Fishing Vessel Casualty Task Force Report

March 1999

Captain James D. Spitzer, U. S. Coast Guard

Task Force Chairman
i

Acknowledgements

I am deeply appreciative of the knowledge, willingness to serve, and concern for fishing

vessel safety that the Task Force members and industry advisors demonstrated. Their

names and biographies are found in Appendices B and C.

The greatest burden was borne by many offices and individuals that supported the Task

Force. Their level of thoroughness was never compromised, and a tight deadline was met

through hard work, dedication, and professionalism.

The team developing the project plan and workshop preparations included Tim Farley,

Ken Olsen, LT Bill Butler, LT Brian Lincoln, Jeff Ciampa, LT Brian Penoyer, LT

Thomas Miller, LT Keith Janssen and YN2 Mark Walters. The Task Force workshop

succeeded in large part due to the skilled facilitation of Doug Perkins, Tim Farley, LT

Brian Penoyer, and Jim Law; and the recording skills of LT Joe Dufresne, LT Kirsten

Martin, LT Karen Weaver, Dave Dickey, and LTJG Alex Foos. CDR Mark Thomas and

LCDR Randy Clark were important guest contributors at the workshop. Sue Jorgensen

and other Fishing Vessel Safety Coordinators and Examiners sampled the opinions of

fishermen. My heartfelt thanks to many of the noted individuals and Task Force

members who performed several tasks, including drafting parts of the report. Final

thanks for assembling and editing the report go to Theresa Miller, Doug Rabe, and

Jennifer Blain.

I was particularly impressed by the concern, enthusiasm, and passion expressed by

participants in this effort, including concerned reporters and members of the fishing

community. Many expressed a hope that their efforts not be in vain. The spirit of these

individuals is characterized by:

They saw their duty and did it.

James D. Spitzer, Chairman

Captain , U. S. Coast Guard
ii

Disclaimer

This report includes facts and conclusions that represent the collective wisdom of the

Task Force members, industry advisors, and other sources. However, this report does not

necessarily represent the official position of the organizations that employ the Task Force

members.
Table of Contents

iii

CONTENTS

Page

Executive Summary..............................................................................v

1.0 Introduction....................................................................................................... 1 – 1

1.1 Task Force Impetus and Objectives.................................................................. 1 – 1

1.2 Task Force Members, Advisors, and Support................................................... 1 – 1

1.3 Approach of Report.......................................................................... 1 – 2

2.0 Historical Overview........................................................................2 – 1

2.1 Inspected Steam Vessels to Uninspected Fishing Vessels................................ 2 – 1

2.2 Marketing Voluntary Fishing Vessel Safety......................................................... 2 – 3

2.3 Tragedies Lead to Modest Standards................................................................2 – 4

2.4 Key Events Since the Act of 1988...........................................................2 – 7

3.0 Comparison of Standards.................................................................3 – 1

3.1 Comparison of Mandatory Standards......................................................3 – 1

3.2 Operational Risks Relative to Standards.................................................. 3 – 3

4.0 Casualty Data................................................................................4 – 1

4.1 Approach...................................................................................... 4 – 1

4.2 Recent Fishing Vessel Casualties..........................................................4 – 2

4.3 Historical Overview of Fishing Vessel Casualties....................................... 4 – 7

5.0 Conclusions and Recommendations.................................................... 5 – 1

5.1 Coordinate Fishery Management with Safety............................................ 5 – 7

5.2 Establish Operator and Crew Standards...................................................5 – 9

5.3 Ensure Vessels Comply with Standards...................................................5 – 11

5.4 Establish Safety and Stability Standards.................................................. 5 – 13

5.5 Improve Program Management............................................................5 – 17

5.6 Conduct Research and

Development......................................................

5 – 21

5.7 Inform Fishermen............................................................................ 5 – 23

Appendix A Fishing Vessel Casualty Task Force Charter............................. A – 1

Appendix B Fishing Vessel Casualty Task Force Members...........................B – 1

Appendix C Industry Advisors.............................................................. C – 1

Appendix D Resources Consulted...........................................................D – 1

Appendix E Past Recommendations........................................................E – 1
Table of Contents

iv

FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures Page

3 – 1 Commercial Fishing Vessels <79 ft; <16 POB........................................ 3 – 4

3 – 2 Unispected Passenger Vessels............................................................3 – 4

3 – 3 Towing Vessels < 300 GT................................................................3 – 4

3 – 4 Commercial Fishing Vessels <79 ft; <16 POB; Built after September 1991.......3 – 5

3 – 5 Commercial Fishing Vessels >79 ft..................................................... 3 – 5

3 – 6 Subchapter “T” Boats.....................................................................3 – 5

4 – 1 Fishing Vessel Particulars................................................................ 4 – 3

4 – 2 Fishing Vessel Casualty Information................................................... 4 – 3

4 – 3 Control Charts for Total Loss of Vessel for Fishing Vessels 1994-1998.......... 4 – 9

4 – 4 Control Charts for All Deaths on Fishing Vessels 1994-1998.......................4 – 10

4 – 5 Fishing Vessel Deaths Associated with Vessels Casualties 1994- Jan 1999...... 4 – 11

4 – 6 Total Fishing Vessel Losses Comparison Before and After the Act of 4 – 12

4 – 7 Total Loss of Vessel By Accident Type Before and After the Act of 1988........4 – 13

4 – 8 Fishing Vessel Total Losses By Length Before and After the Act of 1988........4 – 13

4 – 9 Fishing Vessel Deaths by Length of Vessel Before and After the Act of 1988....4 – 14

Tables

3 – 1 Weighting of Mandatory Standards Categories....................................... 3 – 2

5 – 1 Coordinate Fishery Management with Safety.......................................... 5 – 8

5 – 2 Establish Operator and Crew Standards................................................5 – 10

5 – 3 Ensure Vessels Compy with Standards................................................. 5 – 12

5 – 4 Establish Safety and Stability Standards................................................ 5 – 14

5 – 5 Improve Program Management..........................................................5 – 19

5 – 6 Conduct Research and Development................................................... 5 – 22

5 – 7 Inform Fishermen.......................................................................... 5 – 24
v

 Executive Summary 

It’s no fish you are buying – it’s men’s lives.

Sir Walter Scott, The Antiquary (1816), Ch. 11

Main Points. Commercial fishing continues to rank at or near the top of the most

hazardous occupations in the United States. The spate of recent losses of lives and

vessels is not unique. A few advances in the long history of attempted voluntary and

regulatory safety initiatives have modestly reduced losses. However, commercial fishing

vessel safety standards are lower than standards for other domestic commercial vessels,

and lower than international standards for fishing vessels. There have been many

attempts to raise safety standards over past decades, however, the prevailing opposition to

higher standards accepts the high risks of commercial fishing relative to the cost of those

standards. The solutions are basic and straightforward: seaworthy boats, competent

crews, adequate survival equipment, and safety conscious resource and industry

management regimes.

Reluctance to Mandate Safety. Despite long-standing recognition of the serious

hazards of commercial fishing, a long succession of proposed laws were not enacted.

Federal safety initiatives have been dampened by tradeoffs with other programs,

overriding policies, and legal limits. Notably, many fishermen have strongly opposed

standards that might save their own lives. Many fishermen accept that fishing is

dangerous, and lives are often lost. Many of those harvesting the bounty of our ocean

frontier staunchly defend the independent nature of their profession, and vehemently

oppose outside interference. The paradox is that fishermen attending a state legislative

forum petition for a memorial to lost fishermen in one session, and at another session

oppose requirements for basic survival and emergency communications equipment.

Limited Legal Mandate. For decades, the great majority of commercial fishing

vessels have fallen into the category of “uninspected vessels,” with relatively minimal

safety requirements imposed on their operators, operations, and maintenance. The

Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 (Act) and associated regulations

and voluntary programs are the most important measures aimed at improving safety on

these vessels. However, the Act narrowly addresses the reasons fishing vessels sink and
Executive Summary

vi

fishermen die; it focuses on surviving a casualty rather than preventing one.

Notwithstanding this, it has improved safety.

Multiple and sustained initiatives to address the important factors of vessel condition and

crew competency have not been adopted. Therefore, these critical factors are only

influenced through awareness campaigns, voluntary programs, and routine business

practices.

A comparison of domestic fishing vessel standards to similar types of domestic and

international safety standards shows domestic fishing vessels have the lowest standards,

and operate in the highest risk environments. The level of fishing vessel safety standards

is analogous to requiring parachutes for an airplane crew, but only marketing voluntary

measures to encourage a mechanically sound aircraft and a competent pilot and crew.

Nevertheless, the Act and voluntary programs have advanced safety, and have fostered a

limited safety culture affecting some boats and fishing communities.

Statistical Trends. Though tragic and shocking, the recent loss (December 1998 and

January 1999) of eleven lives and four clam and conch fishing boats is not a departure

from historical casualty rates. Comparing this period to the overall loss rates of the past

four years shows no significant shift in casualty statistics.

Comparing fatality and vessel loss rates for a five-year, post-1988 Act period to a fiveyear, pre-Act period indicates an apparent ≈20% decrease of lives and vessels lost. This

is not enough to meet a Coast Guard Marine Safety Goal to reduce fishing vessel

casualties to levels approaching that of other commercial vessels. More is needed.

Especially considering that analysis of specific casualties, including the recent two-month

sample of casualties that resulted in loss of life or vessel, shows the causes of most

casualties are eminently preventable through improved operational procedures, crew

training and experience, and maintaining a seaworthy vessel.

Conclusions.

Recent Casualty Characteristics. Common conditions in many recent casualties are

poor vessel or equipment condition, inadequate training to respond to emergencies and

use survival gear, and lack of awareness of or ignoring stability issues.

Casualty Data. Recent casualties are indicative of historical casualty rates. Most

casualties are preventable. The unsafe conditions and failed defenses that result in high

casualty rates stem from inadequate safety standards, poor compliance with existing

safety standards, and inadequate participation in voluntary safety initiatives. While

casualty rates appear to have improved since the Act of 1988, there is great need to

improve the quality of casualty data.
Executive Summary

vii

Industry Feedback. Recommendations that may be implemented immediately that may

save lives concern improving fisherman awareness of particularly serious issues

concerning stability, survival gear, and occupational safety. Recently developed

information on vessel stability is now being widely distributed. Unfortunately, there are

no quick solutions that will markedly improve safety.

Recommendations and Direction. Recommendations in Section Five are divided into

seven categories in an action plan format. They comprehensively describe a

recommended course that, in many areas, would require a broad cooperative effort

between industry and government. Many recommendations can be done now. Those

requiring more time generally require significant change in agency policy and more

resources, cultivation of industry support, and often new legislative authority. The

overall top ten ranking, by potential impact on reducing loss of life and property, are

listed under each respective category as follows:

1. Coordinate Fishery Management with Safety

 #8 Limit Entry into Fisheries

2. Establish Operator and Crew Standards

 #3 Operator’s License

3. Ensure Vessels Comply with Standards

 #1 Safety Inspections (#2 was folded into #1)

 #4 Safety Exam Prerequisite for Federal Fishery Permits

 #6 Safety Examinations

4. Establish Safety and Stability Standards

 #5 Good Marine Practices

 #9 Registration/Documentation (harmonize federal/state)

#10 Safety Levels (use territorial sea baseline v. boundary line)

5. Improve Program Management

6. Conduct Research and Development

 #7 Better Investigation Data

7. Inform Fishermen

Despite a unique approach, the Task Force’s recommendations are generally aligned with

recommendations from previous fishing vessel studies (see Appendix E).

Final Thoughts. The Task Force believes that it is right to strive for breakthrough

levels of loss reduction in the fishing industry. And a decade after enactment of the

current minimal standards, now is the right time to work for such a breakthrough.
Executive Summary

viii

However, the most difficult issues are beyond the scope of the Task Force’s Charter. The

public, fishermen, industry, regulatory agencies, and Congress must forge the public

policy issues to determine: today’s standard of acceptable risk for the industry (loss of

property, environment, and injury/loss of life relative to a fishing effort or population);

and a reasonable cost to reduce that risk relative to competing needs.

Unsuccessful legislative efforts to improve commercial fishing vessel safety did not meet

the high political standards required for a controversial issue to prevail. Commercial

fishing risks have been deemed acceptable when compared to the actual and perceived

costs of meeting higher safety standards. However, we now have almost a decade of

experience under the Fishing Vessel Safety Act of 1988 (came into force in 1991). As

our knowledge and values have evolved during that period, so have our standards of what

is an acceptable risk for the fishermen, and what we are willing to pay to reduce that risk.

It is time to reassess the level of risk, determine what levels of risk are acceptable,

determine what costs are reasonable to reduce that risk, and to act. This report is a step in

the journey that can lead to breakthrough advances in safety on board commercial fishing

vessels.
1-1

 Introduction 

“Above all, he learned that a good fisherman didn’t measure the danger

of his occupation by how big or cruel the sea was, but by the potential

margin for error. He learned to respect the smallest of margins.”

On Fisherman Francis Barcott of

Anacortes, Washington, Lost at Sea.

Patrick Dillon, page 6

1.1 Task Force Impetus and Objectives

In a three-week period at the dawn of 1999, eleven lives and four clam/conch fishing

vessels were lost off the mid-Atlantic coast. This quick succession of casualties in one

fishery, in a small geographic area, shocked the regional fishing community. Questions

were raised as to whether they represented a statistical anomaly or a worsening trend in

fishing safety. Rear Admiral Robert C. North, the Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant

for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection, chartered a Task Force to:

1. evaluate recent serious casualties;

2. examine recent casualties in the context of historical data;

3. provide quick feedback to the industry;

4. review the current fishing vessel safety program and past safety initiatives;

5. recommend significant measures to reduce loss of life and vessels; and,

6. develop direction for government and industry.

The Task Force was chartered on 27 January 1999 and this report was due to Admiral

North on 19 March 1999. The charter is in Appendix A.

1.2 Task Force Members, Advisors, and Support

The Task Force was comprised of twelve government officials who were formally

advised by five industry representatives. Biographies of the Task Force members and

industry advisors are in Appendices B and C. Informal recommendations were received

Section One
Introduction

1-2

from both government and industry sources through personal contact, telephone hot lines,

the mail, and the Internet.

The Task Force and industry advisors met during a number of conference calls, and

attended a 2 1⁄2 day facilitated workshop to develop recommendations. Major research,

preparations for the workshop, and drafting of this report were accomplished by a strong

support team.

1.3 Approach of Report.

The approach of this report is as follows:

Section 2 details the history of fishing vessel safety during this century. It is largely a

legacy of unsuccessful initiatives.

Section 3 shows the vessel standards resulting from that history. Domestic fishing

vessels are not subject to any standards in many important areas of vessel safety, and

minimal or modest standards in other areas. Furthermore, these minimal standards are

lower than other classes of domestic commercial vessels, and substandard by

international norms.

Section 4 describes the nature and extent of fishing vessel casualties and their usually

preventable nature. It features recent casualties and places them into the context of

historical data. Casualty statistics from before and after the Commercial Fishing Industry

Vessel Safety Act (the Act) are compared.

Section 5 contains conclusions and recommendations for significantly reducing fishing

vessel casualties and preventing their enormous cost in injuries, loss of life and property,

and indirect costs such as environmental harm and search and rescue expenses. The

recommendations are categorized and listed in an action plan format.

Appendices on the Task Force Charter, members and industry advisors, references, and

past fishing vessel safety recommendations conclude the report.
2-1

 Historical Overview 

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

The Life of Reason,

George Santayana, (1905 – 1906)

The Main Points. The history of fishing vessel safety has been an ongoing struggle

between the rights of fiercely independent individuals willing or resigned to accept the

hazards of their profession, and of those from within and outside of the industry who

attempt to mitigate the extreme dangers of retrieving the ocean’s bounty. This history

shows numerous initiatives to raise the level of fishing vessel safety through the

development of standards consistent with other sectors of the maritime industry.

However, few of these efforts have succeeded.

2.1 Inspected Steam Vessels to Uninspected Fishing

Vessels

Steam Propulsion Brings Standards in 1800’s. After several significant

casualties associated with steam plants on vessels, marine safety statutes established

inspection and manning requirements for steam propelled vessels, including fishing

vessels. As steam propulsion became less prevalent, subsequent legislation required the

inspection of most passenger and commercial vessels, regardless of the means of

propulsion. For example, the standards to improve vessel safety have strengthened in

categories including the design and construction of vessels, training and licensing of

operators, and fire fighting and life saving equipment. As a general rule, any vessel that

requires inspection also must have a licensed master or operator. Efforts to gain

comparable safety requirements for fishing vessels have been unsuccessful.

Motor Boat Act of 1910. This Act was the first statute to address safety on motor

boats. The Act dealt primarily with navigation lights and sound signals, and required

motor vessels to carry life preservers and fire extinguishers. It also required motor boats

carrying passengers be operated by a licensed individual, although no license

examination was required.

