before the administration left office?

Mr. HOLDER. About becoming Attorney General? I didn’t think

President Bush was going to appoint me, no.

Mr. BURTON. I understand that. But there was some question

about whether or not Mr. Bush was going to win the election all

the way up until the——

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Mr. HOLDER. I see what you mean.

Mr. BURTON. Were there any conversations in that timeframe?

Mr. HOLDER. I don’t think so. I really don’t know when that conversation occurred. I think it was before the election, but I’m not

sure.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I think that’s pretty important, because——

Mr. HOLDER. It’s only important if you presume something here

that I think is not in any way supported by anything that is—any

fact—there’s any factual basis for what I think you’re implying

here.

Mr. BURTON. No. No. I understand. I’m not implying anything.

I’m asking questions.

Mr. HOLDER. I think you are.

Mr. BURTON. Well, Mr. Holder, you can think whatever you

want, and I can think whatever I want, but the thing is you wanted something from Mr. Quinn. You wanted his support for Attorney

General of the United States, and he wanted a pardon for Mr. Rich

and his partner.

Now, you can understand why somebody would ask a question

about that. It’s called a quid pro quo. And we don’t know that it

took place; only you and Mr. Quinn know. The fact of the matter

is, you knew Mr. Quinn had great influence with the President and

probably the Vice President and you knew that they could help you

become Attorney General. So I can—I mean, you must understand

why I would ask that kind of a question.

Mr. HOLDER. That’s fine, and you can ask the question. Let me

just answer that question and make it very, very clear——

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Mr. HOLDER [continuing]. My actions in this matter were in no

way affected by my desire to become Attorney General of the

United States, any desires I had to influence or seek to curry favor

with anybody. I did what I did in this case based only on the facts

that were before me, the law as I understood it and consistent with

my duties as Deputy Attorney General, nothing more than that.

Mr. BURTON. I understand. I want to say—I just want to make

one more comment, I want to make sure we have this very clear.

At 6:30, or approximately, the night before the pardon was granted

when the President was leaving office, they called and you said

that you were neutral, but you would lean in favor of it if it would

help our foreign policy interest; is that correct?

Mr. HOLDER. If there were foreign policy benefits that we would

reap from the granting of the pardon, right.

Mr. BURTON. OK. I think we established that we wondered why

you were neutral, since you didn’t have all the facts before you.

That’s what I was asking a while ago.

Mr. HOLDER. What I said was when—as I indicated, neutral

meant that I did not have a basis to form an opinion. I didn’t have

a basis to say yes or no. I didn’t have enough factual information

in front of me.

Mr. BURTON. Why didn’t you just say that? Why didn’t you say

I have no basis for this, Mr. President, or whoever it was, Beth

Nolan, because I don’t have the file in front of me, and I’ve been

working on other things.

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Mr. HOLDER. What I said before was in the context—you have to

understand I had at least one other conversation with Ms. Nolan

about this, and what I indicated to her was that I was neutral because I didn’t have a basis to form an opinion. And when I used

the term neutral on the 19th, it was consistent with the way I used

the term neutral in other conversations.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Holder.

Did you have something briefly, Mr. Quinn, you would like to

say?

Mr. QUINN. I just want to underscore the fact that as far as I’m

concerned, the important conversation is the one you were just focused on on the night of January 19th, and there was no doubt in

anybody’s mind who was going to be President of the United States

on January 20th—— Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. So—— Mr. BURTON. Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to, first of all,

say that I’ve had the occasion to meet with Mr. Holder on a couple

of occasions and to observe his work, and he has certainly given

very distinguished service to this country. He has a reputation of

high integrity and honesty and extraordinary ability, and if anyone

has any evidence of any wrongdoing on your part, they ought to

come forward with it, because I don’t believe it.

As I listened to both of you, I find it amazing, these things do

happen. Sometimes people think things are being said and actions

are going to be taken, but they fall through the cracks. And Mr.

Quinn thought one thing was being said, and Mr. Holder thought

another thing was being said. And you would think that Mr. Quinn

might have been attaching a great deal of weight to something that

was said that really wasn’t on Mr. Holder’s mind at the time.

Is that what I’m observing here from either of you, Mr. Quinn?

You thought you were letting Mr. Holder know that you were going

to be seeking a pardon and Mr. Holder didn’t think he was so informed? Isn’t that what the way——

Mr. QUINN. I didn’t hear Mr. Holder say on November 21st I

didn’t say that. I think he said that he doesn’t challenge my saying

I had that conversation with him, but that if we did have it, he

simply didn’t attach great importance to it.

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah, it was for me, as I said, a rather

unremarkable thing, assuming it was said, and I don’t doubt what

Mr. Quinn said. Given the fact that Mr. Rich was a fugitive and

that it was only one of many things that I was dealing with, and

also based on my assumption, I think this is the key, that anything

that he said to the White House would ultimately work its way to

the Justice Department.

So that it was something that I heard, I’m sure, probably didn’t

even remember the next day.

Mr. WAXMAN. So you thought the petition would get to the Justice Department and it never got to the Justice Department?

Mr. HOLDER. It never did, no.

Mr. WAXMAN. The Justice Department had no opportunity to

comment?

Mr. HOLDER. That’s correct.

205

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Quinn, did you know whether that was the

case or not?

Mr. QUINN. Whether——

Mr. WAXMAN. Whether the Justice Department ever had an opportunity to comment on your petition filed on behalf of your client.

Mr. QUINN. I believe Mr. Holder did comment on it on the

night—I’m sorry. It’s my impression that he did comment on it.

Mr. WAXMAN. How did you get that impression?

Mr. QUINN. He has so testified here today that he commented on

the pardon application.

Mr. WAXMAN. I see. But not in an official way.

Mr. QUINN. You mean the document itself?

Mr. WAXMAN. The document itself and the official process of having the people in the Justice Department look into the submissions

that would go to the President, so he could look at all the facts of

the matter.

Mr. QUINN. Again, I did not know after filing the petition with

the White House whether a copy went to any other agencies of the

government. The Los Angeles Times says that 47 of those pardons

and commutations were handled at the White House and not

through the Justice Department. I don’t know the truth or untruth

of that assertion.

But I did, and it remains my testimony on more than one occasion, urge the White House counsel to seek the views of Mr. Holder. I did so because it was the right and professional thing to do,

and I was hopeful that he would in commenting not necessarily

support the pardon, but confirm that we had reached an impasse

with the Southern District.

So I believed that I had—I believed that I had informed Mr.

Holder on a timely basis that we would be filing the petition. I believe that I had asked the White House counsel to be in touch with

the Department of Justice, and I certainly hoped that would happen before the pardon was granted.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Holder, you said something and I wanted a

clarification. You had a conversation with Beth Nolan and you

were asked about it and you said you were neutral, which meant

in your mind that you hadn’t looked at it. Is that——

Mr. HOLDER. I had a conversation with her before the conversation on the 19th. I’m not sure exactly when the conversation occurred, but I do remember—I have a memory of a meeting. We

were going over to the White House pretty frequently in the last

6, 8 weeks of the administration.

It was the desire of the President to increase the number of pardons that were being processed by the Department, and the White

House was not quite satisfied with the way in which the Department was moving these things along. So we went there periodically

to talk about ways in which we might process more efficiently pardon requests.

During these meetings, occasionally Beth would ask me questions about particular people, and I kind of remember that in one

of those meetings the name Mr. Rich might have come up. And my

memory is that I said I was neutral. I didn’t have a basis to form

an opinion. That’s how I used the term neutral.

206

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, it just strikes me there was a disconnect

here, and that’s amazing, because we’re talking about a matter

that was quite important.

Mr. HOLDER. One thing I would say about that, as I said in my

commentary, and it’s true of people who worked with me, this has

obviously become a cause celebre. Everyone at this point knows the

name of Marc Rich. I really wonder if we took a show of hands in

this room, including people behind the desk here now, if we asked

this question 4 months ago, how many of you know who Marc Rich

is, whether there would be substantial numbers of people saying

yes; I don’t know.

But within the Deputy Attorney General’s Office when we first

heard about this matter back in, I guess the latter part of 1999,

none of us were familiar with Mr. Rich.

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes. Well, I can see that. And I can see that’s why

the whole thing could end up falling through the cracks, as apparently it has. And it’s unfortunate, because when the President

made his decision, I would have liked to have him—and I’m sure

everyone looking at it fairly would have liked the President—to

have had the full input before he made his decision. Not just the

petition on behalf of the person seeking pardon and the letters of

support for those who want that. We would want the prosecutors,

and others in the Justice Department particularly, to have their

input, and it looks like the President didn’t have that input for

whatever reason.

Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. I might suggest, Mr. Holder, that there are some people that if you would have asked them, if you would taken time to

ask them 4 months ago or a month ago or 3 weeks ago about Marc

Rich, they would have known darn well who Marc Rich was.

How about the prosecutors that prosecuted the case? Have you

ever heard of Mary Jo White, the U.S. attorney for the Southern

District who prosecuted the case? Mr. Auerbach, who is sitting

right behind you; why don’t you tell him to his face that if you

would have called him up, you wouldn’t have paid any attention to

what he said, because that’s the import of what you just said.

Just because the public at large might not have known who Mr.

Rich was, that is the basis on which you made a decision, that, I

think, has been a disgrace and possibly harmed our Nation’s security. That may not be important to you.

Mr. HOLDER. That’s not what I said, Congressman.

Mr. BARR. But did you pick up the phone and call the CIA? They

knew who Marc Rich is. Did you pick up the phone and call NSA?

They knew who Marc Rich is. I will tell you some other people who

knew Marc Rich is, if you would have bothered to look into this

case, the Ayatollah, his people, even though he’s no longer around,

Muammar Qadhafi, Saddam Hussein, the former apartheid Government of South Africa. These are all people and institutions and

governments in terrorist regimes that Marc Rich dealt with against

our laws and benefited from.

You sit there and you say that case was unremarkable, and you

say that simply because the public might not have known about

this case that you didn’t have any obligation to look into it.

207

Who was the senior career person that you asked to look into the

matter?

Mr. HOLDER. Mr. David Margolis.

Mr. BARR. And did he look into it?

Mr. HOLDER. He was looking into the matter only to try to facilitate the meeting that had been requested with the Office of the

U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York.

Mr. BARR. His name came up here also in exhibit 1, exhibit 1 is

Mr. Quinn’s notes of November 8th, 1999, apparently, his recollection—or his notes at the time of the conversation with you. Apparently what he is saying is you suggested to him that he send a letter to Mary Jo White, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District,

copy you, which he did, and that you will call her and say you

should do it.

Now, that is not consistent, I don’t think, with your testimony

today. Did you tell him that you would relay to Ms. White that she

should do it, meet with him?

[Exhibit 1 follows:]

208

209

Mr. HOLDER. No, I don’t remember that.

Mr. BARR. I didn’t think so.

Mr. HOLDER. Excuse me?

Mr. BARR. I didn’t think you had said that, his notes, it’s one of

a number of discrepancies.

Mr. HOLDER. No. I mean what we were trying to do, as I said,

was try to facilitate the meeting. It wasn’t a question—and as I indicated in my opening statement, we never pressured anybody to

have the meeting; the call was for the Southern District for New

York to make.

Mr. BARR. Right. Later on in your testimony at the bottom of

page 3, you say shortly after a subsequent conversation with Mr.

Quinn, you received a phone call from the White House counsel,

Beth Nolan, asking for your position. And then you say further

down in that same paragraph, I ultimately told Ms. Nolan that I

was now neutral leaning toward favorable.

Was that all in the same conversation?

Mr. HOLDER. I’m not sure I understand the question.

Mr. BARR. OK. You say, shortly after my conversation with Mr.

Quinn, I received a phone call from White House counsel, Beth

Nolan.

Mr. HOLDER. Right.

Mr. BARR. In the same conversation with her, in other words,

you received a call from her, is that when you told her that you

were now neutral leaning toward favorable?

Mr. HOLDER. Right.

Mr. BARR. That was just one conversation?

Mr. HOLDER. Yes.

Mr. BARR. OK. So in one conversation, you were swayed from

let’s give you the benefit of the doubt that you didn’t know anything about the case and it was unremarkable to you, to understanding that it was important enough for a foreign leader to become personally involved in, and just based on that information

alone, not having heard anything back from Mr. Margolis, not having heard anything back from your prosecutors who identified this

case as one of the most significant in white collar crime history,

you all of a sudden become leaning toward favorably simply because some foreign leader, for whatever reason, that he wants us

to act favorably on this pardon?

Mr. HOLDER. What I said was that I was neutral leaning toward.

Neutral, meaning consistent with what I said before, which was I

don’t have a basis to one way or the other——

Mr. BARR. Is that your presumption as the second top official at

Justice, that if somebody comes in and asks you about a pardon

that you don’t know anything about, that your position is immediately neutral and therefore their job is to move you toward favorable? I mean, wouldn’t your position as a prosecutor be you stand

by your prosecutors and your initial position when you don’t know

about a case is to oppose it?

Mr. HOLDER. No. Without a basis to know whether—how the decision should go, I think it would be incumbent upon——

Mr. BARR. Don’t you presume that your prosecutors have prepared good cases, and therefore you would operate from the preVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00217 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
210

sumption as their superior at the Department of Justice that you

were going to stand by them and not take a neutral position?

Mr. HOLDER. Sure. I suppose that’s the presumption. But as I indicated in my prepared remarks, there was a case involving a man

who was a fugitive who had been frankly abused by the system, racial animus allowed to get into the system.

Mr. BARR. That’s a red herring, the same as the other fellow was

a red herring. We’re talking about a case that was an extremely

significant white collar crime case with very significant national security ramifications.

Did you make a recommendation to the President on the pardon

of Mr. Rich?

Mr. HOLDER. The request—the——

Mr. BARR. Yes or no. Did you make a recommendation to the

President, Mr. Holder, with regard to the pardon requests for Mr.

Rich?

Mr. HOLDER. What I told the White House counsel was that I

was neutral leaning toward positive——

Mr. BARR. Was that your recommendation to the President?

Mr. HOLDER. That is what I told the White House counsel.

Mr. BARR. Why did you tell the White House counsel?

Mr. HOLDER. She asked me what my opinion was.

Mr. BARR. OK. Was she asking that on behalf of the President?

Mr. HOLDER. I don’t know what the process is there. I

presume——

Mr. BARR. You don’t know what the process is there?

Mr. HOLDER. I presume that is what it is. I don’t know if she

rose directly to the President, whether there’s an intermediary, I

don’t know.

Mr. BARR. It’s like—it’s like keystone cops, but I don’t think it

is. I think the President knew exactly what he was doing. You

didn’t request information, so you could probably say I don’t know.

In other words, have you ever heard of the concept of deliberate

ignorance? Maybe not. Most prosecutors have.

Mr. HOLDER. I will stand here and have people say that I made

a mistake, I will debate that.

Mr. BARR. You don’t think——

Mr. HOLDER. You are now implying that I have done something

that is essentially corrupt. And I will not accept that. That I will

not accept. Not——

Mr. BARR. This is otherwise. You sit here and you tell us you

don’t know how the White House counsel works. You say, well, you

told somebody to look into it. They didn’t, but that’s OK, it was an

unremarkable case. Your own prosecutors have said this was a

very significant case, and you say based on one conversation with

the White House counsel that mentions a foreign leader’s name,

that you changed to leaning favorable.

Mr. HOLDER. I said if—what I said was if there were a foreign

policy benefit that would come from the pardon—if, if, and I was

leaving it to them to make the determination. I didn’t have a basis

to know that. I said if Barak is calling in and saying this is something significant, and if there is a basis to conclude that we might

get a foreign policy benefit——

211

Mr. BARR. What about the basis of your prosecutors? That counts

for nothing?

Mr. HOLDER. I said in connection with that, that I was neutral.

I didn’t have a basis to form an opinion one way or the other. As

the Deputy Attorney General who has to ultimately make a recommendation to the White House in pardon matters, there is certainly a presumption, I suppose, that you presume regularity in the

way conditions were obtained; but the default position, seems to

me, should not be one way or the other. You should try as objectively as possible to look at all of the evidence, look at the applicable law, and then come up with a recommendation, a determination.

And what I’ve told—what I told the White House counsel in the

meeting, the earlier conversation, I think, consistent with what I

said on the 19th, was I did not have a basis to make a determination because I had not had access to the relevant documents, the

relevant materials.

Mr. WAXMAN. Regular order.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time is expired.

Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Holder, I have a great deal of respect for you

over your tenure at Justice Department, and I don’t find myself

very often in agreement with Mr. Barr, but I do find some of these

positions almost incredible from the standpoint when you first

heard the name Rich from Mr. Quinn; that triggered no idea of who

this was?

Mr. HOLDER. I did not know——

Mr. KANJORSKI. And you didn’t assign somebody to find out. This

was unusual. You never had been approached by Mr. Quinn regarding a pardon before, had you?

Mr. HOLDER. That’s correct.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So this is the first time that Mr. Quinn was involved in a pardon situation with you?

Mr. QUINN. The contact was not about the pardon.

Mr. HOLDER. Well, no, the initial contact with Mr. Quinn—I’m

sorry. The initial contact with Mr. Quinn was not about a pardon,

the late 1999 contact was not about a pardon.

Mr. KANJORSKI. OK. It was to set up a meeting with the Federal

attorney’s office?

Mr. HOLDER. Right.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Before you would set up a meeting you would

want to know who is the defendant, what are the circumstances;

you wouldn’t just tell some staff set up a meeting. I mean, it could

have been for Adolf Hitler, you know.

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah, I mean I knew enough about the case so that

I had an idea of what the meeting was to be about, but I did not

delve into it in the degree that the people have testified on panel

one. I didn’t have that kind of familiarity with it.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Did you know whether he was a fugitive?

Mr. HOLDER. I’m sorry; what? Did I know what?

Mr. KANJORSKI. Did you know whether he was a fugitive or not?

Mr. HOLDER. Yes.

212

Mr. KANJORSKI. OK. That is a rare classification for someone

seeking a pardon. I don’t imagine there’s a high percentage points

of petitioners for fugitives, is there?

Mr. HOLDER. That’s correct. But again—— Mr. KANJORSKI. You’re a sensitive lawyer. That would ring a bell

to you. Then knowing he’s a fugitive, the request was made with

the Southern District’s office. And are you used to, as Deputy Attorney General, being refused a meeting? I mean, I’m really surprised that a Deputy Attorney General can call up one of these

lonely Federal attorneys and they say hell no, and OK. I would

imagine if I called up and somebody turned me down to a meeting,

I would want to find out why they think they’re running the Department instead of you.

Mr. HOLDER. I didn’t say have the meeting. All I said was this

is something that perhaps they ought to consider, and that’s why

I asked the person in my office to do that, interact with the people

in the Southern District to see what they would do.

Mr. KANJORSKI. And they said they wouldn’t consider it?

Mr. HOLDER. They didn’t want to have a meeting.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Didn’t that set off a bell? You didn’t ask why a

Federal attorney, reasonably asked by a prominent Washington attorney who had been counsel to the President, asked for a meeting

and they refused to have a meeting? Wouldn’t you want to know

why, what’s their objection?

Mr. HOLDER. I assumed, and I think it was conveyed to me, was

that they didn’t want to have a meeting because Mr. Rich was a

fugitive.

Mr. KANJORSKI. OK. And then at that point, after you found out

a week or two later or you received the letter in January that a

petition for pardon was going to be made or was in the process of

being made, there’s a fugitive out there, your prosecutor won’t even

have a meeting with him. Didn’t it strike you that the President

should be informed of some of these circumstances or to know the

other side of the case? Or did you make the assumption that Mr.

Quinn in his petition, rather than being a straight advocate, would

have given both sides of the pros and cons of the individual and

had a full explanation, instead of the most positive advocate’s position?

Mr. HOLDER. What I assumed was going to happen in late November 2000 was that after the petition had been filed, that the

White House would be reaching out to the Justice Department, and

that we would have an opportunity at that point to share with

them as we do in pardon—that we generally do in pardon requests,

after all of the vetting had been done, the opinion of the Justice

Department.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Well, finally, the other points that it comes down

to in the incredibility of it. I’m a politician. If somebody calls me

up and says, do you support a candidate, my answer is not I’m neutral leaning toward, if I don’t know anything about them. I don’t

have a reason—I’m not going to stamp any approval. I’m going to

say I have no comment because I have no facts. But you didn’t take

that position, did you?

Mr. HOLDER. Yes, I did. What I said was that I was neutral on—

when I had that initial conversation with Beth Nolan—was I was

213

neutral because I didn’t have a basis to make a determination one

way or the other. I didn’t have enough factual material to make— to form a conclusion.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Well, at that point, didn’t it trigger in your mind

that this looks like it’s moving at the White House and somebody

from the Department of Justice—and that’s primarily you as the

administrator, to get these facts and make sure that the fact is

properly presented to the President, pro and con instead of just

pro?

Mr. HOLDER. I guess that’s one of the keys. I never really

thought this was a case that was going to move, using your term,

given the fact that he was a fugitive. I didn’t see how it was likely

to have—a pardon request was likely to be successful, given the

fact that Mr. Rich was a fugitive.

Mr. KANJORSKI. If a foreign leader called up and even though he

was a fugitive, that doesn’t matter and you would have been leaning toward it?

Mr. HOLDER. No. What I said was I’m neutral, but if Mr.—but

if there is a foreign policy benefit that we might get from granting

this pardon, if there is, that would make me think I would be leaning toward it. But, again, I didn’t know whether or not that was

true or not. I was putting—— Mr. KANJORSKI. I understand, Mr. Holder. It doesn’t make sense

to me, because that would be the Secretary of State that would be

saying that or the National Security Advisor. What does the Attorney General have to do with foreign affairs?

Mr. HOLDER. That’s why I said if, if there is a foreign policy, I

don’t know if there is or not.

Mr. KANJORSKI. That’s right. It’s not even in your bailiwick. It’s

not important to you. Why should that have an effect one way or

the other in the administration of justice? That’s for somebody else

to weigh in on that proposition and saying for foreign policy reasons we should have some extra consideration here?

Mr. HOLDER. We make decisions within the Department on the

basis of foreign policy at times with regard to—I know we certainly

had dealt with regard to India—with Pakistan and the purchase of

F–16s, there was a foreign policy consideration there that we took

into account in forming our ultimate position.

Mr. KANJORSKI. At that point in time, did you know that they

had worked with the enemies at time of stress; you knew none of

the facts?

Mr. HOLDER. No.

Mr. KANJORSKI. And in spite of that, you said I’m neutral, but

if a foreign leader calls, I will be leaning positive if it had foreign

policy implications?

Mr. HOLDER. Well, I didn’t say if a foreign leader calls. What I

said was that I was neutral consistent with what I said before, but

if there’s a foreign policy benefit, if you all, in essence, determine

there’s a foreign policy that might accrue from this, then I would

lean toward favorable.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I had posed to Mr. Quinn, and I like Mr. Quinn,

too. He’s a friend of mine, as you, through the years in the administration. Did the fact that he had a prior role at the White House,

chief counsel to the President, did that in some way disarm you in

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dealing with him on this particular case, that you imagined that

he probably would have taken extra steps to make sure that it

wasn’t just an adversarial role but also a full disclosure role?

Mr. HOLDER. No. I mean, I assume that Mr. Quinn was acting

as a lawyer here. I’m not—I don’t think that his former status was

something that necessarily—— Mr. KANJORSKI. You know what kind of a good lawyer he is. So

you know he would put the petition in the best light of his client.

Why didn’t you think that somebody should be advocating the negative side of that proposition?

Somebody in Justice, somebody in the White House, somebody

should have been scurrying around, recognizing one of the best

lawyers in Washington is putting a petition in with singularly his

side of his client’s case, and it’s very late in the period of time. And

didn’t it dawn on you that somebody better make sure that the con

should be developed and given to the President?

Mr. HOLDER. Yes. In hindsight, seeing how this turned out, obviously some bells should have gone off, some lights should have

gone on. But at the time, again, what stuck in my mind was this

was a request of pardon for a person who was a fugitive. And the

likelihood—it made this case very unlikely to happen, and it made

one that did not make those bells go off for that reason.

It was—if I had known, obviously, that it was going to turn out

this way, I mean I certainly would have done things differently.

And that’s why I said in my opening remarks, yeah, I wish there

were things that I had done differently.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time is expired. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Holder. Welcome to the committee.

What makes this story so remarkable is that you thought it was

unremarkable that a person who was a chief advisor to the President of the United States’ counsel would have requested a pardon

for a fugitive who basically did business with our enemies.

So please once again try to explain to me why you don’t think

it was a remarkable request. That’s a lot of chutzpah.

Mr. HOLDER. You’re presuming again facts that we now know

that I did not have in my head at the time. I didn’t have before

me all the information that the trial lawyers who ably presented

in the first panel this morning. So, Mr. Shays.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Shays, I think this bears—may I just ask one

question? There was a phone call, according to your phone logs,

from 10 to 11 a.m. that morning with Shirah Neiman. She’s the

deputy U.S. attorney in New York. You talked to her for almost an

hour.

Was this any part of that conversation?

Mr. HOLDER. I don’t remember a conversation between Shirah

and I.

Mr. BURTON. Your phone log right here has it from January 19th

from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m., Shirah Neiman, deputy U.S. attorney.

Mr. HOLDER. No. The call came in at 10, I returned the call at

11.

Mr. BURTON. Well, we would like to know, and I will yield back

to my colleague, thank him for yielding, but I would like to know

what that conversation was about, and we will probably talk to her

as well, so I think it’s important that you recall the facts.

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Thank you, Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What you call an

unremarkable thing makes me want to ask you what it would have

taken to be a remarkable thing. You told Jack Quinn you had no

problem with the pardon; is that correct?

Mr. HOLDER. That I had no problem with the pardon? No, I don’t

remember saying that.

Mr. SHAYS. So you don’t recall saying that. You told Jack Quinn

you didn’t need a copy of the application; is that correct?

Mr. HOLDER. That I didn’t need a copy? No, I didn’t say that.

Mr. SHAYS. You failed to inform the Southern District of New

York or the pardon attorney about Quinn’s effort to get a pardon

even though you knew back in November; is that true?

Mr. HOLDER. That’s true.

Mr. SHAYS. You told the White House you were neutral leaning

toward the pardon, and the President took this as a sign as support

for the pardon; is that correct?

Mr. HOLDER. I don’t know how the President reacted to what I

said, but I said what you said, with a little more.

Mr. SHAYS. You congratulated Jack Quinn in the wake of the

pardon and offered him advice about handling the press about the

Rich matter?

Mr. HOLDER. No, that’s not correct.

Mr. SHAYS. None of those things are true?

Mr. HOLDER. No.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. What this hearing has illustrated to me is that

we not only have a pardon problem, we have a revolving door problem, because you had an individual who signed an Executive order

who adhered to an ethics commitment by executive branch appointees of Executive Order 12834 of January 20, 1993, which was

interestingly revoked effective January 20, 2001, and that was

signed on December 28th.

Mr. Quinn, did you contact White House officials about the pardon before December 28, 2000?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you sign this Executive order like other employees?

Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Why shouldn’t I come to believe that Bill Clinton

gave you a pardon? And the pardon is, you’re not adhering to this

Executive order?

Mr. QUINN. I’m not sure if you were in the room during our earlier discussion of this, but I believed that the Executive order does

not cover the communications I had on this matter with the White

House.

I specifically had a discussion with the White House counsel

about whether it did prohibit them, and I brought them——

Mr. SHAYS. Why did you have that conversation if you didn’t

think it affected you?

Mr. QUINN. She asked me the first time I mentioned to her—or,

perhaps, it was when I filed the petition, she asked if my making

an appearance in this matter was permissible under the Executive

order.

Mr. SHAYS. Why did she ask you that?

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Mr. QUINN. I think it’s an obvious question.

Mr. SHAYS. She thought it was not permissible.

Mr. QUINN. No, she had a question; she didn’t have a conclusion.

And when I brought to her attention the exception that I’ve discussed before the committee, she asked me no further questions

about it. She acquiesced in my making the appearance.

Mr. SHAYS. Acquiesce is a good word.

Mr. QUINN. I think it’s accurate. And I think she did not have

the view that it was impermissible. I believe her conduct from that

point forward indicates that she agreed with me that it was permissible.

Mr. SHAYS. The problem with that logic—— Mr. QUINN. And, in fact, it is permissible.

Mr. SHAYS. The problem with that logic is that you were hired

specifically because of your White House connection, because you

had defended the President, because you were a close associate of

Al Gore’s. You were the person to hire. If I went in there, I

wouldn’t have gotten any impact, obviously not. You had that.

That’s the reason why we Republicans and Democrats alike rejoiced when the President signed that Executive order. I was pretty

astounded that after you had these contacts, he basically repealed

that.

Mr. QUINN. You may think the Executive order should have been

drafted differently than it was.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. QUINN. But it means what it means. You may even think

that the current administration should have a similar Executive

order.

Mr. SHAYS. I think Congress should draft one that is very clear,

and that’s one of the outcomes that I think—— Mr. QUINN. That’s fine.

Mr. SHAYS. Because it’s very clear to me that Mr. Holder is put

in a very tenuous situation. You’re coming to ask him and notifying

him of something, and he’s basically asking you for assistance in

a place that you can be very helpful.

Mr. QUINN. Yes. There are a couple other—— Mr. SHAYS. It’s a very kind of awkward kind of dialog to have.

Mr. QUINN. I need to address a couple of the points—— Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. That I think you are in, I can’t remember, or on. First I, again, I was hired in the spring of 1999, not to

go to the White House, but to work with main Justice and the

Southern District of New York. Second——

Mr. SHAYS. I’m sorry; you weren’t an employee of the White

House? I’m missing what you’re saying. You were not an employee

of the White House?

Mr. QUINN. You made the assertion that I was hired, because I

had worked in the White House, to go to the White House. That’s

what I thought you were saying.

Mr. SHAYS. And your contacts with the President. I mean, I

think you would even acknowledge that.

Mr. QUINN. We’re talking past each other. All I’m saying is that

the initial purpose of hiring me was not to go to the White House

but to do something else.

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Second, in your exchange with Mr. Holder, you asked him, and

I may have created this misimpression on your part, but I want to

clear it up. Mr. Holder—it is not my testimony that Mr. Holder

ever told me he did not have—need a copy of the petition.

Rather, what I was referring to is that in that conversation he

and I had on November 21st, when I said to him that I hoped to

or wanted to or intended to encourage the White House counsel to

contact him, I asked him if he thought I should put that in writing

to the White House counsel. And his response was, you don’t need

to put that in writing, just ask him to call me, I will take their call.

Mr. SHAYS. Just one last question, Mr. Quinn. Do you know how

much Denise Rich contributed to the Clinton library?

Mr. QUINN. I do not, sir. And—I do not. And I certainly did not

at the time I was working on this matter.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time is expired. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a single question. But before I ask it, I want to say, you

recall that I was concerned as to how this hearing would be understood. I thought that the hearing would have in itself, an important

effect on precedents, set the kind of precedent we need to have set,

because it shows that Congress is willing to do oversight even on

the matters it has no control over, which raise appearance problems or even worse.

But I am going to say I am very disappointed that apparently,

the news report that came out as this hearing was going on, it was

announced that all inspectors are going to introduce an amendment

to the Constitution that would give Congress the power to overturn

a Presidential pardon.

I mean that is the kind of overkill and overreaction that I just

want to separate myself from, and I hope we will separate from

this hearing. A President makes a mistake, and somebody wants

to turn the Constitution, something we’ve lived with for 200 years,

on its head. Well, I’m not willing to do that on the basis of one

President, one pardon and one mistake.

I do want to get at the reasons for this mistake. I want to get

at whether there was indeed more than a mistake and I want to

get at the appropriate remedy.

Indeed, my question will ultimately go to remedy, because I certainly don’t think this is the remedy, nor do I think it will happen.

And I think it’s the wrong message from this hearing, and I’ve not

heard any of my colleagues say that that’s what they were doing.

Indeed, I heard the U.S. attorney say that they didn’t think the

pardon, constitutional pardon power should be tampered with.

Mr. Holder, I know you to be a cautious man. I know you to be

a man of high integrity. As I have listened to the exchanges here,

one can see that running through this entire episode are a whole

set of appearance problems, and that appearance problems create

substance problems even when they aren’t there. It’s very unfortunate that’s the way life is.

I must say I part company with those who see your notion of

neutral leaning toward, if there are foreign policy implications, as

raising some kind of serious question. That is to say, if I put myself

in your position, that is to say as a lawyer being asked the question

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by another lawyer in a very substantial position, who says what do

you think, and I haven’t had the opportunity to look at the underlying matter, and so I don’t want to say I don’t know, and the way

in which, at least I learned it in law school is, hey, you don’t put

yourself on the line. And one way not to put yourself on the line

is to say, look, I’m neutral.

From one lawyer to another that means, look, I don’t know

enough underlying facts to render an opinion on which you should

rely. Nor do I find it unusual to say if there are policy implications,

if there are foreign policy benefits to the United States of America.

This country does all kinds of things it would not do but for foreign policy benefits to the United States of America. And I’m assuming that Israeli Prime Minister Barak would not intervene and

open his mouth on the matter because he’s been given some money

or he’s on the take.

And given the way in which our country is now dealing in the

Middle East, I am not going to assume that if somebody says that

there’s something sinister, that there is. I might want to know

what it is, but the whole implication is, oh, my God; but this does

not strike me as oh, my God, it strikes me that we do all kinds of

things.

We and our allies exchange prisoners and people have done terrible things when we wouldn’t do it otherwise, because there are

foreign policy benefits. We are all sophisticated enough to know

that there probably isn’t something sinister behind that.

Now, what I want to know is we’re not going to get into this kind

of overkill, this kind of headline grabbing, let’s go get ourselves a

new constitutional power. What are we going to do, because we

clearly have to do something. We can’t say, oh, well, it was a big

mistake, there’s nothing we can do about it except rely on the best

judgment of the President.

I really think, for the most part, that is going to be sufficient,

because any President in his right mind is going to read the transcript and see what this President went through.

But I know that you say, Mr. Holder, and I am quoting now from

your testimony, indeed, ‘‘it is now clear and this is admittedly hindsight, that we in the Department and, more importantly, President

Clinton, and the cause of justice, would have been better served if

this case had been handled through the normal channels.’’

If there is any problem in this case, it is that in this far-flung

government, things come at people in different ways and they don’t

always go through the normal channels.

Now, I want to know what the normal channels are understood

to be now, and I want to know what you think the normal channels

should be. How can we keep this from happening again? What

should have happened; as precisely as you can tell me, what should

have happened? And if we were trying to make some recommendation other than let’s amend the Constitution of the United States

so that we can second-guess the Presidential pardoning power, if

we are to try to think of something more constructive, more likely

to happen, what changes would we say should occur?

For example, does something need to be written down? Is it sufficiently written down within the Justice Department? Does something have to be written down so that the President of the United

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States has something before him? How is it done now? What precisely, given what you know about the flaws that occurred in this

process, would you do to make sure that those flaws in particular

are remedied?

Mr. HOLDER. Well, there are regulations that now exist that govern the way in which the pardon attorney looks at matters. And

that typically is what happens, a matter comes into the pardon attorney’s office. The prosecutors are contacted. The FBI is contacted.

A check is done to see if there are pending investigations.

Ms. NORTON. But it can go directly to the President, apparently.

Mr. HOLDER. Sure.

Ms. NORTON. And do you think that should be changed? Apparently it can come to the pardon attorney, or it can go directly to

the President. That means that already you have the kinds of problems that occurred here.

Mr. HOLDER. Yes. I mean, the President has a constitutional prerogative, and it’s hard to see how you can right something short of

amending——

Ms. NORTON. We’re not telling—we’re saying this is an absolute

power. You have to understand the nature of my question. I’m not

for a constitutional amendment that would say this. I am saying,

if you were advising President Bush, for example, would you say

that you should not, indeed, to protect yourself, for example, receive pardons directly? Should you always—you can always do

what you want to do, but should you always seek the adversarial

advice from within the Department before you even look at it? I’m

looking for a real remedy, Mr. Holder.

Mr. HOLDER. Yes. I mean, it seems to me it’s possible that a

President could enact an Executive order of some sort that would

be binding on his administration. I’m not sure he could bind successor administrations, but certainly require any pardon filed with his

White House counsel to be sent in the first instance or concurrently

to the Justice Department’s pardon attorney. You can do something

along those lines. I don’t know, again, if that would have an effect

on a successor administration. I suspect not, given the constitutional problems.

Mr. BURTON. The gentlelady’s time has expired. I know there’s

been a request for a break, and we will do that. If we could just

hold off for about 5 minutes because Mr. LaTourette has to go to

another meeting. If we can just have Mr. LaTourette get his 5 minutes, we will break for 5 minutes.

Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And I thank you, Mr. Quinn. I saw your signal.

But actually it’s not another meeting. I want to catch a plane to

go back to Ohio so I can watch you on Hardball tonight and all the

other shows that you are on.

I want to talk a little bit about a time when you were counsel

to the President, and there was an interview by Mr. Lehrer, the

moderator for the Presidential debates, between your old boss and

Mr. Lehrer. He was talking about Presidential pardons. It’s exhibit

No. 96. The President, Mr. Clinton, said, my position would be that

their cases should be handled like others. There is a regular process for that. I have regular meetings on that, and I review those

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cases after there is an evaluation done by the Justice Department.

I think that’s how it should be handled.

I assume that you were—the President’s position was your position because you worked on them. You think that’s the normal

process, a good idea to have the Justice Department look at these

things, right?

[Exhibit 96 follows:]

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Mr. QUINN. If I was ever aware of that at the time or before filing this pardon petition, I didn’t recall it. When this came—this

came to my attention after the pardon petition was filed. But to— the question I think underlying your point and Mrs. Holmes Norton’s point, I would endorse what Mr. Holder said.

I do think now, in the light of the considerable controversy that

this has created, controversy that candidly I didn’t fully anticipate,

that it would make a good deal of sense for sitting Presidents to

consider at least imposing on themselves some—a different sort of

process that would ensure the involvement of prosecutors and so

on.

I would point out to you in this regard, though, that, in exercising this constitutional power, the President’s not acting like a

judge. The President’s acting as the head of the executive branch;

and in that regard is the head of—the head law enforcement official of the Nation.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Let me—I appreciate your response, but you

will run out my 5 minutes. I really—he is acting like the king who

would grant mercy under our English system, and that was the

vestige that was left in our Constitution.

But, more importantly, I understand that you do it differently,

Mr. Holder would do it differently, that we have some documents

that seem to indicate that you and members of your firm actually

wanted to keep this a secret. And let me go through those with you

if I can.

And in particular, exhibit No. 79, there is a copy of an agenda

that occurred, I believe, among the lawyers on November 21st,

2000. And appropriately enough there is a section entitled ‘‘prophylactic issues.’’ And under prophylactic issues, it says, A, a need for

secrecy and a possible likelihood of potential leaks.

[Exhibit 79 follows:]

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Mr. LATOURETTE. There then is an exhibit No. 62, which is a series of e-mails between you and Robert Fink, who, I assume, is another lawyer for Mr. Rich, and Mr. Fink refers to an upcoming

newspaper article that is going to deal with Marc Rich. And your

response is, I think we have benefited from being under the press

radar. Podesta—Podesta, I assume is John Podesta—the President’s chief of staff, said as much.

[Exhibit 62 follows:]

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Mr. LATOURETTE. Then there is going to be a question in just a

second, because then it gets down to actually the day before President Clinton leaves office, there is exhibit No. 69. It’s another email from Bob Fink to members of the Rich legal team on January

19th, this year. And it says that the SEC, I suppose that’s the Securities and Exchange Commission, found out about the pardon request; and we agree that is not good and that maybe the SDNY

knows, too, but we have no information on it.

[Exhibit 69 follows:]

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Mr. LATOURETTE. And that information in that e-mail, it’s being

reported that is your observation. And I assume that SDNY, and

here is the day before President Clinton leaves office, and this pardon is going to be granted, refers to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in

the Southern District of New York.

And so that the implication, and you can correct me if I’m wrong,

from that series of e-mails is that not only was this purposefully

not sent to the Department of Justice so that you can get the second side that Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach were talking about,

but that Mr. Podesta is telling you it’s a good thing you’re flying

below the radar so that the press doesn’t report about it.

And on the 19th, you guys are nervous that the Securities and

Exchange Commission might jump in, not as strongly as they did

in the Milken case apparently, but you’re nervous that the prosecutors at the Southern District of New York may have found out

about this request as late as the day before President Clinton

leaves office. Is that true?

Mr. QUINN. I wouldn’t say I was nervous about it. I will say to

you that I am sure that, in contrast, for example, to the effort that

was made on behalf of Mr. Milken, the fact that a pardon application was pending for Rich but was not the subject of press attention was beneficial.

Having said that, and no doubt if you asked me at the time or

ask me now would I have preferred to have the Department of Justice’s opinion on this coming from Main Justice or from the Southern District, it’s easy. Yes, I wanted those views to be articulated

by Main Justice.

Why? Because as I think my documents bear out and my submission here today bears out, my course of dealings with Main Justice

with regard to Mr. Rich began in October 1999. And though I may

have formed a wrong impression, and Mr. Holder may say I should

not have formed the impressions I did, I certainly formed the impression that there was, as one of my notes reflect, a view among

some senior people in Main Justice that the equities were on our

side in some senses.

Again, I’m not trying to overstate this. I’m not trying to say that

I believed that senior people at Main Justice thought the indictment was meritless, but I did absolutely believe that Main Justice

thought that the Southern District was being unreasonable in

being unwilling to talk to us. I thought that there was a more sympathetic audience at Main Justice.

And that, sir, is why on more than one occasion I encouraged the

White House counsel to seek the views of Mr. Holder. I again—had

that taken place at an earlier point in time in this process, had it

been done in a different way by the White House, had he had more

time, he well might have reached out to the Southern District. But

for my part, I urged the White House counsel to seek his views and

the views of the Justice Department.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I understand that, with the indulgence of the

Chair, but is there any plain reading of that e-mail on January 19,

2001, other than you all were afraid if the Southern District of

New York caught wind of what you were up to, the egg was going

to hit the fan?

231

Mr. QUINN. My preference was that the White House counsel

contact Main Justice and that, based on the course of dealings we

had earlier, that they would make a recommendation that would

be helpful to us. I certainly knew that if Main Justice deferred to

the prosecutors in New York, they were likely to have a negative

recommendation. But I thought that, based on our earlier dealings,

they had enough information. And I certainly, by the way, never,

ever discouraged Mr. Holder or the White House counsel or anyone

else from seeking the views of any agency of this government.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you.

Mr. HOLDER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just have 30 seconds.

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Mr. HOLDER. With regard to question of equities and whether or

not we thought the Southern District was being unreasonable, I

think Mr. Quinn was just a little confused. What we were talking

about there was them being unreasonable and not having the meeting. The equities were on their side, as Mr. Quinn’s side, with regard to the meeting.

No one at Main Justice thought that, with regard to the substance, the equities were on Mr. Quinn’s side.

Mr. QUINN. I’m not trying to suggest otherwise.

Mr. HOLDER. I’m talking about the meeting, the fact of the meeting.

Mr. QUINN. That’s accurate.

Mr. BURTON. OK. We’ll now excuse Mr. LaTourette and let Mr.

Quinn take a 5-minute break and anyone else that wants to. The

rest of us as well.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. The committee will reconvene. Is Mr. Cummings

here? Mr. Cummings. Did he leave, or does he have questions?

Does he have questions?

Mr. Cummings, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Holder, it is interesting that you’ve been able to come

through to this point with a clear record. You, too, Mr. Quinn. We

have sat—I’ve sat on this committee for 5 years, and one of the

things that has always concerned me about this committee is so

often allegations have been made. And as a friend of mine once

said, when you throw mud on a wall, although most of it may fall,

some of it sticks. So I’m just going to ask a few questions to try

to clear up some things so that hopefully none will stick.

Mr. Quinn, was there any kind of—and I—this is the first time

I had heard this, this whole question of the quid pro quo. You

never tried to create any quid pro quo, that is saying that you were

going to help with—perhaps if Gore had won, help Mr. Holder with

regard to the Attorney General position if he did something for you.

Is that—I mean, is that an accurate statement?

Mr. QUINN. That is, sir. There was absolutely no connection between those conversations in either substance or time as far as I’m

concerned.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what about you, Mr. Holder?

Mr. HOLDER. Same thing. The—no, there’s no truth to that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. It just—see, we in this committee, what

happens so often is we have this sensationalism; and the thing that

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I’m so concerned about is, after all of the dust settles, people are

left with impressions that are simply not true, and they become

very unfair. So I just want to keep going.

Now, Mr. Holder, you said that you knew that Rich was a fugitive; is that right?

Mr. HOLDER. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you took a neutral—you believed that there

was just no way that he was going to be granted a pardon; is that

right?

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah. And that’s what I meant to say when I said

the case was unremarkable. It was unremarkable in that it was

just not a case that was going to get favorable treatment, like

many other cases that were—that had been brought—that would

be considered. That is how I meant the case to be unremarkable.

It just wasn’t going to happen.

Mr. CUMMINGS. When you spoke to Ms. Nolan, did you ever say,

look, why are we even talking about this? This is a guy who is a

fugitive. I mean, I just don’t see how anything is going to happen,

so why are we even talking about this, as opposed to saying, if it

has foreign policy considerations? I’m just curious about that.

Mr. HOLDER. Well, because the conversations we had, first of all,

were extremely short conversations. We never had a prolonged conversation about this matter. I mean, the conversations that I had

with her about these were frequently just the mention of a name

and then a comment, not anything that went into any great depth.

So there wasn’t occasion to have that kind of prolonged conversation.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, you said, Mr. Holder, in your written statement, it says at the end of paragraph 2, it says: Specifically I

wished that I had ensured that the Department of Justice was

more fully informed and involved in this pardon process.

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah.

Mr. CUMMINGS. What did you mean by that?

Mr. HOLDER. Well, I wished that, you know, I guess as Mr. Kanjorski had said before, I think probably before, that maybe the bells

had rung, the lights had gone on, and I had either in—at the end

of November or at some point said to the person on my staff who

worked on pardon matters, you know, you ought to look into this

Rich thing.

But you should understand that from what I thought was a fairly

unremarkable comment from Mr. Quinn back in late November

until sometime in January, this was not something that I was

thinking about, not something that I was considering.

I wished there were a point at which I had those lights go on and

said to the person on my staff who handles pardon things, let’s look

into the Rich thing, or see what’s going on in the Rich thing, just

to somehow get it into the system in a way that it never got.

Mr. CUMMINGS. One of the things that is very interesting, I handle for the Congressional Black Caucus numerous pardons. I was

the chairman of the pardons committee. So I had an opportunity

to review many, many requests for clemency and pardons and

commutations. And the applications quite often were quite lengthy,

and there is a lot involved. A lot of those we recommended and—

we recommended a few and rejected a lot.

233

And I was just wondering, what would be the kinds of things

that you would take into consideration? Let’s say, if you had an opportunity to make a recommendation for or against I think you

mentioned Mr. Carey, which was also, by the way, one of the Congressional Black Caucus’s recommendations, I mean, what kind of

things would you be looking for?

Mr. HOLDER. Well, I mean, I think that the kinds of things you

would look for are people who have made contributions perhaps

after they have served their sentence, who have turned their lives

around. Obviously contrition is important; ways in which people

have somehow contributed to society, somehow done something

positive for the Nation. Those are the kinds of things I think you

take into consideration and I would take into consideration in looking at a pardon request.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, is it my understanding that you don’t recall

receiving the documents from Mr. Quinn, I mean any kind of documents with regard to the details of this, the background of this

case?

Mr. HOLDER. That’s correct. I don’t think Mr. Quinn said that he

sent them to us. I was saying that we never got them from the

White House. He sent them to the White House. We never received

them from the White House.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, if you had received those documents, would

you have probably reviewed them?

Mr. HOLDER. Oh, sure.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You personally?

Mr. HOLDER. I’m not sure personally, but they certainly would

have gone to the pardon attorney and to a woman on my staff who

looked at pardon matters. And what I would typically see after that

would be a summary that they would prepare of the pardon request and what the pardon attorney generated as a result of his

work in interacting with both the investigative agencies and the

prosecutors.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I realize that you are—you weren’t the President, but, I mean, looking at it from hindsight, reading this document, your statement that is—it appears from this that, if it were

up to you, a pardon probably would not have been granted in this

case; is that right?

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah.

Mr. CUMMINGS. If it were up to you.

Mr. HOLDER. Knowing everything that we know now, yeah, I

think that’s right. I’m not so sure that—well, yeah.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me put it like this: Would your recommendation—if you knew everything that you know in this case now then

before the pardon was granted, would you have recommended to

the President that he grant a pardon? That’s a better way, I guess,

of asking it.

Mr. HOLDER. No. I mean, knowing everything that I now know,

I would not have recommended to the President that he grant the

pardon.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why not?

Mr. HOLDER. Well, aside from the fugitive status, which, as I

said, I think you can somehow—in extraordinary circumstances can

overcome, it was not—it could not overcome it. It was not overcome

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in this case. And then just understanding the—the facts of the

matter and the breadth of the wrong done by—by Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green, things they have done with regard to their citizenship,

things I did not know before. I mean, the combination of all of

these things, it seems to make these matters not ones for which a

pardon would be appropriate. And I would not have made that recommendation.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Quinn, you had said that—you had

said that you felt that Main Justice believed that the Southern District of New York was not making—necessarily being fair. I don’t

want to take words out of your mouth, OK? And at the end of the

questioning just a moment ago, we were trying to get that clear,

and I want to make sure we’re cleared up.

Did anybody tell that you they felt that—anybody from Main

Justice ever tell you that they felt that the Southern District attorneys in New York might be unfair with regard to your client, or

was this just an impression that you kind of just got over a course

of time?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. It’s an impression that I formed quite clearly in my mind based on the course of dealings that I had with Mr.

Holder back in 1999. And, again, I don’t want to overstate. Mr.

Holder never said, the equities are on your side on the underlying

indictment, or these guys should never have been indicted. But he

quite clearly reported to me, as is reflected, by the way, in the attachments to my testimony here, that senior people of the Department of Justice thought it was in—the word I believed he used at

the time was ridiculous that the Southern District wouldn’t meet

with us.

As we hopefully clarified at the end of the last round of questioning, he did use the phrase ‘‘equities on your side,’’ but in the context of, I believe, saying that the Southern District should have

been willing to sit down with us and at least consider the arguments we were making, that these RICO charges couldn’t be

brought today under current DOJ policy; that under case law developments, the fraud charges were—were wanting; and most importantly that, on the basis of the tax analysis by Professors Ginsburg and what I know to be the conclusions of the U.S. Department

of Energy, that, in fact, the tax case shouldn’t stand.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Quinn, let me ask you this, because I’m running out of time. I’m just curious. Are you surprised by all of the

controversy that has taken place subsequent to the President’s decision; for example, us being here today?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. My notes clearly reflect that I at least considered in the conversation I had with the President pointing out

to him that this would be a controversial pardon, but I want to emphasize I had no idea that it would be as—that it would have resulted in the fanfare that it has.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one—Mr. Chairman, just one.

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why not?

Mr. QUINN. I guess, Congressman, I would have to say to you

that when you do, as you know, work on something as a lawyer,

come to believe in it, come to believe in the merits and the rightVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00242 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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eousness of your cause, you think others will see your point of

view.

Now, here the President saw my point of view. I believe some

others saw my point of view. An awful lot of people have not. But,

look, you know, I win some, and I lose some. I won this one, and

a lot of people ended up on the disagreeing end of that win. But

I’ve lost plenty, too.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mrs. Davis, you have the time. Can I convince you

to yield a little bit of it to me?

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Or do you have questions?

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I have one question, and I

would be happy to yield the balance, if that is OK.

Mr. BURTON. Proceed. No problem.

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. First, Mr. Holder, I would like

to say that I have heard very good things about your reputation,

and I appreciate you being here today. But having said that, I believe I heard you say earlier that you knew Mr. Rich was a fugitive, and you thought it was remarkable that you were even discussing the pardon.

Given that, would it not have been prudent the night on January

19th, when you talked to Beth Nolan, I believe it was, rather than

saying you were neutral but leaning favorable, would it not have

been prudent to say, hey, we haven’t seen the petition. The Justice

Department cannot give a recommendation on this knowing he’s a

fugitive. Perhaps we should not give the pardon at this time.

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah. And I think that’s what I was saying to her.

As I said before, I had a conversation with her previously where

I used the term ‘‘neutral,’’ and said I was neutral because I had not

had a chance to look at the materials, the relevant materials. So

when I used the term ‘‘neutral’’ again on January 19th, what I was

conveying to her, I hope, was that the position I had or the reason

I was neutral was the same, but that given this added new thing,

the foreign policy possibility, that would be something that might

move me toward favorable.

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. And you don’t think that led

her to believe, then, that the Justice Department would be in favor

of it? Don’t you think you should have said you had not spoken to

the prosecuting attorneys?

Mr. HOLDER. Well, I think—I did—that’s what I conveyed, I

think, in that earlier meeting, as I said in that early conversation

that I had with Ms. Nolan, when I said neutral because I don’t

have a basis to form an opinion.

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I’d yield the balance of my time

back to Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Holder, you said, I asked a senior career person on my staff

to look into the matter, the Rich matter. And ultimately the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to meet with Mr.

Quinn. Neither I nor anyone on my staff ever pressed the prosecutors to have the meeting.

236

You know, I think it’s been brought up earlier that it was

strange that your subordinates in the Justice Department would

not adhere to your wishes, or the people that you designated this

task to, they would not adhere to your wishes by meeting with Mr.

Quinn.

And then I read that Mr. Quinn says in this e-mail, I think we’ve

benefited from being under the press radar. Podesta—who was

working at the White House at the time, I guess, wasn’t he?

Mr. HOLDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Podesta said as much. So Podesta was aware of

this, one of the advisors to the President. And Podesta said, you

know, it’s kind of nice that you guys are keeping this under the

radar. You didn’t press the people in New York to meet with him,

and that was to their benefit. And the reason it was to their benefit, it appears to me, is because if they didn’t meet with him, this

wouldn’t come up on the radar screen. They wouldn’t be raising

cane about, you know, not meeting with him—they wouldn’t be

raising cane about the pardon of Mr. Rich because it wasn’t on

their radar screen. There was no meeting. The meeting was turned

down, and you just let the thing go.

Mr. HOLDER. But at the time of the meeting, the pardon request

had not been made. That was before the—Mr. Quinn had indicated,

I guess, in late November——

Mr. BURTON. Nevertheless——

Mr. HOLDER [continuing]. Almost a year later.

Mr. BURTON. Nevertheless, once they start asking questions, and

I think it was at the SEC, somebody got the word over there, and

they opposed very much this possible pardon, and they wanted to

keep this—and I think it’s very clear from Mr. Quinn’s e-mail that,

I think we’ve benefited from being under the press radar. Podesta

says as much.

So it looks like the White House and Mr. Quinn is in cahoots,

saying, you know, this is under the radar screen, that’s good, that

maybe we can get this pardon done for Mr. Rich.

And then you aren’t able to get a meeting for him with the people at the New York office of the Justice Department, the U.S. attorney’s. And so it was kept under the radar screen.

Let me just proceed with another question.

Mr. HOLDER. Again, Mr. Chairman, the meeting was well

before——

Mr. BURTON. I know.

Mr. HOLDER. Almost a year before.

Mr. BURTON. But was it about Mr. Rich?

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah, but it was not about the pardon.

Mr. BURTON. I know. But the point is this gentleman was very

close to the President of the United States, very close. He was the

chief counsel to the President. If the former chief counsel of the

President goes and talks to two attorneys at the New York District

Attorney’s Office and asks about Marc Rich, then it’s going to come

up on their radar screen, hey, something is going on here.

So when you kept them—when the meeting wasn’t held, then it’s

very clear to me, maybe not to anybody else, that this was kept

below the radar screen.

237

Mr. HOLDER. But the people in the Southern District clearly

knew that it was Mr. Rich who was seeking the meeting—I mean,

Mr. Quinn on behalf of Mr. Rich.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, I understand. But there was no meeting held,

so they probably thought the whole issue was being dropped.

Let me just ask this question. I asked you earlier about Shirah

Neiman.

Mr. HOLDER. Shirah Nieman.

Mr. BURTON. You talked to her on the day before the pardon was

issued. In fact, you talked to Beth Nolan at 6:30, I believe. And you

talked to this lady, who is a deputy U.S. attorney in the Southern

District of New York about 11 o’clock. Do you remember what you

talked to her about?

Mr. HOLDER. No, I do not.

Mr. BURTON. Was it about Marc Rich?

Mr. HOLDER. I don’t think so.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t think so. Can you say categorically it

wasn’t about him?

Mr. HOLDER. Yes, I can say that we did not discuss Marc Rich.

Mr. BURTON. Did you discuss pardons at all?

Mr. HOLDER. I don’t know. I don’t know. There was an ongoing

conversation that day, that night, that I found out about between

people on my staff, the pardon attorney’s office, and people in the

Southern District about New York matters that were possibly being

considered for pardons.

Mr. BURTON. What other pardons were pending that dealt with

the Southern District of New York? Were there a lot of them?

Mr. HOLDER. I think they are called the New Market cases. I’m—

involving some Hasidic Jewish folks. I think they’re New Market.

That’s the name of it.

Mr. BURTON. We’re aware of that pardon as well, which is kind

of controversial. But, nevertheless, it’s hard for me to believe or understand why they would talk about other cases that were pending

for pardon and not discuss the Marc Rich case. And it’s hard for

me to believe that you would be talking to them about pardons and

not mention the Marc Rich case since this was, you know—was a

topic that was highly on—high on the agenda at that time.

I mean, Mr. Podesta at the White House knew about it. Mr. Podesta, a close advisor to the President, had talked to Quinn, said,

hey, this is fortuitous that it’s being kept under the radar screen.

And it’s hard for me to believe that the President didn’t know

about it at that time.

So, you know, I mean, for you not to discuss it with this lady

when you called if you were talking about pardons just boggles my

mind. But you say you didn’t talk to her.

Mr. HOLDER. Well, she called—I was returning—she called me,

as I think this is the way it came in.

Mr. BURTON. She called you at 10. You called her back at 11.

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah. So obviously we are discussing something

that she wanted to raise. I don’t remember what it was.

Mr. BURTON. We’ll contact her and ask her then.

Mr. Quinn, do you want to respond?

238

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of accuracy, just in the

interest of making sure the record is correct, I did not myself talk

to Podesta. I heard he had said that from a third party.

Mr. BURTON. Who was the third party?

Mr. QUINN. Mike—one of the other lawyers, Mike Green.

Mr. BURTON. But do you have any doubt that Podesta said that?

Mr. QUINN. No. I’m confident that the information is accurate, I

just wanted to make sure—— Mr. BURTON. So Podesta said it was fortuitous or good that it

was being kept under the radar screen.

Mr. QUINN. That was my understanding.

Mr. BURTON. Why would he say that?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t know the answer to that?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I think—I assume he was saying, you know,

particularly by contrast to the Milken application, you know—— Mr. BURTON. Yeah.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. Milken is probably not going to get pardoned because all these people are out there saying it’s a terrible

idea. But I just wanted the record to be clear it was not a direct

conversation.

Mr. BURTON. Sure. I understand. But a close advisor to the

President indicated it was very fortuitous, very good for you that

this was being kept under the radar screen.

Mr. QUINN. That’s my understanding.

Mr. BURTON. Very interesting.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you.

Just so I can have some things clarified in my own mind, you left

the White House when, Mr. Quinn?

Mr. QUINN. In February 1997.

Mr. WAXMAN. Then you went into private practice?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. So you weren’t an advisor to the President at

any time when you were dealing with this whole Rich thing? You

were a private attorney?

Mr. QUINN. That’s right.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. Now, Mr. Holder, you were contacted about

getting Mr. Quinn together with the people and prosecutors in New

York. When was that?

Mr. HOLDER. That was in late 1999.

Mr. WAXMAN. So that was not about a pardon?

Mr. HOLDER. Right.

Mr. WAXMAN. That was to try to talk about disposing of this

case?

Mr. HOLDER. Right.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. And then that meeting for whatever reason

didn’t take place.

Mr. HOLDER. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. Now, Mr. Quinn told us that he thought, after

trying to work this thing out, representing his client, that the only

hope they had was a pardon. So he initiated a petition for pardon.

That’s a year later; isn’t that right?

Mr. HOLDER. Approximately, yes.

239

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. And I think a lot of Members will get confused

because they’re really unrelated. I think the chairman thought

maybe you didn’t arrange a meeting with the people in New York

because you didn’t—one of you didn’t—want them to be able to

raise opposition to the pardon. Well, that couldn’t have been on

your mind at that point because there was no pardon pending.

Mr. HOLDER. No. In fact, I was trying to facilitate the meeting.

I thought that there would be a purpose to having the meeting. So

I was in favor of having the meeting occur.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, all I know about Mr. Podesta’s statement is

what has been cited here today that someone heard that he said,

good thing this was below the radar screen. Well, I recall at the

end of last year the New York Times was reporting regularly about

the pardon request for Michael Milken. And 1 day they said, he

certainly is going to be pardoned. The next day it was in doubt. No

one knew what was going to happen with that pardon until the

end, and then he wasn’t pardoned.

And here was a man who certainly showed contrition, did an

enormous amount for charity, contributed to society, and showed

rehabilitation. So a lot of people thought that there was a good case

for him to be pardoned.

I would interpret, without knowing what was in Mr. Podesta’s

mind, that if you have something that is being mentioned that is

potentially controversial in the press every day, that you’re inviting

a lot of opposition. Isn’t that the way you would have interpreted

it, Mr. Quinn?

Mr. QUINN. That’s precisely how I interpret it.

Mr. WAXMAN. If you’re trying to get something for your client,

you don’t want a lot of opposition to be drawn to your request.

That’s not saying you didn’t want the President to have all the information, you just don’t want a lot of people to start weighing in

on it.

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct. And I don’t think it would be fair to

read into Mr. Podesta’s comments any purpose on his part to be

helpful to this effort.

Mr. WAXMAN. You left the White House counsel’s position in

1997. You talked to Mr. Holder in 1999 and then in the year 2000.

That was within the 5-year period, although you have an interpretation where you don’t feel you violated the ethics rules.

Let’s say it hadn’t been 5 years later, Mr. Holder. Would you

have been any more influenced with Mr. Quinn coming to you had

it been 5 years or 2 years or 3 years? You knew he was representing a private client.

Mr. HOLDER. No. I mean—no.

Mr. WAXMAN. These waiting periods, on the revolving door. I

mean, you’re an attorney. You were an attorney before you went

to work at the White House. You were the White House counsel.

Then you went back into private practice. I think——

Mr. QUINN. Right.

Mr. WAXMAN [continuing]. Anybody who dealt with you knew you

were in private practice. They might like you because they know

you. They might have thought well of you because you had worked

at the White House, but those things would be there no matter

what period of time we’re talking about.

240

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct. And with respect to the contacts with

Mr. Holder, I should be clear to you that the 5-year rule doesn’t

apply to communications with officials outside the Executive Office

of the President.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. And then I guess the other thing that I

thought was just peculiar, I don’t have any explanation for it, but

Mr. Holder said that Mr. Quinn has stated that he sent a note

about the Rich case on January 10th, and you’ve never received

that note. But the Justice Department got that note at the desk of

the pardon attorney on January 18th. So it was mailed on the 10th.

Mr. Quinn thought you were getting a note. You didn’t have any

idea of it. It lands on the pardon attorney’s desk on the 18th, and

there was very little time at that point to generate the information

that you would have wanted the White House to have.

Mr. QUINN. Sir, it was messengered, not mailed.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK.

Mr. HOLDER. What happened is the executive secretary, the folks

who handle correspondence within the Justice Department, got

that document and referred it—seeing it was a pardon matter, or

interpreting it that way, referred it to the pardoning attorney for

response.

Mr. WAXMAN. So there was a disconnect in what the two of you

thought was going to happen. You thought, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Holder

was going to get it. Mr. Holder didn’t get it because it went somewhere else. Is that a fair explanation?

Mr. QUINN. Right. And for my purposes, what I want the committee to understand is that I wanted Mr. Holder to get the letter.

I wanted him to get it on the 10th. I sent it because I had been

told that his views would be important, and so I wanted him to see

the summary of the argument that I had made to the White House

in the hope that he would be helpful to my effort. But I wanted

that letter to arrive.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, just in conclusion, as Members of Congress,

we have to make decisions all the time. The President has to make

decisions that are far weightier. In this case, he has the exclusive

decision over a pardon. But if someone comes in to me and makes

a case, they usually make their case as good as it possibly can be,

and it’s often quite convincing until I hear the other side, and then

I have to weigh two competing arguments.

It appears from what we have, for whatever reason, and it’s not

a happy situation, that the President really didn’t get all the information that he should have had in evaluating this request by Mr.

Rich for a pardon. I don’t think either of you disagree with that

conclusion—is that safe to say?

Mr. HOLDER. I wouldn’t disagree.

Mr. WAXMAN. If that’s the case, then I think we can say there

was a disconnect, a failure in the process. The President was not

well served. And he made this decision out of ignorance to a great

extent without getting all the information, which means he made

a bad judgment. And we all wish he would have made a better

judgment with all the facts.

But that, again, illustrates the point that I made in the very beginning of this hearing. If he made it on that basis, and it was a

decision that we can now say, looking at all of the information, was

241

a wrong decision, it doesn’t show any illegality. It doesn’t show any

corruption. It shows that the President was poorly served. This was

a—no one doubts—a very smart man. I think if he had all the information, he would have been able to weigh it a little more carefully. He might have agreed with Mr. Quinn still on the indictment

itself and whether the indictment was proper, but he might not

have.

Mr. QUINN. I’m glad you added that, because I don’t want to

leave the impression that I have changed my view on this. I think

he made the correct decision.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, you know all the evidence now that everybody is bringing to us. And you’re telling us that, in your view, not

only because it’s your client, it’s your personal view as you look at

all the evidence, you reach a different conclusion that he should be

pardoned.

