Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Walker, 2016 IL App (3d) 140766

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

MICHAEL WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-14-0766

Filed October 28, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County, No. 06-CF-519; the 

Hon. Scott Shipplett, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier and Katherine M. Strohl, of State Appellate 

Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

John T. Pepmeyer, State’s Attorney, of Galesburg (Justin A. Nicolosi, 

of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the 

People.

Panel JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justice Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Wright dissented, with opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Michael Walker, appeals from the dismissal of his second-stage postconviction 

petition. Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that his Violent Crime Victims Assistance 

Fund fine (VCVA) and drug court fee were fines improperly imposed by the circuit clerk and 

must be vacated. We vacate, as void, the fines imposed by the circuit clerk. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 In January 2008, defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 

5/12-4(b)(6) (West 2006)). The court sentenced defendant to four years’ imprisonment and 

ordered defendant to “pay court costs in this matter which are due within six months of his 

release from custody.” The prison sentence was ordered to run consecutive to the sentence 

defendant was serving at the time he committed the instant offense. 

¶ 4 On April 13, 2012, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, arguing that he had 

been deprived of his right to a speedy trial and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise this issue. The court summarily dismissed defendant’s petition, and defendant appealed. 

We reversed the dismissal and remanded the cause for second-stage proceedings. People v. 

Walker, 2013 IL App (3d) 120330-U. 

¶ 5 On remand, defense counsel filed an amended postconviction petition, which realleged 

defendant’s pro se arguments. The State filed a motion to dismiss. In September 2014, the 

court dismissed defendant’s amended petition, and the clerk entered a written cost sheet into 

the record. The cost sheet included the following assessments: “Clerk Fee” $50, “State’s 

Attorney” $30, “Court Fund—County Fee” $50, “Court Automation” $10, “Court Security” 

$25, “Victim of Violent Crime” $20, “Document Storage Fund” $10, “Arrestee’s Medical 

Fee” $10, “Teen Court” $5, “Drug Court Fee” $5, and “Knox Cty Child Advocacy Center” $5. 

Defendant appeals from the dismissal of his amended postconviction petition, but defendant 

does not contest the dismissal. Therefore, he has abandoned the arguments raised in the 

petition. 

¶ 6 ANALYSIS 

¶ 7 Defendant solely argues that his VCVA and drug court fines must be vacated as they were 

imposed without authority by the circuit clerk. The State agrees that these assessments were 

imposed without authority, but argues that the matter should be remanded to the trial court with 

direction for the court to specifically order these mandatory fines. Upon review, we find the 

VCVA and drug court assessments are void. Additionally, we sua sponte find that the circuit 

clerk imposed several other fines without an order of the court. These fines are void and 

vacated accordingly. We further reject the State’s argument for a remand as we do not have 

authority to order the trial court to impose the mandatory fines. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(4); 

People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19; People v. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 150417, ¶ 13. 

¶ 8 The imposition of a fine is a judicial act. People v. Strong, 2016 IL App (3d) 140418, ¶ 8. 

“The clerk of a court is a nonjudicial member of the court and, as such, has no power to impose 

sentences or levy fines ***.” People v. Scott, 152 Ill. App. 3d 868, 873 (1987). A fine imposed 

without authority by the circuit clerk is void from its inception. People v. Larue, 2014 IL App 
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(4th) 120595, ¶ 56. The circuit clerk may levy fees against a defendant, but only the trial court 

may impose fines. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 150417, ¶ 10.

¶ 9 Here, the parties agree that defendant’s VCVA and drug court fines are void as they are 

fines that were imposed without authority by the circuit clerk. See People v. Folks, 406 Ill. 

App. 3d 300, 306 (2010) (holding drug court assessment is a fine that cannot be imposed by the 

circuit clerk); Scott, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 873 (holding VCVA assessment is a mandatory fine 

that cannot be imposed by the circuit clerk). We find that the record establishes that the VCVA 

and drug court assessments were imposed by the clerk after the court entered a generic order 

for “costs.” As a result, the VCVA and drug court fines are void. See Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 

120595, ¶ 56. Accordingly, we vacate these two fines. 

