IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0043

Filed February 3, 2021

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KATHERINE MARIE STEFFENSMEIER

AND MATHEW ROHAN BOON

Upon the Petition of

KATHERINE MARIE STEFFENSMEIER, n/k/a KATHERINE MARIE HUNOLD,

Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning

MATHEW ROHAN BOON,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Wyatt Peterson, 

Judge.

A former husband appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition to 

vacate or modify the parties’ decree of dissolution of marriage. AFFIRMED. 

Curtis Dial of Law Office of Curtis Dial, Keokuk, for appellant.

Marlis J. Robberts of Robberts & Kirkmann, L.L.L.P., Burlington, for 

appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Mathew Boon appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition to vacate 

or modify a decree of dissolution of marriage. We affirm the dismissal as the 

previously imposed discovery sanction prevents Boon from presenting any 

evidence in support of his petition that was subject to propounded discovery. 

I. Facts & Proceedings 

Katherine Steffensmeier, now known as Katherine Hunold, and Boon were 

married in July 2014. In June 2017, Hunold filed a petition for dissolution of 

marriage. The parties reached an agreement that resolved all pending issues.

The parties filed a stipulation on March 29, 2018, and the court entered a decree 

incorporating the stipulation the next day.

Nearly one year after the entry of the decree, on March 29, 2019, Boon filed 

a petition to vacate or modify the decree of dissolution of marriage. In his petition,

Boon alleged the decree “was obtained through fraud” because Hunold “failed to 

disclose necessary financial information when filing her affidavit of financial status 

as well as when responding to discovery requests.” 

Hunold filed an answer to Boon’s petition, denying all the claims set forth in 

Boon’s petition and requested discovery of Boon.

1 Boon failed to respond to 

 

1 The interrogatories sought discovery related to Boon’s claim. Of particular note, 

one of Hunold’s interrogatories asked: 

What in full specific detail is each [sic] every fact or allegation that 

supports [Boon]’s claim that the decree should be vacated, and for 

each such fact or allegation, what witnesses will be testifying as to 

that allegation, what other persons have knowledge of that 

allegation, what documents support each allegation, and what was 

the date any such allegations occurred?
3

Hunold’s discovery requests, and Hunold filed a motion to compel discovery.2 The 

court granted the motion. However, Boon failed to comply within the prescribed 

time, and Hunold moved for sanctions. In her motion for sanctions, Hunold also 

asked the court to dismiss Boon’s petition to vacate, “as [Boon] can’t even produce 

evidence to support his claim.”

A hearing on the motion for sanctions was held. At the hearing, Boon 

testified regarding his efforts to comply with Hunold’s discovery request. He stated

immediately before the hearing he attempted to electronically submit documents

related to some of the interrogatories.

3 Boon was asked why he had not answered 

all of the interrogatories, and he responded that it was “due to an IRS filing.” On 

cross-examination, Boon admitted that he had not delivered any discovery 

responses to Hunold’s counsel as required in the court’s order compelling 

discovery. 

The court granted Hunold’s motion for sanctions. The court found that Boon 

“admitted to receiving the discovery requests” but “did not provide any other 

reasons for his failure to timely provide the responses to the discovery requests 

that he was compelled to provide.” In determining the appropriate sanction, the 

court noted that Hunold “requested the court dismiss [Boon]’s action as a sanction” 

but concluded the appropriate sanction should be “to prohibit [Boon] from 

 

2

In the initial dissolution action, a motion to compel and a motion for sanctions 

was filed due to Boon’s failure to respond to discovery. 

3 Boon attempted to file three documents as exhibits for the hearing with the clerk

of court, which were rejected. The documents appear to be Hunold’s financial 

affidavit from the dissolution, the original set of interrogatories sent as part of the 

dissolution without answers, and a response to a request for production from the 

original dissolution sent by Hunold’s counsel. 
4

presenting any evidence or testimony or calling any witnesses as part of his case 

that should have been included in the responses to the interrogatories and request 

for production documents.”