Section Two
Historical Overview

2-2

Draft Safety Legislation of 1930’s; “Uninspected Vessels.” Attempts to enact

safety legislation for motor fishing vessels during the 1930’s were defeated by the fishing

vessel and towboat interests and, as a result, the classification known as "uninspected

vessel” was established. With the classification, as "uninspected vessels", came serious

limitations on the ability to develop safety regulations pertaining to fishing vessels.

There are no specific licensing requirements for masters, operators, or other personnel on

commercial fishing vessels. A provision of the "Officer’s Competency Certificates

Convention, 1936" (46 USC 8304) does require licensed masters, mates, and engineers

on all documented vessels over 200 gross tons operating on the high seas. However, this

applies to fewer than 1.5% of domestic fishing vessels. Tonnage measurement rules

permit many large fishing vessels to measure just under 200 gross tons, thereby avoiding

licensing requirements.

Motor Boat Act of 1940 (MBA-40): Although MBA-40 applied to commercial

and pleasure vessels, the law's primary emphasis was limited to a few safety measures

directed at vessels used for recreation. The law was not intended to address commercial

vessel safety, and did not include construction standards or provide for inspection.

Operators were not required to be licensed unless the vessel was carrying passengers.

The portion of the act applicable to commercial fishing vessels was codified in 1983 and

entitled “Uninspected Vessels Generally” (46 USC 41). Only four simple requirements

applied to commercial fishing vessels: fire extinguishers, life preservers, flame arrestors,

and ventilation of engine and fuel tank compartments.

Fishing Vessel Safety Bill in 1941. A bill (H.R.3254) was introduced in 1941

specifically addressing fishing vessel safety. It proposed "to place fishing boats [15 gross

tons or over, fishing outside inland waters] under the supervision of the Bureau of Marine

Inspection and Navigation." It outlined specific requirements for watertight bulkheads,

bilge pumps, ring buoys, life preservers, lifeboats, radio telephone, first aid kits, line

throwing guns, annual inspection, and the licensing of operators. Hearings were held on

the bill in October 1941, at which time the bill was supported by the Atlantic Fishermen's

Union of Boston representing Northeast fishermen. However, most other segments of the

fishing industry opposed the measure, particularly the provisions for watertight bulkheads

and the licensing of operators. This initiative died due in part to the outbreak of war.

Federal Boating Act of 1958 (FBA-58). This act amended MBA-40, making it

applicable to "every motor boat or vessel on the navigable waters of the United States...”

FBA-58 required the numbering of all vessels of more than 10 horsepower, and required

accidents involving numbered vessels to be reported to the state, and subsequently to be

reported to the Coast Guard.

Creating Recreational “Uninspected Vessels” in 1971. The Federal Boating

Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA-71) established manufacturer and operator requirements and a

boating safety council to work with the Coast Guard in the adoption of regulations

affecting recreational boating safety. FBSA-71 provided a new category of “uninspected

vessel.” This legislation created two distinct groups of uninspected vessels: recreational

boats and all other uninspected vessels. Boats were defined as "a vessel manufactured or

used primarily for noncommercial use; or leased, rented, or chartered to another for the
Historical Overview

2-3

latter's noncommercial use; or engaged in the carrying of six or fewer passengers."

FBSA-71 granted broad authority to establish recreational boating safety standards,

including manufacturing requirements and mandatory safety equipment. Once again

commercial fishing vessel s were excluded from comparable standards.

Alternative Safety Programs Report to Congress in 1971. The poor safety

record of fishing vessels caused Congress to call for a report considering ways to reduce

casualties. It was completed by the Coast Guard in 1971. The report documented the

fishing industry's poor safety record and concluded that one of the primary causes was

that fishing vessels, with few exceptions, had been exempted from safety regulations.

The study recommended licensing of masters, mandatory safety standards including full

inspection and certification of new vessels, and mandatory and voluntary standards

combined with inspection and certification of existing vessels.

The 1971 report also compared fishing vessels with small passenger vessels noting that

“Congress passed the first Small Passenger Vessel Safety Act in 1956 (PL 84-519) after

investigations of a number of boating accidents revealed that paying passengers were

being taken to sea in boats that were not structurally sound or were overloaded.” PL 84-

519 required inspection of all passenger vessels carrying more than six passengers, less

than 65 feet in length, and between 15 and 100 gross tons. The passenger death rate went

from 29 per year to five per year after passage of the PL 84-519. Presumably, the small

passenger vessel owners at the time felt this burden would destroy their industry. Yet

today the industry is healthy, and the death rate even lower as a result of further safety

measures.

Fishing Vessel Safety Draft Legislation of 1971-1976. Fishing vessel safety

legislation based on the 1971 study was prepared by the Coast Guard and forwarded to

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The National Marine Fisheries Service

(NMFS) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) recommended the Coast Guard defer

action on any legislation requiring the inspection of commercial fishing vessels until

NMFS concluded their study on commercial fishing vessel insurance. When the NMFS

study was completed in January 1975, DOC recommended an alternative proposal to

OMB for a voluntary safety program for commercial fishing vessels. In July 1975, the

Department of Transportation advised OMB that the Coast Guard legislative proposal

would be held back while a study of the DOC proposal was undertaken.

In July 1976, the Secretary of Transportation forwarded copies of the 1971 fishing vessel

study to the Senate Committee on Commerce and the House Committee on Merchant

Marine and Fisheries. However, the Secretary did not recommend the Coast Guard's

legislative program, citing the inflationary impact to the economy and increased interest

in a voluntary safety program by the fishing industry. This initiative for fishing vessel

safety legislation died.

2.2 Marketing Voluntary Fishing Vessel Safety

Voluntary exams in 1978. The Coast Guard initiated a voluntary dockside

uninspected vessel examination program. The Coast Guard's 1979 budget created fortyfive new positions for a vessel examination program. The purpose was to improve safety

throughout the uninspected commercial fleet, including commercial fishing vessels. A
Historical Overview

2-4

project to develop a triennial dockside educational examination program was initiated;

however, the positions were cut in July 1981 due to budget reductions.

Safety Concept in 1980. "Life Safety Approach to Fishing Vessel Design and

Operation" was presented to the Ship Technology and Research Symposium of the

Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. The Coast Guard authors (J. E.

DeCarteret, N.W. Lemley and D.F. Sheehan) suggested that training, combined with the

recently initiated Coast Guard education and voluntary dockside boarding program,

should reduce casualties. They also made specific recommendations regarding industry

training in fire safety and personnel safety and requirements for lifesaving equipment.

They noted, however, that if casualties continued to increase, there would be significant

pressure for the government to intervene into fishing vessel design and operation.

2.3 Tragedies Lead to Modest Standards

Loss of the A-Boats in 1983. The fishing vessels Altair and Americus capsized and

sank in the Bering Sea with the loss of fourteen fishermen. The report resulting from the

two-year joint investigation, by the Coast Guard and the National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB), recommended that the Coast Guard require stability analyses of new or

modified vessels, and seek authority to establish minimum competency standards and

licensing of fishing vessel masters. The Commandant of the Coast Guard did not concur,

preferring to turn the matter over to a new full-time Fishing Vessel Safety Initiative Task

Force formed in August 1984, thus continuing the pursuit of voluntary approaches to

fishing vessel safety.

Voluntary Program. The Coast Guard’s Task Force developed a two-pronged

voluntary program. One part of the initiative was intended to promote vessel safety

through voluntary standards written by the Coast Guard in five Navigation and Vessel

Inspection Circulars (NVIC). These voluntary standards were revised and consolidated

into NVIC 5-86 (released in 1986). The voluntary standards were written primarily for

fishing vessel designers, builders, outfitters, and marine surveyors. The second part of

the initiative sought to promote crew safety through a safety guide which was developed

by the Coast Guard and North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners' Association (NPFVOA).

The NPFVOA was developing a strong safety culture stemming from the 1983 loss of the

A-boats. The safety initiative became part of the Coast Guard Marine Safety Program in

January 1987.

Limited Standards for Fish Processor and Tender Vessel in 1984. The

House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee’s Subcommittee on Coast Guard and

Navigation held a series of hearings on marine safety in 1984. During one of the

sessions, the Committee heard testimony on fishing vessel safety from three individuals

representing very different points of view: a marine safety consultant testified for the

need to establish a comprehensive program for fishing vessel safety in the Coast Guard’s

Office of Marine Safety; a representative of the National Federation of Fishermen spoke

in opposition to any mandatory standards for commercial fishing vessels, preferring to

leave safety to the voluntary efforts of industry organizations; and a representative of the

Pacific Seafood Processors Association, testified against requirements that fish
Historical Overview

2-5

processors less than 5,000 gross tons and fish tenders less than 500 gross tons be

inspected, preferring amendments to permit their continued operation as "uninspected

vessels.”

Congress amended the 46 USC by: 1) defining fishing, fish tender, and fish processing

vessels; 2) exempting fish tender vessels less then 500 gross tons, and fish processing

vessels less than 5,000 gross tons from inspection; and 3) adopting a new Chapter 45 to

set forth requirements for "Fish Processing Vessels." Other statutes were amended to

clarify the licensing and manning requirements for fish processing vessels.

Insurance Crisis Hearings in 1984. During the 1980's, a crisis in insurance

availability was felt throughout the nation, but particularly in the commercial fishing

industry. The fishing industry's poor safety record brought about a situation where many

fishers could not obtain insurance, or, when available, could not afford to pay the

premiums. In 1984, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee began hearings on

the availability and cost of insurance for commercial fishing vessels. The insurance

industry cited as a major cost factor the special treatment afforded seafarers by the

Unseaworthiness Doctrine under Admiralty Law, and the Jones Act (46 USC 688), which

permits an injured seafarer the right to a jury trial. As a result of those field hearings,

members of Congress began to develop legislative proposals addressing liability and

insurance issues. But a notable tragedy accelerated the debate and the prospect of the

nation’s first fishing safety legislation.

Loss of F/V Western Sea in 1985. In August, the seventy-year-old purse-seiner

Western Sea departed Kodiak, Alaska with a six-man crew to fish for salmon. There were

no reports that the vessel was in trouble until fishermen recovered the body of

crewmember Peter Barry from the sea. An intensive search by Coast Guard cutters and

aircraft failed to locate any survivors. This tragedy had a profound effect not only on the

families of those lost but also on the drive to improve fishing vessel safety. After the

death of their son, Ambassador Robert Barry and Peggy Barry worked to galvanize safety

advocates, government officials, Congress, and survivors and loved ones of other

commercial fishermen lost at sea, to renew the campaign for Congressionally mandated

safety standards.

Legislative Effort in 1986. Three bills (H.R. 4407, H.R. 4415 and H.R. 4465) were

introduced in Congress in 1986 to address fishing vessel insurance and liability issues.

Congressman Studds’ bill was exceptional in its demands. It included mandatory

standards for carriage of certain lifesaving equipment [emergency position indicating

radio beacon (EPIRB), liferafts, and immersion suits] on commercial fishing vessels. In

April 1986, three subcommittees of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee

held hearings on these bills. At that time, it was the Coast Guard’s position that "a

voluntary program would be as effective as regulations, with little difference in cost to

the fishermen, much less costly to the Government, and would achieve the desired results

much more rapidly."

A compromise bill, "The Commercial Fishing Vessel Liability and Safety Act" (H.R.

5013), was reported to the House by the Committee. H.R. 5013 limited the liability of

fishing vessel owners to a maximum of $500,000 in cases of permanent injury, except

where there was gross negligence or willful misconduct. It also required additional
Historical Overview

2-6

lifesaving equipment on fishing vessels, including visual distress signals, EPIRBs,

liferafts, immersion suits, and radio equipment. The American Trial Lawyers Association

strongly opposed any limit on liability, and on 13 August 1986, after the Association’s

intense lobbying effort, H.R. 5013 was defeated in the House. The defeat of this

legislation placed added emphasis and urgency on the Coast Guard's voluntary safety

initiative, and sparked the development of new bills for introduction in the next Congress.

Fishing Vessel Safety Standards at Last...with Limitations. In March

1987, two bills were introduced in the House dealing with fishing vessel safety and

insurance liability. H.R. 1836, developed at the urging of Robert and Peggy Barry, dealt

specifically with inspection, equipment requirements, licensing and training. H.R. 1841

addressed liability and safety, but did not propose inspection or licensing. Hearings were

held in June on these bills, and on the companion Senate bill S.849 in September and

December. During House testimony, the Program Manager of the Coast Guard Fishing

Vessel Safety Initiative Task Force stated "the Coast Guard can support consideration for

safety management in H.R. 1841, the stability criteria that is recommended by both bills

and the record keeping by the insurance companies." At that time the Coast Guard did

not "fully support or cannot support inspection, licensing, termination (of unsafe voyage),

and the proposed advisory committee."

In September 1987, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) published a

comprehensive study on "Uninspected Commercial Fishing Vessels" (NTSB/SS-87/02).

The NTSB added needed support for the passage of safety legislation by testifying at both

hearings. Its recommendations included: safety training; basic lifesaving equipment

including exposure suits, approved liferafts, emergency radios, and EPIRBs; flooding

detection; dewatering systems; fire detection; fixed firefighting systems; periodic

inspection; prohibition of alcohol or drug use when engaged in commercial fishing

operations; and the need for research on stability issues.

The House Committee met again in April 1988 to consider a modified version of H.R.

1841. The revised bill had been separated into Title I containing liability and

compensation issues, and Title II containing the safety issues. Efforts to reach an

agreement on the provisions of Title I were unsuccessful, and liability provisions were

dropped. Title II required lifesaving and fire fighting equipment to be placed on board all

fishing vessels with added requirements, such as immersion suits and EPIRBs, for

documented vessels operating seaward of the boundary line that differentiates between

the use of international and domestic navigation rules. It also required that fish

processing vessels meet the standards of the American Bureau of Shipping or similar

organizations; that a study be conducted by the National Academy of Engineering

(National Research Council) on the safety problems of fishing industry vessels and the

need for inspections; that Coast Guard develop a licensing plan; and that a fishing

industry advisory committee be established. The bill, as amended, was passed by

Congress.

On 9 September 1988, the President signed into law the Commercial Fishing Industry

Vessel Safety Act of 1988 (P.L.100-424), the first safety legislation enacted in the

United States applying specifically to commercial fishing vessels.
Historical Overview

2-7

2.4 Key Events Since the Act of 1988

Fishing Industry Advisory Committee in 1988. The Commercial Fishing

Industry Vessel Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee) was formed, and first met at

the Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., in April 1989.

Regulations Published in 1991. Following a six-month comment period and

thirteen public hearings, the Coast Guard published Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel

Regulations (46 CFR 28) on 14 August 1991. These rules became effective on 15

September 1991.

An overwhelming number of comments received addressed a few contentious issues,

including stability requirements for vessels under 79 feet, survival craft on vessels

operating inside or near the boundary line with fewer than four individuals on board, and

administrative exemptions. As a result, these items were removed from the final rule,

and the Coast Guard published a notice of supplemental rulemaking indicating these

items would be addressed separately. The remainder of the rulemaking proceeded

forward without delay, but the requirement for immersion suits for documented and state

numbered vessels operating in seasonably cold waters was removed after the final rule

was published because of considerable confusion over its application. A new workplan is

currently being developed to address the remaining provisions of the Commercial Fishing

Industry Vessel Safety Act (CFIVSA) that do not have implementing regulations.

The Study of Fishing Vessel Safety Published. As mandated by the CFIVSA,

the Secretary of Transportation arranged for the National Research Council (NRC) of the

National Academies of Science and Engineering to conduct a comprehensive study on

fishing vessel safety, including the need for vessel inspections. This report “Fishing

Vessel Safety, Blueprint for a National Program” was published in 1991. On 12

November 1992, based on recommendations in the NRC report, the Secretary submitted a

“Report to Congress for the Inspection of Commercial Industry Vessels.” The report

recommended a three-tiered inspection program for commercial fishing vessels

compliance with the mandated standards in 46 CFR 28:

1. For new and existing vessels, less than 50 feet in length, it allowed for selfexamination.

2. For new and existing vessels, greater than or equal to 50 feet but less than 79 feet in

length, it allowed for third party examination.

3. For vessels greater than or equal to 79 feet in length, more extensive Coast Guard

inspection and load line assignment would be required. Additional hull and

machinery standards would apply to new vessels.

Licensing Plan of 1992. On 13 January 1992 the Coast Guard submitted “A Plan for

Licensing Operators of Uninspected Federally Documented Commercial Fishing Industry

Vessels” to Congress. The plan allowed a five-year implementation period, and for the

first time permitted third-party training certification, rather than a Coast Guard

examination, to demonstrate the required professional knowledge and skill levels for a

license. The plan was to establish two new licenses; Master of fishing vessels less than

79 feet, and Master of fishing vessels less than 200 gross tons. Eligibility requirements
Historical Overview

2-8

included age, character, experience, physical fitness, citizenship, recency of service and

English language ability. On 24 May 1993 a revised plan was submitted based on

proposals by a joint Coast Guard and Advisory Committee working group.

