alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

#### § 41.52 Rehearing.

(a)

(1) Appellant may file a single request for rehearing within two months of the date of the original decision of the Board. No request for rehearing from a decision on rehearing will be permitted, unless the rehearing decision so modified the original decision as to become, in effect, a new decision, and the Board states that a second request for rehearing would be permitted. The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by the Board. Arguments not raised, and Evidence not previously relied upon, pursuant to §§ 41.37, 41.41, or 41.47 are not permitted in the request for rehearing except as permitted by paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(4) of this section. When a request for rehearing is made, the Board shall render a decision on the request for rehearing. The decision on the request for rehearing is deemed to incorporate the earlier opinion reflecting its decision for appeal, except for those portions specifically withdrawn on rehearing, and is final for the purpose of judicial review, except when noted otherwise in the decision on rehearing.

(2) Appellant may present a new argument based upon a recent relevant decision of either the Board or a Federal Court.

(3) New arguments responding to a new ground of rejection designated pursuant to § 41.50(b) are permitted.

(4) New arguments that the Board's decision contains an undesignated new ground of rejection are permitted.

(b) Extensions of time under § 1.136(a) of this title for patent applications are not applicable to the time period set forth in this section. See § 1.136(b) of this title for extensions of time to reply for patent applications and § 1.550(c) of this title for extensions of time to reply for *ex parte* reexamination proceedings.

[69 FR 50003, Aug. 12, 2004, as amended at 76 FR 72299, Nov. 22, 2011]
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</TABLE>
#### Murdock Trust

*Harold B. Bornemann,*for petitioner.

*C. Harold Meyers,*for guardian ad litem.

February 14, 1956.

Reimel, J.,

Petitioner, by indenture dated June 16, 1924, created an inter vivos trust under the terms of which her trustee was directed to pay the net income to her, the settlor, during the term of her natural life, and, upon her death, to pay the corpus as she might direct by will, or failing to exercise the power of appointment, then, in such event, to the persons entitled thereto under the Intestate Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Petitioner is 53 years of age, married, and has three children, all of whom are sui juris. Testimony taken at the audit discloses that her only next of kin, in addition to her children, is a half-sister, Helen Cramp Rumbaugh, and a second cousin, the Honorable Byron A. Milner. It further appears that she is unable to bear further issue, that her children as well as her half-sister have joined in the prayer of the petition and have executed an assignment to the settlor of their respective right, title and interest, if any, as contingent remaindermen under the deed of trust.

*288Although the settlor is not originally the sole beneficiary of the trust she has subsequently acquired the interests of the contingent beneficiaries by assignment so that she is now the sole beneficiary within the meaning of the A. L. I. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, §339, which provides for the termination of a trust by a beneficiary who is not under any incapacity.

All interests in the trust res, both life and remainder, are now vested in the settlor and it is her right to compel the termination of the trust even though it is provided specifically by the terms of the trust that the said trust shall be irrevocable. This situation is quite different from that of a testamentary trust where the settlor, being deceased, cannot consent to the termination. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in adopting sections 338 and 339 of the A. L. I. Restatement of the Law of Trusts recognizes the right of the sole beneficiary of an inter vivos trust to terminate it, if she so pleases: Schellentrager v. Tradesmens National Bank and Trust Company, 370 Pa. 501, 506, 507; Bowers’ Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85.

Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the petition to terminate the trust must be granted and we therefore enter the following

*Order*

And now, to wit, February 14, 1956, after full consideration of the testimony presented at the hearing in the above case and of the briefs submitted by counsel for petitioner and trustee ad litem, the prayer of the petition for termination of trust filed by Margery Baum Murdock, settlor under deed of trust dated June 16, 1924, is granted and the assets comprising the principal thereof are awarded to said petitioner absolutely freed and discharged of the said trust in accordance with the decree bearing even date herewith confirming the account of the substituted trustees thereunder.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 28, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-20480

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TED SAVALA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:98-CR-3-5

--------------------

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

In 2000, Ted Savala was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea

of conspiring to commit arson. He was sentenced to five years of

probation. Savala’s probation was subsequently revoked, and

Savala was sentenced to serve nine months of imprisonment and

three years of supervised release. Savala now appeals the

two-year term of imprisonment imposed following the revocation of

his supervised release. Savala argues that the district court

reversibly erred in imposing his revocation sentence because the
No. 05-20480

-2-

circumstances of his case do not warrant the statutory maximum

two-year term of imprisonment imposed in his case. 