Mr. QUINN. Absolutely. But to that point, sir, the pardon only

goes to the indictment. If Mr. Rich is guilty of any of these other

things that have been addressed today by the committee, he’s not

free and clear of those charges. I mean, it’s important, I think, to

bear that in mind.

Mr. WAXMAN. That’s a good point.

Mr. BURTON. We understand that.

Mr. WAXMAN. I don’t think the public fully understood that.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Platts, could I convince you to yield to me?

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Mr. Quinn

and Mr. Holder making themselves available to the committee, but

I yield my time back to you.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, sir, very much.

First of all, I think it needs to be made very clear that the President was not as unaware of all these facts as we’re being led to believe. He knew about Marc Rich. He knew Mr. Rich’s wife, Denise

Rich. He received correspondence and other things about Mr. Rich.

He had access to all the security briefings. He knew of Mr. Rich’s

flight from the country. He knew he had given up his citizenship.

He knew all of that. The President knew these things when he pardoned him, and he did not, according to what we’ve been told, he

did not look into national security issues or CIA issues or FBI

issues or investigations that may have taken place.

And you would think when a person who was an international

figure, who was 1 of the 10—6 most wanted people in the world

by the FBI, you would think that the President would at least

check all of those things before he granted the pardon.

So, you know, I mean, to say the President was not well served

may be correct, but to say that he wasn’t aware of the gravity of

the situation, I think, is in error. The President knew. He had to

know that.

Now, let me just ask a couple of other questions here on another

issue.

Mr. Quinn, you worked for Arnold and Porter.

Mr. QUINN. I did, sir.

Mr. BURTON. And you were getting a retainer of $55,000 a month

with $330,000 up front——

Mr. QUINN. Correct.

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. As a retainer, right?

242

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. You left them, and I guess the contract stayed with

them; is that right? What happened? They went on just to a feefor-service with that law firm?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. And you have said that you didn’t receive any fees

from Mr. Rich. You said something about a box of chocolates. It

was all going to be voluntary if you got that. That just seems very

unusual to me. Don’t most attorneys have some kind of a contractual agreement when they leave a law firm with a new client?

Mr. QUINN. Yeah. Let me try to explain this to you. The fees you

just reported were received by Arnold and Porter. And, of course,

as a partner, and because I had a contractual relationship with a

firm, I benefited to some extent from those fees. To another extent,

the fees went to other partners of the firm.

After leaving Arnold and Porter, I did consider and discuss with

Mr. Fink whether we should have a new arrangement. I came to

the conclusion that, particularly because of the fact that we were

unsuccessful in achieving a resolution of this at the Southern District, and because I didn’t think, frankly, there would be that much

more additional time in it, and because I believed that the earlier

payments had been fair and reasonable, that I would see this

through to the end simply on the basis of the fees we had been paid

earlier.

Mr. BURTON. So you received nothing further from Mr. Rich?

Mr. QUINN. I have not received any further fees from him on this

pardon matter.

Mr. BURTON. Have you received any fees from him for anything?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. You’ve received no fees from Marc Rich or his—how

about any of his companies or friends or associates?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. All that was received was from the—to the law firm

that you previously worked with?

Mr. QUINN. Right.

Now, it is clear to me that, as we move forward in the future,

I can bill him additional fees. It’s clear to me that I’m going to have

to spend some additional time on this. And as you’ve no doubt noticed, I’ve had to retain my own counsel, and I expect to be reimbursed for that. But I had no contingency fee arrangement with

him. I had no success fee arrangement with him. He is not legally

obligated to pay me anything.

Mr. BURTON. Do you have any kind of an understanding where

he is going to give you a lump sum of money or funds down the

road for the services you’ve rendered?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. The only understanding I had was that I

would be able to bill him additional—reasonable additional fees for

additional services. I had no agreement that I’m going to get any

lump sum of money down the road.

Mr. BURTON. You know, he’s one of the wealthiest men, I guess,

in the world. I mean, he’s the No. 1 commodities trader in the

world, as I understand it. And it just seems unusual that you

would—that you would be representing him, getting him a pardon

from major crimes, one of the six most wanted people in the world

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by the FBI, you get this pardon for him, and you don’t get anything

for it, just because he’s a good-looking guy, I guess.

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, I’m on the losing end of this discussion

because—no matter which way I had done it, because if I had had

the kind of commitment to receive some large lump sum down the

road, I’m sure you’d be very critical of my having done that.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, probably. That’s why I’m asking these questions.

Mr. QUINN. Right.

Mr. BURTON. But you’re not getting any funds here or abroad or

anyplace else——

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. From Mr. Rich?

Mr. QUINN. None abroad. But, again, let me be clear——

Mr. BURTON. Yes.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. I anticipate of being able to bill him additional fees for my services, and I anticipate receiving from him

reimbursement for the legal expenses that I have to incur.

Mr. BURTON. And you’re going to bill him on the regular or

what’s considered a reasonable lawyer’s fee per hour.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. But no lump sums, no money coming in from anyplace else?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. I have no such commission.

Mr. BURTON. If I ever get in trouble, would you do that for me?

I mean, I would really like you to do that for me for nothing. I

mean, maybe I look half as good as Mr. Rich, I don’t have his

money, but I could sure use the help if I have legal problems if I

could get you to do that for nothing. You’re a heck of a guy.

Mr. QUINN. Well, I don’t think it’s right to say I’m doing it for

nothing. I was finishing up at a matter for which I was paid.

Mr. BURTON. But the money is at the law firm over there. Are

you still getting money for that? Are you still getting fees for that?

Mr. QUINN. No, but I did.

Mr. BURTON. I see. But when you left, you left——

Mr. QUINN. When I left, I left.

Mr. BURTON. Yeah.

Mr. QUINN. But, again, I didn’t think that I needed to—there

weren’t that many additional hours involved. He had paid a generous fee at the time.

Mr. BURTON. My counsel said there was 60 to 100 hours that you

put in. Is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. On—yeah, I think that was my estimate of how

much additional time I have spent.

Mr. BURTON. Sixty to 100. May I ask what you charge an hour?

Mr. QUINN. Over a pretty long period of time.

Mr. BURTON. Yeah, but most attorneys around this town charge

$500 an hour or so. I mean, you probably charge more than that.

But 100 hours, you know, at $500 an hour is a pretty good chunk.

Mr. QUINN. Again, but I’m trying to be very precise here. It has

always been clear to me that if I put in significant additional time

on that matter, that I would be able to be compensated for it. But

what I am telling you is that I had no specific arrangement with

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him. I had no contingency fee. I had no success fee promise. I had

no commitment from him to pay me a particular sum of money.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Holder, looking back on this case, is it clear in your mind

now that Mr. Rich should not have been granted the pardon?

Mr. HOLDER. I think somebody asked me a question similar to

that before. I wasn’t exposed to everything. I can’t know all that

the President considered. The question that was put before was

knowing all——

Mr. BARR. Well, in your opinion.

Mr. HOLDER. Knowing all that I know now, would I have made

a recommendation against the pardon; and the answer to that was

yes. Knowing everything that I know now, I would have recommended against it.

Mr. BARR. Was the pardon attorney ever made aware of this case

before the pardon was granted?

Mr. HOLDER. They received on the 18th that letter from Mr.

Quinn that was sent to me but got routed to them, the January

10th letter to me that enclosed the January 5th letter to the President from Mr. Quinn. So that would be the night before—the day

before.

Mr. BARR. What did they do with that?

Mr. HOLDER. As I understand it, the pardon attorney prepared

a draft of some sort, which I have not seen—draft of some sort indicating that Mr. Rich, for some reason, didn’t fit the criteria for a

person eligible for a pardon. But I’ve never seen the draft.

Mr. BARR. So it’s your impression that they were opposed to the

pardon?

Mr. HOLDER. As I understand—again, I’ve not seen the draft, but

that is my understanding, that for technical reasons.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, have we subpoenaed that? Will we get

that?

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me, I was reading something.

Mr. BARR. Apparently in response to the two letters that Mr.

Quinn sent to Mr. Holder, but which Mr. Holder never got, they

were mistakenly routed or routed to the pardon attorney.

Mr. BURTON. Uh-huh.

Mr. BARR. And Mr. Holder said it’s his impression that they prepared a document in response to that, and the sense, it would seem

to me, is that they had objections to the pardon. We don’t know

that because we haven’t seen it. Can we get that document?

Mr. BURTON. Yes. We would like to request that. But if necessary, we will be glad to send a subpoena for it. Hopefully.

Mr. HOLDER. Again, I’ve heard about this document, and I’m

sharing this with you. I don’t know 100 percent that exists.

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman would yield, that document would

be at Justice right now; would it not?

Mr. HOLDER. I assume so. I have never seen it, but I assume it

will be.

Mr. BURTON. We will instruct our staff—OK. We’ll check into

that, and, if necessary, we will have the staff contact Justice about

that.

245

Mr. BARR. Did the Southern District of New York oppose the pardon?

Mr. HOLDER. You mean before the—they never weighed in on the

pardon. They were never contacted.

Mr. BARR. OK. So they didn’t even know that a pardon request

or a petition had been submitted.

Mr. HOLDER. That’s correct.

Mr. BARR. How about the FBI?

Mr. HOLDER. Did not weigh in.

Mr. BARR. NSA?

Mr. HOLDER. No.

Mr. BARR. CIA?

Mr. HOLDER. No.

Mr. BARR. State?

Mr. HOLDER. No. Again, there were no contacts between the Justice Department and these agencies.

Mr. BARR. I’m confused, Mr. Quinn. I thought you said you were

really searching for—I think the word you used was a robust exchange of ideas and discussion about this case. Nothing about this

seems to be robust.

Mr. QUINN. I used that, I believe, sir, in the context of saying

that it was my understanding from the remarks Mr. Podesta made

recently on a Nightline show that there had been such a discussion

within the White House.

Mr. BARR. There certainly was nothing robust about any discussions anywhere in the Department of Justice.

Mr. QUINN. I think that’s fair.

Mr. BARR. Was Mr. Clinton keenly interested in this pardon?

Mr. HOLDER. Mr.——

Mr. BARR. Did he take a special interest in it?

Mr. HOLDER. I’m sorry, Mr. Keen?

Mr. BARR. Mr. Quinn—Mr. Clinton, the former President.

Mr. HOLDER. I have never discussed the pardon with him.

Mr. BARR. I’m talking with Mr. Quinn.

Mr. HOLDER. Oh, I’m sorry.

Mr. BARR. Was the President robustly engaged in this?

Mr. QUINN. Well, again, when I spoke to him, I came away with

the impression that he was familiar with the argument that was

made in my filing. And I’m also of the impression from these comments that Mr. Podesta made and otherwise that there was a fair

amount of discussion about this matter, at least in the White

House.

Mr. BARR. You may be right about that.

Exhibit 63, please, this is an e-mail from Avner Azulay, who

works for Marc Rich, to you, Mr. Quinn, on January 10. I believe

item 2 indicates an e-mail that DR, Denise Rich, I presume, called

from Aspen. Her friend B, as in Barr, but not Bob Barr, who was

with her got a call today from POTUS, President of the United

States, who said he was impressed by JQ’s—I presume that’s you—

last letter, and that he wants to do it and is doing all possible to

turn around the White House counsels. DR, Denise Rich, thinks he

246

sounded very positive, but that we have to keep praying on the activity and all this. There shall be no decision this weekend, and the

other candidate, Milken, is not getting it.

One question I have for you, Mr. Quinn, is who is B?

[Exhibit 63 follows:]

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248

Mr. QUINN. I believe it’s a friend of Denise’s, Beth Dozoretz.

Mr. BARR. Finance chair of the DNC?

Mr. QUINN. Former. Was. I think hasn’t been for at least a year.

That’s my impression anyway.

Mr. BARR. Pardon?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t believe she has been for the last year or so.

Mr. BARR. I think you’ll find it’s a lot more recent than that.

Mr. QUINN. OK. I don’t know when. I know she’s not at this

point.

Mr. BARR. Why would the President be sharing this information

with the finance chair of the DNC? What do they have to do with

it?

Mr. QUINN. I was on the receiving end of this e-mail, and I don’t

know the answer to that. I was aware of this e-mail.

Mr. BARR. Work with me, speculate a little bit, why would the

DNC finance chair be involved here?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I believe—my impression was that Denise and

Beth were—have been friends, and that, in fact, they grew—— Mr. BARR. I suspect so.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. That they grew up in the same town in

Massachusetts up north.

Mr. BARR. Denise Rich is a major contributor to the DNC, isn’t

she?

Mr. QUINN. I now know that to be the case.

Mr. BARR. You knew then?

Mr. QUINN. No, I did not know the extent of her—— Mr. BARR. See, there you go. I know you may not know the extent, that’s a weasel word that you used on TV also. You certainly

knew that Denise Rich was a major contributor to the DNC.

Mr. QUINN. I assume she was a contributor.

Mr. BARR. You would be right.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Yes.

The call from POTUS, the President, was not to Denise Rich, it

was to the former chairman of the finance committee for the DNC.

I wonder why he was calling her and talking about this part. I can

understand him calling Denise Rich. Why did he call the former

head of the DNC?

Mr. QUINN. But let me be clear, I don’t know that he called her

about this.

Mr. BURTON. Didn’t it say in the memo? Maybe I misheard.

Mr. BARR. Clearly it was about this.

Mr. QUINN. I believe that—my impression was that in the course

of the conversation they were having she asked him what is happening with these two pardon applications, and apparently was

with Denise Rich at the time, which may have motivated her to ask

the President in the course of the conversation, but I was not of

the impression, I want to be careful to say this accurately, that the

call was placed for the purpose of discussing the pardons.

Mr. BARR. The President is talking with the finance chair of the

DNC about the Rich pardon and lamenting the fact that he’s trying

to have to turn around all of these recalcitrant White House counsels. Why would that be something that would be of interest to the

finance chair of the DNC?

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Mr. QUINN. Again—— Mr. BARR. Why would the President feel obligated to tell her

about this?

Mr. QUINN. Again, my impression is that these two women were

friends; that they were together at a time when the President

called one of them.

Mr. BARR. If other people had been there, he would have discussed it with them, too?

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time is expired. My time is coming

up. I’m going to yield it to you. I just have one comment, and then

we will go to colleagues on that side, because we’re going through

the second round—finishing up with the second round.

The comments have been made time and again that the President was not well served, and he did not know all about this, and,

yet, here he is talking to the former head of the DNC finance committee, talking about this, saying he’s got to turn White House

counsels around so everybody will be on board to pardon Mr. Rich.

This shows very clearly that the President was very engaged and

had to know about all of these things. Now he chose not to look

at the national security issues evidently, because as far as we know

he didn’t ask the CIA, the DIA, the FBI or the other intelligence

agencies, NSA.

But he did know about this, he was engaged, so engaged that in

a conversation with the former head of the DNC, when Ms. Rich

was in attendance, that he went into it in some detail and said he

was trying to turn White House counsels around.

You know, that shows, I think, very clearly that he was much

more involved and aware of this than any of us have thought.

I will yield the balance of my time to you, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Exhibit 67 is another e-mail, Mr. Quinn. I think this one is from

Bob Fink at the law firm of Arnold & Porter to you—— Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARR [continuing]. In which he states Mike Green called

after speaking with Peter who spoke with Podesta. It seems that

while the staff are not supportive, they are not in veto mode and

that your efforts with POTUS are being felt. It sounds like you are

making headway and should keep at it as long as you can. Who is

Peter? Is that Peter Kadzik?

[Exhibit 67 follows:]

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Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. Podesta’s personal attorney. Is that who he is?

Mr. QUINN. That’s my understanding, and he’s a partner of Mr.

Green’s.

Mr. BARR. So he’s now involved also, along with B. Podesta indicated that the White House staff were not supportive of the pardon

requests.

If that’s the case who other than the President at the White

House was in favor of it? Was he the only one in support of it?

Mr. QUINN. I genuinely don’t know how this broke down at the

end of the day.

Mr. BARR. I think you’re being too modest. I mean, you knew all

of these people. You know all of these people. You were having a

lot of conversations with them. Different names are coming up.

Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Mr. BARR. I’m sure you didn’t go back to your client, and say,

hey, I have no idea what is going on over there. I suspect you did.

I’m just trying to get a feel. Was anybody at the White House supportive of this other than the President?

Mr. QUINN. I knew there was significant opposition, particularly

in the White House Counsel’s Office, and that was one reason why

I made an effort to continue to sharpen the arguments and make

them more compelling. I’m trying to be precise, and I have to tell

you that, therefore, that come Friday when he makes this decision,

I don’t know who was in the room with him, and I don’t know what

advice he got from Beth Nolan or what he heard Beth say about

her conversations with Mr. Holder.

Mr. BARR. Did you only have one conversation with Ms. Nolan,

Mr. Holder about this?

Mr. HOLDER. No, I think I had two. I think I had one on the 19th

and one sometime before that, but I’m not sure exactly when. I

think I had a very brief conversation, both of them were very brief

conversations, but I think I had one other one. I’m not sure exactly

when.

Mr. BARR. Apparently, I don’t want to put words in anybody’s

mouth, but apparently Ms. Nolan was, I don’t know, was she in

favor of this petition, Mr. Quinn? What was her position?

Mr. QUINN. Again, Congressman, I know that at some point she

was not favorably disposed, but I do not know what her advice was

at the time he made the decision.

Mr. BARR. Did she ever make her views known or her position

made known to you, Mr. Holder?

Mr. HOLDER. No, she did not.

Mr. BARR. What did you all talk about?

Mr. HOLDER. We had very, very clipped conversations. As I indicated before, the conversations would start out with a process question of trying to get the Justice Department to be more efficient in

the processing of pardons and then just kind of——

Mr. BARR. How can they be more efficient if the White House

isn’t telling you what is going on? In fairness to you all, didn’t you

say, hey, look if you want us all to be more efficient, why don’t you

tell us what is going on?

252

Mr. HOLDER. You have to understand, I don’t know at that point

that there are things that are not being presented to the Justice

Department. I was talking about things that we had at the time.

Mr. BARR. You had to have known. How could you not know?

You knew that the Southern District of New York, the people who

prosecuted the case, were opposed it.

Mr. HOLDER. I was talking about other parties. There are—I

thought you were referring to the other 40 or some at the Justice

Department.

Mr. BARR. You said that in here. You said that law enforcement

in New York was strongly opposed to it. You knew they were going

to oppose it.

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah.

Mr. BARR. That’s your testimony.

Mr. HOLDER. I’m not sure what the question is.

Mr. BARR. The question is, you knew that there was a lot of opposition to this. I don’t want you to legitimately sit there and say

you didn’t know that.

Mr. HOLDER. That’s right, and I tried to convey that to Ms.

Nolan when I said that I was neutral, but that there were people

in law enforcement were opposed to this.

Mr. BARR. That’s conveying opposition.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BARR. I would hate to see how you would convey a case that

you really were opposed do.

Mr. HOLDER. I think what I actually said was the Southern District would actually go nuts; that’s what I think I said to her.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. BARR. Certainly.

Mr. BURTON. Let me tell you, in your telephone calls you talked

to Nolan seven times on the 19th the day before the pardon was

granted. And you’re saying that there was just a cursory conversation twice in those seven calls about Marc Rich, even though the

President said he was trying to turn White House counsels around

on this.

It seems to me Ms. Nolan, if she was opposed to it, would have

been, you know, hollering to high heaven trying to convince the

President not to do it, and he said he was trying to turn them

around so they would all be on board, and you’re saying you only

talked to her twice very briefly.

Mr. HOLDER. Yes, but one conversation on the 19th, the other

conversation I believe was sometime before that.

Mr. BURTON. But you only talked to her only one time out of

those seven calls about Marc Rich on the 17th?

Mr. HOLDER. I think that’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. You think that’s correct or do you know?

Mr. HOLDER. I can’t say now 100 percent, but I would be about

99 percent certain that we only had one conversation about Marc

Rich.

Mr. BURTON. We will ask her that one question when we see her.

The gentleman’s time is expired.

Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Yes. Mr. Quinn, I’m not up on pardon law, but

I think you’ve become an expert in the last couple of months.

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Pardons obviously don’t only apply to American citizens, they

apply to foreign citizens; is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. By virtue of the fact that the President did issue

a pardon, does that resolve what Mr. Rich’s citizenship is by receiving and accepting that pardon from the President? Does that wave

all of his contention that he hasn’t been an American citizen for the

last 18 years?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. And, again, as I commented to Mr. Waxman

earlier, the pardon only goes to the allegations within this indictment. If there are other matters that were not addressed by the indictment, whether it’s trading with Libya or Cuba or anything like

that, and if, and I’m emphasizing if, he were guilty of some crime,

the pardon would not relieve him of responsibility for that.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Well, if it’s reasonable to believe that he’s one

of the wealthiest men in the world, he’s obviously a multi-billionaire, and his income must be extraordinary high, hundreds of millions of dollars a year, and if he were an American citizen for the

last 18 months, I think one of the New York prosecutors suggested

that there’s an 18-year tax obligation.

Is there any assurances that were made to the President that he

wouldn’t upon the receipt of this pardon immediately reassert that

no, I’m not a Swiss citizen or an Israeli citizen and therefore I have

no tax obligation?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, that did not come up. But again the pardon

doesn’t go to that. If it were determined that he violated a law,

whether it were income tax law or trading with Cuba or—— Mr. KANJORSKI. I understand that. But the question is can he reassert that he owes no taxes because he’s a foreign citizen and

we’ve lost the possibility of collecting those 18 years of taxes?

Mr. QUINN. I have not discussed with him whether he would do

that, but I suppose the answer is he could.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Would you help him if he wanted to do that?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, I don’t think I had be getting involved in

that matter.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I appreciate that. Just to correct a couple of impressions. What I gathered, hearing your testimony earlier, that

there isn’t any question that the President was aware of the information in your petition, in your discussions with him, it was obvious that he had been briefed or had read your petition—— Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI [continuing]. And knew the facts? That is not to

say that he was aware of the other side of the case that could have

been made but wasn’t made or at least we have no testimony that

it was made to the President; is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So regardless of the fact that—of those being the

facts, it’s very possible that he was persuaded on just your petition,

and that is what he was arguing with the White House counsel on,

your petition alone, and without the benefit of the negative facts?

Mr. QUINN. I believe that’s true, but if I may say so again, I have

been under the impression, and Podesta said as much on the television, that there was significant debate about this. There were

people who articulated reasons why this shouldn’t happen.

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Mr. KANJORSKI. But do you have knowledge—for instance, did

the President know that this man was a fugitive, or was he getting

the impression from your petition that he wasn’t a fugitive?

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, I was not privy to those discussions,

so I can’t tell you what arguments were made inside the Counsel’s

Office of the White House. All I can tell you is that on more than

one occasion, I urged the White House counsel to communicate

with the Department of Justice and get his views.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I understand. But from all of the testimony of

Mr. Holder and some of the other people, obviously they didn’t take

your advice and they didn’t receive the information that would

have indicated the negative side of the case.

So the question I have is, do you have any question as to whether or not the President knew he was a fugitive, or is it possible he

accepted your interpretation of the argument and your petition and

that he wasn’t a fugitive?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know, Congressman, whether or not the issue

came up over there. But going back to the premise you laid, it’s not

true that he didn’t have advice from the Department of Justice.

Now, you may say it came too late or that it was too abbreviated

or that it didn’t involve everyone it should have involved—— Mr. KANJORSKI. Maybe I’m a little confused here. I thought I

heard Mr. Holder say he really wasn’t involved, and he had no real

opinion. And he didn’t know—was he dealing with somebody else

at the Department of Justice other than Mr. Holder?

Mr. QUINN. No. But let me just point out that on Monday afterwards Mr. Holder told me that he had expressed a point of view,

and he had described it accurately here today—or he described it

the same way he did to me that Monday, neutral leaning toward.

Beth Nolan, when I said to her that I understood from Mr. Holder that had been his point of view, she said to me the pardon

wouldn’t have been granted without his input or without his expressing a point of view.

And, third, the former President said to me that it was his understanding at the time he granted it that he had advice from the

Department of Justice.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So on the basis of that interpretation, what Mr.

Holder was saying is that he is neutral but leaning in favor, if

there’s a foreign policy consideration was being interpreted by the

staff at the White House and the President that, in fact, the Justice Department was on board, but as we’ve heard Mr. Holder’s testimony, that was a false impression?

Mr. QUINN. Yeah, and—but, Congressman, all I can tell you is

what Mr. Holder said to me, what Ms. Nolan said to me and what

President Clinton said to me.

Now, in fact, what each of them said to me is consistent. Again,

one may say I wish the President had additional input from the

Department of Justice or input from Mr. Auerbach, but what I’m

telling you is that President Clinton, White House Counsel Beth

Nolan, and Mr. Holder all confirmed to me that he had made his

point of view known.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings.

255

Mr. CUMMINGS. Who had made their point of view known? I was

just following up on what you just said.

Mr. QUINN. Right. On the Monday after the pardon was granted.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just tell me who is. You just said—— Mr. QUINN. First, I want to be sure you have all three of these

conversations. On the Monday following the pardon, Mr. Holder

told me that he had said to the White House counsel he was neutral, leaning toward favorable on the pardon.

I had a subsequent conversation with the White House counsel,

and I said to her that Mr. Holder had told me that. Her response

to me, while not confirming his advice in so many words, was if Mr.

Holder hadn’t participated in the process or something to this effect, this pardon wouldn’t have happened.

I had yet a further conversation with President Clinton in which

the subject of my conversation with Mr. Holder came up, and I repeated what I understood him to have told the White House counsel, and he said to me something to the effect that was my understanding, too, or that’s my recollection.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, I’m just sitting here and I’ve got to

tell you it’s very frustrating, because it seems as if we have a decision that was made by the President—and I don’t care how I look

at it. I can look at it upside down, right side up.

It sort of reminds me of my 6-year-old when she was 3, she

would say, daddy, let’s go play hide and go seek, and she would

stand right in front of me and put her hand up to her face and say,

daddy, you can’t find me.

It just seems to me that there was enough information available.

I mean, this is the United States of America. This is the most powerful government. We’ve got information flowing everywhere. We’ve

got so much information we can’t even keep up with it.

It seems to me that the President should have had the appropriate information to make this decision. Mr. Holder says he

didn’t—he never got a file. He says that it was a neutral—he said

he was neutral, leaning toward, but that wasn’t really based on too

much information.

Then you’ve got Ms. Nolan, who now, correct me if I’m wrong,

Mr. Quinn, says—I mean, does she have information? Did they

have the file? Did she have all——

Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. She had the information?

Mr. QUINN. Yes. She had what I filed, and she may have other

materials too, but I don’t know that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So it just seems to me that the President—I

don’t care how I look at it, it’s hard for me to believe that he was

properly served. I always say that in order to make a proper decision, you’ve got to have proper information. And it just seems like

a series of errors that happened in this case, and I still conclude

that what the result was was very unfair.

It’s clear that there is nothing too much we can do about this decision. The damage of the decision is far-reaching. I don’t even

think we even understand the damage.

In about an hour, I’m going to return to the inner city of Baltimore, and there will be a few people who can afford cable TV, who

will have seen this hearing. And they’re going to ask me about

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$330,000 retainers and $55,000 a month. They’re going to ask me

about a guy who evaded taxes—I mean, allegedly, allegedly evaded

taxes, when they can barely afford to go to H&R Block to even

have theirs filled out.

They’re going to talk about the fact that this is the Government

of the United States and they’re going to say, Mr. Cummings, how

can that happen when the police are arresting us for simple things?

I will tell you, some kind of way—and the reason why I say it’s

done so much damage is because if we are going to have justice,

we must not only have justice, we must have the perception of justice, very important.

When American people lose their faith in this government, we’ve

got a problem. I think it was Mr. Barr or somebody said a little

bit earlier, we were talking about the elections down in Florida. I’m

not trying to bring this up, but it’s a point when people lose faith

in the process of this government, we’ve got a problem.

And when President Bush, when we met with him the other day,

he said he wanted to restore faith. And I hope somebody will give

him some clips from this, because I hope that when it comes time

for him to do his pardons that he will have the information that

is appropriate so that he can make good decisions, because I just

don’t think that we realize how this affects people.

They tell me that there are people who—I’ve spoken a little earlier. The phones rang off the hook, Americans calling in when I

spoke, saying he’s right, and in some kind of way we have got to

correct this system.

So I hope that—I hope we learn from this. I hope that—you

know, I just hope in some kind of way people will realize that this

is not the way that government is supposed to operate, because the

little fellow who lives in Indiana in your district, Mr. Burton, and

the little fellows and little ladies that live in my district, they don’t

even understand this. They don’t even have a clue.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. I think you summed up

the feelings of a lot of us very, very well.

We will now go to Mrs. Davis.

You’re going to yield to Mr. Barr, and then as soon as Mr. Barr

concludes his questioning, we will go to the counsel for his questions.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

Mr. Quinn, going back to exhibit 63, it goes on, we first have the

President calling B, Beth, who is the finance chair of the DNC. I

just want to make sure we all understand the President was calling her and tells her he thinks basically that you’re doing a bangup job, but it’s those persnickety White House counsels that are

standing in the way, but to keep praying.

The last point that is made, and this is from Avner, who sent

this e-mail. I shall meet her and her friend next week. She will

provide more details.

What was the result of that meeting with the DNC finance chair?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know, sir. I don’t know. I mean, there may

be some other e-mail reporting something further.

Mr. BARR. If there were, wouldn’t they be in the documents here?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. And I just——

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Mr. BARR. But they’re not.

Mr. QUINN. Right. What I’m saying to you is I don’t believe I

heard anything further, any more details about this.

Mr. BARR. Did this have to do with further contributions? Do you

know?

Mr. QUINN. The way I interpret this is that he had a phone conversation that he was going to see one or both of these people in

the next week and would find out additional details about the

phone conversation. That’s what I understood it to mean. And to

the best of my recollection, I never heard any further details about

the phone conversation.

Mr. BARR. That might be something we want to check into also,

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman would yield real briefly.

Mr. BARR. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. At the top of this memo that Representative Barr

is referring to right now, there’s a big section that says redacted.

Do you know what that was? I mean, because we would like to

know what that is in there. This is a pretty relevant document.

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. That redaction, I think the legend down here

indicates that it came from the Piper Marbury firm, and that redaction would have been done by them. I don’t know the explanation of it.

Mr. BURTON. We will contact them and find out about that.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Quinn, what is the HRC option?

Mr. QUINN. Are you referring to a particular document?

Mr. BARR. Do you know what that is?

Mr. QUINN. Is it in this document?

Mr. BARR. Yes. It’s not in that particular one. It’s in a number

of documents. I’m asking if you know what the HRC option is.

Mr. QUINN. Yes. There was a discussion that went back and forth

about whether or not an effort should be made either to solicit the

support of Mrs. Clinton for the pardon application or at least inform her that it was pending, and there was a great deal of discussion about that.

There was also discussion from time to time about trying to enlist the support of others, such as Senator Schumer; you know, we

would see reports about soliciting the support of King Juan Carlos

of Spain. In the end, I’m confident that I never communicated with

the First Lady about this, and I don’t believe that anyone else did.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield very briefly?

Mr. BARR. Exhibit 43 is—yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just followup on that. The Senator indicated

in a television interview that she was in a meeting where pardons

were discussed. Were you in a meeting with her and the President

when she may have discussed pardons?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. She said she took no active role. I believe that’s

what she said. I don’t want to quote her incorrectly, but she did

indicate that she was in a meeting where pardons were discussed.

And you’re saying that you had no knowledge of that, were not in

any of the meetings with her where that was discussed?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

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Mr. BURTON. OK. Thank you.

Mr. BARR. Exhibit 43, which is another e-mail from Bob Fink to

you and others, I think, and it talks about the HRC option. I guess

you’ve cleared that up. That’s Hillary Rodham Clinton option; is

that what that is?

Mr. QUINN. Again, I’m sorry, I’m not trying to be difficult. I just

don’t see that phrase in here.

Mr. BARR. Exhibit 43, or you can look at 45 also. It says the HRC

option. It appears in a number of e-mails. I’m sorry, 45.

[Exhibit 45 follows:]

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Mr. QUINN. I see it in 45.

Mr. BARR. It says—— Mr. QUINN. Again, these reflect the debate that I described earlier as to whether—— Mr. BARR. The robust one?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. These reflect the debate that went on among

lawyers working on this, about whether or not to reach out to Mrs.

Clinton to seek her support for the party.

Mr. BARR. You all were considering all of the options?

Mr. QUINN. Precisely.

Mr. BARR. Including the political angle here trying to see what

support you all could get from New York?

Mr. QUINN. That’s right.

Mr. BARR. Reaching out to possibly Chuck Schumer. Did anybody

ever stop and think about such things as national security, justice?

Mr. QUINN. It has been my testimony repeatedly here today that

on more than one occasion I encouraged the White House counsel

to seek the views of the Department of Justice.

Mr. BARR. You keep saying that. There’s nothing on the record

that backs you up on that, and you might have suggested to him— and I suspect you suggested to him—to call Mr. Holder—— Mr. QUINN. That’s right.

Mr. BARR [continuing]. Because you had conversations with him

and, apparently, something led you to believe that he would back

you up.

Mr. QUINN. I wouldn’t go that far, but I thought he was.

Mr. BARR. You certainly wouldn’t encourage people to call him if

you knew he was going to oppose it, I wouldn’t think.

Mr. QUINN. Look, but I thought I should encourage them to call

the Department of Justice, and more than that, I expected them to.

I didn’t think they would act on this pardon application without

consulting with the Justice Department. I thought that would happen.

Mr. BARR. I believe you. I think what the President has done

here is utterly unbelievable, and that’s why some people might

think that there’s some other reason why he would do something

so preposterous that it even surprised you. And it certainly surprises us.

Mr. QUINN. I think he did it on the basis of the legal arguments

I put in front of him. Others may disagree with the legal arguments I put in front of him and may say that they wouldn’t have

decided it this way, but I have no basis to think that he was motivated by anything other than the legal arguments.

Mr. BARR. Why would he talk with the head of the DNC finance

director; why wouldn’t he have shared his legal theories with Mr.

Holder?

Mr. QUINN. Look, on that conversation, again, I don’t think that’s

a fair characterization of it. As I recall, hearing this, my impression

was that he had a conversation with this person who happened to

be with the ex-wife of Marc Rich at the time of the conversation.

Mr. BARR. But the President called this woman. It wasn’t he

called Denise Rich. He called this woman.

Mr. QUINN. But you’re assuming that he called her about these

pardons, and I don’t understand that.

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Mr. BARR. I’m not assuming it at all. All I know is, based on the

e-mail, they talked about that. Now it may have been the purpose

of his call; it may not. But they obviously talked about it.

Mr. QUINN. That’s right. My impression is that she raised these

questions in the course of a conversation with him.

Mr. BARR. So you are somewhat familiar with that conversation?

Because that isn’t what the e-mail says. You’re adding to it.

Mr. QUINN. I’m just telling you the impression I came away from

with it. I did not—in other words, when I read this e-mail, I did

not have the impression that he was calling her to discuss these

pardons, because I wouldn’t have a reason to think he would do

that that would be the purpose of placing that phone call.

Mr. BURTON. Let me take 5 minutes; and if you need time, I will

be glad to yield to my colleague as well.

I want to read to you some e-mails. The first one is from—I don’t

know who it is, it’s from Gershon Kekst, to Robert Fink. It says:

Good point. Can Quinn tell us who is close enough to lean on Schumer? I’m certainly willing to call him but have no real clout. Jack

might be able to tell us quickly who the top contributors are,

maybe Bernard Schwartz of the Loral Corporation in California

that got all of those transfers to allow technology to go to China.

Bernard Schwartz, the largest contributor to the DNC.

Did you talk to Bernard Schwartz about this?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. In fact, I didn’t followup on that e-mail.

Mr. BURTON. You didn’t followup on that e-mail?

Mr. QUINN. In any way.

Mr. BURTON. But you did get that e-mail?

Mr. QUINN. I did get the e-mail, but I never reached out.

Mr. BURTON. Did you talk to Schumer?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. You didn’t talk to Schumer. Did you ask anybody

to talk to Schumer for you?

Mr. QUINN. No.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ask anyone to talk to Schwartz for you?

Mr. QUINN. No.

Mr. BURTON. You didn’t?

Mr. QUINN. No.

Mr. BURTON. This was just a dead issue then?

Mr. QUINN. It just wasn’t something I was going to followup on.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Here’s another one. Here’s another message

from Avner which you did not receive. Avner is looking for suggestions on who could contact the Senior Senator and ask for support

so that the only request for help from the Jewish community is not

to HRC. It may be that DR, Denise Rich, can play this role as well.

What do you think? And what do you think of Pinky’s suggestion.

Who is Pinky?

Mr. QUINN. That’s the other—that’s Mr. Rich’s partner, Pincus

Green.

Mr. BURTON. Pincus Green, I see, OK.

Here’s another one.

Mr. BARR. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, can I ask what was Pinky’s

suggestion?

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Mr. QUINN. I don’t know what that refers to, and there was a lot

of speculation and a lot of kicking around of ideas that were not

part of the pardon application I made to the President.

Mr. BURTON. We understand that, Mr. Quinn, but I think this

is one of the things that the American people would like to know

about—— Mr. QUINN. Fair enough.

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. What goes on when you’re trying to get

a pardon where you’re trying to use influence and money and everything else to get it done.

Mr. QUINN. As long as we’re clear that was not followed through

on. I never—— Mr. BURTON. These were people with whom you did business legally, weren’t it, that were sending you these e-mails?

Mr. QUINN. Sure, but that doesn’t mean it happened.

Mr. BURTON. I know you were talking about it. How do we know

it didn’t happen?

Mr. QUINN. Well—— Mr. BURTON. You’re telling me it didn’t happen.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. They’re suggesting that you do it?

Mr. QUINN. Right.

Mr. BURTON. But you didn’t do it?

Mr. QUINN. That’s right.

Mr. BURTON. But let’s see what they said, OK?

Mr. QUINN. All right.

Mr. BURTON. I’ve been advised that HRC, Hillary Rodham Clinton, shall feel more at ease if she’s joined by her elder Senator of

New York who also represents the Jewish population. The private

requests from DR shall not be sufficient. It seems that this shall

be a prerequisite for her formal position, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

All senators are meeting on January 3rd and then shall take off.

Bob can you check with Gershon which is the best way to get him

involved. I shall check with Abe. Who is Abe?

Mr. QUINN. I think that’s a reference to a man named Abe

Foxman.

Mr. BURTON. Who is he?

Mr. QUINN. He is senior official of some American Jewish organization. I’m not sure which one.

Mr. BURTON. But I see in this other memo that we talked about,

exhibit 45, a while ago, once again it says in this memo, thus I

think we, but mostly you and Avner, should discuss the possibility

of call from Denise and Abe maybe together; otherwise, I would

have you to do what you are already doing and volunteer our help

if there are any questions raised by the White House lawyers or

by the SDNY, Southern District of New York, if it is contacted.

So Denise and Abe evidently were asked to work together to try

to use their influence on this?

Mr. QUINN. But, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that ever happened.

Mr. BURTON. All of these e-mails and all of these memos and all

of this stuff suggesting people you can go to push the buttons to

get the pardon for Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, none of that ever happened?

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Mr. QUINN. I do not believe—— Mr. BURTON. No, no. You say you do not believe. You know,

we’ve had the White House people—— Mr. QUINN. You have me under oath. I want to be careful—— Mr. BURTON. I understand. We’ve had you before—and I want to

clarify one point. We’ve had a lot of people before the committee

from the White House before, Mr. Ruff, God rest his soul, and others, and they always say I do not believe, I can’t remember, I don’t

recall. All of those are very good things to do to make sure you

don’t step in a bear trap.

Mr. QUINN. Right.

Mr. BURTON. But you’re not saying categorically that none of this

happened.

Mr. QUINN. I’m saying that I believe it did not happen.

Mr. BURTON. You’re not saying categorically it did not happen?

Mr. QUINN. Well, because, Mr. Chairman, I’m under oath, OK?

I am telling you that it is my testimony that as far as I know this

did not happen. I did not—— Mr. BURTON. As far as you know, it could not happen? You do

not believe it could not happen?

Mr. QUINN. I did not participate in following up on any of this.

Mr. BURTON. You did not in any way participate?

Mr. QUINN. In following up on these suggestions, OK?

Mr. BURTON. On these suggestions?

Mr. QUINN. I do not believe that anyone approached Senator

Schumer. I do not believe that anyone approached Senator Clinton.

That’s the best I can do, sir.

Mr. BURTON. But you do not believe. But it was suggested by

your law partners to you and to others that these were avenues

that should be pursued and that maybe if certain people got together that some would come along?

Mr. QUINN. Yes. There’s no doubt those ideas were suggested,

and I think that they died there. But that’s—— Mr. BURTON. OK. I think that we will now go to the counsel for

his questions, and then we will adjourn this.

I will tell you this, though, we will be looking at other documents

and, if necessary, subpoenaing documents and other individuals;

and if they take the fifth amendment or choose not to testify, we

will get them immunity and we will force them to testify. Because

there’s so many questions being raised about possible influence—

I don’t want to put words in your mouth—possible influence, peddling and possible other things, that we just can’t let this thing die.

And I understand that the new President wants to move ahead

with his agenda, and I am for that. Tax cuts and all the things

we’re talking about, education reform and everything, I’m for that.

And I wish him well, and we want to work with him to do that and

move on from this.

But today additional questions have been raised that must be answered if we’re going to get to the bottom of this, and so we will

now yield to general counsel for his comments.

Mr. QUINN. May I take a 5-minute men’s room break?

Mr. BURTON. You have to do something about your bladder.

Mr. QUINN. I keep drinking this water.

Mr. BURTON. All right. We will take a 5-minute break.

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[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. We will now resume. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Referring to exhibit 65, an e-mail from Avner dated Friday, January 12th, to Jack Quinn. It says, following Marc Rich’s meeting

with the Prime Minister, the latter called the President of the

United States this week, and the President of the United States

said he is very much aware of the case, in quotes, that he is looking into it, and that he saw two fat books which were prepared by

these people.

We’ve heard a lot of testimony here that the President didn’t

have all the information. What is the two fat books and who are

these people?

[Exhibit 65 follows:]

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Mr. QUINN. I think the two volumes were the pardon applications, which was filed in two parts, and these people I think refers

to me and the other lawyers who submitted the petition.

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So he was well aware of the

pardon request and all of the information going on on the 12th.

That’s 8 days prior to his final day. So it wasn’t like he just got

the information on the 19th and had to give a quick decision.

Mr. QUINN. That’s right. And, in fact, when I heard this, you

know, I was encouraged that he was actually looking, because he

clearly had the petition itself.

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. We will now go to the counsel and try to wrap this

up.

Mr. WILSON. I will try and go quickly. I’ve got a number of subjects to cover, so I will go quickly.

Mr. Quinn, the Chair asked you some questions about compensation. Mr. Quinn, the chairman asked you some questions about

compensation earlier. Apart from your attorney’s fees, will you accept any money from Mr. Rich in the future?

Mr. QUINN. Well, look, I don’t think it would be fair to ask me

to commit never to accept moneys from him. As I’ve said to you,

if I do work that justifies my billing him for it, I will do so. I expect

to be reimbursed for the expenses I’m put to in connection with

this. Those are the only moneys I anticipate receiving from him.

Mr. WILSON. But as far as your work done in pursuit of obtaining

a pardon for him, you do not anticipate him—you’re not going to

ask him to pay you any money?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. You’re not going to accept any money if he did offer

it to you; is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. I only anticipate receiving from him moneys in connection with work I may do.

Mr. WILSON. My question was, will you accept any money if he

offers it to you for the work you did in obtaining the pardon?

Mr. QUINN. I have no idea what he might offer. It’s a hypothetical question. I don’t think I should be required to say—— Mr. WILSON. It’s not a hypothetical question. It’s a very clear

question. If Mr. Rich offers to pay you money in the future for work

you did in pursuit of obtaining his pardon, will you accept it or will

you not accept it?

Mr. QUINN. I will not bill him, and I will not accept any further

compensation for work done on the pardon.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough.

Mr. Holder, could you please describe for us, just so we have this

clear in the record, each of your contacts with the White House,

anybody employed in the White House?

Mr. HOLDER. I think there would be two, the two conversations

that I’ve described with Ms. Nolan.

Mr. WILSON. And those are the extent of your contacts on the

Marc Rich matter, correct?

Mr. HOLDER. I believe that is right. Yes, I think so, the one on

January 19th and one that happened sometime before that.

Mr. WILSON. And what was the duration of each contact as far

as the Marc Rich matter was concerned?

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Mr. HOLDER. I mean, it’s hard to say, but I really think a couple

of minutes, I mean, or perhaps even shorter than that. I mean,

these are very clipped conversations, very abbreviated conversations.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Mr. Quinn, do you know whether or not former

President Clinton has ever met Marc Rich?

Mr. QUINN. I have no reason to think he has. I don’t believe he

has.

Mr. WILSON. OK.

Mr. QUINN. But I don’t know that firsthand. I don’t believe he

has.

Mr. WILSON. One thing we discussed earlier was the material

that you provided to Mr. Holder. I’m directing this at Mr. Quinn.

You sent him a cover letter and a two-page letter, and it was misdirected, and we covered that at some length earlier on. Why did

you not send Mr. Holder the pardon application?

Mr. QUINN. I believed that a good deal of the material included

in the pardon application consisted, at least in their central parts,

of the materials that I had provided to him in October 1999 when

he asked Mr. Margolis to take a look at this matter. But you’re correct. I did not at that time send him a copy of the full pardon petition.

Mr. WILSON. The question was, why did you not do that? Is it

because you thought he had all of the material from over a year

previous?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I thought he was sufficiently familiar with the

underlying case that, when he was asked, he would be in a position

to advise the White House.

Mr. WILSON. That’s an interesting observation, because the pardon application you prepared is comprised of many tabs. The first

tab is your legal reasoning as to why Mr. Rich merited a pardon.

Had you prepared that in 1999?

Mr. QUINN. No, but I had prepared to Mr. Holder a summary of

the flaws and the indictment in the case.

Mr. WILSON. But you had not provided the extent of your ultimate argument to the President, so you didn’t feel that he needed

to see that?

Mr. QUINN. Well, again, I think, in fairness, you have to say, if

you look at the material I provided to him earlier about the flaws

in the indictment, you will see that it was the same argument

made in the pardon petition.

Mr. WILSON. The concern that we feel, and you can help us answer the concern or disabuse us of our error, is that when you prepare—I worked in big law firms, and you prepare large binders of

your material, and you’re generally very proud of them. You work

very late into the nights. You get everything just right. You make

sure that every comma is appropriate and every period is there.

Because you’re proud of your work, and you believe in your work,

you want to provide it to people. It’s not a matter of how much it

costs, because that’s not the issue. You would like to provide it to

people so they can see the extent of what you are representing in

whatever matter you’re pursuing.

And, generally, it seems when you don’t provide material to people it’s because you don’t want them to review it or you don’t want

268

them to poke holes in it or perhaps find a flaw. I mean, the courts

require briefs. You have to provide them so they can see your legal

reasoning.

In this case, were you concerned that if you provided Mr. Holder

your application that Mr. Holder might send it on to somebody who

might actually read it and look at it?

Mr. QUINN. Absolutely not. Again, I had provided these arguments to him at an earlier point.

Mr. WILSON. You haven’t provided all of the arguments, all the

letters and all the other things in the tabs. You couldn’t have provided them previously.

Mr. QUINN. Fair enough. The other point I was going to make

is, as I said earlier, I encouraged the White House Counsel’s Office

to reach out to him, and there’s no reason in the world why they

couldn’t have shared a copy of the pardon petition when they did

so.

Mr. WILSON. I understand, but I’ve not yet heard of a lawyer who

has decided to take a weak argument and leave it on the table

when he’s strengthened his argument. And presumably the point of

the pardon application is you’ve made it bigger and better and

more thorough, and you’ve put all the letters in, and you’ve gotten

everything just right.

And if you believed in your argument, it seems, and if you

thought it would withstand the scrutiny of Southern District lawyers or Mr. Holder’s staff or the pardon attorney, it’s hard for us

to understand, even if it was the 11th hour, why you simply

wouldn’t put it in an envelope, messenger it over, let Mr. Holder

take a look at it, take it home, spend a couple of hours. He could

think to himself, maybe we want to talk to security people; maybe

we want to send it over to the FBI.

It’s just—we still don’t understand. I guess what you said is you

provided material the previous year, and that was enough for Mr.

Holder.

Mr. QUINN. Well, look, you can disagree with me on this. I was

not—I didn’t make that decision in an effort to hide the pardon petition from anybody. I encouraged the White House to reach out to

the Justice Department and seek their views. That’s my testimony.

Mr. WILSON. We’ve had these e-mails about secrecy and under

the radar. Mr. Holder, do you think that—would you have liked to

have had a copy of the pardon application?

Mr. HOLDER. Sure, and I thought that we would get one from the

White House. I thought that’s where—at a minimum, we would get

it from them that—something having gone to them that they would

refer that back to the Justice Department so that we could do the

things we do when it comes to pardons.

Mr. WILSON. Just shift for a minute, Mr. Quinn. What happened

when Otto Obermeier went to Switzerland in the early 1990’s? Tell

us about the negotiations with Mr. Rich.

Mr. QUINN. I wasn’t on the case. I know that they had conversations, but I’m really not the person to tell you in detail about this.

Mr. WILSON. You told us about the intransigence of the Southern

District of New York, how they weren’t working with Mr. Rich.

Mr. Holder, you’ve been a U.S. attorney. How many—give us

each time that you can remember when a U.S. attorney has flown

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to a foreign country to negotiate with a fugitive. How many occasions are you aware of?

Mr. HOLDER. How many times did I do that?

Mr. WILSON. No, any in the history of the United States, for a

broad question.

Mr. HOLDER. You just talked about Mr. Obermeier. Maybe that’s

what you’re describing here. I’m not aware of any. I don’t know of

any.

Mr. WILSON. I’m not either. We’ve looked at this, and I’m not

aware of any.

Mr. Quinn, you’ve explained at great length in your pardon application and here and television and other places about the intransigence of the Southern District of New York and how they won’t—

they weren’t working with Mr. Rich. And they weren’t trying—they

weren’t able to solve the problems that might have resolved this

issue.

There was a U.S. attorney that flew to Switzerland and met with

him, which is an extraordinary thing, and it sounds like you don’t

even know what happened.

Mr. QUINN. I know that meeting took place. I was not on the case

at that time. My references to the intransigence of the Southern

District was with respect to their unwillingness to sit down and

meet with the tax professors and review the case and try to come

to a resolution of it at any time in the last decade or so.

Mr. WILSON. But, surely, if Mr. Obermeier went over and was extraordinary reasonable, offered what reasonable lawyers would consider a prospect for a resolution to the matter, and Mr. Quinn or

Mr. Rich behaved the way he was behaving when he was shipping

steamer trunks out of the country, and by your own admission,

your own letters, having his lawyers behave in relatively outrageous conduct, I mean, isn’t there a time when the Southern District of New York might decide that things have gone along pretty

far and, without any indicia of good faith, they can’t negotiate any

further? I’m just trying to figure out why you didn’t find out what

happened in that meeting, because it seems like you make representations without knowing facts.

Mr. QUINN. That’s not the case. The meeting, contrary to what

I think is your impression, was not, as far as I was concerned, an

indication of any willingness on the part of the Southern District

now to review developments in the law, including the change in

DOJ policy about the use of RICO in tax cases or the McNally development in the Supreme Court.

Mr. WILSON. I thought you said you didn’t know what happened

in the meeting.

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me just a moment, if I might interrupt.

Then what did he go over there for? I mean, if he wasn’t over there

to do some kind of negotiations with Mr. Rich, why do you think

he flew over there? To go skiing or what?

Mr. QUINN. All I know is that it was an incomplete process, and

it didn’t reach a resolution of the matter.

Mr. BURTON. No, but the point is the Justice Department was

trying to get this thing resolved; otherwise, why would the U.S. attorney fly all the way to Geneva or Switzerland?

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Mr. QUINN. Mr. Obermeier did make that effort, but it didn’t

work. And in subsequent years, the Department refused to talk to

Mr. Rich’s attorneys about developments in the law, about the

analysis of the tax professors, about the contrary position that the

Department of Energy had reached.

Mr. WILSON. See, our problem here is you tell us that the process

doesn’t work because of the bad actions of prosecutors in the Southern District of New York, including your former partner, Mr. Litt,

including Judge Gerald Lynch, including the two gentlemen that

testified earlier today. You’re telling us that these people engaged

in—you haven’t gone as far as saying bad faith—but they’ve acted

badly. They have done things they shouldn’t have done. They have

overcharged. You have told us all these things. And yet you’re unable to address whether they made an effort to recover. Perhaps

when Mr. Obermeier went over, he said, we’ll drop the RICO count.

If you give us X, we’ll do Y.

Mr. QUINN. But I’m also imparting knowledge to you that this

impasse did have a good deal to do not just with the prosecutors,

but with Mr. Rich and the lawyers who represented him initially.

They were very much to blame for it as well. But, look, I was simply trying to get this thing to a resolution. I didn’t come on to get

him a pardon. I came on to try to persuade the Department of Justice, and later the Southern District of New York, to look at a case

through a different set of glasses.

Mr. WILSON. And it sounds like you were unable to obtain a

meeting, and you had to go to the next phase. That’s——

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. One of the big factual issues, I don’t want to go into

this at great length, but the prosecutors this morning told us about

how Mr. Rich set up duplicate bookkeeping. They set up fraudulent

books to hide the transactions that were conducted back in the

early 1980’s. Tell us a little bit about the duplicate book arrangement and how that is OK in your eyes.

Mr. QUINN. Well, my understanding of these transactions is that,

in fact, they were structured lawfully and that——

Mr. WILSON. No, I wanted to ask about the duplicate books, not

the transactions so much, but the duplicate books. Have you ever

seen the duplicate books?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Did you ever ask?

Mr. QUINN. No. But I—again, this is an allegation that has been

made by the Southern District. I do not think that it undercuts the

argument that these transactions were lawfully structured and

that the—as the tax professors concluded—that there was, in fact,

no further tax due and owing to the United States.

Mr. WILSON. But——

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman will yield. Let me—they had a duplicate set of books. As I understand it, they had one set of books

that was handled in a pretty formal way. And then they had a set

of handwritten books where they put the money, and it was called

the pot.

Mr. QUINN. I understood——

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Mr. BURTON. And the handwritten books were the ones that

showed very clearly that they were trying to hide money so they

wouldn’t have to pay taxes on them.

Mr. QUINN. Well—— Mr. BURTON. You haven’t seen those books?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. But what was going on here was that oil

companies like ARCO and Rich—— Mr. WILSON. Let me—if I can interrupt.

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Mr. WILSON. We don’t want a recitation of your theory of the

case. I’m just asking about the dummy books.

Mr. QUINN. I understand. I’m not trying to filibuster by reciting

the case.

Mr. WILSON. You told us a moment ago there was an allegation

about dummy books. But the prosecutors actually have the dummy

books. They exist. I’m just asking you for the reason for the dummy

books. I mean, when you have fraudulent transactions set out in

meticulous detail, why do you do that? I mean, it’s one thing if you

say you don’t understand the Department of Energy regulations.

Your lawyers got it wrong. The law is bad. You had a bad day. All

these things you can say. But when you go through a conspiracy

with individuals to set up fraudulent bookkeeping techniques I am

only asking you, why did they set up the dummy books?

Mr. QUINN. The bookkeeping they engaged in was, as I understand it, designed to facilitate the effort that they and ARCO were

engaged in to find ways to sell domestic oil, the price of which was

regulated, let’s say, down to $10 but that was worth $30 on the

world market. And what they were doing was setting up—was linking domestic and foreign transactions through a series of tiered

trades, the result of which would be that for, to simplify it, two

barrels of oil, they would end up getting a total of $60. So they

were trying to find ways around the price control regulations of the

Carter years.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I appreciate the simplification, but where are

the dummy books coming into the story? That’s all I’m asking

about. I know your story because I’ve read everything you’ve written. But I want to know about the dummy books.

Mr. QUINN. They well may have had records that kept track of

these linked transactions.

Mr. WILSON. So you don’t even know that they had these

records?

Mr. QUINN. The prosecutors alleged that these were designed to

facilitate a fraud. As I understand it from them, they were designed to keep track of money that was owed for linking one transaction to another. But let me repeat that the—even if that’s evidence of their doing something in violation of those Energy Department regulations, it doesn’t undermine the tax analysis of the professors.

Mr. WILSON. But apparently the tax professors didn’t know about

that. I mean, we’ve been through this already. The tax professors

did an analysis based on the facts that were provided to them, stated very clearly that the lawyers for Mr. Rich have given us the

facts, and did an analysis accordingly of the facts, apparently. But

we won’t be able to determine that.

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Let me move to something else, the fugitivity issue. We now

have—there are three sort of things going on with fugitivity. One,

Mr. Quinn did not believe that Marc Rich was a fugitive. The counsel for former President Clinton is, in an e-mail, purported to have

said—and this is an e-mail from Mr. Quinn to at least two people,

with a courtesy copy to Marc Rich—she, that’s Beth Nolan, she responded that this is still a tough case, that the perception will nevertheless be that MR is some sense, and quotation marks are put

around sense, a fugitive.

So Beth Nolan is not saying in this e-mail I think Marc Rich is

a fugitive. She’s saying I think in some sense he’s a fugitive. You

don’t think he’s a fugitive at all.

Mr. Holder, you were the No. 2 lawyer at the Department of Justice. Can you help us out here? What do you think? Was Marc Rich

a fugitive?

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah, I think he’s a fugitive, and that is the reason

why, as I’ve indicated in my testimony on a couple of occasions, I

didn’t think the pardon request would be granted.

Mr. WILSON. And if you were grading a final exam right now,

and Mr.—I don’t know if you heard the testimony earlier, but Mr.

Quinn had presented to you his argument about fugitivity and how

Marc Rich isn’t a fugitive, does it pass the laugh test?

Mr. HOLDER. I mean, I think it’s an interesting argument. It’s

not one that I would agree with but—— Mr. WILSON. Well, I mean, what’s interesting about it?

Mr. HOLDER. It’s creative, perhaps. Let me say that.

Mr. WILSON. The Department of Justice had him on a list of the

six most wanted international fugitives in the world. I’m not quite

sure what’s interesting. It just seems deceptive.

Mr. HOLDER. Well, I don’t agree with his analysis. I would agree

that he is—I would say that he is a fugitive.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Mr. Quinn, what’s the meaning of this, the

quotation marks around the word sense for Ms. Nolan’s analysis of

the fugitivity issue? Did she think Mr. Rich was a fugitive, or did

she not think Mr. Rich was a fugitive?

Mr. QUINN. I think what she was saying is you may argue that,

merely because he’s not breaking any law by failing to return, and

that being the case, he’s not in some sense that you mean a fugitive. But the reality is going to be that, however you may argue

around it, he’s going to be regarded as a fugitive.

I think—and if anything, you know, I would say to you that this

at least shows that the White House was well aware that fugitivity

was an issue. And it must have been discussed at some level there.

Whether they asked Mr. Holder about it, I—— Mr. BURTON. If I might interrupt. This goes back to that phone

call or e-mail to the—was it a phone call? I guess it was a phone

call to Aspen, CO, where it was said that, you know, that Mr. Rich

was being discussed by the President and his counsels at the White

House, and that he was having a difficult time convincing them

that there ought to be a pardon, and asked them to pray about it.

Which is kind of interesting.

But the fact of the matter is, the President was engaged and was

talking to his counsel, according to this memo and phone call,

about the pardon. And I think that’s very important, because we’ve

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heard time and again that he was not engaged and didn’t have all

the facts, but he was very definitely engaged all the way through

this thing.

Mr. QUINN. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. That’s my impression as well.

Mr. BURTON. Even though he’s considered a fugitive by Beth

Nolan and others.

Mr. WILSON. I’ll get back to that. But before I forget, the tax

analysis that is so important to the petition you filed with the

White House was prepared by Mr. Ginsburg and Mr. Wolfman.

How much were they paid for their analysis?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t know the answer to that because I wasn’t involved in the case when they did it.

Mr. WILSON. Would you be able to find that out and submit that

for the record, please?

Mr. QUINN. Yeah, I’m pretty sure I could.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. Now, going back to the fugitivity, your

argument was my favorite of all, because we started off with some

examples before. And just try for the record—we’re trying for the

record to get a sense of this issue. If somebody hijacks an airplane,

and they fly to Cuba with the intent of staying in Cuba, and they

get there and they haven’t yet been indicted, under your definition

they are not fugitives, correct?

Mr. QUINN. Look, it would depend on whether the United

States—as I was defining fugitive in terms of whether or not it was

itself a violation of the law to fail to return to the United States.

I mean, we can—— Mr. WILSON. If I could just interrupt you, the list of fugitives on

the Department of Justice fugitive list, you know, they’re on there

for murder and armed robbery, and Mr. Rich’s case, because he at

the time was the largest tax cheat in American history. But, you

know, I don’t think any of them were charged with a crime of

fugitivity; they were charged with their underlying crimes.

But I just want to ask you, you know, here you’ve got all the people watching. You’re a Washington lawyer. You’ve got a guy. He

gets on the airplane, he hijacks an airplane. He gets to Cuba. He

gets indicted later for hijacking an airplane. And somebody comes

up to you and says, is this man a fugitive? Would you say yes or

no?

Mr. QUINN. I was using fugitive——

Mr. WILSON. Well——

Mr. QUINN. I want to tell you what I did here. I want to address

the facts.

Mr. WILSON. But you’re trying to convince the White House counsel and the President and other people about him being a fugitive.

Mr. QUINN. And they’re as capable as you of rejecting my interpretation. I made an argument in that letter. You’ve seen it. You

reject it. They may have rejected it. For all I know, they did.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Let me—because we’re trying to create a

record, I’ll just ask again. The guy that hijacks the airplane and

gets to Cuba, do you think he’s a fugitive, or do you not think he’s

a fugitive?

Mr. QUINN. It would depend, under my interpretation of that

word, whether or not it was——

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Mr. WILSON. Which word? The word fugitive?

Mr. QUINN. Fugitivity, yes.

Mr. WILSON. No. Fugitive. We’re using it as a noun.

Mr. QUINN. We can beat this as long as you want to. I’m going

to repeat. I was using it in the sense of being—of it being a criminal conduct to refuse to return or submit oneself to the jurisdiction.

I think that’s clearly what I said in the letter. You may disagree

with it. They may disagree with it.

Mr. WILSON. So, I mean, that does stand for the propositions

that, in the future, if you commit a crime and you get out of the

United States before you get indicted, you shouldn’t be called a fugitive. You shouldn’t be—have that word.

Mr. QUINN. That’s how I was urging that they interpret the

word.

Mr. WILSON. OK. And it sounds like the White House counsel

signed off on that.

Mr. QUINN. I don’t come to that—I don’t think it’s fair to come

to that conclusion. You’d have to ask them.

Mr. WILSON. OK. The last thing I wanted to get to was the comment, the neutral but leaning toward comment from Mr. Holder.

You had referred to a foreign policy benefit. And I won’t sort of go

back through exactly what you said there, but the question that

we’re left with as we sort of work through this is, is that all that

matters?

And let me explain that. Should there be a balancing of other

facts to determine whether the other facts are more important than

the foreign policy objective? For example, if a mass murderer flew

off somewhere, and wherever he went to, you know—the Sheinbein

case is a good example. Somebody who murders somebody in the

Washington area and flies to Israel, and we tried to extradite him.

I mean, there’s a foreign policy benefit if you just give a foreign

government what they want. But aren’t there other facts to be balanced?

Mr. HOLDER. Oh, yeah, absolutely. I didn’t mean that was the

only thing to be considered. And that’s why I said leaning toward,

that would be—that could be a factor that I would think people

could consider and something that at least would make me move

a little bit if there were a foreign policy benefit.

You know, I am opposed, for instance, to a pardon for Jonathan

Pollard. I’ve been on record for that. And yet if—and this is, you

know, something that had been discussed. If that had somehow,

the granting of the pardon had somehow led to Middle East peace,

something that the Israeli Government had requested, I mean that

might be something taking into account a variety of things.

Mr. WILSON. That I understand, and that’s fair enough. But if

you’re the person in the loop on this issue, you’re talking to the

White House counsel, and you explain I’m neutral but leaning toward, and you mention the foreign policy benefit, unless you give

them the balancing facts, the countervailing facts, how are they

going to figure it out for themselves?

I mean, unless you can come and say look, you know, if there’s

a foreign policy benefit, fine, but I would like to tell you the guy

did this and this and this. And the prosecutors say this. And his

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level of contrition is this. And if you don’t give them the factors,

who will?

Mr. HOLDER. But I didn’t tell them, you know, if there is a foreign policy benefit that we reap from this, I think this pardon

should be granted. I didn’t say that. I did say neutral, which, as

I said, is kind of a word, I don’t if it’s term of art necessarily—but

certainly in the way that I used it with Beth Nolan, given the previous conversation that we had.

So I didn’t mean to imply by that and I don’t think a reading of

that would support the notion that I meant to say if there’s a foreign policy benefit, I support the pardon. I was simply trying to say

that is something that kind of moves me in order to be something

I think you ought to consider in making that determination.

Mr. WILSON. Why would you use the neutral—the term neutral

if you were not in command of the facts?

Mr. HOLDER. But that’s what I—I mean, when I told her—because what’s my position? I’m either for the pardon, I’m against the

pardon, or I’m in the middle. I used the term neutral as the middle, because what I told her in that earlier conversation was that

I was neutral because I don’t have a basis for a determination one

way or another.

Mr. WILSON. But apparently you didn’t. You then qualified that

by saying, but leaning toward. And that’s you. That’s what you

were doing, not what they would do if they thought there was a

countervailing foreign policy benefit. It is—that’s what the Deputy

Attorney General, the No. 2 guy, the fellow whose office supervises

the office of the pardon attorney. You’re saying you’re leaning toward something which does convey a very qualitative assessment

of the situation. And the difficulty we face and the hard part over

the next few weeks for us is to try and determine why, based on

no facts, you would say leaning toward.