¶ 10 After reviewing the cost sheet, we find the circuit clerk imposed several additional fees, 

which have been judicially categorized as fines, without an order of the court. These 

assessments, which are properly categorized as fines, are void. See id. We “have an 

independent duty to vacate void orders and may sua sponte declare an order void.” People v. 

Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 27 (2004). Therefore, we vacate the following additional fines as 

void: “Court Fund—County Fee” (People v. Ackerman, 2014 IL App (3d) 120585, ¶ 30 

(holding the court systems fee of $50 (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c)(1), (g) (West 2008)) was a fine)), 

“Arrestee’s Medical Fee” (People v. Jernigan, 2014 IL App (4th) 130524, ¶ 38 (holding the 

$10 arrestee’s medical assessment is a fine)), “Teen Court” (People v. Graves, 235 Ill. 2d 244, 

255 (2009) (holding the teen court assessment is a fine)), and “Knox Cty Child Advocacy 

Center” (People v. Jones, 397 Ill. App. 3d 651, 660-61 (2009) (holding the Children’s 

Advocacy Center Fund assessment is a fine)). 

¶ 11 Having vacated the improperly imposed fines, the State argues that we must remand the 

cause for the trial court to properly order any mandatory fines. See 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 

2008); 55 ILCS 5/5-1101(d-5) (West 2008). However, in Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19, 

our supreme court abolished the void sentence rule. In doing so, the supreme court noted that 

an “appellate court may not, under our rules, address a request by the State to increase a 

criminal sentence which is illegally low.” Id. ¶ 26. Since a fine is part of a criminal sentence 

(Graves, 235 Ill. 2d at 250), Castleberry bars remanding this case to the trial court with 

instructions to impose the required fines. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 26. To do so would 

impermissibly increase defendant’s sentence on appeal. Id. Therefore, we reject the State’s 

argument that a remand is required for the proper imposition of the mandatory fines. The 

State’s sole remedy with regard to these mandatory fines is to file a petition for writ of 

mandamus. See id.

¶ 12 We recently applied the Castleberry analysis to several unauthorized fines in Wade, 2016 

IL App (3d) 150417. The defendant in Wade argued that the circuit clerk improperly assessed 

several fines, which necessitated reversal of the unauthorized fines and remand for the proper 

entry of an order of enumerated costs. Id. ¶ 9. We vacated several void fines that were imposed 

without authority by the circuit clerk. Id. ¶ 12. We then found that the omission of the 

mandatory fines resulted in an illegally low sentence. Id. ¶ 13. However, Castleberry, 2015 IL 

116916, ¶ 25, prevented a remand for the imposition of the statutorily required fines as this act 

would result in an impermissible increase in defendant’s sentence on appeal. Wade, 2016 IL 

App (3d) 150417, ¶ 13. We concluded that the State’s sole recourse to impose the mandatory 

fines was to “file a petition for writ of mandamus seeking an order requiring the trial court to 

impose the statutorily required fines.” Id. Analogously, in the instant case, we vacate the 
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improperly imposed fines. 

¶ 13 CONCLUSION 

¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the fines imposed by the circuit clerk of Knox County 

and otherwise affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County. 

¶ 15 Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

¶ 16 JUSTICE WRIGHT, dissenting. 

¶ 17 It is well established that “[i]ssues not raised before the trial court are considered forfeited, 

and a party may not raise such issues for the first time on appeal.” McKinley Foundation at the 

University of Illinois v. Illinois Department of Labor, 404 Ill. App. 3d 1115, 1120 (2010). 

However, equally well-established case law also provides that void judgments may be 

challenged at any time. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2002). 

¶ 18 The $25 error in this case was not raised in the trial court. Consequently, in order to avoid 

forfeiture, not surprisingly, this defendant loudly complains that the issue regarding the 

amount of unpaid court costs requires our review as part of a “void order.” Much like shouting 

fire in a theater, appellant’s approach has caused my well-intentioned and diligent judicial 

colleagues to spring into action. However, since defendant concedes forfeiture, our court must 

first carefully examine whether a fire or a void order exists before exercising our jurisdiction. 