These plans on licensing and inspection were not implemented. Several other efforts to

obtain the necessary budget, resources, and authority were also unsuccessful. The Coast

Guard requested licensing authority again in its FY96 Authorization Act, but Congress

denied the authority based on the estimated $1 million in costs and increased burden on a

depressed fishing industry.
3-1

 Comparison of Standards 

“While no vessel can ever be regarded as unsinkable, it should be

capable of absorbing a number of errors and misfortunes before

there is danger of sinking.”

Statement of the Royal Institution of

Naval Architects. Seatrader Review,

December 1997, page 7

Main Points. Few standards, primarily concerning survival equipment, apply to the

domestic commercial fishing fleet. The small impact of these standards is accentuated when

compared to other domestic commercial fleets and international standards. Standards for

domestic fishing vessels are all the more insignificant when the degree of operational risk is

considered. The paradox is that our domestic commercial fishing industry has the fewest

standards to maintain while possessing the highest risk for marine casualties.

3.1 Comparison of Mandatory Standards

This section describes a qualitative comparison among standards for small and large

commercial fishing vessels, those of other domestic vessel types, and international fishing

vessel standards. The subjects and regulatory standards chosen for this comparison are:

1) Uninspected Passenger Vessel Standards (46 CFR Subchapter “C”)

2) Towing Vessel Standards, less than 300 GT (46 CFR Subchapter “C”)

3) International Fishing Vessel Standards (Torremolinos Convention)

4) Small Passenger Vessel Standards (46 CFR Subchapter “T”)

Since the Torremolinos Convention only applies to commercial fishing vessels greater than

79 feet, it should only be directly compared to the regulations for vessels greater than 79

feet. The Torremolinos Convention is not yet ratified. However, many nations with

significant fishing fleets impose higher standards than the United States imposes on its

vessels.

The regimes of mandatory standards are broadly categorized to simplify the comparison of

detailed regulations. Each regulation category is weighted to represent the

comprehensiveness of the set of regulations. Table 3-1 tabulates the weighting factors for

each set of regulations. The category for fishing vessels greater than 79 feet excludes the

Section Three
Comparison of Standards

3-2

few vessels that are fishing processors, fishing tenders or over 200 net tons. Note that the

amount of improvement in safety that would result from the application of the most

comprehensive regulations in a particular regulation category cannot be inferred from this

qualitative comparison.

Explanation of Weighting Factors

• Drug Testing (46 CFR 16)

This is an “all-or-nothing” category. Drug testing programs are required on vessels that

must be operated by an individual licensed by the Coast Guard.

• Machinery & Electrical Installations (46 CFR 25.35, 46 CFR 25.45, 46 CFR 182, 183)

Subchapter “T” small passenger vessels have thorough mandatory standards for this

category, while the other vessel types have only limited requirements.

• Fire Protection Equipment (46 CFR 25.30; 46 CFR 181)

Subchapter “T” boats have mandatory standards for built-in and portable fire

extinguishing systems, while the other three vessel types require only portable fire

extinguishers.

• Lifesaving Equipment & Arrangements (46 CFR 25.25; 46 CFR 180)

Fishing vessels and Subchapter “T” small passenger vessels have regulations for this

category that include emergency position indicator radio beacons (EPIRBs), life

rafts, and survival suits. Uninspected passenger vessels have lifesaving equipment

regulations, but do not require EPIRBs, or life rafts. Towing vessels are similar to

uninspected passenger vessels, but include EPIRBs.

• Stability & Seaworthiness; Construction & Arrangements (46 CFR 177 - 179)

Of the vessel types studied, the only regulations under these categories are found for

Subchapter “T” boats and fishing vessels larger than 79 feet built or converted after

1991.

Table 3-1. Weight of Mandatory Standards by Vessel Type

Regulations Fishing

Vessels <

79’

 < 16 POB

Uninspected

Passenger

Vessels

Towing

Vessels

< 300 GT

Fishing

Vessels ≥79’

 < 16 POB

Internationa

l

Convention

(Torremolin

os)

Small

Passenger

Vessels

Drug Testing 0 3 3 0 0 3

Machinery & Electrical

Installations

1 1 1 1 2 3

Fire Protection

Equipment

2 2 2 2 3 3

Lifesaving Equipment &

Arrangements

3 1 2 3 3 3

Stability &

Seaworthiness

0 0 0 2

3

3 3

Construction & 0 0 0 0 3 3
Comparison of Standards

3-3

• Licensing (46 U.S.C.A § 7101)

While uninspected passenger vessels and towing vessels have licensing

requirements, the process of obtaining a license is not as thorough as it is for

Subchapter “T” boats. Domestic fishing vessels do not have licensing regulations.

• Inspection / Examination (46 CFR 176; 33 CFR Subchapter S; Coast Guard

Commandant Instruction 16711.13)

Although commercial fishing vessels and uninspected passenger vessels are not

inspected, a limited scope voluntary exam is available.

3.2 Operational Risk Relative to Standards

The mandatory standards for these different types of vessels cannot be compared directly,

since their operations and characteristics are very different. A dam analogy is used to

normalize the “quality” of operational weighted risks and standards to allow direct

comparison.

Standards are written to ensure an adequate level of safety for people and the environment

based on the operational risk of a vessel. Therefore, to judge the “quality” of a set of

standards they must be weighed against the level of operational risk for which they were

designed. The dam analogy illustrates this balance. Diagrams of this analogy for each

regime of mandatory standards are found in Figures 3-1 through 3-6.

Operational Risk. The water represents the level of operational risk of the vessel type.

Risk is quantitatively defined as (Probability x Consequence). The operational risk,

therefore, is composed of two parts:

Consequence of Loss: The impact on the environment, property, or the injury

or loss of human life that will result from a casualty (note:

passengers are traditionally considered to have a higher

consequence than crew).

Operating Conditions: The weather conditions under which the vessel

normally operates, and the hazards associated with the nature of its

work. This is correlated to the probability that a casualty will occur.

The combination of these two variables defines the height of the water and the operational

risk of the vessel type. For example, although small passenger vessels usually operate in fair

weather with consistent loading conditions and operations (operating conditions), the large

number of passengers they carry results in a high consequence if the vessels are lost

(consequence of loss). Commercial fishing vessels only carry a small crew; however, the

probability of a casualty is much greater due to the range of weather conditions they

encounter, variable loading conditions, and open holds and cargo handling while at sea.

Standards. The dam is composed of blocks representing each regulation category listed

in Table 3-1. The size or existence of the block is based on the weighting factors listed in

the Table 3-1’s columns.

The figures clearly illustrate the relative insignificance of existing mandatory standards for

domestic fishing vessels, especially relative to operational risk.
3-4

Comparison of Standards
3-5

Comparison of Standards
4-1

 Casualty Data 

The accident rarely has a single overwhelming cause. Usually there are a number of

elements, none necessarily of outstanding significance in isolation, whose combination

proves fatal.

Seatrade Review, December 1994, p. 9

Main Points. On a national scale, the rash of fishing vessel losses and deaths during

December 1998 and January 1999 is not unusual, nor are the causes types or causes of

casualties unusual. Data shows that fishermen continue to be among the most dangerous

occupations, having far higher fatality rates than fire fighters, police offices, and truck,

taxi, and delivery drivers. In the great majority of fishing industry cases where causes

can be determined, the casualties are preventable. Analysis of the numbers of casualties

makes it appear the post-1988 Fishing Vessel Safety Act vessel losses and deaths are

about 20% less than pre-1988 Act losses. However, the most serious deficiency in

casualty statistics is the lack of total population data to normalize counts of casualties

relative to the whole population, hours underway, total fish landed, or some other more

suitable number. The bottom line is that casualty rates remain very high.

4.1 Approach

Data from recent fishing vessel casualties and historical data was reviewed to determine

how recent casualties compare with other fishing vessel casualty trends since 1994. A

review of Coast Guard Search and Rescue (SAR) data, data from the National Institute

for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and data from the Bureau of Labor

Statistics (BLS) were used to develop and confirm conclusions. An overview of the data

in this section was presented at the workshop attended by Task Force members and

industry advisors.

Data analysis was performed in five steps:

1. Acquire detailed information pertaining to the four shellfish vessel casualties.

Identify other fishing vessel sinkings during December 1998 and January 1999.

2. Process and summarize basic information from the cases identified in step 1.

3. Compare historical fishing vessel casualty data from a period before the Act of

1988 implementation to a similar period following implementation.

Section Four
Casualty Data

4-2

4. Develop preliminary findings to stimulate the Task Force and their industry

advisors in discussing and developing recommendations.

5. Review SAR data and costs associated with rescue efforts. Review NIOSH and

BLS data.

4.2 Recent Fishing Vessel Casualties

The spate of clam and conch fishing vessel losses that occurred between 28 December

1998 and 18 January 1999 (the Predator, Beth Dee Bob, Cape Fear, and Adriatic) was

the impetus for establishing the Task Force. To better analyze the nature of recent vessel

casualties, case logs and reports were reviewed, and fishing vessel casualties meeting the

following criteria were selected:

• engaging in commercial fishing (excluding sinkings at dock),

• occurring between 01 December 1998 and 31 January 1999, and,

• resulting in total loss of the vessel.

This filtering yielded in 20 cases. This sample represents a small fraction of the fishing

vessels suffering casualties or fishermen being injured nationwide during this period.

Preliminary case information was sought from Coast Guard units investigating each of

the 20 casualties. The intent was to develop as much information as possible, in a very

short period. The survey allowed recent casualties to be reviewed relative to historical

data, and to determine if the recent casualties represented a statistical anomaly or a

significant shift in casualty trends.

The investigations of the twenty casualties are ongoing as this report is being completed.

Three of the casualties described in more detail later are undergoing formal investigations

and will not be complete for some time.

Overview of Recent Fishing Vessel Casualties. The 20 casualties this report

covers are a sample of the serious recent vessel casualties. They show great diversity in

all aspects: fishing type, hull material, vessel age, etc., and they stimulated ideas for

identifying problems, solutions, and recommendations. This casualty information was

presented at the Task Force Workshop.

Figure 4-1 summarizes characteristics of the 20 vessels and Figure 4-2 is a casualty

synopsis. Since several vessels sank without survivors or were state-registered vessels,

some information is unknown.

The preliminary findings from these 20 casualties show:

• ignoring stability issues,

• lack of preparation to use lifesaving equipment, and,

• poor maintenance of vessel and equipment.
Casualty Data

4-3

Fishing Vessel Sinkings from 1 December 1998 to 31 January 1999.

Figure 4-1. Fishing Vessel Particulars

Vessel

Name

Fishing

Type

Gross

Tons

Net

Tons

Length

(feet)

Breath

(feet)

Depth

(feet)

Hull

Material

Year

Built

CHIP AHOY! Lobster 35.0 FRP

CONQUEST 12 10 30.5 10.3 5.2 FRP 1972

LINDA E Gilnetter 29 20 39.8 13.0 5.7 Steel 1937

CAPT. J. V. Trawler 21 18 37.5 16.6 3.8 Wood 1978

CURRENT Longliner 30 24 41.0 14.0 8.0 FRP 1993

SEA BUM Live Fish

LOVELY DAY Live Fish

KIM LENG Shrimper 45.0

CF8872JF Dory Vessel 18.0

BUTT UGLY

PREDATOR Conch 14 10 33.4 13.2 5.6 Wood 1979

BO-NITA Shrimper 41 33 49.0 17.0 7.5 FRP 1990

BETH DEE BOB Clammer 96 65 84.3 26.0 7.2 Steel 1990

CAPE FEAR Clammer 188 127 105.0 24.0 13.5 Steel 1983

RAKE 11 10 38.0 12.7 3.4 Wood 1961

ADRIATIC Clammer 134 95 74.1 22.0 11.2 Steel 1977

ELLIE B Clammer 66 57 60.8 19.5 7.8 Wood 1978

NOWITNA Crabber 198 134 124.9 30.2 9.8 Steel 1942

KAVKAZ 15 11 35.8 11.0 6.2 FRP 1976

ATLANTOS Longliner 25 20 37.8 11.2 8.6 FRP 1982

Figure 4-2. Fishing Vessel Casualty Information

Vessel

Name

Incident

Date

Aprx

Time

USCG Invest

Port

No.

Dead Major Issues And Comments

CHIP AHOY! 02-Dec-98 1200 Bangor, ME 0 Load shift & capsized while dragging.

CONQUEST 08-Dec-98 0711 San Francisco, CA 0 25-ft. wave struck & capsized vessel.

LINDA E 11-Dec-98 0930 Milwaukee, WI 3 Missing vessel.

CAPT. J. V. 15-Dec-98 1000 Morgan City, LA 0 Struck submerged object.

CURRENT 15-Dec-98 1230 Kenai, AK 1 High center of gravity. Capsized.

SEA BUM 16-Dec-98 1900 Santa Barbara, CA 1 Anchor line wrapped around prop.

LOVELY DAY 17-Dec-98 0725 San Francisco, CA 2 Storm, vessel hit rocky coastline.

KIM LENG 20-Dec-98 0430 New Orleans, LA 0 Ran into unlit platform.

CF8872JF 20-Dec-98 0720 Los Angeles, CA 1 Dislodged cork plug.

BUTT UGLY 22-Dec-98 1025 San Francisco, CA 0 Line caught in prop, waves over stern.

PREDATOR 28-Dec-98 1130 Hampton Roads, VA 1 Overloaded. 113 conch pots o/b.

RAKE 02-Jan-99 1621 Tampa, FL 0 Unknown.

BO-NITA 05-Jan-99 0643 Savannah, GA 0 Problem with seachest suction.

BETH DEE BOB 07-Jan-99 1750 Philadelphia, PA 4 Stability issues.

CAPE FEAR 08-Jan-99 2115 Providence, RI 2 Stability, down flooding, w/t integrity.

ADRIATIC 18-Jan-99 1500 Philadelphia, PA 4 Stability issues.

ELLIE B 18-Jan-99 0600 Philadelphia, PA 0 Capt fell asleep. 896 clam bushels o/b.

NOWITNA 25-Jan-99 Anchorage, AK 0 Stability issues.

KAVKAZ 30-Jan-99 1700 Anchorage, AK 2 Icing on vessel affected stability.

ATLANTOS 30-Jan-99 1900 Anchorage, AK 0 Down flooding. Watertight integrity.
Casualty Data

4-4

Four 1998-99 Clam and Conch Fishing Vessel Casualties were the impetus

for chartering this Task Force. The investigations are not yet closed; therefore, incident

facts here must be viewed as preliminary. In retrospect, each casualty appears to have

been preventable through a combination of eliminating latent conditions that caused

flooding, training to respond to emergencies, and the using of survival equipment.

(1) F/V Predator. Sinking, 28 December 1998, one dead, one survivor.

F/V Predator was returning to Ocean City, MD with 113 loaded conch pots stowed aft,

each weighing 40 pounds. The Captain noticed water on the deck and slowed the

vessel’s speed to find the source. Water came over the stern, swamping the well deck

within 45 seconds. The vessel remained afloat with 4-5 feet of the bow above the water.

The Captain managed to issue a distress call but his radio was not set on a distress

frequency. The life raft deployed hours later and both men swam to it. The Captain died

of hypothermia overnight. The vessel was not reported overdue until 0830 the next day.

Preliminary Findings:

• The operator had his radio set to Channel 10, a working frequency, vice Channel

16 the distress radio frequency, and in his haste to scramble to safety on the

bow had only enough time to say "Mayday" once.

• The immersion suits were inaccessible. Two persons were able to break the boat's

plexiglas windows and retrieve lifejackets, but not the immersion suits that, if

donned, would have prolonged the onset of hypothermia.

• The life raft and emergency radio beacon (EPIRB) were atop the pilothouse.

Because the boat assumed a stern down attitude with 4-5 feet of the bow

above water, the hydrostatic pressure was insufficient to release either device.

• The EPIRB was registered under the vessel's former name. The operator never

re-registered the EPIRB when he bought the boat. Therefore, potentially vital

information would not have been available to rescuers even if the signal was

transmitted. Tests of the EPIRB showed it worked properly, but the canister

and hydrostatic release were not recovered for testing.

• A crewmember attempted to free the life raft in the first few seconds by pulling

on the straps. He was able to get only one strap off. He did not know he

could release the raft by pulling the sea painter (a rope attached to the raft).

The raft later deployed, most likely after the other strap gave way.

The preliminary findings point to an overriding problem - training. All the equipment in

the world will not save fishermen's lives if they do not take the time to learn how to

respond to emergencies. These two people had less than a minute to scramble to the

vessel's bow. A common thread in many fishing vessel losses is the suddenness with

which they sink. Either there is a significant situational awareness problem or the

problems develop so fast there is little time to respond.
Casualty Data

4-5

(2) F/V Beth Dee Bob. Sinking, 6 January 1999, loss of four lives, no survivors.