Mr. HOLDER. Well, as I said, simply to indicate that, given where

I was before, that if there is a policy, foreign policy benefit, that

might be something that could move you. Again, I think it’s significant that I didn’t say if it’s a foreign policy benefit, do it. I’m just

saying—or that I would recommend doing it. I’m just saying I

would lean toward. It was something that I was trying to be careful

with as I expressed it to her. Maybe I was inartful, but I was trying not to give her the impression that the mere existence of the

foreign policy consideration would be sufficient for me to say this

is something that ought to happen.

Mr. WILSON. But you didn’t have a specific foreign policy benefit

on the table at that time.

Mr. HOLDER. That’s why I also said, if there is a foreign policy

benefit that might be received.

Mr. WILSON. But, still, how can you put in the qualification leaning toward, if there is no benefit on the table? I mean, what would

lead you to go that extra step to say something other than I don’t

know anything about this or I’m neutral or something that puts

you in the middle? Why would you say anything unless there’s

some tangible benefit that you are thinking about? That’s the hard

part for us.

Mr. HOLDER. Yeah, I don’t mean—we’re talking past each other.

I mean, if—when I say I’m neutral, but leaning toward, neutral

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means I’m kind of where I was before, don’t have the ability to

make that determination. If there is a foreign policy benefit, then

that kind of moves me. I think, you know, I—as I said, I tried to

be careful in relaying that to her so that it would not be misinterpreted. Perhaps I didn’t do as good a job with her or with you. It

seems kind of clear to me, but I guess I haven’t explained it as well

as I might.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I want to thank the counsel and the staff on

both sides for their hard work on this and all the Members for

being so patient today. And I want to thank you both for your patience, especially you, Mr. Quinn, because you’ve been here, I

think, since about 10 a.m. That’s almost 9 hours. I think most of

the Members of Congress, most of the members on the committee

feel that this was the wrong thing to do and a miscarriage of justice. Nevertheless, it was done. We will try to find out more about

this in the weeks to come.

But as for now, we want to thank you for being here. Thank you

for your patience. And I think that’s all we have. We’ll stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jo Ann Davis follows:]

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(279)

THE CONTROVERSIAL PARDON OF

INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE MARC RICH

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:10 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Burton, Morella, Shays, Mica, Davis of

Virginia, Souder, Scarborough, LaTourette, Barr, Ose, Davis of

California, Platts, Weldon, Cannon, Putnam, Otter, Schrock, Waxman, Kanjorski, Sanders, Mink, Norton, Cummings, Kucinich,

Davis of Illinois, Tierney, Clay and Jackson Lee.

Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; James C. Wilson, chief

counsel; David A. Kass, deputy counsel and parliamentarian; Mark

Corallo, director of communications; M. Scott Billingsley, John

Callender, and James J. Schumann, counsels; S. Elizabeth Clay,

Caroline Katzen, Nicole Petrosino, and Jen Klute, professional staff

members; Jason Foster and Kimberly A. Reed, investigative counsels; Gil Macklin, senior investigator; Kristi Remington, senior

counsel; Sarah Anderson and Scott Fagan, staff assistants; Robert

A. Briggs, chief clerk; Robin Butler, office manager; Michael Canty

and Toni Lightle, legislative assistants; Josie Duckett, deputy communications director; John Sare, deputy chief clerk; Danleigh

Halfest, assistant to chief counsel; Corinne Zaccagnini, systems administrator; Phil Schiliro, minority staff director; Phil Barnett, minority chief counsel; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy chief counsel; Jon Bouker, Paul Weinberger, and Michael Yang, minority

counsels; Christopher Lu, minority deputy chief investigative counsel; Michael Yeager, minority senior oversight counsel; Ellen

Rayner, minority chief clerk; Earley Green, minority assistant

clerk; and Andrew Su, minority research assistant.

Mr. BURTON. Good afternoon. A quorum being present, the Committee on Government Reform will come to order. I ask unanimous

consent that all Members’ and witnesses’ written opening statements be included in the record, and without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and extraneous or tabular material referred to be included in the record, and

without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that a set of exhibits which was shared

with the minority prior to the hearing be included in the record,

and without objection, so ordered.

280

I also ask unanimous consent that questioning in the matter proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule 11 and committee rule 14

in which the chairman and ranking minority member allocate time

to the committee members as they deem appropriate for extended

questioning, not to exceed 60 minutes, equally divided between the

majority and minority, and without objection, so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that questioning in the matter

under consideration proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule 11

and committee rule 14 in which the chairman and ranking minority member allocate time to committee counsel as they deem appropriate for extended questioning, not to exceed 60 minutes, divided

equally between the majority and minority, and without objection,

so ordered.

Good morning. Today we’re holding our second hearing regarding

the President’s last-minute pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus

Green. Since our last meeting, there have been a number of new

developments, but before I talk about that, let’s go back and look

at what we learned in our first hearing.

On February 8th, the first thing we learned was that the normal

review process at the Justice Department was completely bypassed.

Jack Quinn testified that he delivered the pardon application to the

White House on December 11th, but it was never delivered to the

Justice Department for review. We released an e-mail that showed

that Mr. Rich’s lawyers were doing their dead level best to keep the

pardon application secret, to keep it from getting shot down.

We heard from Deputy Attorney General Holder, Eric Holder.

Mr. Holder was told by Mr. Quinn in November that Marc Rich’s

pardon application would be submitted directly to the White House.

Mr. Holder didn’t tell the pardon attorney. He didn’t tell the prosecutors in New York, who were responsible for the case and who

worked on it.

On January 19th, Mr. Holder was called by the White House

about the pardon. At this point it was clear that this pardon of an

international fugitive was under serious consideration. Again, he

didn’t contact the pardon attorney, and he didn’t contact the prosecutors in New York. In that January 19th phone call, White

House Counsel Beth Nolan asked Mr. Holder what he thought

about pardoning Mr. Rich. He told her he was neutral, leaning toward, but he admitted that he never reviewed the case. He never

talked to prosecutors about it. The only information he had was

former White House Counsel Jack Quinn. Now, how could he be

neutral, leaning toward when the only information he had seen

about the case came from Marc Rich’s lawyer?

We released an e-mail that showed that President Clinton called

Beth Dozoretz about the pardon. Beth Dozoretz is a former finance

chairman of the Democrat National Committee. She also pledged to

raise $1 million for the Clinton library, and she’s a close friend of

Denise Rich, Marc Rich’s ex-wife. Neither one has cooperated with

this committee so far. According to that e-mail, the President wanted to approve the pardon, and he was doing all he could to turn

around the White House counsels.

Why was the President on such a different wavelength from his

staff? Why would the President call a fundraiser about a pardon,

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but he wouldn’t ask his own Justice Department for an opinion?

Now there’s new developments.

That was 3 weeks ago. A lot’s happened since then. I said all

along that I don’t want to drag this investigation out, and I mean

that. At the same time, new information is coming out so fast, it’s

almost impossible to keep up with it. I want to just mention a few

important developments. First, we have learned that Denise Rich gave $450,000 to the

Clinton library. That’s on top of the $1.2 million that she gave to

the Democrat campaigns. We need to learn more about that. Second, we learned that Beth Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton library.

Third, we learned that the President’s brother-in-law Hugh Rodham got more than $430,000 for helping two people get pardons. He received a $200,000 contingency fee from Glenn Braswell,

who was convicted of fraud. At the time of the pardon, Mr.

Braswell was still under investigation by the Justice Department

for tax evasion. He got another $200,000 to help Carlos Vignali get

a pardon. Carlos Vignali was convicted of shipping 800 pounds of

cocaine from Los Angeles to Minneapolis. That’s more than $5 million worth of cocaine, and they were going to turn it into crack.

Fourth, we learned that the former First Lady’s campaign treas- ury received $4,000 to help two people who are trying to get pardons.

And fifth, we learned that the President’s brother Roger Clinton

asked for pardons for a number of people. We need to find out if

any money was promised to Roger Clinton, and we need to find out

exactly what he did on behalf of these people.

We’ve learned more important detail in just the last 2 days.

Today the New York Times reported that the First Lady’s older

brother Tony Rodham helped get a pardon for someone who was

paying him as consultant. The Justice Department opposed his pardon, but it was approved anyway.

We received a new document that shows that prosecutors, the

prosecutors in the Marc Rich case, offered to drop the RICO charge

against Mr. Rich if he would return to the United States to face

trial. I believe that was in 1999. Now Mr. Quinn has been telling

us that this RICO sledgehammer was what forced Mr. Rich to flee

the country. Well, evidently that wasn’t the whole story, and it

wasn’t quite accurate because they were going to drop the RICO

charge to get him back to stand trial on the other charges, and

there were 50 of them.

We learned that Carlos Vignali, the cocaine dealer who paid

Hugh Rodham, lied on his pardon application. He lied about his

prior offenses, and yet he still got a pardon, much to the chagrin

of the U.S. Justice Department and, I believe, the pardon officials.

We were surprised to learn this week that Eric Holder wouldn’t

sign the Justice Department’s memo opposing Carlos Vignali’s pardon. Apparently he didn’t want to sign any more pardon denials.

He was the Deputy Attorney General, and he didn’t want to sign

a memo opposing a pardon of a major drug dealer. Why?

We’ve learned John Podesta’s personal lawyer Peter Kadzik was

lobbying Mr. Podesta on behalf of Marc Rich. That’s one of the reasons we called Mr. Kadzik here today.

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Finally, on Tuesday the pardon attorney from the Justice Department told us that the night the pardon of Marc Rich was granted,

his office sent information to the White House stating that Marc

Rich was involved in illegal arms trading. That was the night the

pardon was granted. Now, it’s not clear now that this information

was accurate, but nobody at the White House even called back to

ask about it. As far as they knew, they were granting a pardon for

an arms dealer.

The appearances that have been created here are obvious. If you

have friends in high places, you can get around the law. It makes

it look like we have one system of justice for the rich and powerful

and another system of justice for all the rest of us.

Were laws broken? We don’t know. We don’t have all the facts

yet. We want to be responsible. We don’t want to rush to judgment

or make accusations until we have all the facts, but we have an

obligation to try to find out what happened and lay the facts before

the American people.

We want to move expeditiously. In some areas we’re making

progress. We asked the President not to claim executive privilege

so his aides could testify, and he’s done that. That was a positive

step.

We had a problem with the Clinton library. They didn’t want to

comply with our subpoena for information on their donors. If you

read the editorial pages across the country, I think there’s widespread agreement that they shouldn’t try to keep that secret. We

made a great deal of progress on this issue in the last 2 days, and

we’re very close to resolving it. The lawyers for the library have

committed to bringing us more information tomorrow. I had scheduled the library’s president, Skip Rutherford, to testify on the first

panel today. We’ve made enough progress that I’ve excused him. I

appreciate the fact that the lawyers for the library have worked

with us to resolve this.

We asked Mr. Quinn to provide us with written answers to some

questions prior to the hearing, and he’s done that, and we appreciate it. Last night we received answers to the questions we submitted to Mr. Rodham, and that was helpful. And I ask unanimous

consent to place this letter in the record at the conclusion of my

remarks, and without objection, so ordered.

On the other hand, we still have some problems. We wrote to

Roger Clinton. We asked him to provide us with some basic information about who he tried to help get pardons. We asked him how

much money he received, if any. He has not responded. We wrote

to the lawyer for Glenn Braswell. His name is Kendall Coffey. We

asked him for some very basic information, like a copy of the material he submitted to the White House. He hasn’t responded.

The most serious obstacle we have faced is this: We have two key

witnesses who are taking the fifth amendment against self-incrimination. Denise Rich exercised her fifth amendment rights 3 weeks

ago. We don’t know, if she’s done anything wrong. We don’t anticipate that she has, but we sure wish she would answer our questions. We want to get to the bottom of this. Now we are told this

Beth Dozoretz will also take the fifth. These are two people who

are involved in raising money for the President and lobbying the

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President for pardons, and we apparently can’t talk to either one

of them.

Now, Mrs. Dozoretz is here with us today. She was called as a

witness to this hearing. We have received word through her lawyer

that she plans to exercise her fifth amendment rights; however,

this is a personal privilege that must be exercised by the individual

and not through counsel, and that’s why we’ve asked Ms. Dozoretz

to be here, and we hope she’ll reconsider.

On our second panel we have several former senior White House

officials. We have the President’s former chief of staff, John Podesta. We have the former White House Counsel Beth Nolan. We

have the former Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, and

we also have Jack Quinn, who represented Mr. Rich as well as having in the past worked at the White House for the President. And

he, of course, has lobbied for Mr. Rich’s pardon.

The purpose of the second panel is to determine what kind of

process they went through at the White House. We know that Justice Department was not consulted in any meaningful way, so who

was consulted? What information did they use to evaluate the Marc

Rich pardon? Who advised the President? And that’s what we want

to find out from that panel today.

On the third panel we have three attorneys who represented

Marc Rich. We have Robert Fink, we have Lewis ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby,

and we have Peter Kadzik.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today. I know

that Members on both sides here don’t want to spend the rest of

their lives investigating Bill Clinton, and I’m certainly one of them,

but I want people to recognize that we’re facing some significant

obstacles in getting information for the Congress and the American

people who deserve to know the facts. We’re willing to be responsible, and we’re willing to move forward as rapidly as possible. I

want to work with Members on both sides to get this done.

Mr. Waxman asked us to call Scooter libby to testify today. I personally didn’t think that was necessary. There’s no evidence that

Mr. Libby was involved in the pardon process at all. But it was important to Mr. Waxman, so I agreed. And I believe if we work together, we can get this work done very quickly, and we can move

on to other important things that need to be done for the country.

That concludes my opening statement, and I now yield to Mr.

Waxman for his statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

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Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Three weeks ago at the committee’s first hearing on the Marc

Rich pardon, I criticized President Clinton’s actions. I said the Rich

pardon was bad precedent, an end run around the judicial process,

and appeared to set a double standard for the wealthy and powerful. Almost immediately the phones lit up in my office. Oddly many

of the calls came from anti-Clinton viewers accusing me of being

an apologist for the President. But I also received many calls from

Democrats demanding that I explain why I wasn’t supporting

President Clinton’s actions. That’s where I want to start today.

I want particularly to direct my comments to Democrats around

the country who are puzzled why congressional Democrats aren’t

defending President Clinton. Well, if a Republican President had

presided over a pardon process that resembled the chaotic mess

that seemingly characterized the final days of the Clinton administration, I would be outraged and would criticize it. Issuing pardons

is one of the most profound powers given to the President. At a

minimum, the decisionmaking process must be careful and above

reproach. It’s clear that President Clinton’s efforts weren’t.

President Clinton had two equally important responsibilities in

deciding whether to grant pardons. First, the President could not

grant a pardon in exchange for any personal benefit. A quid pro

quo obviously would break the law, and although the President’s

pardon power is absolute, it is not above the law. To this point, I

have seen no evidence that the President broke any law. I’ve seen

a lot of evidence of bad judgment, but not illegality.

But given the extraordinary circumstances of the Rich pardon,

it’s important that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New York fully,

quickly and impartially investigate this issue. The U.S. attorney is

doing that, and its investigation should resolve any question of illegality for the American people.

President Clinton’s second fundamental obligation is just as important as the first. He must protect the American people’s trust

by exercising sound judgment. This isn’t a legal standard, it is a

subjective measure, and President Clinton failed to meet it. The

combination of revelations ranging from the Marc Rich and New

Square pardons to the role Hugh Rodham played in the pardon

process are disturbing, and they raise serious questions about the

President’s judgment. And if anyone should have been sensitive to

this, it was the President. He has been subject to a constant barrage of attacks and scrutiny, some unquestionably justified, but

most reckless and unfair. He knows that whatever he does will be

questioned, even if he didn’t actually do it.

During the battle over impeachment, I repeatedly noted a distinction between private conduct and official activities. The President’s relationship with a White House intern was a personal failing and a betrayal of his family. Everything that sprang from that

scandal, including his false testimony under oath, came from that

personal failure.

In this case, however, Mr. Clinton’s failure to exercise sound

judgment affected one of the most important duties of the Presidency. Bad judgment is obviously not impeachable, but the failures

in the pardon process should embarrass every Democrat and every

American. It’s a shameful lapse of judgment that must be acknowlVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00303 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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edged because to ignore it would betray a basic principle of justice

that Democrats believe in.

I know that many Democrats fear that criticizing President Clinton’s actions will somehow negate all the accomplishments of his

administration. I disagree. President Clinton’s discipline and masterful handling of our economy and his leadership on the score of

international and domestic issues, health and environmental concerns will not be forgotten. Democrats and I hope even some Republicans should be proud of the progress we made and the immense talents President Clinton brought to the White House.

Those truths remain despite the President’s other failings. But

when he makes a serious mistake, as I think he did in this case,

Democrats must be willing to say so.

I hope that helps explain to my Democratic callers why I’ve been

so critical of the President’s conduct, but I also want to address the

anti-Clinton callers who attack me for being an apologist for the

President and the First Lady. At the same time that I believe that

President Clinton made grave errors, I also believe there’s clearly

a double standard that’s applied to him. Pointing out that there’s

a double standard isn’t an attempt to excuse what’s happened, it’s

just the facts.

One major reason we’re holding this hearing is to investigate

whether President Clinton pardoned Marc Rich in exchange for

contributions. Republicans are saying that an investigation is essential because of the suspicious circumstances that Marc Rich’s

former wife gave hundreds of thousands of dollars to the DNC and

the Clinton library. Well, compare this pardon to that which President Bush gave in 1989 to Armand Hammer, the former head of

Occidental Petroleum who pled guilty to making illegal campaign

contributions. According to news reports, Mr. Hammer gave over

$100,000 to the Republican Party and over $100,000 to the BushQuayle Inaugural Committee shortly before he received his pardon.

The appearance of a quid pro quo is just as strong in the Hammer

case as in the Rich case, if not stronger, since Mr. Hammer himself

gave the contribution, but there was never an investigation of

former President Bush.

The committee has now opened a new front by investigating the

involvement of the First Lady’s brother in two of the last-minute

pardons. Here again, there’s a parallel with the Bush administration. According to news reports, former President Bush’s son Jeb

Bush successfully lobbied his father’s White House in 1990 for the

release of an anti-Castro terrorist named Orlando Bosch. But we

aren’t investigating former President Bush or his son, just former

President Clinton and his brother-in-law.

If we are genuinely concerned about the undue influence of relatives on policymakers, there are a lot of examples that we could

investigate in Congress. Representative Tom DeLay is the Majority

Whip. After his brother Randy became a lobbyist for Cemex, which

is a Mexican cement company, Mr. DeLay asked the Commerce Department for special treatment for that company. Senator Ted Stevens’ brother Ben lobbies for organizations that have been reported

to have received millions of dollars in earmarked appropriations.

And Scott Hatch, Senator Hatch’s son, represents entities like the

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American Tort Reform Association, even though they have extensive interests in Senator Hatch’s own committee.

Now, I’m not impugning the actions of any of those individuals,

and I don’t question the integrity of their actions, but I don’t believe that this committee should engage in selective indignation.

The committee’s pursuit of the Clinton library is another example of this double standard. In 1997, during the committee’s campaign finance investigation, I asked that we subpoena records from

the Bush and Reagan libraries about potential fundraising abuses

involving those administrations, but I was turned down. It seems

we can pursue President Clinton’s library, but not President Bush’s

or President Reagan’s. And if anybody doesn’t understand why I

was turned down, let them know that the power to issue subpoenas

is invested in one person on this committee and only one person,

and that’s the chairman.

I also wanted to investigate the Jesse Helms Foundation. Senator Helms’ foundation had reportedly received large contributions

from foreign governments at the same time that the Senator was

chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. But again, there

was no inquiry.

As I say this, I have no doubt that my phone is ringing off the

hook in my office, with people criticizing me for having the temerity to point out these inconsistencies. But we need to keep perspective. American taxpayers have already spent over $140 million investigating President Clinton. I realize ridiculing President Clinton

makes great entertainment for some, but these obsessions with

President Clinton are not healthy. President Clinton is not going

to be impeached again, and he’s no longer the President. At times

the feeding frenzy involving President Clinton is unfair. He is denounced as an individual bent on thwarting or stonewalling the

committee’s investigation, but, in fact, in this case he has taken the

extraordinary step of waiving executive privilege, the President’s

constitutional prerogative, to allow his top advisers to testify.

And at other times the frenzy displaces any sense of priorities.

It’s amazing that the news that President Clinton’s brother Roger

asked for pardons became lead story in the country, even displacing

the FBI scandal. After all, Roger Clinton was unsuccessful, and

there’s no evidence to date that he received any payments for his

efforts.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to comment for the record on your

insistence that Beth Dozoretz be required to assert the fifth amendment during today’s hearings. Mrs. Dozoretz has already informed

the committee that given the U.S. attorney’s investigation in New

York, she will not be able to participate in today’s hearing. There

is congressional precedent for requiring a witness to assert the fifth

amendment, but I don’t think it’s constructive to call Mrs. Dozoretz

before the committee if the goal is to punish her for asserting her

constitutional right and to create a media spectacle.

I also want to note my disappointment in the committee’s treatment of Peter Kadzik. Mr. Kadzik was informed a few days ago

that he might be invited to today’s hearing. The hearing conflicted

with appointments he already had scheduled in California for

today, and he informed the committee he could not participate, but

he’s willing to cooperate in any way possible with us. Well, when

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Mr. Kadzik stepped off the plane in California, he was greeted by

a Federal marshal, who served him with a subpoena requiring his

presence here today. So Mr. Kadzik had to cancel his meetings and

immediately board another flight back to Washington. That all

would have been necessary if Mr. Kadzik were an essential witness

for today’s hearing, but he’s not. In fact, earlier this week your

staff told him that he wouldn’t have to testify if I would agree that

we should excuse Scooter Libby from today’s hearing. Since Mr.

Libby was Marc Rich’s lawyer for more than 10 years and helped

develop the argument that was ultimately presented to the President as a justification for his pardon, we felt he should testify, and

I regret he’s been placed on the agenda for today so far down that

we won’t hear from him for at least 4 hours, and probably not until

nightfall.

Mr. Chairman, given the developments of the last few weeks, I

think it’s appropriate for us to have this hearing. Clearly, there is

a widespread interest in obtaining the views of the day’s witnesses

and I’m pleased they’re going to be able to testify to us freely, not

restrained under the executive privilege where the President could

refuse to let them testify.

But I think we need to think twice before continuing with additional investigation. There is a criminal investigation going on in

New York that can answer whether illegal conduct is involved. We

know that bad judgment was involved. We can have many investigations to show there was bad judgment. But the issue before us

is going to be, when all is said and done, was there anything illegal. We could spend months investigating the details of all of President Clinton’s pardons. But I seriously question whether it makes

sense for us to conduct another redundant investigation. I look forward to listening to today’s witnesses and learning what we can

about this whole matter and I thank you for yielding me this time.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

Do other Members have opening statements they’d like to make?

Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Just one thing. While as usual I find nothing enlightening in the ranking member’s discussion of things that are utterly

irrelevant to this investigation, we have sort of come to learn to expect that. I did learn something. If you listen carefully enough to

the gentleman, you can usually pick up a new euphemism. Witnesses used to simply assert their fifth amendment rights or their

rights to not incriminate themselves. Now we know that really

what they were doing was they were simply not able to participate

in today’s hearings. That’s a delightful euphemism.

I think that, Mr. Chairman, you put your finger on the heart of

the matter here. There have been very serious questions raised

about these pardons. They go to the heart of whether or not we are

a Nation of laws or of men, and there is nothing at all improper

about requiring a witness to come in here, and if they refuse to answer questions, if they have something to hide, then all they have

to do is say so. And it’s not a matter of not being able to participate

in a hearing, it is simply exercising one’s right not to disclose information.

We are not here to waste anybody’s time. If any of the witnesses

decide that they don’t want to disclose information, all they have

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to do is say so. But this is something that the American people

have a right to know, and members of this committee as Representatives of the people of this country have a right to know that. So

I thank you for holding the hearings, and as always I thank you

for your indulgence. Even though there was nothing enlightening

in the last 20 minutes, we did learn a new euphemism for asserting

fifth amendment rights.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Barr.

Any further opening statements, any comments?

The gentlelady from Washington is so recognized.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to indicate that I believe these hearings have served a salutary purpose. I believe

they’re basically two functions. One is transparency. We live in a

democratic Republic, and people have a right to know about any official matter. And the other is to send a message to future Presidents that while the power of the pardon is absolute, as I believe

it should remain, that Congress does have the power itself to look

into the appropriateness of pardons.

As we welcome today’s witnesses, I think we ought to also say

that the President deserves credit for having waived executive

privilege and for having released the names of donors. I think that

tends to show that he is trying to show he had nothing to hide.

At the same time, I want to say that however much we have

hearings on this matter, I believe that the old rule that lawyers

learn, that appearances control, means that the only person who

can get to whether there has been a corrupt motive is the U.S. attorney. There is—in my view, lawyers and public officials are essentially held to one rule: A thing is what it appears to be. The

only person who can get beneath that at this point is the U.S. attorney, and I think we have to content ourselves with that.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a matter

that I think is necessary to correct the record. I have read in the

press and even heard from some Members of Congress that while

if the pardoned this billionaire fugitive, I must say at odds with all

he has stood for, this man who stood for the poor and those most

in need, that he left in jail offenders languishing who were firsttime offenders and who are poorer people. Mr. Chairman, that is

not true.

I would like to submit for the record the list from the Families

Against Mandatory Minimums. This organization submitted 12

names to the President of first-time offenders, poor people, moderate-income people, anonymous people. All 12 had commutations

and were free from prison, and beyond those 12, 5 more that were

not on their list, but were members of their organization were also

freed. The public may know about Kemba Smith, the young mother

and college student who was caught up in her boyfriend’s conspiracy to sell drugs when she herself had committed no overt act of

crime, but I don’t think that the public knows or the press, which

has made great stock of how these poor people have been left with

nothing done for them. Shame on them. I do think it only right for

us to know that the President did pardon some such people.

Congress has had no such mercy, despite the fact that Justice

Rehnquist, the Federal judiciary, Barry McCaffrey and the Catholic

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bishops have called for a change in the laws requiring mandatory

minimums.

Please let nothing I have said contradict my view that Marc Rich

should not have been pardoned, that pardons should not be granted

to the privileged, that the President made a terrible judgment in

making these pardons, that he will never set the record straight

because appearances control such matters, and I am afraid tragically that the appearances will always control this matter unless

the U.S. attorney tells us otherwise.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentlelady for her comments.

Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank

Mr. Waxman for his statement. I don’t agree with the latter part

of his statement, but I appreciate his acknowledgment in the forward part of his statement. I also believe that he has attempted

to, while defend the position, that charges must be proven before

they can be made, which at times has made him seem like a defender of the administration, as a fair-minded man.

I had no decision in my public career that was more agonizing

or painful than the impeachment vote, and I have paid a terrible

price in my district from hatred of longtime friends who did not

like it that I only voted for one count on impeachment. And that

was very difficult because I, too, have been trying to sort out how

you separate public and private behavior, and how you can establish a truth in this system, and how we set precedence.

But sitting on this committee under Chairman Clinger and

Chairman Burton has been one of the most exasperating experiences in my life. We had a minimum of 125 people take the fifth

amendment or flee the country. If you want to know what’s undermining the American people’s confidence in our governmental systems, it is that everybody seems to be protecting everybody else,

and that money and power seem to influence the ability to make

decisions even for pardons, which our Founding Fathers meant for

those who were hurting, those who didn’t get a fair trial.

And it seems like whether it was in the Travel Office, whether

it was in the files, whether it was in—and I said ‘‘seems like’’ because we haven’t been able to get to the truth because there’s been

community blocking. The Chinese funding, the casino fund, every

time we start to pursue something, it’s like a whole bunch of people

put up a wall, and that’s partly why so many Members on our side

have been so frustrated, and hopefully with this investigation we

can move in advance toward truth in other things that have been,

in my opinion, at the very least justice-obstructed. We don’t know

what for sure was obstructed, but through this wall of fleeing the

country and taking the fifth, we have not been able to get to the

truth. And I really hope—and I understand there’s a court case

going on, but I really hope that today’s witnesses will at some time

come forward and speak fully to us as well because American people have a right to know what has happened in this whole entire

process, because public hearings such as this and things that our

chairman are conducting are part of the way, in the absence of a

clear norm standard in our country, we determine our norms of

what’s acceptable behavior and not.

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When Judge Thomas went through his hearing, we, as a community, as a Nation, learned more about how sexual harassment can

be handled. Whether the charges were true or not, we went

through a process. Through Watergate we went through a process

through these—of how we determine what is allowable behavior in

the public arena, and I think this served a purpose. And I hope today’s witnesses and future witnesses will come forth and speak

rather than take the fifth.

I yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Souder.

Further discussion?

Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will attempt to be

brief so we can get on with the panels, but I did want to followup

on the ranking member’s observation that this hearing will talk

about whether or not there’s illegality. I think there are other

things this committee is looking at, and should be looking at. For

instance, one of our colleagues from Massachusetts, Congressman

Frank, has introduced a constitutional amendment to indicate that

perhaps pardons are not appropriate by lame duck Presidents between the time of the election and when they leave office, and I

think the facts developed at the last hearing and this hearing can

illuminate us on that.

I think this committee can certainly take a look at the revolving

door policy of when someone works for the administration or Congress can come back and lobby. I think that’s an appropriate discussion. My personal opinion is that Mr. Quinn sort of took the revolving door off the hinges as he spun around and went back into

the White House to gain this particular pardon. It’s also while the

history lesson with President Bush and his relatives was interesting, I think what’s intriguing with Mr. Rodham, the former First

Lady’s brother, is when Mr. Quinn was before the committee, he

indicated he didn’t violate the revolving door policy because he was

subject to the judicial exception; that is, he was able to represent

Mr. Rich in a criminal matter. Well, Mr. Rodham has taken a contingency fee in a pardon matter, which is against the ethics code

of the Bar Association of the State of Florida, and his argument is

it’s not a criminal matter. So I think perhaps we can legislatively

get to the bottom of that as well.

And relative to the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, I

think some of the press reports I have seen relative to who got in

and who got out have to do with Mr. Vignali in California, where

it was not only Carlos Vignali, a white drug dealer, 800 pounds

turning into crack cocaine in Minnesota for distribution on the

streets of Minnesota, but he had 30 co-defendants, many of whom

had never been in trouble before, and they all are still in prison

with mandatory minimums. In particular there was a fellow from

Minnesota who received a longer prison sentence than Mr. Vignali.

So I think all of those are issues before the committee. And the

last comment I want to make, I was watching this Geraldo Rivera,

and he was calling the Chairman Dandy Dan Burton; that he was

going to bring Ms. Dozoretz in and subject her to Mafia-style treatment before the U.S. Congress. All I want to say is if she chooses

to take the fifth amendment today, it is a personal privilege, as you

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pointed out. It can’t be sent by letter. It can’t be sent by her lawyer. She has to invoke it, and if she feels there’s evidence she

would give that would implicate her in conspiracy, bribery or conduit contributions, then it is her best interest to take the fifth

amendment. That is her right. But to suggest somehow or otherwise that she is receiving ill treatment or is a media spectacle or

anything else I think does a disservice to the chairman and to the

committee.

And thank you, and I yield back my time.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. SANDERS. I’ll be very brief. And let me just pick up on a

point that my friend Mr. LaTourette just made a moment ago. I

think what he was suggesting is that one of the benefits of this

hearing, it educates us about things. And he touched on other

manifestations of what we can learn from hearings like this, but

I wonder if he would add to this some other areas that this committee might want to study.

I have been concerned that the American people pay by far the

highest prices in the world for prescription drugs, and the millions

of elderly people cannot afford prescription drugs. I wonder if he

would join me in calling on this committee to study the role of the

millions of dollars that the pharmaceutical industry contributes to

the Republican Party and to the Democratic Party and why we end

up paying the highest prices in the world for prescription drugs.

This country is the only country in the industrialized world that

does not have a national health care system guaranteeing health

care to all people. I wonder if he will join me and ask Mr. Burton

to conduct a hearing about the role that insurance company moneys play in influencing the political process so that millions of

Americans don’t have health care.

Today on the floor of the House there’s a bankruptcy bill. My understanding is that the credit card companies and those people who

will benefit from this bill have contributed millions of dollars to the

Republican Party. There is a tax bill that President Bush has offered that will provide 43 percent of the benefits to the richest 1

percent. I wonder if we will take a hard look at the role of the hundreds of millions of dollars that have come in to the political process from the wealthiest people in this country and see maybe there

might be a correlation that the legislation that came out benefits

overwhelmingly the wealthiest people in this country.

So I would agree with what Mr. Waxman said earlier. I think it

is important that we have this hearing, that we learn about what

Mr. Clinton did and his terrible lapse in judgment, but if we are

going to talk about money in politics, let’s talk about money in politics, the influence that money had on Mr. Clinton, the influence

that money has on the Republican Party and the Democratic Party,

and then open up that issue so the American people once again can

have faith in the political process in this country.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SANDERS. I will yield.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I’d be delighted to join you in all of those activities. I think the distinction that I would draw is that if any of

those activities have a quid pro quo, they’re all wrong, and the

ones—and I’d be happy to work with you.

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Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Burton, I hope that you will work with us on

those as well.

Mr. BURTON. I would be happy to look into that with you, Mr.

Sanders.

Mr. SANDERS. OK.

Mr. BURTON. Are there any further opening statements? If not,

Ms. Dozoretz, would you rise and raise your right hand, please.

[Witness sworn.]

STATEMENT OF BETH DOZORETZ, FORMER FINANCE CHAIR,

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Mr. BURTON. Ms. Dozoretz, do you have any kind of opening

statement?

Ms. DOZORETZ. No, I don’t.

Mr. BURTON. Then we will start with 30 minutes on each side.

I will yield first to Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, first let

me thank you and Ranking Member Waxman for two very thoughtful statements. I appreciate it very much.

Good morning Ms. Dozoretz.

Ms. DOZORETZ. Morning.

Mr. SHAYS. Welcome to this hearing on Presidential pardons.

Thank you very much for being here. This committee has almost

been overwhelmed by what appears to be a number of inexcusable

pardons granted by President Clinton in the 11th hour over his

Presidency. Many on this committee question why a number of pardons were granted, and we question the process by which they

were granted. On the surface it seems someone was more likely to

get a controversial pardon if they gave to the President’s party or

to its candidates, gave to the new Presidential library, hired Washington White House or Washington insiders or used the services of

family members of the former President and his wife.

We question why some of the pardons were granted and the process by which they were granted; the fact that 40 weren’t vetted

with the Justice Department; the fact that some were not properly

documented; and the fact that they were granted to a major drug

dealer who was caught shipping 800 pounds of cocaine to four individuals who defrauded $30 million from government education programs designed to help those most in need, to an individual who

practiced medical fraud and is still under additional investigations.

But of all the pardons, the hardest one for us to understand and

justify is the pardon of Marc Rich, an individual who allegedly

made $100 in illegal profits, attempted to hide $48 million in profits, fled the country and became a 17-year fugitive from justice, renounced U.S. citizenship, and traded with Iran while our hostages

were there, Iraq around the time we had hostilities in the Gulf,

Libya, Korea and the apartheid South African Government.

Ms. Dozoretz, we are an investigative committee that tries to

root out waste, fraud and abuse in government, and Lord knows it

appears we seem to have seen all three in this pardon process. I

hope these hearings, besides helping to root out fraud, lead to an

improvement in the pardon process; not change the Constitution,

but the process; help improve the revolving door requirements and

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braries. Your testimony is invaluable to us and would help us conclude our investigation much more quickly.

So with all this in mind, I would like to show you exhibit 63 and

to ask for your response, and what I’d like to do is just read parts

of it. Do you have a copy of it?

No. 2 says, ‘‘DR called from Aspen,’’ and we understand from

Jack Quinn that is Denise Rich. ‘‘Her friend B,’’ we understand

from Jack Quinn is you, Beth Dozoretz, ‘‘who is with her got a call

today from POTUS,’’ who we understand to be the President, ‘‘who

said he was impressed by JQ,’’ Jack Quinn’s, ‘‘last letter and that

he wants to do it and is doing all possible to turn around the White

House counsels. DR, Denise Rich, thinks he sounded very positive,

but, that we have to keep praying. There shall be no decision this

weekend. And the other candidate Milk,’’ we understand to be Michael Milken, ‘‘is not getting it.’’ Then No. 3, ‘‘I shall meet her and her friends next week. She will

provide more details.’’ [Exhibit 63 follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Now, what I would like to ask is the following: exhibit 63 is an e-mail which indicates that on January 10, 2001,

President Clinton called you in Aspen, CO, where you were staying

with Denise Rich. The e-mail indicates that the President discussed

the Marc Rich pardon with you before he spoke with the Justice

Department. My question is at any time while you were discussing

the Marc Rich pardon with President Clinton, did either you or the

President mention Denise Rich’s contributions to the Clinton library or the Democrat National Committee?

Ms. DOZORETZ. Upon the advice of my counsel, I respectfully decline to answer that question based on the protection afforded me

under the U.S. Constitution.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, will that be your response to all our

questions, or are there are specific subjects or persons you will not

discuss and others you are willing to discuss with us?

Ms. DOZORETZ. Sir, that will be my response to all questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Ms. Dozoretz. I know it hasn’t been easy

coming here today, and we appreciate your informing the committee personally of your decision to assert your rights under the fifth

amendment even though your lawyer had done so earlier. In doing

so, you show respect for our responsibility and our process.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Gentleman yields back.

Just 1 second.

Mr. LaTourette, no questions.

Mr. Waxman.

Let me just say that since Ms. Dozoretz has exercised her fifth

amendment rights and has said she wants to continue to do so, we

have no further questions. We’ll be happy to excuse her. If you

have questions, go ahead.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I understand that Denise Rich, who

also took the fifth amendment but wasn’t required to come here

today to assert it, has indicated she is going to cooperate with the

U S. Attorney’s Office in New York, which is, of course, the official

investigation, as to whether any criminal actions took place. I don’t

think I could get an answer from Ms. Dozoretz because I think, as

I understand the rule, if she answers any questions, then she’s

waived her right not to testify. But I presume and expect and hope

that she is also going to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

As I understand the matter, witnesses who are being called to

testify and cooperate with law enforcement may well feel that they

ought to take the fifth amendment here, but cooperate there. I

again regret that she was brought here to assert what the chairman knew she would assert, her constitutional right not to testify,

and while people say it’s not for media spectacle purposes, I wish

that the TV audience could see all the people here with cameras

anxious to take her photo as she asserted her rights, which we expected she would do. I have no questions.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Waxman, I’ll retain my time. Let me just say

why do you assume that she wouldn’t take her fifth amendment

rights before the U.S. attorney?

Mr. WAXMAN. I can’t answer whether she will or she won’t. I

could ask her the question, but I presume that would be——

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Mr. BURTON. I understand, but the comments you made

indicated—— Mr. WAXMAN. The reason I made that statement is if Denise Rich

is going to cooperate and is cooperating with the U.S. attorney, and

she has taken the fifth amendment with regard to this committee,

I presume and expect—and we’ll get a response, I expect, from Ms.

Dozoretz and her attorney, if not on the record right now, shortly,

and publicly—that they will be cooperating with the official law enforcement investigation.

Mr. BURTON. Well, Mr. Waxman, perhaps you know something

we don’t, and I appreciate you sharing your expectations with us,

but let me just say this about Ms. Rich. I have heard she’s a very

fine lady, and we certainly didn’t want to cause her any undue

heartburn as well. Ms. Rich—we sent a letter as we have always

done to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Justice Department to

find out if they object to our granting Ms. Rich or possibly Ms.

Dozoretz immunity for testifying, and the U.S. attorney indicated

that they were opening a criminal investigation, and I believe they

have impaneled a grand jury. Whenever the U.S. attorney or the

Attorney General indicates to this committee that they would request that we not grant immunity because it might interfere with

their investigation, and might cause a person who might possibly

be convicted of a felony and our granting immunity would impede

that process, then we don’t grant immunity, and we always write

that letter.

Now, we received a response back from the U.S. attorney for the

Southern District of New York, who said that they were opening

a criminal investigation and asked us not to grant immunity, and

since Ms. Rich planned the take the fifth amendment and we decided not to try to grant her immunity at the request of the U.S.

attorney for the Southern District of New York, we decided not to

call her. Those are the facts, and that has not been the case with

Ms. Dozoretz, and that’s why she was asked to be here today.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Chairman, if you will yield to me for a

minute.

Mr. BURTON. I’ll yield.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think Mr. Waxman’s earlier observation is

correct. At least my limited understanding of the law is that if Ms.

Dozoretz answers any question, she can’t pick and choose which

questions she answers. So I think he’s right about that, but I think

also she can’t pick and choose, nor can Ms. Rich pick and choose,

which forum she chooses to speak in, and once she violates or says

that she’s no longer invoking the amendment, should that be in the

Southern District of New York or some other forum, she no longer

retains that right. And I would ask perhaps that if she breaks this

code of silence and determines that she wants to give testimony

and not invoke the fifth amendment in another forum, that perhaps the committee send to her through her lawyers written questions when she no longer has the privilege available so that we

may have the benefit of those answers she’s giving to others to help

us in our probe.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. LaTourette.

One second.

Mr. Barr.

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Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are getting off on a tangent here that I’m not quite sure is

accurate. Any individual has the right with regard to any question

put to them to assert an articulable basis for not testifying if it incriminates them, and I’m not quite sure that we’re all operating

within the bounds of a clear understanding of the law when we say

simply because a person may choose to assert the right with regard

to question A, that that means they have to assert it to all or none.

Ms. Dozoretz, I think we can at least get one issue off the table

here. This has nothing to do with the hearing today, but is it your

intention to cooperate with any investigation being conducted by

the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York?

Ms. DOZORETZ. I’ll rely on the advice of my counsel, sir.

Mr. BARR. In other words, your counsel has instructed you not

to cooperate with any probe by the U.S. attorney for the Southern

District of New York?

Ms. DOZORETZ. I will rely on the advice of my counsel, sir.

Mr. BARR. And does that advice include telling you not to cooperate with the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York?

Ms. DOZORETZ. I will rely on the advice of my counsel, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Which is to assert your fifth amendment rights even

as to that question?

Ms. DOZORETZ. It’s privileged, sir.

Mr. BARR. What is privileged?

Ms. DOZORETZ. The advice of my counsel.

Mr. BARR. OK. Well, you keep citing it, so obviously it’s not really privileged because you keep citing it.

Apparently the witness, Mr. Chairman, will not even state to the

American people or to this panel that it is her intention to cooperate with the Department of Justice. I think that’s very unfortunate.

That’s unfortunate advice, but apparently that’s where we are.

Mr. BURTON. We’re prepared, Mr. Waxman, to release Mr.

Dozoretz. Do you have any further comments?

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a further comment. I

don’t want the chairman or anyone else to think I’m being critical

of how you handled the situation with Ms. Rich in not asking her

to come in and give her immunity and force her to testify because

there is an ongoing law enforcement investigation. I must also say

that I take a harsh view of people not willing to cooperate with

committees of the Congress, and if I had my way, I wish Mrs.

Dozoretz would testify, because I think people ought to testify before committees of the Congress. But I do understand that she is

under the guidance of her lawyers, sorting through a legal thicket,

where on the one hand you have the committee of the House investigating, committee of the Senate investigating, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office investigating.

It has been reported that Denise Rich, who also said she would

take the fifth amendment before Congress, is at the present time

talking to the U.S. attorney. Now, I can’t say from my own knowledge whether Ms. Dozoretz is doing the same, but I can say from

my own knowledge, knowing her, that she is a responsible person,

and that she has been very philanthropic.

She has been a concerned citizen. And as such I would expect to

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neys Office. I just wanted to make that statement and have my

views very clearly on the record.

Mr. BURTON. If there’s no further discussion or questions, Ms.

Dozoretz and your counsel, thank you very much for being here.

We’ll excuse you at this time.

The next panel that we will welcome to the witness table will

consist of Jack Quinn, Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and John Podesta. Can we have the staff assist the people and the media to move

out in the corridor? Would you, as soon as you can, please shut

that door so we can proceed with our business? Would everybody

please take seats so we can have the proper order?

Mr. Quinn, Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, Mr. Podesta, would you

please rise to be sworn?

[Witnesses sworn.]

STATEMENTS OF JACK QUINN, COUNSEL TO MARC RICH,

FORMER COUNSEL TO PRESIDENT CLINTON; BETH NOLAN,

FORMER COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT; BRUCE LINDSEY,

FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY

COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT; AND JOHN PODESTA,

FORMER WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF

Mr. BURTON. I think you may have opening statements. I think

we’ll just go right down the table. Mr. Quinn, do you have an opening statement.

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. As you know, Mr. Chairman,

I was here almost 9 hours a few weeks ago.

Mr. BURTON. Would you repeat what you said? I did not hear it.

Mr. QUINN. As you know, I testified before this committee for almost 9 hours a few weeks ago, and I subsequently testified before

a Senate committee. I’ve submitted to this committee for inclusion

in the record of its hearings my Senate testimony. And I’ll stand

on that and be prepared to answer any questions you may have

today.

[The information referred to follows:]

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312

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314

315

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Mr. BURTON. We appreciate your coming back and being with us.

Ms. Nolan, do you have an opening statement.

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening statement;

but I am prepared to answer your questions.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Ms. Nolan. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening statement;

but I’m prepared to answer any questions.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. Yes, I’d like to make an opening statement.

Mr. BURTON. Would you turn the mic on sir.

Mr. PODESTA. Is it on?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir. You’re recognized.

Mr. PODESTA. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my

name is John Podesta. From November 1998 until January 2001,

I served as President Clinton’s chief of staff. Between January

1993 through June 1995 and between January 1997 through November 1998, I held other positions in the Clinton White House.

Between June 1995 and January 1997, I was the visiting professor

of law at Georgetown University Law Center, and I have recently

returned to the Law Center as a visiting professor.

As the committee requested in its letter inviting me here today,

I will briefly outline my recollections of my discussions concerning

the Marc Rich-Pincus Green pardon matter. This matter arose during, as you know, an exceedingly busy period at the White House

as President Clinton’s term was drawing to a close. Because I was

involved in a great many issues unrelated to pardons during this

time and I do not have access to records, my ability to reconstruct

these discussions has been limited, but I am prepared to share

with the committee what I do recall.

My first recollection of this matter is that some time in mid-December 2000 I returned a call from Mr. Peter Kadzik who has been

a friend of mine since we attended law school together in the mid1970’s. I remember that Mr. Kadzik told me that his firm represented Mr. Rich and Mr. Green in connection with a criminal

case and that Jack Quinn was seeking a Presidential pardon from

them.

At that point, I was unfamiliar with the Rich/Green case. Mr.

Kadzik asked me who would be reviewing pardon matters at the

White House. I recalled that I told him that the White House

Counsel’s Office was reviewing pardon applications.

A few days later, Mr. Kadzik sent me a summary of the cases

which I forwarded to counsel’s office. Shortly after the first of the

year, Mr. Kadzik again called and then asked, in light of the pardons that Mr. Clinton had issued around Christmas, whether any

more pardons were likely to be considered. I told him that yes the

President was considering additional pardons and commutations,

but it was unlikely that one would be granted under the circumstances he had briefly described unless the counsel’s office,

having reviewed the case on the merits, believed that some real injustice had been done.

I thought a pardon in the Rich/Green case was unlikely but still

knew very little about it. That call from Mr. Kadzik prompted me

to ask Ms. Nolan about the merits in the case. I believe she or Miss

Cabe or both told me that Rich and Green were fugitives in a major

317

tax fraud case and that whatever the merits of the underlying case,

it was the unanimous view of the counsel’s office that the appropriate remedy was not a Presidential pardon.

I learned then or subsequently that Mr. Lindsey was of the same

view. I strongly concurred in that judgment. A few days later, Mr.

Kadzik asked me if he could see me for a few minutes. I agreed

and we had a brief meeting in my office. He again raised the Rich/

Green pardon case. I told him that I, along with the entire White

House staff counsel, opposed it and that I did not think it would

be granted. At that point, I believed that the pardons would not be

granted in light of the uniform staff recommendation to the contrary and that little more needed to be done on the matter.

Mr. Kadzik made one more call to me, and I believe we spoke

on either January 15 or 16. He told me he had been informed that

the President had reviewed the submissions Mr. Quinn had sent in

and was impressed with them and was once again considering the

pardon. I told him I was strongly opposed to the pardons and that

I did not believe they would be granted.

On January 15 or 16, I spoke with former Congressman John

Brademas, president emeritus of New York University. Mr.

Brademas, who is a friend of King Juan Carlos of Spain, called to

tell me that he had received a message from the King. The message concerned the Rich pardon case. Mr. Brademas told me that

he understood Israel’s Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, had visited the King to brief him on the Middle East peace process and

had raised the Rich case. Mr. Ben Ami evidently had asked the

King to call President Clinton to support the Rich pardon application. And Mr. Brademas, in turn, had been asked if he could make

known the King’s interest to the White House.

Mr. Brademas did not advocate a pardon. He simply asked me

whether the pardon was likely or even possible. I told him while

it was the President’s decision, the White House Counsel’s Office

and I were firmly opposed and I did not believe that the pardon

would be granted.

Late on January 16, I believe, the staff met with President Clinton on some other pardon matters, and the President brought up

the Rich case and told us that he thought Mr. Quinn had made

some meritorious points in his submission. He clearly had digested

the legal arguments presented by Mr. Quinn since he made a point

of noting the Justice Department had abandoned the legal theory

underlying the RICO count and mentioned the Ginsburg/Wolfman

tax analyses. The staff informed the President that it was our view

that the pardon should not be granted.

On Friday afternoon January 19th, the President talked to Prime

Minister Barak in a farewell call. While the bulk of that call concerned the situation in the Middle East, Prime Minister Barak

raised the Rich matter at the end and asked the President once

again to consider the Rich pardon.

That evening, the President had a final meeting with White

House counsel to discuss pardon matters. While I was there for

part of that meeting, I had to leave for a scheduled television interview and was not present during the discussion of the Rich/Green

cases. I was informed of the President’s decision to pardon Mr. Rich

and Mr. Green by Ms. Nolan on Saturday morning, January 20.

318

Members of committee, on February 18, former President Clinton

stated in the New York Times his reasons for granting the Rich

and Green pardons. One can disagree with his reasoning as many

have. One can say he did not adequately consult with the Justice

officials before issuing the pardons as the President himself acknowledged in his statement, but I believe that President Clinton

considered the legal merits of the arguments for the pardon as he

understood them and he rendered his judgment wise or unwise on

the merits of the case. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Podesta follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. If there are no further opening statements, we will

now go to the 30 minutes on each side; and I believe we’re going

to yield to Mr. LaTourette on this.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Welcome to all. Mr.

Podesta, I think your opening statement gets to the first set of

questions I had. Is it your recollection that on January 16th of this

year was the first time that you personally discussed the Pincus

Green/Marc Rich pardon with the President of the United States?

Mr. PODESTA. My recollection is it is the first time it came up

with the President in my—— Mr. LATOURETTE. In your presence. How about you, Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. I certainly don’t remember—it came up in two

maybe, three meetings that we had with the President some time

around the middle of January it would seem that approximately

the first meeting had occurred.

Mr. LATOURETTE. From the last meeting, we know that the pardon application was filed with the White House on December 11.

You don’t remember any discussions in the month of December.

Mr. LINDSEY. With the President? No, sir, I don’t.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Ms. Nolan how about you.

Ms. NOLAN. No, I don’t.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you present at this January 16 meeting

that Mr. Podesta was talking about.

Ms. NOLAN. I believe I was. I don’t have access to my calendars

either. There were several meetings that week.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Lindsey, at the last hearing and I want to,

if you have the book of exhibits in front of you at the last hearing,

exhibit No. 15 in our program is a letter that we talked to Mr.

Quinn about at our previous hearing. It’s a letter dated December

19, 2000; and it indicates that perhaps while on a trip to Ireland

there was a concern raised and it looks like it was raised by you

about whether or not Mark Rich and Pincus Green were fugitives

from justice. First of all, do you recall having such a conversation

with Mr. Quinn in Ireland?

[Exhibit 15 follows:]

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Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, I do.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you express to him your concern or the

White House’s concern or somebody’s that these fellows were fugitives from justice and they were on the FBI most wanted list?

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t know if I was aware that they were on the

FBI most wanted list, but Mr. Quinn asked me if I had gotten his

packet of material on Mr. Rich and Mr. Green. I told him I had.

He asked me what I thought. I told him I thought they were fugitives.

Mr. BURTON. Will both of you put your mics a little closer? I

don’t think all the members can—— Mr. CUMMINGS. We cannot hear the questions either, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. LaTourette, would you hold the mic close to

you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I’ll lean in as close as I can. I apologize. This

letter of December 19, did you receive it from Mr. Quinn.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It addressed the issue of fugitivity did it not?

Mr. LINDSEY. In a technical sense, yes, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Basically in that letter, Mr. Quinn is advising

you that these fellows really aren’t fugitives because they left the

country before the indictment was issued.

Mr. LINDSEY. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Do you agree with that definition of fugitivity?

Mr. LINDSEY. Probably from a legal point of view, yes. From a

practice point of view, it made no difference to me whether they

left before indictment or after indictment.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you ever discuss with the President of the

United States, either in the meeting on January 16 or any other

meeting, the concerns about pardoning people who had been 17

year fugitives from justice?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. What was the President’s reaction I guess to

that?

Mr. LINDSEY. I believe he believed the fugitives status was a factor to be considered but not the beginning and the end of the conversation. For me it was both the beginning and the end of the conversation.

Mr. BURTON. Will the gentleman yield briefly?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. Did anybody in the meeting ask the President if he

knew that the study that the President based part of his judgment

on was paid for by Mr. Rich and his attorneys?

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t think anybody asked him that. I assume

since it was prepared at their request that they had paid to have

it prepared. But frankly, I don’t question either of the two professors. I do not believe either of them would say something different

than what they believed just because they were being paid. I don’t

know them personally, but I accepted their analysis at face value.

Mr. BURTON. Did the President know that Mr. Rich paid for that

study?

Mr. LINDSEY. Again it was never discussed.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

324

Mr. LATOURETTE. Ms. Nolan, to you. At our last hearing, we had

a discussion with Mr. Quinn; and he indicates that you, at one

point, raised a question about whether the Executive order talking

about the revolving door policy, that is a member of the administration can’t come back within 5 years and lobby the administration, whether or not his involvement in the Rich pardon created a

difficulty with that Executive order. Do you remember that conversation?

Ms. NOLAN. I do remember raising the issue. I think when I first

spoke with Mr. Quinn about the pardon, one of the things that concerned me was he eligible to represent someone.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And again according to his testimony, he indicated that he allayed those concerns based upon the judicial exception contained therein in the policy that he wrote; is that right?

Ms. NOLAN. He told me that he had obtained a legal opinion that

it was permissible for him to represent someone in a pardon application. I, nevertheless, asked one of my associate counsels to look

at the question independently and got the answer back that it did

meet the exception.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And the exception we’re talking about is the

judicial exception that if there has been a criminal process commenced, it was your feeling that he could come back in a period of

less than 5 years.

Ms. NOLAN. That is correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. The reason I asked that question is I heard

Mr. Quinn say that at the last hearing I think you’ve also seen in

the news the indication that Hugh Rodham, who is the former

First Lady’s brother, accepted a $200,000 contingency fee to represent another individual in a pardon application. According to the

code of ethics for lawyers in the State of Florida, it is improper to

take a contingency fee in a criminal matter. One, are you aware

of that fact? Or are you aware of ethics codes similar to that?

Ms. NOLAN. I am not aware of the Florida rules, but I’m certainly

aware of ethics codes similar to that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It’s really not appropriate to take a contingency fee in a criminal case to get a desired result. That’s the purpose behind the rule I suppose. My observation is in that case at

least the First Lady’s brother sees to be indicating that was OK because it’s not a criminal matter; but in this particular case, Mr.

Quinn’s representation is also OK because it is a criminal matter.

And we seem to be at, perhaps, cross purposes.

Going to the meeting of the 16th with the President of the

United States. At that meeting, did he ask you to get more information other than the information that was included in Mr.

Quinn’s submission on behalf of Marc Rich and Pincus Green? Did

he ask you to call the Justice Department?

Ms. NOLAN. I had already spoken with Mr. Holder. I don’t recall

that it was an extensive discussion. However, we were going

through a number of pardon applications, and my memory is that

it was a fairly brief discussion in which he heard from all of us our

opposition. I didn’t think it was going anywhere.

Mr. LATOURETTE. When you say he——

Ms. NOLAN. The President.

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Mr. LATOURETTE. President Clinton heard your opposition that

you had the feeling at that meeting that it really didn’t matter

what you said. He was inclined to grant this pardon based upon

reasons that he saw in the application and perhaps calls from

world leaders.

Ms. NOLAN. No I don’t mean that at all. I did not believe that

the pardon was going anywhere. He was familiar with it. He was

sympathetic with it. And he was familiar with the issues, but I did

not have the sense—he said we’ll come back to this. I did not have

the sense at that meeting or until the 19th that he really was inclined to grant the pardon.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Does that comport with your understanding,

Mr. Lindsey, and yours, Mr. Podesta, that you left that meeting

thinking, yeah, he’s sympathetic; but this isn’t going to happen?

Mr. LINDSEY. I clearly left the meeting understanding that no decision had been made. I don’t know if I knew what was in his mind.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. No. I thought he accepted our judgment and I

didn’t think this was a particularly active matter.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman I yield back to you

for further distribution.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Barr. Excuse me, Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Good afternoon, gentlemen. The former deputy White

House—and lady, I’m sorry Ms. Nolan.

Ms. NOLAN. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Former Deputy White House Counsel Cheryl Mills

left the White House in October 1999. It’s reported to us by the

pardon attorney that when he called the White House late in January, that Ms. Mills answered the phone and responded to his questions in the White House regarding the pardon.

And so my first question: Was former Deputy White House Counsel Cheryl Mills assisting the White House or counsel’s office at

any time during the final weeks of the Clinton administration?

And we’ll start with you, Ms. Nolan.

Ms. NOLAN. Ms. Mills, since she had left the White House, continued to be somebody that we called on for advice. She had been

there for 7 years. She had a great deal of experience, and people

throughout the office called her the president. She had been a very

close advisor of the President and the President continued to depend on her.

I’m not familiar with the particular phone call you’re talking

about. She was present several days at the end because there were

events at the White House to which she had been invited. She’s a

friend of mine and a former member of counsel’s office, and she

would come by the counsel’s office. She was present the afternoon

and evening of the 19th. She had been invited to an event at the

White House the evening of the 19th. And she did participate in

discussions with my office and the President about the Marc Rich

pardon and some other pardons.

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me. Could we pull all the mic’s a little closer, I know all the members think it’s because there are so many

people in the room. We can’t hear as well as we would like.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Lindsey, what would you like to add.

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Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t know if there is anything needed to be

added, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have any additional information that you can

share with us.

Mr. LINDSEY. No. I’m unfamiliar with what Mr. Adams is referring to. Ms. Mills was at the White House on the afternoon and

evening of the 19th and did participate in some discussions. But

beyond that, I have no clue as to what Roger Adams is referring

to.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Podesta, was former Deputy White House Counsel Cheryl Mills assisting the White House or counsel’s office during any time during the final weeks of the Clinton administration,

and did you know about it?

Mr. PODESTA. Let me take it from the back and then the front

end. I didn’t know that she was assisting the counsel’s office in the

final weeks of the administration, if she was. I did know that she

was present on the 19th during a discussion of some other pardon

matters; but as I said, I did not participate in the Rich pardon matter discussion. And so I was aware that she was there on the 19th.

Mr. SHAYS. So your testimony is that you did not authorize her

to be there?

Mr. PODESTA. Did not authorize her to be there? I was aware

that she was there in the discussion; and I knew that with respect

to the other pardon matters that we were discussing that most, all

of which involved cases that had been prosecuted by the independent counsels, that the President was interested in knowing her

views on those cases.

Mr. SHAYS. Are our statistics, in fact, correct. She was not an

employee of the White House? She had left the White House.

Mr. PODESTA. She had certainly left the White House.

Mr. SHAYS. So, Ms. Nolan, I wanted to know who authorized her

to be in the White House handling pardon activities.

Ms. NOLAN. I’m not sure I would describe her as being in the

White House handling pardon activities. She did participate in advising the President. The President had continued to depend on

her. She was the person he asked to be counsel to the President,

and she would have been counsel to the President had she accepted. He continued to depend on her for advice.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. When the pardon attorney called the White House,

he said Ms. Mills answered the phone and started giving him answers regarding the pardons. She was not an employee of the

White House. And we were wondering by what authority she was

entitled to answer questions to the pardon attorney about some of

the pardons.

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Chairman, I am just not familiar with that

phone call. As I mentioned, she not only is a long-time employee

of the White House who is very familiar with the office, she is also

a friend of mine; and when she was in Washington, she would

sometimes come sit in my office. She might have picked up the

phone. I don’t know. She wasn’t working on pardon matters for a

week, for the last several weeks. But she was familiar with parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00334 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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dons and she was present the last day and she participated in discussion.

Mr. BURTON. Well there may be some misunderstanding, but

when we talked to the pardon attorney it was our impression I

think pretty clearly that she was discussing pardons with him on

the phone with a great deal of authority and giving him answers.

Anyhow I yield back to the gentleman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Ms. Nolan, I am having a little difficulty

with this. We knew it really bordered on very questionable lines

that Mr. Quinn, who was a former White House employee, was

back in the White House lobbying. And we can have our disagreements on whether it was a criminal matter or not. There was a dialog between the two in which he said you acquiesced.

I have a problem with that, but I have a question how someone

who is in the private sector under private employment is back

working in the White House. And I would like to know who invited

her to be in the White House, who authorized her to be involved

in the Marc Rich issue, and then I want to ask you isn’t it true

that she works for a trustee of the Clinton library? First let me ask

you this, isn’t it true she is a trustee of the Clinton library?

Ms. NOLAN. I believe I heard that a couple of weeks ago, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. So the answer is yes.

Ms. NOLAN. I believe that is correct. I have only heard it—— Mr. SHAYS. I want to know why this trustee of the Clinton library was back in the White House discussing Marc Rich’s pardon.

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Shays, I don’t know that I’m going to be able

to give you an answer that satisfies you any more than the one I

have given you. She was a long-time trusted advisor of the President. She continued to be someone that we looked too for advice.

Mr. SHAYS. So is your point that the President authorized her to

be there or you authorized to be there?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know that I can give you an answer about

who authorized it.

Mr. SHAYS. Who invited her to come?

Ms. NOLAN. She was invited when she was in Washington to

come by.

Mr. SHAYS. By who?

Ms. NOLAN. Certainly by me but by many people in the White

House. She had many friends.

Mr. SHAYS. Why would you invite her to come and work on the

Rich pardon in your office?

Ms. NOLAN. I did not invite her specifically to do that. She was

present. I don’t know whether the President had discussed pardons

with her already. He talked with her frequently.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield? Was she in any of the

meetings when they discussed any of the pardons?

Ms. NOLAN. She was in the meeting on the evening of January

19.

Mr. BURTON. That was when they discussed the Rich pardon?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Did she take a position on the Rich pardon?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t remember her having a position on yes or no.

I thought that she was pushing everyone in the room to think hard

about the issues.

328

Mr. BURTON. There’s a significance to this. If she’s on the library

board, we want to find out if she participated in the decisionmaking process on the Rich pardons. She was in the room with

you, and you don’t recall. Do any of you recall what Ms. Mills position was and what she said regarding the Rich pardon?

Mr. PODESTA. If you want me to start, I have already said I

wasn’t in the discussion. She was in the discussion. She wasn’t

present in the room when we discussed several matters involving

prosecutions by the independent counsels. The President wanted

her views about those things. She was quite familiar with those

cases.

Mr. BURTON. But you don’t recall on the Rich pardons.

Mr. PODESTA. The President did want to know what she thought

about individual’s cases that had been prosecuted by independent

counsels; and I think probably amongst all of those in the room,

she may have been the most maybe, with deference to Mr. Lindsey,

she may have been the most familiar with those independent counsel cases. And that’s why he was seeking her advice about them,

but I was not present during the discussion of the Rich pardon.

Mr. BURTON. We’re not talking about other cases before the independent counsel but Mr. Rich.

Mr. PODESTA. That was in some extended response to Mr. Shays’ question.

Mr. LINDSEY. In order to understand the context, it is important

to understand that the purpose of the meeting with the President

on the 19th was to discuss the independent counsel issues. That

was why we were meeting with him. We had deferred those issues

until the end. In that meeting, the President indicated that he had

received a call that day from Prime Minister Barak and reraised

the Rich issue. But until that time, as Mr. Podesta and Ms. Nolan

indicated, at least they were under the clear impression that the

Rich issue was dead.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask this. Did, I mean, she was in there

when they discussed the Rich pardon issue. Do any of you recall

what her position was?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir. I don’t believe she took a position on the

merits of it. She asked whether or not we were discussing several

of the assertions that Mr. Quinn made with respect to whether or

not these people had been singled out, and she asked several questions as: Do we know whether they were singled out? Do we know

whether there were other cases similar to this? But beyond asking

these questions I don’t believe she took a position.

Mr. BURTON. Were there any other things discussed, any financial things like the library or anything like that?

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir. There were no discussions in that meeting

or in any meeting that I attended with the President in which contributions or the library was discussed in which DNC contributions

were discussed, where contributions to Mrs. Clinton’s campaign

were discussed.

Mr. BURTON. Or the library?

Mr. LINDSEY. Or the library. Not in that meeting; not in any

meeting.

Mr. BURTON. And Ms. Mills, at that time, was she on the library

board?

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Mr. LINDSEY. She was a trustee of the board, yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. And nothing was mentioned in relation to that.

Mr. LINDSEY. Nothing was mentioned in relation to the library

period.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I would like to refer to exhibit 152. While

that’s coming up, I want to be very clear. Mr. Podesta, did you ask

Ms. Mills to come to the White House in any way to discuss the

Rich issues or any other pardon issues?

