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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/429NOT PRECEDE NTIAL
UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF A PPE AL FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No. 03-1299
UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v. WAYNE CHI NNERY,

Appellant
On A ppeal from the District Cou rt of the Virgi n Islands (D.C. Crimi nal No. 01-cr -00321) District Judge: H on. Tho mas K . Moo re Argued April 30, 2003 BE FO RE : RO TH , M cK EE and CO W EN , Circuit Judges (Fil ed: June 26, 2003) Stephen A. Brusch, Esq. (Argued) Internationa l Plaza Suite 2G P.O.Box 988 Charlotte Amalie, St . Thomas USVI, 00804 Counsel for Appell ant2

Antho ny J. Jenkins, Esq. (A rgued) Office of United St ates Att orney United States Courthouse 5500 Veterans Buil ding, Sui te 260 Charlotte Amalie, St . Thomas USVI, 00802-6924 Counsel for Appell ee
OPI NION
CO W EN , Circuit

Judge
. Wayne Chinnerywas indicted in the Distri ct Court of the Virgi n Islands on four counts of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 1623. F ollowing trial to a jury, Chinn ery
was co nvicted on all counts and sentenced to thirty-si x mo nths imprison ment. C hinnery appeals r aisi ng a host of cons tit utional , st atutor

y, evidentiary , and proce dural cha llenge s to his co nvictio n and senten ce. W e find no er ror in th e D istrict Co urt’s rulin gs an d w ill th er efo re aff

irm. BACKGROUND This case arise s out of Chinnery’ s test imony during a trial f

or civi l ri ghts vi olati ons and a ssault. A s we write f or the p arties, w e only brie fly expla in the e vents leadin g to this app eal. In 2 000 , Ch inn ery ser ved as th e A cting Dir ecto r ofthe N arco tics S trike Fo rce, a law enforcement agency of the Go vernment of the Virgin Islands. Chinnery’s post include d a str eet pat

rol det ail i n the Savan ar ea of St. Thomas. On the eveni ng of May3

21, 2000, Chi nnery was involved i n an alt ercation while responding t o a report of disorde rlybehavior a nd drug posses sion. As a result of that incide nt, t

he United States obtained an indictment charging Chinnery with violat ing the civilrights of Charese Hu ggi ns, p oss essin g a f irear m d urin g a c rime of v iolen ce, a nd a ssau lt. A ju ry trial o n th ese cha rge s w as c ond ucte d in Oc tob er 2 001 (the “H ugg ins T rial” ). Chinnerytestifie d as the onl y defens e witness . At the beginning of his di rect
exam ination , Chin nery pro vided the fo llow ing d escrip tion of his ed ucatio nal ba ckgr oun d: Q: Did you go to school in St. Thomas? A: Yes, I di d.

. . . Q: Did you go on t o colle ge? A: Yes, I di d. Q: And where did you go t o colle ge? A: I began atthe Coll ege of the Vir gin Isl ands, which is now the Univer sity of t he Virg in Isla nds. And then Iwent to Ho[f]st ra Univers ity , and eve nt ua lly, Ho[ f] st raUni ve rs it

y Sch oolof

Law. Q: D id you ob tai n a ny d eg re e f ro m H o[ f] str a U ni ve rsi ty? A: Yes, I obt ained a BA and eventual ly a Juri st Doctr orate [ sic ] degree. Chinneryalso t esti fied as to his prof essiona l experi ence: Q: Mr. Chinnery , what are some of the j obs that you have ha d? A: Oh, in the l ast, in the l ast fi fteen y ears I served as Director of Labor Relations in the De partmen t of Lab or. I worked as an as sociate in a coupl e of la w fi rms here in the Virgin Is l ands. And eventua lly I worked as the Drug Policy Advisor to t

he Governor from 1999 unti l 2000.4

Chinneryreiterate d these cl aims on cros s-examinat ion: Q: [S]ir, you sa id y ou got a col lege degr ee, i s that correct ? . . . A college degr ee, is that correct? You graduate d from Ho[f]str a? A: Yes, I di d. Q: You got a Juri st Doctor ate [ sic ] d eg re e, w hi ch m ea ns you ar e a n a tto rn ey? A: Yes, sir. Q: Is that co rrect? A: Yes, sir. Q: And as an attorney you got trai ning on how to an swer and ask questions— didn’t you, sir? A: Yes, sir. The jury ultimately found Ch innery not guil ty on allcounts. After Chinnery’ s acquit tal, the government