¶ 19 I cannot criticize the majority for instinctively reacting to the inflammatory term “void” as 

used in this case. I also recognize the majority’s holding is entirely consistent with the 

unanimous decision recently announced by this court in People v. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 

150417. Respectfully, I disagree with the approach adopted by this court in Wade. Thus, I must 

also respectfully dissent regarding the same approach adopted in this case. I disagree that this 

court should repair a forfeited clerical error that was not first addressed in the trial court. 

¶ 20 In Wade, the defendant forfeited the cost issue as well. First, the defendant filed a motion to 

reconsider his sentence in that case, but did not challenge any part of the financial 

consequences resulting from the court’s sentencing order. Significantly, in Wade, the 

defendant also voluntarily paid all court costs, as calculated by the circuit clerk, without 

voicing any objection to the clerk’s calculations before payment in full.

¶ 21 In Wade, our court recognized the court’s sentencing order was “illegally low” but “not 

void.” Id. ¶ 13. In spite of this finding, the court elected to correct the clerical miscalculation in 

Wade. The court reduced costs three years after defendant voluntarily paid the costs, as 

calculated by the circuit clerk, in full. In fact, by reducing the balance of costs in Wade, the 

defendant became entitled to a $150 refund. In Wade, the opinion asserts that this approach 

was the “economically rational thing to do” because it allowed our court “to vacate the fines 

and move on to the next case.” 

¶ 22 I strongly disagree with this expressed view of judicial economics. I submit that the Wade

decision will only increase the number of appeals involving requests to reduce previously 

forfeited monetary miscalculations by the clerk. Who can fault the multitude of defendants 

who will rely on Wade in future appeals by requesting this court to address forfeited cost 

issues, with high hopes of receiving similar cash refunds or financial credits. I must ask, is 

Wade entitled to interest on the $150 he overpaid three years ago? 
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¶ 23 Like the order in Wade, the court order in this case negligently omitted mandatory fines by 

requiring defendant to pay an undetermined amount of costs. Yet, the 2008 order is not void, it 

is just wrong. Since I conclude the 2008 sentencing order in this case is not void, I disagree an 

adjustment in costs is now required due to forfeiture.

¶ 24 Thankfully, Castleberry brings us back to a well-centered starting point when presented 

with a forfeited sentencing issue raised for the first time on appeal. In such a case, reviewing 

courts should begin by carefully scrutinizing whether the “void” label applies to the court’s

sentencing order in each case. If not, our jurisdiction does not attach to that sentencing issue. 

Here, the majority reversed the process by skipping the first step. Unless the majority first 

holds that the judge’s 2008 order in this case is void, we should not exercise our jurisdiction to 

consider the only issue raised in this appeal. 

¶ 25 My interpretation of the holding in Castleberry is stubbornly inflexible. I believe

Castleberry stands for the proposition that a truly “void” sentence is now limited to directives 

resulting from a circuit court that lacked jurisdictional authority. Here, defendant does not 

challenge the jurisdictional authority of the trial court to delegate the task of calculating the 

amount of costs to the circuit clerk. Based on this record, I conclude the court’s order is not 

void. Based on the rationale of Wade, the majority cannot logically disagree with my view. 

¶ 26 I remain hopeful that my dissent will result in a lightbulb moment for the reader. Simply 

stated, I agree the clerical assessments are arguably void assessments. However, the clerical 

assessments in this case were not ratified by the court. Arguably, void clerical assessments do 

not magically become part of a court order without judicial ratification. 

¶ 27 It seems simple. Castleberry allows us get out of the business of engaging in financial 

audits years after the sentence was imposed. Such an approach favors judicial economy. Now, 

this court may finally stop addressing endless requests from defendants asking this court to 

audit and then reduce, but never increase, amounts most defendants will never be compelled to 

involuntarily pay. 

¶ 28 This approach stops the exponential growth of sentencing issues, raised first on review, 

that have spiraled out of control in recent years. Following Castleberry, we may now turn our 

attention to addressing the merits of substantive issues that are properly subject to our review. 

¶ 29 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in this appeal.