[Exhibit 152 follows:]

330

331

Mr. PODESTA. Did I ask her to come to the White House? No, I

did not.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Nolan, did you?

Mr. PODESTA. Can we look at the exhibit before we answer the

questions?

Mr. SHAYS. No, this question is not related to the exhibit directly.

I just want to cover up the past territory. I’m unclear. Did you

have—in any way, request that Ms. Mills be there? Did you authorize her to be there?

Ms. NOLAN. I certainly knew she was coming to town, and I expected that she would come to my office and see me, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you make an assumption that the President had

asked her to be there? Yes?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know that I made that assumption. No.

Mr. SHAYS. What are we to assume? This person comes and

starts talking about the Rich pardons, sits in on your meetings;

and she’s not even an employee.

Ms. NOLAN. I’ve explained the context in which that wasn’t so

surprising. I know you don’t accept it, but I don’t know, I don’t

know what else to say.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m still unclear on who asked her to be there. Let

me just make reference to the exhibit, it says, here is a letter Jack

sent to the White House. As you may notice it’s from Robert Fink

sent to Mike Green, and it says, here is the letter that Jack sent

to the White House. As you may notice, his secretary said that

Jack sent copies to Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and Cheryl Mills.

April said they had clearance to deliver it to the White House so

it will get there this evening presumably before POTUS leaves for

Camp David to Avner, whom I will not be speaking to this afternoon and evening. If you call me at home tomorrow, I can give you

an update.

And I just want to know, Mr. Quinn, did you send it to her at

the White House?

Mr. QUINN. I think not, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Why did you send Ms. Mills a copy? Was it your

understanding that she was doing some kind of work with the

counsel’s office in January 2001?

Mr. QUINN. I sent it to her, Mr. Shays, because knowing, as Ms.

Nolan has testified, that she’s a person who, after some 7 years at

the White House, was enormously well regarded and trusted, well

might at some point be consulted on this. I had raised with her the

fact that I was pursuing the pardon as I did with others from time

to time to just bounce ideas off. But also I was hopeful, knowing

of her relationship with Ms. Nolan and Mr. Lindsey and the President, that as any good lawyer would, that as this thing progressed,

if it were progressing, that I would get some sense of how people

were reacting to different arguments in order that I might be in a

position to know better what concerns the folks advising the President might have so that I might address those concerns.

Mr. SHAYS. What’s very much surprising is that you were no

longer an employee, but you were back in touch with the White

House and in the White House. You have Ms. Mills, who was no

longer an employee, worked for the library, back in the White

House, and sitting in on meetings in which no one knows who

332

asked her to be there other than she was a sharp person and knew

a lot about these issues and even answers the phone and has a dialog with the pardon attorney. Ms. Nolan, why would she have a dialog with the pardon’s attorney?

Mr. QUINN. I can’t answer that question, sir. But like Ms. Nolan,

I learned of her role in the library only after reading of it in the

newspapers after this pardon was granted.

Mr. SHAYS. But the facts still exist.

Mr. QUINN. It may have, but I wanted you to know I wasn’t

aware of it.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Nolan, who qualified her to answer phones and

have dialog with the pardon attorney.

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Shays I’m not familiar with the call so I can’t

give you any information about it.

Mr. SHAYS. On what basis would you allow someone in your office answering phone calls from a pardon attorney? In other words,

it was more than seeking advice she was in the office working; isn’t

that true.

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Shays, I’m not familiar with the call.

Mr. SHAYS. I will conclude by asking, was she in the office working? Or did she just happen to stop by, and she was only there for

a few minutes or so? Tell me again how long she was there; how

often she was there; and to the best of your knowledge, why she

would have participated in conversation with the pardon attorney

in the last night in office.

Ms. NOLAN. I’m sorry, that was a somewhat compound question.

Mr. SHAYS. Go for it.

Ms. NOLAN. OK. Ms. Mills left the White House in the fall of

1999. She continued to be a trusted advisor of the President and

someone that many people in the White House called for advice,

people in the counsel’s office, people in other offices. But more than

anything she continued to be somebody that I and others in the

counsel’s office looked to for advice and the President did.

In the last several weeks of the an administration, she was

present in Washington and the White House for several events that

many of them having to do with staff parties and end of the administration events. She often would come before events or after events

and sit in my office.

She, on a couple of those occasions, stayed over at my home for

a night. She was welcome in my office. And she did, I know on occasion if she heard somebody was on the phone she knew, she

might pick it up. I don’t recall her ever picking up and doing a

business conversation other than, I think, she did have conversations on the night of the 19th regarding the Marc Rich pardon.

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman——

Mr. SHAYS. One last point. The bottom line is, Mr. Quinn, you

thought she had the ability and influence to persuade the President; and you sent her a letter advocating that Marc Rich be pardoned. Isn’t it true you sent her that letter?

Mr. QUINN. I did send that letter to her. My primary motivation

in discussing this matter with Mrs. Mills was, as I said, to have

other sources of information about how people might be reacting.

But again as several of us here have said, I knew that she was terrifically well regarded by the people here on this panel, myself inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00340 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
333

cluded and by the President. And I certainly didn’t rule out the

possibility at that point they would seek her judgment on this and

other matters.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you tell me her view on the pardons.

Mr. QUINN. I don’t actually know.

Mr. SHAYS. You don’t know if she was sympathetic or not to your

request that Marc Rich be pardoned.

Mr. QUINN. The one meaningful conversation that I think I can

point to was one in which she didn’t express a point of view but

said to me that her view was in order for anyone to find the argument compelling it would be important, we would have to demonstrate that the prosecution had been unfair. But she never said

to me——

Mr. SHAYS. Did she think the prosecutor had been unfair.

Mr. QUINN. I’m trying to answer your question, Congressman.

She did not adopt that point of view; she did not ever tell me that

she agreed with me. She did not tell me that she would do what

she could to help secure the pardon. She, you know, I think she

was——

Mr. SHAYS. I get your point.

Mr. QUINN [continuing]. Open minded.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Shays, may I ask a question?

Mr. BURTON. We’ll get to you. Let me ask, you wrote the letter

around January 5th or 6th to Mrs. Mills.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. When did she first become involved in the discussions of the Mark Rich pardon? Does anybody remember that?

Mr. LINDSEY. Mr. Chairman, let me try. Ms. Mills was invited,

on the afternoon of January 19, to come to a reception in the White

House.

Mr. BURTON. I know but——

Mr. LINDSEY. Hold on, I will get to your question.

Mr. BURTON. Before——

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t know—I’m sorry your question was before

that.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, the question was the letter was sent on the

5th or 6th by Mr. Quinn to Ms. Mills. When did she first start talking to anyone at the White House to anyone including the President about the Marc Rich pardon? I know she was there on the

19th, and I know she participated in the meeting. When was the

first time, to any of your knowledge, that she started talking about

this?

Mr. LINDSEY. The first time I had a conversation with Marc Rich

with Ms. Mills was on the 19th.

Ms. NOLAN. I had one conversation earlier. I don’t remember the

exact date, but they were doing staff farewell video for President

Clinton; and I had invited Mr. Quinn and Lloyd Cutler and Judge

Mikva and Mr. Nussbaum and Cheryl Mills to come back and be

part of our video. And she said something to me, I think in Mr.

Quinn’s presence, that she had told him to stop pestering me about

the Marc Rich pardon.

Mr. LINDSEY. But if I can go back to Mr. Shays’ question which

is the context for which the meeting on the 19th.

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Mr. BURTON. I’ll let you answer that question, Mr. Lindsey, in

just a moment; but I’m running out of time. And I want to yield

on the minority. At the meeting on the 19th, was anything of a

classified nature discussed, national security, or classified nature

in relation to any of the pardons or things that was confidential.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t think there was any classified or national security information.

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Mr. BURTON. No grand jury information was discussed?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t think other than that there had been indictments was discussed; but no, we didn’t have any, you know, grand

jury information or succeeding material.

Mr. BURTON. Go ahead, Mr. Lindsey, we’ll let you conclude.

Mr. LINDSEY. Ms. Mills had been invited to the White House on

the 19th for a reception for Kelly Craighead, an employee of Mrs.

Clinton. She had also been invited by the President to fly back to

New York on the 20th. She was also scheduled to have dinner with

Ms. Nolan and I on the evening of the 19th.

We were in Ms. Nolan’s office, waiting to go discuss with the

President the independent counsel issues. As several people have

indicated, there was no indication at that point that Marc Rich

would be discussed. We got a call to come to the oval office to discuss the independent counsel matters.

I invited Ms. Mills to join that conversation because Ms. Mills

had been in the White House at the time of the Espy investigation,

at the time of the Cisneros investigation, and at the time of the

Whitewater investigation. The purpose of the meeting that night

was on the independent counsel pardon.

The President did, in the meeting, raise the conversation he had

earlier in the day about Marc Rich and began revisiting it. In those

conversations, Ms. Mills asked a question or two but took no position. But there was no way for Ms. Mills to know, when she went

down to the meeting, that the Marc Rich pardon was going to come

up since that was not the purpose of the meeting and therefore—

and the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the independent

counsel pardons.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Waxman, you’re recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The President has come in for a lot of criticism on these pardon decisions.

And I think, as those who have heard my opening statement, much

of that criticism is justified; but I don’t believe all of the criticism

he’s received is justified because some people have said he’s trying

to stonewall and cover up this investigation. Yet all of you are here

testifying because he’s waived the executive privilege. Ms. Nolan,

let me ask you this question so we have it on the record. As I understand it, the President could be prohibiting any of you from

speaking today to Congress or to anyone else if he exercises rights

under the executive privilege; isn’t that correct.

Ms. NOLAN. The President certainly—President Clinton certainly

has a strong voice in whether executive privilege can be asserted

even after he’s left office. He did not do that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well I commend him for allowing all of you to

come before us today, and it’s a major step to waive a fundamental

335

constitutional prerogative. His action will be helpful to the committee and to the public. But the reason we’re here today is not because President Clinton exercised poor judgment. It’s because

there’s a juicier scandal, a suspicion that something illegal has

taken place. So let me be blunt and get to some of these bottomline questions.

Mr. Podesta, you served as the White House chief of staff. Did

you receive anything in the pardon process that remotely resembled quid pro quo?

Mr. PODESTA. No.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Ms. Nolan.

Ms. NOLAN. I’m sorry, Mr. Waxman, I didn’t get the last part.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did you see anything that resembled quid pro quo?

Ms. NOLAN. No, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Podesta, did you see anything until the pardons process that constituted wrongdoing of any kind?

Mr. PODESTA. No. In the context that you’re talking about,

wrongdoing is different than making a bad judgment. And I think

that there was no wrongdoing; and I think that, in response to your

previous question, nothing of that nature. As Mr. Lindsey has indicated, we never discussed any matters having to do with any of the

things that have been alleged by his critics. So no, there was no

wrong doing in that.

Mr. WAXMAN. The President has an absolute right to——

Mr. PODESTA. He has an absolute right to make a pardon. And

in that context, he can make a decision based right or wrong on

the merits; but as I said in my opening statement, I believe that

the President made that decision in the Rich case, which I disagreed with, he made it on the merits.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me get it on the record. Mr. Lindsey, did you

see anything in the pardon process that constituted wrongdoing,

meaning legal wrongdoing, not bad judgment?

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir. To reinforce what Mr. Podesta said, we had

many discussions about many of these pardons. The discussion was

on the merits. It was the pro’s and con’s. It was the issues before

us. In my judgment, the fact that they were fugitive was the beginning and the end of the discussion. For the President, that was a

factor but not the beginning and the end. I believe he made all of

his decisions on the merits whether you agree or disagree with his

judgment.

Mr. WAXMAN. Ms. Nolan, you said you didn’t see any quid pro

quo. Did you see any wrongdoing by the President in exercising

this authority?

Ms. NOLAN. No I did not, Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, we’re called to a vote.

Mr. BURTON. There’s 12 minutes and 45 seconds on the clock. If

you would like to proceed now and come back, that would be fine,

or we can proceed for another 5 or 10 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me proceed. I will not complete my 10 minutes,

but let me proceed as far as we can.

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

336

Mr. WAXMAN. So none of you observed anything that would have

violated the law; isn’t that correct? That’s from all of you; and that

was also the testimony of Eric Holder and Jack Quinn, who testified before us last time. If anyone was in a position to detect the

existence of a quid pro quo for a wrongdoing, it would have been

one of you three; isn’t that correct?

Mr. PODESTA. I think that’s fair.

Ms. NOLAN. I think that’s right.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. Let’s go to the Mark Rich pardon, and I’m

going to ask about this pardon. Ms. Nolan, Mr. Rich’s application

was received at the White House in December 2000; is that correct.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t really remember. I remember a discussion

about it in December. I don’t remember seeing it until somewhere

around Christmas either late December or early January.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did you get a chance to form an opinion as to

whether this pardon should be granted?

Ms. NOLAN. I formed an opinion rather quickly that the pardon

should not be granted.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did you convey your view to the President?

Ms. NOLAN. I think I know I had a discussion with John Podesta.

I’m not sure when it first came up with the President, but I would

have conveyed it the first time that it did. I don’t remember talking

about it right away.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Podesta did you form an opinion on whether

Marc Rich should receive a pardon?

Mr. PODESTA. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. What was your view?

Mr. PODESTA. I have thought he should not receive a pardon,

that if there was any problem with his indictment that the proper

remedy was come back and handle it through judicial channels.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Lindsey, you already testified that you thought

the pardons should not have been granted because Mr. Mark Rich

was a fugitive; is that right?

Mr. LINDSEY. Maybe technically not a fugitive, but he had been—

but he was out of the country and had been for 17 years.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did the President know about your views?

Mr. LINDSEY. In the process he did. Again we had scheduled

meetings with the President in which we discussed—the first time

the Rich pardon came up in one of those, and Mr. Podesta believes

it was on the 16th. I wouldn’t argue with that. I don’t know it was

a fact; but whenever it came up, yes, he knew my views.

Mr. PODESTA. Just to be clear on that. I think that was the first

time when I was present. But I was out of the country for a couple

of days the previous week, and I don’t know whether there was

meetings held or not.

Mr. LINDSEY. I can’t tell you which date or when we first discussed it. We had a series of meetings in late December or early

January on pardon matters. Whenever the Rich pardon came up,

I think each of us expressed our views.

Mr. WAXMAN. You’re the three top advisors of the President.

Each of you have came to this conclusion, that the pardons

shouldn’t have been granted; and you communicated that to the

President, so he knew it presumably. Ms. Nolan, why do you think

the President granted that pardon?

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Ms. NOLAN. The President was the President, sir. And I even had

that discussion with him on the 19th because we were in some

heated discussion about one of the pardons, and I said ‘‘look, my

job is to tell you what I think about this and to tell you what my

best judgment about it is, but I know who’s President and who’s

not.’’ And he got to exercise the pardon power.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Podesta, do you have a view?

Mr. PODESTA. I think he laid that out in his op-ed piece. I’m sure

there were a variety of factors. I think that the fact that this happened at the end on the 19th—I think the fact that he heard from

Prime Minister Barak, Shimon Peres, and others didn’t mean that

this was a significant U.S. Israeli issue; but those were men he respected, and they were asking him to look at it. And I think he felt

obliged, having heard from a number of people he respected asking

him to take it under serious consideration that he did that.

And I think that based on that, he looked at it, he bought the

argument. They’re arguments that obviously the three of us didn’t

buy, but he bought them. But again the process could have been

done better. He could have heard more from the Justice Department as I think he’s acknowledged. But he made the decision, I believe, on the merits of the case as he understood it and based on

all these factors.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, during this process of deliberations when the

President was making his decision, were you aware or did you become aware of the fact than Denise Rich had made significant contribution to the Clinton library?

Mr. PODESTA. No. I was not aware.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Lindsey, were you aware of that?

Mr. LINDSEY. I may have been aware that she was a supporter.

I don’t know if I had any sense as to whether she had actually

given any money or what; but yes, I think I was probably aware

that she had indicated that she would be supportive of the library.

Mr. WAXMAN. Ms. Nolan.

Ms. NOLAN. I was not aware.

Mr. WAXMAN. Or that she had given to any of these campaigns?

Were you aware of her financial involvement in the office?

Ms. NOLAN. No. I think I understood that she was somebody who

was generally a supporter, but I wasn’t aware of any specific contribution.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do any of you have any evidence to suggest that

the Rich pardon was part of a quid pro quo for the purpose of contributions for campaigns, the library, to Mrs. Clinton’s efforts, or

to the Democratic National Committee?

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir.

Mr. PODESTA. No.

Ms. NOLAN. No, sir. Mr. Waxman, if I can say too when I said

that the President did it because he was the President, I don’t

mean to suggest in any way that I think he did it just because he

could. I agree with Mr. Podesta that the President believed there

were valid reasons to do it; that to grant that pardon that I disagreed with and his staff did, but he was entitled, ultimately, to

make the judgment about it.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you. Mr. Lindsey, I’m particularly interested in your role regarding the Rich pardon. As I understand it,

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you were a consultant to the Clinton library. In this role you certainly had an interest in the success of the library; isn’t that correct?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes. I wasn’t a consultant at the time. I was still

with the government; since then, I am now a consultant to the

Clinton library.

Mr. WAXMAN. And I presume that you had an interest in making

sure the library received adequate funding.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir. I’ve been involved with the library since

the initial discussions of 5, 6 years ago.

Mr. WAXMAN. Is it fair that among those affiliated with the library, you were the closest advisor with the most regular contact

with him at the White House at that time?

Mr. LINDSEY. I would hate to argue who was the President’s closest advisor, but probably with the most regular contact, yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did the subject of Ms. Rich’s contribution to the library, did it come up in your discussions with the President about

the Rich pardon?

Mr. LINDSEY. Never.

Mr. WAXMAN. The major theory of wrongdoing that we are investigating is, did President Clinton issue the Rich pardon in order to

get funds for the library. Even the suggestion of Cheryl Mills

seemed to give us a hint that because she was on the board of the

library, maybe she was trying to influence the President’s decision.

It’s hard to see how this pardon was done to benefit the library.

If you had that concern about the library in mind, why would you

advocate to the President not to grant the pardon?

Mr. LINDSEY. That is correct. And also if you would look, there

were other people who were probably more significantly involved in

the library who were advocating on behalf of other pardons. Michael Milken, Leonard Peltier that we did not grant. So if you were

to accept that as a premise, there were better cases, if you will, for

that. But it didn’t happen in those cases, and it didn’t happen in

this case.

Mr. BURTON. We have a vote on the floor, and the gentleman

from California has 18 minutes on the clock so we will resume

questioning as soon as we come back from the vote. We’ll stand in

recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. Would everyone take their seats please. Mr. Waxman, you have 18 minutes and 6 seconds. You’re recognized for the

balance of our time.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The issue

of Ms. Mills’ attendance at the January 19 meeting has been raised

by several members. I want to ask you all the same question so I

can understand why she was at the White House. Ms. Nolan, how

long did Ms. Mills serve on the White House counsel.

Ms. NOLAN. She was in the White House Counsel’s Office from

the first day of the administration in January 1993.

Mr. WAXMAN. And she had expertise and institutional memory

that would be valuable to the lawyers in the counsel’s office.

Ms. NOLAN. Absolutely.

Mr. WAXMAN. After she left the White House, was she contacted

on various occasions for her expertise and institutional memory?

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Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. What types of issues would she be consulted

about?

Ms. NOLAN. She was consulted about a range of matters that she

had knowledge about or expertise. She had served as the alternate

designated agency ethics official in the White House so there were

a number of rules and standards of conduct that she had experience in providing advice on.

Mr. WAXMAN. Ever on pardons?

Ms. NOLAN. She had, in fact, worked on pardons, yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did she visit the White House after she left the

staff and was sometimes consulted when she came back to the

White House?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes to both?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes and yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. She had come back.

Ms. NOLAN. She visited and she consulted and when she wasn’t

present—most of the time she was not present in the White House,

the vast majority of the time; but when she did stop by and visit,

we might talk to her about issues. And it wasn’t uncommon for us

to talk about such issues with other former White House officials

as well.

Mr. WAXMAN. Was she paid by the White House after she left the

staff?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did she maintain an office or desk at the White

House after she left?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. WAXMAN. When she visited, did she need to be cleared in?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. I have to say, from my own knowledge, my own experience, I have had former staffers of mine come in and talk to

me about matters that are on my mind because I trust their judgment and particularly if it relates to a matter that they were involved in when they worked for me. So I don’t find it all that significant. Mr. Quinn, you were trying to influence her because you

knew she had some ability to communicate and maybe even have

an impact on those who were going to make the decision on this

pardon; is that right?

Mr. QUINN. Again Mr. Waxman—I’m sorry. I thought it was conceivable that she could be helpful. I didn’t anticipate that she

would be a decisionmaker. I didn’t anticipate that she would be one

of the people who, along with the other folks here on this panel,

would necessarily be asked for recommendations; but I thought it

was conceivable. And more importantly, again I thought that based

on the longstanding relationship I had with her that I could get a

feel for where I stood and perhaps be in a position to better tailor

my arguments, know what the substantive concerns were, and address them at an appropriate point.

Mr. WAXMAN. I understand your point. Let me ask the three of

you. At the White House, did Cheryl Mills advocate the pardon for

Marc Rich? Ms. Nolan, do you know if Ms. Mills urged that he be

pardoned?

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Ms. NOLAN. No she did not urge that he be pardoned. She urged

that we look seriously at the issues.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes. I’m not aware that she advocated for the pardon.

Mr. PODESTA. I’m certainly not aware of it, but again I wasn’t in

the meeting.

Mr. WAXMAN. So the three of you would be the natural people

that would know if she was advancing Mr. Rich’s pardon to the

President and urging him to grant that pardon? So it’s your testimony, the three of you, you don’t know whether she did; and the

question is do you believe that she talked to the President in favor

of this pardon. Do you know whether she did or did not?

Ms. NOLAN. I know she spoke with the President in that meeting. I don’t believe that she urged that he grant the pardon.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me try to find out what the mood of the White

House was like at this time. Mr. Podesta, could you walk us

through the final weeks of the Clinton administration? In addition

to pardons, what else was going on?

Mr. PODESTA. Well I think as you know, Mr. Waxman, there

were a number of issues before the President at the end of the administration; and we were trying to work diligently up and through

toward the end to make sure that the policies that he had been

pursuing were implemented properly.

We were working on issues of protecting the privacy of medical

records. Providing a patients bill of rights for Medicaid patients.

We were dealing with the California energy crisis. We issued a new

rule on air conditioning standards. I mean we had, I recall that

during—on Wednesday of that week, for example, we did a major

event with Secretary Babbitt where we designated a number of

new monuments; and so we were, the bulk of at least my time and

the President’s time were taken up with those issues finishing up

the agenda, working diligently to get that done. We appointed—

made a recedd appointment of a fine trial attorney in Virginia to

the fourth circuit to integrate the fourth circuit court for the first

time. We were putting forward Federal judges. We had just innumerable matters to try to deal with to get done before the ends of

the term.

Mr. WAXMAN. So you were winding down the administration

waiting for the new team to take over. You were pretty busy. You

had the Middle East, you mentioned, and then the other things

that were going on——

Mr. PODESTA. The Middle East, as you refreshed my recollection.

He was dealing with that right up until the end. He was dealing

with Prime Minister Blair and Bertie Ahern on the northern Ireland issues so I think there was plenty on both the foreign policy

side as well as domestic policy side that we were dealing with. He

also traveled and made a number of speeches in the last week talking about what he thought the right direction for the country was

including a trip to Arkansas on Wednesday of that week.

Mr. WAXMAN. And he was also dealing with the fact that he had

to come to terms with the independent counsel?

Mr. PODESTA. Yes he was. And that was a significant issue.

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Really kind of, I think, arose. I don’t remember precisely maybe

Ms. Nolan would. But it arose at the beginning of January and it

worked its way up through the process right up at the end. And

I think it’s fair to say at Mr. Ray’s insistence that the agreement

that he struck with Mr. Ray, the independent counsel, was entered

on January 19, the morning of the time that we’re talking these

events.

Mr. WAXMAN. So that was the same day that he came to terms

with Mr. Ray and had to make his admission publicly about the

Monica Lewinsky statements before the grand jury and all of that.

That was the same day that he also had the meetings of the pardons.

Mr. PODESTA. That is correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. It was that night that it was the meetings on the

pardons?

Mr. PODESTA. I guess the only thing that I would quarrel with

what you just said was that I think Mr. Ray recognized and this

was certainly lost in history. We should not keep fighting it. But

Mr. Ray realized there was no problem with his grand jury testimony and there is no statement on the grand jury testimony.

Mr. WAXMAN. He might have been feeling a little more sensitive

about overzealous prosecutors on that day.

Mr. PODESTA. I can only speculate, Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. I can only speculate, but Mr. Quinn was making

that argument of Marc Rich that he was the victim of an overzealous prosecutor; isn’t that right.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. In this pardon process, the President has been

criticized for not getting the input from the Justice Department.

Ms. Nolan, you have been with the President in the White House

Counsel’s Office in 1999 all the way to the end. After you began

this position did the President give you instructions as to how he

wanted to handle the pardon process on how he wanted to proceed?

Ms. NOLAN. Sometime fairly soon after I began as counsel, which

was in September 1999 certainly by the beginning of the year 2000,

we had a discussion in which he had said that he wanted to exercise the pardon power more than he had in the past. That he felt

that he hadn’t exercised it fully, and he wanted to be sure that we

had a process in place to be sure that pardons moved quickly

through the process.

Mr. WAXMAN. So the President was saying he wanted to exercise

his pardon authority more frequently than he had in the past? He

wanted more pardons to be presented to him. Is that your statement?

Ms. NOLAN. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. And he told you to get those pardons to him?

Ms. NOLAN. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did you call the Justice Department and tell them

to get those pardon reviews to the White House?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. And was it running smoothly or what was happening?

Ms. NOLAN. I actually had several meetings—I think the first

meeting was sometime in early 2000; I’m not sure of the exact

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date—with the Deputy Attorney General and the pardon attorney

and I think one or two other people from the Deputy or Pardon Attorney’s Office, which we talked about the standards that the Justice Department was using in reviewing pardons and expressed the

President’s view that, with respect to pardons, he generally believed that restoration of civil rights was important, that if people

had served their time and led a good life since then he would be

in favor of receiving pardons.

We discussed the particular standards that were used by the

Justice Department, some of which I think the Deputy Attorney

General and—— Mr. WAXMAN. Let me interrupt you, because we have a limited

amount of time. Is it fair to say that this process was not moving

along as fast as the President would have liked and you would

have liked?

Ms. NOLAN. That’s fair to say, yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. And so did you find resistance from the Justice Department Pardon Department or office or whatever it was?

Ms. NOLAN. I found no movement. I don’t quite know how to describe what was happening. It was very hard for me to see inside

the Justice Department, but sometime in August I said to Eric

Holder, we have to have another meeting, because we’re coming up

to the end and we need to know that we can move along more pardons. That produced very little. Sometime I think in November or

December I learned that we could expect at most 15 favorable recommendations.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did the Pardon Attorneys Office tell the White

House in September or October 2000 that they couldn’t take anymore pardon applications and that they weren’t going to be able to

review them and get the information to the White House?

Ms. NOLAN. They told us that some time in the fall. I’m not sure

of the exact date.

Mr. WAXMAN. So around the time that the Pardon Attorney’s Office of the Justice Department was telling the White House that it

would process no more pardon applications the President was seeking out more applications; and there was also an increase in pardon requests, isn’t that right?

Ms. NOLAN. Right. There had been, in fact, a great increase all

through the year in applications, so the Pardon Attorneys Office

had more applications and hadn’t been able to move them in any

significant faster rate.

Mr. WAXMAN. In December and January did you feel overwhelmed by the amount of pardon requests that you were asked to

process?

Ms. NOLAN. We were really inundated with pardon requests and,

in fact, sometime around Christmas week I think I spoke with Mr.

Podesta and said we really should—we have to have a cutoff. We

can’t possibly finish what we have if more pardon requests come

in.

Mr. WAXMAN. Where were they coming from?

Ms. NOLAN. They were coming from everywhere. Mr. Waxman,

we had requests from Members of Congress on both sides of the

aisle, in both Houses. We had requests from movie stars, newscasters, former Presidents, former First Ladies. There wasn’t anyVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00350 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
343

body—I didn’t—I refused to go to holiday parties because I couldn’t

stand being—nobody wanted to know how I was, thank you very

much. They wanted to know about a pardon. So I just didn’t go.

Mr. WAXMAN. So let me make sure I understand this. The White

House was involved in closing up its operations but still trying to

issue new regulations and negotiating a Middle East Peace Agreement. The President was insisting that you consider as many pardon applications as possible, despite the fact that the Justice Department wouldn’t take any more applications after October 2000;

and you were being besieged by Members of Congress and others

to consider an ever-growing number of pardons. And on top of that

I suspect you weren’t aware of some of the pardon activities. Is

that a fair statement of what was going on at the White House?

Ms. NOLAN. I think that is a very fair statement. I would add

that we were also doing this in a shortened transition period and

trying to work with the incoming administration. So that was

another—— Mr. WAXMAN. And, Mr. Podesta, is that an accurate statement

from your point of view?

Mr. PODESTA. I think that’s accurate, yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. And you were hearing from Members of Congress;

and I even called you on behalf of a constituent who I thought deserved consideration for a pardon, Mike Milken, and who did not

get a pardon.

Ms. NOLAN. That’s right.

Mr. WAXMAN. And I understand you got calls from Congressmen

and Senators. Did any of them suggest you not follow the Justice

Department guidelines?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, certainly. Several of them suggested that they

knew it was too late really to go through the Department of Justice, but they wanted to send the pardon application directly to the

White House.

Mr. WAXMAN. How many contacts, if you know, did you get from

Members of Congress, House and Senate?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know, sir. I had probably 30 or 40 phone

calls, and I think I took less than half of the calls I had. I just

couldn’t possibly respond to all the calls I had.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Podesta, do you have any idea?

Mr. PODESTA. I would guess it’s in the high double or in the triple digits.

Mr. WAXMAN. Were there any examples that stand out in your

mind of Congressmen or Senators that were asking you to issue

pardons and not follow the Justice Department guidelines?

Mr. PODESTA. Well, let me clarify one thing. I don’t think that

Members of Congress said, please issue a pardon; and, by the way,

don’t follow the Justice Department guidelines. I think they basically just didn’t care whether we followed the Justice Department

guidelines. For example, I think in one particular case in which we

did issue a pardon for Mr. Lake, that was done at the end and I

think did not go through the Justice Department. I think both the

chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the chairman of

the counterpart to your committee in the Senate called on his behalf or at least made their views known on his behalf.

Mr. WAXMAN. Senator Hatch?

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Mr. PODESTA. Senator Hatch and Senator Thompson. I don’t

think they really cared whether that had gone through the Justice

Department guidelines or not.

Mr. WAXMAN. Ms. Nolan, did you know Roger Clinton was seeking pardons from some individuals or for some individuals?

Ms. NOLAN. I’m sorry, say the question again.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did you know that Roger Clinton was seeking pardon for some individuals?

Ms. NOLAN. I believe I did. I can’t think of who those individuals

are now, but I think I probably knew that he was interested in certain pardons. I did not know everybody who was interested in

every pardon. It was impossible given the thousands, as Mr. Podesta said, thousands of people who were interested in pardons.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did you know that Hugh Rodham was being paid

to obtain pardons for Vignali and Braswell?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I see my time is about up. But I have to say

it doesn’t seem to me a very ideal process for a President exercising

such an important responsibility, just seems absolute chaos at the

White House and lack of cooperation from the Justice Department

in what the President wanted to do, which was to give more pardons. And at some point it looks like, particularly on January 19th,

the President sat there and said, I’m going to go ahead and just

issue some of these pardons that he thought made sense.

Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. Mr. Waxman, I think I might put that in a little

bit more perspective, which is that I think that for the bulk of the

177 pardons and commutations that were processed, you could disagree with them, you can agree with them. Most of them were— at least the Justice Department got to chop on them, gave them

their recommendations. But I think that they were managed by the

White House Counsel’s Office through a process in which there was

substantive consideration given to them, and a judgment was made

and a recommendation was made to the President, and he either

took it or he didn’t take it.

So I think that there’s a misperception that this all happened on

the last day and this giant batch of pardons and commutations

went through on the last day. I think the bulk of them were considered, and they were considered on the merits, and, as I said, sometimes, in many cases, the Justice Department agreed and concurred. In some cases, they didn’t, but they were considered on the

merits.

Mr. WAXMAN. But do you think that the process broke in the

handling of them?

Mr. PODESTA. I want to say two things.

One is that I think there are a couple of what I would describe

as sui generis cases. I think the batch of independent counsel cases

that we considered at the end were considered sort of sui generis

and as a group, and I think that some of these cases moved

through at the very end.

As Ms. Nolan testified, she talked to me about stopping the inflow. I discussed that with the staff at a staff meeting in early January, said no more new pardon applications are coming through

the system. But I think obviously that there were some that came

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in late, and I think that you know we bear the responsibility for

having the process that we thought was manageable that in the

last days I think broke down and let some of these go through. But

I don’t think it’s the whole set of pardons, and I think if you look

at those, the bulk of them are—everyone would agree are meritorious. Now some people may think that no pardon should be granted,

but I think the bulk of them are meritorious.

I think there are others which were considered by the White

House, judgment was rendered, you can agree or disagree with it,

and there are very few that came up, and I would put Rich as

being probably the No. 1 example in which the process broke down.

I don’t think the President got good and full advice on it. He made

a judgment. As I said, I believe he made it on the merits as he understood them, but I think that we didn’t serve him very well in

terms of providing him with the counterargument. There’s an explanation for that because of the Barak call on the 19th, etc., we

all thought it wasn’t happening, but I don’t think we served him

very well in that regard.

Mr. BURTON. We have a vote in less than 2 minutes, so we have

to sprint to the floor. This will probably be the last interruption so

we won’t have to break. If you need to take a break while we’re

gone, you should do so. We’ll be back in about 10 or 15 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. If we could have everyone take seats and close the

doors, we’re going to now go to the 5-minute schedule, and I’ll start

off with that. We are missing a couple of witnesses here.

OK. I want to get a little bit more specific, if I can. We’ve kind

of hit and missed on some questions. So I’m going to try to do this

in a little more organized manner so we can expedite this a little

quicker.

Who, among the White House staff, supported the pardons of

Marc Rich and Pincus Green?

Mr. PODESTA. Let me speak for the panel. I believe we all opposed it.

Mr. BURTON. Was there anybody else at the White House that

you know of that supported the pardon of those gentlemen?

Mr. PODESTA. The President reviewed the matters, and he decided to grant it.

Mr. BURTON. So it was the President alone as far as you know?

OK. Who opposed it?

Mr. PODESTA. Start with the three of us.

Mr. BURTON. And was there anyone else that opposed it that expressed opposition to the President?

Ms. NOLAN. There were a couple of associate counsel who worked

on pardon matters, and they opposed it.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Who participated in the debate about the pardons on the 19th and any other time? Who participated in the debate on the pardons?

Ms. NOLAN. I did, Mr. Lindsey, the two associate counsels, the

President and Ms. Mills.

Mr. BURTON. And everyone was opposed to it except ultimately

the President when he made his decision?

Ms. NOLAN. I think, as I said before, I don’t believe Ms. Mills expressed a view on the bottom line.

346

Mr. BURTON. What did Ms. Mills say?

Ms. NOLAN. She argued—or suggested, I think is a fairer way of

saying it, suggested that we should be looking at the selective prosecution question seriously. Had anyone looked at that? But she also

had very strong views that normally pardons or the arguments

about selective prosecution were less available or plausible to rich

white people.

Mr. BURTON. Was there a formal recommendation from the entire staff to the President? I mean, did you all collectively say we

think this is—was there a formal recommendation that he not be

pardoned?

Ms. NOLAN. I’m not sure what you mean by a formal recommendation. I think President knew that each of us opposed the

grant.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Besides the three of you, who—you said there

were two others. Who on the White House staff expressed their opposition directly to President Clinton besides the three of you and

Ms. Mills? Or Mills didn’t, but besides the three of you, you said

two associate counsels.

Ms. NOLAN. There were two associate counsels.

Mr. BURTON. Who were they?

Ms. NOLAN. Meredith Cabe and Eric Angel.

Mr. BURTON. Meredith Cabe, she had contact with the pardon attorneys on occasion, didn’t she?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. I want you to take a look at exhibit No. 63. Would

you put that on the screen, please?

According to this January 10, 2001, e-mail, President Clinton

called DNC Finance Chair Beth Dozoretz and spoke to her about

the pardons saying he, quote, wants to do it and is doing all possible to turn around White House counsels. What was the President doing to try to turn you around?

Ms. NOLAN. I am not aware that he did anything.

Mr. BURTON. Well, in the memo, as you can see there, it says

very clearly he was talking to Ms. Dozoretz, and Ms. Rich was with

her. He was saying he was having difficulty, and he says I’m doing

everything I can to turn them around. I think he also said you

should pray about it.

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know if this is accurate or

not. All I can tell you is from my end, other than the President did

some time I think the last week of January, the last week of his

Presidency, it might have been the week before, raised the pardon,

seemed to be familiar with the issue, but I didn’t—— Mr. BURTON. But he didn’t try to turn you around as denoted in

this.

Ms. NOLAN. I did not experience that.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. He discussed it with you, but he wasn’t trying to

turn you around or anything?

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. No, and I think that the President—I think this

kind of—I don’t know where this comes from, this third-hand conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00354 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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versation. I have no reason to believe that it is accurate, but it sort

of subverts the authority in the White House when the counsel

doesn’t—the President doesn’t report to the counsel. The counsel

reports to the President.

Mr. BURTON. OK. I am very well aware of that. I found that troubling when I read that.

I have one more question, and I think we’ll be out of time. If the

staff check had been in a veto mode, could you guys have prevented

the pardon if you would have been in a veto mode? I mean, you

would have said you believed it shouldn’t have been done?

Mr. PODESTA. The President understood our views; and, ultimately, it’s his decision to grant or not to grant the pardon.

Mr. BURTON. Well, let me go ahead and yield to Mr. Waxman or

someone on your staff. My time is expired.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to thank you all for being here. I want to tell

you that your testimony has helped me tremendously in feeling a

little bit better about this situation.

I want to just zero in on one point. It seems as if I think almost

all of you, Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Podesta, said that there

was a certain point where you all felt because of the circumstances

of the Rich case that it was basically not going to happen; and I

think it was you, Mr. Lindsey, who said that on the 19th apparently a call came from Prime Minister Barak and that things began

to change. I’m not trying to put words in your mouth, but it seems

as if things were going in one direction and then all of a sudden,

or may not have been all of a sudden, but they started going in another direction. Could you help us with that? The President in his

New York Times explanation said that the Barak call was of some

significance. Can you or Mr. Podesta or you, Ms. Nolan, shed some

light on that?

Mr. LINDSEY. Let me start. We had on at least one occasion prior

to the 19th had a fairly full discussion of the Marc Rich-Pincus

Green application. We each expressed our views, and there was no

indication at the end of that meeting that the President was going

to grant the pardon request.

Mr. CUMMINGS. When was that? I’m just——

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, Mr. Podesta believes the first one he participated in was the 16th. I don’t have access to a calendar, but I

wouldn’t argue with that. It was some time 3 or 4 or 5 days prior

to the 19th.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right.

Mr. LINDSEY. On the 19th we had put off discussion of pardons

for the people involved in various independent counsel investigations, and we had scheduled a meeting with the President for the

purposes of discussing those applications and requests. During that

meeting or at some point during that meeting the President raised

with the group—and Mr. Podesta may have been gone at this

point—that Prime Minister Barak had spoken to him that afternoon and had asked him again—I don’t believe it was the first time

that the Prime Minister had raised the Marc Rich pardon—had

asked him again to consider it.

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We then had an additional discussion concerning their status,

the arguments that Mr. Quinn had been making to the counsel’s

office at that point. And it was some time that evening that the

President made the decision, after speaking again with Mr. Quinn

and getting from Mr. Quinn a commitment that they would waive

all civil procedural restrictions, statute of limitations and so forth,

that the President indicated that he intended to grant the pardons.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And can you shed any light on that, Ms. Nolan?

And then I want to come to you, Mr. Quinn.

Ms. NOLAN. No, I think again, like Mr. Lindsey, I’m not exactly

sure when the first discussion was, but I did not realize until the

evening of the 19th that it was live and the President specifically

did mention his conversations with Mr. Barak.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, did you have something, Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. No.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Mr. Quinn, Mr. Lindsey just referenced

a conversation about the waiving of the civil situation; and do you

remember, I mean, is there a point where things in your efforts to

represent your client, where things seemed to be going downhill,

and then they seemed to turn? I mean, do you think that during

that discussion that Mr. Lindsey just referenced, and I assume that

you’re familiar with it, do you remember the President ever mentioning that he had gotten more than one call or had recently gotten a call from Mr. Barak?

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, I came to the impression as we approached the end of the term that he had spoken to Prime Minister

Barak more than once, but I quite honestly can’t tell you how I

came to believe that. I think in all likelihood I was hearing that

reported back from people associated with Marc Rich in Israel. I’m

rather confident that no one in the White House told me of those

calls. But I was aware that on the 19th this matter was raised by

Prime Minister Barak with the President.

You know, in retrospect it strikes me, as I think it does a good

many people, that was a significant development. It was a turning

point; and, in all honesty, I can’t tell you that I ever thought that

this was anything other than a tough decision. I thought we had

put together a persuasive case and had a meritorious argument,

but I was well aware not so much of Mr. Podesta’s views but I was

certainly well aware that Mr. Lindsey and Ms. Nolan were, at a

minimum, highly skeptical.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Nolan, you had a number of phone conversations with Eric

Holder on January 19th, is that correct? Isn’t it?

Ms. NOLAN. I did, yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. OK. What was the subject matter of those phone calls,

beginning with your call to Mr. Holder at 9:45 that morning? These

are logs found in exhibit 127.

[Exhibit 127 follows:]

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350

351

352

353

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Ms. NOLAN. I’m sorry, exhibit 127?

Mr. BARR. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NOLAN. I found them. I’m not sure I can remember the specifics of each, you know, what each call was for. I remember several

pardon discussions with him that day. The only one I had with him

regarding Marc Rich was late in the evening, would be the last

phone call on the log.

Mr. BARR. The phone—where you call him at 6:38.

Ms. NOLAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BARR. And what precipitated that particular phone call

about Mr. Rich?

Ms. NOLAN. As I said earlier, Ms. Mills was in my office. Jack

Quinn had, I believe, called my office and ended up speaking to

her; and she told me that he said Mr. Holder favored the pardon;

and I called Mr. Holder right away to determine if that was correct.

Mr. BARR. And did he say to you, yes, I favor the pardon?

Ms. NOLAN. I had talked with him the first week in January

about it, and I did not have the impression that he was in favor

of it, so that’s what I said. I said, I’m hearing you’re in favor of

it. I didn’t think you were in favor of it.

He said that he was neutral, which I think is the language he

had used earlier in January about it. He—and I said, well, I’m a

little confused because I’m hearing that you’re not just neutral.

And he said that he, if—he had heard that Mr. Barak was interested, that if that were the case, while he couldn’t judge the foreign

policy arguments, he would find that very persuasive and that— and I finally said, well, are you? I still don’t understand what neutral means here. And he described it as neutral leaning toward or

neutral leaning favorable. I’m not sure of the exact phrasing.

Mr. BARR. So he never really answered the question.

Ms. NOLAN. Well, the end of the conversation, he said he would

consider himself neutral leaning favorable, which I thought was an

answer. It wasn’t—you know, it was an answer. It was a description of—and I informed the President of that conversation when I

met with him some time fairly soon after that. I think we met

around 7, 7:30.

Mr. BARR. Now what was the President’s reaction?

Ms. NOLAN. I think that was significant to the President. I don’t

think it was the thing that made his mind up entirely, but I think

it was a significant piece of information that the Deputy Attorney

General had said that.

Mr. BARR. From the standpoint that that would give him something to hang his hat on.

Ms. NOLAN. I didn’t understand it that way. It is just he, Mr.

Quinn, had made what were to the President very persuasive arguments. Mr. Quinn was somebody he greatly respected. Mr. Barak,

who the President respected a great deal, had weighed in favor several times; and Mr.—— Mr. BARR. Who made persuasive arguments on the other side

against granting the pardon to this fugitive?

Ms. NOLAN. We argued, Mr. Barr, that if Mr. Rich and Mr. Green

had such great legal arguments there was a base to make them,

and it wasn’t there. It wasn’t in the Oval Office.

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Mr. BARR. And Mr. Clinton apparently disagreed.

Ms. NOLAN. He did disagree, and I think he disagreed because

other people he respected had a different view, and he made a

judgment that—in favor of their view.

Mr. BARR. We had—returning to the phone logs on that final

sheet, there are calls to you; there are calls from Roger Adams to

Eric Holder; calls from Eric Holder to Roger Adams; calls from Eric

Holder to you. But none of those, as far as you know, related to

the Rich case.

Ms. NOLAN. No, the only one I spoke with him about was at the

end of the day.

Mr. BARR. Did these other calls——

Ms. NOLAN. I mean, I don’t know about the Roger Adams to Mr.

Holder.

Mr. BARR. Did these other calls between you and Mr. Holder relate to other pardon cases?

Ms. NOLAN. They related to other pardon cases. As far as I’m

aware there may have been other matters that weren’t pardon

cases, because we do deal with other things. The only thing can I

can remember is pardon discussions.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired. We’ll have several more rounds.

Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to join my colleagues in commending your presence

here today, Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Podesta. I think that

you have added a great deal of light to the testimony and news articles and other things that we have read about the circumstances

that some people think led to the decision that the President made

with respect to the Marc Rich case, and I think that the fact that

there were discussions between the three of you and the President

with respect to this pardon is very material to the public’s understanding that there was consultation amongst the people that the

President trusted the most to give him their honest opinion.

Your opinion was not regarded by the President, and he went another course, but that’s the President’s prerogative in these cases.

That’s what the Constitution allows.

The first question I wanted to ask was with reference to executive privilege, which he has waived and allowed you to come to testify. Is it the clear understanding of the law that after the President has left the White House that this executive privilege continues on with respect to conversations that you had with him that

led to some executive decision?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mrs. MINK. That continues on. So I think then that it is of paramount importance that the President has issued this release to

allow you to come testify, to give some clarity to what happened.

Now in terms of your discussions about the Marc Rich case, from

what you have said already today, there were discussions on April

19th, I think the three of you have indicated that——

Mr. LINDSEY. January 19th.

Mrs. MINK. January 19th and that he had still not made up his

mind. Is that a clear conclusion of the status of your discussions,

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that your impression was on January 19th when you met with him

he had not yet made up his mind?

Mr. LINDSEY. I think I’ll speak for Mr. Podesta and Ms. Nolan.

I think their impression was that the matter had been resolved at

an earlier meeting and that he was not going to grant it. When the

President re-raised it on the 19th it was clear once he re-raised it

that he was still considering it and that he had not made a decision, but it was their clear impression prior to that that he had accepted our recommendation and was not going to grant it.

Mrs. MINK. So there was an earlier meeting where the three of

you were fairly sure that the President had decided not to grant

this pardon, is that——

Mr. PODESTA. That was my impression. That was my impression.

That was on January 16th.

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Lindsey, that was your clear understanding.

Mr. LINDSEY. I was not as clear as they are as to what the President—when we left that meeting with the President—intended or

not intended to do.

Mrs. MINK. Did he specifically articulate it or did you just make

that assumption because he didn’t have a rebuttal?

Mr. PODESTA. In my case, I’d say the latter, that he raised the

points that had been made in—and at least some of the points had

been raised by Mr. Quinn. We argued that given his status as a

fugitive, if you will—we can go back and forth on that a little, but

I think we viewed him as a fugitive in at least a common sense,

that the proper forum to raise those was before judicial tribunal,

and it was my impression that he accepted that.

Mrs. MINK. So, given your long experience of working with the

President, your assumption was, since he didn’t give you a clear rebuttal on the other side, that he had been persuaded by the advice

that he was getting from people that had worked with him and

whom he trusted the most in the White House, is that it?

Mr. PODESTA. I think that’s——

Mrs. MINK. Fairly good understanding.

OK, well, then after that, is it in the factual circumstances of

things where Mr. Barak made a phone call, was it after that discussion or somewhere earlier or before? I’m trying to get a feeling

as to when things might have changed in his view of this particular

pardon.

Mr. PODESTA. Well, the conversation——

Mrs. MINK. When was the Barak——

Mr. PODESTA. The conversation with Prime Minister Barak occurred in midafternoon, I think, on Friday, January 19th.

Mrs. MINK. So it was after your earlier discussions.

Mr. PODESTA. After the conservation on the 16th. Then Prime

Minister Barak talked to him one more time on January 19th, on

Friday; and later that evening there was a further discussion, as

I said, between my colleagues here. I wasn’t present for that conversation, but it was early or I guess late in the evening, must

have been 9 or 10 o’clock on the evening of the 19th. So it was subsequent to his conversation with Prime Minister Barak.

Mrs. MINK. So, Ms. Nolan and Mr. Lindsey, you can verify that

it was likely that the telephone conversation he had with Prime

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Minister Barak may have had an impact on his prior decision not

to grant the pardon.

Mr. LINDSEY. He actually I think indicated that.

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, he did.

Mrs. MINK. He specifically said that to both of you.

Mr. LINDSEY. That’s correct.

Ms. NOLAN. And I would be clear, though, I wouldn’t characterize

that he had made, as Mr. Podesta said—— Mrs. MINK. But it had influence on his thinking.

Ms. NOLAN. But it certainly seemed that he was not going to

grant it, and Mr. Barak’s phone call had been significant.

Mr. BARR [presiding]. The time of the gentlelady from Hawaii

has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Mrs.

Morella, for 5 minutes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Ms. Nolan and gentlemen, for your patience. It’s awfully hard to be here all afternoon under the grilling, but we do appreciate it, and we do feel that it adds further clarification to this

very difficult situation.

I guess the kinds of questions I want to ask is what did you

know, when did you know it, what would you have done about it

had you known about it earlier, just kind of to set the record

straight. For instance, I would ask the same question of all of the

panel, and you can answer as briefly and succinctly as you can. Did

you know that Marc Rich or his companies were trading with Qadhafi and Libya, Mr. Quinn?

Mr. QUINN. I did not know that.

Mrs. MORELLA. You did not know that. Had you known it would

you have done anything about it?

Mr. QUINN. I was representing Marc Rich as a lawyer trying to

persuade the Department of Justice, the Southern District and ultimately the President that the indictment was wanting. That matter was not addressed in the indictment. And I think it does bear

emphasis that if Marc Rich or anyone associated with him broke

any laws in that regard, the pardon does not free him from being

held accountable for that.

Mrs. MORELLA. But you really were not even aware of it.

Mr. QUINN. I was not. I had no personal knowledge of that. My

assignment had to do with the indictment.

Mrs. MORELLA. Ms. Nolan.

Ms. NOLAN. I did not know that.

Mrs. MORELLA. Would you have done something if you had

known?

Ms. NOLAN. Well, it certainly would have been another important

factor in an argument I was already making against——

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. No, I understood there were allegations that he

had traded with Iran but not with Libya.

Mrs. MORELLA. All right. How about Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. I was unaware of that.

Mrs. MORELLA. You were unaware of it.

OK. Were you aware that Marc Rich or his companies were involved with trading with Iran? Maybe if you could just go yes or

358

no and if you want to add about whether it would have made a difference in your actions. Mr. Quinn.

Mr. QUINN. I think my earlier answer stands. I was asked the

question at one point whether he had been involved in arms trading. I responded first that I had heard that that allegation had

been made in an article in Playboy magazine and that I had been

informed that he denied that allegation.

I took the opportunity then to call Mr. Fink in New York to confirm that my memory was correct, that he maintained that he had

not dealt in arms; and I reported that back. But again, even with

regard to that allegation, I do think it’s important to bear in mind

that the pardon does not free him from being held accountable for

anything unrelated to the indictment if in fact he broke any other

law.

Mrs. MORELLA. Looking at little technicalities of the law but, in

general, this man is asking for a pardon—but let me just go on and

ask the rest of the panel and ask if they knew anything about

whether Mr. Rich’s companies were trading with Iran.

Ms. NOLAN. I had conversations with Mr. Quinn in which I asked

him about the arms trading allegation. I did understand that there

was a Trading With the Enemy Act issue, but I was concerned

about what the arms trading was and was assured that was misinformation.

Mrs. MORELLA. You were assured by whom?

Ms. NOLAN. By Mr. Quinn.

Mrs. MORELLA. By Mr. Quinn.

Let’s go on Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. Again, I was aware there was a trading with the

enemy count in the indictment. Your question as to whether it

would change my mind or I would have done anything

differently——

Mrs. MORELLA. You would have done something?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yeah. I don’t know if there’s any way to be more

against something than I was against this. So, you know, it would

have been an additional basis—it was an additional basis for my

opposition. But I was told that his company was not an American

company, and therefore the company would not be subject to our

laws.

There’s an article in the Wall Street Journal the other day that

suggested there are a lot of American companies that have foreign

subsidiaries who, because they’re foreign subsidiaries and not subject to that are not subject to that.

But, again, I was opposed to this and for all the reasons, you

know, that we’ve talked about.

Mrs. MORELLA. And Mr. Podesta.

Mr. BARR. The gentlewoman’s time has expired, but certainly Mr.

Podesta can finish answering the line of questioning.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, can I just mention some items

that fall into the same category?

Ms. Nolan and gentlemen, the trading agreement with the Soviet

Union when there was the embargo, the trade with South Africa

during apartheid—the reason I was asking these questions, Mr.

Chairman, was simply to point out whether we knew and, if we did

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know, did we do anything about it, and if we didn’t know should

we have found out more about it.

So I then yield back.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Podesta, you can complete your answer.

Mr. PODESTA. Let me answer the question on Iran.

I’m not sure precisely when I learned this, before or after, but

I think the underlying indictment was—involved oil trading and

that involved oil trading that I guess was involved with Iran. But

I associated myself with Mr. Lindsey. I was against this. So I don’t

know whether I would have done—taken additional steps if I had

known it. I suspect that—and I don’t know what the President’s

state of knowledge was on those issues.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

The gentlelady from District of Columbia is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your willingness to come freely, and I certainly appreciate the President’s willingness to waive his executive privilege, at the very least. It certainly speaks to the notion of whether

or not he believes things should be hidden from this committee and

tends to eliminate the notion that he does and wants to bring these

matters out into the open.

I’d like to have your views on these notions of constitutional

amendments which are popping up, especially as people who have

been on the inside of the White House during the pardon process.

Ms. Nolan, you indicate you had so many of these coming down

and then they came late and there was a notion of, my goodness,

isn’t there some cutoff in all of this. As a matter of fact, the Framers reserved the pardon power, in part, because there might be

things that came late. But I can certainly understand the notion

that these things galloped in with increasing speed as you got near

the end.

Indeed, as I said earlier in this hearing, I called the counsel’s office—it must have been the day before the end of the administration—because it crossed my mind that the so-called Democracy 7

people were being tried for the second time for the same offense

after having had a hung jury for protesting from the gallery that

the Congress takes the budget of the District of Columbia and adds

things to it. So I called and said, can we have pardon for the Democracy 7?

Of course, these were misdemeanors. It would have been a political act of the President who supports voting rights and statehood

for the District. But I can certainly understand that people just get

the idea in the back of their mind. And, of course, I didn’t get to

speak with Ms. Nolan. I got to speak with somebody in your office.

Ms. NOLAN. I apologize to every Member of Congress.

Ms. NORTON. Nor do I believe, frankly, that you should have

come to the phone for me or any Member of Congress in those last

hectic days, especially after what we have heard today about what

you confronted.

By the way, I had no idea that there was such things as Justice

Department guidelines. I am a Member of Congress and a lawyer

and had no idea what the process was. You know, I called the

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counsel’s office the way I think people who know nothing might

well do.

We have had one constitutional amendment that’s kind of been

shouted down that would have the pardon power reviewed by twothirds of the Congress. That is to say, a pardon can be overturned

if two-thirds of the Congress—or do you think that would make it

more political? Imagine Members of Congress voting to pardon a

criminal. That one didn’t get very far.

Now there’s another one that says no pardons after October 1st.

Now I know that would make your—October 1st of the election— I know that would make your lives a lot easier, or maybe not. So

I’d like your view as to the effects on the pardon power of stopping

all pardons October 1st of the election year when the President is

going out of office.

Ms. NOLAN. I think that the Framers had it right when they

vested the pardon power in one person and that person being the

President. They did it quite deliberately to ensure that one person

was responsible for the decision, one person could take the hits for

it and knowing full well that the kind of mercy that is inherent in

the pardon power would not be exercised by committee in the same

way that it would by one person.

Ms. NORTON. I ask about the timing. I’m asking about October

1st.

Ms. NOLAN. I think that I would retain that power, and I would

retain it unfettered and expect that this President and future

Presidents are fully subject to criticism and public rebuke if the

public disagrees. But that the idea of having one person who can

do it and can do it at any time I think is what the Framers had

in mind, and I continue to believe that’s the right way to do it.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, I have law professors on both sides of me, so

I’m not sure I’m qualified to answer this, but I agree with Ms.

Nolan. They think the power, as it exists, for the purpose that it

exists, should remain the same. I would just also say I’m not sure

that September 30th would be any different than January 19th

under that scenario.

Ms. NORTON. It would be the rush then to meet that deadline.

Mr. LINDSEY. Exactly.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. Well, I agree with Ms. Nolan.

Let me point out one other point, though, that I think that this

situation gives rise to, which is it goes back to the beginning of Ms.

Nolan’s statements about the President’s frustration about not getting recommendations for pardons from the Pardon Office in the

beginning of the year 2000, which is I think that if you look back

on this, the President granted I think only something less than 200

pardons over the course of his 8 years, and I think that was something that the President really noticed that he was not getting any

applications moving forward out of the system as it currently exists. Partly I think that’s the result of the situation in which people

are afraid to be criticized for granting pardons or for recommending

pardons, etc.

If you look in contrast to what President Clinton granted, the

system produced I guess for President Reagan during his 8 years

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some 400 pardons or more or less. There were more people in prison, more people coming out of it, more people who I believe served

their sentence and lead a good life. So I don’t think that the answer

to the problems that we encountered is to restrict or to try to suppress or to try through to some extent through the exercise of second-guessing the reduction of the overall number of pardons and

commutations. I think that would be a bad outcome.

Mr. BARR. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. LaTourette,

for 5 minutes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think, to Mr.

Quinn’s delight, I’d like to leave the Rich-Pincus Green matter for

a moment and talk about another fellow, Carlos Vignali, if I could.

As we know from the news account, Carlos Vignali helped finance

another group of people that was involved in the distribution of 800

pounds of cocaine shipped to Minnesota where it was going to be

cooked with other chemicals to create crack cocaine for distribution

to, among other people, children in the State of Minnesota. Thirty

people, to my understanding, were convicted. And on January 20th

only one spins out of jail, and that’s Carlos Vignali, and there have

been a couple of wrinkles since we last got together.

One has to do with Hugh Rodham; and, Mr. Lindsey, I’d like to

start with you. I think I read in the Los Angeles Times an observation that you recall speaking at least twice with Mr. Rodham about

the Vignali pardon. Were you quoted correctly?

Mr. LINDSEY. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. When and where did those conversations take

place?

Mr. LINDSEY. I believe the first conversation occurred probably

around the middle of December. Mr. Rodham called to ask me to

take a look at a commutation application for Carlos Vignali, indicated that he was a first-time offender, that his application was

supported by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, that it was supported by the U.S. attorney in Los Angeles.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you aware that the U.S. attorney in Los

Angeles was not the prosecuting agency during the course of that

conversation?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, because he also told me it was supported by

the trial attorney who actually tried the case in Minnesota. That

turned out probably not to be correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Probably not.

Mr. LINDSEY. But, you know, well, we know the U.S. attorney opposed it. I don’t know whether the trial attorney did or didn’t, but,

be that as it may, I’m telling you what he told me.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure.

Mr. LINDSEY. Told me it was supported by the U.S. attorney in

Los Angeles, by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, by the Cardinal

Archbishop Diocese and Archdiocese in Los Angeles, Cardinal

Mahoney, by several Congressmen, former Congressmen, city council people.

I indicated to him that he had served 6 years approximately. I

indicated to Mr. Rodham that that was the kind of application the

President actually was interested in looking at. He was interested

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in looking at first-time drug offenders who did not play major roles

in the crime and that we would take a look at it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did he represent to you that this fellow didn’t

play a major role in a crime? 800 pounds is a lot where I come

from. I assume that’s not the type——

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t think there is a finding. I actually believe

the judge made a specific finding that he was responsible for 5 to

15 kilos, which is I think 11 to 33 pounds. I think the total amount

of money he was involved with was $2,500—$25,000 excuse me. So

I don’t believe that it is correct that he was responsible for

$800,000; and, in fact, I think there’s a specific finding that he was

not.

There was also I believe a specific finding that he was not an organizer, leader of the conspiracy.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about the second time you talked to Mr.

Rodham? When did that occur?

Mr. LINDSEY. Some time thereafter. At some point we learned

through the Pardon Attorneys Office that the U.S. attorney in Minnesota did not support the application, was opposed to the application.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. In some conversation, I can’t date it for you, I

told—because one of the facts he had told me at the beginning was

that the attorney in Minnesota—he said the trial attorney, not the

U.S. attorney—but the trial attorney in Minnesota supported it. I

told him that at least as far as the U.S. Attorney’s Office was concerned in Minnesota that they were not supportive.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And is that the sum and substance of your contact with Mr. Rodham on this matter?

Mr. LINDSEY. As far as I recall, yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you inquire of him what his interest was

in a convicted drug dealer from Los Angeles?

Mr. LINDSEY. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you ask him whether he had received a

fee?

Mr. LINDSEY. No, I didn’t ask. I don’t think I’ve ever asked that

of any person who has ever contacted me.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, was that your assumption? Did you think

he was family friend or he was acting as a lawyer?

Mr. LINDSEY. You know, I don’t know. When anyone contacts me,

I have no idea. I mean, if they’re a lawyer, they could be there as

a lawyer. Oftentimes they have friends or they know someone. I

really—from my analysis it wasn’t important why he was calling

me. He told me about a person. The facts seemed to follow along

the lines of people we were looking at, and I told him I would take

a look at it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you aware or did the pardon attorney tell

you that Mr. Vignali lied upon his pardon application in the section

that asked if he had a previous criminal conviction? Were you advised of that by the pardon attorney?

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t believe so.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you advised of that by Mr. Rodham?

363

Mr. LINDSEY. No, I believe the first time I heard that, frankly,

was this morning. If I remember right, he actually indicated he had

several prior.

Mr. LATOURETTE. On his pardon application?

Mr. LINDSEY. I thought so.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I don’t think that’s correct, and I will be happy

to supply you the information and that’s incorrect.

And just as a last matter, as my time——

Mr. LINDSEY. I was just informed that it is reflected in his pardon application, but, again, we can get the application and see.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It’s reflected in his pardon application that he

has priors.

Mr. LINDSEY. I believe so.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARR. I thank the gentleman from Ohio.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Ose, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question is directed, I believe, to the former chief of staff, Mr.

Podesta, and that is, what is the procedure by which the White

House deals with gifts received during the President’s tenure, particularly this President’s tenure?

Mr. PODESTA. I think that Ms. Nolan could answer that more directly.

Mr. OSE. I might ask her, but we’ll start with you, OK?

Mr. PODESTA. Well, I think that if the President receives a gift,

it’s logged into the gift unit. The gift unit then creates a running

log of those. The President has the right to accept and take gifts

that are presented to him if he chooses to do so. If he does not

choose to do so, I believe they become the property of the National

Archives, and I think that’s set up by statute, but I couldn’t quote

the statute, the statutory citation.

Mr. OSE. Is there a procedure outlined at the White House for

what qualifies as a gift to the President or one that’s supposed to

go to the Archives?

Mr. PODESTA. Sure.

Mr. OSE. When was that policy established?

Mr. PODESTA. I think it’s been in existence since probably prior

to the Clinton administration.

Mr. OSE. Do we have a copy of that particular policy as it applied

to the Clinton administration?

Mr. PODESTA. I think that this is regulated by statute.

Mr. OSE. All right. Mr. Quinn, is Mr. Rich a U.S. citizen or is

he not?

Mr. QUINN. It is my understanding now that he believes he is not

a U.S. citizen. I understand that our State Department disputes

that.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Nolan, is your recollection of the manner in which

gifts are received by the White House consistent with Mr.

Podesta’s?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, yes, it is.

Mr. OSE. If a gift comes to the White House, what happens? Just

take me through just a brief synopsis. Let’s say I send a gift to the

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President valued at $275, and it’s a portrait. What happens? What

are the questions that are asked?

Ms. NOLAN. The gift, as I understand it, is sent to the gift unit

in the White House for evaluation; and the gift unit identifies, puts

on a list who the donor is, what the value is; and the President

makes a determination whether to accept the gift or not.

Mr. OSE. The President makes the determination whether to accept the gift personally or as a representative of the Federal Government or—— Ms. NOLAN. Well, it depends on whether the gift is given to the

White House, as I understand it, the gift unit records reflect gifts

given to the President personally.

Mr. OSE. What happens to the gifts given to the White House?

Ms. NOLAN. I believe the residence department office keeps a

record of those, but I haven’t seen such record. I don’t know.

Mr. OSE. How would we go about establishing what those records

contain?

Ms. NOLAN. I have to say I’m not quite clear what you’re asking.

Mr. OSE. Where are those records?

Ms. NOLAN. I assume they’re with the Archives now as part of

the President’s record. But I’m not sure.

Mr. OSE. OK. And my final question—Mr. Chairman, I see I’m

almost out of time. I was here for the testimony about the relative

lack of knowledge about Mr. Rich’s past behavior in terms of his

activities overseas. Relative to Mr. Vignali and the behavior that

he engaged in, transporting the 800 pounds, you’re all aware of

Plan Colombia, the official U.S. Government policy?

Mr. PODESTA. I certainly am.