Although the two-year term of imprisonment imposed upon

revocation of Savala’s supervised release exceeded the sentencing

range indicated by the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines, it did not exceed the

statutory maximum term of imprisonment that the district court

could have imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Accordingly,

Savala’s revocation sentence was neither “unreasonable” nor

“plainly unreasonable.” See United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d

114, 120 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1804 (2006). 

Savala has not shown error.

AFFIRMED.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Notes:

1. In Patent and Trademark Office publications and usage the part number is omitted from the numbers of §§ 1.1 to 1.352 and the numbers to the right of the decimal point correspond with the respective rule numbers.

2. For nomenclature changes to part 1, see 68 FR 14335, Mar. 25, 2003; 87 FR 68904, Nov. 17, 2022.

#### § 1.601 Filing of papers in supplemental examination.

(a) A request for supplemental examination of a patent must be filed by the owner(s) of the entire right, title, and interest in the patent.

(b) Any party other than the patent owner (*i.e.,* any third party) is prohibited from filing papers or otherwise participating in any manner in a supplemental examination proceeding.

(c) A request for supplemental examination of a patent may be filed at any time during the period of enforceability of the patent.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
Onhsore State Permit Information

2007

Gross NG Withdrawals Cumulative Permit for Operator to Operate O

State/Region (MMcf) (%)

1 Texas Permit For Drilling O2 Alaska Well Drilling Permit O3 Wyoming Drilling Permit O

4 Oklahoma5 New Mexico Well Drilling Permit O6 Louisiana Permit For Drilling O7 Colorado Drilling Permit O8 Utah Drilling Permit Ow9 Kansas Drilling Permit Ow

10 California Drilling Permit O11 Mississippi12 Michigan Drilling Permit Ow13 Arkansas Well Drilling Permit/Operational Forms Ow14 West Virginia Ow15 Pennsylvania Drilling Permit Ow16 Alabama Well Drilling Permit/Operational Forms Ow17 Arizona Principal on Bond/Permit to Drill O18 South Dakota Permit to Drill O19 Montana N/A Ow20 New York N/A Ow21 Ohio Well Permit O22 Oregon Permit to Operate O23 Nebraska Principal on Bond/Permit to Drill Ow24 North Dakota Principal on Bond/Permit to Drill Ow25 Florida Operating Permit O26 Illinois Well Permit O27 Indiana Well Permit O28 Kentucky Drilling Permit O29 Virginia Permit O30 Tennessee Drilling Permit O

United States
Indian Tribal Drilling Hyperlink to Regulation

No Jurisdiction http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.TacPage?sl=R&app=9&p_dir=&p_rloc=&p_tloc=&p_ploc=&pNo Jurisdiction http://doa.alaska.gov/ogc/functions/OvrSurvIndex.html#PTDNo Jurisdiction http://wogcc.state.wy.us/wogcchelp/commission.html