discover ed that

Chinneryhad fabric ated m uch o f his b ackg roun d. Co ntrary to his testimo ny, Chin nery did n ot grad uate from colleg e, and did n ot grad uate, o r even attend , law s choo l. Chin nery did n ot, ther efo re, ev er p racti ce a s an attor ney, a nd n eve r w ork ed a s an asso ciate in an y law firm
. Chinnerywas indicted on four count s of perj ury in viol ation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 base d on his erroneou s testimony that: 1) he held a Bach elor of A rts degree from Hof stra Un iversity; 2) he had a ttende d the H ofstra Un iversity Sch ool o f La w, an d rece ived a Juris Doctorate degree; 3) he was an attorney ; and 4) he ha d worked as an assoc iate in sever al law firm s. A two -da y jury trial r esu lted i n a ju dgm ent o f co nvi ction on a ll fou r co unt s.5

The Distri ct Court s entenced Chinne ry to thi rty -six months impri sonment, t hree y ears of supe rvised release , and a man datory $4 00.00 spec ial asses sme nt. Ch innery file d a tim ely not ice o f ap pea l and we hav e jur isdic tion pur sua nt to 28 U .S.C . § 12 91. DIS CUSS ION Ch innery arg ues th at 1) the gov ernm ent’s e viden ce w as insu fficien t to prov e his false statemen ts were m aterial to the issues at the H uggins T rial; 2) the District Court erred i n admitting evide nce of pri or fals e declar ations ; 3) t he government’ s reexam ination of a w itness improp erly introduced exp ert testimony; 4) the District Cou rt
erron eous ly instructed the jury on the issu e of m ateriality; 5) the Distric t Cou rt impro perly permitted a porti on of the transcript fr om the Huggins Tria l to be read to the jury ; 6) t he District Court erred in granting the government’s Batson chall enge; and 7) the Dist rict Court improperly applie d the sentencing gui deline s. We discus s each argument in turn. I. Chinn ery first argues that govern ment’s ev idence w as insufficient to su pport a jury fin din g th athis fal se s ta te ment s wer e mat eri al to t he i ssu es i n th e Huggi ns Tria l. To prove a viol ation of

18 U.S.C. § 1623(a ), t

he government was re quired t o show that Ch inn ery kn ow ing ly mad e a m ateri al fa lse d ecla ratio n du ring the H ugg ins T rial. Ch inn ery did not disp ute th at he kno win gly m ade the f our fals e sta tem ents at iss ue. Inste ad, h e arg ued that h is fa lse te stim ony w as n ot m ateri al to t he is sue s be for e the jury. We have ex plained that “[o ]ur review of the suf ficiency of the evid ence after a6

guilt y ver dict i s ‘highl y deferentia l’. ” United Stat es v. Hodge , 321 F.3d 429, 439 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Hart , 273 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2001)). “When deciding whether a j ury verdict

rest s on legal ly suffici ent evi dence it is not for us t o weigh the evidence or

to dete rmine the credibi lit y of t he witness es. Rather, we must vi ew the evidence i n the li ght most favor able t o the government , and wil l sust ain the verdict if any rati onal trier of fa ct coul d have found the es senti al el ements of the crime bey ond a reasonabl e doubt. ” Id . (citation omitted). A false statement is materialwithin the meaning of § 1623 if the statement “has a naturaltendencyto influence, or was capable of i nfluenci ng, the decisi on of the tribunal in making a particul ar dete rminati on.” Un ited Sta tes v. B arrett , 1 11 F. 3d 9 47, 953 (D. C. Cir. 19 97); se e a ls o Un it ed Stat es v. Ada ms , 870 F.2d 1140, 1147 (6th Cir . 1989) ( “The test of wh ether a false de claration satisfies the ma terialityrequireme nt is whethe r a trut hful st atement mi ght have ass ist ed or infl uenced the t ribunalin it s inqui ry .”). The
ma teria lity requ irem ent is con strue d br oad ly. United Stat es v. Regan , 103 F.3d 1072, 1084 (2d Cir. 1997). Accordi ngly , the stat ements “need not be materi al to any particul ar iss ue , bu t m ay b e m ate ria l to co lla ter al m att er s th at m ig ht in flu en ce th e c ou rt o r th e ju ry” in its d ecis ion s. Uni te d St at es v. Abroms , 947 F.2d 1241, 1248 (5th Cir . 1991) (quoti ng Un ited Sta tes v. D am ato , 554 F.2d 1371, 13 73 (5th C ir. 1977)). Chinneryargues that his false s tate ments were not relevant to the e lements of