The order imposing sanctions further ordered, 

If [Hunold] reasonably believes that no evidence or testimony could 

be produced at trial in support of [Boon]’s claims, [Hunold] may 

renew her motion to dismiss by filing such motion. [Boon] would then 

be required to respond by outlining what evidence could be 

presented to support his claims after the court’s sanction is imposed.

Subsequent to the hearing and discovery sanctions order, Hunold filed a motion to 

dismiss. In the motion, Hunold asserted, “As [Boon] is prohibited by the motion for 

sanctions to introduce evidence regarding these matters, there is no evidence or 

witnesses that can be offered at trial to support his claim to vacate or modify, and 

no point in having a trial.”4

Boon filed a resistance to the motion to dismiss, stating in pertinent part: 

Although most of the motion of [Hunold] dealt with [Boon]’s 

failure to complete discovery the court has already ruled on the 

motion for sanctions. 

. . . .

At this time [Hunold] is somehow attempting to speculate as 

to what evidence will be presented even though trial has not 

begun. If [Hunold] believes that [Boon] cannot present 

sufficient evidence to prove his case, then the appropriate 

remedy is to file a motion for summary judgement. However, 

this has not been filed.

At this time [Boon] intends to proceed to trial and present 

evidence which is admissible.

 

4 Hunold also attached to her motion the notice of discovery request, request for 

production of documents, and interrogatories related to Boon’s petition to modify 

or vacate the dissolution.
5

Without hearing, the trial court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for 

summary judgment and granted Hunold’s motion, entering an order to dismiss. In 

ruling, the trial court stated: 

[Hunold]’s motion to dismiss is before the court, as is [Boon]’s 

resistance thereto. The court views [Hunold]’s motion as a motion 

for summary judgment.

. . . . 

[Boon]’s resistance does not state disputed facts as relates to 

[Hunold]’s motion or what could be submitted in light of the order for 

sanctions. Summary judgment is appropriate.

[Hunold]’s motion is granted. [Boon]’s petition for modification 

is dismissed. 

Boon appeals the district court’s decision. Boon argues the district court 

improperly treated Hunold’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment 

and asks the matter be remanded to the district court for hearing on the petition.5

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review 

As dissolution proceedings are heard in equity, our review is typically de 

novo. In re Marriage of Larsen, 912 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Iowa 2018). However, the 

subject of this appeal is a ruling on what was filed as a motion to dismiss a petition 

to vacate; therefore, our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 

6.907; U.S. Bank v. Barbour, 770 N.W.2d 350, 253 (Iowa 2009) (“A ruling on a 

motion to dismiss is reviewed for correction of errors at law.”); In re Marriage of 

 

5 Specifically, Boon argues: 

What was filed by [Hunold] was a motion to dismiss. Without any 

agreement of the parties nor any notice to the parties that the court 

was going to consider this motion as a motion for summary judgment 

the court then treated the motion as a motion for summary judgment. 

The first time that [Boon] knew that the motion to dismiss was being 

treated as a motion for summary judgment was when the court 

entered the ruling granting the motion to dismiss. 
6

Marsh, No. 12-1572, 2013 WL 1751372, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013) (“A 

proceeding to vacate a judgment under [Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.1012 is 

an action at law. Therefore, our review is not de novo.”) (citations omitted)). 

B. Sanctions Hearing and Order Imposing Sanctions 

In the court’s order imposing sanctions, the court contemplated a 

forthcoming “motion to dismiss,” which would become the subject of this appeal. 

However, the trial court’s order and directive to the parties appears to 

mischaracterize the requirements and standards applied to a typical motion to 

dismiss.

In her motion for sanctions, Hunold asked the court to “impose appropriate 

sanctions pursuant to Rule 1.517, and other applicable law, including but not 

limited to . . . entering an order dismissing the application of [Boon].” After a 

hearing, the court imposed sanctions prohibiting Boon from presenting evidence 

subject to Hunold’s discovery request. In its order, the court noted, “[Hunold]

requested the court dismiss [Boon]’s action as a sanction. The court finds the 

above sanction to be appropriate instead.” We note dismissal, as a sanction for a 

discovery violation is an available, and in limited situations, appropriate sanction 

for discovery violations. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.517(2)(b)(3). However, “before the 

district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with a discovery order 

there must be a finding that the failure to comply was a result of willfulness, fault, 

or bad faith.” Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Iowa 2005).