http://www.occeweb.com/divisions/gc/OCCRULES/permrules/CH%2010%20Web%20Ready%20FY10-070http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/documents/20098-5currentrules-new17and39.pdfhttp://dnr.louisiana.gov/cons/Title43.ssihttp://cogcc.state.co.us/http://www.rules.utah.gov/publicat/code/r649/r649-003.htmhttp://www.kcc.state.ks.us/conservation/cons_rr_110308.pdfftp://ftp.consrv.ca.gov/pub/oil/laws/PRC01.pdfhttp://www.ogb.state.ms.us/docs/RuleBook20090403.pdfhttp://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/ogs-oilandgas-regs_263032_7.pdfhttp://www.aogc.state.ar.us/OnlineData/Forms/Rules%20and%20Regulations.pdfhttp://apps.sos.wv.gov/csr/rules.asp?Agency=Oil%20&%20Gashttp://www.pacode.com/secure/data/025/chapter78/chap78toc.htmlhttp://www.ogb.state.al.us/ogb/rules.aspxhttp://www.azsos.gov/public_services/Title_12/12-07.htmhttp://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Statute=45-9&Type=Statutehttp://www.mtrules.org/gateway/ChapterHome.asp?Chapter=36.22http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1628.htmlhttp://www.dnr.state.oh.us/portals/11/oil/pdf/oilgaslawsummary.pdfhttp://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_600/OAR_632/632_010.htmlhttp://www.nogcc.ne.gov/section3.aspxhttps://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/rules/rulebook.pdfhttp://www.dep.state.fl.us/legal/Rules/geology/62c-26.pdfhttp://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=1391&ChapAct=225 ILCS 725/&ChapterID=24&Chaptehttp://www.in.gov/dnr/dnroil/2611.htmhttp://www.lrc.ky.gov/KRS/353-00/CHAPTER.HTMhttp://leg1.state.va.us/000/reg/TOC04025.HTM#C0150http://tn.gov/environment/permits/oilgas.shtml 99.9 % operator same person
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

July 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

130880 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 130880 

 COA: 268471 

Wexford CC: 03-007097-FH 

ROBERT MICHAEL KULP,

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 29, 2006 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

l0724 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

July 31, 2006 

 Clerk
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
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30, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
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```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 190 (Monday, October 1, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 60005]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-24075]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

Notice of Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and 
Necessity and Foreign Air Carrier Permits Filed Under Subpart B 
(Formerly Subpart Q) During the Week Ending September 15, 2012

    The following Applications for Certificates of Public Convenience 
and Necessity and Foreign Air Carrier Permits were filed under Subpart 
B (formerly Subpart Q) of the Department of Transportation's Procedural 
Regulations (See 14 CFR 301.201 et seq.). The due date for Answers, 
Conforming Applications, or Motions to Modify Scope are set forth below 
for each application. Following the Answer period DOT may process the 
application by expedited procedures. Such procedures may consist of the 
adoption of a show-cause order, a tentative order, or in appropriate 
cases a final order without further proceedings.
    Docket Number: DOT-OST-2012-0153.
    Date Filed: September 11, 2012.
    Due Date for Answers, Conforming Applications, or Motion to Modify 
Scope: October 2, 2012.

Description

    Application of LLC Nord Wind requesting a foreign air carrier 
permit and exemption authority to engage in on-demand charter 
transportation of passengers, property and mail between point(s) in the 
Russian Federation and point(s) in the United States, as well as other 
charters subject to pertinent national, bilateral and international 
laws and regulations.

Renee V. Wright,
Program Manager, Docket Operations, Federal Register Liaison.
[FR Doc. 2012-24075 Filed 9-28-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
```
FILED

Oct 22, 2018

03:57 PM(ET)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

** Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137 (1995).

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-11127 Conference Calendar

LARRY LEE OCHSNER, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus LES FLEMING, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:01-CV-490-E

-------------------- December 11, 2001 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Larry Lee Ochsner, federal prisoner # 19267-077, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition and from the denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Ochsner argues that the factual basis of his guilty plea to using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)-(2), was insufficient in the light of Bailey

. ** Ochsner argues thatNo. 01-11127 -2- he should be allowed to bring his claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition under the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. “[T]he savings clause of § 2255 applies to a claim (i) that is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and (ii) that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.” ReyesRequena v. United States , 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). A prior unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion does not render 28 U.S.C. § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. Tolliver v. Dobre , 211 F.3d 876, 878 (5th Cir. 2000). The petitioner bears the burden of affirmatively showing that the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Pack v. Yusuff , 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). The district court determined that Ochsner’s Bailey claim was addressed on the merits in a prior 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. Ochsner’s prior unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion does not render 28 U.S.C. § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. See Tolliver , 211 F.3d at 878. AFFIRMED.