Mr. OSE. Do you have any observations about the conflict that

might be perceived between the President pardoning someone

transporting 800 pounds of coke and our efforts in Colombia to

ameliorate or eliminate the production?

Mr. PODESTA. I think Mr. Lindsey corrected the record. He

knows more about the case than I do with regard to the specific

facts.

Mr. OSE. I see my time has expired.

Mr. PODESTA. I think what you’re suggesting, that no one who

is involved in a drug case should ever receive a commutation or

should ever receive a pardon—and I understand that you may believe that, but I think that is a harsh standard.

Mr. OSE. That’s not the suggestion I’m making, Mr. Podesta.

Mr. LINDSEY. If I may correct the record again. The judge made

a specific finding in the Vignali case that he was responsible for 5

to 15 kilos, which I understand translates to 11 to 13 pounds, not

800.

Mr. BARR [presiding]. I think we’ve established the ratio between

pounds and kilos sufficiently.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me also thank each one of you for appearing this afternoon.

Mr. Podesta, in your opening statement you indicated that the

staff had recommended against pardoning Mr. Rich. Did you have

any further individual conversation with the President about the

matter?

365

Mr. PODESTA. No, not beyond the night of January 16th. As I

said, I was not present on the night of the 19th to have that discussion.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. And that was part of a group discussion

or group interaction.

Mr. PODESTA. On the 16th?

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Yes.

Mr. PODESTA. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Mr. Lindsey, how long have you known

the President?

Mr. LINDSEY. Over 32 years.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. And how would you characterize your relationship?

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, up until a month ago I was an employee for

8 years. Before that, he and I for a short period of time, were both

in the same law firm. We’ve been friends for a number of years.

We have both worked for Bill Fulbright in the late 1960’s, which

is where I first met him.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. So you would say that the two of you

were very comfortable with each other.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Did you have any individual conversation

with the President about the Rich case?

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t believe so. I can’t recall any conversation

with him.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. So any interaction you had would have

been part of the group activity where someone else was present

other than just the two of you.

Mr. LINDSEY. I think that is correct.

I do recall one conversation that was not part of the meeting in

which I indicated to him that he should consider Mr. Quinn in this

to be an advocate on one side and not his advisor, and that Jack

had a client. And I don’t believe that was in a meeting. I think that

was the night of the 19th at some point.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Ms. Nolan, were your discussions with

the President individual or part of a group discussion or where

other people were present?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, my conversations with the President were part

of a group discussion. I did talk to him on the telephone late on

the night of the 19th, morning of the 20th for a few minutes. There

were people in my office, but I talked with him on the phone.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. So, for the most part, it seems to me that

all three of you are saying that your conversations were part of a

normal interaction that one would have expected to take place

given the roles that each one of you played.

Ms. NOLAN. That is correct.

Mr. LINDSEY. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. At any time or any other time did you

ever get the impression that there was anything to be considered

other than the legal determinations in terms of trying to make a

rational decision about the situation?

Ms. NOLAN. I did not. I disagreed with the President’s judgment,

but I believed he had his reasons for doing it that involved his view

366

of the merits of the case and the advice or recommendations of people he respected.

Mr. PODESTA. I agree with that.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, same answer.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would sort of like to go back to the process under which a pardon application goes in; and I guess this is directed to Ms. Nolan,

Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Podesta. It’s my understanding you knew

about the pardons application sometime in December, correct?

Ms. NOLAN. I think that’s right, yes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. At any time did any of you discuss it

with the prosecuting attorney or the U.S. attorney or get any input

from them or notify them?

Ms. NOLAN. I discussed it with Mr. Holder sometime early in

January, which is right after I had taken a look at it. It had come

in sometime in December, but I don’t think I took a look at it sometime until January. I have discussed it with Mr. Holder, the Attorney General.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I’m talking about the prosecuting attorney.

Ms. NOLAN. Well, he—— Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Would he be the one who contacted

them?

Ms. NOLAN. Right. I normally talk to Main Justice and to the

Deputy’s Office—or my office would, more commonly; and we

wouldn’t normally reach out individually. We did on some occasions, but rarely. It usually went through the Justice Department.

He represented to me at that time that he was clear what the U.S.

Attorneys Office would think about the matter but that he did not

think we would hear any objection from Main Justice.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Is it normal procedure that the prosecuting attorneys would get to weigh in on a case, especially one

of this magnitude?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, normally, they would.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Mr. Podesta or Mr. Lindsey, did either

one of you all think to tell the President or anyone that we need

to talk to the prosecuting attorneys?

Mr. LINDSEY. The President has indicated and I think we did indicate that the U.S. Attorneys Office in the Southern District was

opposed to it. We knew that as a fact.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. How did you know that as a fact if they

did not have the opportunity to weigh in on it?

Mr. LINDSEY. Because we knew that there had been discussions

prior to this application to sit down—for the U.S. Attorneys Office

to sit down with representatives, attorneys for Mr. Rich, to discuss

the matter and that their position was that until they came back

there would be no discussions. So, again, their position was that as

long as they remained fugitives there would be no discussion of any

of these matters, and I just assumed that would clearly be their position with respect to a pardon application.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Did you relay that to the President?

367

Mr. LINDSEY. You know, can I recall specifically? I believe the

President was aware of all of that, that there had been attempts.

I think Mr. Quinn may have mentioned it in letters, that there had

been attempts to talk with the U.S. Attorneys Office in the Southern District and they refused to have those conversations.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I’ll let Mr. Podesta weigh in, and then

I’ll yield my time.

Mr. PODESTA. Yes, I think the proper channel for soliciting the

U.S. attorney’s view in this case was through main Justice,

through Mr. Holder or through the pardon attorney; and I think it

was a mistake not to have done that. I think from the perspective

of the three people sitting up here and I think with respect to Mr.

Holder I think the reason that wasn’t done was because no one

thought this was going to happen and no one supported it. And I

think it wasn’t until the evening of the 19th that proposition was

put to Mr. Holder, and I think that it would clearly have been better to have solicited the views of the U.S. attorney in New York,

in the Southern District of New York, and to have her views at

that point in front of the President before he made a final decision

on this matter.

And I think—as I said earlier in my testimony, I think we would

bear some responsibility for not having had that done, but I think

it’s explained by the course of conduct we were all engaged in,

which we were busy. We were working on a lot of things. We didn’t

think this was going anywhere. We didn’t think it was a live option

on Tuesday night.

But, obviously, I think the President made a decision. I think it’s

fair to say what Mr. Lindsey said, was the President understood

that the U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York would

not support this. But I think in due regards to her equities that

he at least should have been able to hear what her views were.

I would add something else, which is that I don’t think that the

President in all these matters—and I think I heard him say this

on several occasions—wanted to not know what the Justice Department thought. I thought he always wanted to know what the Justice Department thought, but he didn’t want them to have, in essence, a de facto veto power by not giving the White House the applications or what their views were. So I think that he was perfectly happy to get recommendations not to grant a pardon which

he then could consider and then decide to do or not do. But in this

case I think that, from that perspective, the system didn’t work

well; and we bear some of the responsibility for that.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I would like to yield to you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Lindsey, I just heard what you said in response to the question; and Mr. Quinn said that at the last hearing. But I think in the next round I invite you to look at exhibit

135, and the observation that the Southern District of New York

would not sit down and negotiate this case is not right. They

agreed to dismiss the RICO case. They agreed to bail. They agreed

to sit down with the lawyers that prepared the report that Mr.

Rich paid for. Did you know all of that?

[Exhibit 135 follows:]

368

369

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir, I was told that the U.S. Attorneys Office

had indicated that then as long as they were fugitives they would

not negotiate with them.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I would invite you to look at exhibit 135 and

maybe you and I can talk about it when I get more time.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Putnam.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Podesta, you have testified that your opinion on this case

was that the facts did not support a recommendation to the President for a pardon, is that correct?

Mr. PODESTA. That is correct.

Mr. PUTNAM. And that you stated the same, Mr. Lindsey, is that

correct?

Mr. LINDSEY. I’m sorry. I was reading exhibit 135. What was

your question?

Mr. PUTNAM. You stated that from the beginning it was your

opinion the facts did not support a recommendation to the President for a pardon.

Mr. LINDSEY. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. PUTNAM. You did the same, Ms. Nolan?

Ms. NOLAN. I’m sorry, sir.

Mr. PUTNAM. The facts did not support.

Ms. NOLAN. That is correct.

Mr. PUTNAM. The conclusion that I draw from that is Mr. Quinn

has an uncanny ability for persuasive writing. That based on the

advice of every attorney in the White House who has responsibility

for viewing these matters it was your memo to the President that

convinced him, based on the merits of the case, that the pardon

was in fact justified. Is that essentially what it was? Everyone else

in the entire White House Counsel’s Office, according to Mr. Podesta, unanimously was against the pardon, so this one memo to the

President was so persuasive, so convincing that he made his decision to pursue the pardon.

Mr. LINDSEY. If I may respond to that. I think there were a number of issues. I think Jack did make persuasive arguments, at least

to the President. In addition, we’ve talked about the Prime Minister of Israel weighing in. In addition, the President, at the time

he made the decision, had been advised that the Deputy Attorney

General, who was neutral to leaning favorable. So I cannot tell you

if any one of those three factors had not been present whether the

decision would have been the same. But to sort of focus only on one

of those factors I think is not correct.

Mr. PUTNAM. A moment ago Ms. Nolan testified that the President made the decision based on the merits of the case and advice

from those he trusted. Whom else did he seek out for advice besides those of you here who were on the White House or Justice

Department staff?

Ms. NOLAN. The people I had mentioned before were the advice

of Mr. Quinn, the recommendation of Mr. Barak, and the recommendation, such as it was, of Mr. Holder. That is what I was

referring to.

Mr. PUTNAM. Is it common—in your review of the other pardon

applications, how many other—we have got the King of Spain,

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Barak. How often does it come up that foreign heads of state weigh

in on pardon applications?

Ms. NOLAN. It came up I guess a handful of times in this past

season.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. Just to give you some example, I just read that,

for example, Margaret Thatcher and Prime Minister Gorbachev at

the time weighed in on behalf of Armand Hammer’s pardon appli- cation shortly after he had contributed $100,000 to the Bush/Quale

campaign and the RNC campaign, and those may have been factors

in granting that pardon as well.

Mr. PUTNAM. And you indicated that your concern about this pardon was not great because, quote, no one thought it was going to

happen. It was not a live option. Have you had an opportunity to

review exhibit 67, the e-mail that indicates that, as we’ve previously indicated, staff were not supportive, were not in detail

mode, but that, according to you, Mr. Podesta, the efforts with the

President were being felt, it sounds like you’re making headway

and you should keep at it as long as you can. That was sent on

the 16th.

[Exhibit 67 follows:]

371

372

Mr. PODESTA. I don’t know what—I mean, again, my recollection

of that conversation was that I said to Mr. Kadzik that I was opposed do it, that the counsel was opposed to it, and that we would

recommend to the President that he not grant it.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Quinn, do you have any idea why Mr. Fink

would have thought that, based on Podesta’s remarks, you were

making headway and your presence was being felt?

Mr. QUINN. No, and you’ll notice that Mr. Fink is not reporting

on a conversation he had with me. But I know that Mr. Kadzik and

Mr. Fink will both be before the committee today.

Mr. PUTNAM. Just one final question for you, Mr. Quinn.

According to exhibit 72, there was an e-mail that indicates, from

Robert Fink to Mr. Azulay, I have been asked who lobbied the

President on behalf of Marc and Pinky and said it may be private

and therefore did not immediately respond. Who should I say?

Why would there be any reason for embarrassment or shame or

reluctance to disclose who had advocated this supposedly meritorious application?

[Exhibit 72 follows:]

373

374

Mr. QUINN. Again, sir, that is not my e-mail, so I can’t speak to

what was in his mind. There’s at least one other document that indicates that Mr. Azulay was sensitive to public opinion in Israel.

But beyond that I can’t comment.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Schrock, would you yield to me please?

Mr. SCHROCK. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

I hope I’m not redundant. I was gone for a little while. I had to

leave. There’s a few questions I would like to ask.

I know that when Mr. Quinn presented his application to the

President he presented the best case possible; and when you met

with the President, the three of you talked to him about the Rich

pardon. Did you talk to him about Mr. Rich breaking embargoes,

like trading with Mr. Muammar Qadhafi of Libya or trading with

Iran when our hostages were being held in violation of embargo or

that he traded with Iraq when he was involved in problems with

Iraq and he embargoed oil or the grain embargo on the Soviet

Union when we had the grain embargo?

Was the President aware of that? Was he aware that Mr. Rich

was violating the embargo of South Africa or he was trading with

Cuba during the Cuban embargo? Did you tell the President any

of that?

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Burton, I don’t think I knew or know any of

that, except I did know at that point part of the indictment was

a Trading With the Enemies Act violation. And the President knew

that.

Mr. BURTON. Did you call—— Ms. NOLAN. I told the President late in the evening that there

was an allegation of arms trading, that I had spoken with Mr.

Quinn several times to try to determine what that allegation was

and if that was something different from trading with the enemy.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I want to get to that in just a moment. Did

you or any of you talk to him about any of these violations of embargoes that was a violation of the law? Any of them? And there

was one, two, three, four, five, six that we know of.

Ms. NOLAN. Other than the thing I just referred to, the Trading

With the Enemy’s Act and the allegation of arms trading, no, I

don’t think so.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ask for an intelligence briefing? Did you

talk to anybody at the Justice Department about any other violation that may have taken place by Mr. Rich so you can convey

them to the President?

Ms. NOLAN. No. I agree with Mr. Podesta’s description and want

to make clear that until 8 or 9 or later in the evening of January

19 I did not know this pardon was going forward.

Mr. BURTON. But you knew it was being considered earlier, did

you not?

Ms. NOLAN. I thought that it was not going forward. I knew it

had been considered, but I left a meeting sometime earlier in that

week with a clear impression that it would not go forward.

Mr. BURTON. Well, what I can’t understand is, even if something

of this significance is being considered and you knew that this was

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one of the most wanted fugitives in the world by the United States,

if you thought it was even being remotely considered and you knew

Mr. Quinn was pushing for it and you knew there was calls coming

in from people and leaders around the world, why didn’t you ask

for an intelligence briefing? Why didn’t you ask if there were other

laws and embargoes and things like that that had been broken so

the three of you could have at least explained to the President

what was going on? The Justice Department knew about these

things.

Ms. NOLAN. Sir, I did not know until that evening that it was

a live issue. We were—for all the kinds of matters Mr. Podesta described, we were extremely busy; and we weren’t spending time on

pardon applications that looked like they weren’t going anywhere.

And that was simply a matter of trying to manage the best we

could with an extremely heavy load. I didn’t have the time to and

wasn’t inclined to do work on matters that I thought weren’t live

matters. Once we had the President’s determination, we did ask

the Justice Department for an NCIC check.

Mr. BURTON. Well, you reached out to Mr. Quinn about some of

the issues, did you not? You talked to him.

Ms. NOLAN. On the 19th.

Mr. BURTON. If you talked to Mr. Quinn, why didn’t you call over

to the Justice Department and say, hey, this thing is a hot item.

As quickly as you can get it, I want a complete rundown.

Ms. NOLAN. I spoke with Mr. Holder, sir, the Deputy Attorney

General.

Mr. BURTON. What did Mr. Holder say?

Ms. NOLAN. He said he was neutral, leaning toward favorable.

Mr. BURTON. Did you say, tell me what is going on with Mr.

Rich? Tell me where he violated the law. Tell me so I can tell the

President clearly what the problems are with this problem. Did you

ask him that?

Ms. NOLAN. If the Deputy Attorney General gives me—if he

wants a pardon, I don’t normally get all the underlying facts on it,

sir.

Mr. BURTON. He says, well, I’m neutral leaning, yes. But the fact

of the matter is you knew this was a very, very much wanted fugitive, but you didn’t pursue it.

Ms. NOLAN. My view was clearly expressed to the President, was

that this should not be done.

Mr. BURTON. On what basis?

Ms. NOLAN. My view was, if Mr. Quinn’s arguments were all correct, if Mr. Rich and Mr. Green will be selectively prosecuted, it

didn’t matter. They should come back——

Mr. BURTON. I think I’m next. Do you want to take your time?

I would like to go on and continue the questioning, if you would

like, if you would let me take my time. But I will yield to you, if

you like. Go ahead.

Mr. WAXMAN. It just appears to me this whole pardon process

broke down because, ideally, the President should have had all this

information. He should have known what the prosecutors had to

say about this. He should have known all this background about

Mr. Rich, which he apparently did not have at his disposal.

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So this whole pardon process broke down, and we’re trying to understand how the President could make this decision and he made

it contrary to the top advisors that worked for him at the White

House. Sometimes when we step back and try to figure out what’s

going on, we miss the obvious; and two things are going through

my mind as I recollect that period of time.

The failure of the Middle East process, peace process, it should

have been a tremendous blow to the President. And here Prime

Minister Barak was calling him and asking him for a favor. The

President must have known at that point that Mr. Barak was likely to be out of office pretty soon.

The second thing is that was the day that the President had to

come to terms with the independent counsel and make a public

statement of his statements not being completely accurate, if I

could just be mild in my way of putting it. But the President nevertheless had to come forward and make a public statement about

testimony he had given. These were two things on his mind.

Mr. Podesta, you know, no one can quite know what was going

on in his head. But his concern about overzealous prosecutors, a request from the Prime Minister of Israel, probably his exhaustion,

the failure to get all of the information, how much of this was contributing to the President’s decisionmaking?

Mr. PODESTA. Mr. Waxman, I don’t want to—I am loath to kind

of psychoanalyze the President and try to figure out exactly what

factors went to what. But I do know that Mr. Barak—as Mr.

Lindsey said and raised a couple of times, that was, as you properly point out, was an emotional time. The peace process obviously

wasn’t coming to fruition. He had enormous respect for Mr. Barak.

I think Mr. Barak had asked him for several things, if you will,

that were intended to show support for the State of Israel, not so

much for Mr. Barak but for the State of Israel, including, for example, the pardon of Jonathan Pollard.

Mr. WAXMAN. And the President was not going to give that pardon to Mr. Pollard.

Mr. PODESTA. That is correct. I think it was one thing that he

was seeking, in my own view, that he really felt like he had to go

back and look at it hard; and at that point it was I think too late

to do what you’re suggesting we should have done and that I have

suggested that we should have done, which is to provide him a

more complete portfolio with respect to the case. But it was on the

evening of January 19 I think, as a result of that, he wanted to

take a hard look at it. He did—again, I wasn’t present for the conversation, so I can’t go into what I thought was in his head. But

I think that gives some fuller explanation of what we think the situation was at that time.

Mr. WAXMAN. I want to touch on another issue. I want to clarify

something that received a lot of attention earlier. That was a conversation that Cheryl Mills had with Roger Adams. Roger Adams

is the pardon person at the Justice Department. This was a conversation that was supposed to have taken place on January 20.

Miss Nolan, I assume, tell me if I’m not correct, that all of the pardon decisions had been decided by January 19?

Ms. NOLAN. All of the pardon decisions except I believe Mr.

Deutch.

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Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Rich was decided earlier?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Cheryl Mills, her position was she never called

Roger Adams on January 20 or any other day and that Roger

Adams called the White House Counsel’s Office. She picked up the

phone because everybody was so frantic and so busy. This was the

last day of the President’s term. And he had a question about paperwork, something about warrants that had to go back over to the

Justice Department. She tried to assist him in answering that

question on the paperwork.

And then I do want to make the point that she has maintained,

and as far as I know it’s true, that she had no knowledge about

Denise Rich’s contribution to the library or the campaigns or anything else. Do you have any evidence to the contrary?

Ms. NOLAN. None whatsoever.

Mr. WAXMAN. The last question I want to ask Mr. Podesta.

There’s been some concern in the press about this Hasidic group

in New York and the appearance because they voted so overwhelmingly for Mrs. Clinton in the Senate. Do you have any information

you can share with us about this group? Is it surprising that they

voted so overwhelmingly or is there anything else you want to tell

us about that?

Mr. PODESTA. I think much has been made in the press that the

group voted overwhelmingly for Mrs. Clinton and suggested that

there was some quid pro quo, which I reject.

But I went back and looked at the voting in News Square, and

it’s interesting that in 1998 they voted 1,132 for Governor Pataki;

8 for Peter Vallone, who was running for Governor. In 1996, they

voted 1,110 for President Clinton; 31 for Senator Dole. In the Senate race in 1992, the vote was 664 for Al D’Amato; 3 for Mr. Abrahams.

So I don’t know much about this community, but I do know they

vote as a block. I don’t think you can make much out of the fact

that they, in fact, vote as a block, because they seem to do it for

Republicans, and they seem to do it for Democrats.

I think the President concluded in that particular case that no

purpose was served in these gentlemen staying in jail. They had

all served a couple of years. He did not, by the way, pardon the

gentlemen, as he was requested to do by the community leaders.

He did commute their sentence to time served—not time served—

he commuted it to 2 years.

Mr. LINDSEY. Thirty months with respect to three, 24 months

with respect to one.

Mr. PODESTA. Because he thought they all had children at home;

and it made more sense at that point to reduce their jail terms, let

them go home to begin to work and pay off restitution fines which

they had which he left in place.

Again, one can disagree with it. I think it was a decision made

on the merits. We heard from some people outside of the community was well on that particular case, and I think it was a justifiable decision based on the fact that they had all served significant

jail terms, and it made much more sense to have them home with

their kids and earning money to pay the restitution back.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. BURTON. I understand there is a need for a break, so we will

take a 5 or 10-minute break, and then we will go to the next round.

We will stand in recess for 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. OK. The committee will come to order. We’ll start

the second round. I’ll start with my 5 minutes.

Miss Nolan, you received word that Mr. Rich had been involved

in arms trading; and as I understand it—correct me if I’m wrong— you asked Mr. Quinn about that, is that correct?

Ms. NOLAN. That is correct.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ask anybody at the Justice Department

about it?

Ms. NOLAN. This was at 2 or 2:30 a.m. I did not.

Mr. BURTON. You did not. Well, the thing is, when somebody who

is an international fugitive is about to be pardoned and somebody

tells you, I guess from one of the intelligence agencies, that the

man was involved in international arms trading, which may or may

not have been the case, it may have been under that category, it

looks like red lights would go all over the place and you would say,

my gosh, we have to check this out very thoroughly.

Now I cited earlier six or seven embargoes, trading with the

enemy of the United States—Iran, Iraq, Cuba, South Africa—during the embargo—all of these things—Libya, Muammar Qadhafi,

whom we bombed because of those things, it seems like, if a red

light went off on those things, you would say, hold it, we have got

until tomorrow at noon. Let’s double-check this thing. What I don’t

understand is why you would go to the man advocating the pardon,

Mr. Quinn, and not get people out of bed at the Justice Department. I just don’t understand it. It doesn’t make any sense to me.

Ms. NOLAN. That’s what I did. I asked Mr. Quinn the information. I talked to the President. I told him that we had this information. I remembered the words we used because I said all we have

is Jack Quinn’s word that the arms trading is not, in fact, an issue

for Mr. Rich.

Mr. BURTON. Well, let me interrupt. All you had was Jack

Quinn’s word?

Ms. NOLAN. That is correct.

Mr. BURTON. An intelligence agency tells you that there was

arms trading, a violation of law, and all these other things had

taken place which had not just been revealed or checked; and you

take the man’s word or the President takes his word on the pardon

of one of the most wanted fugitives in the world who renounced his

citizenship and all the other things we talked about. You took his

word when Mr. Quinn was representing him. And Mr. Quinn said

in previous testimony the last time he was here, my job wasn’t to

tell all the facts that were against the pardon. My job was to point

out all the reasons why there should be a pardon.

You know as an attorney that’s what you do. You try to make

the best case for your client.

Why in the world would you go to Mr. Quinn when there was a

question of illegal activity and say, hey, what about this? You know

darn well he’s going to say, oh, that’s nothing. That was just a

minor thing. That was probably not arms trading. It was oil trading or something else. Why would you take his word for it and why

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would the President take his word for it and then go ahead and

grant that pardon? I just don’t understand it. It eludes me. Would

you explain that to me?

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Chairman, I will try to explain it to you. I don’t

know that you and I will see eye to eye on what the situation was

then.

Mr. BURTON. I’m worried about what the American people think

about it.

Ms. NOLAN. Well, I would like to try to explain it.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Ms. NOLAN. This was 2:30 a.m. My eyes were officially stuck together by then. I had my contact lenses in since 7 or 6 the morning

before. I had been going on a couple hours of sleep most nights that

week, as had the President; and I think frankly, as Mr. Podesta

said, because this came up so late we did not do the kind of checks

that we would have if we would have had the time.

Mr. BURTON. Well—— Ms. NOLAN. If I may finish, Mr. Chairman, since you asked this

question.

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Ms. NOLAN. As Mr. Lindsey indicated, he had indeed indicated

that, understand Mr. Quinn is not your advisor, he is an advocate.

But I do think that the President viewed Mr. Quinn as somebody

who he truly did trust to give him correct information; and as far

as we know that information was correct, not incorrect.

Mr. BURTON. I’m running out of time here. Was Mr. Quinn at the

White House?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. BURTON. So you had the ability with your eyes stuck together to get ahold of Mr. Quinn, but you didn’t try to contact the

Justice Department to ask them about it because it was 2:30 a.m.?

And you can get ahold of the man who is an advocate for pardoning

one of the most wanted fugitives in the world, but you don’t call

the Justice Department or the intelligence agency at 2:30 a.m.? I

don’t understand that.

Ms. NOLAN. Sir—— Mr. BURTON. Why would you call Mr. Quinn and not the Justice

Department to find out about that?

Ms. NOLAN. I was trying to determine if Mr. Quinn understood

or had an explanation for why it was there. I agree—although, as

I said, it may very well be—appears that Mr. Quinn was correct

about the description of the NCIC, so I’m not sure in retrospect

that it was an incorrect decision. But I agree, had there been more

time, had I been operating on more sleep, if the President had been

operating on more sleep, if the Constitution didn’t say at 12 noon

this was done, there would have been more calls made. I have no

question about that. I completely agree with that. I can only tell

you what happened.

Mr. BURTON. Let me end by saying this: It was 2:30 a.m. The

President didn’t leave office until noon the next day. This was a

very serious thing. It should have sent up red flags all over the

place. And to ask the defense attorney for his counsel on this and

not ask the Justice Department when you’re going to be pardoning

one of the most wanted fugitives in the world, whom everybody in

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Justice and Democrats and Republicans alike said shouldn’t be pardoned, it just doesn’t pass muster.

Who’s next? Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am so

glad you started asking those questions, Mr. Chairman. That’s

amazing. That’s exactly where I wanted to go.

I wanted to talk about Mr. Quinn for a minute and just ask a

few questions. Ms. Nolan, you seem to have a lot of confidence in

Mr. Quinn, is that right?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I take it that you believe the President did

also.

Ms. NOLAN. That is correct.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now the chairman asked you a question—and I

am going to get to you, Mr. Quinn, in a moment. But the chairman

asked you a question, and it seems to boil down to this. You have

a trusted friend of the President, someone who has represented the

President, who is now an advocate for his client. And we lawyers,

we are advocates for our clients. That is our job. We’re sworn to

do that.

At the same time, one who has a loyalty to the President, I

mean, has some because he has been a significant part of his life,

I mean, did you take that into consideration? Did you feel that

there was some kind of not official conflict but perhaps a conflict

with his advocacy with his client and at the same time his friendship with the President? And do you think Mr. Quinn would have

put the President in a situation, would have, say, given the President some advice that may have done harm to the President and

would have benefited his client?

And I will ask you the same question, Mr. Quinn.

Ms. NOLAN. I did not believe that and do not believe that Mr.

Quinn would put the President in harm’s way, or intended to, in

any way; and Mr. Quinn had, in fact, said that he believed in this

case. He said, I’m an advocate, but I believe in this with my whole

heart and soul. I completely believe in this case.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You remember those words? Those were the

words?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you believe that you felt that he really

meant that when he said it.

Ms. NOLAN. I felt he meant it. It didn’t change my mind. I felt

his heart and soul took him to the wrong place, but I believed that

he believed it, yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Quinn, you understand my question, right?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You are advocating for your client and at the

same time you have a President who you represented. And what

happens with us lawyers and our clients, we get to know them so

well and we wanted the best for them, too, so we have two situations. Someone who is a non-lawyer may be looking at this and

there has been some implications coming from up here that maybe

there was some kind of, again, unofficial conflict.

I want you to comment on that. And the reason I’m getting to

that is because I think that sometimes things can be implied, and

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I would rather for you to let us know exactly where you stood with

regard to the President, who you felt who was your former client,

and at the same time Mr. Rich, who was your present client.

Mr. QUINN. Sure. Let me say several things, if I may, Congressman.

First of all, no one is absolutely correct. I would never have consciously put the President in harm’s way or any of the people sitting next to me. I would imagine you can appreciate that I did not

think my advocacy here would lead to us being in this room today.

I acknowledge that.

I did believe in the merits of the case I made. I still do. I don’t

expect to convince anyone of that after all the publicity we’ve seen

and all the questions that have been raised, but I believed in it,

and I do today, and I would not have misrepresented the facts either to the people sitting alongside me or to the President.

When Ms. Nolan called me about this matter, I told her what my

understanding of the allegation was. I told them that I wanted to

confirm my understanding with the person who had led me to that

understanding, one of my co-counsel; and I did so.

And I would point out that, with respect to these matters of arms

dealing that have been alleged, not only were these people never

indicted for anything like that, to my knowledge there’s not any

criminal investigation of it. And again I will repeat if they violated

any law for activities outside the scope of this indictment of which

the chairman has complained they can be held legally accountable.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just want to take a moment again to thank you

all for your service to the country. One of the things that has always concerned me about this committee is that so often we drag

people before the committee and then their reputations are tarnished. Like somebody said, how do I get my reputation back? I

really do appreciate what you all have done to try to lift up all

Americans, and so I just want to take this moment to speak on behalf of Elijah Cummings and the people that I represent to say

thank you.

Ms. NOLAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LINDSEY. Thank you.

Mr. QUINN. Thank you.

Mr. BARR [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, Mr. Podesta, are any of you all familiar

with the Braswell case?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. I was not familiar with it while at the White

House, but I have become familiar with it from reading press accounts later.

Mr. BARR. Did any of you all see the petition filed by Mr.

Braswell?

Ms. NOLAN. I believe I did, yes, sir.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. That’s very interesting, because, according to the Justice Department, there was no petition filed.

Ms. NOLAN. We certainly received something, and I think it was

in the form of a pardon petition.

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Mr. BARR. Oh, really?

Ms. NOLAN. I think so.

Mr. BARR. That’s very interesting because, according to the Department of Justice, he was 1 of 44 individuals pardoned on the

President’s last day in office who did not file clemency applications

with the Department of Justice prior to January 20. How could you

all have seen a petition?

Ms. NOLAN. I think, as in the case with Mr. Rich, he filed a pardon petition. It was filed with the White House, not with the Justice Department.

Mr. BARR. And apparently a very fine one. Well, this is the pardon petition for Mr. Rich. Did any of you all see that one?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. That one really does exist. I’m really intrigued that

you all could have seen a petition that the Department of Justice

says didn’t exist.

Ms. NOLAN. Sir, all I can tell you is the fact that the Department

of Justice didn’t receive a pardon petition doesn’t mean that a pardon petition wasn’t filled out and sent to the White House. And I

believe I saw one. I certainly saw some application——

Mr. BARR. That’s very interesting. Was it Mr. Rodham that filed

it?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know who filed it. I believe that it was sent

to the White House through Mr. Rodham, yes.

Mr. BARR. Is that the petition that you might have seen Mr.

Lindsey, a petition filed by Mr. Rodham?

Mr. LINDSEY. I did not know Mr. Rodham was involved at all. I

believe what I saw was filed by Mr. Kendall Coffey. Filed may not

be the right word because, again, as Ms. Nolan said——

Mr. BARR. I’m not splitting hairs. Apparently, the two of you all

saw some document on behalf of Mr. Braswell.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir.

Ms. NOLAN. That is correct.

Mr. LINDSEY. And I believe it was a pardon application because

I think I read it.

Mr. BARR. Did you bring that with you Mr. Lindsey?

Mr. LINDSEY. That would be in the White House files. It would

be in the Archives.

Mr. BARR. Ms. Nolan, did you bring what you saw with you?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t have it.

Mr. BARR. Which one did you see, Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. I didn’t see any for Mr. Braswell. The first time

I heard about Mr. Braswell was when I read about him in the New

York Times.

Mr. BARR. Do you recall what was in that petition, Ms. Nolan,

to your recollection, the one filed by Mr. Rodham?

Ms. NOLAN. May I be clear? I would not use the word filed, and

I do not know that it was sent to the White House by Mr. Rodham.

I thought it was, but I don’t know for sure. It could be the same

one Mr. Lindsey is talking about. I just want to be clear.

Mr. BARR. Well that’s not very clear.

Ms. NOLAN. It’s as clear as I can be, sir. I want to be clear about

the lack of clarity of my memory.

383

Mr. BARR. Well, that’s clear, that you’re trying to be clear about

the lack of clarity.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t want to overstate what I remember.

Mr. BARR. I don’t think there is any doubt that any of us harbor

any illusions that you do. I think you’re deliberately unclear.

Ms. NOLAN. Sir, I have not been deliberately unclear.

Mr. BARR. Then perhaps you might rethink whether the petition

that you saw—the documentation that you saw on behalf of Mr.

Braswell came from Mr. Rodham.

Ms. NOLAN. Are you asking me to testify to facts I don’t remember?

Mr. BARR. Why would I do that?

Ms. NOLAN. Sir, you seem to be objecting to the level of my memory. All I can tell you is what I remember.

Mr. BARR. That’s true. I do object to the level of your memory.

It’s apparently pretty low.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t think that’s correct, sir; and I don’t think

that’s a fair characterization of my testimony.

Mr. BARR. You can’t remember where the petition came from, yet

you take great exception to the fact that I used the word ‘‘filed’’ which is not a legal term that I’m using. Apparently, there was

documentation that was somehow delivered to the White House or

got in the hands of people at the White House, namely yourself.

First you say you think it was sent there by Mr. Rodham or he had

something to do with it. Then as soon as we hear from Mr. Lindsey

that he saw something filed perhaps or delivered by somebody else,

all of a sudden your memory becomes even fuzzier and you’re not

sure it was from Mr. Rodham.

Ms. NOLAN. I think I testified right to begin with, that I thought

it was from Mr. Rodham. I just wanted to clarify that I had so testified. But maybe we can just move on because I don’t know that

we’ll see eye to eye.

Mr. BARR. Thank you very much for your direction to the committee.

Ms. NOLAN. You’re welcome, sir.

Mr. BARR. We will come back to that.

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Ohio.

Mr. WAXMAN. Will you yield to me?

Mrs. MINK. Yes, I’ll be happy to, Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. I will say that the last questioning of you has been

insulting. Ms. Nolan has been before this committee on several occasions. She has always been helpful and cooperative. No one can

testify to facts she doesn’t know. She’s testifying after many hours,

and I don’t think any witness should have been treated in such a

shabby way as you just were.

Ms. NOLAN. Thank you.

Mrs. MINK. I would yield to the gentleman, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.

I want to take a moment to associate myself with the words of

Mr. Waxman. You know, since I have been on this committee for

the last almost 5 years I have heard a lot of people testify. And Ms.

Nolan—we were just talking here a moment ago. I was talking

with staff, and we were talking about how credible not only you but

all of you have been. You’ve answered the questions straight up.

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What you didn’t know, you didn’t know. What you didn’t remember, you didn’t remember. But you gave us, I believe, the very best

that you had to give. And we cannot ask any more of a witness

than for you to give us the best that you have to give. That is what

you’re sworn to do. And to object to your memory I just find simply

incredible.

But I just want you to know, and I’ll reiterate it until the day

I die, people who work for government often sacrifice much. I am

not only talking about wages. I’m talking about sacrificing reputations, hours of work, time away from their family.

When I heard you talk, Ms. Nolan, about 2:30 a.m. with your

eyes—I forget how you said it—stuck closed—I think you said

something like that, but I just want you to know that there are a

lot of people who really appreciate it.

And again I have just wanted to—I could not let this moment go

by—I wanted to scream a moment ago, but I didn’t. I felt I would

be called out of order by Mr. Barr, so I didn’t want to do that. But

I just wanted you to know that we do appreciate your testimony,

all of you. And I am so glad—I am so very, very glad that it’s people like you that are part and have been a part of our government,

and I don’t want people who look at their television screen tonight

or whenever this plays to feel that people who come into public

service have to go through unfair statements and things that have

happened here in the last few moments.

Thank you. Thank you. I yield back.

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Chairman, I just want to join my two colleagues

in expressing my own personal satisfaction with the responses that

have been given. I have a much clearer view of what transpired in

those last hectic days in the White House; and I think that your

explanations and your timeframes in which all of this occurred are

very helpful, at least it is to me and I hope to all of the people who

have watched this hearing this afternoon. As to what the judgment

was and how it came about, no one will ever know. But certainly

the circumstances, the performance, the advice that the President’s

highest advisors attempted to give him is very clear.

You were there, you told him what you thought, and the decision

went the other way. And I’m satisfied that there is absolutely no

scintilla of evidence or suspicion of any kind of conduct that could

lead to any questions as to the behavior of you or your colleagues

or your staff or your assistance in the President’s final determination. It was his judgment. We may disagree with it, but I am perfectly comfortable in saying this afternoon that the performance of

all of you as his staff and advisors was clearly beyond any suspicion, any characterization other than the superb performance of

dedicated people who have served this administration for such a

long time. And I thank you for coming here today voluntarily.

Ms. NOLAN. Thank you.

Mr. BARR. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut,

Mr. Shays, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

I think one of the things that this hearing is pointing out is that

you don’t give a pardon in the last few days of the President’s term

unless you’re able to really do due diligence, and I don’t agree with

any comment on any side of the aisle that would suggest due diliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00392 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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gence was done. Whether someone questions her memory or not is

another issue. I don’t know what your memory is. Due diligence

was not done. This was not the finest hour for the President and

his staff. And it may be just that, not the finest hour.

But I mean I have a problem with the pardon of Susan

McDougal. But, you know, I just happen to have a problem with

someone who was given immunity to testify and tell the truth and

just explain why in a September 1996, appearance before the grand

jury the United States located a record of a check dated August 1,

1983, in the amount of $5,081.82 drawn on the James P. McDougal

Trustee Account payable to Madison Guarantee and signed by

Susan McDougal. The words, quote, pay off are written in the notation section of the check. What we wanted to know is what the

words ‘‘pay off’’ meant, and all she had to do is come and tell the

truth. Instead, she went to jail because she, even after given immunity, didn’t want to tell the truth; and the President pardoned her.

There is nothing really very pleasant about a lot of these pardons. So we will just plug away. And in the end I look at someone

I know well, Mr. Podesta, and I hope we meet on better grounds,

and I hope we find a way to get out of this mess. Because the more

questions we ask, the worse it looks.

I would just want to verify a few things, and then I have a number of questions, and I may have to keep coming back.

But, Mr. Lindsey, when I was gone I had a number of people that

came up to me and said that you had reason to know Mrs. Mills’ schedule a little better than you had led on. And I just wanted to

put on the record, because when you ask different people the questions, I may not have directed it properly, but the last week of the

President’s term I would like to know in that last week, the 20th

down to Monday, do you know if Miss Mills was in town on Monday?

Mr. LINDSEY. Monday—what day?

Mr. SHAYS. Monday preceding the Saturday, January 15.

Mr. LINDSEY. I do not.

Mr. SHAYS. On Tuesday.

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. On Wednesday.

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. On Thursday.

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t think so.

Mr. SHAYS. On Friday.

Mr. LINDSEY. She came to town on Friday.

Mr. SHAYS. So your testimony is that she came to town on Friday, and she was there on Friday but not before.

Mr. LINDSEY. Again, I don’t know. My testimony was I don’t

know. I don’t think she was there on Thursday because I think she

came to town on Friday. I don’t know whether she was there earlier in the week.

Mr. SHAYS. Was she in the White House on Friday?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, that was the night we were talking about.

Mr. SHAYS. Was she in the White House on the 20th?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, she flew back with us to New York.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. I am going to ask each of you

these questions; and Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, and Mr. Podesta, the

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questions I ask each I’m asking all of you; and so on some of it will

be a little redundant, but we will just plod through, starting with

you, Ms. Nolan. When did you discuss with Mr. Clinton the possibility of a pardon for Mr. Rich and Mr. Green?

Ms. NOLAN. I am not sure. I think it was about mid-January, but

it could have been the week before.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. I can. We had a—we had a discussion prior to the

19th. Mr. Podesta believes we had a discussion on the 16th. I’ll accept his memory on that. Whether we had a discussion prior to

that, I don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. As I said in my opening statement, I think that

we had that discussion. I believe it was on the night of the 16th

and that was the first time I believe that I discussed the matter

with the President.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Do you have any understanding of

what—if they knew about either Mr. Rich or Mr. Green, the time

the pardon application was presented to him? And what is that understanding, Ms. Nolan?

Ms. NOLAN. I’m sorry, at the——

Mr. SHAYS. I read it fast. Do you have any understanding of

what the——

Ms. NOLAN. It was the last phrase, at the time the pardon petition was presented.

Mr. SHAYS. Presented to him.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know that he knew anything at that time.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Ms. NOLAN. Do you mean what did he know when we discussed

the pardon or——

Mr. SHAYS. When he got the application, did he have a sense of

what this application was all about?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know at the time that he received the application what he knew it was. I think he did understand the arguments Mr. Quinn was making by the time we discussed it.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. I would agree with that.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. I have no knowledge of his knowledge in mid-December when he received the application.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand that you can smile about it, but you

know a lot about what he thinks because you’re his closest adviser.

Mr. PODESTA. But I don’t know. As I said, I think the first time

I talked to him about it was January 16th. So it was almost a little

over a month later.

Mr. SHAYS. I see my time has run out. We’re going to just have

to come back. I’ll just come back.

Mr. BARR. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.

LaTourette, for 5 minutes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lindsey, I

want to come back to Carlos Vignali and then maybe we can talk

about exhibit 135. I was under the impression—and I think that

this came from the briefing that we received from the clemency atVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00394 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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torney—that Mr. Vignali lied on his pardon application. You were

of the opinion that he reported past convictions.

Mr. LINDSEY. You know I’m not sure what they were referring

to with respect to lying. Not whether it had to do with past convictions. I remember I think that there were past convictions listed

on the pardon application.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well—and so I would hope you’d agree with

me that if he lied on the pardon application, that’s a bad thing; and

if he didn’t lie on the pardon application and the fact was asked

if he had prior convictions and listed them, I guess my question is,

I’m curious as to how he fit in the profile of the first-time offender

that we were interested in getting out of jail.

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, again, I found that certain of those qualifications, certain of the facts that were given to me—you asked me

what I learned from Mr. Rodham. Certain of those facts turned out

not to be correct. It turned out not to be correct that he was necessarily a first-time offender. He had previous run-ins with the

law. They were fairly minor, but I believe he had previous run-ins.

That was clearly in Roger Adams’ report. So if I didn’t know it from

the application; I knew it from Mr. Adams’ report.

I also knew from the report that the Minneapolis U.S. attorney

was opposed to the application.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. Those facts were different than what Mr. Rodham

told me. The facts that were not different was that the Los Angeles

sheriff indicated he supported a commutation.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. That the U.S. attorney, while saying he didn’t

know much about the facts, felt like that the family was a good environment for which Mr. Vignali would get the proper supervision.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. That the cardinal from Los Angeles had weighed

in, that numerous Congressmen had weighed in.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. That numerous other public officials had weighed

in. So as we considered it, it wasn’t a matter that if I learned any

fact was wrong I was going to discard it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. Mr. Rodham asked me to review it. We began reviewing it. In that process, we decided that we should commute the

sentence.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Mrs. Davis was talking to you about process, and I clearly when we heard from Ms. Holmes-Norton before

not everybody that asked the President for clemency or a pardon

made it to his desk, and as a matter of fact when—if I could just

finish my question and then I’ll be happy to have your response—

and I think in the last weeks he made the observation that he was

considering between 300 and 500, which certainly wasn’t the sum

and substance of anybody that was looking for his mercy in the

waning days of the administration.

I’m curious as to how, since the Justice Department is saying it

was a good idea to pardon somebody wasn’t the criterion, how did

you get in that pile? If I was looking for—how did I get in that pile

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of 300 to 500 that was going to receive President Clinton’s ultimate

authority on whether I deserved grace or not?

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, there’s many ways. A Member of Congress

may call us and ask us to look at an application.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Let me ask you this, How did Mr. Vignali get

into this pile of 300?

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, he came through the Justice Department.

Mr. LATOURETTE. With a negative recommendation.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, but again, it’s the President’s decision.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. First of all, it should be clear, every person that

the Justice Department recommended favorably we considered. So

there was no person that went through the process.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. That got to us whose application wasn’t considered

and probably granted.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. In addition, there were numerous people, not just

Mr. Vignali, that went through the Justice Department that they

recommended negatively.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. We indicated to them on several occasions that we

didn’t necessarily agree with the standards. For example, in Mr.

Vignali’s case, one of the reasons why they turned it down was that

he throughout the process maintained his innocence. For the Department of Justice, that’s an automatic rejection.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Don’t you think that shows a lack of remorse

on the part of the criminal, doesn’t it, when you get convicted and

you get caught and you still say I didn’t do it? That flies in the face

of remorseful, doesn’t it?

Mr. LINDSEY. Not necessarily if you believe it. Are you suggesting

that no person who has ever been innocent has ever been convicted?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you think Mr. Vignali was wrongfully convicted?

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir, but I—— Mr. LATOURETTE. I think it shows a lack of remorse.

Mr. LINDSEY. Again, it could be a factor. It’s not in the President’s decision at least or in his mind an absolute disqualifier. So

there were a number of factors that he considered; but anyway, my

point was all the people that the Justice Department sent us favorably were considered. Many of the people that they made a negative recommendation we reviewed and the President granted. Many

he didn’t grant.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. There were others. Families against mandatory

minimums, someone made reference to it, sent us a list of 24, 25

people.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. We took a look at them. We granted.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Twelve she said.

Mr. LINDSEY. Twelve, 13. I’m not sure of the number. They got

to us through families against mandatory minimums. Members of

Congress sent them to us.

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Mr. LATOURETTE. I’m asking about Mr. Vignali in particular.

Mr. LINDSEY. I told you Mr. Vignali’s—we took—I’m not sure

what we would have done if we had gotten the recommendation

from Mr. Adams. The fact of the matter is that application had

been pending at the Department of Justice for over 2 years, which

is one of the problems that the President had been complaining

about; and it’s only, you know, probably when we went back to the

Department and said, you know, we are going to look at this, are

they able to rush up a recommendation, and they sent it to us

sometime in the last week.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. LINDSEY. So my point is no person in my judgment should

have to have his application sit over at the Department of Justice

for 2 or 3 years. That is part of the process—the system that’s

wrong you know and that was—— Mr. LATOURETTE. And no person wanting to become a U.S. citizen should have to sit at INS for 2 or 3 years.

Mr. LINDSEY. I agree with that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. But anyway, as the President said in that wonderful video he made for the White House correspondents dinner,

so many questions, so little time, and I will be back in a little bit.

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to the

White House gifts, Mr. Podesta. If I understand the earlier testimony, if a citizen gives a gift to the White House and, in the office

of gifts, there’s a determination made if this is a personal gift to

the President, does this go to archives, what have you, and there’s

a valuation attached to the gift—am I correct on that?

Mr. PODESTA. When a gift is sent to the President, it goes to the

gift unit. The gift unit values the gift, puts it on a list. The President under the law may choose to keep that gift or it goes to the

archives.

Mr. OSE. OK. How is the value of the gift that’s received determined?

Mr. PODESTA. By the gifts unit, which is staffed by a career employee, I believe, of the General Services Administration who is detailed to the White House.

Mr. OSE. So GSA sends over—— Mr. PODESTA. I believe that’s right, but I think there’s a career

person in the gift unit; and that I believe is a detailee from the

GSA but I could stand to be corrected on that.

Mr. OSE. All right. Is there a check on these valuations? In other

words, if I’m that GSA career employee and I say it’s worth $3,218,

is that the end of the debate or is there any check on it?

Mr. PODESTA. No. I don’t believe there’s any rereview of the career employee’s decision about what a gift is worth; and I believe

that’s been the system that’s been in place for many, many years

and many, many Presidents.

Mr. OSE. OK. How many gifts—I have no idea how many.

Mr. PODESTA. Hundreds of thousands.

Mr. OSE. Ten per day?

Mr. PODESTA. Oh, at least, I would think. I don’t know. I don’t

know the answer to that.

Mr. OSE. Hundreds of thousand. Is that what you said?

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Mr. PODESTA. Thousands. Let me correct that, thousands.

Mr. OSE. Tens of thousands or ones of thousands?

Mr. PODESTA. Over the course of 8 years, I would think it’s 10’s

of thousands.

Mr. OSE. OK. Now, do the questions as to how to assign the gifts

ever percolate up to your level?

Mr. PODESTA. Assign the gifts?

Mr. OSE. For instance, if the office of gifts can’t make a determination—it’s a close call—does it ever percolate up to your level

for a final determination?

Mr. PODESTA. No.

Mr. OSE. OK. Ms. Nolan, does it ever come to the counsel’s office?

Mr. Lindsey.

Ms. NOLAN. As to the valuation of a gift?

Mr. OSE. Or how to treat it, whether it’s a gift to the President

or gift to the White House or something that goes to archives or

what have you?

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, first of all, just to be absolutely clear, I don’t

believe the White House has gift authority. So gifts to the White

House are actually gifts to the National Park Service, which accepts the gifts on behalf of the White House.

Mr. OSE. Well, Mr. Lindsey, you’re embarrassing me. You’ve exposed my ignorance here, so I appreciate that.

Mr. LINDSEY. But gifts that are meant to be part of the permanent gift collection I think go to the National Park Service that

sends a thank-you note and so forth. Gifts that are meant to be

gifts for the Clintons’ personally are sent to the White House gift

unit that makes the evaluation, puts them on a register, if you will.

The President at some point reviews that register and decides

whether or not he intends to keep any of the gifts personally. If he

does, those gifts are reported on his annual financial disclosure

form. So every year any gifts that the President accepts are reported on his annual financial disclosure form. Any gifts that he

does not accept automatically at the end of the administration go

with everything else from the White House, all other Presidential

records, if you will, to the archives and become part of the archives

collection, or President’s collection, that are maintained by the archive.

Mr. OSE. If you have got 10’s of thousands of gifts flowing in over

an 8-year period of time, let’s say it’s 10,000, that’s 10 gifts a day,

that’s 20,000, 20 gifts a day—I mean, do the math. How do you

handle gifts that, say, come in the last month or 6 weeks because

you’re in the process of shipping stuff to the archives, you’re in the

process of crossing the Ts and dotting the Is on the administration?

Do you maintain the process of logging in the gifts?

Mr. LINDSEY. Absolutely.

Mr. OSE. So that went on all the way till noon on the 20th?

Mr. LINDSEY. If any gifts were received on the 20th, it would

have been the process, yes. Now, there are some dollar amounts,

and Ms. Nolan might know below which they do not go on the register because they are de minimus.

Mr. OSE. $250, or something like that.

Ms. NOLAN. I think it’s around $270. It changes every so often,

but I can’t remember. But it’s approximately that.

391

Mr. LINDSEY. But I believe they still go through that process. But

if it’s determined it’s below that—— Ms. NOLAN. That’s the reporting requirement for the public financial disclosure.

Mr. OSE. So above that it has to be reported and below that?

Ms. NOLAN. That’s right.

Mr. OSE. Now, Ms. Nolan, have you ever—— Mr. PODESTA. Got a lot of T-shirts we could send you, Congressman.

Mr. OSE. Come to my house, I need them. Has, in your role as

counsel, Ms. Nolan, have you ever been involved in judgment calls

on any of these gifts or setting the policy or determining what— you say National Park Service—what’s a personal gift and what’s

for archives? Have you ever played a part in that?

Ms. NOLAN. Normally you know whether something is given to

the Clintons or intended for the White House; and, therefore, a gift

of the National Park Service is a determination that’s made when

something comes in. It’s not normally a legal question. It’s just a

question of what the donor intends.

Mr. OSE. Have you ever been involved in such a determination?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t think so.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. And, Mr. Podesta, you testified it’s never gotten to your

level. OK. My time’s up, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

Mr. BURTON. Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to go back to Mr.

Quinn. Could you tell us exactly how many contacts you had with

Mr. Clinton or the White House staff regarding the Marc Rich pardon?

Mr. QUINN. Sure. Let me take them one at a time. And I covered

some of this in my recent submission to the committee. I had a conversation with the President on the evening of the 19th about this

matter.

Mrs. DAVIS. In person? telephone?

Mr. QUINN. Telephone call. I believe that it’s possible that at an

earlier point in time I said to him in person I’d like to talk to you

sometime. I’m confident that I didn’t say to him then, either that

it was about Marc Rich or that it was about pardons; but I have

some memory of knowing this was on my mind and something I

wanted to do, trying to indicate to him that I’d like to have a conversation with him. After the pardon was granted, early the next

week—and I’m not sure whether it was Monday or Tuesday or even

conceivably Wednesday—I had a conversation with him about the

considerable press attention that this had gotten.

Mrs. DAVIS. OK.

Mr. QUINN. Now on staff, I, as I testified earlier, had a relatively

brief conversation with Mr. Lindsey around December 12th or 13th

when we were in Belfast.

Mrs. DAVIS. OK. That was in person.

Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Mrs. DAVIS. OK. Were there any other people there with you?

Mr. QUINN. There were a lot of people around, but no one else

in that conversation. I think it’s possible, but I’m not 100 percent

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sure of this that I may also have spoken to Ms. Nolan separately

on the same day in person in the course of that trip. I had subsequent telephone conversations with Ms. Nolan.

I think I had left out that I believe that on the day I filed this,

December 11th, I believe I called Ms. Nolan and either told her it

was coming or it was there. Then again, I had a number of telephone conversations with her subsequently. I really can’t identify

each and every one of them. I had, you know, more than one conversation with her on the 19th. I don’t recall having had any further conversations with Mr. Lindsey, and I did not at any time

have a conversation with Mr. Podesta.

Mr. BURTON. Mrs. Davis, would you yield just for one question.

Mrs. DAVIS. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. When did you start working on the Rich case?

Mr. QUINN. I started working on the matter sometime in the

spring of 1999. It was—the focus of our efforts in 1999 and going

through March or so of 2000 was twofold: first, the efforts we made

at main Justice to attempt to get assistance from main Justice, either in the form of having them encourage the southern district to

sit down with us and try to work this case out, take another look

at it; or second, to, you know, see if it were possible that they

might in essence take the matter.

Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentlelady.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. The committee received waves records

indicating you entered the White House on January 17, 2001, at

9:01 a.m., and exited at 10:58 a.m. You were scheduled to visit

with the President of the United States in the residence. Can you

tell us what you were doing at the White House on the morning

of January 17th?

Mr. QUINN. Yeah. That was what has been referred to as the

President’s last public event at the White House. It was—I think

Mr. Podesta alluded to it earlier. It was the designation of certain

national monuments around the country, an event that he did with

Secretary Babbitt. There were a couple of hundred people there. I

was invited to attend that event and I did; but in the course of

being there, I did not have any conversation with the President. I

don’t think I even saw anyone from the counsel’s office.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think my time has expired.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Otter.

Mr. OTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I don’t

have any questions at this time.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield to me then for a couple

of questions.

Mr. OTTER. I’d yield to the chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. Let me ask you, Mr. Quinn.

You started, you said, working on the Rich case in 1999 in the

spring.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Better start the clock. And you said you focused

your attention initially on the Justice Department to try to find out

what could be done there.

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

393

Mr. BURTON. Did you ever talk to anybody at the White House— I mean, you were a very close friend of the President’s—did you

ever talk to him about that during the years 1999 or 2000 before

all this happened?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t believe so, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I don’t want you to believe. Did you or didn’t

you?

Mr. QUINN. I’m quite confident I did not.

Mr. BURTON. I don’t want you to be quite confident.

Mr. QUINN. Chairman, I’m doing the best I can.

Mr. BURTON. We’ve had these little nuances in the language. Did

you, yes or no, talk to the President about this? Did you, yes or no,

talk to the President about this in the year 1999 or 2000 before

this happened?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. You’re sure about that.

Mr. QUINN. I gave you my preferred answer, and you backtracked me into that one.

Mr. BURTON. OK. I want to read you something. This is a memo

from Avner Azulay. Do you know who he is?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. It’s dated Saturday, March 18, 2000. Why don’t you

put this up on the screen, if you could, if you could find it. It think

it’s exhibit 137, and it’s to Robert Fink, who will be testifying later;

and it’s ‘‘subject: JQ.’’ I guess that might be Jack Quinn. What do

you think?

[Exhibit 137 follows:]

394

395

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. ‘‘and MS, et cetera. I had a long talk with JQ—’’

Jack Quinn ‘‘—and Michael.’’ Now, as I understand it, Michael is

Michael Steinhart, who’s a New York financier and good friend of

Marc Rich.

Mr. QUINN. I think that’s right.

Mr. BURTON. ‘‘I explained why there’s no way the MOJ—’’ and

I understand that’s the minister of justice in Israel ‘‘—there’s no

way the minister of justice is going to initiate a call to EH—’’ Eric

Holder ‘‘—a minister calling a second level bureaucrat who has

proved to be a weak link. We are reverting to the idea discussed

with Abe ‘‘—Abe is Abe Foxman, head of the Anti-Defamation

League ‘‘—Abe, which is to send DR—’’ Denise Rich ‘‘—on a personal mission to No. 1—’’ now a wild guess, that might be the

President ‘‘—with a well-prepared script. If it works, we didn’t lose

the present opportunity, until November, which shall not repeat

itself. If it doesn’t, then probably Gershon—’’ and Gershon Kurst is

a public relations expert in New York ‘‘—then probably Gershon’s

course of action shall be the one left option to start all over again.

This is only for your info. Regards, AA.’’ Now this was on March 18, 2000; and they were talking, if I interpret this correctly and this was not about you and MS, they

were talking about asking Denise Rich to go on a personal mission

to No. 1 with a well-prepared script. You don’t know anything

about that, or do you?

Mr. QUINN. Let me say what I know and what I don’t know.

First of all, you will see I think that I didn’t receive this e-mail.

Mr. BURTON. No, I know you didn’t receive this. I just want to

know, do you know about this?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t have any recollection of it but more—— Mr. BURTON. No, no. Don’t give me no recollection. Do you know

about this, yes or no?

Mr. QUINN. I have no recollection of having heard this but—— Mr. BURTON. But.

Mr. QUINN. OK. I do not believe that Denise Rich spoke to the

President at this time about this matter. I don’t believe this was

followed up on.

Mr. BURTON. Well, the reason I’m asking this question is you

said you didn’t talk to the President about this at any time up until

you know the timeframe we’re talking about here, and here you

started working on this back in 1999. Here’s March 18, 2000, 10

months before the pardon was granted, or 11 months, and this is

a pretty involved memo saying you know we’re trying this, we are

trying that and now we’re talking about sending Denise Rich, his

former wife, on a personal mission to No. 1 with a well-prepared

script and the subject of the memo was you, but you don’t know,

you don’t recall anything about it; you don’t think anything happened and you didn’t talk to the President about it.

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, I did not speak to the President anytime around this time about this matter. I do not believe that

Denise Rich spoke to him about the matter. Now by the way, remember, this was, I suspect, around the time that we had heard

from the southern district of New York that they would not sit

down with us; when I had then made another effort to persuade

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Mr. Holder, who in turn was consulting with two other senior officials of the Department of Justice, to meet with us and essentially

take the case. Sometime around this time—and I know that the

record reflects a note in my hand to this effect—Mr. Holder—I

asked Mr. Holder, look, is this over, are we basically dead, are you

guys not going to take this, and he said that’s correct.

It is entirely possible that these folks and every one of us involved in this thought out loud with each other, is there any way

to persuade the President to tell Justice, to tell the southern district to do something. It’s also entirely possible that Mr. Azulay,

others, myself included, were involved in a conversation where

someone said you know we are going to try to pardon one of these

days. But as I think the record also reflects, basically the legal

work on this matter at all of these firms, Mr. Fink’s, Mr. Libby’s

and so on, basically shut down sometime around the end of March.

Now, I’m telling you, I did not speak to the President in the year

2000 about the Marc Rich matter. I was not a recipient of this. I

have no reason to believe that anyone asked Denise Rich to speak

to him about this matter, and I have no reason to believe that she

did so. But my firsthand knowledge of this is limited to the facts

I’m able to testify to.

Mr. BURTON. Well, we will talk to Mr. Fink about that later.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to followup on this

issue, Mr. Rich had lawyers, lots of lawyers, didn’t he?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir, over the years a good many.

Mr. WAXMAN. Over the years a good many, and they were trying

to figure out how to serve their client. So it appears—and there’s

even a story on the Web in the Washington Post—even a year ago

a top aide to Marc Rich was thinking about a Presidential pardon.

Mr. QUINN. That would not surprise me. But my impression,

having been involved in this, is that was not seriously considered

until sometime in the vicinity of October 30th and decided upon

early, you know, in the next couple of weeks; and I don’t think that

the lawyers involved actually got together to meet about it until

November 21st.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, earlier in the year, as I recall your testimony

from 3 weeks ago when you were before this committee, earlier in

that year, Mr. Rich’s lawyers—and maybe I think you were included you were trying to get a deal with the Justice Department;

and in fact, as I recall you talked to Mr. Holder about getting the

prosecutors to talk to Mr. Rich’s attorneys, you and his other attorneys. Is that right?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, and heard back from Mr. Holder that he and

other senior officials of the Department of Justice thought it was

ridiculous that the southern district wouldn’t sit down with us.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, was there some point in the year 2000 when

you concluded that there was no chance any longer at the Justice

Department?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. Without being able to pinpoint the records

I produced earlier in this book, my recollection is that it was sometime in the month of March.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I’m not as interested in the specific moment,

but I’m just trying to understand the trend here.

Mr. QUINN. Yeah.

397

Mr. WAXMAN. These lawyers are working around the clock or at

least billing around the clock and trying to figure out what to do

for their client, and they want to negotiate a settlement. They had

you go to Mr. Holder, see if Mr. Holder can get Justice to agree

with some settlement. That didn’t work out, and at that point when

it fell apart, where there was no question the Justice Department

was not going to agree to what you wanted, is that when the whole

idea of a pardon started coming forward as the way to help your

client?

Mr. QUINN. Well, again—and I’m looking now at my pardon application and specifically tab G, which reflects that the southern

district informed us they wouldn’t sit down with us on February 2,

2000. In the ensuing weeks, I undertook sort of what I viewed as

a last-ditch effort with Mr. Holder to make a determination whether they could either persuade the southern district or get us a

meeting with the head of the criminal division and the head of the

tax division. Mr. Holder basically came back and said that’s not

going to happen. And again, the best I can do on this is that it is

barely conceivable that there were conversations in which the notion of 1 day pursuing a pardon took place.

Mr. WAXMAN. I really don’t want to get into all the detail of it

because I don’t see how it’s really particularly important. Mr. Rich

was able to hire lots of lawyers. They were going every way they

could to help their client and at some point lawyers sending all

sorts of e-mails came up with the idea that you could go in and get

a pardon if you could work at it and convince the President.

But the thing I want to ask you is this, you made a case to the

President that persuaded him and that case was based on the indictment not being a valid indictment. Who prepared that argument? Who came up with that theory? Was that you or did someone else do that.

Mr. QUINN. Well, it grew out of a lot of work going back a good

many years. The chief architects of that argument, in my view,

were Larry Urgenson, who had been in the Reagan Justice Department; Mr. Libby, who will be here with you.

Mr. WAXMAN. Scooter Libby, who’s now the chief of staff to Vice

President Cheney?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. A partner of his named Mike Green. Mr.

Fink himself.

Mr. WAXMAN. So when it was reported in the press that Scooter

Libby and some of these Republican lawyers didn’t have anything

to do with the pardon, that might have been accurate; but they

helped develop the theory that you advanced to the President to

grant this pardon?

Mr. QUINN. Yeah, and I don’t want to speak for Mr. Libby. That

wouldn’t be fair.

Mr. WAXMAN. We will hear from him shortly.

Mr. QUINN. He’s a terrific lawyer, a very smart guy as are all of

the other people I mentioned who are involved in this. The argument for the pardon was, as you know, that the indictment had

complete defenses. That argument was laid out over literally days

and days and days of meetings involving all of those lawyers and

me and one of my partners.

398

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, that argument didn’t convince the three

other people sitting next to you or the President’s chief advisers,

but it convinced the President on a day when he was probably fuming about the deal he had to make with the independent counsel

and concern about what was happening in the Middle East and

looking at so many different other things and probably wanted to

do something for Mrs. Rich, who was certainly very helpful to him.

Mr. QUINN. I don’t think any one of us can testify to all the different things that might have been in the President’s mind at the

time but I think that the point that Mr. Lindsey made earlier is

fair, that it’s, you know, it is inconceivable, and based on what we

know, more than quite likely, that the appeal from Prime Minister

Barak, which by the way followed on the heels of an appeal from

Shimon Peres and others in Israel.

Mr. WAXMAN. But that was all based on strategies you and other

lawyers worked out to try to influence the President. I’m not being

critical.

Mr. QUINN. I understand, but I think that all of these things

were elements of the decision.

Mr. WAXMAN. All of us in public office have to understand that

when we have an orchestrated campaign we have to recognize it for

what it is, that often the rich and the powerful, whether it’s an individual or an industry, get the access and make their case and it

comes from all different directions because they have smart lawyers, skillful people thinking about what might be the right button

to push with any of us as we sort through and make our decisions.

Mr. QUINN. Yes and I think, by the way, that the President was

served by some very smart people himself.

Mr. BURTON. Let me start another round now. Going back to exhibit 137. You said that you didn’t talk to the President during the

year 2000. Did you talk to any of his aids about the pardon, any

of the people at the White House besides the President?