§ 1623, or hi s credi bili ty as a witnes s. Chinnery contends that because he never

testifie d7

that he was more believable because of his purported education and experience, his false clai ms could not have influe nced the j ury ’s deci sion on the ulti mate iss ues. Chinne ry thus
con clud es th at his fals ities “ we re a tr iflin g co llater al cir cum stan ce to the is sue in d ispu te.” Long ago, w e held that false statem ents implicating a w itness’s credibility are
ma teria l un der the f ede ral p erju ry statu te. United Stat es v. Wei ler , 143 F.2d 204, 205-06 (3d Cir . 194 4), rev’d on ot her grounds , 323 U.S. 626 ( 1945). I n Weiler , we explai ned that material ity

consider s whether, in li ght of the tri al as a whole , the false s tate ment “was capable of i nfluenci ng the tribunal on t he issue before i t.” Id . at 206 (quoti ng Blackmon v. United State s , 108 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir . 1940)) . Therefor e, the false stat ement might be materi al when “calc ulate d and inte nded to prop and bol ster the te sti mony of the witness on s ome materialpoint, ” by “c lothi ng it wit h circumst ances which . . . s trengt hen the cre dibil ity

of the witness. ” Id . (cita tion om itted ). Here, the record i ndicat es that Chinnery ’s fal se statements were part of afalse s elfportr ait t hat convey ed a knowledge of the l aw and the legalprocess. That image was certa inly releva nt to Chinne ry ’s te sti mony that his actions di d not exceed t he boundarie s of legi timat e self- defense: Q: Mr. Chinnery , te ll t he jurywhether or not

you bel ieve that y ou used excessi ve force that eveni ng? A: . . . I did no t use ex cessiv e forc e. . . . No, I d id no t. Moreov er, Chinnery r e-iterated his fabricati ons during the government’s crossexaminati on even as the prosecut or sought to atta ck his cr edibil ity . If Chinne ry had8

answ ered th ese q uestion s truthf ully, the jury ma y have d iscou nted o ther as pects o f his testimo ny, includ ing h is acco unt o f the e venin g in q uestion , and h is opin ions a s to
exce ssive f orce. In deed , Chin nery’s co unse l remin ded th e jury dur ing clo sing a rgum ents that C hinn ery “w as no t impe ache d” an d “w as no t contra dicted ,” cha racteriz ing h is testimony as “firm and convi ncing. ” Chinnery ’s te sti mony was a central i ssue at the Huggins Trai l, a s the j ury was ask ed to cho ose betw een his v ersio n of the e ven ts, or t hat o ffe red by the victi m. Ch innery’s f alse state men ts we re cap able o f influ encin g the ju ry on that iss ue, an d his inflated crede ntials clo thed h is testimo ny with circum stance s that stre ngth ened his credibility. Viewing the ev idence in the ligh t most favo rable to the gov ernmen t, the jury could have fou nd th e elem ent of mate riality in § 16 23 b eyond a reaso nable dou bt. II. Chinnerynext argue s that the Dist rict Court improperly admitt ed evidence of Chinnery ’s pri or fals e declar ations . Over objec tion, the Dist rict Court admitted evi dence of severalinst ances in whic h Chinneryhad false ly repres ented hi s background, includi ng: 1) a voter