The F/V Beth Dee Bob left Point Pleasant, NJ for a 24 hour trip to dredge for ocean

quahogs. After an uneventful trip, the vessel was returning home when the seas grew

rough and the 84-foot vessel foundered and sank approximately 13 miles off Manasquan,

NJ. The Coast Guard received a distress call at around 0540 local time, saying the vessel

was taking on water. The sister ship Danielle Maria, two Coast Guard vessels, and a

USCG helicopter raced to the location pinpointed by satellite receivers. An hour later, a

crewmember was found by the helicopter floating in a life preserver, holding a strobe

light and bobbing in a 39 degree heaving sea. He was airlifted to Jersey Medical where

he died. Two empty rafts were found. The Beth Dee Bob sunk before help could arrive.

Preliminary Finding:

• A former Captain of the Beth Dee Bob stated he believed the vessel’s stability letter

did not serve its purpose. He knew the vessel had a stability letter, but never bothered

to read it because he “knows better how the vessel should be loaded.” He further

stated “the more water in the hold, the better she rode - as long as you kept her on an

even keel” and “the hatch covers were only to protect the clams from the sun and

heat; after all, many boats have no hatches at all!” While the Beth Dee Bob’s

stability letter seems to be very clearly written, there are indications that the only

information of concern to the crew was the maximum number of full cages of clams.

(3) F/V Cape Fear. Sinking, 8 January 1999, loss of two lives, three survivors.

The F/V Misty Dawn reported the F/V Cape Fear was taking on water with five

persons on board off of New Bedford, MA. Approximately 20 minutes before

sinking, the Cape Fear Captain called the Misty Dawn and reported they "took two

good ones," implying two hard waves or rolls. Later, the Cape Fear reported they

were having "a problem" and asked the Misty Dawn to check on them when they

got a chance. When the Misty Dawn called back the Cape Fear reported there was

water everywhere and asked the Misty Dawn to call the Coast Guard. The Misty

Dawn rescued three crewmembers.

The Cape Fear was laden with clams as she was returning to New Bedford. The

vessel’s Captain testified that the three deckhands were talking in the pilothouse,

with “not a care in the world” when they initially noticed the stern was sinking.

The vessel was operating with less than 18 inches of freeboard, fully loaded, and

taking water over the stern while a port aft hatch cover was open approximately 6

inches. The weather was 6-10 foot seas, 25-30 knot winds, with rain and sleet.

Preliminary Findings:

• Vessel loaded with 130 cages of clams at 32 bushels per cages - 10 more cages

than specified in its Stability Manual.

• Survivors testified emergency drills were only discussed, not performed as if an

actual emergency. Crew did not have any training other than CPR. Drills were

not logged.
Casualty Data

4-6

• The clam tank hatches were not maintained in a watertight condition.

• The port aft clam hatch was open approximately 6 inches.

• The vessel sank within 5 minutes of when the crew noticed water had stopped

shedding off deck at the aft clam tank.

• Two survival suit zippers (worn by the deceased members) were difficult to pull up.

Only 1 of 5 survival suit lights worked and one suit (on a deceased crewman) did

not have enough reflective tape.

• Divers found the EPIRB in the galley tethered to the EPIRB bracket. There was no

time to manually deploy the liferaft; however, the hydrostatic release worked and

the raft did deploy at some later time.

• The F/V Misty Dawn rescued the master, mate and one deckhand. These survivors

had been in water approximately 30 minutes. One crewman remains missing; he

was last seen with his survival suit half donned. The body of the other crewman

was found the next morning washed ashore with his survival suit zipped-up to the

waist only.

(4) F/V Adriatic. Sinking, 18 January 1999, loss of four lives, no survivors.

On 18 January 1999, Coast Guard Station Atlantic City, NJ received a call from a worker

at Barney's Dock in Atlantic City reporting F/V Adriatic was overdue from a fishing trip.

Two Coast Guard HH-65A Dolphin helicopters from Air Station Atlantic City and a 47-

foot motor lifeboat from Station Barnegat, NJ, searched the area. The Coast Guard

recovered a life ring with the name F/V Adriatic stenciled on it, and an unmarked survival

suit six miles off shore. F/V Adriatic was located sunk about nine miles due east of

Barnegat Light, NJ. No survivors were found; two bodies were later recovered in the

vessel and two crewmembers are missing.

F/V Adriatic sent out a distress call but it was too garbled to understand, delaying a

search that might have saved all four crewmembers.

Preliminary Findings:

• Vessel sank quickly in heavy weather with a full load of clams.

• Unintelligible “Mayday” call was picked up by rescue units, but units were

unable to ascertain vessel’s position or name.

• The video of vessel’s exterior shows no evidence of hull fractures or failure.

Video from the engine room reveals evidence of maintenance problems with

the main sea suction valve and clam pump piping. The valve stem of the main

sea suction valve was broken off, and a flange of 10" sea suction line was

missing two bolts with two additional bolts loose. The sea suction valve was

held in a fully open position with a pulling device called a come-along. There

was no ability to close the main sea suction valve, and there was an

approximately 1 inch gap in the flange.
Casualty Data

4-7

• The EPIRB transmitted a signal, but did not deploy and float to the surface. A

pin in the hydro release had not been replaced in accordance with the

manufacturer's recommendation.

• The liferaft was initially caught in the railing of the vessel and was still

attached to the sea painter and in the casing. Approximately six days after the

casualty, the raft was found fully inflated after it washed ashore and was

recovered by Station Barnegat.

• A sister vessel’s stability analysis puts the maximum load at 30 cages of clams

which was the amount being carried at time of casualty.

• There is no record of any members of crew having participated in safety

training given by various entities in Mid Atlantic Marine Safety Association.

• Marijuana was found in a pocket of a deceased crewmember and a bong found

in personal articles, but autopsies revealed no evidence of drug or alcohol

influence.

4.3 Historical Overview of Fishing Vessel Casualties

This overview will focus on deaths on fishing vessels and total losses of fishing vessels.

In both categories, the casualty will be counted only if the vessel was engaged in fishing

at the time of the casualty, including transits between fishing location and the port. It

does not include fishing vessel losses that occurred while moored or when the vessel was

used for recreational purposes. It also does not include deaths from natural causes, e.g.,

heart attacks. This section also compares casualties that occurred prior to and after the

Fishing Vessel Safety Act of 1988. Population data or other suitable information to

reliably normalize the count of casualties (e.g., vessel losses per 100,000 operating hours)

is a continued shortfall. Analysis of the numbers of casualties makes it appear the post1988 Fishing Vessel Safety Act vessel losses and deaths are about 20% less than pre1988 Act losses. However, the most serious deficiency in casualty statistics is the lack of

total population data to normalize counts of casualties relative to the whole population,

hours underway, total fish landed, or some other more suitable number. Depending upon

the source, estimates of the number of workers in the fishing vessel industry range from

45,000 to 125,000. Part of the problem may rest with the fact that many fishermen fish

part-time or seasonally. These numbers should be equated to full-time jobs. The bottom

line is that casualty rates remain very high.

Regardless of how the data is displayed, the fatality rate within the fishing industry

continues to be among the highest of all occupations. In 1995, there were 74 fishing

vessel deaths in the fishing vessel industry. Assuming a population of 47,000 workers,

this translates to a rate of over 160 deaths per 100,000 workers. Second that year were

sailors and deckhands on other class of vessels at 115, and timber cutting and logging

occupations was third at 101. The death rate for fishermen remained high at 181 in 1996,

134 in 1997, and preliminary data shows there were 179 for 1998. In 1996, fishermen

death rates were 16 times higher than the protective service occupations such a fire
Casualty Data

4-8

fighting, police and detectives, which was 11.3 fatalities per 100,000 employed, and

almost 8 times higher than persons operating motor vehicles for a living at 22.7.

Workforce figures used above are based upon the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of

Labor Statistics (BLS) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. Fishing vessel deaths came

from a detailed analysis of deaths recorded in the Coast Guard's Marine Safety

Information System. Together with BLS population data, the death rate per 100,000

workers was calculated. The Coast Guard's 1997 Business Plan recognizes significant

problems with the worker population data by stating "since 1993, BLS population

estimates have fluctuated dramatically from year to year, between 22 and 24 percent.

Consultations with BLS statisticians indicate substantial estimating error exists in certain

worker population estimates, particularly the fishing industry." The 1997 Coast Guard

Business Plan estimates were indexed to a 1987 National Marine Fishery Service survey.

Using the BLS figures in the 1997 Coast Guard Business Plan, death rates in the fishing

vessel industry would be approximately one-half the rates shown above, still very high.

In order to make fatality statistics as accurate as possible, the Fishing Vessel Task force

examined several different sources to identify fishing vessel deaths. As a result,

additional deaths were identified that were not previously included in other reports. For

example, a death previously attributed to a passenger vessel, upon further research, was

found to be a fishing vessel death. Thus, the 66 deaths reported in the 1997 Coast Guard

Marine Safety Business Plan increased to 74.

Control Charts. The control chart is a graphical and statistical tool that will test a

process against the average and standard deviation of its theoretical distribution. It flags

points that are “out of control,” or beyond the predictable variability of the process.

Control chart theory establishes three standard deviations as the limit beyond which a

point is “out of control.” The process here is the system that produces fishing casualties

including Coast Guard policies, industry or company policies, economic fluctuations, and

the extent of latent conditions and failed defenses that caused the casualties. When the

process is determined to be “out of control,” examination of all these factors under the

total umbrella of the fishing vessel industry is needed to find the cause. Without

normalizing the data, factors such as broadly declining operating hours due to fishery

management restrictions will adversely influence the display.

Control charting can help explore and measure maritime community, public and private,

marine safety process performance. In looking at a control chart, a process is considered

out of control when a data point falls outside the natural process control limits. Also, a

process is in trouble when five or more data points fall above or below the mean or

average. The value of control charting is in its ability to test central tendency and natural

variability of the processes within its normal state, and alert program managers to

changes and conditions that require attention.

Figure 4-3 is a control chart. The top chart depicts the view of the variation of individual

values as it relates to the upper and lower control limits that bound its natural process and

is called an X-Chart. The bottom chart depicts the variation in the range between
Casualty Data

4-9

consecutive values shown in the X-Chart as it relates to its upper control limit and is

called a moving range chart or R-Chart. The X-Chart and R-Chart in this scenario are

depicting a time series view of fishing vessel total losses and differences in losses from

month to month (ranges) between 1994 and 1998. Any points that fall outside the limits

are considered “out of control” and should be investigated. The mean and control limits

were derived using 1994 as the base year.

The control charts show in general that the fishing vessel process as it relates to total

losses among vessels is functioning within predictable limits from an industry-wide

perspective. This is not to say the number of fishing vessel losses isn’t too high, but that

it is an expected result for fishing vessel losses in any given month. Also shown on the

X-Chart, or upper chart, is that the total number of losses appears to have been

significantly reduced since 1996 as indicated by the number of data points below the

average line. This reduction in the number of losses, especially in 1998, requires further

Figure 4-3. Control Charts for Total Loss of Vessel for Fishing Vessels 1994 - 1998

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J

Number of vessel losses

Upper natural process limit

Lower natural process limit

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

MEAN

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J

Variance of # of vsl losses

Moving Ranges (mR)

UCL R - upper control limit

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

MEAN
Casualty Data

4-10

investigation. Although this is a positive sign, it begs for more research into the reasons

why there is a reduction. The reason might be safer vessels, or it could be fewer

operating hours due to fishery restrictions, milder weather due to climatic changes, or

other reasons.

The number of deaths occurring on fishing vessels is shown in Figure 4-4. This is again

an X-Chart (top) and an R-Chart (bottom) depicting a time series view of all fishing

vessel casualty deaths and ranges by month between 1994 and 1998. The mean and

control limits were also derived using 1994 as the base year. Fishermen reported missing

and never found were presumed dead and counted as such in these charts.

The number of deaths per month also appears to be within predictable limits although

unlike the fishing vessel losses, the number of deaths are not decreasing. The high peaks

on the R-Chart point toward large fluctuations in the number of deaths from month to

Figure 4-4. Control Charts for All Deaths on Fishing Vessels 1994 - 1998

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J

Number of fishing vsl deaths

Upper natural process limit

Lower natural process limit

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

MEAN

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J

Variance of # of F/V deaths

Moving Ranges (mR)

UCL R - upper control limit

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

MEAN
Casualty Data

4-11

month, and when matched with the upper X-Chart show those deaths come in spurts,

usually during the months of December and January. It is not surprising, then, that there

were a number of high incidents and deaths during this recent December and January.

Link between deaths and casualty type. The pie chart in Figure 4-5 illustrates

how the deaths shown in the above control chart were associated with a vessel casualty.

From 1994 – 1998, 396 fishermen lost their lives while fishing. We were able to show

which of those personnel casualties resulted from a vessel casualty. These casualties, or

specific events in an incident, are based on the first event in the casualty. There can be

numerous events in an incident (e.g., a vessel can ground, causing it to flood, and then

sink, resulting in a death by drowning or from other means). In this scenario, that

casualty would be counted as a grounding in the pie chart since it was the first event that

set off the sequence of events resulting in a personnel casualty. The category of

“personnel casualty” is used when there was only one event in the casualty and the death

was not a result of a vessel casualty. These deaths are most often associated with falling

overboard, or getting caught in equipment.

As shown in Figure 4-5, 57% of the deaths can be directly related to a vessel casualty.

Most of those vessel casualties were from the vessel sinking, flooding, capsizing, or

failure of vessel integrity. Last are those deaths associated with collisions, groundings, or

Figure 4-5. Fishing Vessel Deaths & Personnel Casualties 

1994 - Jan 1999

CAP S IZ E

16%

SIN K

16%

FLOOD IN G

11%

OTHER

3%

C O LLISIO N

3%

F IR E /EXP LOSIO N

3%

GRO UND IN G

3%

UNKNOWN

2%

PERSONNE L 

C A SUA LTIE S

43%
Casualty Data

4-12

possible piloting errors. The “other” category includes abandonment, loss of vessel

control, and other structural failures.

Comparison of Pre- and Post-1988 Data. To show the impact the Act of 1988

had on total vessel losses and deaths, two 5-year periods were compared - one before and

one after the Act. Figure 4-6 is a chart on the number of fishing vessel total losses based

on these time periods and distributed using the first event in an incident as explained

earlier. Comparison of the periods show the total number of losses have been reduced by

over 20%. The biggest declines come in explosions/fires and sinkings, with an increase

in the number of floodings. However, a definite downward trend cannot be declared until

the count of losses can be normalized.

The “unknown” category for the post-Act time period reflects investigations that had not

been completed by the date of the data extraction. The “other” category includes

pollution incidents, abandonment, and disappearance without a trace.

Although there was a decrease in the total number of fishing vessel losses between the

two periods, the percentage makeup of the casualties is similar to that shown in Figure 4-

7. There has not been a significant shift in the manner in which vessels are being lost.

Figure 4-6. Total Fishing Vessel Losses Comparison

Before and After The Act of 1988

151

29

21

335

255

121

105

98

76

24

19

34

72

179

153

132

86

40

144

0

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

SINK

EXPLOSION/FIRE

GROUNDING

COLLISION/ALLISION

FLOODING

CAPSIZE

LOSS VES CNTRL

STRUCTURAL FAIL

OTHER

UNKNOWN

# OF TOTAL LOSSES

1984-1988

1994-1998

TOTAL LOSSES:

1984-1988: 1177

1994-1998: 897
Casualty Data

4-13

Vessel losses and deaths as related to vessel length are shown in Figures 4-8 and 4-9.

The length categories are directly related to the standards based on length. For example,

the 1988 Act requires stability calculations for vessels over 79 feet for new or modified

vessels since 1991. The comparison shows no significant change.

Figure 4-7. Total Loss of Vessel by Accident Type

Before and After The Act of 1988

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1984-1988 1994-1998

STRUCTURAL FAIL

LOSS VES CNTRL

CAPSIZE

FLOODING

COLLISION/ALLISION

GROUNDING

EXPLOSION/FIRE

SINK

Figure 4-8. Fishing Vessel Total Losses By Length

Before and After The Act of 1988

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1984-1988 1994-1998

>= 79 FEET

65-78 FEET

50-64 FEET

26-49 FEET

<26 FEET
Casualty Data

4-14

From 1984 – 1989, 519 fishermen lost their lives compared to 396 who died during from

1994 – 1998, about a 20% improvement. The types of deaths include being crushed,

struck by an object, falling into the water, galley accidents or being caught in the lines.

We can determine from the data in both periods the total number of fishermen who ended

up in the water. For this comparison, of the 519 deaths in the pre-Act period, 423

fishermen deaths were associated with the person ending up in the water from a vessel

sinking, capsizing or simply falling in the water which resulted in a death from exposure,

drowning, hypothermia or other water related means. In the post-Act period, 298

fishermen died in the same fashion. This accounts for 84.8% and 83.2% respectively of

all the fishing industry deaths. [There were 20 unknown types of deaths in the pre-Act

period and 38 in the post-Act which were not used in figuring the percentages.]

Fishermen are dying on the same size vessels today as they were in the pre-Act period as

depicted by Figure 4-9, despite a number of regulations in the Act of 1988 that increased

the standards for longer vessels. Around 40% of all deaths still occur on vessels over 49

feet in length.

