IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10759

CORDELL DAVIS, Individually; ANTOINETTE TURNER, as next friend J. 

T. T., a minor,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

CITY OF FORT WORTH, 

 Defendant - Appellee

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LESLEE MARIE MARTIN, as next friend C. T. T., a minor; ALICIA 

DE'SHON WHITE, as next friend T. L. T., a minor; PATRICIA THOMAS, as 

next friend D. M. G., a minor, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

CITY OF FORT WORTH,

 Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

4:13-CV-198

4:13-CV-234

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 18, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-10759 Document: 00512938956 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/18/2015
No. 14-10759

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

City of Fort Worth Police Officer Jon Romer (“Romer”) shot and killed 

Charal Thomas (“Thomas”) while attempting to arrest him following a traffic 

stop. Plaintiffs Cordell Davis (“Davis”), a passenger in Thomas’s car, and 

Thomas’s four children filed lawsuits against Romer and the City of Fort Worth 

(the “City”), alleging, among other claims, that Romer violated their Fourth 

Amendment rights through the use of excessive force, and that the use of such 

force is a policy or practice of the City’s police department.1 The district court 

found that Romer did not violate plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights and 

granted summary judgment to Romer on the basis of qualified immunity. The 

court later granted summary judgment to the City. Plaintiffs appealed both 

judgments. The judgment in favor of the City is now before us; the judgment 

in favor of Romer came before another panel of this court.

“Municipal liability for section 1983 violations results if a deprivation of 

constitutional rights was inflicted pursuant to official custom or policy.” 

Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001). To prevail on an 

excessive force claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must show: “(1) an injury 

(2) which resulted from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need 

and (3) the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable.” Rockwell v. 

Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“The ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Plaintiffs Davis and J.T.T., one of Thomas’s minor children, filed a lawsuit against 

Romer and the City; Thomas’s three other minor children (each acting through a next friend)

also filed a lawsuit against Romer and the City. The district court consolidated the two 

lawsuits.

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 Case: 14-10759 Document: 00512938956 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/18/2015
No. 14-10759

is a question of law.” Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

The panel that considered plaintiffs’ appeal of the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment to Romer held that “Romer’s use of force was objectively 

reasonable,” and, accordingly, plaintiffs “have not shown a Fourth Amendment 

violation.” Davis v. Romer, No. 13-11242, 2015 WL 409862, at *5 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(per curiam) (affirming the district court’s judgment that Romer was entitled 

to qualified immunity). We are bound by the prior panel’s determination. See 

Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) (“It is 

a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of our court may 

not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the law 

. . . .”). Because the prior panel affirmed the district court’s holding that

Romer’s use of force did not violate the Fourth Amendment, plaintiffs cannot 

maintain a section 1983 claim against the City alone. See, e.g., Bustos v. 

Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a 

municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 if no constitutional 

violation has been committed by a municipal actor). The district court’s grant 

of summary judgment to the City is AFFIRMED. 

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 Case: 14-10759 Document: 00512938956 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/18/2015