regis tration card l isting Chinnery ’s profe ssion as “att orney ”; 2) a ne wspaper intervie w w here C hinn ery stated h e w as an attorne y; and the 3) testim ony of Virg in Islands’ offi cers that Chinnery had r epresented himself as an attorney . We review the Dis trict C our t’s de cisio n on the a dm issib ility of e vid enc e fo r an abu se o f dis creti on. United Stat

es v. Ser afini , 233 F.3 d 75 8, 76 8 n.1 4 (3 d C ir. 20 00)
.9

The Federal Rule s of Evidence defi ne rele vant evi dence as any thing “ha ving any tendencyto make the exi stence of any fac t that

is of cons equence to t

he determinati on of th e ac ti on mo re pr obabl e or le ss pr obabl e than it

woul d be withou t t

he e vi den ce. ” Fe d. R. Evid . 401. R eleva nt evid ence may be exclu ded, h ow ever, “ if its prob ative v alue is sub stan tially ou twe igh ed b y the d ang er o f un fair prejud ice . . . .” Fed . R. E vid . 403 . W e will gi ve “subst antia l defer ence” to t he District Court ’s dis creti onary determi nation t hat pro bativ e va lue o utw eigh ed p reju dice und er R ule 4 03. Elcock v. Kmart Corp. , 233 F.3d 734, 754 (3d Cir. 200 0). Chinn ery argues that his prior fab rications were irrelevant to the gov ernmen t’s burden of provi ng the el ements of § 1623. However, the government’s bur den incl uded demonstrating that Chinnery fal sely and knowingly testified t hat “in the last

fifteen year s . . . Iworked as an assoc iate in a coupl e of law firms here in t he Virgin I slands. ” Chinnery ’s pri or publi c clai ms to be li censed as an attorney pr ovided ci rcumstant ial evidence t

hat his tri al te sti mony was no mere mist ake, but rather delibe ratel y and kno win gly fa lse. Serafi ni , 233 F.3d at 770 (recogni zing that the requirement of knowledge under § 1623 may be proven by ci rcumstantial e vidence) ; Fed. R. Evid. 404( b) (all owing evidence of ot her cri mes or wrongs in or der to s how knowledge or the abse nce of mistake ). Nor was the admissi on of these i tems unfai rlyprejudi cial . Chinnery ar gues that the admiss ion of his prior false s tate ments served onlyto permit the jur y t o decide the10

case on an i mproper emoti onal basi s. We see no meaningfuldiffere nce between Chinnery ’s pri or statements and his st atements at Huggins Tri al, as each i nstance comprised the same misrepresentation of his background. Moreover, the governmen t also demonstrated that

Chinneryhad obtai ned his posi tion as the Direc tor of t he Narcoti cs Strike Force by relyi ng on h is false educa tion. This fact ne cessarily placed Ch innery’s prior f alse state men ts befo re the ju ry. There fore, th e D istrict Co urt did n ot abu se its discre tion in c onclu ding that C hinn ery’s past sta teme nts w ould not allo w th e jury to convict by “i llegi timat e means.” United Stat es v. Bl yden , 964 F.2d 1375, 13 78 (3d C ir. 1992). III. Chinneryalso ar gues that the te sti mony of a government witness include d unqualif ied expert opini ons that did not as sist

the jur y’ s determinati ons. We revi ew for
an a bus e of disc retio n. Serafi ni , 233 F.3 d at 7 68 n .14. Barry Willi ams, one of the prosecuting attorney s from the Huggins Trial , te sti fied for the gove rnment at

the perj ury tri al. On cross-exami nation, Chinnery ’s counsel engaged in the foll owing line of questi oning: Q: Now, you bel ieve that in y our number of y ears, the fi ve years that y ou hav e been practi cing la w and have been admitt ed t o more tha n on e jur isdic tion
. .