The trial court did not find Boon acted in bad faith and the court specifically 

declined to impose dismissal as a discovery violation sanction. Consequently, the

court advised Hunold that if she “reasonably believes that no evidence or testimony 
7

could be produced at trial in support of [Boon]’s claims,” she “may renew her 

motion to dismiss by filing such motion,” seemingly contemplating a separate 

motion to dismiss outside of the resolved discovery matters. The court went on to 

instruct Boon he “would then be required to respond by outlining what evidence 

could be presented to support his claims after the court’s sanction is imposed.” 

Under a motion to dismiss, dismissal is warranted because petitioner’s 

pleading, on its face, is insufficient. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1); Reiff v. Evans, 630 

N.W.2d 278, 284 (Iowa 2001) (“At issue is petitioner’s right of access to the district 

court, not the merits of his allegations.” (citation omitted)). “In considering a motion 

to dismiss, the court considers all well-pleaded facts to be true.” Hawkeye 

Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 609 (Iowa 

2012) (quoting U.S. Bank, 770 N.W.2d at 353–54). A motion to dismiss “admits 

. . . [the] well-pleaded facts in the petition for the purpose of testing their legal 

sufficiency.” Id. at 608–09. The court’s directive to Boon that he “would then be 

required to respond by outlining what evidence could be presented to support his 

claims after the court’s sanction is imposed” would be atypical of a motion to 

dismiss as “[t]he court cannot rely on evidence to support a motion to dismiss, nor 

can it rely on facts not alleged in the petition.” Id. at 609 (citations omitted).

The court’s description is fairly applicable to that of a motion for summary 

judgment. A motion for summary judgment seeks dismissal because there is “no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). The opposing party then 

must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Iowa 

R. Civ. P. 1.981(5). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court 
8

considers a broader scope of facts than that of a motion to dismiss and engages 

in an evaluation of the evidence to determine whether trial is necessary. See

Estate of Harris v. Papa John’s Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2004).

C. Treatment of Motion to Dismiss as Motion for Summary 

Judgment 

It appears from the record the district court recognized a motion to dismiss 

may not have been the proper means for addressing the arguments advanced by 

the parties, and sua sponte treated the motion as one for summary judgment,

disposing of the case accordingly. The question becomes whether this was 

reversible error, the answer to which rests on whether Iowa’s Rules of Civil 

Procedure permit a trial court to convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary 

judgment and, if so, under what circumstances and procedures.

We first note that the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure are based on the federal 

rules. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421 official comment, motion to dismiss (explaining 

Iowa Rule 1.241 is derived from Federal Rule 12(b)). The federal rule permits a 

court to consider matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim, treating the motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(d). In Iowa, however, “a motion to dismiss must be based upon matters 

alleged in the pleading assailed; facts not so appearing, except those of which 

judicial notice may be taken, must be ignored.” See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421 official 

comment, matters outside pleadings.

Despite this, there are limited situations in which reviewing courts have 

found it acceptable to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. See

Troester v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 328 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Iowa 1982). 
9

Generally, where the district court has ruled on a motion to dismiss in which facts 

outside the pleadings are relied upon, reviewing courts have not found error where: 

(1) those facts implicate a question of the parties’ or court’s authority to proceed 

and (2) where the parties are given notice of the court’s intention and agree to the 

conversion. Boon argues the present case falls outside these recognized 

exceptions and seeks reversal. 

Reviewing courts have not found error where, after providing notice to the 

parties of the court’s intention and their agreement, the lower court treated a 

motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. In George v. D.W. Zinser Co., 

our supreme court found it permissible to review a district court’s ruling treating a

motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. 762 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 

2009). However, the court noted, “[a]s the motion to dismiss in this case relied on

matters outside the pleadings and both parties and the court treated it as a motion 

for summary judgment, we will do so as well.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in 

In re Estate of Bacon, this court did not find an abuse of discretion where after the 

parties agreed to convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, the 

district court afforded an opportunity to the parties to submit briefs or memoranda 

in support of the converted motion. No. 16-1270, 2017 WL 1088112 at *4–5 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017).