Cost Statistics. Total loss of vessel and deaths are just the tip of the iceberg when

identifying the property, injury, and other costs of all fishing vessel accidents. According

Figure 4-9. Fishing Vessel Deaths By Length of Vessel

Before and After The Act of 1988

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1984-1988 1994-1998

>= 79 FEET

65-78 FEET

50-64 FEET

26-49 FEET

<26 FEET
Casualty Data

4-15

to the study “The Economic Impacts of Accidents on the Marine Industry,”1 the figures

are quite staggering. Taking into account both the direct costs and indirect costs such as

drops in stock prices, insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and P&I club

payments, interruptions in operations or loss of contracts among many others, accidents

cost the fishing industry over $240 million annually. This is more than three times the

annual cost identified in that study for the tanker industry, and four times greater than the

passenger vessel industry. The $240 million annual cost covers almost a quarter of the

$1.1 billion the entire marine industry suffers from marine casualties including pollution,

property damage, fatalities, and other indirect costs.

Not included in these statistics are losses of productivity, other indirect costs, and the cost

of Coast Guard search and rescue (SAR) for fishing vessels. Available data for 1992 and

1993 shows the Coast Guard conducted over 8000 SAR cases for fishing vessels,

expending over 38,000 resource hours at a cost of approximately $45.7 million.

 

1

 ICF Kaiser Consulting Group, Incorporated (ICF), Soza & Company, Ltd. (SOZA), Marine Research

Associates, dated April 1997 and prepared for U.S. Coast Guard Standards Evaluation and Development

Division, Washington, D.C.
5-1

Section Five

Conclusions

and

Recommendations

“We Fishermen used to have a more fatalistic attitude to our profession:

we knew it was dangerous, and we knew lives were often lost. But we

accepted this, thinking that this was simply the way of fishing and not

much could be done about it. But we were wrong and you helped prove us

wrong.”

Letter of 19 November 1998 from

North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners

Association member Robert Desautel

of Nina Fisheries, Inc., to Leslie

Hughes, Executive Director of the

Northwest Pacific Fishing Vessel

Owner’s Association, upon her being

awarded the U. S. Coast Guard’s

Meritorious Public Service Award

Main Points. The key question for policy makers is “Do the continued high loss rates

in the commercial fishing industry represent an acceptable risk by today’s standards?”

The Task Force concludes that the risk is not acceptable, that pushing for breakthrough

levels of reduced fishing industry losses is the right thing to do, and that the time is right

to take on this challenge. Solutions must come from improvements to the broad system

that determines the importance of safety in the fishing industry. Responsibility for this

rests not only with fishermen, but also with line management, industry groups, and policy

makers. The Task Force arrived at many of the same types of recommendations that

were made in the past. Implementing the recommendations will result in profound

reductions in injuries, loss of life, and loss of property.

Changing Public Policy. The Task Force believes that the comprehensive

recommendations that follow are the right thing to do, and that the present is the right

time to work for a breakthrough to significantly lower casualty losses. However, the

most difficult issues are beyond the scope of the Task Force’s Charter. For many

recommendations, the public, fishermen, industry, regulatory agencies, and Congress will

have to define today’s standard of acceptable risk for the industry, relative to competing

needs.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-2

Unsuccessful legislative efforts to improve commercial fishing vessel safety did not meet

the high political standards required for a controversial measure to prevail. Commercial

fishing risks have been deemed acceptable when compared to the actual and perceived

costs of meeting higher safety standards. However, we now have almost a decade of

experience under the Fishing Vessel Safety Act of 1988 (implemented in 1991). As our

knowledge and values have evolved, so have our standards of what is an acceptable risk

for the fishermen, and what we are willing to pay to reduce that risk. This report is a step

in the journey that can lead to breakthrough advances in safety on board commercial

fishing vessels.

Conclusions. The history of safety in the industry, comparison of standards regimes,

and analysis of safety data lead to the following sets of conclusions:

Recent Casualties Characteristics

1. Common conditions in many recent casualties are poor vessel or equipment

condition, inadequate preparation for emergencies, and lack of awareness of or

ignoring stability issues.

2. There is no common element that could enable a “quick-fix” solution.

History and Casualty Data

1. The continued top ranking of commercial fishing as the most hazardous of marine

transportation occupations, and among the most hazardous of national occupations, is

a call for corrective action.

2. Recent casualties are indicative of historic casualty types and rates.

3. Most casualties are preventable.

4. The minimal and largely voluntary scope of safety standards appears to have

modestly reduced losses since implementation of the Safety Act in 1991. Data

quality for determining casualty rates needs great improvement.

5. The history of fishing vessel safety clearly shows that a solid foundation of

comprehensive standards was never built. Safety standards are low.

6. The dearth of industry standards has evolved to where a lax approach to vessel

condition, operator knowledge, and other safety factors has defined the industry

standard.

7. Within this framework unsafe conditions can proliferate, awaiting active failures and

failed defenses to become casualties.

8. A foundation of standards must be developed and adhered to if a broad culture of

safety is to develop.

9. After a culture of safety develops, there are improved prospects of evolving to

successful self-regulatory and voluntary regimes.

Industry Feedback

1. Widespread release of this report will generate interest, debate, and bolster awareness

of safety issues.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-3

2. Some recommendations, especially in Section 5.7, are designed for quick

development of practical safety issues for broad dissemination.

Recommendations and Direction

Recommendations are divided into seven categories in an action plan format later in this

Section. They comprehensively describe a recommended course that, in many areas,

would require a broad cooperative effort between industry and government. Many

recommendations can be done now. Those requiring more time generally require

significant change in agency policy and more resources, cultivation of industry support,

and often new legislative authority. The overall top ten ranking, by potential for

reducing loss of life and property, is listed under each respective category as follows:

8. Coordinate Fishery Management with Safety

 #8 Limit Entry into Fisheries

9. Establish Operator and Crew Standards

 #3 Operator’s License

10. Ensure Vessels Comply with Standards

 #1 Safety Inspections (#2 was folded into #1)

 #4 Safety Exam Prerequisite for Federal Fishery Permits

 #6 Safety Examinations

11. Establish Safety and Stability Standards

 #5 Good Marine Practices

 #9 Registration/Documentation (harmonize federal/state)

#10 Safety Levels (use territorial sea baseline v. boundary line)

12. Improve Program Management

13. Conduct Research and Development

 #7 Better Investigation Data

14. Inform Fishermen

Many Recommendations. The Coast Guard, the National Institute of Occupational

Safety and Health (NIOSH), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the National Marine

Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Research Council (NRC), and other agencies and

organizations have made numerous recommendations that would reduce the risk on

fishing vessels. Some reports from these agencies contain analyses supporting the

recommendations. Appendix E contains recommendations from notable NTSB, NRC,

and NIOSH reports, and their comparison with Task Force recommendations.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-4

How Recommendations Were Developed. There is no “Silver Bullet” to make

the commercial fishing industry safe. Accidents don’t just happen. And casualties rarely

result from the sea overwhelming a seaworthy vessel and a first-class crew. Casualties

are seldom attributable to a single factor that causes the event, the so-called “root cause.”

The Task Force developed recommendations at its workshop using the International

Maritime Organization’s draft Guidelines for the Investigation of Human Factors in

Marine Casualties and Incidents, a proposed Annex to the International Code for the

Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents. The Guidelines draw on the cutting

edge accident analysis techniques pioneered by Dr. James Reason. Using the Guidelines,

the Task Force identified and addressed recommendations to reduce latent unsafe

conditions in the commercial fishing environment that set the stage for an accident, as

well as recommendations to reduce the likelihood of typical mistakes and failures.

Latent Conditions Ë Active Failure Ë Failed Defenses Ë Casualty

If the number of unsafe conditions “hidden” or latent in the system can be reduced, there

will be less likelihood that an active failure will evolve into an accident.

Unsafe Latent Conditions. The Task Force and industry advisors, while concerned with

unsafe acts or active failures, focused on identifying unsafe latent conditions that allow

active failures to evolve into accidents. A wide variety of active failures of both

equipment and people cause accidents. A particularly high number of dangerous or

unsafe conditions are permitted to be latent in the fishing industry, allowing a random

confluence of these conditions and events to become an accident. For example, the

decision to improperly load a vessel or to make an ill-advised vessel modification

establishes unsafe conditions that are latent in the system until certain loading and sea

conditions cause the active failure - a capsizing with often tragic results. These decisions

occur both through ignorance and a disregard for safety.

Human error and equipment failures cannot be legislated out of existence; there are no

“zero defect” mariners or vessels. However, it is possible to greatly reduce the number of

unsafe conditions found in the system. Implementing the Task Force recommendations

will greatly reduce unsafe conditions, the risk of active failures, and casualties.

Failures of the Human System. The Task Force recognized that the unsafe conditions

latent in the system are not exclusively created by mariners themselves. While the Task

Force did examine conditions created by the mariner, it focused on identifying failures in

the “system,” namely unsafe latent conditions on the vessel, in the company, and in the

industry. These were conditions often created by people other than the mariner, which

set the stage for an accident to happen. These unsafe conditions were created by the

skippers, operating company managers, owners, insurance agencies, policy makers, and

by larger market forces. Since, conditions created by the system can only be fixed by
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-5

altering the system, recommendations are directed to the entire range of people and

groups involved.

Failures of Equipment. In looking at the active failures leading to capsizing, sinking,

death, and serious injury, the Task Force concluded that both active equipment and active

human failures are prevalent. In some industries, such as the nuclear power industry,

active equipment failures have largely been eliminated. Similarly, ergonomic design,

training, and education have helped reduce human error in some industries, such as the

airline industry, to a bare minimum. This is far from the case in the fishing industry.

Gear, equipment, and vessels fail because they no longer meet the originally intended

specification. Unsafe latent conditions are created when decisions are made to use

equipment beyond its service life, use equipment in ways that were not originally

intended, or apply faulty criteria for design, manufacture, or installation of the equipment.

Inspection of vessels, stability criteria, and required equipment standards can greatly

reduce equipment failures and unsafe conditions in the system.

Inspection proposals have been criticized in the past because inspection does not address

the human component of accidents. However, the Task Force concluded that the

prevention of prevalent equipment failures is critically important to improving safety in

the commercial fishing industry, and that an inspection program, aimed at eliminating or

reducing unsafe conditions, is an indispensable part of a comprehensive strategy to

protect fishermen.

Defenses. As previously noted, there are no “zero defect” mariners or vessels. Active

failures are unavoidable, but defenses can be built into the system that can prevent those

failures from becoming a tragic accident or, at least reduce the consequences of that

accident. Noting this, many recommendations are aimed at improving defensive systems

and include improving manning and lifesaving equipment standards, vessel condition,

safety regulation compliance, and search and rescue. There remain, however, some

inherent hazards of fishing for which there are currently no good defenses. Several

recommendations are aimed at developing defenses for these inherent risks.

Guide to Action Plan Rankings and Timetable. Task Force members and

industry advisors developed forty-eight recommendations at the workshop and ranked

them from 1st to 48th in two ways:

1. Impact in reducing the loss of life and property with #1 having the greatest impact

and #48 the least.

2. Ease to implement with #1 being easiest and #48 most difficult.

Workshop developed recommendations are followed by a bracketed ranking, for example

[Impact 4th / Ease 15th]. Notably, the alignment between Task Force and industry

advisor rankings was very close. Not surprisingly, many high ranking measures were
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-6

also the most difficult to implement, often requiring new laws, being controversial, or

both. For example, mandatory vessel inspections were rated first in impact, and last in

ease of implementation.

There are gaps in rankings caused by the Task Force eliminating or combining a number

of recommendations. After the workshop, the Task Force continued to develop

recommendations and received suggestions internally and from the public through

Fishing Vessel Safety phone lines and an internet web site. Acceptable recommendations

were incorporated into the report. Post-workshop recommendations are not ranked.

Recommendations were divided among seven categories:

1. Coordinate Fishery Management with Safety

2. Establish Operator and Crew Standards

3. Ensure Vessels Comply with Standards

4. Establish Safety and Stability Standards

5. Improve Program Management

6. Conduct Research and Development

7. Inform Fishermen

The first two columns of the recommendation tables contain a time frame for

implementation and identify the action organization(s).

Key to “Timing” and “Action Party” Columns of

Recommendation Tables

Timing Immediate Implement in current year

Short Term Implement within 1-2 years

Mid Term Implement within 2-4 years

Long Term Implement in over 4 years

Action Party USCG United States Coast Guard

NSC National Safety Council

RFMC Regional Fisheries Management Councils

Insurance Insurance Industry

NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and

Health

NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Association
5-7

5.1 Coordinate Fishery Management with Safety

“Management” means, in the last analysis, the substitution of thought for

brawn and muscle, of knowledge for folklore and superstition, and of

cooperation for force. . . .”

Peter F. Drucker, People and Performance

Main Points. Fisheries management objectives must both protect marine resources

and promote safe fisheries. Managing for different purposes, different agencies have set

rules that inadvertently set the stage for accidents. Resource management decisions

should encourage safe operations, or at least have a neutral safety influence. National

level coordination and leadership must review national resource management rules, and

set resource management standards that don’t create unintended hazards. Courageous

national policy is required to solve the problem of too many fishermen competing for too

few fish, who in the process sometimes defer safety out of economic necessity.

Background. Fishery management decisions by the National Marine Fisheries Service

(NMFS) and Regional Fisheries Management Councils (RFMC) are becoming

increasingly complex. Overcapitalization of the industry has led to too many fishermen

in fierce competition for diminishing fish stocks. While fishing vessel safety has few

required standards, fisheries are regulated to a high degree in order to manage the

resource. Fishermen typically encounter both state and federal limitations including

quotas, time restrictions, limitations in terms of species, catch size and age, vessel size,

crew sizes, and other regulatory controls. The Coast Guard has an opportunity to

influence fisheries management through an NMFS liaison and as non-voting members of

the RFMCs. However, the current orientation of these positions is to support resource

protection rather than safety improvement.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-8

Table 5-1 Coordinate Fishery Management with Safety

Timing Action

Party

Recommendation

Short Term NMFS

RFMC

USCG

1.1 Limit Entry into Fisheries. Maintain resource stocks

by limiting participation to enable economic success for

fishermen and vessels that meet progressively higher safety

standards. Increased earnings will support higher standard

vessels and crews. Substandard vessels and crew should be

phased out of fisheries, or brought up to standard.

[Impact 8th / Ease 41st]

Immediate NMFS

RFMC

USCG

1.2 National Standard 10. Emphasize safety elements of

National Standard 10 of the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries

Management and Conservation Act when making fishery

management decisions. National Standard 10 allows the

USCG to review the NMFS regulations and advise NMFS

on safety concerns.

[Impact 16th / Ease 5th]

Short Term USCG

NMFS

1.3 Fisheries Management Effects on Human Factors.

Determine the effect of fishery management regimes

(quotas, Olympic method, etc.) on human factors casualties,

and choose safer management regimes.

[Impact 29th / Ease 11th]

Short Term NMFS

USCG

1.4 Safety-based Crew Standards. Reassess NMFS

requirements that limit crew size (for example, seven vice

eleven crew members are allowed aboard vessels operating

in the scallop fishery). Meet fishery management objectives

in ways that promote safe vessel operations.

[Impact 31st / Ease 18th]

Short Term USCG

NMFC

OSHA

NIOSH

1.5 National Fisheries Management and Safety

Coordination Council. Charter a high level organization

to develop and coordinate national policy integrating fishery

management and safety regimes; boldly address the

problem of too many fishermen as a major influence on

resource management and safety problems.
5-9

5.2 Establish Operator and Crew Standards

“Every other advanced country in the world has been or is licensing their

fishermen. We feel it is appropriate at this time to license captains and

crews in safety routines. This will promote professionalism, safety, and

the lowering of the liability insurance in the long run. At the present time,

on a two-hundred-ton fishing vessel, there are no or minimal federal or

state license requirements for the captain. . . . There are more

requirements for a person to obtain a moped license.”

Pete Zimny, Anacortes WA fisherman,

father of Mark Zimny who died as Captain

of the F/V Aleutian Harvester; testimony of

11 June 1987 before House subcommittee

overseeing wildlife conservation and the

environment; Lost at Sea, Patrick Dillon,

1998, p. 234

Main Points. Fishing vessel operators should hold licenses and crew members hold

certificates indicating they have met minimum competency standards. In addition to

increased operator competency levels, licensed operators would be expected to maintain a

drug free workplace and be subject to drug and alcohol testing requirements. Licenses

could also expand the options available to fishermen as professional mariners. The

specter of license revocation and suspension proceedings could increase the sense of

responsibility and standard of care. Drill conductor training also needs improvement.

Background. The Coast Guard does not have the statutory authority to require the

licensing of operators of federally documented commercial fishing vessels of less than

200 gross tons. Commercial fishing vessel operators are not required to meet a minimum

experience, training, or competency standard for this dangerous occupation, even when

other crewmembers are entrusted to them. The only prerequisite for working on a

commercial fishing vessel of less than 200 gross tons is a willingness to step on board.

This is one of the most disturbing aspects of commercial fishing. Lack of experience and

training, and poor judgment can, has, and will continue to cost fishermen their lives.

The Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 required the Coast Guard to

submit a plan to Congress outlining proposed licensing requirements for operators of

federally documented commercial fishing vessels between 5 net tons and 200 gross tons.

This plan was submitted in1992. However, draft legislation was not enacted into law. In

1996, the Coast Guard, due to continued lack of congressional sponsorship, discontinued

submitting the licensing plan for inclusion in Appropriations Bills.

The fact that few realistic drills held on many vessels points to the need for more

preparation as a defense against failures.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-10

Table 5-2 Establish Operator and Crew Standards

Timing Action

Party

Recommendation

Short Term USCG 2.1 Drill Conductor Training. Re-evaluate required

training for drill conductors considering course content and

duration, refresher training, and market-driven availability of

third party organizations able and willing to train conductors.

[Impact 13th / Ease 6th]

Long Term USCG

Congress

2.2 Operator License. Obtain legislative authority and

require that operators of certain commercial fishing vessels

hold a vessel operator’s license. Practical considerations will

call for various grandfather clauses, phase-in schedules, and

exemption provisions; however, the extent of such exemptions

should be minimized.

[Impact 3rd / Ease 46th]

Long Term USCG

Congress

NMFS

2.3 Operator’s License Prerequisite for Federal fishery

Permits. Obtain legislative authority and require that

operators of commercial fishing vessels holding a federal

fishery permit have a vessel operator’s license.

[Impact 11th / Ease 44th]

Long Term USCG

Congress

2.4 Drug and Alcohol Testing. Apply drug and alcohol

testing requirements of 46 CFR 16 to operators and crew

holding licenses or certificates.

[Impact 30th / Ease 45th]

Long Term USCG

Congress

2.5 Crew Competency Certificate. Obtain legislative

authority and require that certain crewmembers working

aboard commercial fishing vessels hold a crew competency

certificate similar to a merchant mariners’ document. This

initiative should follow the implementation of a licensing

program for commercial fishing vessel operators.

[Impact 34th / Ease 33rd]
5-11

5.3 Ensure Vessels Comply with Standards

“You could say, ‘The sea rose up and smote those people down’ – people

have been saying that for thousands of years—but there was no honor in

this. This is just tragic. Someone knew those boats were unstable and

they accepted that risk. Now to say that they will accept voluntary

standards and abide by them...that is just tragic.”

Naval Architect and Professor Bruce

Adee, University of Washington,

Lost at Sea, Patrick Dillon , 1998, p.

192

Main Points. While some commercial fishing vessel owners and operators have made

great strides in adhering to voluntary safety standards, many have failed to properly

maintain their vessels, equipment, and even basic safety gear. Significant advances in

safety awareness make it essential to improve the scope of voluntary vessel examinations

and move toward mandatory inspections. Verified compliance with existing and

improved standards will result in lower vessel loss and fatality rates. An evolutionary

approach to the mandatory inspections is needed to reduce adverse economic impacts.

The poorest quality vessels cannot economically be brought up to higher standards, and

should leave the fishery.

Background. Many previous safety initiatives have concluded that compulsory vessel

inspection is needed to ensure vessels are fit for the intended service. Authority to

conduct mandatory, periodic safety inspections or examinations on commercial fishing

vessels does not exist.

Without authority for mandatory inspections, the Coast Guard has had to rely on a

program that is voluntary in character. Accordingly, the existing program is focused on

voluntary dockside exams of limited scope, and on a variety of educational and outreach

efforts.

Enforcement of federal laws is normally done at sea, on and around the fishing grounds,

by boarding teams of relatively junior personnel. Teams are directed by boarding

policies that vary with different law enforcement issues. Orders to zero in on a specific

issue, for example, turtle excluder devices (TED) in the Gulf of Mexico, may result in

numerous exams for TEDs compliance. Those exams may or may not check for

compliance with safety regulations. Generally, enforcement teams will examine all the

items listed on the boarding form. If a vessel has a decal indicating a satisfactory

voluntary dockside exam, the boarding team may decide not to examine the vessel, or

may spot check the “Big 5:” survival craft, personal flotation devices/immersion suits,

fire extinguishers, visual distress signals, and the EPIRB.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-12

Table 5-3 Ensure Vessels Comply with Standards

Timing Action

Party

Recommendation

Immediate USCG 3.1 Multi-Unit Law Enforcement (MULE). Establish

standard policy for the use of MULE teams comprised of

both marine safety and fisheries expertise.

Immediate USCG 3.2 Compliance Exam Location. Shift more (not all)

compliance from at-sea locations to more efficient

congregating locations such as the dock or icehouse.

Short Term USCG 3.3 At-Sea Compliance Policy. Provide policy for more

thorough at-sea compliance exams.

[Impact 40th / Ease 21st]

Short Term USCG 3.4 Training. Provide extensive training to boarding

officers on the Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Act of

1988 to permit full safety compliance and material

condition exams.

Mid Term NMFS 3.5 Safety Exam Prerequisite for Federal Fishery

Permits. Require evidence of passing a safety exam prior

to issuing a federal fishery permit.

[Impact 4th / Ease 15th]

Mid Term USCG

Congress

3.6 Safety Examinations. Obtain legislative authority and

require periodic vessel safety examinations of similar

limited scope as the existing voluntary exam for compliance

with 46 CFR 28.

[Impact 6th / Ease 30th]

Mid Term Insurance 3.7 Safety Exam Prerequisite for Insurance. Require

evidence of passing a safety exam prior to issuing

insurance. [Impact 25th / Ease 13th]

Long Term USCG

Congress

3.8 Safety Inspections. Obtain legislative authority to

require commercial fishing vessels to undergo periodic

vessel safety inspections. This effort would require the

development of expanded standards in addition to the

limited standards currently contained in 46 CFR 28.

[Impact 1st / Ease 48th]

Long Term USCG

NMFS

3.9 Uniform Enforcement Template and Vessel

Inspection Management System. Develop standard

measures of safety condition and compliance to identify

high risk vessels. Populate data base with conditions

discovered during inspections and exams. Apply data to

better use resources to target high risk vessels and

encourage compliance. Mandatory vessel inspection

program must exist, since this recommendation could

adversely affect the voluntary program.
5-13

5.4 Establish Safety and Stability Standards

“The absence of jurisdiction over commercial fishing vessels does not

allow for the imposition of regulations which apply to the inspected

segments of our Maritime industry. . . . practices reflect the absence of an

industry standard to the extent that a lax approach to decision-making

defines the industry standard.”

Marine Casualty Report on Capsizing of the

F/V Altair and F/V Americus, U. S. Coast

Guard Marine Board, 8 April 1985

Main Points. Regardless of future approaches to improve the safety of commercial

fishing vessels (e.g., mandatory examinations, certificates of inspection, continued

voluntary examinations, licensing), additional standards must be adopted to reduce latent

conditions leading to accidents, and to enhance survival when a casualty does occur. The

standards should be amended to better reflect the hazard exposure rather than arbitrary

divisions such as whether a vessel is state registered or federally documented, or whether

it operates inside or outside of a geographic line that poorly reflect hazard exposure. It is

particularly important that standards be developed for all classes of commercial fishing

vessels to foster stability and watertight integrity.

Background. Mandatory safety standards are minimal, and primarily address survival

equipment. They do not address prevention of fishing vessel accidents. Common

conditions and failures in serious fishing casualties are: lack of knowledge; shifting deck

cargo; entanglement in and failure of fishing gear; faulty machinery; lack of stability;

poor occupational safety awareness; inadequate watch standing; fatigue; man overboard;

inadequate warning for fire, smoke, or flooding; and improperly use of emergency

survival equipment. The current standards must be amended to address such conditions.

In addition, certain standards are based solely on arbitrary factors such as the vessel’s

form of registration or area of operation relative to the boundary line, rather than actual

risk to the vessel.

Many vessels could leave port with holes in the hull or in an unstable condition and be in

compliance with existing regulations. Capsizing accidents occur suddenly and are

particularly deadly. The Coast Guard has developed watertight integrity and stability

regulations for vessels more than 79 feet in length that had their keels laid after 15

September 1991, and may implement such standards for smaller vessels built since 1991.

But this covers few of the fishing vessels working today. No mandatory stability or

watertight integrity standards apply to older uninspected fishing vessels.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-14

Table 5-4 Establish Safety and Stability Standards

Timing Action

Party

Recommendation

Short Term USCG 4.1 Stability Regulation Project. Complete project to

require stability letters for all commercial fishing vessels

greater than, or equal to, 50 feet in length. Also establish

watertight integrity and subdivision requirements for

commercial fishing vessels less than 50 feet in length.

Evaluate impact and feasibility of eliminating “grandfather”

provisions.

[Impact 17th / Ease 8th]

Short Term USCG 4.2 Safety Awareness Drills. Amend 46 CFR 28.270 to

require: (1) safety awareness instruction for each crew

member, (2) moving equipment hazards instruction for each

crew member, and (3) vessel operator logging of drill

dates/times, participants, and drill conductor.

[Impact 20th / Ease 14th]

Short Term USCG 4.3 Stability Instructions and Documents. Develop a

specific form and criteria for stability testing and

calculations. Establish stability documents specific to

fisheries, vessel lengths, and hull types that are in plain

English, user friendly, in a uniform and understandable

format, consider likely adverse sea conditions, and include

emergency stability procedures.

[Impact 21st / Ease 31st]

Short Term USCG 4.4 Emergency Lighting/Smoke Detectors. Require

emergency lighting and smoke detectors in interior berthing

spaces.

[Impact 35th / Ease 17th]

Short Term USCG 4.5 International Warning Symbols. Establish a

regulation requiring international symbols on signs and

placards required on commercial fishing vessels.

[Impact 46th / Ease 23rd]

Short Term USCG 4.6 Safety Briefings. Establish regulations requiring initial

and periodic crew safety briefings pertaining to vessel

specific machinery and deck hazards.

[Impact 44th / Ease 10th]

Short Term USCG 4.7 Hazardous Area Warnings. Establish a regulation

requiring prominent warnings in hazardous areas, including

areas around moving machinery, winches and lines.

[Impact 47th / Ease 16th]
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-15

Mid Term USCG

Congress

4.8 Registration/Documentation. Harmonize regulations

for federally documented and state registered vessels.

[Impact 9th / Ease 47th ]

Mid Term USCG

Congress

4.9 Safety Levels. Substitute “territorial sea baseline” for

“boundary line” as primary statutory parameter for fishing

vessel safety requirements.

[Impact 10th / Ease 43rd ]

Mid Term USCG 4.10 Wear PFDs on Deck. Establish regulations requiring

the wearing of personal flotation devices (PFDs) in

designated areas on deck. Encourage innovation for designs

(e.g., inflatable) that do not interfere with work.

[Impact 26th / Ease 35th ]

Mid Term USCG 4.11 Deck Gear and Cargo. Research and establish

mandatory safety standards for securing deck gear and

cargo to improve stability.

[Impact 32nd / Ease 27th ]

Mid Term USCG

NIOSH

OSHA

4.12 Industrial Safety. Develop standards and an

inspection program for industrial applications on board

fishing vessels, or develop an agreement and action plan

with other agencies to address industrial safety issues.

Mid Term USCG 4.13 Re-write NVIC 5-86. Re-write NVIC 5-86 to allow

for substantial technical development and expansion of

Coast Guard voluntary standards.

Long Term USCG 4.14 Good Marine Practices. Develop good marine

standards and practices for application to equipment,

materials, designs, and operations on commercial fishing

vessels.

[Impact 5th / Ease 32nd ]

Long Term USCG 4.15 Stability for Existing Vessels. Phase in stability

regulations for existing vessels greater than, or equal to, 79

feet in length. [Impact 11th / Ease 42nd ]

Long Term USCG 4.16 Design/Require Systems to Recover People.

Require that fishing vessels be designed with some means

of recovering people in the water using such as a platform,

equipment, or techniques.

Long Term USCG 4.17 Safety Gear Exams. Establish guidelines for the selfexam and replacement of certain lifesaving gear, including

life jackets, survival suits, life rafts, etc. These guidelines

should promote the replacement of gear before the point of

material failure.
5-16

blank page
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-17

5.5 Improve Program Management

“We understand that high standards are imperative. We will excel as

responsible stewards of taxpayers’ resources. We will improve

operational performance through the development of solid performance

plans. We will build a 21st century decision-making architecture and the

information system that supports it. We will use aggressive performance

measures to track our progress. We will continuously improve our

business processes and apply Information Technology creatively. We will

be the leader in government for making the precepts of outcome-based

performance and accountability work for the American people. We will

make risk-taking, innovation, trust and empowerment central to our

leadership culture.”

Admiral James Loy’s Commandant’s

Direction, U. S. Coast Guard, 1998

Main Points. While the Coast Guard’s Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety (CFVS)

Program significantly contributes to fishing vessel safety, the program needs continuous

improvement. Key billets should be reprogrammed from military to civilian positions to

foster program consistency and improved relationships with the commercial fishing

community. Voluntary Dockside Examination (VDE) consistency and Dockside

Examiner (DE) competency must be given emphasis. CFVS auditors need the full

support of District Commanders. The scope and emphasis of the dockside exams needs

to be improved.

Background. Historically, both the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Advisory

Committee (CFIVAC) Executive Director and the CFVS Program Manager have been

Coast Guard military billets supported at times by civilian and military billets. In 1991,

when the most recent Program was established, a separate Fishing Vessel Safety Section

(FVSS) was set up at Coast Guard Headquarters within the Office of Marine Inspection

and Documentation (G-MVI). The Section’s Chief was a Commander who served as the

CFIVAC Executive Director and was supported by four billets: a Lieutenant Commander

Section Chief, a civilian GM-13 Fishing Vessel Safety Specialist, and two other officers.

The FVSS was responsible for all program management, regulatory development and

rulemakings, and CFIVAC administration. This enabled a good working relationship

with the commercial fishing industry. Both Coast Guard and the industry clearly

understood who at Coast Guard Headquarters was working the regulatory and

compliance issues at the decision-maker level. This allowed more insightful Coast Guard

decisions as the FVSS personnel were able to understand the big picture.

During the G-M reorganization in 1995, the duties of the FVSS were redistributed
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-18

throughout the Marine Safety and Environmental Protection Directorate. All CFVSrelated program management duties shifted to the Office of Compliance (G-MOC), and

regulatory and CFIVAC duties moved to the Office of Operating and Environmental

Standards (G-MSO).

Currently, the CFVS Program has a quality assurance program that oversees District

activity. Additionally, a training program for Dockside Examiners consists of a resident

training course, and a training and qualifications instruction (COMDTINST 16711.14)

for personnel who conduct VDEs or at-sea compliance exams.

An important element of the VDE program has been to educate commercial fishing

vessel owners and operators of the importance of having, maintaining, understanding the

use of, and properly stowing marine safety equipment. For example, a nationwide

promotional blitz in 1994 covered proper EPIRB use, stowage, registration, and

mounting.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-19

Table 5-5 Improve Program Management

Timing Action

Party

Recommendation

Immediate USCG 5.1 Program Accountability. Continue CFVS Program

auditing and evaluation of vessel examiner and district

coordinator activities to assure fishing vessel resources are

used within the CFVS Program. Full District Commanders

support of auditors is required.

[Impact 23rd / Ease 4th]

Immediate USCG 5.2 Quality Assurance. Periodically evaluate vessel

examiner skills to assure consistent, high-quality

examinations.

Immediate USCG 5.3 Focus on Emergency Drills. Vessel examiners should

continue efforts to evaluate emergency preparedness drills

during dockside vessel exams, and should assist/encourage

fishing vessel crews to become familiar with the use of fire

fighting gear, survival craft, donning immersion suits, etc.

Short Term USCG 5.4 HQ Fishing Vessel Safety Division. Create a

Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety (CFVS) division within

the Office of Compliance (G-MOC). This division would

be led by a high-grade civilian responsible for safety

activities pertaining to the commercial fishing industry,

including the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Advisory

Committee (CFIVAC), regulation maintenance and

development, and the Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety

Program.

[Impact 19th / Ease 2nd]

Short Term USCG 5.5 Reprogram Personnel. Reprogram key program

billets from military to civilian positions, including the

CFVS Program Manager and CFIVAC Executive Director.

[Impact 19th / Ease 2nd]

Short Term USCG 5.6 Vessel Examiner Training. Provide additional

professional training for commercial fishing vessel

examiners, such as wooden boat inspection training,

fiberglass and reinforced plastics, inspection and

investigation training, and human factors engineering

training.

[Impact 23rd / Ease 4th]
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-20

Short Term USCG 5.7 National/District CFVS Conference/Workshop.

Hold an annual national CFVS conference and periodic

district examiner workshops in order to address/share

important issues among program personnel.

[Impact 23rd / Ease 4th]

Short Term USCG

Congress

5.8 Resources. Provide additional resources (funding and

personnel) in order to support new safety initiatives and the

expanded role of fishing vessel safety personnel.
5-21

5.6 Conduct Research and Development

“There are things about the sea which man can never know and can never

change. Those who describe the sea as ‘angry,’ ‘gentle,’ or ferocious do

not know the sea. The sea just doesn’t know you’re there – you take it as

you find it, or it takes you.”