. yo u have conf idenc e that th e jury is cap able o f do ing a g ood and f air assess ment of the facts . . . .? [I]t is y our opinion that the jury is f a ir, sophisticat ed enough, t o have reached a c onclusi on as to M r. Chin nery’s gu ilt or innocence, and not make a det ermination that he was not guiltyjustbecause of the cr edenti als and qual ific ation he stat ed in that trial11

A:
. . . I be lieve that a ny jury in the V irgin Islan ds, o r any wher e in the United States, if give n all of the fa cts, can com e to a c onclu sion. B ut in my—the case that we tried, t

hey were not given all of the facts. Q: But my question to you, sir, is just simple: Do you believe that the jury found hi m no t g ui lty ju st b ec au se of th e c re de nt ial s h e s tat ed be fo re th at j ur y? The government the n asked the wit ness on re- direct

examinati on “is i t y our legalopinion that t hese fal se statements made by Mr. Chinneryeithe r had a natural tendency to—or were capable of i nfluenci ng the jur y’ s decis ion as t o a materi al matter in t hat case .” The government argue s that Chinnery“opened the door ” to it s re-direct que sti on by es senti ally

asking Will iams for hi s legalopinion on cross-exami nation. We have
ex pl ain ed th at “ op en in g t he do or ,” b ett er kn ow n a s th e d oc trin e o f c ur ati ve ad m iss ib ilit y, provides that onc e a party i ntroduces inadmiss ible e vidence, the opposi ng partymay intro duc e oth erw ise in adm issib le ev iden ce to reb ut o r ex plain the f irst o ffe ring
. Gov’t of the V irgin Isla nds v . Arch ibald , 987 F.2d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1993). As the government does not ar gue that

Willi ams’s te sti mony on cros s-examinat ion was inadmis sibl e, the doctri ne of curative admiss ibil ity is i napplic able. A re lated e viden tiary doctrin e kno wn as the p rinciple of co mp letene ss states th at a witness maybe questi oned as to t he basis , moti ve, or reasons for an opinion, elic ited on
cro ss-e xam inati on. Id . at 187 -88; see a lso U nited S tates v. D avis , 183 F.3d 231, 256 (3d Cir. 19 99); United Stat

es v. Walker , 421 F.2d 1298, 1299 (3d Cir. 1970). Here, the defense used i ts cr oss-exami nation of Willi ams to est ablis h the witne ss’s l egal credentials, before asking whether, in his opinion, t he jury acquit

ted Chinnery “just12

because of the credentials he stated.” These ques tions placed Will iams’s l egal opi nion on the materiali ty of Chinnery ’s false st atements before the jury . Under these circumstances, the government

reasonabl y sought

to probe t

he full basis f

or Willi ams’s te sti mony, a nd the r eas ons for his o pin ion
. See Walker , 421 F.2d at 1299 (“If t

he Government had fai led to cla rify the situa tion , the ju ry mig ht w ell ha ve b een unf avo rab ly imp ress ed . . . .” ). Vie win g the gov er nme nt ’s que stio ns in th e c ontex t o f the de fe ns e c ro ss -e xa mi na ti on, we
are s atisf ied th at the re-d irect exa min ation wa s w ithin the D istrict Co urt’s disc retio n. IV. Chinnerychall enges a portion of the Distri ct Court’ s inst ructi on to the j ury on the issue of materi alit

y. The Distri ct Court’ s explanat ion of the law incl uded the fol lowing ill ustration: [S]tate men ts intende d to embell ish the defendant’ s resume or c rede ntial s as a l aw enforcem ent offic er or d rug c zar, an d to en hanc e his b elieva bility or cred ibility compared to w itnesse s wh o testifie d aga inst him at that trial, wo uld be materi al as t he term is us ed in this p erju ry indic tme nt b efo re you . Chinneryargues that thi s singl e statement removed the questi on of materi alit y fr om the jury’s c ons ider ation
. In revi ewing a chall enge to a j ury inst ructi on, “we conside r the t otali ty of the inst ructi ons and not a par

ticul ar sent ence or par agraph in i solation.” Go v’t of the Virg in Islandsv. Fonseca , 274 F.3d 760, 767 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Un ited Sta tes v. C oyle , 63 F.3d 1239 , 1245 (3d Cir . 1995)) . So viewed, we will uphold t he inst ructi ons “if t

he charge as awhole fair ly and adequatel y submi ts the issue s in the case t o the jur y. ” Id.13

