UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

VARINDER SINGH, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 13-9566 (Petition for Review)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judge, PORFILIO , Senior Circuit Judge, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judge.

Varinder Singh, a Sikh native and citizen of India, claims that he will be persecuted on account of his membership in a Sikh political party if he is returned to India. The immigration judge (IJ) denied his applications for asylum, restriction on removal, and relief under the Convention Ag ainst Torture (CAT), and the Board of

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 11, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his a ppeal. He now petitions for review by this court. Exercising juri sdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 125 2(a), we deny review. The IJ found that Mr. Singh was not a credible witness because his testimony at his hearing was internally inconsistent and was inconsistent w ith his application, his sworn credible-fear statement, and affi davits he submitted. The inconsistencies so troubled the IJ that he carefully cons idered the government’ s argument to deem the application frivolous, barring Mr. Singh fro m immigration relief for his lifetime. Characterizing the issue as “a close call,” the IJ “[found] by the slimmest of evidence there is no frivolous application in this case.” Admin. R. at 21. But the IJ denied all

relief because of Mr. Si ngh’s lack of credibility.

The BIA discussed certain inconsistencie s that the IJ had identified and held that the credibility finding was not clearly e rroneous. It stated that Mr. Singh had not satisfied his burden of proof for asylum or restriction on removal because he had not submitted any “evidence or testimony i ndependent of his own non-credible testimony.” Id. at 4. The BIA also stated that Mr. Singh’s lack of credibility was

“fatal to his CAT claim.” Id. Accordingly, it dismissed his appeal.

In this case it is the BI A’s order that we review. See Uanreroro v. Gonzales , 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). “[W]e will not affirm on grounds raised in the IJ decision unless they are relied up on by the BIA in its affirmance.” Id. “However, when seeking to understand the grounds provided by the BIA, we are not precluded from consulting the IJ’s more complete explanation of thos e same grounds.” Id.- 3 - We review the agency’s findings of fact, including credibility determinations,

for substantial evidence. Id. “Where the BIA’s decision relies upon an IJ’s initial findings, we must ensure that such determ inations are substant ially reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The agen cy must give “speci fic, cogent reasons for disbelieving” an applicant’s testimony. Elzour v. Ashcroft , 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004) (interna l quotation marks omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence, see Yuk v. Ashcroft , 355 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10t h Cir. 2004), and “the administrative findings of fact are conc lusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the c ontrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Under the asylum statute, the agency must consider “the totality of the circumstances, and all releva nt factors” in making a cr edibility determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). But the stat ute specifically author izes the agency to base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and c onsidering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the cons istency of such statemen ts with other evidence of record . . . .

Id. ; see also id. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (same in removal-pr oceedings statute). Further, the agency may discredit an applicant’s testim ony about significant incidents where the applicant did not disclose that informati on at earlier stages in the proceedings. See Ismaiel v. Mukasey , 516 F.3d 1198, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 2008). Here, the agency gave specific, cogent reasons for finding Mr. Singh incredible. The BIA highlighted several inconsistencies in Mr. Singh’s testimony,- 4 - including how several aspects of his test imony at the heari ng differed from his previous statements. It also noted that Mr . Singh testified about a significant incident with a police officer that he had never be fore mentioned, and he testified about problems his father experienced, problems that were not described in his father’s own

affidavit. The inconsistenc ies and the omission are prope r credibility factors and are supported by substantial ev idence in the record. Al so, the BIA considered Mr. Singh’s explanations for the discrepanc ies, but found them unpersuasive. We cannot conclude that the agency’s cr edibility findings we re substantially unreasonable or that any reasona ble adjudicator would be co mpelled to conclude that Mr. Singh must be considered a credible witness. Mr. Singh’ s arguments to the contrary would require us to rewei gh the evidence, which we do not do. As the BIA stated, Mr. Singh’s case for asylum, re striction on removal, and CAT relief hinged upon his credib ility. In light of the cred ibility determination, the

BIA also did not err in denying relief. The petition for review is denied.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio Senior Circuit Judge