Mr. QUINN. I believe the first conversation I had with anyone in

the White House, again, I believe that I spoke to Ms. Nolan on December 11th to tell her the application was coming, and the next

conversation I had was with Mr. Lindsey in Belfast.

Mr. BURTON. But that was the first, December 11, 2000.

Mr. QUINN. Right you asked about 2000.

Mr. BURTON. Yeah. This is 2001. So it would have been last year.

So the earliest that you talked to anybody at the White House was

in December 2000?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. That is my recollection. The first——

Mr. BURTON. I guess I just wanted to get that straight because

the memo we’re talking about there if you look up above it you will

see that was followed up 2 days later. The memo I referred to is

on March 18, 2000 at 2:11 a.m. Incidentally and then 2 days later

it says it’s from Mr. Fink to Avner Azulay and it says: ‘‘thanks, I

spoke to JQ after you and he told me about Denise. Let’s see how

his visit with Zvi goes and what EH—’’ Eric Holder’s ‘‘—research

shows. I assume you’re keeping Marc Rich, MR, up to date as I

have nothing real to report.’’ And the first memo says that they were going to try to send her

to No. 1 with a well-prepared script. What did you tell him about

Denise?

399

Mr. QUINN. I don’t recall that conversation.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t recall.

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, and I didn’t write the memo or receive it.

Mr. BURTON. No, I know. But the memo said that they were

going to suggest sending her on a personal mission to No. 1 with

a well-prepared script, and 2 days later it says ‘‘I spoke to JQ after

you and he told me about Denise.’’

Mr. QUINN. I’m not sure what he’s referring to. He may have a

better recollection of this, and the best I can do for you is that I

do not believe, but I have no personal knowledge, but I don’t believe that Denise Rich spoke to the President about her ex-husband

in this timeframe.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Barr, I yield my time to you.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. According to the waves

records, two individuals visited the White House, visited the President between this period of January 16th and January 19th when

something seems to have happened in the President’s mind that he

would grant the Rich pardon. The two I have are Beth Dozoretz

and Denise Rich; both according to the records visited the President during that timeframe. Do any of you know why Ms. Dozoretz

and Ms. Denise Rich visited the President during that particular

time?

Mr. PODESTA. Mr. Barr, I think given the fact that at least I believe Ms. Rich through her counsel, I believe, and certainly Ms.

Dozoretz through her husband have denied that they met with the

President. I think that question is unfounded, and I think that—

look I don’t know anything about this, but I believe Mr. Dozoretz

in the newspapers laid out records that he had showing that

they’re on an airplane and staying in some hotel in Los Angeles.

So I think the implication of your question, unless you’re not reading the newspapers, Mr. Barr, is just off base.

Mr. BARR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Podesta. You and Ms.

Nolan certainly have thin skins today. I’m——

Mr. PODESTA. Mr. Barr, I have an exceedingly thick skin.

Mr. BARR. Hold on.

Mr. PODESTA. That’s why I’m sitting here all day.

Mr. BARR. Hold on. I’m not reading a newspaper. I’m reading the

waves records from the White House which show not only a scheduled time for the visit for Ms. Dozoretz and Ms. Rich but also a

time of arrival on those days. So unless you’re telling me that in

your experience these wave records don’t accurately reflect the reality of who’s visiting the White House, the question has a very

well-founded basis in fact. The White House records themselves,

according ——

Mr. PODESTA. The question has a well-founded innuendo, in fact.

Mr. BARR. According to these wave records, which all three of

you are very familiar with and I’m sure you are too, Mr. Quinn,

they indicate during that time period between January 16th and

the 19th both Ms. Dozoretz and Ms. Rich, neither of whom have

chosen to testify so it’s very easy for you to stand here and say that

these records are not good, visited the White House. And I’m simply asking, do you all know why they might have visited the White

House during this period of time?

400

Mr. LINDSEY. Mr. Barr, if I may, you keep saying between the

16th and the 19th. Are you talking about the 19th.

Mr. BARR. According to these records.

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, the records have a date, so which date is it

that they were supposed to have visited the White House between

the 16th and the 19th?

Mr. BARR. Thank you for assuming the role of questioner here,

but I don’t mind telling you because these are the records. And according to these records, Ms. Dozoretz visited the residence, the

President of the United States, visited him at his residence on the

19th at 1729.

Mr. LINDSEY. OK. The event on the 19th was a reception for

Kelly Craighead who got engaged several weeks before that. Again,

Ms. Rich and Ms. Dozoretz say they were not there. I have asked

other people who were there who do not remember seeing them but

the event that they were waved in for was a reception for Kelly

Craighead who had just gotten engaged.

Mr. BARR. And the same would hold, according to the best of

your recollection, for Ms. Denise Rich also.

Mr. LINDSEY. For the 19th, yes. I asked people who were there

whether, because I knew they were on the waves list, whether they

attended and was told that nobody remembered them being there.

Mr. BARR. My time has expired. Who’s next on your side, Mr.

Cummings?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On these records,

these wave records, are they always accurate as to who’s there and

who’s not there, who appears in the White House and who does

not?

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir. They basically are accurate as to someone

being waved in.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK.

Mr. LINDSEY. Beyond that, especially for large social events, you

know, where there are lots of people, they often are not correct because at some point people get backed up and if it is a large event

where there’s going to be a lot of people, they will often times let

people in without going through all of the procedures. But they are

usually accurate as to when someone was scheduled to come in, not

necessarily always accurate as to whether they were actually there

at that time.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So, in other words, when we get opportunities to

go to the White House and there’s some function and they have

your name at the gate, if I don’t show up, you would still have a

record that I could have come in?

Mr. LINDSEY. That’s correct.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Doesn’t mean I was there.

Mr. LINDSEY. Correct.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And that happens many times up here because

we get our schedule conflicts, and you have got a document that

says we could have gotten in; but that doesn’t prove that we got

there.

Mr. LINDSEY. And it also would be the case perhaps that if you

are out there and getting a little unhappy about having to wait in

the line that somebody might make a judgment to bring you all in

without going necessarily through the procedures simply because

401

certain Members of Congress often times do not like standing outside while they’re being waved in. So often times they would make

that judgment.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Libby is definitely going to

testify tonight because I have some questions, and I want to make

sure that we’re hearing that he might not testify. I want to make

sure he’s going to testify.

Mr. BURTON. No, no. He has agreed to come, and he offered no

resistance.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So he will be testifying.

Mr. BURTON. He will be here.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Good. In that light I just want to ask you a question, Mr. Quinn. I was just looking at these exhibits, and then we

have spent a lot on exhibit 137; but when you turn the page, we

turn, lo and behold, to 138, very interesting exhibit; and it says to

the Rich team from Lewis Libby. You familiar with that document?

[Exhibit 138 follows:]

402

403

404

405

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you tell me about it.

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me. Would you put the document up?

Thank you.

Mr. QUINN. The southern district had taken the position in response to a letter that Mr. Urgenson had written some years earlier that it would not negotiate with attorneys for these men because they were fugitives. In the course of our work together on

this matter, Mr. Libby I recall, volunteered to put together a document which would demonstrate that in fact there was no Department of Justice policy prohibiting them from negotiating with fugitives, and this is the product of that work.

At around this same time, by the way, you will recall there were

press reports about the Bank of New York, Russian money-laundering matter which was pending in fact in the southern district

of New York. And based on those press reports, it seemed apparent

to us that the U.S. Attorney’s Office had in fact dealt with attorneys for people who ultimately became defendants and pled in the

matter, even though they were not in the country.

So we were trying to demonstrate there was no such policy and

that it was at least the practice in a good many U.S. Attorney’s Offices and perhaps even in the southern district from time to time

to negotiate with attorneys for people who had absented themselves.

Mr. CUMMINGS. That’s dated October 6, 1999; is that right?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so that we’ll be real clear, this is the same

Lewis Libby who is now chief of staff for Vice President Cheney?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. I just wanted to make sure I was clear

on that. Let me just go on to something else. Ms. Nolan, you said

something that was very interesting a little bit earlier and I wanted to see what you meant by this. You said when you were talking

about advising the President and you had talked about the President, is the President—he makes the decision; he had the final decision. You said one person would have to take the hit for it, in

other words for a decision; and I take it that what you meant by

that is that if it was a wrong decision, that there might be some

criticism. Is that what you were alluding to?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And did you all ever say to any of the—you, Mr.

Podesta, Mr. Lindsey, or Ms. Nolan, did you ever say Mr. President, you know, you are the President, but I think you’re going to

really take the hit for this one because people are really going to

be very critical of you, although you may feel very strongly that

you’re doing the right thing. Did any of you ever say anything like

that to the President, just out of curiosity?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes. I said it with respect to a number of pardons,

some of which I was right about, some of which I wasn’t.

Mr. CUMMINGS. When you say you were right about, what do you

mean? In other words—— Ms. NOLAN. There was some that I suspected that would be criticized that weren’t and some that I thought would be criticized that

would be.

406

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did he feel comfortable in so-called taking the

hit for them?

Ms. NOLAN. He fully understood that he might take the hit and

he listened to our recommendations. We had discussions about how

things would look and appearances. He didn’t always agree with

our assessments, and I have to say my assessments were sometimes quite right-on and sometimes not.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. I think the answer is almost the same. I’m not

sure. I mean, I think I made it clear to the President as did others

that pardoning Marc Rich would not go down well; that you know,

I was, again I was opposed to it because he was a fugitive. As others said, he had the ability of all these arguments that Mr. Quinn

was making, were correct, he could come back, he could have the

RICO claims dismissed. He could present the arguments of the two

law professors as to why there was no tax fraud. He could argue

that the trading with the enemies involved a company that wasn’t

subject to U.S. law. He could make all those arguments. And that

I did not believe that people would understand why you pardoned

a fugitive.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. The gentleman’s time

has expired. Mr. Barr, you can have your own time now.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Going back to the Braswell

pardon, did any of you all have any communications or discussions

in person or on the phone with Mr. Rodham about the Braswell

case?

Ms. NOLAN. I did not.

Mr. LINDSEY. I did not.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. No.

Mr. BARR. Are you aware of any conversations Mr. Rodham had

with anybody at the White House concerning the Braswell pardon?

Ms. NOLAN. I’m not.

Mr. LINDSEY. I’m not personally aware of any. I have read, I

think, press reports; but I have no personal knowledge.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. No, I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield briefly.

Mr. BARR. Certainly.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall during the last couple of weeks of the

administration how often Mr. Rodham was there? We’ve had reports he was there 2 or 3 days a week. Was he there continually,

or was he just there 2 or 3 days a week? Can you give us some

information on that?

Mr. LINDSEY. I personally wouldn’t know whether he was there

unless he came by to see me, called me or I ran into him.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t know if he was in the residence, any of

you?

Mr. PODESTA. I don’t know what his presence was, in the residence or at the White House.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. With regard—back on the Rich pardon, did any of you

all, Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, or Mr. Podesta, have any discussions

407

with either Ms. Denise Rich or Beth Dozoretz about the Marc Rich

pardon?

Ms. NOLAN. I did not.

Mr. LINDSEY. I believe I have never spoken, I don’t think, to

Denise Rich. Ms. Dozoretz called me on one occasion and asked me

about two pardons: Milken and Marc Rich. It was at a time when

I—I’m not quite sure exactly what I indicated to her. I told her I

thought the President wasn’t going to do Milken and I hoped he

wouldn’t do Rich.

Mr. BARR. Would this have been in early January?

Mr. LINDSEY. Early to mid-January, yes. Again, it’s hard for me

to place it; but it could have been well within that last week sometime.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. No, I never talked to either one of them.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. Mr. Quinn, I’d like to give you an opportunity. You and I had a discussion at your last hearing with regard

to a January 10th, I think it was January 10th, e-mail that had

to do with Ms. Dozoretz. We had a discussion about that, and then

there was a subsequent discussion you had in your testimony on

the Senate side; and there seemed to be when you read your two

statements one was much more elaborative and contained a lot

more information and background which was not a part of your answer here, and I’d like to give you an opportunity to discuss that,

if you would, please.

Mr. QUINN. Sure. And in fact, as a result of your appearance and

Mr. Shays’ on a television show subsequently, I have gone back and

looked pretty, pretty carefully at the exchange and the fact that I

testified the way I did in the Senate, I think it’s fair to say, was

in some sense—is directly related to how this didn’t unfold here.

I think in fairness, if one goes back and looks at the transcript, at

least this is the way I read it, I was first asked a question which

I understood to be asking me to express a view as to why the President was making a call to her and as with every other thing that

might be in the President’s head, I didn’t know and tried to explain

that I didn’t know whether he was calling to discuss the pardons

or whether he was calling for some other matter, and it came up

in the course of that.

Then you seemed to clarify that you were interested in knowing

why she was involved, at which point I said, oh well. And I began

to tell you the facts that I laid out in my Senate testimony. You

will see in the transcript that you interrupted me and then you

were interrupted by the chairman and time expired and we went

off to another subject.

Now, the principal focus of our discussion in almost 9 hours that

day was on my dealings with Mr. Holder and to a lesser degree

with the White House Counsel’s Office. I was certainly impressed

after the hearing that it would be important for me to give a more

complete presentation of my discussions with Ms. Dozoretz in the

Senate testimony that occurred just 6 days later, and as I hope you

know I then filed that Senate testimony with the chairman for inclusion in the record of this committee’s hearings.

408

Mr. BARR. Thank you. Maybe if Mr. Shays in your time if you

could give me an opportunity to just ask one quick followup question on that.

Mr. BURTON. We have to go to Ms. Norton first, and then we’ll

come back.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Quinn, I’m curious, when one looks at your resourcefulness as an attorney, one can only admire what you have

done. Indeed, I think it’s what one would expect a splendid lawyer

to do given the openings that he had. Let me ask you, do you believe in the adversarial process as a way for discovering truth?

Mr. QUINN. Certainly.

Ms. NORTON. Given the fact that you had to appear here now

twice for hours on end and that your client has been made more

notorious than he ever was as 1 of the 10 most wanted men in the

United States, do you think the Congress would be wise to advise

a President in the past to make sure that he gets both sides completely of every pardon matter before making a pardon? I say that

not only with respect to the now, but I think that your client and

you have also taken a tremendous hit because you were too clever

by half perhaps. The resourcefulness I think that any lawyer would

admire, and I say that as a lawyer, but looking back and standing

back, where you might have gotten the same result, would it not

have been better to have the President fully briefed on both sides,

to have the Justice Department have the pardon papers, have the

pardon attorney, have the papers long before she did so that she

wasn’t trying to go on the Internet at the last moment to do her

work? I mean, hasn’t the fallout been a whole lot more than on the

President of the United States but on you and on your client Mr.

Rich as well?

Mr. QUINN. Yes. There’s certainly a lot of truth to that conclusion. But I would like to make a couple of points that I think are

important. You’ve heard a great deal from the people to my left

about the timing of this being put in front of the President and all

the other things that were going on. But I’d like to remind you that

the application was filed 5 weeks before the pardon was granted.

Ms. NORTON. Filed with whom?

Mr. QUINN. At the White House.

Ms. NORTON. My question goes to the Justice Department, the

pardon attorney.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, I’d like to get to that. OK. I had had a course

of dealings with Mr. Holder from 1999 about the Marc Rich indictment.

Ms. NORTON. When did the pardon attorney get the papers?

Mr. QUINN. The pardon attorney, you mentioned earlier not having been aware of the rules of the pardon attorneys office, those

rules demonstrate quite clearly that this was in the type of pardon

that the pardon attorney could move on favorably. Because those

rules are as, in my view, are limited to those applicants that have

been tried, convicted and spent time in jail. It was clear to me from

the beginning that the other people in the chain of command,

namely, the Deputy Attorney General, the White House Counsel’s

Office, and the President himself, if anyone was going to move on

409

this favorably, it would have to move in those three offices, not in

the pardon attorney office.

Ms. NORTON. I thought you got the papers for the pardon attorney 48 hours before, if I recall correctly.

Mr. QUINN. No, that was a different document, Congresswoman.

That was my letter of January 10 to Mr. Holder, which apparently

was misdirected not to his office, but to the pardon attorney’s office. But the other thing I’d like to remind you of is that as far as

I was concerned, I very much wanted there to be a communication

between the White House Counsel’s Office and Mr. Holder, because

I had been, and I don’t want to overstate this in fairness to Mr.

Holder. I thought that Mr. Holder was sympathetic to the notion

that we had reached an absolute impasse with the southern district. I had had a conversation with Mr. Holder, and the documents

in the record that reflect this, which suggested to me, in his words,

that he was not personally against there. Not personally against in

a circumstance like this frankly was—— Ms. NORTON. I don’t understand why you say pardon, this was

not an instance where the pardon attorney should advise—— Mr. QUINN. I am not saying shouldn’t advise. What I said was

this was not the type of pardon which the pardon attorney under

those procedures—— Ms. NORTON. Well, who was Mr. Holder to rely upon then? Was

he to do his own research on this matter?

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Holder could rely on anyone and everybody.

Ms. NORTON. Why shouldn’t he rely on the pardon attorney?

Mr. QUINN. He may well have. I never discouraged him from

talking to anybody. And if I may—— Ms. NORTON. I can understand why.

Mr. QUINN. Can I finish this point?

Ms. NORTON. I can understand why you wouldn’t have wanted to

go back to the southern district. These are prosecutors. I don’t overly rely on the Justice Department at all because they are prosecutors. I think the Justice Department is advisory just like the counsel’s office is advisory. A judgment call has to be made here.

Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. The point I am trying to make here is that if a

principal has the opportunity to set up in his own mind and in his

own way an adversarial system, he can keep himself from making

mistakes. That was his own job but as it turns out, the fallout has

been on you and your client as much as the President.

Mr. QUINN. I understand that I did want to bring to your attention a document, which during my last appearance here, that I did

not have in front of me, which was an e-mail I wrote on Christmas

day to the people I was working with here in which I told them

that I am hopeful that Eric Holder will be helpful to us, but we

can expect some outreach to New York. So I thought——

Ms. NORTON. Did you think that Mr. Holder was reaching out to

the pardon attorney?

Mr. QUINN. I don’t think I thought one way or the other he

would.

Ms. NORTON. The reason I am asking about the pardon attorney

if I can just finish this and be gone.

Mr. BURTON. All right.

410

Ms. NORTON. I don’t appreciate the fact that over and over again

that Mr. Holder is being made the fall guy here.

Mr. QUINN. I am not doing that.

Ms. NORTON. You indicated from the beginning that you were not

doing that. The way not to do this is to make sure the pardon attorney has this and not to make this such a question of jurisdiction

as you have made it. You’re not trying to make him the fall guy,

but the fact is that one of the bright stars of the African American

community has had his reputation damaged.

Mr. QUINN. And it shouldn’t be.

Ms. NORTON. And a lot of us do not appreciate it. He has taken

full responsibility for it, but I think there was also some very smart

lawyering going on here avoiding the pardon attorney and going

around the process, and it’s the kind of thing that almost any lawyer seeing openings might have done. But the net effect of it is that

Eric Holder, the President of the United States, Marc Rich, yes,

and even Jack Quinn, have been hurt by the way this process unfolded, and I don’t think you should take a lot of credit for it. But

you offered some advice in response to a question to me before

about the kind of things that might be done to shore up the process. I thought it was very good advice about an Executive order,

and the thrust of my question was that if there were an Executive

order to indicate that the President had within his own context a

sufficiently adversarial process to make an informed and responsible decision, that he could defend, might well be something that

we would want to recommend or an Executive order ought to say.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, and I think I told you last time that I thought

that was a good idea.

Mr. BURTON. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Barr, you wanted me to yield to you.

Mr. BARR. Yes, thank you. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

I am looking at the e-mail of January 10, and I’m no longer focussing on your testimony here in the Senate. What I’m looking at

is the substance of the e-mail and your subsequent explanation in

the Senate, and if you could just clarify what Beth Dozoretz was

doing here. The e-mail of January 10 indicates that the President

takes the initiative and calls her and talks about with her about

the pending pardon application. Your explanation, and maybe we’re

talking about two completely different things here, I don’t know.

Your explanation or your discussion before the Senate indicates

that you went to Beth to encourage her to intercede on your behalf

with the President, which seems very different from the discussion

of this e-mail description which the President reached out to her.

What was her role in all this. Was she acting as your agent or as

a friend of Denise Rich’s or in some other capacity?

Mr. QUINN. I informed Beth Dozoretz sometime around the

Thanksgiving home day that I would be pursuing a pardon for

Marc Rich. I did so because she was a friend of mine, because she

had a relationship with Denise Rich, she was in much more frequent communication with the President than I was. I was motivated by two things principally; one, I was hopeful that she could

let the President know that I had or was going to file this so that

he would be aware it was there; and two, she was another person

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who I hoped might be in a position to give me the kind of information that I have, as a lawyer, thought would be useful to me to pursue their efforts on behalf of my client vigorously. Now, I want to

also tell you have that in that conversation I had with her again

around Thanksgiving time, I cautioned her that it would be very

important to make sure that no such conversation was ever connected in any way with any kind of fundraising activity. She reacted to that by kind of looking at me like how could I even suggest

that. She said to me, of course I would never do that to him.

Mr. BARR. And the reason you brought that up is because she

was the finance director for the DNC or was.

Mr. QUINN. She had been. And I wanted to be very careful to

make sure that no discussions about this ever took place in the

context of anything related to fundraising. I had a couple of conversations with her after the pardon was granted in which I essentially reminded her of that.

She had called to congratulate me on Saturday. Said this guy is

going to be enormously grateful, he owes you a lot, he owes everybody who was involved in this process a lot. And I reflected on that

conversation after I have got off the phone with her and I called

her back, initiated a call and said to her relating to our earlier conversation when you say he should be very grateful, I want to be

very clear you’re not talking that he should be grateful to the

President. And I said we had a conversation about this a long time

ago. I trust that no one ever had a conversation with the President

about this matter and connected it in any way to any fundraising

activity, and she said absolutely not. And left me with the impression that my concern that she had been vague about this was misplaced, that she was not talking about that at all.

Mr. BARR. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. SHAYS. My time has really ended but let me ask you, Ms.

Nolan, I will ask you what were the other pardons you warned the

President about that didn’t make the news?

Ms. NOLAN. I wasn’t——

Mr. SHAYS. Don’t be shy.

Ms. NOLAN. I was more concerned about some of the independent

counsel pardons than I think the press, I don’t think that they got,

I don’t think they got the reaction that I expected.

Mr. SHAYS. Name me the pardon that you advised him. You have

been freed to tell me. You are not breaking a faith here. What were

the specific pardons that you told the President—did you warn the

President, for instance, about Susan McDougal?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. What are some others.

Ms. NOLAN. You know, I’m sorry, I was concerned generally

about the independent counsel Starr/Ray pardons. I just don’t remember right now which they are.

Mr. SHAYS. When you have time to think about it, I want you

to write down a list and I’m going to ask you again. This is a very

serious question. I just want to know and you should know.

Ms. NOLAN. I can tell you this, Mr. Shays, I just want you to

know this now. I can try to come up with a list, but I am not going

to be able to—I couldn’t tell you who all got pardons right now. I

just don’t have that in my memory banks.

412

Mr. SHAYS. I’m asking you a specific question. I want to know

the pardons—— Ms. NOLAN. I’ll tell you what I remember, certainly.

Mr. SHAYS. And we’ll come back at another time.

Ms. NOLAN. OK.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Shays your time has expired.

Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you for not making me a freshman

again, even though Mr. Shays wanted me to be.

Mr. SHAYS. I apologize.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I would like to go back to Vignali, and hopefully finish this, and Ms. Nolan, and I would ask you, were you

aware that Hugh Rodham was advocating for a petition for Carlos

Vignali, did you know that?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t think I knew that, but I may have known

that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And Mr. Lindsey, we already heard from you.

Mr. Podesta, did you know that?

Mr. PODESTA. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. At any time, did you all, in this meeting on the

16th in the Oval Office, or on the 19th, or any time, were you ever

present at a meeting where the Vignali case was discussed with

the President of the United States? Ms. Nolan.

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, I believe I was, yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Was Mr. Lindsey there at that meeting?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t remember which meeting it was, that Mr.

Lindsay was generally there. There was one meeting that we had

that he wasn’t. I think he was there, though, yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Podesta? Were you there?

Mr. PODESTA. Mr. LaTourette, I can’t be specific. I was engaged

in a discussion—I heard the merits of Vignali. I didn’t have a

strong view about Vignali. I think it was in front of the President.

But it’s possible that it was a separate meeting that only involved

the staff as opposed to the President.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I am interested in what took place in front of

the President, and the meeting that you remember, Ms. Nolan,

whether these guys were there or weren’t there, was the fact that

Hugh Rodham was advocating this position, or was advocating that

Mr. Vignali receive a pardon commutation, was that discussed in

your presence? Was Hugh Rodham’s name invoked to the President

of the United States in this meeting?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Lindsey?

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t recall. I don’t have a specific memory of

mentioning it. I wouldn’t have hesitated to mention it. I just don’t

recall.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You don’t remember. How about you, Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. With the caveat that I gave earlier, in the meeting

I was in where Vignali was discussed, Mr. Rodham’s name did not

come up.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Going back to the meetings of the 16th and the

19th when you’re doing the Rich pardon, as you sat in that meeting, I know the fundraising was not discussed. As you said on the

413

meeting on the 16th, Ms. Nolan, were you aware that Denise Rich

had contributed $1.2 million to the Democratic National Committee, $75,000 to Senator Clinton’s campaign, and $450,000 to the

Clinton library? Was that within your knowledge?

Ms. NOLAN. I did not know that and don’t know that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Lindsey, how about you?

Mr. LINDSEY. The amount I had no idea about. I knew she was

a supporter of the Democratic Party and had been a supporter of

Mrs. Clinton, and that she had indicated some level of support to

the library, but the dollar amounts I had no idea.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you aware that she wasn’t somebody that

came to a clam bake and bought a $35 ticket? She was a significant

contributor to all three of those causes?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You were not aware that she was a contributor

to any of those causes. Do you know, any of you, whether or not

the President was aware that she was a participant and a contributor to those three causes? I’ll start with you, Ms. Nolan. I assume

no since you didn’t know she was one.

Ms. NOLAN. I do not know.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Lindsey?

Mr. LINDSEY. I’ve seen clippings of an event where he’s standing

on a stage somewhere with her and Mrs. Clinton, so to the extent

she was on the stage with them, yes, I would assume he knew that

she was a major supporter.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. I do not know what the President’s knowledge was

which is, I think, the question you asked. Although subsequently,

just to clarify what Mr. Lindsey said, I didn’t know this at the

time, I subsequently learned having seen that photo over and over

again, that was a benefit concert for the Leukemia Foundation that

she’s involved with, but that had nothing to do with the Democratic

Party.

Mr. LINDSEY. You can’t believe what you see in the press.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I understood that to be a charitable event also.

I think she was giving him a saxophone and not cash on that particular occasion, if I understand the clipping. How about with

Braswell that you were asked about by Mr. Barr? Are you aware

that Mr. Braswell was being advocated by Hugh Rodham.

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, I believe I was.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And you were, Mr. Lindsey?

Mr. LINDSEY. No, I was not.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you have a meeting with the President of

the United States on the Braswell pardon, Ms. Nolan?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Lindsey, were you present at such a meeting?

Mr. LINDSEY. I am not sure we had a meeting on the Braswell

pardon.

414

Ms. NOLAN. I think it came up in a meeting. I don’t think that

we had a meeting on the Braswell pardon.

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t recall Braswell coming up in a meeting.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. I don’t remember Braswell at all until I heard

about it subsequent to January.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And Ms. Nolan, since you’re the only one who

has a clear recollection of the Braswell matter coming up in a

meeting, was Hugh Rodham’s name invoked to the President of the

United States during the course of that meeting as someone who

was interested in seeing Mr. Braswell—— Ms. NOLAN. I don’t believe so, Mr. LaTourette, but I am not positive.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think if we do another round, I would like

to ask you a similar set of questions about Roger Clinton, and then

I think I’ll be done with this panel, I think.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you very much. Mr. Quinn, I have

some questions for you. I know it’s been a long day for you. I appreciate you being here now twice on your own volition. I just have

a few questions that I’m not sure about and I want to clear up. Can

you tell me anyone, other than the people who were either paid by

Mr. or Mrs. Rich, or were their friends or the objects of their political or charitable benevolence who were really in favor of this pardon?

Mr. QUINN. What I can do is tell you whether each and every one

of the people who wrote letters or spoke up in favor of it were in

some ways beneficiaries of their generosity. I just don’t know the

answer to that.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I would like you to turn to exhibit 79,

it’s a copy of the agenda for a November 21, 2000 meeting among

the Rich legal time. No. 7 on the item on the agenda states maximizing use of D.R. and her friends.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Perfectly understandable. Who were her

friends? What did you mean by that?

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Davis, I did not write this, and my best recollection is that when I did get together with Mr. Fink and Ms. Behan,

I don’t believe we went through these items, at least I don’t recall

having done so. But you know as for what Mr. Fink had in mind,

he will be here some time later.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let me ask you this, in your Senate testimony, you said I expect Mrs. Dozoretz would inquire about the

status of our application, and I believe she might provide me with

some status of my application and thereof. As a lawyer, I wanted

information from as many sources as I could get about where my

petition stood in the White House so I could refocus my efforts and

my arguments to achieve the desired result for my client. Did Mrs.

Dozoretz keep you updated on the status of the application?

Mr. QUINN. There were times when I would get phone messages

from her asking me what the status of the matter was. We had a

number of conversations. The ones that stick out in my mind as

having been meaningful in this regard are that as I had requested

early on in the process, she indicated to the President that I was

415

going to be filing a pardon application, she left a message for me

to the effect that I should meet with or talk to Bruce Lindsey, and

I understood again, thirdhand, that the President had, in essence,

said fine, Quinn is filing a pardon application, he should deal with

the White House Counsel’s Office. The other one that sticks out in

my mind is the conversation which we’ve talked about here today

and a couple weeks ago that’s reflected in this Avner Azulay email. I don’t recall whether she reported that information to me directly at around the same time, but it’s entirely possible.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. How many times do you think you spoke

to Mrs. Dozoretz about the pardon application?

Mr. QUINN. It’s quite honestly hard for me to say. I had, over the

course of a few months, a fair number of phone messages with her,

some of which no doubt led to conversations, but not all of those

conversations would have been about this matter. We have been

friends, we’re, from time to time, invited to social events by her

and her husband. I was working with her to try to put her together

with a startup company in which I have thought the Dozoretz

might want to get involved, and there were conversations and gettogethers in connection with that. I am confident that I have actually spoke to her far fewer times than the pink message slips in

my office might indicate. I just hesitate to pick a number.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Would it be more than 10 times possibly?

Mr. QUINN. Very unlikely.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. More than five?

Mr. QUINN. Probably, in that neighborhood; 5 to 10.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. If I was to ask you how many contacts

you had with either Mr. Clinton or his White House staff regarding

the pardon, could you put a number on that?

Mr. QUINN. I can tell you with certainty the answer to that as

regards the President. And I can tell you the answer to that as regards Mr. Podesta. Zero in his case. And as I indicated in my written answers to the committee, I had, I believe, that I at one point

told the President that I hoped to talk to him, that I don’t believe

I said it was about either Rich or a pardon. I had the conversation

on the 19th of which you were aware, and then I had this subsequent conversation with him the following week.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. All right let me ask you—— Mr. QUINN. I’m sorry, because I do want to be complete. Then,

of course, I spoke to Mr. Lindsey definitely once. I don’t remember

further conversation with him. I communicated with him in writing. And I had a number of conversations with Ms. Nolan, particularly at the end of process there. But before that as well.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Could we turn to exhibit 155 for a second. That’s on the Jack Quinn memorandum at the top.

[Exhibit 155 follows:]

416

417

Mr. BURTON. I’ll let the gentleman finish this question and we’ll

have another round if you would like to ask more questions.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Could you read that to me?

Mr. QUINN. It says fax JQ/POTUS to Gloria for Beth. Tell Gloria

to get this to Beth as soon as possible.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I was just going to ask you about that

one.

Mr. QUINN. Yes. This relates to that report from Mr. Azulay that

the report from Mr. Azulay I believe follows this. My recollection

is that in one of the conversations I had with Ms. Dozoretz, I told

her of the letter I wrote to the President, which I don’t have in

front of me. It’s about a page and a half letter. Do we know the

date? On January 5. She, I believe this is the period of time when

she was out in Colorado and upon hearing about the letter I sent

asked if she could have a copy of it. And I believe it was subsequent to getting a copy of that letter at that point she had a conversation with the President.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want

to put some things in perspective. And I’m responding to Mr.

LaTourette’s question about the three people that work at the

White House, whether they knew that Mrs. Rich had given money

and substantial amounts of money to the Democratic Party, to the

President’s library. Who’s kidding whom? She gave $450,000 to the

library. She gave hundreds of thousands to the Democratic Party.

The President didn’t know what she gave in any instance, but he

knew she was a big supporter. But let’s also remember when the

oil and gas interests donated $29 million mostly to Republicans in

last year’s election, that people thought maybe we ought have a bill

providing subsidies and tax relief provisions worth billions to the

oil and gas interests. Was there a quid pro quo? I don’t know that

you can jump to that conclusion, but they certainly got their case

across.

Let’s look at another. In 1997, big tobacco companies gave the

Republican Party $8.8 million in contributions, and then the Republican leadership snuck into a bill on the Balanced Budget Act

a $50 billion tax credit for the tobacco companies. In January,

President George Bush held a closed door economic summit with 36

business leaders. And according to the Center for Responsive Politics, the combined contribution of 27 of these business leaders to

a Republican candidate or the Republican Party was over $1.6 million. Well, look, what’s going on? Big money gets access. And it gets

access to both sides, Democrats and Republicans. And it’s a sorry

spectacle. That’s why I have supported Mr. Shays and Mr. Mehan

and Senator McCain and others in trying to reform the campaign

finance system. But the reality is that those who have a lot of

money and a lot of power do get their voices heard. I was pleased

that Mrs. Eleanor Holmes Norton from the District of Columbia

pointed out something that I wasn’t aware of, and you wouldn’t

know it from what you read in the newspapers, that a large number of pardons that were granted by President Clinton were to peoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00425 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ple who were warehoused in prisons on some of these mandatory

sentences.

Ms. Nolan, maybe you can tell us. Did you go over some of those

pardons where you felt good about them, or did you feel uncomfortable with a lot of them?

Ms. NOLAN. No, I felt very much that assisting the President in

using his clemency power was one of the most satisfying things I

did as his counsel, and it was exactly those kind of cases that were

very rewarding. And he, there’s obviously a great deal of controversy, and I think we have all acknowledged understandable

controversy about some of the pardons he gave. I don’t—but there

were many pardons for, and commutations for people who nobody

knew who really were looking for justice and mercy from the President and who received it.

Mr. WAXMAN. It’s obvious that because the President did some

good things, it doesn’t negate the fact that he did something that

most of us think was an improper judgment call, giving a pardon

to Marc Rich. I can’t see the rationale for it. I know Mr. Quinn has

developed this rationale with others who have been in the employ

of Mr. Rich. But when a man is a fugitive from justice, it seems

to me that you don’t exercise the power of the pardon on his behalf.

But I think we ought to be more honest in this committee and with

the American people about the fact that there’s a lot of big money,

powerful interests that do get their cases heard and often favorably. That is the way it works. It’s unfortunate, and then the issue

is is it criminal? That means was it exchanged for money? Now we

know that Mr. Quinn evidently believes his argument of why the

pardon should have been granted, but we also know that he

worked for Mr. Rich. The President doesn’t work for Mr. Rich and

the President made the judgment that he thought was right. And

we disagree with it. There’s an investigation by law enforcement to

see if there’s anything illegal, but I certainly have heard no evidence any stronger than those other examples I cited earlier. Those

were not proud moments when big powerful interests get their

way, but it doesn’t mean they weren’t right, and it doesn’t mean

that when people agree with them that it might not be for the best

motives.

Mr. BURTON. We have a few more questions from a few more

members, and we should be able to wrap this up. Counsel has some

questions, so I understand that some of you need to take a little

bit of a break. So if you like, we’ll take a quick break and try to

wrap this up in the next half hour.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. OK. We will resume the questioning with Mr.

LaTourette. Mr. LaTourette, you’re recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just observed during the recess, I was chatting with Mr. Quinn, and I think he’s had

such a good time, he’d like to become an exofficio member of the

committee. He’s indicated he’s enjoyed our proceedings very much

over the last couple of times. I would like to talk as advertised

about one other relative of the first family, and that would be

Roger Clinton and ask each of you in turn, beginning with you, Ms.

Nolan, were you aware at the time the pardons were being considVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00426 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ered at the White House in January of this year that the President’s brother was advocating on behalf of certain individuals?

Ms. NOLAN. Again, Mr. LaTourette, I am not sure what I learned

subsequently, and what I knew then. I think I probably was.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You think you probably were before?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. No, sir, I don’t believe so.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. I believe I was aware that he had asked for a pardon, but I subsequently heard that it may have been for more than

one, but I think I was aware he asked for one for a friend of his.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Let me go back to some of the people we’ve already been talking about, and Ms. Nolan, since you seem to have

recollection, were you aware that Roger Clinton was involved at all

in the request made on behalf of Carlos Vignali?

Ms. NOLAN. No, I don’t think I was.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about Glen Braswell?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about a fellow by the name of Philip

Young?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mitchell Wood?

Ms. NOLAN. I have to say I don’t even recognize those names. I

am not aware that anyone was involved in them.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Podesta, since you have some recollection,

do you recall who it is that Mr. Roger Clinton might have been interested in?

Mr. PODESTA. No, but my recollection was that he had asked for

a pardon for a friend of his and it was being denied.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And that’s the only—— Mr. PODESTA. Yes, I didn’t know, and don’t know that he was involved in any of those.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Well then, I guess we’ll just throw it out

there so we’re all squared away. During any of the discussions that

you had on the 16th, the 19th or anytime else during these waning

days of the Clinton administration, was the fact that the President’s brother was interested in advocating a position on behalf of

anybody discussed in your presence and also the President’s presence?

Ms. Nolan.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t recall a discussion about it. I have some sense

that I knew. But I don’t remember discussing it with the President,

particularly.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. How about you, Mr. Lindsey, no?

Mr. LINDSEY. No. I had a discussion with the President about a

pardon for Roger, but other than that, no.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I’m specifically speaking about Roger looking

for a pardon for somebody else. So you have no recollection of that?

Mr. LINDSEY. Right.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about you, Mr. Podesta?

Mr. PODESTA. I frankly don’t remember who told me that he

asked for a pardon for a friend of his, but when I heard about it

was denied, I really didn’t think much about it beyond that.

420

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Chairman, that concludes anything I was

interested in. I thank the panel very much for their attention.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Nolan, you had a chance to look at the list. I’m

sorry that during the break we still put you to work. How many

names do you have on that list?

Ms. NOLAN. I didn’t count it.

Mr. SHAYS. Why don’t you give us the names.

Ms. NOLAN. Six or seven.

Mr. SHAYS. Why don’t you give us the names. These were pardons that you have warned the President about that didn’t seem

to make the public’s attention.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t mean to say they didn’t make the public’s attention. I don’t think it got the same kind of attention that I was

concerned that they would get.

Mr. SHAYS. What were they?

Ms. NOLAN. William Borders, Henry Cisneros, John Deutch,

Linda Jones, Jim Lake, Susan McDougal, Jack Williams.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I was most unfriendly thinking about the

present, and I basically had this theory that I shared with no one

that the President pardoned Marc Rich, so we wouldn’t pay attention to the pardon of Susan McDougal. Cheryl Mills is a trustee of

the library, I am told, and I am told that you, Mr. Lindsey, are a

consultant to the library; is that correct?

Mr. LINDSEY. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. What does a consultant do as it relates to the library?

Mr. LINDSEY. I advise with respect to all sorts of decisions. I am

one of the main contacts with the architects, with the exhibit designers, I am involved in discussions with the President—the library is not only a library. It’s a library foundation, and the library

foundation serves more than one purpose. The first purpose is to

actually build a library which we then give to the Federal Government and the Federal Government maintains, but the library foundation is also the entity through which the President engages in

sort of his public policy post-election activity. So, for example, in

addition to building a library and giving it to the government, William Jefferson Clinton Presidential Foundation is involved in and

will be involved in all sorts of public policy activities that the

former President will be involved with. And I have been involved

in discussions with what those should be and where we’re going in

that direction.

Mr. SHAYS. Are you still working with the President? Since he

is no longer President, you’re still under his employ through the library or also through his private office.

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, I also handle the legal matters in the transition office, so for example, I’m involved in continuing e-mail reconstruction issues, I’m also the President’s representative of the National Archives. So I’m involved in requests to the Archives for information.

Mr. SHAYS. I mean, I gather that like Cheryl Mills, you are a

trusted friend, and in your case, an employee of the President?

421

Mr. LINDSEY. Again, I’m an employee, I’m a consultant, not an

employee.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand that.

Mr. LINDSEY. For tax purposes, of the foundation. The President

is not a member of the board of the foundation.

Mr. SHAYS. I think it’s fair to say you’re a trusted friend, someone he respects. So with that I would like to ask—I know that Mr.

LaTourette asked if you told the President that Hugh Rodham had

called you on behalf Carlos Vignali, and I believe you said you

didn’t tell the President.

Mr. LINDSEY. I said I have no recollection of telling him. I think

I would have told him in one of the meetings that Ms. Nolan or

Mr. Podesta was present, because I think that’s the only time I

ever discussed Carlos Vignali with the President at all. And if they,

neither remember a reference to Hugh Rodham, I would probably

accept their judgment that I probably didn’t, but I frankly didn’t

know.

Mr. SHAYS. It’s so hard for me to imagine that a trusted friend

and advisor to the President wouldn’t have warned the President

that a family web was involved in a pardon that he may ultimately

agree to. It just strikes me that’s like ethics 101.

Mr. LINDSEY. It’s interesting, after Mr. Rodham brought Mr.

Vignali’s application to my attention, we spent a lot of time looking

at the merits of the application. You know, I don’t know if a Congressman had called me and brought an application to my attention, I would necessarily have mentioned it to the President.

Mr. SHAYS. But in the case of Hugh Rodham he was paid.

Mr. LINDSEY. I did not know that at the time, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Now in the case of new stories, I’m kind of hoping

that the stories kind of end so we can kind of exit this sordid affair,

and we just now have learned that Tony Rodham’s role with Edgar

Allen Gregory, Jr., and Vonna Jo Gregory and the pardon involved

there, these are business associates that he has. And I would like

to know if you knew and if the President knew that Tony Rodham

was advocating for these two individuals.

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, I knew and I believe the President knew.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you speak to Tony Rodham about this?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes. Tony Rodham called me mostly concerned

about the fact that the application had been pending over in the

Department of Justice and asked me whether I could try to move

it along.

Mr. SHAYS. And you were aware from that conversation that he

had spoken to the President about it?

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t know if it was that conversation. I think I

was aware at some point in the process that Tony had spoken to

the President about it.

Mr. SHAYS. Did the President discuss the Gregory pardon with

you?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And what did he say?

Mr. LINDSEY. He indicated to me, well, he indicated to me that

he understood that the Gregorys were unable to do business in certain States, and that competitors of the Gregorys were raising their

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conviction some 17, 18 years ago as a basis as to why various

States shouldn’t do business with them.

Mr. BURTON. I’ll yield the gentleman my 5 minutes so he can

conclude.

Mr. LINDSEY. He thought that was not fair. I think the agriculture commissioner from Florida may have actually brought it

also to his attention, or at least we knew that the agriculture commissioner in Florida—— Mr. SHAYS. Bottom line, they were involved in two banks that

went under and they gave loans to their friends. There were a lot

of people that did that, but they didn’t get pardoned here.

Mr. LINDSEY. Mr. Shays, this was again in 1982. The President’s

belief on pardons is that if a person makes a mistake, does something illegal, wrong, if they have to pay the price for that, if they

have to go to jail or they go on probation and then they live a good

life from that point forward, that they should not be denied the restoration of their rights because of that. He certainly would believe

that a person 17 years afterwards shouldn’t have a conviction, be

used to keep them from making a living. And therefore, believed

that if, in fact, they had lived a good life, if they had not been in

additional trouble from that point—— Mr. SHAYS. I hear you, Mr. Lindsey. It’s fortuitous that you mentioned the term 17 years, there are parallels. But the fact is the

Justice Department objected to this pardon; isn’t that correct?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, what I just want to wrestle with a little bit is

that the President knew in the case of these two individuals is they

had a financial relationship with a family member.

Mr. LINDSEY. I didn’t tell you that, sir, and I don’t know that to

be a fact.

Mr. SHAYS. You didn’t know that they did real estate transactions? This is unknown to you, unknown to the President?

Mr. LINDSEY. Again, I don’t know what was known to the President. It was unknown to me until I read it in the paper this morning.

Mr. SHAYS. So basically, what we have in the books are two family members that advocated for pardons got them accepted, and

they had a financial relationship. One got a payment, others actually had business dealings with. Doesn’t that just strike you as just

being a bit unethical, that you know the family shouldn’t be involved in that way?

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, again, I am opposed to success fees or contingency fees in criminal matters, including pardon applications. I am

not sure where I come out on Mr. Rodham, who is an attorney, as

to whether or not he should be allowed, be able to represent people

before the government, including the White House. With respect to

Mr. Rodham, I knew—Tony Rodham, excuse me, I knew he was a

friend of the Gregorys, I did not know of the financial relationship.

I did not believe that those factors were considerations. There were

many other, there were several other people, I don’t know many

other—there were several other people, for example, Hugh Rodham

expressed interest in that we didn’t grant. And the fact is the basis

I think is that some we determined were meritorious, and others

we didn’t on the merits, not on the relationship.

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Mr. SHAYS. My time is ending. I just want to thank all four of

you. Mr. Quinn, I would thank you again for appearing a second

time. I am going to make a parting comment and say that I don’t

think it’s possible for you to have served Marc Rich faithfully and

the President faithfully at the same time. And that’s the reason

you’re here, in my judgment.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman yields back his time?

Mr. SHAYS. I yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Is there further discussion?

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I wasn’t going to say anything, but with what

Mr. Shays just said, I got to say something. And I want to give you

an opportunity, Mr. Quinn, to respond to if you want to respond

to what was just said. Again, I have said it many times, I get tired

in this committee of people’s representations being tarnished, and

then there’s no way for them to get their reputation back. We have

one life to live. This is no dress rehearsal. This so happens to be

that life. Now if you want to respond to what Mr. Shays just said

you may, but other than that I have some questions.

Mr. QUINN. We went over this a few weeks ago.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I can’t hear you. I’m sorry.

Mr. QUINN. I’m sorry, it’s off. We did go over this a few weeks

ago, I think Mr. Shays is off base. I don’t think that in this context,

anyone failed to understand that I had a client and I was acting

as an advocate.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Let me ask you this. I listened to the

question, listened to the testimony, the questions of Ms. Eleanor

Holmes Norton about a half hour ago, and she said something certainly that I must revisit, and when she talked about Eric Holder,

and I also want to add to the name, Cheryl Mills. One of the things

that happened with Mr. Holder is he has had an impeccable reputation with the Congress, and he has been just a wonderful public

servant. And it’s so interesting that as he leaves, left office, that

all of this seemed to come falling down around him. And you, in

answer to Mr. Quinn, to answer to something that was said by

Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, she said it seems like Mr.

Holder seems to be the fall guy or is becoming the fall guy. You

disagree with that; is that right?

Mr. QUINN. I certainly disagree. Well, that shouldn’t be the case.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you think Mr. Holder acted properly in this

instance with regard to this? And I will ask the same thing of you,

Ms. Nolan.

Mr. QUINN. Congressman, I think we’ve heard an awful lot about

circumstances which, in retrospect, all of us regret. But I don’t

think that makes him or any of these people sitting here with me

blameworthy. This process would have worked an awful lot better.

We know that. A lot of things went wrong. But a case was presented on the merits. I happen to believe that the President decided this for reasons with which everybody in the Congress may

disagree, but which were wholly appropriate for him to base his decision on.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Nolan.

Ms. NOLAN. I have a great deal of respect for Mr. Holder. I

worked very closely with him when I was at the Department of

424

Justice, and then when I was at the White House. I think he, like

I and others in this, because of press, of affairs and the last minute

look at this, again didn’t fully examine the matter. But I think that

is, as he’s acknowledged, unfortunate but understandable. And I

think it would be ridiculous and I don’t believe it, in fact, will be

true that his reputation is tarnished in the end. I think he, as

many are, is getting a little bump right now. But he’s an outstanding person, an outstanding lawyer, and I think this country knows

that and will know that again.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I agree with every syllable you just said. Let me

just leave you with this. You know when people tune into this they

see parts of it, but one of the things is clear and I just want to go

back to this, to you, Mr. Podesta, to you, Mr. Lindsey, and to you,

Ms. Nolan, I just want to make sure the record is clear, and for

the person who just tuned in that during these discussions with the

President, there was no—to your knowledge, there was no mention

of contributions made by Ms. Rich to the library or to the First

Lady or to the President of the DNC. I think I got everything there.

Mr. PODESTA. That is correct.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is that correct, Mr. Lindsey?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir.

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, absolutely no mention.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you would consider yourselves some of his

closest advisors with regard to this situation, that is, the pardons?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is all.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you Mr. Cummings.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. If I might make a concluding comment as well,

just to followup on what Mr. Cummings had to say. When you have

a real confusing situation as it appears the last days of the Clinton

administration came to and a breakdown of the system, where

ideally the Justice Department, the Pardon Office, the prosecutors,

everybody would have had their opportunity to weigh in and influence the President’s decision, when that broke down it was unfortunate. But I would think we would be doing a great deal of harm

to people who would think about working for the government of the

United States to have to have their reputations tarnished unfairly.

I have known Mr. Holder as well from the work on this committee and I think he’s a man of great integrity. I think the four people before us are people of great integrity. And I don’t think that

they should be tarnished with a brush because people disagree

with the judgment that the President made. I also think that

Cheryl Mills’ name has been mentioned, and just because her name

has been mentioned that she was at the White House, no one

should think there’s anything wrong with anything she did because

I haven’t heard anything that would lead me to believe that she did

anything that anyone can criticize. So let’s keep all that in perspective but if we do have people’s reputations tarnished easily, which

I have seen happen in this committee and Congress in the past,

which was easy for Members of Congress to throw smear bombs,

let’s realize that what we really do is harm the whole idea of public

service. We ought to encourage people to come in and serve the interests of the Nation.

425

They may make mistakes, but who hasn’t made a mistake? And

if there are mistakes that are made, let’s understand the mistakes

aren’t made by everybody involved, but only by some. There are

some mistakes that are made inadvertently or just in the context.

We can look at an isolated issue of these pardons, but so much is

going on at the same time that all of us think what would happen

if we had to be judged based on what was said or done by us at

one moment in time, which wasn’t of consequence to us at that moment when so many other things were far more important, it would

be so unfair and we ought to keep all of that in perspective.

And the other thing I want to say, Mr. Chairman, is we’ve been

here with this panel for over 6 hours. We have another panel to

follow, and I know we agreed that the staff can ask questions a

half hour each side, that means another hour for this panel. The

members have taken four or five rounds, I would like to request

that the counsel on both sides submit questions in writing to the

four members of the panel that are before us right now. If they’re

not satisfied with their responses, we can always bring them back

in, but I can’t imagine that there’s anything that anybody has to

ask any of these four people that has not been asked at least four

or five times already.

So I’d like to make that request to you so that we can get on to

the last panel. It’s already after 7 p.m. If we have to take the same

amount of time with the next panel that we took with this panel,

let’s see that would put us at 1 a.m. So I think we ought not to

unfairly tarnish peoples’ reputations nor should we engage in a

form of kidnapping by holding them hostage. So I would hope that

we can move expeditiously.

Mr. BURTON. We will try to expedite the counsels’ questions as

quickly as possible.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WAXMAN. My request is being denied?

Mr. BURTON. We’ll move expeditiously.

Mr. WILSON. I don’t want to research the kidnapping statutes

here. That will be my break to you all, and I will go as quickly as

possible, and my role is always the housekeeping role, to try to establish a few things that are not clear on the record.

First of all, Ms. Nolan, did you have a recommendation on the

Vignali pardon matter?

Ms. NOLAN. You know, Mr. Wilson, I was not enthusiastic about

the Vignali pardon, but I really can’t remember whether in the end

was opposed or sort of persuaded that given the large support he

had it was tolerable.

Mr. WILSON. Did you give any advice to the President on the

Vignali matter?

Ms. NOLAN. I know we discussed it, but I really don’t know at

what point we discussed it and at what point my discussions were

with my staff.

Mr. WILSON. Was there any written recommendation at any

point on the Vignali matter?

Ms. NOLAN. Normally what went in to the President was a chart

that would contain the recommended pardons. On some occasion,

we sent them a chart without a recommendation for pardon he

wanted to consider. That’s what I don’t remember, whether Vignali

426

went on a chart in which we were making a recommendation. I

honestly, I just don’t remember. It wasn’t a pardon I was particularly involved with.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough. The Justice Department did have a

recommendation, did it not? It’s my understanding they recommended against the pardon.

Ms. NOLAN. I believe they opposed it. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. What factors did you take from the Vignali matter

that led you to reject their recommendation?

Ms. NOLAN. Mr. Wilson, I didn’t work closely on that matter. I

don’t have much memory of it other than I remember the discussions about what U.S. attorney did or did not support the bishop

or archbishop of Los Angeles. I do remember those discussion so I

remember I was aware of it but it was not one—of course, most of

these were not matters that I looked at directly. I just got reports

from staff. I know Mr. Lindsey had some conversation about it. I

didn’t with anyone other than my staff.

Mr. WILSON. If I can, I’ll turn to Mr. Lindsey. Mr. Lindsey, did

you have a recommendation on the Vignali matter?

Mr. LINDSEY. Again, I originally was probably negative. After the

call from the—first of all, it wasn’t a pardon, it was a commutation.

But after I received a call from the sheriff of Los Angeles and our

office reached out to the U.S. attorney in central district of California and Los Angeles, I decided that given the community support

and their position that into the county in which he would go to live,

that they would be aware of the crime situation, if you will, in their

community, and if they were not concerned about him coming back

to their community, that I thought it was an appropriate commutation.

Mr. WILSON. Did you communicate that to the President?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask a question. Did you think to possibly

contact the prosecuting attorneys who prosecuted the case in Minnesota?

Mr. LINDSEY. We said the opinion of the U.S. attorney from Minnesota. He was opposed to it. So we knew the opinion of the U.S.

attorney in Minnesota. We knew we had looked at—I was aware

of amount that was involved. It was $25,000.

I was aware of what, what his role was, if you will. I mean, if

you’d listen to the chairman now, this is an 800-pound conspiracy

going over a number of years. The fact of the matter is, the evidence and the finding of the court was that he was involved for,

I think, less than 6 months; that he was responsible for 5 to 15

kilos, the 11 to 33 pounds; that he was not an organizing, leader/

manager of the conspiracy. All of that we took into consideration.

Yes, we took into consideration the recommendation of the U.S.

attorney. We also took into consideration the recommendation of

the sheriff of Los Angeles, the position of the U.S. attorney in Los

Angeles, the position of Cardinal Mahoney.

Mr. BURTON. We’ve heard that before, but the fact is, you did not

talk to any of the people who were involved in the case up there.

They have been very, very forthcoming, and their sequence of

events and what took place is not consistent with what you have

just told us.

427

Mr. LINDSEY. Well, the pardon attorney had spoken to them and

gave us a written report that included their position on this matter.

Mr. WILSON. Turning to the Braswell matter, Ms. Nolan, did you

have a recommendation of the President on the Braswell matter?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, I believe I recommended in favor of Braswell.

Mr. WILSON. You did, Mr. Lindsey did you have a recommendation?

Mr. LINDSEY. Based upon what I knew at the time, yes, I recommended in favor of it.

Mr. WILSON. OK. And, Ms. Nolan, what principal factors—and if

you could be brief, what principal factors did you have to recommend in favor of the Braswell petition?

Ms. NOLAN. What I remember about it, Mr. Wilson, is that it

looked like the kind of situation that the President was looking for

quite a long time ago, 15, somewhere between 15 and 20 years, I

think. A crime with no apparent—to us at the time—further activity, criminal activity of any sort. So it looked like the kind of pardon that the President was looking to do.

Mr. WILSON. Did you have a recommendation on the Gregory petitions?

Ms. NOLAN. Those weren’t done, those were done earlier, the

Gregory.

Mr. WILSON. I believe they were done earlier.

Ms. NOLAN. Petitions.

Mr. WILSON. In early 2000.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t remember what my recommendation was.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Lindsey, do you know whether you had a recommendation on the Gregory petitions?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, if I believed they were being financially hurt

because of a conviction 17, 18 years ago and that they had done

nothing subsequent to be in trouble with the law, that they were

deserving of a pardon.

Mr. WILSON. Now, Ms. Nolan, on the Braswell matter, how

would you be aware that there was no ongoing criminal activity or

ongoing investigation of Braswell if you didn’t check with the Justice Department?

Ms. NOLAN. Well, I mean, we did; I think that my staff did do

an NCIC check. I don’t know—again with these matters what I

would know is what was brought to me, the information that was

brought to me by my staff. I was aware of the petition the last

week, but I recollected the name and believed that we had already

had it in process. So I don’t think I focused on whether we had gotten full information from the Justice Department.

Mr. WILSON. So to your knowledge there was no check with the

Department of Justice; it was simply your staff handling the matter internally?

Ms. NOLAN. Well, the staff would check with the Department of

Justice to do an NCIC check.

Mr. WILSON. So in this case the staff had the Department of Justice do the NCIC?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes, that’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. And you’re aware that did happen?

Ms. NOLAN. I believe it did, yes.

428

Mr. WILSON. If we could get the chronology for the late night of

the 19th and the early morning of the 20th, when did you first

learn, and I’ll go through this quickly so—I just want to get a very

brief answer to each question—but when did you first learn—at

what time did you first learn that the Rich pardon was not a dead

issue?

Ms. NOLAN. Well, I had a conversation, I think—as I testified

earlier, I was told that Mr. Quinn said Mr. Holder still supported

it.

Mr. WILSON. I’m trying to get the time.

Ms. NOLAN. Well, according to Mr. Holder’s telephone records, it

was 6:38 p.m. that I called him.

Mr. WILSON. OK.

Ms. NOLAN. And it was right about that time, I mean, I picked

up the phone and called him. We went to see the President shortly

thereafter, somewhere between 7 and 8 p.m.

Mr. WILSON. So it’s fair to say that somewhere between 7 and

8 you realized the Rich pardon was not a dead issue and there

might be something more to be done?

Ms. NOLAN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. That’s fair.

And after that, what was your next step?

Ms. NOLAN. My staff, one of my associate counsels, I’m not sure

who, contacted the Department of Justice to get an NCIC check.

Mr. WILSON. OK, and it’s my understanding the result of that

NCIC check, among other things, was the information provided to

you that there was an issue with arms-dealing; is that correct?

Ms. NOLAN. That’s the information I got somewhere between 1

and 2 a.m., that’s right.

Mr. WILSON. And you called Mr. Quinn next. At what time did

you call Mr. Quinn?

Ms. NOLAN. Somewhere in that timeframe of between 1 and 2.

I’m not sure. I’m putting it in that timeframe because I think that

I called the President at 2:30. So I’m just sort of backing that up.

Mr. WILSON. So you had your conversation with Mr. Quinn, and

I know you did explain that earlier. I won’t ask you about that. But

was that your last step prior to the final conversation with the

President about the Rich matter?

Ms. NOLAN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. And you had a conversation with the President

about 2:30; is that correct?

Ms. NOLAN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. And what did you tell him?

Ms. NOLAN. I told him that the NCIC check revealed this armstrading. It did list Mr. Rich as a fugitive; that——

Mr. WILSON. Can I just stop you there.

Did he reject that? I know we’ve had Mr. Quinn tell us that he

had explained to people that Mr. Rich wasn’t a fugitive, and Mr.

Lindsey had quibbled with the technical aspect of fugitivity, but did

the President believe Mr. Rich was a fugitive?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. WILSON. Did you ask him?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know whether I asked him. I don’t think I

asked him. I mean, I think we had a discussion about it doesn’t

429

matter whether he’s a fugitive or not in terms of my view of—I

don’t know that it was critical to the President.

Mr. WILSON. Did you have a discussion where it became clear

whether it was critical to the President? Did he for example say,

I don’t care that he’s a fugitive, or I don’t believe that he is technically a fugitive? Did he provide some feedback to you?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t believe he said anything like that.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Did he know that you were doing an NCIC

check?

Ms. NOLAN. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. He did. So when we left—well, I’m not sure we had

that step then because before you—did you tell him earlier in the

evening that you were going to do an NCIC check?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t know. I don’t think so.

Mr. WILSON. When did you tell the President you were going to

do an NCIC?

Ms. NOLAN. I’m sorry. He knew we did it when I called him at

2:30 a.m.; he knew that’s what we were doing with everybody. I

don’t know that we had a specific discussion about Mr. Rich, but

he understood that part of our process was to do an NCIC check.

Mr. WILSON. OK. And what did the President say about the

arms-trading matter, if anything?

Ms. NOLAN. With respect to both of those matters, that’s when

I said, you know, what we have is Jack Quinn’s word; that’s all we

have at this hour. And he said, take Mr. Quinn’s word, or take

Jack’s word.

Mr. WILSON. So he was the one that signed off on Mr. Quinn as

the final authority on that matter?

Ms. NOLAN. I suppose that’s right.

Mr. WILSON. OK. And what happened next?

Mr. BURTON. Did he in any way indicate that you ought to call

the Justice Department back and find out just how extensive that

problem was with the arms-trading?

Ms. NOLAN. No, sir.

Mr. WILSON. What happened next, then, if anything?

Ms. NOLAN. About an hour and a half later, about 4 I got to go

home.

Mr. WILSON. OK. But I guess we can do it a little more slowly

then.

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t think anything—nothing else happened.

Mr. WILSON. But did this conversation between yourself and the

President get translated to the ultimate executive grant of clemency? Did you tell somebody after you met with the President

about the discussion?

Ms. NOLAN. Several of my staff lawyers were in the office with

me when I talked with the President, so they knew about the conversation I’d had.

Mr. WILSON. And who was with you at the time?

Ms. NOLAN. Meredith Cabe and Eric Angel. And Cheryl Mills

was there—well, had gone out to dinner; she was coming to stay

at my house.

Mr. WILSON. OK. So she was with you during—was she with you

during the telephone conversation you had with Mr. Quinn?

430

Ms. NOLAN. Yeah, she was in my office; and I think she talked

to Mr. Quinn also.

Mr. WILSON. At the same time that you were speaking with Mr.

Quinn?

Ms. NOLAN. I know I spoke with Mr. Quinn by myself. I don’t

know if we talked on the phone together or not.

Mr. WILSON. OK.

At any time during that evening did either yourself or your staff

or Ms. Mills or the President suggest that you might reach out to

any of the intelligence agencies that would be able to brief you on

Mr. Rich?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. WILSON. I guess that can’t go much further than that. It just

wasn’t something that was even entertained in your mind?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. WILSON. The only reason I ask is because Mr. Rich had been

living out of the United States for 17 years. He was a very wellknown man, who had traded in metals and various other natural

resources all over the world, dealings with—publicly reported dealings with practically every enemy we’d had over the last 20 years.

It’s hard for us to understand that somebody wouldn’t think, we

could get such and such an intelligence resource on the telephone

right now and see if they have anything at all to offer us. That just

didn’t crop up in the Rich situation?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. WILSON. Does anybody on the panel know how many times

Prime Minister—former Prime Minister Barak actually called the

President? Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. Are you referring to how many times he called him

or how many times he called and talked about the Rich matter? I

think that the President talked to Mr. Barak more than the combined number of phone calls of all other foreign leaders during the

year 2000.

Mr. WILSON. That’s good distinction. I’m sorry for that. The number of times they discussed the Rich pardon.

Mr. PODESTA. I think two or three; I’m not precise about that.

Mr. WILSON. How do you know that?

Mr. PODESTA. Because I was involved in the discussions with Mr.

Berger and with the President and the others, Mr. Ross and the

others about those phone calls generally, which obviously which

were centered on the Middle East peace process. But when Pollard

or the Rich matter came up, the President would brief us on that;

and I think that it came up two or three times. I’m not sure.

Mr. WILSON. Does anybody?

Mr. PODESTA. Prior to January 19th, it did come up. I’m certain

that it came up prior to January 19th. I don’t know the first time

it came up, and I don’t know—I think it may have been three times

that he raised it.

Mr. WILSON. I know that because I’ve seen that in the newspapers, but there have also been reports from Israel that it was

only one time.

Mr. PODESTA. There was only one time that he raised it? I don’t

believe that’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. We’re just trying to resolve the discrepancy.

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Mr. PODESTA. I just don’t believe that’s correct. I think that’s—

again, other people may have a recollection of that, but I believe

he raised it—I’m certain he raised it before January 19th, at least

in another conversation, and he may have raised it in two other

conversations.

Mr. LINDSEY. If I could, the President indicated on the 19th, I

believe, that was the third time at least; I don’t know if it was

third or fourth, but maybe third time at least that Barak had mentioned it to him.

Mr. WILSON. He told you that?

Mr. LINDSEY. In our meeting when he said Barak had raised it

in his conversation that day he indicated that was, I think, the

third time it had been raised by Mr. Barak.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough.

Ms. NOLAN. Can I just say, I thought he said ‘‘fourth.’’

Mr. LINDSEY. I thought it was three or four. It could have been

four.

Mr. WILSON. Ms. Nolan, earlier you mentioned that you first

learned about the Rich pardon matter in mid-January; is that correct?

Ms. NOLAN. No. I agree with Mr. Quinn that he called me on December 11th to tell me he was submitting a pardon application. I

think it was after Christmas, so end of December that I looked—

you know, had a chance to look at it.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Ms. Nolan, did you have any contacts with

Beth Dozoretz regarding the Rich pardon?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Lindsey, did you have any contacts with Beth

Dozoretz regarding the Rich pardon?