(c ita tio ns om itte d) . H er e, t he D ist ric t C ou rt e xp lai ne d t he leg al d ef in itio n o f m ate ria lity, and instructed that

the government must prove m aterial ityas to each of the four false stat ements. The Distri ct Court s tres sed that the jur y al one must dete rmine the facts, and whether the alle ged false stat ements had a t endency or were capabl e of infl uencing the jury in the H ugg ins T rial. Fina lly, the District C ourt ca utione d the ju ry to cons ider its instr uctio ns a s a w hol e, an d to avo id p lacin g un due em pha sis o n an y sing le ch arg e. Viewed as a whole, we are s atis fied that the Distri ct Court’ s comprehensi ve inst ructi ons fair ly and ade qua tely sub mitte d th e issu e of ma teria lity to the jury. See United Stat es v. Milan , 304 F.3d 273, 285-86 (3d Cir . 2002). Accordingly , we find no pre judice in the Dis trict C our t’s in struc tion s. V. Chinneryalso ar gues that the Dist rict Court err ed in al lowing the or al publi cati on of incomplete excerpt s from the Huggins Trial . Chinnery ar gues that intr oduction of

the entire trans cript

from the Huggins Tri al was necess ary to all ow the juryto dete rmine the materi alit

y of Chinne ry ’s fal se statements. We disagree. In United Stat

es v. Leon- Reyes , 177 F .3d 81 6 (9th Cir. 19 99), the Nin th Circ uit considered a similar objection to the introduction of summ arized testimon y in a perjury trial. The cour t noted the nu mero us ad vanta ges o f adm itting sum marie s instea d of a full tri al tr anscri pt: t

he testimony can be redact ed to short summarie s tendi ng to prove materi alit

y; prejudi cial materi al may be excluded; releva nt tes timonyis pre sented t o the14

jury in a clea r an d co her ent m ann er. Id . at 820. The Court noted, however, that because summaries are prepare d by the inte rest ed parti es, t he District Court

must scrut

inize the
sum marie s “to en sure th at they are a ccura te, com plete, no t und uly prejud icial, limited to the rel evant i ssues, and confined byappropri ate j ury inst ructi ons.” Id
. Here, the Distri ct Court ut ili zed the summari es to avoi d admitting prej udicia l materi al. The court i nstruc ted the jurythat t he summaries were not

being offer ed to prove the tr uth of the testimony, but to i dentif y the issue s at t

he Huggins Trial . The District Court furt

her ins tructed the government to re ad onlythe rel evant port ions of the trans cript . These saf

eguards ar e simil ar to t

he protec tions outli ned in Leon-Reyes , and suf ficie nt to pro tect C hin ner y from any u ndu e pr ejud ice. Id
. The jurywas not asked t o determi ne whether Chinnery’ s fals e statements al one resul ted in hi s acquit

tal. Rather, the jur

y cons idered whether his false testi mony was capa ble of , or had a natu ral tend ency to, inf luenc e the H ugg ins T rial jury. Giv en this limi ted function, t

he introduction of

the entire t

rialtrans cript , ri fe with pot entia l prej udice and irr elevancy , would not ha ve been helpful . Under thes e circ umstances, the Dist rict Co urt d id n ot ab use its dis creti on i n ad mittin g th e su mm aries into evid enc e. VI. We need only bri efly address Ch innery’s a rgum ent tha t the D istrict Co urt faile d to properly eval uate the government’s Batson objection. I n evaluating an obje ction to a peremptory

chall enge based on ra ce, a di stri ct court firs t consi ders whether the obje ctor15

has esta blish ed a prim a fa cie c ase . United Stat es v. Milan , 304 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2002). Fi ve factor s are r elevant to a pri ma facie cas e: 1) t he number of raci al group
mem bers in the pan el; 2) the nature of the crime; 3) the rac e of the de fendan t; 4) a pattern of strikes agai nst ra cial group members; and 5) the quest ions and st atements during t he voi r dire
. United Stat

es v. Cl emons , 843 F.2d 741, 748 (3d Cir. 1988). I f the di stri ct court is satisfied with the objector ’s showing, the partydefending the challenges must reb ut th e pr ima fac ie ca se b y tend erin g a r ace -ne utra l exp lana tion for eac h stri cke n ju ror. Id. He re, fo rty-fiv e po tenti al jur ors a ppe ared for serv ice, s ix o f w hom we re C auc asia n. The defense used i ts fi rst f our peremptor

y chal lenges t o strike the four Caucasians t

hen seated i n the jur

y box. The government obje cted, arguing t hat the defendant’ s chall enges of each and every