R. M. Snyder, early oceanographer

Main Points. The government, insurance agencies, and fishermen must focus

attention on latent hazardous conditions, apply solutions when they are known, and

develop new solutions for currently unmanaged risks. Investigations and data quality

must be of sufficient quality to focus safety initiatives on areas the will provide the

greatest advances in safety.

Background. Major data and casualty investigation quality initiatives are being

undertaken. However, these initiatives must capture information in a way that readily

allows analysis, and is tailored to the hazards, gear type, and management considerations

that greatly influence commercial fishing vessel safety. Multiple data bases and differing

means of collecting data just within the Coast Guard should consolidated. This situation

is inefficient, doesn’t encourage development of the best analysis practices, and leads to

conflicting data reports. It is of great importance to develop data to be used for

normalizing casualty rates relative to measures such as full-time equivalent fisherman

jobs, operating hours, fish landings, etc.

Several inadequate defenses to problems inherent in fishing require research or

development.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-22

Table 5-6 Conduct Research and Development

Timing Action

Party

Recommendation

Short Term USCG 6.1 Better Investigation Data. Improve the quality of

commercial fishing vessel investigations and data

collection. Develop data to normalize casualty rates.

Combine the best attributes of multiple data collection.

[Impact 7th / Ease 19th]

Short Term USCG 6.2 Feedback from Investigations. Develop methods for

prevention information learned as a result of casualty

investigations to reach fisherman and help development of a

safety culture in the industry.

Mid Term USCG 6.3 Immersion Suits. Develop an immersion suit that

allows greater freedom of movement and is easier to don.

[Impact 22nd / Ease 28th]

Mid Term USCG 6.4 Work Suits. Develop a full-body protective suit that

can allows freedom of movement, can be comfortably worn

in moderate temperatures, and provides reasonable

protection against hypothermia.

[Impact 24th / Ease 25th]

Mid Term USCG,

Congress

6.5 Coast Guard De-watering Pumps. Develop and

procure new emergency de-watering pumps that can more

easily be started and operated than the existing P3 pump.

[Impact 38th / Ease 36th]

Mid Term USCG 6.6 Continue Investigation Quality Enhancements.

Continue upgrading casualty investigation quality by

improving data collection and analytical techniques. IMO

Guidelines for the Investigation of Human Factors in

Marine Casualties and Incidents should be in the

mainstream.

Mid Term USCG 6.7 Investigation Training for Examiners. Provide basic

investigation training to commercial fishing vessel

examiners. Some units require examiners to investigate

fishing vessel casualties.

Long Term USCG

Congress

6.8 Improve Communications. Upgrade communications

capabilities to improve distress communications.

[Impact 36th / Ease 29th]

Long Term USCG

Insurance

NIOSH

OSHA

NMFS

6.9 Human Factors Engineering. Study the occupational

hazards of commercial fishing and consider developing

human factors engineering standards aimed at making the

fishing environment safer. Deck arrangements, exposure to

the elements, machinery, control stations, and fishing gear

should all be areas of consideration.
5-23

5.7 Inform Fishermen

“When you call up the Coast Guard, or the Air National Guard, or

whomever, you are asking them to risk their lives to save yours. The

rescuers neither ask for nor get much in return (those who make a career

out of criticizing the Coast Guard all too often forget that), and they value

their lives as much as we value ours.

It is the duty of those who go to sea to avoid getting into situations that

require the aid of rescue services. Heed the season, equip your vessel

properly, keep a sharp eye for weather changes, shake down a new vessel

conscientiously, don’t expect your ship to do something she can’t, pump

for your life if you’re sinking, maneuver your vessel if you are not, and

think ahead. Anything else and you will be asking more of others than you

ask of yourself.”

Peter Specter. “The Abandonment of the

John F. Leavitt,” Wooden Boat, March/April

1980

Main Points. Tragically, most fishing vessel accidents happen because fishermen are

either unaware of hazards, or because they accept those hazards as the cost of doing

business. Often conditions causing the casualty easily could have been corrected.

Improved efforts to make fishermen aware of hazards will help clear the stage of

conditions for accidents, and help build a safety culture.

Background. A recurring theme at the Task Force workshop was the idea that

fishermen operate in a culture that discounts the need to protect against accidents that

they have not personally seen. A crewman who has experienced stability problems, for

instance, may pay more heed to stability practices than one who has not. Operators who

have never experienced stability problems might also be more willing to jeopardize their

vessel’s stability, or will not know when that might occur. The best safety practices

should be broadly publicized in the interest of sharing knowledge and stimulating a new

safety culture. While some risks related to working so near the water are inherent, the

majority of the risks can be controlled or defended against.
Conclusions and Recommendations

5-24

Table 5-7 Inform Fishermen

Timing Action

Party

Recommendation

Immediate USCG Auto-deployable Survival Equipment Guidance. Provide

safety guidance on proper installation of auto-deployable

survival equipment, describing the differences between

float-free arrangements and other arrangements that employ

hydrostatic release devices. Guidance should emphasize

how overhead obstructions prevent the successful release of

survival equipment.

[Impact 18th / Ease 1st]

Immediate USCG 7.2 Occupational Safety Awareness. Step-up public

awareness efforts to emphasize the dangers of crew fatigue,

rotating machinery, breaches of watertight integrity, running

gear and lines, etc. These efforts should highlight the

importance of effective communications, periodic hull and

machinery maintenance, and the proper use of safety

equipment.

[Impact 28nd / Ease 3rd]

Immediate USCG,

Insurance

7.3 Bilge Alarm Guidance. Provide safety guidance on

proper installation of automatic bilge pump switches and

alarms in an attempt to reduce false alarms and crew

intervention to deactivate alarms.

[Impact 33rd / Ease 12th]

Immediate USCG 7.4 EPIRB Promotion. Launch another promotional effort

explaining the importance of the registration, maintenance,

stowage, and proper use of emergency position indicating

radio beacons (EPIRBs).

[Impact 42nd / Ease 9th]

Immediate USCG 7.5 Develop Issues. Develop other issues worth

communicating such as the results of the formal casualty

investigations that were the impetus for this task force.

Short Term USCG 7.6 National Newsletter. Publish a national newsletter to

address important commercial fishing vessel safety issues.

The newsletter should take advantage of communications

technology that would allow adding safety information from

other agencies, and regional and local news for distribution

in such locales. The design and distribution network should

use network links to organizations who could easily adapt

the information to their own newsletters.

[Impact 45th / Ease 7th]
A-1

Task Force Charter

Purpose. The Fishing Vessel Casualty Task Force has been established to perform a

fast-track examination of commercial fishing industry operational and safety issues that

may have contributed to a recent increase in marine casualties. The Task Force shall:

• evaluate the factual circumstances of an apparent rash of serious accidents resulting in

the loss of life and vessels during recent weeks (particularly the four clamming

vessels undergoing current casualty investigations);

• examine these incidents in the context of historical data for loss of life and property;

• provide quick feedback to the industry as a follow-on to the industry alerts initiated in

the First and Fifth Coast Guard Districts;

• review the current fishing vessel safety program and past recommendations that have

great potential for reducing loss of life and property;

• recommend the most significant measures that have great potential for reducing loss

of life and property; and

• develop direction to be pursued by the CFIVAC, the Coast Guard, and industry.

Discussion. In recent weeks the commercial fishing industry in the Mid Atlantic and

Northeast regions have suffered a series of serious marine casualties resulting in loss of

life and vessels. Four of the lost vessels were in the shellfish fishery. These casualties

have galvanized renewed concern that commercial fishing industry risks are excessive.

While individual investigations are ongoing and will likely not be completed before the

task force meets, the task force will have the opportunity to communicate with Coast

Guard investigators while events are still fresh in the memories of investigators and

witnesses.

Deliverable. The Task Force will report their findings that focus on the purposes

outlined above by 19 March 1999. Time is of the essence. Time restrictions do not allow

employing exhaustive methods. The need for further inquiries, or reference to past

efforts, shall be incorporated into the recommendations of the Task Force.

Timetable.

Identification of team members 22 January

Collection of data and information. Task Force Conference

calls as required.

25 Jan - 12 Feb

Task Force meeting mid February

(17-19 tentative)

Task Force meeting 1-2 March

(if required)

Draft Final Report 19 March

Appendix A
Appendix A Task Force Charter

A-2

Methodology. The Chairman shall establish the methodology for achieving the purposes

of the Task Force in consultation with the members. Quality principles should be used

for all meetings and deliberations. Consider current programs and policy as well as past

recommendations related to this issue that were not implemented.

Resources. The Task Force membership is comprised of:

G-M Captain James Spitzer, Task Force Chairman, Chief, Office of

Investigations and Analysis (G-MOA)

Commander Mark Prescott, Ex. Director CFIVAC, (G-MOS)

LT George Paitl, F/V Safety Program Manager (G-MOC), Task

Force Member and Recorder

G-O CDR Mark Thomas, Fisheries Enforcement Division (G-OPL-4)

Mr. Richard Schaefer, Office of Search and Rescue (G-OPR)

Commander, Atlantic

Area

Mr. Robert Higgins, 1st District F/V Safety Coordinator

Mr. Donald Midgette, 5th District F/V Safety Coordinator

Commander, Pacific

Area

Mr. Ken Lawrenson, F/V Dockside Examiner, MSO Portland, OR

National Marine

Fisheries Service

TBD

Nat’l Transportation

Safety Board

Dr. Meg Sweeney, Author of NTSB Fishing Vessel Safety Report

Headquarters Support. The Task Force will be supported by G-M Directorates and

Offices and “Team Fish” members as required by the Chairman.

District Support. Support is hereby requested of District Commanders for the support of

District Marine Safety Divisions and Marine Safety Offices for information on specific

current or recent casualty investigations as specified by the Task Force.

Industry Professionals. The Task Force shall obtain the counsel of fishing industry

professionals.

Authority to Act. The Task Force is authorized to collect information necessary for it to

realize the goals of this charter and to use funding allocated for Marine Boards of

Investigation for necessary travel and administrative costs.

/S/___________________________ ___1/27/99______________________

R. C. North Date

Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard

Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection
B-1

Task Force Members

CAPT James D. Spitzer, Task Force Chairman

Chief, Office of Investigations and Analysis (G-MOA)

U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

CAPT Spitzer is now responsible for Coast Guard investigation of marine casualties and

for the analyses of casualty and marine safety data. His extensive experience in marine

safety includes Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard Pacific Strike Team; Executive

Officer at Marine Safety Office Detroit, MI; Chief of Port Operations at Marine Safety

Office San Francisco, CA; and Hull/Machinery Inspector and Investigator at Marine

Safety Office Hampton Roads, VA. He received his B.S. degree from University of

Massachusetts and M.S. in Environmental Management from the University of Michigan.

CDR Mark Prescott, Task Force Vice Chairman

Executive Director, Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel

Advisory Committee (G-MSO-2)

U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

CDR Prescott presently serves as Chief, Vessel Facility Operating and Environmental

Standards Division. Previous experience includes Staff Engineer at the Coast Guard

Marine Safety Center in Hull and Engineering Divisions and evaluating small passenger

vessel stability submissions and conducting vessel inclining experiments. He served as

Chief, Prevention Division, which included commercial fishing vessel safety at Marine

Safety Office Tampa, FL. He is a licensed Professional Engineer. CDR Prescott

received his B.S. in Ocean Engineering from the Coast Guard Academy and M.S.E.

Marine & Mechanical Engineering from the University of Michigan.

Dr. William Bellows

National Marine Fisheries Service (F/SF-3)

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Bellows’ recent work in Sustainable Fisheries has involved the development and

review of fishery management plans for Alaska and the Northeast. He coordinated the

writing of the Sustainable Fisheries Act which mandated observer health and safety

regulations. He began working at National Marine Fisheries in 1980 and held positions

in Policy and Planning, Utilization Development, Trade and Industry Services, and

Sustainable Fisheries. He has a Ph.D in Economics from the University of

Massachusetts.

Appendix B
Appendix B Task Force Members

B-2

Mr. Robert Higgins

Fishing Vessel Safety Coordinator – First Coast Guard District

Boston, MA

Since 1991, Mr. Higgins has been District Fishing Vessel Safety Coordinator. He advised

on the formal investigation of F/V HEATHER LYNN casualty in 1996. He reviewed all

fishing vessel casualty cases and maintained statistics. He is an instructor in Coast Guard

Fishing Vessel Safety Training Program. He has ten years experience as a commercial

diver/supervisor diving systems, salvage, rigger, and marine biological research. He has

twelve years experience with commercial fishing in lobster, gill net, urchin, trawler,

ground fish and shrimp. He graduated from the College of Oceaneering in California

1973.

Mr. Ken Lawrenson

Fishing Vessel Safety Coordinator

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, Portland, OR

Mr. Lawrenson is presently employed as the Fishing Vessel Safety Coordinator. He has

served as a Deck Officer and Fisheries Boarding Officer in Pacific NW and Alaskan

waters, and as a Marine Inspector specializing in the offshore and oil industry and new

vessel construction. He worked at Christensen Motor Yacht as Quality Assurance

Manager and Production Engineer. He graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy

and earned M.S.E. in Naval Architecture from the University of Michigan.

Donald Midgette

Fishing Vessel Safety Coordinator –Fifth Coast Guard District

U. S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, Portsmouth, VA

Mr. Midgette serves as the Atlantic Area and Fifth Coast Guard District Commercial

Fishing Vessel Safety Coordinator. He retired from Coast Guard active duty as a Master

Chief Boatswain Mate with commands both ashore and afloat. He has worldwide

experience as a commercial vessel inspector. His qualifications include Marine Inspector

for Hull and Machinery, Law Enforcement Instructor and Boating Officer, and

possession of Master Mariners License of 1600 GT.

CDR Louis J. Orsini

Deputy Chief, Office of Law Enforcement (G-OPL)

U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

CDR Orsini is Deputy Chief, Office of Law Enforcement. He is responsible for maritime

law enforcement strategy and policy including that related to fisheries enforcement. Prior

experience include command on two USCG Cutters conducting a variety of missions,

including enforcement of safety, fisheries, drug and migration laws and regulations;

search and rescue; defense operations; Boarding Officer for over 400 at sea boardings

primarily on US and foreign fishing vessels in Northwest Atlantic waters; and Chief,
Appendix B Task Force Members

B-3

USCG Atlantic Area Fisheries Enforcement Branch responsible for developing policy for

fishery enforcement efforts in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico.

LT George Paitl

Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program Manager (G-MOC)

U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

LT Paitl has served as the National Program Manager for Commercial Fishing Vessel

Safety for the past two years. His prior experience in marine safety include Commercial

Vessel Inspector, Marine Casualty Investigator, and Inspection Department Chief. He

holds undergraduate degrees in avionics, instructional technology and management, and

received a Masters of Public Administration (MPA) degree from George Mason

University.

Mr. Richard Schaefer

Office of Search and Rescue (G-OPR)

U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Schaefer is a Policy Analyst in the Office of Search and Rescue. He is also the editor

of On Scene, the Coast Guard's search and rescue (SAR) periodical. Coast Guard active

duty tours included deck watch officer on USCGC MACKINAW (WAGB 83) on the

Great Lakes; SAR Controller at the 9th District Rescue Coordination Center in Cleveland,

Ohio, Operations Officer for Group Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan; and Analyst in the SAR

Division at USCG Headquarters. He currently is a member of the USCG Reserves. He

received a B.S. in physics and his officer's commission from the U.S. Coast Guard

Academy in 1979.

Mr. John Solheim

Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health administration (OSHA)

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Solheim works with OSHA’s Directorate of Compliance Programs. He works

primarily with OSHA field personnel and staff from other Federal agencies to resolve

jurisdictional issues, pursuant to section 4(b)(1) of the OSH Act.

Dr. Meg Sweeney

Transportation Research Analyst, National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Sweeney is a Transportation Research Analyst in the Safety Studies Division.

Dr. Sweeney’s area of expertise is human behavior/performance in transportation

accidents. She has studied various ways to improve fishing vessel safety, including

operator licensing and vessel inspection.

Dr. Sweeney received a B.A. in Psychology from Boston College and M.A. and Ph.D.

degrees in Psychology from George Mason University.
Appendix B Task Force Members

B-4

CDR George E. White

National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

Washington, D.C.

CDR White’s twenty-three year career in NOAA includes over eight years sea duty on

NOAA charting, oceanographic, and fisheries research vessels in the Atlantic,

Pacific, Gulf of Alaska, and Caribbean Sea. His most recent sea duty was as

Commanding Officer of the NOAA Survey Ship HECK. He currently assists the

Director on a wide range of issues in fisheries management.
C-1

Industry Advisors

Mr. Erling Berg

Fisherman and Boat Manager

Cape May, NJ

Mr. Berg fished Georges Bank and the Mid Atlantic for scallops, surf clams, ocean

quahogs and groundfish from 1958 to 1992. He was a Captain for 25 years and spent two

years fishing in Oregon and Alaska. He has owned a 96-foot scalloper for 20 years. The

last four years he has been boat manager for Atlantic Capes Fisheries. In 1991, he

became a marine safety instructor.