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes. As I testified earlier, she called me one time

and asked about two pardons.

Mr. WILSON. And that was the one time?

Mr. LINDSEY. That’s the one time.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Podesta, did you have any?

Mr. PODESTA. No.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Well, Ms. Nolan, are you aware of any contacts

between Beth Dozoretz and the President regarding the Rich pardon?

Ms. NOLAN. None.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. LINDSEY. Other than what I’ve read in Jack’s e-mails, no. I

mean, I have no direct knowledge of any.

Mr. WILSON. And those from your subsequent reading?

Mr. LINDSEY. Right, exactly.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough.

Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. The same answer as Mr. Lindsey.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Quinn, who suggested that Peter Kadzik be

hired to work on the Rich matter?

Mr. QUINN. Well, Mr. Kadzik was at a firm that, as I understand

it——

Mr. WILSON. Had done work for a number of years, but I think

his first billing on the Rich matter was in November of——

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Mr. QUINN. Right, but he’s a partner of Michael Green, who was

actively involved, and I believe it was Mike who suggested that he

get involved.

Mr. WILSON. And is it your understanding that his first involvement was in November 2000 Quinn on the Rich matter?

Mr. QUINN. On the pardon, I don’t know what past involvement

he may have had in Rich matters, but I think that’s basically right

in terms of the pardon process.

Mr. WILSON. Why was Mr. Kadzik brought on to work on this

matter?

Mr. QUINN. Again, Mr. Green suggested it would be a good idea

to get him involved, that he was well regarded, trusted by Mr. Podesta, and that he could be a useful person to convey our arguments to Mr. Podesta.

Mr. WILSON. Is it fair to characterize then, what you have said,

he was hired because of his access to and friendship with Mr. Podesta?

Mr. QUINN. That’s not what I said.

Mr. WILSON. What I said, is it fair to characterize what you said

as that? That’s why I mentioned—— Mr. QUINN. My impression was that he was being brought in because of the high regard in which Mr. Podesta held him.

Mr. WILSON. I’m not sure if I’m quick enough to distinguish between those two things, but it was because of his relationship with

Mr. Podesta, correct?

Mr. QUINN. Again, it was Mr. Green’s suggestion about—I’m not

going to try to divine what he was thinking.

Mr. WILSON. Right.

Mr. QUINN. But I am not going to quibble with your own right

to characterize it as you see fit.

Mr. WILSON. On January 6, Mr. Kadzik billed time for a conference with you. Was that an in-person meeting?

Mr. QUINN. No. I don’t believe I ever discussed this matter with

Mr. Kadzik in person. This——

Mr. WILSON. Let me actually—— Mr. QUINN. What day of this week is this?

Mr. WILSON. I misspoke in asking you the question. But what we

have is a billing record that indicates Mr. Kadzik billed time for

a conference with Mr. Podesta. Did, in fact, Mr. Kadzik meet with

you on January 6 about the Rich matter?

Mr. PODESTA. If you refer to my opening statement, yes, he did,

which I’ve already testified to.

Mr. WILSON. Right.

Did—one of the things that came up in the e-mails that we reviewed a while back was that there’s an indication that you told

Mr. Kadzik that you thought Mr. Rich and his lawyers, ‘‘benefited

from being under the press radar.’’ Did you ever tell Mr. Kadzik

anything to that effect?

Mr. PODESTA. No, I don’t believe I did.

Mr. WILSON. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Kadzik any benefit

obtained from the matter not being prominent or not being in the

public eye?

Mr. PODESTA. Well, I don’t remember precisely the conversation.

There was a brief meeting in my office that occurred, but I was—

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certainly by then I was—had consulted, I believe, with Ms. Nolan.

I was opposed to the pardon; I told Mr. Kadzik I was opposed to

the pardon. I wasn’t trying to give them any advice about it.

I don’t know what Mr. Kadzik may have said to me that transpired in that conversation which led to his reporting that back.

But I don’t remember saying that, and whether he raised it with

me or not I just do not recall.

Mr. WILSON. OK. And then, not to do this backward, but that

seems to indicate you do not have a recollection that didn’t happen.

So it might have happened. You just don’t recall; is that correct?

Mr. PODESTA. All I’m saying to you is—well, I think the answer

to that is, I don’t recall. But I was certainly not trying to give them

advice. Again, this is a third-hand e-mail, and I don’t think I was

giving him advice at this point. I told Mr. Kadzik that I didn’t

think it was warranted, and I opposed it.

Mr. WILSON. Just if we could put up exhibit No. 62 on the screen,

and I think you have it in front of you. It is an e-mail dated January 9, 3 days after the conversation that we were just talking

about.

[Exhibit 62 follows:]

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Mr. PODESTA. What number is that?

Mr. WILSON. It’s No. 62, if you could take a quick look at that.

I don’t think we’ll be able to go any further. This is not an e-mail

that you were a part of, but if you could just take a quick look at

that. And at the top there’s this very short, I think we’ve ‘‘benefited

from being under the press radar. Podesta said as much.’’ I think

we’ve covered fully it, but there’s nothing here—— Mr. PODESTA. These are from two individuals I haven’t spoken

to.

Mr. WILSON. I understand that. OK, fair enough.

If you were opposed to the pardon, Mr. Podesta, why didn’t you

direct people to at least obtain input from the Southern District of

New York?

Mr. PODESTA. Frankly, Mr. Wilson, I thought the matter was

dead, and I thought with all of us being opposed to it that no work,

no real work, needed to be done on it because I thought it was a

dead matter.

As I said earlier, I think that we would have benefited from having done that, but we didn’t, and I take responsibility for that.

Mr. WILSON. Did Mr. Lindsey, did you have any conversations

interaction with a rock musician, Don Henley, about obtaining a

pardon for somebody?

Mr. LINDSEY. I don’t know if I ever spoke to him or not. I know

he called my office a number of times; and I think I ultimately

spoke to an assistant of his, but I don’t believe I ever spoke to Don

Henley.

Mr. WILSON. Do you know the name of the individual for whom

he was requesting a pardon?

Mr. LINDSEY. Again, it seems to me it was a commutation, not

a pardon. I do not remember the name. It was a man who was involved in gambling in California and had—was now very active in

certain—Gambling Anonymous and trying to help other people

break that, and but I don’t recall the name.

Mr. WILSON. In this matter do you know whether the Justice Department provided a recommendation regarding this particular

commutation request?

Mr. LINDSEY. I do not. I do not.

Mr. WILSON. Ms. Nolan, are you familiar with the matter that

Mr. Lindsey’s talking about?

Ms. NOLAN. I don’t. This is not to say I wasn’t familiar with it

at the time, but I don’t. It doesn’t ring any bells.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Podesta.

Mr. PODESTA. I’ve spoken to Mr. Henley about environmental

matters, but I don’t think I ever spoke to him about a pardon.

Mr. BURTON. I just want to make sure I’ve got all this straight

here.

This memo that we had before us, this No. 62, where—it’s from

Jack Quinn, sent Tuesday, January 9th, to Robert Fink. It says, ‘‘I

think we have benefited from being under the press radar. Podesta

said as much.’’ You do not remember saying anything like that?

Mr. PODESTA. I don’t remember having this conversation. I certainly didn’t speak to these people. I don’t know what it’s in reference to, and I don’t remember doing it.

436

I know that in the meeting that I had with Mr. Kadzik on the

6th that I opposed this pardon, and I was certainly consistent in

that; and I was not trying to give them any pointers, so I don’t

know what this is in reference to.

Mr. BURTON. Well, it’s a significant statement, and if you didn’t

say it, that’s fine, but this is from Mr. Quinn.

Mr. Quinn, do you remember him saying something like that?

Mr. QUINN. I’m confident I wrote this e-mail, but I’m also confident that I never spoke to Mr. Podesta about this.

Mr. BURTON. Where did you get this information, ‘‘I think we’ve

benefited from being under press radar. Podesta said as much.’’

What did Mr. Podesta say that made you think that?

Mr. QUINN. I had a report from Mr. Green, who in turn talked

to Mr. Kadzik, and that was what I understood to have been reported.

Mr. BURTON. So it was third-hand.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. I think our time’s expired.

Counsel, who are we recognizing?

Mr. SCHILIRO. I don’t have any questions for the panel, which I’m

sure will disappoint you, but Mr. Kanjorski does, so I’m going to

yield some time to him.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I’m just going to take a few moments to test Mr.

Quinn’s kidneys, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Quinn, in your previous oral and written testimony before

this committee, I received the distinct impression that, beginning

in late 1999 you worked with many of the attorneys in town working for Mr. Rich. You named three of them—Mr. Garment, Mr.

Urgenson and Mr. Libby—and, on page 4 of your testimony, you

stated that you knew the current counsel and law firms involved

in Mr. Rich’s defense, and you respected their reputation and judgment. And I implied from that, or inferred as the case may be, that

you were saying they agreed with your petition for pardons, since

they helped you, as I understand, prepare all the material. It was

basically their work product and you were the editor of this work

product for submission and application. Is this correct?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. Let me try to straighten that out.

First of all, the gentlemen with whom I worked initially were Mr.

Urgenson, Mr. Libby, Mr. Green and Mr. Fink. Mr. Garment had

been involved previously, but was not involved with me. As we discussed earlier today, the basis of the pardon application was a series of arguments to the effect that the indictment was flawed. I

understand all of them to agree with that, that is to say, that the

indictment was flawed, but I did not mean to imply that they had

worked on the pardon itself. The only other thing I would add is

that at least according to the New Yorker magazine, Mr. Garment

did say after the fact that he didn’t know why the President granted the pardon, but he agreed with it.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Then, as of this moment, you don’t know whether these lawyers agreed with the pardon?

Mr. QUINN. Again, they certainly not only agreed that the indictment was flawed, they explained to me why the indictment was

flawed, but I have to let them speak for themselves.

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Mr. KANJORSKI. That’s on the indictment. What do you know regarding their feelings of whether or not there was merit here for

the pardon?

Mr. QUINN. The only thing I know going to the pardon is what

I told you about, what Mr. Garment was quoted as having said in

the New Yorker.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So from the time in October that you began

working with these men in October 1999 until sometime in midJanuary, even though you used all their work product—you’d obviously been briefed on their case, their briefings, their arguments,

their positions—you never asked them whether or not they favored

granting the petition for pardon?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. And you have no idea whether or not they favored the pardon?

Mr. QUINN. But, Congressman, I had enormously high degree of

confidence that they agreed that the indictment was thoroughly

flawed.

Mr. KANJORSKI. But not sufficiently flawed to support a pardon?

Mr. QUINN. They weren’t involved at that point.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I see. OK, I’ll just take a moment then. I’ve often

had the occasion over the last 8 years to work with at least two

of the three members of the panel. I want to compliment you on

your testimony. It was certainly forthright. I think you have been

under a great deal of strain.

It’s very difficult to take the position that you took in private

confidence—a disagreement with someone that you worked for—

and now come publicly and disclose that disagreement. But you’ve

certainly done the honorable thing. Your testimony today, as I understand it, is that in your opinion, the judgment exercised in

granting the pardon was probably faulty, but that you feel there

was no wrongdoing, illegality or impropriety in the action of the

President in issuing the pardon. Is that correct?

Mr. PODESTA. That’s correct.

Ms. NOLAN. That’s correct.

Mr. LINDSEY. That’s correct.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I think that concludes our hearing as far as

you’re concerned. I want to thank you all for being here, and I hope

that your derrieres are not completely asleep so you can walk out

of here. Thank your much.

We’ll now have the next panel come before us.

We will now welcome our third panel to the witness table—Lewis

Libby, Robert Fink and Peter Kadzik—and I doubt seriously if

we’re going to be here anywhere near as long as we were with first

two panels.

Would you all please rise, so I can swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Be seated.

Do any of any of you have an opening statement?

Mr. KADZIK. I have no opening statement. I’d be pleased to answer the committee’s questions.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Libby.

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STATEMENT OF LEWIS LIBBY

Mr. LIBBY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, once again

pursuant to the committee’s requests, I welcome the opportunity to

provide whatever useful information I can about my knowledge of

the Marc Rich matter.

I should add that I’m here today in my personal capacity and not

as a representative of the government or speaking in any way for

the government. I did not represent Mr. Rich in connection with

the pardon or the pardon application. However, a brief overview of

my past representation of Mr. Rich as a private attorney and my

decision not to participate in the effort to obtain a pardon may be

useful for you.

In the spring of 1985, Mr. Rich and Mr. Pincus Green asked Mr.

Leonard Garment, a Washington attorney, to represent them in

connection with an outstanding criminal indictment. At the time,

Mr. Rich had already renounced his U.S. citizenship and was living

in Switzerland. Mr. Garment told Mr. Rich and Mr. Green that he

would not be able to represent them unless he first determined

that they had a sound legal defense.

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me, Mr. Libby, could you push the mic just

a little bit further away from you.

Mr. LIBBY. I’m sorry, sir.

Mr. BURTON. You have a very strong voice and it depends on how

you pick it up. Thank you.

Mr. LIBBY. About this time, Mr. Garment asked me to join his

firm. Mr. Garment assigned me to help assess whether there were

legal defenses to the tax and energy fraud charges to which the

Rich companies had already pled guilty. Attorneys from the firm of

Milgrim, Thomajan & Lee, including Mr. Robert Fink and other expert counsel, participated in the analysis. We later included notable tax law experts as well.

In August 1987 we presented our analysis of the facts in law to

an assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York.

We argued that based on all the information available to defense

counsel, Marc Rich companies had properly reported their tax obligations and energy transactions and that these criminal charges

should be reexamined. I wish to emphasize that in approaching the

Southern District of New York we were not seeking a pardon, but

rather negotiated settlement of the outstanding indictment.

Our efforts were unsuccessful. In 1989, I resigned from private

practice in the representation of Mr. Green and Mr. Rich to join the

Defense Department where I served until 1993. Sometime after my

return to private practice, I assisted Mr. Fink and Mr. Urgenson,

a partner at Kirkland & Ellis and a former official of the Justice

Department, in another attempt to open discussions with the

Southern District of New York. This effort, somewhere in the 1993

to 1995 timeframe, also failed.

Thereafter, I viewed the matter as largely inactive, and I do not

recall any significant work on the matter until 1999. Sometime in

1999, I first learned that Mr. Rich had retained Mr. Jack Quinn.

Mr. Quinn said that he planned to ask the Department of Justice

to look at the case or persuade the Southern District to do so. I

participated in efforts to brief Mr. Quinn about the case and the

subsequent effort to prepare yet another request to the Southern

439

District. These efforts also failed. Immediately thereafter, in roughly the spring of 2000, I was instructed by counsel for Mr. Rich and

Mr. Green to stop all work on behalf of them.

In late November 2000, one of the defense counsels, Mr. Michael

Green, called me. Michael Green said that the defense team was

planning to approach the White House for a pardon. I was at the

time spending nearly all my free hours working on the possible

transition a new administration and determined that participation

in a pardon effort would be inconsistent with my time commitments and my role related to the transition and the possible new

administration.

I informed Mr. Green that I would not participate in an effort to

obtain a pardon. I did not at any time thereafter represent Mr.

Rich or Mr. Pincus Green or work on their behalf in connection

with the effort to obtain a pardon.

I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Kadzik, you do not have an opening statement?

Mr. KADZIK. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Fink, do you have an opening statement?

STATEMENT OF ROBERT FINK

Mr. FINK. Yes, I do, but in the interest of making the last shuttle

and seeing my family tonight, if you think you can accommodate

me, I’d be happy to dispense with it.

Mr. BURTON. OK. You can submit it for record, and we’ll use it

in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fink follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Since there are no more opening comments, we’ll

yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kadzik, I’d like to start with you, if I could. Your law firm,

as I understand it, represented Marc Rich for a substantial period

of time, but your work was not certainly as extensive as that of

other members of your firm. Is that an accurate observation?

Mr. KADZIK. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. When were you were first asked to participate

in the representation of Marc Rich to work on his file?

Mr. KADZIK. I was consulted in the late 1980’s when Mr. Libby

and Mr. Garment were in the process of preparing to approach the

U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York, because at that time I was representing another client with respect

to a matter before the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District and they asked me for my thoughts and advice on what kind

of approach they should take, what the likelihood of success was

and whether I knew any of the personalities, whose names I don’t

recall now, that they were going to deal with.

Mr. LATOURETTE. When you say ‘‘personalities,’’ the thinking was

that if you had worked previously with someone in the U.S. Attorney’s Office that you might be able to give them some advice as to

what advice would be successful with this or that person?

Mr. KADZIK. This is correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And subsequent to that were you then asked

to participate in this processing of the pardon application, which is

the subject of this hearing here?

Mr. KADZIK. Actually there was one other contact before, in 1999,

when there was going to be another effort to approach either the

U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Southern District of New York or the

Department of Justice. Mr. Green asked me what I thought about

approaching either of those two entities. I told him that I thought

that approaching the Justice Department, rather than the U.S. Attorney’s Office would be more fruitful; and then subsequent to that

was in late November, early December 2000 with respect to the

pardon.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. And then that was—specifically was the

pardon application that was being prepared by Mr. Quinn and others?

Mr. KADZIK. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. And now prior to—in addition to the work

that you might have done for Mr. Rich’s concerns, I think I remember, being a member of the committee, that you appeared before

this committee as counsel for Mr. Podesta during the White House

e-mail hearings; is my memory correct on that?

Mr. KADZIK. I represented Mr. Podesta. He did not appear before

the committee. He was interviewed by Mr. Wilson and other members of the staff.

Mr. LATOURETTE. That’s what I meant by appearing before the

committee, appearing before committee staff.

Mr. KADZIK. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And was that your only work for Mr. Podesta?

Mr. KADZIK. No. I also represented Mr. Podesta with respect to

his appearance before the grand jury in the Monica Lewinsky matVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00453 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ter and also in connection with the e-mail controversy. He testified

in the Alexander case before Judge Royce Lamberth.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

I think the staff has put before you a book of exhibits, and we’ll

try and show them on the screen as well, and I would like to focus

on exhibit 130, which is a series of Dickstein Shapiro billing

records, and they indicate, at least as I’m reading them, and if I’m

reading them incorrectly, please stop me and tell me I’m reading

them incorrectly—that between December the 12th of last year and

January 20th of this year, President Clinton’s last day in office, you

had seven contacts with either John Podesta or the White House

regarding Marc Rich’s pardon application; am I reading that correctly or does that fit with your recollection?

[Exhibit 130 follows:]

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448

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

Mr. KADZIK. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you contact anyone or have contact with

anyone in the White House regarding this pardon application aside

from John Podesta?

Mr. KADZIK. There were three contacts with administrative assistants in his office and the press office on the, I believe the 18th,

19th and 20th, just to determine whether or not there had been

any pardons granted and, if so, whether a list was available.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Exhibit 130 shows that on December 12th

last year you contacted JDP, and I assume that’s John D. Podesta.

Mr. KADZIK. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Would you describe or have you already

described—is that the substance of your conversation, whether or

not pardons had been granted and whether or not that was available, or was that contact something else?

Mr. KADZIK. Those, the contacts I described previously, were not

with Mr. Podesta. The contact with Mr. Podesta on the 12th was

a brief conversation where I asked him what the pardon process,

the consideration of pardons, was going to be like in the White

House. He indicated it would be primarily handled by the White

House Counsel’s Office.

I told him that my law firm represented three individuals who

were seeking pardons, and he suggested that I send him a ‘‘piece

of paper,’’ I think, as he put it, concerning those three individuals;

and I did, and that was it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. In this phone conversation of December 12th

did you identify who those three individuals were?

Mr. KADZIK. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And did he express, either upon further conversation or just—and I assume one of them was Marc Rich?

Mr. KADZIK. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did he have any observation or offer any observation to you about Marc Rich?

Mr. KADZIK. No, he did not.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And did you have any discomfort as a lawyer— maybe you did or maybe you didn’t—but in going to another client

of yours, seeking a pardon from the President of the United States

or this representation, did it cause you any concern at all?

Mr. KADZIK. I wouldn’t say that I was seeking a pardon. I inquired as to whether or not—who in the White House would be

considering pardons. He said it would be primarily the White

House Counsel’s Office, and it was my understanding that Mr.

Quinn had submitted a pardon application to the counsel—White

House Counsel’s Office.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Do you think, just as in the 1980’s when your

firm asked you to sort of pick your brain about who best to approach and how should we approach this person or that person,

that perhaps your services were sought in December of last year—

the same sort of thing, get a feel for the lay of the land over at

the White House as to what—how best to get this to where it needed to go? Was that the advice you were being asked to offer?

Mr. KADZIK. I would view it as a process inquiry, yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. There was an article this year in Newsweek

and that indicated that the President’s aides—about we’ve just

459

heard from Mr. Podesta and the others that they were opposed to

the pardon of Marc Rich. Did you hear any of their testimony, so

I don’t have to go into that?

Mr. KADZIK. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. To your knowledge, did Mr. Podesta indicate

to you his position on the pardoning of Marc Rich?

Mr. KADZIK. Yes, he said he was opposed to it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. When did he tell you that, if you remember?

Mr. KADZIK. The three subsequent conversations I had with him,

which I believe were on January 2nd, January 6th and January

16th.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Was it part and parcel of your responsibility

as a lawyer for Marc Rich to attempt to influence or change Mr.

Podesta’s mind as to his position?

Mr. KADZIK. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you ever attempt to do that?

Mr. KADZIK. No, I didn’t. Once he told me he was opposed to it,

I knew that I wouldn’t be able to change his mind.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did Mr. Podesta provide you any recommendation as to how you might proceed to achieve the successful result

on the application that your firm was processing.

Mr. KADZIK. No, not at all.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did Mr. Podesta indicate to you at any point

in time how the President of the United States felt about this particular pardon application?

Mr. KADZIK. No, he simply indicated to me the decision was the

President’s.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

If I could ask you to turn now to exhibit No. 58, that seems to

refer to a call, I think, of January 2, 2001.

[Exhibit 58 follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Can I interrupt briefly?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. You said you talked to Mr. Podesta and he indicated he was opposed to the pardon, but he further said that the

decision was up to the President. Did he indicate in any way what

his recommendation was going to be to the President? It just seems

like that conversation has something missing in between. He said

he’s opposed to it, but he said that decision is going to be left up

to the President.

Mr. KADZIK. Well, I think in the conversation was that he was

opposed to the pardon and that, if asked, he was going to say that

he was opposed to it. And I think I asked whether or not that

meant that the staff was going to veto it and he said the decision

is the President’s.

Mr. BURTON. So he didn’t elaborate on what the staff might or

might not say to the President?

Mr. KADZIK. No, he did not.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Again, exhibit No. 58—I’m sorry, lost my place

for just a second—I think is a reference to the telephone call that

you had with Mr. Podesta on January 2nd of this year, and it’s that

he told you that the Rich pardon was still in the mix as of that

date.

Is that a correct reading of that exhibit and is that your recollection?

Mr. KADZIK. Yeah, my recollection that he told me that a decision

had not yet been made.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Did he use the words ‘‘in the mix,’’ or is

that your description of what he indicated to you?

Mr. KADZIK. He didn’t use those words, and I don’t think they’re

mine either. I assume they’re Mr. Fink’s.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Fink’s?

Mr. KADZIK. Right.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you unclear at all on this date, January

2nd, January 3rd, of this year that Mr. Podesta opposed this pardon application?

Mr. KADZIK. It was perfectly clear to me that he did oppose it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Now, exhibit No. 62, did you have a conversation at any time

with Mr. Podesta wherein he indicated to you that you—and I don’t

think you personally, but that this Rich pardon application was

benefiting by being ‘‘under the press radar.’’ [Exhibit 62 follows:]

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Mr. KADZIK. No, he did not.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And so, again, as you look at exhibit No. 62,

I guess that’s Mr. Fink’s interpretation again of the conversation?

Did you have a conversation with Mr. Fink regarding what it was

you and Mr. Podesta talked about on January 6th?

Mr. KADZIK. I have never spoken to Mr. Fink.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you have any personal knowledge—and

I’m sure we’ll ask Mr. Fink in a minute; did you have any personal

knowledge as to where Mr. Fink would get the information necessary to express that opinion?

Mr. KADZIK. The only thing that I can speculate as to is, I spoke

to Mr. Green after I talked to Mr. Podesta. I said that he was opposed to the pardon, as was the staff, and I think that Mr. Podesta

made an offhand comment to me that while there was a lot of controversy in the press about other pardons, such as Mr. Milken,

there had been no press coverage with respect to Mr. Rich or Mr.

Green.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And that was seen as a good thing?

Mr. KADZIK. It wasn’t seen as anything. It was simply a statement of fact.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Now, exhibit No. 67, it looks like this is

a reference to the telephone call that might have taken place between you and Mr. Podesta on January 16th. This e-mail in particular states that Mike Green spoke with Peter, who I assume is

you, who spoke with Podesta; and that Podesta told Peter that

while the staff are not supportive they are not in the veto mode.

First of all, did Mr. Podesta communicate that to you on January

16th?

[Exhibit 67 follows:]

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Mr. KADZIK. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Again——

Mr. KADZIK. Again, he told me he was opposed to it, that the

staff was opposed to it, but no final decision had been made and

again the decision was the President’s.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Do you have—again, this sort of chain from

Mike Green to you to the author of exhibit No. 67, do you have any

personal knowledge as to how the author of exhibit No. 67 would

reach the conclusion that the staff was not in the veto mode if that

information didn’t come from you, who was the person who had the

conversation with Mr. Podesta?

Mr. KADZIK. I don’t know upon what that was based. I can only

speculate that it was because the decision, there was no final decision yet.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. At any point during the contacts that you

had with Mr. Podesta, did he identify why it was that he was opposed to the Rich pardon or what concerns the White House Counsel’s Office had concerning this application?

Mr. KADZIK. No, we didn’t discuss the merits of it in detail at all.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

The final two pages of entries on exhibit 130 indicate that you

continued to have teleconferences with former White House staff

after the granting of the pardon on January 19th or 20th. And I’ll

let you flip to those, and then I have a couple of questions.

Mr. KADZIK. Yes, I’ve got them.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. And you see those entries?

Mr. KADZIK. Yes, I do.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Who were you talking to during that period of

time after the granting of the pardon.

Mr. KADZIK. My recollection was that I received telephone calls

from Karen Tramantano, the former President’s current chief of

staff, and someone from the press office, I don’t recall who, asking

me if I would be willing to do press appearances in defense of the

President’s decisions with respect to the pardons; and I told them

that given the fact that my firm represented Mr. Rich, I wouldn’t

be, certainly, seen as a neutral observer and that I wasn’t the best

person to do that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And is that sum and substance of all of the

context referenced in that billing statement?

Mr. KADZIK. Yes, yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have?

Mr. BURTON. There appear to be 16 minutes left.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I will stop whenever you want me to, but I

would like to ask Mr. Kadzik one more question because at the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Waxman in his opening remarks talked

about how you got here; and I think that, obviously we had an observation on our side about whether you were supposed to be here

or not.

Mr. Waxman had an observation during his opening remarks,

and I’d like to invite you to take a couple of minutes and express

in your own words how that occurred and so we can get that out

of the way and go—if you’d like to. If you don’t want to, that’s fine

with me too.

467

Mr. KADZIK. I received a letter from the committee on Monday,

the 26th, asking me to appear, and I responded on Tuesday saying

that I had previous business commitments in California on Thursday. I was in my office until after 9 p.m. on Tuesday. I had nothing

further, so I went forward with my plans to go to California on

Wednesday. When I got off the airplane in California on Wednesday I was met by a U.S. Marshal, served me with a subpoena. I

promptly turned around went back to the counter and booked myself on the exact same airplane that I flew out on, to fly back on,

and spent less than 45 minutes in San Francisco in order to come

back here today; and I’m now scheduled to go back to San Francisco at 9:50 this evening in order to make the second of the two

meetings I had planned.

Mr. LATOURETTE. If it is still my opportunity to talk, I’d like to

talk to you for a minute, Mr. Fink.

Mr. FINK. Sure.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Fink, how long have you known or been

associated or represented Marc Rich?

Mr. FINK. Two decades.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Two decades, exactly 20 years, or is that a—— Mr. BURTON. Mr. Fink would you pull the mic just a little bit

closer.

Mr. FINK. It could be 201⁄2, 21; it’s around two decades.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Did you do work for Mr. Rich when you were associated with the

law firm of Milgrim, Thomajan—and I hope I pronounce that name

correctly—and Lee?

Mr. FINK. Yes, I did.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And when would that have been year-wise?

Mr. FINK. Starting in 1980.

Mr. LATOURETTE. We had testimony at the last hearing, I think,

from the former assistant U.S. attorneys that at some time during

the investigation of Mr. Rich there was a steamer trunk, or multiple steamer trunks, that were attempted to be taken out of the

country on a Swissair flight; are you familiar with that?

Mr. FINK. Yes, I am.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And is our information correct that it was a

paralegal from that firm Milgrim, Thomajan & Lee that was responsible for that activity?

Mr. FINK. The trunks were in the custody of a paralegal from

that firm.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. At any point in your knowledge, since Mr.

Rich left the country, has he returned to the United States?

Mr. FINK. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I want to talk now about some conversations

that we had with Mr. Quinn and a series of e-mails; and I think

we talked a little bit about them with the previous panel, but for

your information, it’s exhibit 135.

[Exhibit 135 follows:]

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Mr. FINK. Just a moment, please.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure.

Mr. FINK. OK. I’m there.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Is it a fair observation that during the

course of your representation of Mr. Rich on this matter, that being

the outstanding criminal indictment, that you had made a number

of overtures at a number of different times, either you or people

working with you, in an attempt to resolve this in an amicable or

less painful way for Mr. Rich?

Mr. FINK. I think that’s fair.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Specifically, the e-mails that occur in exhibit No. 135 seem to be—I have three of them. The one at the bottom, actually the bottom two seem to indicate that in February of

the year 2000 somebody has heard from the Southern District of

New York that they’re really not interested in sitting down and discussing this while Mr. Rich remains a fugitive.

But I’d like to focus on the top one which—that’s a notation

that’s been authored by you; is that correct?

Mr. FINK. Yes, it is correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. And as I understand the import of that,

it basically indicates that sometime during the course of your representation there have been discussion and there have been offers

made both by you and also by the U.S. attorney for the Southern

District of New York; is that correct?

Mr. FINK. Well, I don’t know they would characterize it as you

have.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Mr. FINK. I would be comfortable saying there were many discussions. I don’t know that we ever got to a real offer in any of those

discussions.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Specifically, there has been testimony before this committee that the thing that was really the hammerblow—and some people blamed Rudy Giuliani, some people blamed

other people—the thing that really put Mr. Rich to flight was the

RICO charge. Do you have that opinion?

Mr. FINK. I do not know what put Mr. Rich to flight, to use your

phrase. I do know that RICO was perceived to be a huge force that

affected the case and the outcome of the case.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Looking at exhibit 135, or your recollection

from the representation of Marc Rich, is it accurate that at one

point you were told that the prosecuting authorities would drop the

RICO charge if Marc Rich returned to this country?

Mr. FINK. That was something that was discussed with me in at

least one meeting I had with the prosecutors.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. And when you say ‘‘discussed,’’ the specific

words in the e-mail were that ‘‘I was told at one point that they

would drop the RICO charge if we wanted Marc to come in.’’

Mr. FINK. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you told that?

Mr. FINK. It wasn’t formalized. It was discussed as a possibility.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Mr. FINK. I perceived it, I perceived it to be a serious possibility,

but as I understood it, the discussion was if Marc would come in

and surrender——

470

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. FINK [continuing]. We would consider in advance dropping

the RICO charge.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And likewise, was there a consideration in this

set of negotiations, or you can tell me if it is another one, that bail

would be arranged, as well, as part of this negotiation so that he

wouldn’t have to remain incarcerated pending the outcome of the

criminal proceeding?

Mr. FINK. I think that occurred as part of the very same conversation.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And that condition was that they would like to

have his passport so he would not leave again if he didn’t like the

way things were going on; is that right?

Mr. FINK. That’s my best recollection of that conversation, which

was probably 9 years ago.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It goes on to indicate that they would also

meet with the lawyers, the professors—and when they say ‘‘professors,’’ had this report already been done by the professors we’ve

heard so much about that were hired to examine the tax intricacies

of Justice Ginsburg’s husband; are those the professors you were

talking about?

Mr. FINK. Yes, but I think to avoid any misunderstanding that

I am now talking about a different conversation.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. So in one conversation—well, let’s break

them down. In one conversation, they said they would consider

dropping the RICO, agree to bail if he would give up his passport

and sit down and negotiate the case. Did you then have additional

discussions where they said they would sit down with the lawyers

and professors and do a full review before proceeding to trial, that

they would take a look at the strength of their case and engage in

further discussion with you?

Mr. FINK. To be clear, there was no discussion about dropping

RICO at the time of this second conversation.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Their hang-up, as I read the totality of the

e-mail, and maybe we’re talking about two or three different discussions, but their hang-up seemed to be that they didn’t want to

negotiate, sort of come up with their best shot and have Mr. Rich

reject it from Switzerland. They wanted to at least have something—if they’re going to do a lot of work, they’ll listen to what the

professors had to say, evaluate their case. They at least wanted to

have some assurance that he was going to submit himself to their

jurisdiction, did they not?

Mr. FINK. I think your characterization is reasonable. Their exact

characterization is an exhibit to the pardon application. It’s one of

the letters from the U.S. Attorneys Office.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you ever negotiate this case with a fellow

by the name of Gerald Lynch when he was in the U.S. Attorneys

Office?

Mr. FINK. I would have to say a double negative. No, I don’t

think I ever negotiated this case with anybody; and I do not believe

I have ever met Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LATOURETTE. How about Robert Litt?

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Mr. FINK. No, I’m not sure I’ve met him either. Let me take that

back. To the best of my knowledge, I don’t think I have met him.

How am I doing? I have not met him.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think you’re doing fine.

When did you decide to engage the services of Jack Quinn in this

matter?

Mr. FINK. In all fairness, that decision wasn’t mine. But that decision was made summer—early summer of 1999.

Mr. LATOURETTE. When you say it wasn’t yours, who made the

decision, if you know?

Mr. FINK. Mr. Rich.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Rich came up with the name of Jack

Quinn by himself.

Mr. FINK. No. Maybe I’m being too precise, but I want to be precise here. The person who decided to engage Mr. Quinn was Mr.

Rich. Mr. Rich did not come up with Mr. Quinn’s name.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. The specific pardon application——

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me, if I might interrupt. How did he obtain

Mr. Quinn’s name? Through what source?

Mr. FINK. Through me.

Mr. BURTON. So you knew Mr. Quinn from his professional work

and his work in the White House?

Mr. FINK. No, I did not.

Mr. BURTON. How did you come up with Mr. Quinn’s name?

Mr. FINK. His name was given to me by Gershon Kekst.

Mr. BURTON. Can you tell us the context in which he recommended Mr. Quinn?

Mr. FINK. We were having lunch, and I asked him if he could

recommend someone who I called the white-haired man. It’s an expression.

Mr. BURTON. Does that mean someone who had connections with

the White House?

Mr. FINK. No. It did not, at all.

Mr. BURTON. So you weren’t looking for somebody who had a connection with anybody at the White House.

Mr. FINK. Certainly not as you would you describe it. We were

looking for someone who understood the entire political process.

And I shouldn’t say we. I was the one who raised this, and I was

wondering if he knew someone who I honestly expected then and

still believe today does not exist, but who understands the whole

political process, because I was convinced—at least highly frustrated with efforts to approach this simply as an attorney and wondered if there was some other aspect to the way our government

works that would allow us to get an opportunity to have Mr. Rich’s

case heard without him having to surrender. That was my goal in

asking that question of Mr. Kekst.

Mr. LATOURETTE. That was very delicately put, and I think what

that means——

Mr. FINK. Thank you. I think it’s also accurate.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I do, too. How I interpret it, certainly as Mr.

Waxman was indicating before, that your best lawyering didn’t

seem to get the job done and so we need to go another way and

that is to find someone who has access to whomever.

472

Mr. FINK. Well, actually, that is not true. At least it wasn’t in

my mind. And I understand that you’re going to look at everything

I say and all of the e-mails with the advantage or in my view disadvantage of all that’s happened. But, no, I represent this to you,

I’m under oath. I am not Washingtonwise. In fact, quite to the contrary. And I was looking for someone who had an overview of the

entire political process. I didn’t have the White House in mind. I

didn’t have anything in mind. In fact, you could have read my mind

very quickly.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, that would have been in 1999 when Mr.

Quinn was first retained.

Mr. FINK. Actually, I am not exactly sure when my conversation

with Mr. Kekst was. It could have been late 1998, early 1999. I

wasn’t fast on this process. There wasn’t urgency behind on it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Quinn testified before the committee that

in fact he wasn’t first retained to work on a pardon. He was retained to work on the case. When would you say the focus of the

representation of Marc Rich before the government shifted to the

notion of a pardon?

Mr. FINK. In October 2000.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And did you ever have any contact with the

White House, the White House staff, the White House Counsel’s

Office on the behalf of this pardon application or was that left to

others?

Mr. FINK. That is a multi-faceted question. I think the answers

to each and every one of them is no.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. There was an agenda set for a meeting on

the Rich pardon, and it’s exhibit No. 79 if you want to take a

minute to find that.

[Exhibit 79 follows:]

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Mr. FINK. I’m there.

Mr. LATOURETTE. That, among other things, item 5A on the

agenda is the need for secrecy. Do you see that?

Mr. FINK. 5a. Yes, I see it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you at that meeting on November 21?

Mr. FINK. Well, respectfully, I prepared this agenda in anticipation of a meeting that was supposed to occur on November 21.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Mr. FINK. This meeting didn’t occur.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. But you prepared exhibit No. 79.

Mr. FINK. Yes, I did.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And in preparing for a meeting that didn’t

occur, your thought was to have 5a, the need for secrecy. That was

your thought as one of the items that should be discussed at a

meeting, should it occur.

Mr. FINK. Yes, I definitely wanted to discuss that at this meeting

which didn’t occur. But if it had, I would have raised it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Can you explain what it is that you meant by

a need for secrecy during the course of a meeting on the Marc Rich

pardon?

Mr. FINK. I can give you any best guess. Recollections aren’t that

easy to come by for me. But my best guess—and I believe this is

a reasonably good guess because I would have felt this way—is

that Marc Rich has been victimized by the press and publicity and

that if the press learned about this that victimization would continue.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you have a similar concern—and it goes to

another e-mail that we talked about with other witnesses—about

benefiting by being under the press radar? Which I think ties into

what you just said was there a concern in your group that not only

the press would find out but the U.S. attorney for the Southern

District of New York would find out what you were up to.

Mr. FINK. Can I pause?

Mr. LATOURETTE. You can do what you want to do.

Mr. FINK. No, I just want to be good here. I don’t believe I wrote

any e-mail about Mr. Podesta’s suggestion about being under the

radar. I’ll volunteer that I don’t remember such a conversation.

And as to your second question, no, this was about press publicity.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. You don’t recall any discussion—and the

reason I ask you, I’m not a tricky guy.

Mr. FINK. No, that’s fine.

Mr. LATOURETTE. He was here before. He indicated that he

would rather have the device given or the OK given or the whatever given by Justice Washington as opposed to Justice Southern

District of New York. He sort of indicated that there was a discussion or a feeling that maybe we don’t need to tell Mary Jo White

and her folks what we’re up to. We’ll just leave it to Eric Holder

and Janet Reno and the folks in Washington. Do you remember

any of that?

Mr. FINK. I remember being of a similar mind. It would have

been my preference, had I had some power, to at least have the

issue start in Justice Department. But, in fairness, you know, we’re

talking about this now after the pardon application and the pardon

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being granted. When I wrote this agenda that we’re referring to,

I didn’t know very much about the process or what would happen.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the three witnesses for being here at this late

hour.

Mr. Libby, I want to ask some questions of you because you’ve

had a long involvement with Mr. Rich and probably better than

any other witness that we’ve had before us would understand the

merits of the case that Mr. Rich was offering in his defense. The

President of the United States wrote an op-ed in the New York

Times, and in the op-ed he said or implied that you had advocated

for a pardon. And I understand that’s wrong and you stated you

had no involvement in the effort for a pardon, is that correct?

Mr. LIBBY. It’s correct that it’s wrong, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. But the President gave other reasons, and the first

reason the President gave was, ‘‘I understood that the other oil

companies that had structured transactions like those in which Mr.

Rich and Mr. Green were instead sued civilly by the government.’’ Was the President right about this statement?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, there were other companies that had similar

transactions; and to the best of my knowledge those were generally

handled civilly.

Mr. WAXMAN. The second reason the President gave was, ‘‘I was

informed that in 1985 in a related case against a trading partner

of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green the Energy Department, which was responsible for enforcing the governing law, found that the manner

in which the Rich/Green companies had accounted for these transactions was proper.’’ Was the President right about this statement?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir, I believe he was. That would be the ARCO

proposed remedial order issued by the Department of Energy.

Mr. WAXMAN. The third reason the President gave was, ‘‘two

highly regarded tax experts, Bernard Wolfman of Harvard Law

School and Martin Ginsburg of Georgetown University Law Center,

reviewed the transactions in question and concluded that the companies were correct in their U.S. income tax treatment of all of the

items in question and that there was no unreported Federal income

or additional tax liability attributable to any of the challenged

transactions.’’ Was the President correct about this?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. The fourth reason the President gave was, ‘‘in

order to settle the government’s case against them the two men’s

companies have paid approximately $200 million in fines, penalties

and taxes, most of which might not have even been warranted

under the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis, that the companies had followed the law and correctly reported their income.’’ Was the President correct on this statement?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. The fifth reason the President gave was, ‘‘the Justice Department in 1989 rejected the use of racketeering statutes

in tax cases like this one.’’ Was the President right about this?

Mr. LIBBY. That is my understanding of the Justice Department

manual.

478

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Libby, it appears that you agree with

most of the points the President made.

Let me ask you the bottom line question. President Clinton apparently concluded that Mr. Rich had not committed the crimes he

had been accused of. Do you agree with this? Do you think that Mr.

Rich is a tax fraud and a criminal or do you agree with President

Clinton’s assessment of the merits of the case?

Mr. LIBBY. I believe, sir, that, based on all of the evidence available to defense counsel, the best interpretation of the evidence is

that they did not owe any tax, even in the civil matter. That would

be the interpretation given by the two tax professors.

Mr. WAXMAN. Therefore, there should not have been a criminal

liability.

Mr. LIBBY. Based on the evidence available to the defense, that

would be correct, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Libby, according to several press accounts,

there was discussion in the Bush administration about whether or

not the Rich pardon was invalid because of lack of service. On January 28, 2001, Vice President Cheney said that Justice Department

lawyers may be looking at this issue. The next day President Bush

announced that he had decided against acting on lawyers’ ideas for

revoking the pardon. Are you aware of any discussions in the

White House or the Department of Justice about whether or not

the Rich pardon was invalid?

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir. I recused myself immediately from any matter having to do with Mr. Rich, and I did not participate in any

such discussion. But I have seen the press stories, as you have, I

suppose.

Mr. WAXMAN. So you were not involved in them, and you were

not aware of them.

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Libby, I believe I asked you earlier, when you

concluded your representation of Mr. Rich I think you testified that

was—tell me again. When did you end your representation of Mr.

Rich?

Mr. LIBBY. My best recollection is that I stopped work sometime

in the spring of 2000.

Mr. WAXMAN. Spring of 2000?

Mr. LIBBY. Right, in anything active for Mr. Rich. I probably put

away from some files after that, but that would be the last bit of

work for them.

Mr. WAXMAN. You were asked in November 2000 to participate

in the pardon. What happened at that point?

Mr. LIBBY. As I testified in my statement, sir, I declined to participate in the pardon.

Mr. WAXMAN. And when did you have your last conversation

with Mr. Rich before joining the Vice President’s staff?

Mr. LIBBY. I am not really sure, 1999, 2000, something like that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Libby, I would like to read to you an opening

line of the story the Washington Post is reporting today. A top aide

to Marc Rich alluded more than a year ago to seeking a Presidential pardon for the fugitive financier in correspondence with

Rich’s attorneys, calling it the unconventional approach which has

not yet been tried and which I have been proposing all along, acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00486 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cording to one of dozens of documents made public today. The email that the Post quotes was written on February 10, 2000. It’s

exhibit 135 in the book in front of you. Mr. Libby, were you representing Mr. Rich at the time that e-mail was written—February

2000?

[Exhibit 135 follows:]

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481

Mr. LIBBY. It was still during the course of our efforts with the

Southern District of New York, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Are you familiar with the unconventional approach

that the e-mail refers to? It’s exhibit 135.

Mr. LIBBY. I don’t believe I have ever seen this e-mail before, sir;

and I don’t know particularly what it’s speaking about.

Mr. WAXMAN. Could you repeat your answer?

Mr. LIBBY. I don’t believe I have ever seen this e-mail before, and

I’m not sure what he’s speaking about.

Mr. WAXMAN. It’s interesting, earlier today Mr. Quinn didn’t

know about that e-mail either, and he was given a pretty hard time

about it. I guess the conclusion I think I can reach is, even if you’re

a lawyer you may not be familiar with this particular e-mail and

that’s your testimony and his testimony.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. In November 2000 you were called into some discussion either by phone—well, let me ask you specifically. You said

you were contacted in November 2000 about the idea of a pardon.

Was that a meeting or a telephone conversation?

Mr. LIBBY. A telephone conversation.

Mr. WAXMAN. That was between you and who else?

Mr. LIBBY. Mr. Michael Green, as I mentioned in my opening

statement.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did he discuss the grounds or strategy of this?

Mr. LIBBY. No.

Mr. WAXMAN. What did he tell you?

Mr. LIBBY. It was a confused conversation, because I didn’t quite

understand what he was talking about at first. And then he said

that they were going for a pardon, going to the White House for

a pardon, something like that. And I said that I could not participate in that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me take you back to the administration of

former President Bush. Was there any effort at that time to get a

pardon for Mr. Rich?

Mr. LIBBY. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. If I asked you whether you contacted anybody that

was part of the Bush administration to advocate the pardon, your

answer would be—— Mr. LIBBY. Not that I recall.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Libby, according to press reports, you called

Mr. Rich on January 22 of this year, is that accurate?

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct, sir. I believe January 22 is right.

Mr. WAXMAN. Where were you when you called him?

Mr. LIBBY. At home.

Mr. WAXMAN. Why did you call him?

Mr. LIBBY. He had spoken to Mr. Green, who is a good friend of

mine, and he had told Mr. Green that he thanked Mr. Green for

all the work that Mr. Green had done on his case over the years

and that he also wished to thank me for the work that I had done

prior to the pardon on his matters over the years. But that he

didn’t know if it would be OK for him to call me. He did not want

to get me in any trouble calling me. And so I thanked Mr. Green

for telling me that, and I said I would call Mr. Rich to say it was

OK. And I called Mr. Rich, and he thanked me for my work on the

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case, and I congratulated him on having reached a result that he

had sought for a long time.

Mr. WAXMAN. Have you had any other contact with Mr. Rich

since you’ve joined Vice President Cheney’s staff?

Mr. LIBBY. No.

Mr. WAXMAN. Have you had any contact with Mr. Rich’s attorney

since joining Vice President Cheney’s staff?

Mr. LIBBY. Mr. Green is a good friend of mine, and I have had

contact with him.

Mr. WAXMAN. What kind of contact have you had with him?

Mr. LIBBY. Well, he and his wife were good enough to take our

kids to the Inaugural parade which in a rainstorm was an act of

heroism on his part, and we met up with him there, and I showed

him my office. Social contact.

Mr. WAXMAN. Social contact. Not about Mr. Rich.

Mr. LIBBY. Social contact. He told me they had received a pardon

for Mr. Rich. He showed me a list from the Internet. Things like

that, no substance about it.

Mr. WAXMAN. Since joining Vice President Cheney’s staff have

you had any conversations with anybody within the administration

about the Marc Rich matter?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, as soon as this became public I went to the general counsel for the Vice President and told him that—about my

representation in the past and I was recusing myself to anything

that might come up about it. I subsequently went to the President’s

general counsel, told him about my participation in it and said I

was recusing myself. And I went to my deputy to be sure that he

would know, in case there was any paper flow I shouldn’t see, to

say I have recused myself from the Marc Rich matter. People in the

corridor have expressed regret that I had to come up here and testify, and I suppose that qualifies with being about the Marc Rich

matter.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me commend you, because I think you took the

absolute correct response in joining the government to recuse yourself on this matter.

Mr. LIBBY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Since joining Vice President Cheney’s staff have

you had any conversation with anybody outside the administration

about the Marc Rich matter?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes. I had conversations—the answer is certainly yes.

Trying to go all through that list might take me a bit, but, yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. A recent article—you might give it some thought

and you might come back to it.

A recent article in the New Yorker discusses several attorneys

that Mr. Rich hired to advocate his case. And according to this article, Lenny Garment, former White House counsel in the Nixon administration, said the following about President Clinton’s pardon of

Marc Rich, ‘‘I don’t know why he did it, but I think Clinton did the

right thing.’’ Mr. Libby, do you believe that Mr. Rich should have

been granted a pardon?

Mr. LIBBY. Sir, I have recused myself, as I mentioned, from anything having to do with the Marc Rich case and from my commuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00490 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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nication with anybody on the White House staff directly or indirectly about whether it was a good idea or a bad idea. Your question puts me in an odd spot since this is being televised and people

from the White House would hear my view of the pardon if I were

to give it.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, you’re not in any way involving yourself in

the case. I’m only asking your personal views of the result of this

case. Did you think it was the right result?

Mr. LIBBY. Sir, I would not give my personal view of the result

to anyone on the White House staff directly or have a conversation

in their presence about my view of the result, if I believed that

would push the envelope a little bit on keeping any recusal. If you

wish me to answer the question, I will, but I think you’re taking

us into areas where the safest ethical position would be just not to

speak on it.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, you’ve already answered questions on the

merits of the argument that the President made for granting this

pardon. You seem to agree with the President’s views on each of

those points. Why would you not agree with this conclusion?

Mr. LIBBY. Those were underlying questions, statements about

the merits of the case, not about the wisdom or lack of wisdom of

the pardon. If you wish me to answer the question, I will, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, the determination of the wisdom of a pardon

could be a political evaluation as well as one on the merits. But if

you separated the political evaluation of whether such a decision

should have been reached by this or any other President simply on

the merits, do you think the President reached the right conclusion?

Mr. LIBBY. Again, sir, you’re asking me a portion of the decision

about whether it related, how it relates to the pardon, and I would

prefer not to answer that. I would like to answer if you wish me

to.

Mr. WAXMAN. I would like you to.

Mr. LIBBY. I would not know. I know the evidence available to

the defense team. Based on the evidence available to the defense

team, as I expressed before, I believe the correct interpretation of

the law and the facts was that there was no tax owed. But I do

not know what was in the Barton application. I do not know what

information might have been possessed by the government.

Mr. WAXMAN. You were his lawyer for many years. You have a

good understanding of the facts, probably a better understanding

of the facts than anybody else that has appeared before us. And

certainly many people have commented on the issue. It just seems

to me that, knowing the facts as you know them, should this man

have been held to answer for these charges or should those charges

in the indictment be resolved by Presidential action to dismiss

them through a pardon?

Mr. LIBBY. Well, I know only the facts available to the defense

team. Based on the facts available to the defense team, I believe

that the case should have been resolved by the Southern District

of New York listening to our approaches, looking at the facts in evidence, and we would have been done with it back at the Southern

District of New York.

484

Mr. WAXMAN. And that would also mean, based on all the information you know and only what you know, and you know quite a

bit, would that have led you to the conclusion that either the

Southern District of New York should have resolved this issue or,

failing that, that a Presidential pardon resolving the issue was justified?

Mr. LIBBY. I believe the Southern District of New York should

have resolved that issue with us back at that point. Whether a

Presidential pardon is justified would again depend on what evidence the Southern District of New York might have and what

other factors the President might consider in the course of a pardon. The Presidential pardon power is virtually unfettered.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. Libby, this is a pretty simple question. You were an attorney

for Mr. Rich. You helped brief Mr. Quinn. You know all the facts

from that side of the case. You are not expected to know the facts

from the Southern District of New York. You feel they should have

stopped the prosecution because it was unwarranted with the facts

you knew, but they didn’t. Now as a lawyer and prior to you assuming the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Office of Vice President, are you telling this committee that, with everything you know

about the case and nothing more, that you don’t know about the

pardon. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the pardon

should have been issued?

Mr. LIBBY. Correct, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. What is that opinion?

Mr. LIBBY. No, no. Correct, I am telling the committee that I

don’t know.

Mr. KANJORSKI. You have no opinion.

Mr. LIBBY. I have an opinion—— Mr. KANJORSKI. Do you have an opinion? Let’s start there. Do

you have an opinion?

Mr. LIBBY. Do I have an opinion as to whether—— Mr. KANJORSKI. Do you have an opinion as to whether this pardon was justified under the facts as you know them?

Mr. KANJORSKI. Sir, I have never seen the application. I do not

have the facts available to me.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I’m not asking about the application, Mr. Libby.

I’m asking about the facts that you know of your own knowledge.

As a lawyer representing Mr. Rich over those several years, do you

have an opinion as to whether or not those facts warrant the issue

of this pardon? That’s a simple question.

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. You have no opinion.

Mr. LIBBY. I have no opinion because I would not be able to

render an opinion without the full record before me. I do not have

that record before me.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So when you worked on this case with Mr.

Quinn, you didn’t have the facts, or the information as an attorney?

Mr. LIBBY. I did not have the facts available to the government,

and I—— Mr. KANJORSKI. Nobody has the facts available to the government. I’m not asking you to render an opinion on what facts the

government may have. I’m asking you to render an opinion on

485

what facts you have, and what facts you had at the time. It’s very

simple. You have to have an opinion—yes or no. And you’re trying

to parcel this down.

In fairness as a lawyer and a member of the bar and having

worked for this client, did you represent a crook who stole money

from the U.S. Government, a fugitive who should never have been

granted a pardon by the facts that you know? Is that what we

should conclude from your statement?

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir. I believe on all of the evidence I know that

there was no tax liability.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Do you believe as a result that the pardon would

be warranted insofar as there are no facts that you know of that

support the criminal charges against your former client?

Mr. LIBBY. There are no facts that I know of that support the

criminality of the client based on the tax returns we’ve been discussing.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So based on all the facts you know is the pardon

issued by the President justified?

Mr. LIBBY. I cannot say whether the pardon is justified because

I don’t have those facts and that application before me.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Libby, I’m not asking you to take any other

facts than what you have. We’re able to understand that as a lawyer for a couple years working for a very wealthy guy, you might

come to the same conclusion as Harvard and Georgetown law professors about a lot of things. And we’ll accept all of what you know,

accept nothing of what anybody else knows because, obviously, you

don’t know.

We’re asking your opinion. I like to see a guy hedge, but this is

unreasonable. You either have an opinion or you don’t have an

opinion. If you don’t have an opinion, tell us you don’t have an

opinion, and therefore your client may or may not have been a

crook who should have gone to trial, or may or may not have been

a fugitive. Do you have an opinion? Was he a fugitive?

Mr. LIBBY. In every common-sense term of it, yes, he was a fugitive.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Do you think he was a fugitive on justifiable

charges or was he a fugitive because there was a mistake in the

interpretation of law by the Southern District of New York?

Mr. LIBBY. I believe that the Southern District of New York misconstrued the facts and the law, and looking at all of the evidence

of the defense he had not violated the tax laws.

Mr. KANJORSKI. He was not a fugitive.

Mr. LIBBY. In every common-sense term, he was a fugitive.

Mr. WAXMAN. How about in a legal standpoint?

Mr. LIBBY. There is a fugitivity statute which is very complicated. I haven’t looked at it in years. It has to do generally with

avoiding State process. It wasn’t State process. It’s very technical

matters. I don’t recall it. It was so many years ago.

Mr. WAXMAN. Without knowing all the details, it sounds like you

would even dispute whether legally he was a fugitive even though

by the common definition of the word he was a fugitive.

Mr. LIBBY. I would think you have to say he’s a fugitive. But I

don’t know what the term—when you say legally, the question is,

what statute or provision are you talking about? I don’t have any

486

of those in front of me. It’s been years since I looked at it. I believe

he was a fugitive in any common-sense meaning of the term.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me, before I yield further—of course, you not

only knew the information as a defense lawyer but you knew everything the prosecutors had to say about Mr. Rich and Mr. Green.

You’ve heard their arguments. I assume you also followed the hearing we had 3 weeks ago because we had the two prosecutors in

here. I know you’re busy, but you might have read in the newspaper their arguments. You disagree with them, don’t you?

Mr. LIBBY. From everything I know, yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. At the hearing this committee had several weeks

ago, there was a considerable discussion about the merits of the

Rich case; and I want to read to you some of the statements that

were made and ask you about them. Let me read to you what Representative Shays said at the hearing, ‘‘there are some who believe,

and I am one of them, that former President Clinton appears to

have pardoned two traitors to their country.’’ Do you agree with

that statement?

Mr. LIBBY. As I recall from the snippets I have heard, he was referring to a series of trades that they may have made or business

engagements they may have had, one of which was with Iran, one

of which was with Iraq, if I recall, South Africa maybe, Russia,

something like that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Whatever.

Mr. LIBBY. I don’t have any knowledge about any of those other

items. The only one I’ve heard about was the transaction with Iran,

and that was one of the claims in the indictment.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, and you thought the indictment was not

proper, was not justified.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir. That was not my portion of the case, but I’ve

always understood from the experts who handled that portion of

the case that the Rich companies were allowed to trade with the

Swiss-based Rich companies.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you agree with the statement that these gentlemen were two traitors to their country?

Mr. LIBBY. I can understand someone using those terms.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you agree with them?

Mr. LIBBY. Their companies engaged in trades with Iran—— Mr. WAXMAN. Traitors not traders.

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir, I was trying to finish—during a period when

trades were held, and that was an act you could consider an act

of a traitor.

Mr. WAXMAN. That someone could consider, but you do not consider it?

Mr. LIBBY. I could consider it. I do not condone it. I didn’t advise

it. I do not admire it.

Mr. WAXMAN. At the first committee hearing on this pardon a

few weeks ago, two of the former Federal prosecutors who pursued

Mr. Rich, Morris Weinberg and Martin Auerbach, testified. Mr.

Auerbach said the merits in the Rich case were unquestionably in

the government’s favor. Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. LIBBY. Not from what I know, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. In their joint written testimony to the committee,

the prosecutors said that in December 1981, it was apparent that

487

they had uncovered at that time the biggest tax fraud in history.

Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. LIBBY. Not from what I know, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. I mentioned earlier an analysis done by two distinguished law professors, Bernard Wolfman and Martin Ginsburg,

which defended Mr. Rich’s companies from charges of tax evasion.

Some people have implied this analysis was flawed because it was

based on biased information.

At our last hearing, former prosecutor Martin Auerbach said that

the professors admitted, ‘‘making no independent verification of the

facts but accepting the statements thereof made to us by Mr. Rich

and Mr. Green’s attorneys.’’ Mr. Libby, can you tell me, where did

you get the information for the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis? Where

did it come from?

Mr. LIBBY. We got the basic trading documents and summaries

of those documents as to how the trades occurred. Some of documents were provided to me from the files of the law firms that

have been engaged in defending Mr. Rich during the period when

he was under investigation through the criminal indictment. Some

of the documents were provided by the prosecution.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you believe that information was accurate?

Mr. LIBBY. The information provided to me?

Mr. WAXMAN. Provided to Mr. Ginsburg and Mr. Wolfman.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me yield to Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just have a few questions, and I’ll yield back.

Mr. Libby, I’m not going to ask you whether you thought the pardon should be granted, because I think you pretty much answered

it already. I mean, I’m just listening to what you’ve said. But let

me ask you these questions. Do you believe that crimes were committed by these two gentlemen?

Mr. LIBBY. Sir, I only know the facts related to this particular

indictment.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, I’m talking with regard to this indictment,

which is the subject of this pardon.

Mr. LIBBY. I do not believe that these two gentlemen, based on

all of the evidence available to me, were guilty of the charges for

which they were indicted.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Which would mean that—and I’m just limiting

myself to the scope of the indictment—so you don’t believe it. And

you would have to—I guess you would, as you can tell me you had

a pretty good bit of information about these cases, did you not, that

is the subject of the indictments?

Mr. LIBBY. I endeavored to get all the information I could, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now let me ask you this. Do you think that the

Southern District of New York treated these gentlemen unfairly?

Mr. LIBBY. I believe that in some aspects, the use of RICO in the

Southern District of New York was quite vigorous. I would also say

it was largely the fault of the defense. The defense never went to

the government and presented their case in that period. They instead chose to play hard ball, if you will, and refuse to cooperate

with the government. I believe if they had cooperated with the government, laid out the case, how the transactions worked and what

they were, that the Southern District of New York would have

488

reached the same conclusions about the trades that the Department of Energy reached when the Department of Energy looked at

these trades and said that, in fact, the domestic transactions and

the foreign transactions were linked and what follows from that is

that the no tax obligation was owed thereafter not paid.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you believe that—you answered the question

with regard to the fugitive status. Let me ask you this: Do you believe if a person is a fugitive that should automatically rule them

out of being pardoned? And I’m just talking generally now.

Mr. LIBBY. Sir, I have never studied the pardon power, never

look at cases referring to the pardon power. I’m not a student of

how it has actually been employed. My general position would be

that the Constitution leaves the power to pardon unfettered virtually unfettered by the President, and I would be loath to sit here

and second-guess the Founding Fathers.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I yield whatever time I have left.

Mr. WAXMAN. Just to ask one last question on that point. While

you’re avoiding saying whether the pardon would be appropriate,

the fact that they were fugitives and everything you know about

this case wouldn’t—would it lead you to conclude that if the Southern District Court of New York decided to drop the charges that

it would have been appropriate or did you think it would have been

appropriate?

Mr. LIBBY. I thought from everything known to me they should

have.

Mr. WAXMAN. So you think it’s appropriate for the prosecutor to

drop the charges, but you’re not sure whether it was appropriate

for the President to use the power to resolve a prosecution by dismissing it?

Mr. LIBBY. It would be appropriate if the President knew what

the Southern District knew and looked at the entire case and made

a decision on it.

Mr. WAXMAN. If he knew what you do could he reach that conclusion, that the case ought to be dismissed——

Mr. LIBBY. Well, the President can reach any—— Mr. WAXMAN [continuing]. And pursue it as a civil matter, not

a criminal matter?

Mr. LIBBY. Well, the President can conclude anything he wants

to on a pardon.

Mr. WAXMAN. If he called you up and asked you, what would you

have said?

Mr. LIBBY. I would have recused myself.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kadzik has to catch a flight.

Do we know if there are any questions to pursue of him?

Mr. BURTON. Let’s stop the clock here. While we’re checking on

that, let me ask some questions of Mr. Libby. I’ll start the clock.

Mr. Libby, did you talk to or have access to the witnesses in the

case for the prosecution?

Mr. LIBBY. I do not know who all the witnesses for the prosecution were, sir. I had access to some witnesses whom the prosecution had interviewed.

Mr. BURTON. OK. But the fact of the matter is you only saw the

defense side of the equation; isn’t that correct?

489

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct, sir. I only had the information available to defense counsel.

Mr. BURTON. Now the Marc Rich companies paid $200 million in

fines and penalties when they pled guilty, and they pled guilty in

open court, and their attorneys were Peter Fleming, Maurice

Castellanos, Peter Zimroth and John Tighe. I think those are pretty prominent attorneys nationwide, are they not?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Do you think they would plead guilty and pay a $200 million fine if they thought they didn’t have a problem with

the case?

Mr. LIBBY. I think they would plead down, sir, if their clients

told them they should plead guilty. I assume their clients at that

point wanted to plead guilty.

Mr. BURTON. And pay $200 million?

Mr. LIBBY. And pay $200 million rather than continue the case.

Mr. BURTON. So what you’re saying is the judgment that you

have here that these gentlemen didn’t break any laws is your judgment. It might not be any of the judgment of others who had more

knowledge of the case then maybe you did when they had all prosecuting witnesses before them.

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct.

Mr. BURTON. I think that’s very important. Because my colleagues on the Democrat side who have said that they condemned

the President for this pardon have been making the case that the

President should have pardoned him. But the fact of the matter is

the gentleman fled the country, was a fugitive for 17 years, paid

a $200 million fine, dealt with every enemy of the United States,

including those who were holding our Americans hostage with the

threat of death hanging over their heads. He tried to smuggle documents out of the country that were relevant to the case. And Mr.

Fink, one of the interns or peoples associated with one of the firms

with which you were working was involved in trying to help get

those out of the country on a Swiss airplane. Am I correct on that?

Mr. FINK. You are correct, but your description is not.

Mr. BURTON. Were they trying to get the documents out of the

country?

Mr. FINK. The documents were on an airplane that was going to

Switzerland, but they weren’t being smuggled.

Mr. BURTON. Were they being taken out of the country, and were

they documents that the government wanted?

Mr. FINK. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. That’s all I need to know.

But the fact of the matter is this, my colleagues can’t have it

both ways. They can’t condemn President Clinton, as they have

roundly, for pardoning Marc Rich and then have you as the VicePresident’s chief counsel here and try to make you justify the pardon. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Rich was a fugitive from

justice. He renounced his citizenship and for 17 years has been trying every way he could to get pardoned.

Now you may disagree with the outcome, Mr. Libby. You were

a defense attorney, and you were working on this, and I understand that, just like Jack Quinn was working on that as well. But

the fact of the matter is those who knew the case very well, promiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00497 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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nent attorneys advised Mr. Rich, a billionaire, that he probably

ought to pay $200 million and get this thing behind him, and they

did. All of his companies pled. And then when he thought he was

going to face criminal charges he fled the country. He took off. He

went to Switzerland.

Now most people, if they think they’re not guilty and there’s an

indictment against them, they will come back; and they will stand

trial. And they even offered—our Justice Department offered to

drop or at least consider dropping the RICO charges against him,

and he still didn’t want to come back. They offered to give him take

bail, just take his passport so he would stand trial; and he still

wouldn’t come back.