Caucasian j uror demonst rated a n impermiss ible r acialbias. Given the small number

of Caucasians on the panel , Chinnery’ s race, and the use of four chal lenges to suc cessiv ely remo ve the seated Cau casian s, the circ um stance s are su fficien t to establ ish a prima facie Batson vio latio n. See Simmons v. Beyer , 44 F.3d 1160, 1168 (3d Cir. 1995) (prima facie case shown by the defendant’s race and the exclusion of at leas t one potential j uror). In respons e, the defense was unabl e to art iculate a ra ce-neutral explanation for s tri king two of the juror s, and even c onceded that one was “okay. ” The D istri ct Court’s findings are supported bythe record, and hence, we must
acc ept it s co nclu sion
. United Stat es v. Uwaezhoke , 995 F.2 d 38 8, 39 4 (3 d C ir. 19 93)
.16

Ac cor din gly, the re w as n o er ror in the D istrict Co urt’s rulin g. VII. Finall y, we address Chinnery’ s chall enges to hi s sente nce. Chinnery ar gues that the Dist rict Court err ed in concl uding that his fal se declarati ons were “in r espect” to a crimina l offense wit

hin the meani ng of the Sent encing Guidel ines. Our review of the Distri ct Court’ s int erpret ation of the Sente ncing Guidel ines i s plenary, but we revie w fac tual f ind ing s on ly for c lear e rror. United Stat es v. Butch , 256 F.3d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 2001). Section 2J 1.3 of the Sentenci ng Guideline s governs convi ctions for perj ury , and provides a base offense level of 12. U.S.S. G. § 2J1.3( a). However, the provi sion st ates that “ [i]fthe o ffe nse inv olv ed p erju ry . . . in re spe ct to a crim inal o ffe nse , app ly § 2X 3.1 (Accessory

After the Fact) i n respect to that crimina l offense, if the resul ting off ense leve l is gre ater t

han that determi ned above.” Id. § 2J1.3(c)(1). Section 2X3.1(a) establishes a base leve l of “6 l evels l ower than the offense le vel for t he underlying offense, but in no event l ess than 4, or more t han 30.” The Distric t Cou rt conc luded that Chinn ery’s perjury pertained to material ma tters in the Hu ggins T rial, and were th erefore m ade in respe ct to a criminal off ense un der § 2J1.3( c)(1) . Adop ting the recom mend ation of the P re-Sentenc e Rep ort, the District Court
con cl ude d t hat

th e man dat or y 60 mo nt h co nse cutiv e t er m for con vi ct io ns u nde r 1 8 U. S. C.1 18 U .S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A )(i) prov ides:

Except to the e xtent t

hat a gre ater mi nimum sentence is othe rwise prov ided b y this subsection or by any other pr ovisi on of law, anyperson who, during and i n relat ion to anycr ime of viole nce . . . for which t he person maybe prosecuted in a court of the United States , uses or carr ies a firearm, or who, in furtheranc e of any s uch crime, possesses a fi re ar m, shall , in a dditi on to the puni shment provi ded for such crime of violenc e or drug traffic king crime be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.
2 Chinnery argues that t he District Court should have used the lowest guideline offense level encompassing a 60 mon th sentence. The District Court recognized that offense levels 24 an d 25 bo th allowed for a 60 m onth senten ce. How ever, the D istrict Court noted that ha d C hinn ery been conv icted o f the u nder lying off ense s at the H ugg ins T rial, his Guidel ines se ntence would have i ncluded 21 months f or the ci vil rights violat ion, a nd a consecutive 60 month t erm for the firearm violat ion, resulting in a total s entence of 81 months. The Dist