Mr. James Herbert

Chairman, U. S. Coast Guard Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety

Advisory Committee

Fisherman, Fisheries Instructor

Seward, AK

Mr. Herbert has fished commercially in Alaska since 1971. As a crewman and vessel

owner he has participated in salmon, halibut, crab and shrimp fisheries. Currently he

teaches Maritime and Fisheries topics at Alaska Vocational Technical Center in Seward,

Alaska during the winter and works summers at sea. He holds a USCG 1600GT Master’s

License.

Mr. Richard C. Hiscock, President

Principal Investigator

ERE Associates Ltd.

Orleans, MA

Mr. Hiscock is the founder, president and principal investigator for ERE Associates Ltd.,

and charter board member of the Marine Safety Foundation. He has been a fishing vessel

safety advocate for over 20 years, authoring both the Fisherman’s Digest for the First

Coast Guard District and “Safety Notes” for Fishermen, testifying on fishing vessel

safety, and drafting H.R. 1836 to require “licensing, inspection and additional safety

requirements for fishing vessels” in 1987. He has served on the Commercial Fishing

Industry Vessel Advisory Committee, and edited the Personal Survival and Emergency

Drills Course: A National Standard Curriculum. He is a member of the Society of Naval

Architects and Marine Engineers, and holds a Coast Guard License as Master.

Appendix C
Appendix C Industry Advisors

C-2

Mr. Robert W. O’Sullivan

Executive Vice President, The Flagship Group Ltd.

Norfolk, VA

Mr. O’Sullivan is presently Executive Vice President of the Flagship Group Ltd.,

Norfolk, VA., an independent insurance agency handling all lines of commercial

insurance with a specialty area in the maritime industry. The agency insures over 700

commercial fishing vessels on the East Coast and Alaska. He is a former member of the

East Coast Fisheries Association Board of Directors. He graduated from the University of

Tennessee in 1968.

Mr. Rick Savage

Member, Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council

Fisherman and Fishery Consultant

Berlin, MD

Mr. Savage has been President of Savage Fisheries, Inc., (which owned and operated 3

surf clam vessels), President of Savage Marine Transport, Inc., (which owned and

operated a freight barge on Chesapeake Bay), and Vice President of Savage Ice

Company, Inc. (which owned and operated 2 ice plants serving the fishing fleet in West

Ocean City). He has also been a member of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management

Council for 15 Years, and a member of the Maryland Tidal Fishery Advisory

Commission for 6 years. Additionally he has been a former President and Vice President

of the Worcester County Watermen’s Association, and a member of the Federal

Investment Task Force to study over-capitalization in U.S. fisheries as mandated by the

Magnuson-Stevens Act of 1996.
D-1

Other Resources Consulted

Coast Guard Studies and Reports:

A Cost Benefit Analysis of Alternative Safety Programs for U.S. Commercial Fishing

Vessels, Volume 1 – Study, by Planning Staff, Office of Merchant Marine Safety, U.S.

Coast Guard, 16 April 1971. A Coast Guard report that documents the fishing industry’s

poor safety record, due to a lack of safety regulations. It outlines a series of

recommendations to improve fishing vessel safety and utilizes comparisons between

small passenger vessels, citing the decline in fatalities on passenger vessels in the five

year period following the introduction of the Small Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 1956.

A Safety Analysis of Fishing Vessel Casualties, by Commander William J. Ecker, U.S.

Coast Guard, October 1978. This analysis was presented to the 66th National Safety

Congress and Exposition, which explores fishing vessel casualties and concludes

additional studies into incidents resulting in loss of life or vessel are warranted.

Fishing Vessel Safety, Blueprint for a National Program, by Committee on Fishing

Vessel Safety, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research

Council, 1991. A comprehensive study on fishing vessel safety conducted by the

National Research Council of the National Academies of Science and Engineering, as

mandated by the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988.

Safety Project Activities Report, by Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental

Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, 31 December 1989.

A Plan for Licensing Operators of Uninspected Federally Documented Commercial

Fishing Industry Vessels, Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 (P.L.

100– 24), by U.S. Coast Guard, 1988. A plan submitted to Congress January 13, 1992 as

mandated by the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988. The plan

recommended establishing two new licenses for fishing vessel operators: Master of

fishing vessel under 200 gross tons and Master of fishing vessel less than 79 feet.

Hazard and Risk in the District 1 Fleet of Small Fishing Vessels, by Environmental

Engineering Division (DTS-33) Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 31

January 1999. A report prepared for the Coast Guard Prevention Through People

program, which assesses vessel safety and risk in the commercial fishing industry.

Commercial Fishing Vessel...A Legislative History, by Commander Raymond G.

Magno and Mr. Richard Hiscock, Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council (Vol. 48,

No. 6), November-December 1991. An article in a special commercial fishing vessel

Appendix D
Appendix D Other Resources Consulted

D-2

safety issue, which chronicles the legislative history of vessel safety from 1910 until the

Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Act of 1988.

Other Reports, Manuals and Literature:

Commercial Fishing Fatalities in Alaska, Risk Factors and Prevention Strategies

(Current Intelligence Bulletin 58), by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health, September 1997. A review of fatal fishing vessel

casualties in Alaska, current efforts and successes in lowering the statistics, as well as

recommendations to prevent further incidents.

Proceedings of the National Fishing Industry Safety and Health Workshop, by U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Center for Disease

Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, January

1994. The compilation of issues and recommendations raised at the National Fishing

Industry Safety and Health Workshop (FISH), which addressed fishing vessel safety

issues.

ALERT, Request for Assistance in Preventing Drownings of Commercial Fisherman,

by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,

April 1994. A special bulletin based on the Alaska fishing industry, which cites drowning

statistics of fishermen and encourages the use of Personal Flotation Devices (PFDs).

Uninspected Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety, (NTSB/SS-87/02) by the National

Transportation Safety Board, 1987. A study to examine actions taken by agencies and

organizations to address uninspected commercial fishing vessel safety.

Vessel Safety Manual, by the North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners Association, with the

assistance of the Coast Guard, 1986. A comprehensive fishing vessel safety manual

developed as a part an overall safety enhancement program aimed at improving the safety

record of commercial fishing vessels.

Stability for Fishermen, A Self-Study Course for the Commercial Fishing Industry of the

United States of America, by National Cargo Bureau, Inc., 1989.

Lost at Sea, An American Tragedy, by Patrick Dillon, 1998. An account of the 1983 loss

of two Alaska crabbing vessels, the F/V Americus and the F/V Altair, and the impact it

had on future fishing vessel safety regulations.
Appendix D Other Resources Consulted

D-3

Fishing Vessel Navigation and Vessel Inspection

Circulars:

10-65 Stability Determination in Capsizing Cases Involving Uninspected Vessels. In

the event an uninspected vessel capsizes, if possible, the cause should be determined in

order to measure the effectiveness of existing stability standards and possible need for

changes.

4-82 Safety of Uninspected Vessels. Provides fishing vessel owners and operators and

Coast Guard personnel information pertaining to uninspected fishing vessel casualty

trends and recommendations that may improve safety.

12-83 Stability of Towing and Fishing Vessels. Results of Coast Guard sponsored

research on intact stability criteria of towing and fishing vessels.

Voluntary Standards for Fishing Vessels. Voluntary minimum standards for

uninspected commercial fishing vessels, which address safety, operation, stability,

maintenance, equipment requirements and general housekeeping.

12-91 Termination of Unsafe Operations Aboard Commercial Fishing Industry

Vessels. Outlines actions that may be taken if a Coast Guard enforcement official

believes a vessel is being operated in an unsafe condition or manner.

13-91 Fishing Industry Vessel Third Party Examination and Procedures for

Designation of “Accepted Organizations” and “Similarly Qualified Organizations”.

Coast Guard approval of third party examinations by accepted organizations within the

maritime industry in order to supplement the Coast Guard’s uninspected fishing industry

vessel boarding and examination program.

1-92 (CH 1) Lifesaving Equipment Requirements for Commercial Fishing Vessels.

Outlines specific safety equipment for commercial fishing vessels, as well as information

on equipment maintenance, inspection, stowage and use.

1-92 (CH 2) Implementation of Lifesaving Equipment Requirements for Commercial

Fishing Vessels. Coast Guard policies and guidelines for enforcing commercial fishing

vessel safety regulations

7-93 “Fishing Vessel Safety Instructors” and Course Curricula for Training

“Fishing Vessel Drill Conductors” Guidelines for Acceptance.

Coast Guard requirements for acceptance as a Fishing Vessel Safety Instructor and

approval of curricula for training Fishing Vessel Drill Conductors on procedures for

conducting drills and instruction on federally documented commercial fishing vessels.

9-93 Emergency Position Indicating Radiobeacons (EPIRBs) and Other Radio

Lifesaving Equipment for Inspected Vessels and Uninspected Commercial Vessels.
Appendix D Other Resources Consulted

D-4

Information and recommendations on the use of the Emergency Position Indicating Radio

Beacons and other radio lifesaving equipment.
E-1

Past Recommendations

Main Points. Three past commercial fishing safety studies and their associated

recommendations were reviewed during the development of this of this report.

• The 1987 National Transportation Safety Board study, “Uninspected Commercial

Fishing Vessel Safety.”

• The 1991 National Research Council report, “Fishing Vessel Safety, Blueprint for a

National Program.”

• The 1997 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Current Intelligence

Bulletin 58, “Commercial Fishing Fatalities in Alaska, Risk Factors and Prevention

Strategies.”

There was considerable overlap in all three of the reports ‘recommendations. When

consolidated, they closely resembled the recommendations developed by this Task Force.

Note: Recommendations in bold script were also made by the Task Force. These

recommendations may vary in wording or implementation method. Recommendations in

italicized script indicate items already implemented. Those recommendations in standard

script have yet to be implemented or recommended by this report.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Recommendations.

NTSB undertook the 1987 safety study to examine actions undertaken by agencies and

organizations to address commercial fishing safety. The study focused on Coast Guard

data from 1981 to 1984 and included a review of its own investigation activities from the

previous 18 years. The study concluded “the commercial fishing industry is one of the

highest risk industries in the world and has the poorest safety record of any industry in

the United States.” The study also concluded “The use of voluntary training and manuals

to improve the poor safety record in the industry was started at least as early as 1968, but

has not been successful.” The NTSB study made the following recommendations:

1. Seek legislative authority to require the licensing of captains of commercial

fishing vessels, including a requirement that they demonstrate minimum

qualifications in vessel safety including rules of the road, vessel stability, fire

fighting, watertight integrity, and the use of lifesaving equipment.

2. Seek legislative authority to require that stability tests be conducted and that

complete stability information be provided to the captains of commercial

fishing vessels.

Appendix E
Appendix E Past Recommendations

E-2

3. Establish minimum safety training standards for all commercial fishermen,

commensurate with their responsibilities, for all types of uninspected

commercial fishing vessels.

4. Seek legislative authority to require uninspected commercial fishing vessel

captains/owners to provide safety training to all crewmembers.

5. Seek legislative authority to require basic lifesaving equipment for uninspected

commercial fishing vessels.

6. Seek legislative authority to require basic safety equipment for fish processing vessels

built before January 1, 1988.

7. Establish standards for the implementation and use of the new 406.025 MHz

emergency position indicating radiobeacon for uninspected commercial fishing

vessels, including proper handling, placement on the vessel, maintenance, and

inspection practices.

8. Seek legislative authority to require that all uninspected commercial fishing

vessels be certified and periodically inspected by the Coast Guard or its

recognized representative to ensure that the vessels meet all applicable Federal

safety standards.

9. Include in the final rule on “Operation of a Vessel While Intoxicated” an

absolute prohibition against the use of alcohol and/or drugs while engaged in

commercial fishing operations.

10. Research and review casualty data on the potential for toxic gas exposure in

unventilated spaces and publicize the danger to the commercial fishing industry if

such action is warranted.

11. Through the Sea Grant programs at universities, examine stability issues relating to

commercial fishing vessels and their particular fishing operations, including but not

limited to the impact of adding equipment such as circulation water tanks and the

need for basic stability testing requirements.

12. To the National Council of Fishing Vessel Safety Insurance: Report to your member

organizations the results of data collected by the Commercial Fishing Claims

Register on major marine accidents and the causes assigned to those accidents to

inform them of the continued need for safety improvement.

National Research Council (NRC) Recommendations).

NRC concluded commercial fishing is “inherently a dangerous undertaking and has one

of the highest mortality rates of any occupation.” NRC also concluded; “the industry’s

safety record is so poor that the availability and cost of insurance have become major

sources of concern for many fishermen”. The NRC study made the following

recommendations:

1. Update and expand safety data.

- assess data requirements, including fishing fleets and fishermen

- provide compatibility between CG data including CASMAIN, SAR, SEER, &

MSIS
Appendix E Past Recommendations

E-3

- expand data acquisition and utilization capabilities in order to gather, standardize,

evaluate and disseminate fishing vessel data, modify CG 2692 to include the fishery

the vessel was engaged in

- coordinate data activities with OSHA, NOAA and state offices

- publish annual report on fishing vessel casualties

2. Require vessel registration to include all commercial fishing vessels for

regulatory tracking & improve future analytical capabilities.

3. Require professional registration.

- to ensure effective management of fisherman certification and operator

licensing requirements and information.

4. Establish minimum design, structural, stability and material condition

standards.

5. Expand equipment requirements.

6. Improve human engineering of vessels, deck layouts, and machinery.

7. Continue compliance examinations.

8. Require self-inspection system where vessel owners & operators not subject to more

stringent inspection methods would be required to do a self inspection.

9. Require marine surveys.

10. Require load lines.

11. Require vessel classification.

12. Require vessel inspection.

13. Remove unsafe, inefficient or excess vessels from service

- in concert with NOAA evaluate the merit of safety/economic programs for

permanently removing vessels no longer fit from service.

14. Establish risk communication/safety

- in conjunction with MARAD, NOAA and OSHA develop a program to

inform, educate, and motivate fishermen on matters of safety.

15. Publish and distribute safety publications.

16. Require emergency preparedness measures

- require regulations for emergency drills and safety orientation for all

personnel.

17. Develop and promulgate standard operating procedures.

18. Develop competency standards.

19. Promote education and training.

20. Require education and training with certification.

21. Require licensing.

22. Establish vessel manning and watch keeping criteria.
Appendix E Past Recommendations

E-4

23. Require manufacturers to provide installation, maintenance, and use requirements.

24. Develop and require carriage of fishing industry-specific survival equipment

such as effective deckwear and audiovisual aids on proper use and maintenance

of equipment.

25. Prohibit use of survival equipment that is not Coast Guard approved.

26. Establish flexible season openings.

27. Establish a voting position for a marine safety organization on each fishery

management council.

28. Expand safety emphasis of fishery management plans.

29. Require insurance coverage

- determined to not be practical under current structure and economic conditions.

30. Expand fishing-industry-specific weather services

- NWS should research fishing industry weather advisory needs to determine if

additional coverage is needed.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Recommendations.

NIOSH concluded “the Commercial Fishing Industry Safety Act primarily emphasizes

the use and availability of safety equipment during and after a disaster at sea.” The

findings of this report demonstrate considerable reductions in fatalities in some sectors of

this industry, while persistent problems remain in other areas. NIOSH recommended

augmenting this approach by preventing these disasters in the first place, as well as

continuing to prepare to react to them if they occur. Additional efforts must be made to

reduce the frequency of vessel capsizing and sinkings, particularly during crabbing

operations, and to prevent fishermen from falling overboard. The NIOSH study made the

following recommendations:

1. A requirement for periodic stability reassessment and vessel inspection of all

vessels should be seriously considered, as equipping and retrofitting can

substantially affect the stability of vessels.

2. Minimum specifications for watertight components and bulkheads sufficient to

keep swamped or capsized vessels afloat should also be developed, implemented

and evaluated.

3. A thorough assessment should be made of current training requirements and

efforts, and deficiencies should be immediately corrected.

4. Consideration should be given to establishing adequate watch keeping and

staffing for new safety and fatigue requirements for all vessels.

5. Consideration should be given to requiring the successful completion of basic

fishing safety training, such as those programs currently offered by the Alaska

Marine Safety Education Association (AMSEA), before an Alaskan (state) crew

license or a commercial fishing permit is issued.
Appendix E Past Recommendations

E-5

6. All current and proposed management regimes should be examined from a

safety and health perspective.

7. Weather information should be more closely heeded.

8. All fishermen should wear PFDs when on the deck of any vessel.

9. Man overboard alarms should be thoroughly evaluated and widely deployed if such

evaluations demonstrate that the devices are effective.

10. Thorough study of the handling of lines, especially during deployment of crab pots,

should be conducted to reduce worker exposure to this hazard.

11. A training curriculum should be developed, implemented, and evaluated for

fishermen who are harvesting seafood or clearing lines or nets by diving.