So for those who try to say Mr. Rich was not guilty and try to

make you who were working on the defense side say that he was

not guilty and justify that just astounds me. Because they have

been condemning, like we have, the pardon of Mr. Rich in the waning hours of this administration.

So I’m disappointed that we’ve taken this turn today because I

don’t think it’s justified, No. 1; and, No. 2, I don’t think it’s justified

to ask you who were working on the defense side to start making

a judgment, to try to put you on the spot simply because you’re

working for the Vice President of the United States and you may

have more credibility in this particular case.

I’ll be happy to yield to my—do we have any more questions for

Mr. Kadzik? Mr. Kadzik, you can catch your plane if you want.

Mr. KADZIK. Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. Do either of you have any response to my remarks?

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Who is next on your side? Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. WAXMAN. I just want to point out for the record that we were

asking Mr. Libby to testify, because he was the defense counsel,

who knew more about this case than anybody else. And we’re not

asking him to testify because he works for the Vice President.

We’re asking him because he’s a knowledgable person about this

whole matter. And I can’t understand the chairman’s outburst

about it because Mr. Quinn was asked these questions over and

over again, and I think we’re entitled to ask someone who has been

the attorney for so many years. Thank you.

Mr. KANJORSKI. All right. Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate for

the record, those of us that know the facts we know would not

agree or exercise the judgment as the President has. That’s not the

questions we’re asking Mr. Libby. We have a witness here who not

only is an expert but who probably has more information in regard

to this case than anybody who has testified before the committee.

I think, in fairness, if you want to express an opinion on the pardon I will give you an opportunity. If you decide you don’t want to,

Mr. Libby, I will not press that. You would rather not go further

on that.

Mr. LIBBY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. But you did say something else, and I want to

go back to it. Let me put this in context. You represented Mr. Rich

from what period of time to what period of time?

Mr. LIBBY. Spring of 1985 till fall probably, or end of summer of

1989, not continuously, of course, but periodically. And from 1993

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after leaving the government, some period after leaving the government, back, you know, with a matter that was under consideration

until about 1995. It was then inactive. And I represented him

again in connection with Mr. Quinn’s approach with respect to the

Southern District and the Department of Justice sometime in 1999,

and that effort ended sometime around the spring of 2000.

Mr. KANJORSKI. From 1999 until the end of 2000 approximately.

Now what period of time and what information came to your attention that you made the conclusion both legally and otherwise that

he was a traitor?

Mr. LIBBY. Sir, what I said is that I can understand someone

viewing the evidence that he traded with Iran as a traitor.

Mr. KANJORSKI. The question wasn’t put that way. The question

was, do you consider Mr. Rich a traitor?

Mr. LIBBY. On that trade I can understand that, yes, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I didn’t ask if you can understand.

Mr. LIBBY. I do not condone—— Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Libby, do you consider him a traitor or don’t

you? It’s very straightforward. If you don’t consider him a traitor,

say you don’t. If you do, say you do.

Mr. LIBBY. I would not have made that trade. You could apply

the traitor to it.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Do you consider him for having made that trade

a traitor?

Mr. LIBBY. It’s not a word I would use.

Mr. KANJORSKI. You can’t be half pregnant, Mr. Libby. He is or

isn’t. It seems to be very simple. Is he or isn’t he? You said before

you considered him a traitor. Is that correct, what I heard?

Mr. LIBBY. I would say yes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. What I am interested in is, when did you consider him a traitor? When did you get that information and become

aware of that information and draw that conclusion personally?

Mr. LIBBY. The information is in the indictment which was

issued in 1983, something like that.

Mr. KANJORSKI. So for this period, the last 17 years, you’ve considered this client of yours a traitor.

Mr. LIBBY. Sir, my understanding is that the conduct in which

he engaged was not illegal, but I agree with the description that

you could consider him a traitor for trading with Iran during that

period.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Not I consider him. You consider him.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. How many traitors to this country do you call up

in your official capacity?

Mr. LIBBY. I call none, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. You did on January 22 when the new administration took office and you were chief of staff to the Vice President

of the United States.

Mr. LIBBY. Not in my official capacity, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. But you do call traitors in your unofficial capacity?

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir. I called Mr. Rich to respond to his request.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Why would you call a traitor, somebody you considered a traitor, after he got a pardon that was a hullabaloo in

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this country? You can’t tell me you didn’t know about the reaction

to the pardon. You knew there was a hullabaloo in the country

about the pardon. You in your own mind consider him a traitor.

Why did you call him?

Mr. LIBBY. Mr. Rich is a former client. I believe he was not guilty

of those things of which he was charged based on the evidence

available to me. He had called Mr. Green to say that he wished to

call me and thank me for my services. I had always taken his calls

when he was a client of mine. He had been pardoned by the President for those very trades, and so I called him.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Would you call another traitor in the country

again?

Mr. LIBBY. I don’t believe I know any other traitors, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Stick around this committee long enough. You

may learn something.

Mr. BARR [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fink, drawing your attention please to exhibit 135 we were

looking at earlier and the e-mail in the middle of that page from

Mr. Azulay to you dated February 10, 2000, the operative phrase

there that we’re concerned with is ‘‘the unconventional approach’’. What did you take that phrase to mean, ‘‘the unconventional approach’’?

Mr. FINK. I have no recollection of this particular e-mail. I do not

know what Mr. Azulay meant on February 10, 2000. But I do know

that I don’t believe it was a pardon application.

Mr. BARR. You replied to him, and you don’t address it expressly

in your reply. You employ some level of detail regarding the backgrounds of the steps that the U.S. Attorneys Office for the Southern District of New York at various times had said they were willing to consider. And then you say, ‘‘as for your other question, to

the best of my knowledge, other than the negative answer, all other

matters remain the same.’’ To what were you referring there and

what does that sentence mean?

Mr. FINK. I do not remember.

Mr. BARR. It’s a rather unusual e-mail that Mr. Azulay sends.

His use of the term ‘‘the unconventional approach’’, did that give

you some pause at the time? Did you wonder what he was talking

about?

Mr. FINK. I may have actually known what he was talking about

at the time. I just do not recall now what he might have been talking about.

Mr. BARR. You have no reason to have any thoughts whatsoever

or can’t draw any conclusion looking at this e-mail as you sit there.

Mr. FINK. That is correct.

Mr. BARR. And with regard to your e-mail, the one at 10:29 a.m.,

you don’t know as you sit here what you were referring to in that

one sentence I read.

Mr. FINK. All of the matters remain the same?

Mr. BARR. To—the whole sentence, to the best of my knowledge,

other than the negative answer, all other matters remain the same.

Were you replying to his notion of an unconventional approach?

Mr. FINK. I read this e-mail almost as you do. I do not recall it,

and I do not recall what Mr. Azulay was talking about. I did volunteer because I thought I should that I have every reason to believe

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he was not talking about a pardon. Because I think I would have

recalled any serious discussion about a pardon at this time, and I

do not.

Mr. BARR. I mean to be honest with you. I have no idea what

he’s talking about. I don’t know that he’s necessarily talking about

a pardon.

Mr. FINK. I thought that’s what you suggested earlier.

Mr. BARR. No, I haven’t asked any questions. I was just wondering if you could enlighten us as to what it is he’s talking about. He

might have had something completely different in mind. I don’t

know.

Mr. FINK. I do not know.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Libby, there is the very next exhibit, No. 136 from

Mr. Fink to Marc Rich, along about the middle of that e-mail it

mentions your name. It says that all agree that we should try to

approach the DOJ tax lawyers even without the SDNY, Southern

District of New York, if necessary. I know that Scooter always felt

this was our fall back position.

Could you explain briefly what that fall back position was?

[Exhibit 136 follows:]

494

495

Mr. LIBBY. Sir, as I understand it, the Department of Justice has

the right to review any decisions made by a U.S. attorney for any

particular district.

Mr. BARR. On tax matters.

Mr. LIBBY. On tax matters. I think on all matters, but you would

have to consult someone who does more of this than I do. My feeling was that the Southern District of New York—let me see. I actually don’t recognize this sentiment particularly, but I believe that

if the Southern District of New York did not give us a satisfactory

answer the only resources was the Department of Justice.

Mr. BARR. I don’t want to put words in your mouth. Are you basically saying that, given your understanding of the position of the

U.S. Attorneys Office for the Southern District of New York, the

best approach might be to take the merits of the case and argue

them directly to main Justice?

Mr. LIBBY. If we can get main Justice to listen to us, the tax lawyers at main Justice, we would have welcomed the opportunity to,

yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. Which was essentially the conclusion Jack Quinn

reached.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just

want to go back to something that Chairman Burton said a few

minutes ago that really disturbed me, and I want to make sure

we’re very clear there, Mr. Libby, because I want to be very fair

to you.

We on this side, Mr. Burton is correct, had major problems with

the judgment of the President with regard to these pardons. As to

trying to get you to say that the pardons should have been granted,

I don’t think that’s the case. What we’re trying to do, though, is

get to the truth. The pardons were—I mean, we’re—when we’re

talking about pardons we’re basically talking about forgiveness of

criminal activity. And we’ve already had Miss Nolan, Mr. Lindsey,

Mr. Podesta come in here and testify that they had a problem with

the granting of pardons, and there was no efforts on our part to

tear up their testimony. As a matter of fact, we took time out on

this side to applaud them for coming in, and I heard Mr. Waxman

say it over and over again, applaud them for coming in and making

public what had previously been private and being something that

was advice given to the President that the President did not adhere

to.

And so it’s not about trying to get you to say that the President

should have pardoned Mr. Rich. However, as Mr. Waxman has said

and Mr. Kanjorski has said, you are a person who has spent many

years, years dealing with this matter. As a matter of fact, you are

without question one of probably the most knowledgeable people

about this case. And so it would seem to me, it does not matter to

me whether you are the chief of staff for Vice President Cheney or

not. To me that’s irrelevant.

What is relevant, however, is that you have facts with regard to

this case and what the media has sort of zeroed in on is the whole

question of what, if any, justification did the President have for

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granting these pardons. Was it bad judgment? Was it criminal activity?

And you have come in and you’ve said something that’s interesting—and I’ll be very frank with you, I did not expect it, but I’m

very pleased to hear it—that you do not believe that these two gentlemen, the subjects of this pardon situation that we’re discussing,

you do not believe, based upon the information that you have or

had, that they have committed any crimes.

I mean that is to me, I mean that to me says a whole lot. And

I think it’s not about, I mean—and so if you’ve got a pardon apparatus which is supposed to forgive, be about the business of forgiving criminal activity. But if there are those who are most familiar

with the case that have come to the conclusion that there was no

criminal activity, then it seems to me that one could make a reasonable argument that perhaps the President at least had some rational basis for doing what he did.

I did hear your testimony with regard to some questions that Mr.

Waxman asked you earlier when he went through very carefully

the justifications given in the New York Times piece with President

Clinton’s justification for what he did, and it seems to me, because

I was not room at the moment, but as I listened to it, that you

agreed with the various points that President Clinton made as the

basis for his opinion; I’m not dealing with whether you agree

whether she should have pardoned, at least the basis. Was that

correct?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir, based on the information available to defense

counsel.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. Now you keep saying that and I just

want to, you know, be real clear on this. I don’t want the public

to get the information that defense counsel lacks a whole lot of information about a case. Usually you have a pretty good idea of

what the other side is presenting, and that’s how you’ve prepared

your defense; is that correct? I mean, most of the time the defense

counsel have a pretty good idea of what is going on, what is being

offered on the other side. And apparently there’s been some talk of

negotiation, so you had a pretty good idea, would you guess, about

what the prosecution had?

Mr. LIBBY. It’s very true in civil litigation, sir, that the defense

usually has a very good idea of what the plaintiff has, because civil

cases were allowed to discover every bit of relevant evidence. As

you may know, in criminal cases the government does not share its

cards with the defense. They hold them close to their chest except

for certain things that are required by the court to hand over. We

didn’t reach all of the phases of the case that—where it would have

been turned over. So I’ve been very careful as best I can, sir, to

help the committee, to say I do not know what evidence the government may have claimed they had. All I knew was the evidence

available to defense counsel and based——

Mr. CUMMINGS. One last question, Mr. Chairman. Just during

the course of, you had dealings with the government, did you not?

Mr. LIBBY. I had two meetings with the government in 1987, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And during those times they didn’t reveal to you

what they had, anything of what they had?

497

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir, they made some statements. In fact, Mr.

Auerbach said to us there was evidence that we didn’t know.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. BARR. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Libby, and thank you, Mr. Fink. You

have stayed around a while. It’s a late night and I appreciate it.

And I will confess, Mr. Libby, that this is a little awkward for me,

because I consider you a person in a very powerful position, working for someone I have tremendous respect for, who I consider one

of the most powerful people in the United States, and you’re before

the committee and thank you for being here.

But what I wrestle with is just not doing what I have been critical of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for doing, and

that is not asking the questions you really want to ask of maybe

your friends. And I consider you and obviously this administration,

I hold you up to the highest esteem, but I do want to ask you my

questions.

The first thing I do want to say, though, it’s my understanding

that you in no way were involved in this pardon process.

Mr. LIBBY. Correct, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And that the purpose for you being invited to this

committee was that when you weren’t working for the government,

you represented Mr. Rich over a period of a number of years.

Mr. LIBBY. Correct, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. It’s also my understanding that attorneys can represent people, one, they think are guilty and, two, they may not

like, but everybody’s entitled to their defense.

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Now it seems to me that you have some affection for

this client that you had and you believed in his cause.

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct, sir. Well, I believed that all the evidence available to me indicated he was not, that his companies

were not guilty of the crimes for which they had been indicted.

Mr. SHAYS. They may have been guilty of other crimes but not

these crimes.

Mr. LIBBY. I only represented him with respect to these crimes,

sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Now Joe diGenova, when he commented about the

Marc Rich pardon, said the bottom line is that Mr. Rich, while

never subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the United States,

got a pardon under circumstances which are so apparently corrupt

by the appearances, large donations by his former wife to the

Democratic Party, gifts for the Clinton family, the refusal of the

President to talk to the Justice Department about the case. That

was said on the Today show, January 30th.

He also said that Rich was indicted and he was a fugitive, which

makes him a highly unusual case, in that it is rare for someone

who has sought to evade the criminal justice by becoming a fugitive

to be pardoned. In fact, I think it is unprecedented. That was said

on McLaughlin on January 26th. He said on McLaughlin on the

26th, what is striking about the one pardon that didn’t happen was

the President did not pardon the American spy, Jonathon Pollard,

who spied for Israel. It is clear that Pollard’s people did not give

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enough money to the DNC or the President and that they had the

wrong lawyer, Alan Dershowitz. So there’s a lesson there for people

seeking a pardon, hopefully from no future President the way this

President uses pardons.

Obviously Joe diGenova believes that this was a pretty sad affair, but he’s representing Jack Quinn who is entitled to his defense, and he believes that Jack Quinn had every right to lobby the

way he did. What I’m interested in knowing is, would you have

ever sought to lobby either this administration or the other administration for a pardon for Marc Rich?

Mr. LIBBY. You mean——

Mr. SHAYS. You didn’t seek, you didn’t try to, but I’m asking you

if you had been paid to do so and you were a private sector, would

you have sought to get pardon for this man?

Mr. LIBBY. Were I not involved in the government and still in

private practice, would I have participated in an attempt to get a

pardon for Mr. Rich?

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. LIBBY. Quite possibly, if the client wished us to get a pardon

and I did not see any problem with it. I don’t see any technical

problem with going for a pardon, if a client wants to.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this. Would you in your capacity

today first advocate that a pardon be granted without making sure

that it had been properly vetted?

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. You would, in other words, make sure it was properly

vetted.

Mr. LIBBY. If you’re asking me——

Mr. SHAYS. Properly vetted.

Mr. LIBBY. Correct. I wouldn’t want——

Mr. SHAYS. In your judgment, what would that involve?

Mr. LIBBY. Proper vetting by the White House of a pardon application.

Mr. SHAYS. What would that mean?

Mr. LIBBY. I assume they should gather all relevant information

about the person. Let me say that the President’s pardon is unfettered, the President’s power to pardon is unfettered, so technically

it would be proper for him to do it without consulting with anyone

and it would be not questioned. I believe that.

Mr. SHAYS. I know my red light’s on but when you guys do this

to me, it just blows my mind. Having an absolute power, if anything, means, doesn’t it, that they should do an even more thorough job to make sure they have vetted it properly?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir. I was about to finish by saying while he has

that absolute power, it seems to me he should exercise it by bringing in all the possible information that would be relevant to him

and thereby have a process which would be fair and have very high

standards.

Mr. SHAYS. Including——

Mr. BARR. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. WAXMAN. If I might be recognized.

Mr. BARR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5

minutes.

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Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Libby, you just answered what you would say

if you were advising the administration on how to handle this sort

of thing. But you were for many years the counsel for Mr. Rich.

Can you tell us how much money you received or your firm received in that capacity?

Mr. LIBBY. I received none. The firm would receive the fees. I

don’t know offhand how much it would be.

Mr. SHAYS. Over $100,000, over $500,000, over a mill?

Mr. LIBBY. Certainly, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Over $2 million?

Mr. LIBBY. It is probably in that ballpark, I would guess.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, as a good lawyer—— Mr. LIBBY. At different firms. I was in different firms over this— firm received in total.

Mr. SHAYS. But you had Mr. Rich as your client?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, as the defense counsel for Mr. Rich, you heard

what he had to tell you, but wouldn’t you make an investigation

as to what the case might be on the other side to try to prepare

for your client’s best interest?

Mr. LIBBY. Certainly, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And when Mr. Wolfman and Ginsburg had the information before them to make their report, did they get all the documents that they needed to get, in your opinion, to give a sound

judgment on their part?

Mr. LIBBY. All the documents available to us were available to

them.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And you think that they had the documents that

would have given them the information they needed to reach their

conclusions they reached.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, they had the information that they needed, to

the extent we had it, to reach their conclusions.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, a lot of people tried to discredit their analysis

by saying they didn’t have valuable, they didn’t have valuable and

accurate analysis of the situation. You’re not critical of them, you

think that they had valid information.

Mr. LIBBY. Right. I believe they had the best information that

they could have.

Mr. SHAYS. And you had the best information you could have, although no one has all the information, but you’ve told us that

based on all the information you had, you didn’t think that Mr.

Rich was or his companies were guilty of the crimes for which they

were charged.

Mr. LIBBY. Based on the information available to us, yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. You don’t want to say whether the President could

give a pardon or not, you don’t want to reach the conclusion on that

issue. But would the President of the United States have to be corrupt, would the President of the United States have to take a bribe

to reach a conclusion in his mind on the merits that perhaps Mr.

Rich and Mr. Green were not guilty of the charges brought against

them?

Mr. LIBBY. Would he have to take a bribe? No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Would somebody have to take a bribe to reach that

conclusion, or do you think somebody on their view of the merits

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could agree that these charges shouldn’t have been brought and

that a pardon would resolve the matter, just as the prosecutor

dropping the case would resolve the matter?

Mr. LIBBY. I don’t know what was going through the President’s

mind when he made his decision.

Mr. SHAYS. Of course you don’t know, and I don’t know either.

But would a reasonable man reaching the conclusion that he

reached only come to that conclusion if he were corrupt, or could

he have the view of the merits that you seem to have also had, that

the charges weren’t justified?

Mr. LIBBY. I believe it would have been more reasonable for the

President to have received fuller information, from what I understand.

Mr. SHAYS. I think so, too. I feel very critical that he didn’t get

more information. But what he had, based on what he had, it’s not

unthinkable that he could reach this conclusion that he reached?

You reached the same conclusion, that the charges brought against

Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were not justified.

Mr. LIBBY. Correct, sir; I reached the conclusion that based on

the evidence available to us, he was not guilty of the crimes for

which he had been indicted.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t want to belabor the point about your view

that they might be traitors. I don’t know what the legal ethics are

for representing people you consider to be traitors for 17 years. It’s

a little puzzling you would call a traitor up and congratulate him

on a pardon. So—and then I think there were technical issues,

maybe you weren’t involved in them, whether the subsidiaries were

foreign subsidiaries, whether they’re parent companies or sister

companies. Do you think that there’s a legal argument that perhaps they weren’t traitors to the country of the United States?

Mr. LIBBY. There’s a legal argument that the trade that was engaged in was a legal trade, as I understand it.

Mr. SHAYS. And if it were a legal trade, would they be traitors

to the country? This country?

Mr. LIBBY. Well, you can take the view that it would be—that

what they were doing, while legal, was not in the country’s best interest, and that’s the final question.

Mr. SHAYS. It may not be in the country’s best interest; that

doesn’t make you a traitor. Traitor’s a legal matter. Mr. Fink, do

you think Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were traitors to this country?

You know a lot about this whole case.

Mr. LIBBY. That was never my perception.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Libby, in the editorial published by the New York

Times that we’ve discussed earlier today, President Clinton wrote,

‘‘The applications were reviewed and advocated not only by my

former White House counsel, Jack Quinn, but also by three distinguished Republican attorneys: Leonard Garment, a former Nixon

White House official; William Bradford Reynolds, a former highranking official in the Reagan Justice Department; and Lewis

Libby, now Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff.’’ That was not an accurate statement, that the President made,

was it?

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct. It was inaccurate.

501

Mr. BARR. The fact of the matter is that you’ve never reviewed

the pardon application, have you?

Mr. LIBBY. Even to this day, sir.

Mr. BARR. And you have never advocated on behalf of the pardon

application, have you?

Mr. LIBBY. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. BARR. Do you know where Mr. Clinton got this wrong information?

Mr. LIBBY. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut,

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Libby, I interrupted you when I

asked you about absolute power because I anticipated an answer

that I had no right to anticipate. It was your testimony that an absolute power, because it’s an absolute power, needs to be exercised

more carefully.

Mr. LIBBY. I would agree with that statement, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And the question I now wonder—because one of the

issues that this committee does is we look at waste, fraud and

abuse, and we don’t legislate, we don’t appropriate, but what we do

is recommend changes. Now obviously, an absolute power can be

exercised by this President any way he chooses to, but one of the

hopes that I have is that this committee will recommend to this administration that they don’t do all the stupid things that we heard

happen in today’s testimony. And I would make the assumption

that your people are looking at what happened in the last few

months and are hopefully saying we are not going to do the same

thing.

Mr. LIBBY. President Bush has stated, sir, that he believes that

the power is a virtually unfettered power but that he would exercise it fairly and with high standards.

Mr. SHAYS. It’s also my understanding that we need to look at

the revolving door process, and Mr. Kadzik is an individual who

was hired, frankly, to lobby Mr. Podesta. He knew him, he was a

client. Mr. Podesta was a client. I am not trying to say something,

since he’s not here to defend himself. That’s pretty much factual

and I’ll leave it at that. We even have Mr.—well, it just strikes me

that part of the reason this administration got into trouble was

that it allowed certain people to have access, who had significant

influence, who only knew part of the story. Frankly, Mr. Libby, you

only know part of the story.

Mr. LIBBY. That’s correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Unless you have checked with the Intelligence community of the United States to understand all the various activities

of this man called Marc Rich. And I make an assumption that

when you were in the private sector you did not have that capability.

Mr. LIBBY. Of course not, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m also going to make an assumption, and tell me

if I’m wrong, that when you were in the public sector and might

have had access to this information, because you were not going to

involve yourself with Mr. Rich’s activities as a government employee, that you did not seek to get this information.

Mr. LIBBY. That’s correct; I recused myself.

502

Mr. SHAYS. So the bottom line is it’s almost irrelevant, with all

due respect and with no disrespect, for you to suggest that he

should have gotten a pardon or shouldn’t have, because you truly

don’t know facts that this committee knows that may have led you

to another conclusion.

Mr. LIBBY. That is the point I’ve been trying to make, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And it’s also a fact that—I guess, let me ask you this

question. Is the administration considering a revolving door process

to set a standard to make sure that if someone leaves the employment of the White House or the executive branch, they at least not

lobby the executive branch for a period of time like we have in Congress, which is 1 year?

Mr. LIBBY. I do not as a matter of fact know that, sir, and I’m

not here the person to testify for the administration on that. I’m

not here tonight as an administration witness.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I would just, since I don’t get to speak to you

as a general rule, I would make that argument that this is something that would be helpful to the administration, because in my

judgment it will prevent the kind of junk that we have seen happen in the last few weeks. It’s a protection to the administration

and to the American people, and I truly hope that will be considered along with a very clear process of vetting of pardons.

Mr. LIBBY. I agree so, sir, and I welcome the chance to talk to

you outside of this informal format to go through that.

Mr. BARR. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I really

want to followup on some of what Mr. Shays has said, and I think

that there is no one who has listened to this who doesn’t understand the fact that you don’t have every fact of this case, and I

think that you’ve been very clear on that and I really do appreciate

the way you have presented it, because I mean we understand

that. That’s not the issue, though.

Mr. LIBBY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But let me just ask you this. I’m also a lawyer

and there’s some cases when you take them, you really believe that

your client’s got a great shot. On the other hand, there are some

cases that you take and you almost want to walk in to the prosecutor’s office and say let’s make a deal. And you may not in either

case, you don’t have all the facts. You don’t have everything that

the prosecution has but you do have what your client’s telling you.

You do have documents that they may have presented to you. You

do have access to witnesses that they feel might shed light on their

case and might be helpful.

And so I guess what I want to ask you is that this was not one

of those cases—you worked on it for so long, but this was not one

of those cases that you wanted to walk into the prosecutor’s case

and say, look, you know my clients are guilty, and let’s make a deal

as fast as we can. It wasn’t that kind of case, was it?

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And it was a case, I take it from just based upon

what you’ve told us, that you felt that you—your client would have

had a reasonable shot if he had gone to trial, if they had gone to

trial, would have had a reasonable shot because you never can tell

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what a jury is going to do, but what he had a reasonable shot at

being successful; is that right?

Mr. LIBBY. Based on all the evidence available to the defense,

that’s right, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So when Mr. Shays talks about you not having

all the facts, I mean we understand that. But we also understand

that you had quite a bit of information, as you testified to a little

bit earlier.

Let me just go back to something that you said that I’m just curious about. You said that Mr. Rich called you and you all had a discussion with regard to the fact that he had been pardoned.

Mr. LIBBY. He called; essentially correct, sir. He called Mr. Green

and left a message with Mr. Green in effect that he would like to

speak to me.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You did speak to him, then?

Mr. LIBBY. I did speak to him; yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you tell us about that conversation?

Mr. LIBBY. Sure. I called him from my home very early in the

morning. He’s in Switzerland and so there’s a time difference. It

was a very brief conversation. By the time he got on the phone, it

might have been only a minute or so, or 2-minute conversation.

Was quite brief. He said that he appreciated what I had done for

him over the years of working for him, of course, prior to the pardon, and I congratulated him on having reached a goal that he had

sought for a long time. Of course, none of these issues had arisen

at that point in time. I had no idea what had gone on in the pardon

process, even the newspaper reader’s idea of what had gone on in

the pardon process. This all came up later.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, we fully understand that you were not a

part of actually trying to get this pardon. We understand that. But

when he thanks you, I take it that you can—I mean, if you can

shed some light on this I’d appreciate it—that he was thanking you

because you basically were the architect over the years for putting

again together enough information. And I mean, through your efforts, that’s a lot of—you said somewhere in the area of $2 million

worth of work—that’s quite a bit of work. But you were the architect for putting together a lot of the information that was probably

used in Mr. Quinn’s arguments and in the justification that the

President gave in the article that has been referenced so much here

in the New York Times. Is that correct?

Mr. LIBBY. Well——

Mr. CUMMINGS. I’m not saying that you did it with the pardon

intent and effort, but basically a lot of that information was probably used; is that correct?

Mr. LIBBY. The defense team divided up the issue, sir. I worked

primarily on the tax issue and I worked some on the energy issue.

Mr. Fink’s firm had experts in energy law and export controls and

things like that, so his firm led that portion of the case. So it was

a team effort in which my prime responsibility had to do with the

tax side of the case.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me just say this and then I’ll—I want to—

I do agree with Mr. Shays on this, that I think we have all learned

a lot from this, and I’m glad that you are where you are in the administration, because I think that there’s nothing like going

504

through a process like this that teaches us more. I mean, a lot of

people can tell us, but once we go through this process I think it

is a very tough lesson about trying to make sure that, you know,

we can see how things can be dealt with in a proper fashion in the

future. And I appreciate your comments in response to Mr. Shays’ questions about, you know, the administration and President Bush

and how he intends to handle these matters, and I do appreciate

your testimony.

Mr. LIBBY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE [presiding]. I thank the gentleman from Maryland for his excellent questions. And, fellows, when they ask me to

chair the hearing, it means we’re almost done. I can guarantee you

that. And it’s now time for the counsel on each side to ask questions, and we’ll yield to the counsel for the majority, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, if I could just inquire, we should feel

free—I don’t want to give up my right to ask more questions.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You’ve surrendered no right.

Mr. SHAYS. I may not have any but—and Mr. Cummings may

want to stay as well.

Mr. LATOURETTE. If you have questions, Mr. Shays, just let me

know. We’ll go to Mr. Wilson. If you want to interrupt him, or if

you want time in your own right, just let us know.

Mr. WILSON. I will try and move quickly through this, and I’m

glad we are not talking about kidnapping statutes this time either.

Mr. Libby, just for the record, we’ve had a lot of discussion about

what you know and what you didn’t know, and you have been very

careful, you said, based on evidence available to the defense or

based on the evidence available to me. And I wanted to just make

sure we have the full understanding of that, because when we had

prosecutors testify before us, they spoke of dozens of witnesses that

they were prepared to put on at a trial, and it is fair to say that

you did not know what those witnesses would have said at trial.

Mr. LIBBY. It would depend which witnesses. Well, it is true I did

not have any idea what they would say at trial. Some of the witnesses we had interviewed and some of the witnesses we may have

seen previous testimony from. Those people, we had at least some

notion of what they might say at trial, but I do not know who their

dozens of witnesses would have been. To the extent I know of their

witnesses and who they are, then we had some sense of what they

would say with almost entirely—almost all of them, we had a good

sense of what they would say.

Mr. WILSON. And I think that goes to my point that you knew

some of what the government had, but you didn’t know everything

and you didn’t know all of the witnesses that would be made available and you were not aware of everything that would be said; is

that correct?

Mr. LIBBY. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. WILSON. And for example, I mean this is somewhat hypothetical because we don’t know, but if there are witnesses who

would have testified that information had been destroyed or documents had disappeared, that would have had an impact on the

overall case, would it not?

Mr. LIBBY. Probably not on the tax analysis. It would have had

an impact on how the jury might have viewed them. It might have

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had an impact on an obstruction of justice charge. The tax analysis

has to do with the transactions that occurred and what motivated

those transactions. Intent is really not all that important for it and

destruction of documents might not be so important for it, but it

might well color how a jury perceived what went on.

Mr. WILSON. But in addition, without the full knowledge of what

the facts of the case were—and it’s entirely possible that there

were facts that were unavailable to the tax analysis, indeed this is

what the prosecutors told us a few weeks ago, that there was information that was significant for the tax analysis—it is not your position today that there could have been no additional information

that would have been germane to the tax analysis, is there?

Mr. LIBBY. Correct. It’s my contention that there may have been,

although I don’t know what it may be.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough.

Mr. Fink, when Mr. Quinn left Arnold and Porter, and I believe

that was the end of 1999, did you—I should back up because we’re

starting a new subject. When Mr. Quinn was at Arnold and Porter,

he had a retainer agreement whereby Mr. Rich paid, I believe,

$55,000 per month to his former law firm, Arnold and Porter.

When he left his law firm, did you discuss with him the possibility

of signing a new retainer agreement to compensate him for the

work that he would do for Mr. Rich?

Mr. FINK. The precise answer, I think, is no. We did have a conversation about the fact that we did not have a fee arrangement,

but we didn’t talk about a retainer agreement, to the best of my

recollection, after he left Arnold and Porter.

Mr. WILSON. Why was there no fee arrangement?

Mr. FINK. The work that had been done while he was at Arnold

and Porter ended in early 2000. I think everybody felt there wasn’t

any need to provide additional compensation for that work, and it

did not appear at all certain that there would be additional work

in the future.

Mr. WILSON. And that might explain why a retainer wouldn’t be

signed; but as Mr. Quinn did additional work, was it ever contemplated that you would be compensated for the work he was

doing?

Mr. FINK. It was contemplated by me.

Mr. WILSON. And what were you thinking about Mr. Quinn’s

compensation?

Mr. FINK. I personally thought that we should try and come up

with a retainer agreement for Mr. Quinn going forward. But we did

not.

Mr. WILSON. And was there a reason for not coming to some type

of arrangement? The general perception of lawyer is they’re not benevolent societies and they do need to pay their bills, and we’re

just wondering why there was not an arrangement agreed to.

Mr. FINK. It was not an issue that was pursued by anybody.

There was very little activity from the spring of 2000 to the fall of

2000.

Mr. WILSON. When Mr. Quinn began pursuing the pardon, the

prospect of a pardon, did you anticipate compensating him for that

work?

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Mr. FINK. I anticipated that he would be compensated for that

work by Mr. Rich.

Mr. WILSON. And if you could, tell us what you were thinking.

Mr. FINK. Actually, I don’t know that I was thinking anything

other than he was entitled to some fair fee, the exact parameters

of which I did not have in mind. I believe I told Mr. Quinn when

we started to discuss the pardon that we would find a fair fee arrangement for him consistent with whatever his fee arrangements

were. I did not know how he was handling fee arrangements.

Mr. WILSON. Did you discuss with Mr. Rich compensating Mr.

Quinn?

Mr. FINK. Could you excuse me just one moment?

Mr. WILSON. Certainly.

Mr. FINK. The answer is yes, I did. I communicated thoughts I

had to Mr. Rich, with which he did not disagree.

Mr. WILSON. And what did you communicate to him?

Mr. FINK. I actually communicated to him what I told to Mr.

Quinn.

Mr. WILSON. And what was that?

Mr. FINK. That we would come to a fair fee arrangement that

was consistent with his normal fee arrangements.

Mr. WILSON. So you had communicated to Mr. Quinn that you

would come to an arrangement with him to compensate him?

Mr. FINK. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. And when was that?

Mr. FINK. The precise date I do not know, but it was most likely

early November 2000.

Mr. WILSON. And when did you stop thinking that was going to

be the case?

Mr. FINK. I stopped thinking that was going to be the case during the first hearings of this committee.

Mr. WILSON. When I was asking Mr. Quinn about his compensation?

Mr. FINK. I believe you were the questioner.

Mr. WILSON. I’m not quite sure where to go after that. But you

had not had a conversation with Mr. Quinn during which you had

discussed the prospect of him not being compensated up until at

least the time of our last hearing; is that correct?

Mr. FINK. It was always my contemplation, I mean, not that I

reflected on this frequently, but if you had stopped me at any point

in time and said would you expect that Mr. Quinn would be compensated for this work, I would have thought that he would be.

Mr. WILSON. And it was also his expectation, correct?

Mr. FINK. I can’t speak for his expectation. I can only tell you

that we had this very brief—honestly, very brief—it wasn’t even a

conversation, it was my comment to him. I do not remember his

response to me. And that was the entire exchange on fees.

Mr. WILSON. Did you ever hire an individual named Neil Katyal?

Mr. SHAYS. Before the gentleman proceeds on that question, I’d

like to interrupt and ask, would it have been unethical for Mr. Rich

or you to have Jack Quinn get a contingency based on whether or

not a pardon was approved or not?

Mr. FINK. I do not know, but I would have been leery of such a

proposal.

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Mr. SHAYS. Because you would have thought it was unethical?

Mr. FINK. I do not know if it is unethical. I just would have been

leery of a proposal like that. I was leery. I would not have agreed

to that.

Mr. SHAYS. And you would not have done that.

Mr. FINK. I would not have.

Mr. SHAYS. And you can testify before this committee that Mr.

Quinn will not get some payment in this near future or the distant

future because of the pardon?

Mr. FINK. I cannot testify to that. I can just tell you that there

was no contingency fee agreement with Mr. Quinn in which I participated or of which I know.

Mr. SHAYS. But the bottom line is now that there’s a pardon

granted, Mr. Rich is free to travel throughout Europe, where before

he couldn’t, and evidently can come into the United States; is that

correct?

Mr. FINK. That calls for a legal conclusion, the answer of which— well, I’m not qualified to answer that, but I would have the same

assumption you do.

Mr. SHAYS. And so the bottom line is you—the work that Mr.

Quinn did is huge. I mean he spent, he spent literally millions hiring other attorneys, and in the end he’s got a pardon in large measure because of what Mr. Quinn has done; isn’t that true?

Mr. FINK. I credit Mr. Quinn for a lot of the success.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Thank you.

Mr. WILSON. Congressman Shays calling me a gentleman is the

first nice thing that has been said to me this month. Thank you

very much.

Mr. Fink, did you ever hire at any point an individual named

Neil Katyal who I believe worked in the Deputy Attorney General’s

Office to work on the Rich matter?

Mr. FINK. No.

Mr. WILSON. No, OK. Do you know where Mr. Katyal works now?

Mr. FINK. No.

Mr. WILSON. What was Michael Steinhardt’s role in the pardon

process, if there was any role?

Mr. FINK. I hesitate only because the word ‘‘role’’ can have many

meanings to many different people. He wrote a letter. He may have

encouraged others to do so. That’s all I can recall.

Mr. WILSON. What is Mr. Steinhardt’s relationship to Marc Rich?

Mr. FINK. My perception is that they’re friends.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough. If you could take a look at exhibit 69,

please, which should be in the book in front of you.

[Exhibit 69 follows:]

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Mr. FINK. 69?

Mr. WILSON. 69, correct. This is an e-mail from you apparently

to Mr. Azulay, Mr. Green and Ms. Behan, and the text—it’s an email, and it says: I just spoke to Jack. He has not heard from the

President, but agreed to call him as soon as he gets to a hard line

phone (he was in the car). He said that the SEC knows of the request and for some reason opposed it. But not like they opposed

Milken. He does not know how they learned of it. (He found out

when the head of the SEC gave one of his partners a hard time

about Marc yesterday.) We agree that is not good and that maybe

the SDNY knows too, but we have no information on it. No other

pardons have been announced yet, as far as we know. Bob.

Was it, in your opinion, a bad thing for the Securities and Exchange Commission to know about the Rich pardon application?

Mr. FINK. Not in and of itself.

Mr. WILSON. But that was not a concern of yours that the SEC

would—— Mr. FINK. I never was concerned that the SEC would learn about

it.

Mr. WILSON. But there was a concern?

Mr. FINK. No no.

Mr. WILSON. OK.

Mr. FINK. The concern, the concern that I had was one I enunciated earlier. I was always concerned that the pardon application

would become a matter of public record and create a press reaction

such as that I had seen in the early eighties, and I felt that would

not be helpful for a thoughtful review of the pardon application.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough. I’d like to just return for one moment

to the fees question. If you could take a look at exhibit 70, which

fortunately should be the very next one in your exhibit book.

[Exhibit 70 follows:]

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Mr. FINK. 70?

Mr. WILSON. Correct. This is an e-mail from Mr. Quinn dated

January 22nd, 2001. It’s to Mr. Fink. Subject, RE: Pardon Document. And the text is: Re press calls, the question of fee might

come up. As I think you know, Marc is not obligated to pay me

anything. Whether he will or not, I do not know and have never

discussed it with him. Anything he might later choose to pay is voluntary. I felt he had paid me well in 1999 and that I had an obligation to see this through to the end.

When you got this e-mail from Mr. Quinn, what were you thinking?

Mr. FINK. I do not remember what I was thinking, precisely. It

seemed to me that he was reminding me that we had never agreed

on a fee; that he had never suggested one.

Mr. WILSON. Now, did it strike you as odd that the context for

this communication was regarding press calls?

Mr. FINK. I do not remember. Is that working still?

On Monday, January 22, this fact that someone was concerned

about press inquiry did not strike me as odd. That’s what we were

dealing with, press inquiry.

Mr. WILSON. Right, but specifically regarding the compensation

aspect. I mean, would expect him to have been compensated. That

would be a fairly normal arrangement. Here he had not been. So

did it strike you as odd in the context of press inquiries there was

a concern about compensation?

Mr. FINK. I don’t remember, but I don’t believe that I was surprised that the press was asking him questions about compensation. I had already been asked questions about compensation by

that point, I believe.

Mr. WILSON. Did you follow this e-mail up with any communication, verbal communication? Maybe a better way to ask that is,

what happened after you read his e-mail?

Mr. FINK. I don’t believe, I don’t believe—well, that’s not true. I

was going to say I don’t believe Jack and I talked about fees after

that. But I think we did, and the subject was that he had—his fee

arrangement had never been fixed and it still wasn’t. And I believe

I told him that I realized that and that I intended to discuss it with

Mr. Rich.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. Let’s move on to the last subject that

I’ll cover today and it involves Denise Rich. Mr. Fink, how long

have you known Denise Rich?

Mr. FINK. My best recollection is that I met Denise Rich circa

1985.

Mr. WILSON. And do you know how much money she received in

her divorce settlement with Mr. Rich?

Mr. FINK. Just a moment, please. I apologize for the delay. The

answer to your question is, to the best of my recollection, I do

know; but the amount would cause me to reveal an attorney confidence, an attorney-client confidence.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Do you know whether Denise Rich has any

bank accounts or had at any time in the past year any bank accounts or trust funds to which she and Marc Rich have joint control

or access?

Mr. FINK. I do not.

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Mr. WILSON. To your knowledge, has Ms. Rich received any

money from Marc Rich since her divorce settlement other than anything that was contemplated in the settlement itself?

Mr. FINK. I have no knowledge of any such thing.

Mr. SHAYS. Are you aware of any request for a revision of the

settlement or increased funds for her children?

Mr. FINK. No, I am not.

Mr. WILSON. As has been reported recently, Ms. Rich gave over $1.2 million to the Democratic Party—— Mr. FINK. I’m sorry, I missed what you said.

Mr. WILSON. As has been reported, Ms. Rich gave a little over $1.2 million to the Democratic Party and gave $450,000 to the Clinton library. Do you have any knowledge as to whether these contributions were made with her own money or they were not made

with her own money?

Mr. FINK. Other than the fact there are press reports about this,

I have no knowledge of the contributions at all. That is meant to

include your question.

Mr. WILSON. Right. Do you know whether Marc Rich or anyone

acting on Marc Rich’s behalf suggested that Ms. Rich make any

contributions to any political causes?

Mr. FINK. I do not.

Mr. WILSON. To the Clinton library?

Mr. FINK. I do not.

Mr. WILSON. Prior to November 2000, which is the ballpark time

for the pardon process commencing, had you ever attempted to involve Denise Rich in any of the strategy that went toward solving

Mr. Rich’s legal problems?

Mr. FINK. I think the answer to your question is no, I had not.

Mr. WILSON. Were you part of any contemplation to bring her in

in any way to play a part in the resolution of Mr. Rich’s legal problems?

Mr. FINK. Could you pardon me for one moment. The answer

would call for confidential information. My answer to your question

would require me to reveal confidential information.

Mr. WILSON. Confidential information. Is there a privilege that’s

involved in this?

Mr. FINK. There’s a privilege that’s involved here.

Mr. WILSON. Perhaps you might share with us what the privilege

is.

Mr. FINK. Just one moment. It’s unfortunate. I mean, I find it

hard as a lawyer here to testify. I approach this whole thing with

some dread because of this problem. So bear with me for one moment.

Mr. WILSON. Sir, please.

Mr. FINK. I believe and I have been advised that it is both attorney-client and work product privileges are involved here. My opinion is consistent with the advice I’m receiving.

Mr. WILSON. OK. If you could take a look, please, at exhibit 137

in the book that’s in front of you there, there appear to be two email communications here. The lower one is dated March 1, 2000.

It is from Avner Azulay and it appears to be to you, Mr. Fink. And

while you’re looking at it I’ll just read the text: ‘‘I had a long talk

with JQ and Michael. I explained why there’s no way the MOJ is

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going to handle—to initiate a call to EH—a minister calling a second level bureaucrat who has proved to be a weak link. We are reverting to the idea discussed with Abe—which is to send DR on a ‘personal’ mission to No. 1 with a well prepared script.’’ There are a few questions that flow from this, but could you tell

us what was contemplated by sending DR on a personal mission to

No. 1?

[Exhibit 137 follows:]

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Mr. FINK. I cannot. And it’s not because of privilege, it’s because

I do not know. I may have known, but I certainly do not remember

from reading this e-mail.

Mr. WILSON. I know the shorthand that’s used in the e-mails,

there is a lot of shorthands, and initials are used. But is No. 1 the

President?

Mr. FINK. It was not a code that we had but I read it as you do,

and I also read it as No. 1, although it could be read differently.

I read it as you do.

Mr. WILSON. And DR in the context of the e-mails we’ve reviewed

is Denise Rich.

Mr. FINK. That would be my assumption as well.

Mr. WILSON. And I don’t know if I can get more out of this, but

here in the text, We have sent send DR on a personal mission to

No. 1, and the ‘‘personal’’ is in quotation marks. What does personal mean in this context?

Mr. FINK. I do not know. I would only be speculating entirely. I

have no idea.

Mr. WILSON. I mean, this may be more puzzling to us now than

it was to you then, but do you recall whether upon receiving this

e-mail you contacted Mr. Azulay in any manner to try and figure

out what he was talking about?

Mr. FINK. I have no recollection. It looks like I responded by my

e-mail above and that does not help refresh my recollection either,

candidly. I looked at this e-mail earlier today when you guys were

discussing it to see if I could remember it, and I could not.

Mr. WILSON. Now, the date of this e-mail is March 18, which is

quite a bit in advance of the pardon process starting in November

2000. Do you recall anything about Denise Rich’s involvement in

any of the legal problems Mr. Rich had prior to November 2000?

Mr. FINK. That is, not to be critical, a very broad question. The

answer, considering it is so broad, would have to be yes. I’m sorry,

the answer is yes. I’ll let you ask your next question.

Mr. WILSON. It was purposefully broad. I’ll try to narrow it a little bit. Just staying within the bounds of the year 2000, if you

could tell us anything you know, anything you know about, involving Denise Rich.

Mr. FINK. I have no recollection of any involvement with Ms.

Denise Rich during this period of time in 2000. I do know that

there was involvement later in 2000. I actually participated in

some of that.

Mr. WILSON. But in response to my very broad question, is it fair

to characterize there was involvement; you just don’t remember

what it was?

Mr. FINK. No, no. I have an imperfect memory, so I’ll be careful.

I believe as I sit here that there was no involvement by Denise

Rich in Mr. Rich’s problems during that period of time. I have absolutely no recollection that she became involved in any way.

Mr. WILSON. The conclusion to the e-mail I read, almost all of it,

I didn’t read the conclusion of the e-mail. The last couple of sentences are ‘‘if it doesn’t work’’—this is the ‘‘personal mission to No.

1 with a well prepared script.’’ Then it follows: ‘‘If it works we

didn’t lose the present opportunity—until Nov—which I assume to

be November—which shall not repeat itself. If it doesn’t, then probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:54 Dec 19, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00523 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\75593.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
516

ably Gershon’s course of action that be the one left—and it says

one left option to start all over again. This is only for your info.

Regards, A.A.’’

Do you recall at what Gershon—this refers to Gershon Kekst, a

publicist in New York—do you know what Gershon’s course of action was?

Mr. FINK. Well I do not know what Mr. Azulay was trying to say

in this sentence.

Mr. WILSON. Do you, just based on your knowledge of who was

doing what at the time, do you have any sense of what he was trying to communicate or what is attempted to be communicated here?

Mr. FINK. Could you give me 1 second, please? As you can tell,

this is not written as well as people might like for clear discourse.

But I suspect that he’s talking about an application for a pardon

here.

Mr. WILSON. OK. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Libby.

Mr. LATOURETTE [presiding]. Counsel’s time has expired. It is

now time for counsel for the minority to ask whatever questions

you choose to. You have 30 minutes.

Mr. BARNETT. Thank you. I’m Phil Barnett. Good evening. I’m

counsel for the minority.

Mr. FINK. Good evening.

Mr. BARNETT. Good evening. It definitely is well into the evening.

Mr. Libby, I have a few questions for you.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARNETT. Yes, sir?

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Libby, could you move your mic down for us? We

will hear you better.

Mr. BARNETT. I think you said earlier that you were asked by

Mr. Green in November 2000, did you want to work on the pardon

application. And you said, if I remember right, you were tied up in

the transition and you didn’t have time and you didn’t think it was

appropriate for you to do; is that right?

Mr. LIBBY. Without being ironic, could you move your mic closer

to your mouth, because I’m having——

Mr. BARNETT. I’m sorry. You didn’t participate in the pardon application because you were busy with the transition. My understanding is that was your testimony.

Mr. LIBBY. Just for the record, I did not hear the first part of

your question. I’m not sure where you picked it up at.

Mr. BARNETT. I was trying to recall your testimony earlier this

evening, I was beginning with a call you received from Mr. Green

who had asked whether you wanted to participate in the pardon

application, whether you wanted to represent Mr. Rich in the pardon process. And my recollection was your answer was you didn’t

have time to do it, you were wrapped up in the transition, you had

those duties, and you didn’t have time and it wouldn’t have been

appropriate for you to represent Mr. Rich in the pardon.

Mr. LIBBY. Correct.

Mr. BARNETT. It wasn’t because you had a view that it would be

inappropriate being a lawyer seeking a pardon for Mr. Rich.

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct. A pardon is a legitimate activity for

a lawyer to engage in.

517

Mr. BARNETT. In fact, I think Mr. Shays actually asked you that

question: Would you have, if you had a client who wanted a pardon, would you file a pardon application? And your answer was if

your client wanted that, you would do that.

Mr. LIBBY. Assuming all the circumstances were such that I was

comfortable with it, yes.

Mr. BARNETT. That’s what Mr. Quinn, Jack Quinn, did in this

case. He came in the case, I understand, in 1999, spent a considerable amount of time with you understanding the merits of the case.

And he tried first at the Justice Department to have a meeting and

to get the case dismissed on the merits. When that failed and there

was a decision to seek a pardon, he took that on. He testified in

front of our committee for many, many hours; and boiling down his

position as I understood it, he said people might disagree about the

pardon but he thought it was defensible on the merits. And he was

comfortable arguing for the pardon because he thought it was defensible on the merits.

If you were taking this case on, would you make the same argument as Mr. Quinn did?

Mr. LIBBY. I don’t know. I don’t know the details of what Mr.

Quinn argued.

Mr. BARNETT. You know the details of Mr. Rich’s case probably

better than Mr. Quinn. If you were Mr. Rich’s pardon attorney

seeking a pardon, what kind of argument would you make?

Mr. LIBBY. I assume I would argue that and I might argue other

aspects of the case as well. It’s pretty hard to say what kind of arguments I would make in an abstract pardon application not before

me, for a client I’m not aware of.

Mr. BARNETT. If we made it more concrete with Mr. Rich as the

client and the facts as you know them, the facts as they were available to the defense counsel, what argument would you make?

Mr. LIBBY. Generally, I would argue the facts of the case, as I

assume Mr. Quinn did. I would argue other good deeds that may

have been done by the witness or by the accused, as I assume Mr.

Quinn would have done. You might also talk about activities of

government, if there were any.

Mr. BARNETT. Would you make any argument that you thought

was not defensible?

Mr. LIBBY. No.

Mr. BARNETT. So these arguments you would make in this case

are arguments that you would think would be defensible arguments and a defensible basis for the pardon.

Mr. LIBBY. If I were engaged in a pardon, I would only make defensible arguments.

Mr. BARNETT. I guess what the question I’m trying to ask is, was

the pardon defensible on its merits?

Mr. LIBBY. I have no idea, sir. You have asked me if Mr. Quinn

would make defensible arguments. I assume he would make defensible arguments. That’s different from the decision to grant the

pardon. I don’t know about the decision to grant the pardon. I don’t

have the evidence that was before the President when he made his

decision.

Mr. BARNETT. I don’t know if you watched much of the hearing

we had today, this afternoon. It was a long hearing. You probably

518

have lots of other responsibilities. The scenario or the picture that

came across, as I understood it, was that it was a broken-down

process, particularly as it regards Mr. Rich’s pardon. It had come

up, I think, on January 16 at a meeting the President had with Mr.

Podesta, Mr. Lindsey, Ms. Nolan, and they had come away with the

impression that the pardon wasn’t going to go anyplace. They

viewed it was inappropriate and they have didn’t think the President was going to pursue it. As a result, they didn’t seek out information from the CIA and the National Security Agency and others.

They had a lot of things going on at the time.

They thought it was a dead issue, so they didn’t pursue it. Then

they come to the evening before the transition and the President

has gotten a call from Prime Minister Barak, and all of sudden he

wants to revisit it. And there’s really no time at that point to get

additional information at that point. Essentially all that is presented there is the evidence that’s understood to the defense. In

that situation, is the granting of the pardon unreasonable?

Mr. LIBBY. I don’t know, sir. I don’t know what evidence the

President had before him or could have had before him.

Mr. BARNETT. Well there’s one option he would have, the President, which I think, if I understood what many members have said,

they might have preferred; which is to say he doesn’t have all of

information, so he shouldn’t go forward. He doesn’t really have an

opportunity to get more information because he won’t have the

power to issue a pardon after noon the next day. So that would

have been one option, presumably a reasonable option.

The other option he has is to make a decision. And if he had the

information that you have, information that is available to the defense, is it unreasonable for him to make the decision that this case

warrants a pardon?

Mr. LIBBY. I didn’t hear all of the testimony the way you probably did today and other days, but I thought I heard some questioning of witnesses which said if you had time to make one phone

call, why didn’t you make another phone call? So it seems to me

there’s a third logical possibility, which is what you’re saying,

which is to pick up the phone to call other people to get other information. I don’t know what was done or what could have been done,

but in what you have described, there’s a third possibility which

would have allowed the President to get more information.

Mr. BARNETT. In law school they have the reasonable man test,

if I remember law school. And I guess my question is going somewhat to that concept. There’s a third option, and I hadn’t thought

of the third option. That might have been the best option. Was it

unreasonable to do the pardon option?

Mr. LIBBY. To me it would be more reasonable to take the third

option and call for more information, but I wasn’t there at 2 a.m.,

or whatever it was.

Mr. BARNETT. But you have testified earlier today that the

charges weren’t justified. You looked at them and Congressman

Waxman read through the different elements of the charges in the

President’s rationale. You agreed with those, so the charges aren’t

justified. It was an indictment brought on what you think isn’t a

sound foundation. That’s based on the information you know.

519

Mr. LIBBY. Based on the information available to me and to the

defense team, the charges were—there was a compelling defense to

the charges for which they had been indicted; that’s right. But it

seems to me that the President doesn’t have to rely on that. He can

ask for more information. So if you’re asking me what the reasonable man would do, I presume the reasonable man would ask for

more information.

Mr. BARNETT. I know that lots of Members on both sides, if I

have listened over the days, we’ve held the hearings, would say

that would have been the best thing to do. But I’m asking you, was

it unreasonable, was it indefensible for him at that time, believing

as he did, that the indictment was improper, to issue the pardon?

Mr. LIBBY. Maybe it’s just late. Maybe it’s that we’ve been here

for 5 hours, but I did not have any participation in this pardon. I’m

not quite sure what I can bring to your own judgment of what’s

reasonable or unreasonable. You know more about it than I know

about it. I didn’t participate in it so I just—I’m unclear what it is

you think I bring to this discussion. As I have said, I believe if it

were me, I would have made the calls or recommended the calls

rather than just acting in the way it was acted.

Mr. BARNETT. The reason I’m asking the question is that I think

the reason we’ve been holding the hearings is that there have been

allegations that this was illegal conduct or corrupt conduct or quid

pro quos. And that has to be the explanation. There is not an explanation that this was just simply bad judgment. It’s not an explanation that the President could have reasonably reached a wrong

judgment. Because of your expertise and experience in the matter,

I was asking the questions to help make the assessment, whether

as the only option here was that former President Clinton was acting in an illegal manner, for illegal or improper motives.

Mr. LIBBY. I have no firsthand knowledge of whether he acted for

illegal motives or legal motives. As I said, the information available

to the defense team was sufficient to create a compelling defense

that Mr. Rich and Mr. Green’s companies had not committed the

crimes for which they were indicted.

Mr. BARNETT. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Schiliro, who is the minority

staff director, would like to ask questions for about another 5 minutes or so, if that is permissible.

Mr. SHAYS. I have absolutely no problem with you gentlemen

having your 30 minutes. I just want to ask a question or two, not

many, when you are done. And I will respect the fact that you do

not have a Member on your side to counter.

Mr. SCHILIRO. I will be happy to give you my time because I

won’t use it all.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You have 18 minutes. Knock yourself out.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Mr. Libby, let me do this as quickly as we can so

we can get out of here. I think part of the problem is we’re seeking

something, and you’re trying to avoid, for good reason, giving us

what we’re seeking. Maybe it’s because we disagree or maybe it’s

because we’re not communicating. The reason we’re interested in

what you think is because you’re one of the smartest lawyers in

Washington. You’re probably one of the smartest people in Washington. This is a complicated case. You understand the case——

520

Mr. LIBBY. That’s the first thing said tonight that I take strong

disagreement.

Mr. SCHILIRO. I mean it sincerely. I don’t know you personally

but you have a terrific reputation. You made a lot of money on this

case. I think you said earlier it was more than $2 million which

means to me, because you’re a terrific lawyer, you learned the details of the case, you learned the intricacies of the case. You know

more about this case than probably anybody else in the world.

The threshold question for this committee in our first hearing

was, as Mr. Barnett was saying, is there any plausible explanation

for this pardon on a legal case? And the answer from a lot of members on the committee was there wasn’t. So you become very relevant because you have expertise in this matter.

If you were handling the case, and I know you don’t want to deal

with hypotheticals, but let’s assume for a second that you were continuing with Mr. Rich as a client. If you were handling the case,

knowing everything you know about the case, do you think you

could have put together a good legal argument for a pardon?

Mr. LIBBY. If I were handling the case, I probably would not have

asked for a pardon.

Mr. SCHILIRO. You would not have?

Mr. LIBBY. Probably not.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Even when you had a dead end with the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

Mr. LIBBY. That is correct.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Explain why you wouldn’t have asked for a pardon.

Mr. LIBBY. I would seek to have the Justice Department reopen

the case and look at the merits of the case.

Mr. SCHILIRO. I think when you did your transition with Mr.

Quinn, you fully apprised him of the details of the case.

Mr. LIBBY. Correct.

Mr. SCHILIRO. On both the legal arguments and the situation

surrounding the case?

Mr. LIBBY. This was in fall of 1999 and a little bit into 2000, yes.

Mr. SCHILIRO. And they tried to make headway with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New York and got nowhere.

Mr. LIBBY. Correct.

Mr. SCHILIRO. You stayed on the case, maybe not in as active of

a way as you had been previously, but Mr. Quinn joined you and

other people working on this. The lawyers reached the conclusion

they were making no headway. There was no alternative but to

seek a pardon.

Mr. LIBBY. I was not——

Mr. SCHILIRO. You were not part of that, but that’s my understanding of what the lawyers decided, and I assume you’ll agree

with that based on the facts as we know them. That’s the testimony we’ve received from the lawyers.

Mr. LIBBY. I’ll accept that.

Mr. SCHILIRO. So when we asked you before about November

2000 when you were approached, it didn’t sound to me at that

point that you declined because you thought it was an inappropriate act to seek a pardon in this case. It sounded as if you declined

because of circumstances.

521

Mr. LIBBY. That’s correct.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Let me make sure I don’t misunderstand it. If you

hadn’t been in those circumstances, would you have entertained a

pardon in this case?

Mr. LIBBY. I would have considered asking for a pardon, yes.

Mr. SCHILIRO. And so if we’re in that situation, it doesn’t sound

to me that’s exactly what you said before when you wouldn’t have

sought a pardon in this case.

Mr. LIBBY. It is fully consistent with what I said before. I would

have considered a pardon. I would have considered other routes.

And I think in the end, the course I think that would have best

served the client was not to go for a pardon but to get the Department of Justice to look at the merits of the case.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Right. But your client has paid you more than $2

million. Your client has received no relief, wants to come back to

the United States, and feels the indictment was flawed. You know

the case, and your client is saying to you this is my only alternative. At that point you have entertained it. Is your testimony

that you would have said no to your client at that point?

Mr. LIBBY. At that point, I would have presented to the client the

options. What I’m saying is there is another option besides going

to the pardon. There is an option to try to get the Department of

Justice to look at the merits of the case.

Mr. SCHILIRO. And that’s failed, so now—— Mr. LIBBY. No—— Mr. SCHILIRO. I think that’s the conclusion the other attorneys

on the case reached in 2000.

Mr. LIBBY. The Department of Justice never looked, in the postindictment stage, never looked at the merits of the case.

Mr. SCHILIRO. I think the conclusion of the lawyers who were

working on this case was that the Justice Department was not

going to do that. That’s why they sought a pardon.

Mr. LIBBY. I was not present when they made that conclusion.

I understand that was their conclusion.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Let me try it one last way, and I think I’m not

going to get any further but I’ll try one last time. If you were in

a position where the decision had been made, and you were part

of the team, and it was decided that a pardon was going to be pursued—so it wasn’t a question of different options, a pardon was

going to be pursued—knowing everything you know about this

case, do you think you could put together a good legal case for a

pardon? I am not asking you if it’s the best option.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes.

Mr. SCHILIRO. And if you did that and you brought it to the

President, do you think that would have been a defensible case?

I’m not asking from the other side, the prosecution side. I’m talking

about the defense side.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes.

Mr. SCHILIRO. The last question I have on that, again because

you know this case much better than I do, you’ve evaluated I think

all the arguments the U.S. attorney made through the years because you had to know your case—in doing that, I assume the conclusion you reached was your case was stronger than their case,

which is why you think the case should have been dismissed.

522

Mr. LIBBY. Yes. And I believe everyone on this panel could now

repeat what I’m about to say. Based on all the evidence available

to the defense, that is correct.

Mr. SCHILIRO. But just on that phrase—and we all can repeat

that phrase—because you’re a terrific lawyer, I think you probably

tried the prosecution case 20 times in your head. You went

through, you tried to figure out every piece of evidence the prosecution had, you examined every legal theory the prosecution had, and

I think you reached the conclusion, because you’re acting honorably, and because I think it’s your testimony that case didn’t hold

up.

Mr. LIBBY. Yes. I’m afraid that you did misspeak, though, in the

course of your question. I examined every argument that we knew

of that the prosecution had. There’s a saying in the intelligence

world, you don’t know what you don’t know. We knew only what

we knew. We knew that the prosecutor had said we had evidence

for which we were not aware. I will take him at his word. I’m not

convinced that evidence would have persuaded me, but there were

things—we were told there were things we did not know.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Did you see any of our first hearing on the pardon? Did you see when the prosecutors testified?

Mr. LIBBY. I have seen some of the transcript. I did not watch

the testimony.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Was there anything in their testimony that was

new to you?

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir. But, of course, their testimony was somewhat

abbreviated. There were allusions in their testimony, so that I

could guess what they meant, but I don’t know for sure. I have

been convinced if I sat down with them and they laid their cards

out and we laid our cards out, that we would win. But I don’t

know.

Mr. SCHILIRO. But so I understand, had you been in the position

where you were pursing the pardon, based on everything you know

in this case, you think you could put together a good strong case

for a pardon, and a defensible case, if the President so issued,

based on what you know?

Mr. LIBBY. Yes.

Mr. SCHILIRO. Thank you. I apologize for using more than the 5

minutes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Do you want to yield back the rest of your

time?

I thank you very much. And before yielding to Mr. Shays to wrap

things up, I just remember when I practiced law and we would try

a case and I would go first, I always thought, man, am I doing

good, until the other side showed up and all of a sudden we had

to rethink some things.

Mr. Shays, I’ll be happy to yield to you for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t know if I’m getting a second wind, but I actually enjoyed the questions our attorneys asked on both sides of the

aisle and I appreciate the responses.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I don’t know if that is a second wind, or vapors, Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I do think it is fairly clear, if you are a lawyer you

are an advocate for one side, and you are going to emphasize the

523

strength of your case and obviously minimize the weaknesses that

may involve your case. I meant no real disrespect to Jack Quinn

in pointing out that I said he couldn’t adequately serve both his client and the President properly, because I think in the process of

serving his client well, he didn’t serve his President well, someone

he had worked for.

And I look at you, Mr. Libby, and I say why are you here? You

should be here, and I appreciate you being here, and I appreciate

you not complaining about being here. You represented Marc Rich

with the prosecution. You developed and brought in people with tax

expertise to determine, in your judgment, that he did not owe

taxes. And I would tend to believe that you could find experts to

take any position, and you found two that made persuasive arguments to you.

But you didn’t lobby the White House for the pardons, and that’s

really what we’re looking at. In my judgment, we got a pretty disappointing view of why these pardons were granted. There was a

rush to complete them. There wasn’t the proper vetting and so on.

But you’re here as now a government official, and I just want to

ask you this question and I hope I like the answer, but I may not.

I want to know if you left the administration, would you come back

to lobby your boss, Dick Cheney, or the President of the United

States, on behalf of a client, given the unique relationship that you

have as a chief of staff of the Vice President?

Mr. LIBBY. I doubt it. But I can’t be sure, but I doubt it.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you concur that if you were looking to lobby

the White House and you were hired to represent a certain interest, that your position would be to present that interest as forcefully as you could, even if it meant not disclosing information that

might be helpful for the person making that judgment?

Mr. LIBBY. If I understood your question properly, I think I

missed part of it, I do not believe I would ever appear before Vice

President Cheney or President Bush under terms in which I would

withhold any information from them.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you. Mr. Shays and I think that that

exhausts any questions that anybody could possibly have. I want

to thank you, Mr. Libby and Mr. Fink, for your patience and forthrightness with the committee. You were both excellent representatives. Mr. Vice President Cheney is lucky, Mr. Rich is lucky, and

we thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.

Mr. LIBBY. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 10:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The pardon petition and the complete set of exhibits follow:]

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1168

1169

Æ