rict Court thus reasonabl y concluded that level 25, with asentenci ng ran ge o f 57 -61 mo nth s be st rep rese nted Ch inn ery’s o ffe nse . 17 § 924(c) 1 trans late d to an offense level of 25 using the Guideli nes Sentenci ng Table. The Distri ct Court t

hen appli ed the si x-levelreducti on specifi ed by § 2X3.1, resul ting i n an adjusted offense level of 19 and an applicable sentencing range of 30-37 months. 2 The Dis trict C our t sen tenc ed C hin ner y to 36 mo nth s im priso nm ent. Chinnery ’s sol e objection to t his cal culation is the appl ication of § 2J1. 3(c)( 1) and the cros s-ref

erence t o § 2X3.1 for perj ury committed “in r esp ect” to a c rimi nal o ffe nse . Chinneryargues that his fal se statements ha d an insi gnific ant effect on the char ges at issue i n the Huggins Tri al. He reasons that becaus e the st atements did not i nvolve the elements of the crimes consi dered bythe jur y, theywere not intended to ass ist escaping punishment. As the prosec ution’ s case di d not hinge on Chi nnery ’s profe ssional expe rience or ed ucatio n, Ch innery co nclud es that h is false te stimo ny wa s not in respe ct to18

a crimi nal offense
. The Sentencing Guide lines refle ct the belie f that “perjury shoul d be treated sim ilarly to o bstru ction of ju stice .” U .S.S .G. § 2J1.3 commentary backgr ound. The purpose of the cross-reference within § 2J1.3 is “t o treat more severelyperjuries t hat risk an incomplete or an ina ccurat e . . . trial of a crimi nal offense .” United Stat es v. Sul eiman , 208 F.3d 32, 39 ( 2d Cir. 2000) . Therefor e, the enhancement does not requi re that the def end ant b e co nvi cted of, o r an acc esso ry to, the und erlying crim e. United Stat es v. Blanton , 281 F .3d 77 1, 775 -76 (8 th Cir. 2 002 ); United Stat es v. Martinez , 106 F.3d 620, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1997) . Ins tead, courts have held that a per juri ous statement “is in res pect to a crim inal of fens e w here th e def enda nt kn ew or ha d reas on to kno w, at th e time of h is perjury, that hi s test

imony conc erned such a c riminaloffense. ” Leon-Reyes , 177 F.3d at 824 ; see also Suleiman , 208 F.3d at 39. The Distri ct Court made an e xtensi ve revie w of the tra nscri pt from the Huggins Trial —over which it als o presi ded—and concluded that Chi nnery was aware of the critical role credibilityplayed in the case. T he D istrict Court noted that C hinnery’s
counse l repeatedly emph asized that noth ing wa s more im portant than C hinnery’s credibility, t

hat “he w as not con tradicted, he w as not imp eached .” Mo reover, Ch innery repea tedly em phas ized h is pub lic stature , and h is com mitm ent to “ toil[ing ] tirelessly in the mine fields of this community. ” In sum, Chinnery’s defense was built on the premise that whil e the vi ctim was not a belie vable witness, Chinnery ’s te sti mony, ba sed in part on3 As we agree with the Distri ct Court’ s int erpret ation of U.S.S.G. § 2J 1.3(a) and § 2X3.1 we need not addres s Chinnery ’s chal lenge t o the Dist rict Court’s a lternative sen tenc ing calc ulati on. 19 his posi tion, was “firm and convi ncing. ” On these fact s, we conclude that Chi nnery knew that hi s test imony conc erned the crimina l offenses at is sue in t he Huggins Trial . By fabricat ing his professi onal background and educat ion, hi s consci ouslyenhanced the c redibi lit y of hi s test

imony, and the the ory of his defens e. The Dist rict Court’s de termination t hat Chinnery’ s test

imony materially

influenced the jurywas thus not clearly erroneous. 3 CONCLU SI ON For the fo regoing rea sons, the judg ment of the District Cou rt entered on Ja nuary 27, 2003, wil l be affi rmed.

TO THE C LERK: Please fi le the foregoing opi nion.

/s/ Robert E. Cowen United States Circui t Judge