While the above case law identifies a few narrow situations where reviewing 

courts have not found error, less clear are the boundaries outside of these 

exceptions that constitute reversible error. Boon argues reversal is warranted 

because he was not afforded notice of the court’s intention to treat what was filed 

as a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, denying him a fair 
10

opportunity to respond when the court dismissed his petition by granting the motion 

because he failed to submit any disputed facts. 

Case law lends some support to Boon’s position as to the determinative 

nature of notice. In Warford v. Des Moines Metropolitan Transit Authority, the 

district court erroneously relied on matters outside the pleadings when ruling on a 

motion to dismiss. 381 N.W.2d 622, 623 (Iowa 1986). The ruling was appealed 

on procedural grounds, and the appellant urged our supreme court to simply 

review the lower ruling as one for summary judgment in an effort to conserve 

judicial resources. Id. at 623–24. However, the court refused, noting the parties 

below had not received notice that the district court intended to rely on facts outside 

the pleadings until they received the court’s ruling. Id. at 624. Ultimately, the court 

limited their review to facts found in the pleadings and reversed and remanded the 

case. Id. at 625. 

Further, in Hernandez v. State, applicant Hernandez applied for 

postconviction relief, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective. No. 02-1916, 2004 

WL 573731, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2004). The State responded by filing a 

motion to dismiss, arguing that Hernandez’s application failed to state a claim while 

also addressing the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Id. 

Hernandez filed a resistance to the State’s motion, and the district court set the 

motion for hearing, referring to it as a “motion to dismiss defendant’s application 

for postconviction relief.” Id. After an unreported hearing, the district court issued 

a “ruling on respondent’s motion for summary judgment.” Id. The ruling addressed 

the merits of Hernandez’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and granted 

summary judgment, dismissing Hernandez’s application. Id. Hernandez appealed 
11

the district court’s ruling arguing, “the district court erred in considering the State’s 

motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment without giving him notice of 

its intention or an opportunity to respond.” Id.

We found “there is merit to Hernandez’s argument that he was not fairly

apprised of the district court’s intention to summarily dispose of the claims in his 

application.” Id. at *2. Specifically, we noted, 

The State filed a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary 

judgment, and the order setting hearing refers to a “Motion to Dismiss 

Defendant’s Application for Postconviction Relief.” Moreover, the 

record provides no indication that the parties agreed to treat the 

State’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.

Id. We concluded that the district court should not have summarily dismissed 

Hernandez’s application and reversed the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings.6 Id. at *3. 

The instant case draws some stark distinctions from the above-cited cases. 

Due to the broad sanctions imposed, Boon has been stripped of the possibility of 

a successful argument in a resistance to a motion for summary judgment. Within 

the context of this case, and in light of the discovery sanction imposed on Boon, 

the distinctions between the motions are not determinative. This naturally 

implicates questions of judicial economy and whether reversal is necessary when

the outcome of the matter will be unchanged. In an effort to conserve judicial 

resources, our supreme court has reviewed a lower court’s ruling on a motion to 

dismiss that relied on matters outside the pleadings as one for summary judgment. 

 

6

In her brief, Hunold argues Hernandez is distinguishable from this case because 

Hernandez’s claim occurred within criminal postconviction relief proceedings. 

Postconviction-relief proceedings are civil matters and the rules of civil procedure 

generally apply.
12

See Stotts v. Eveleth, 688 N.W.2d 803, 811–12 (Iowa 2004) (finding it procedurally 

incorrect for lower court to determine issue of duty in ruling on motion to dismiss 

but reviewing decision as one for summary judgment, stating “that would leave us 

no choice but to reverse and remand to allow these defendants to file a motion for 

summary judgment”). Unlike the applicant in Hernandez, Boon is foreclosed from 

the offer of evidence by a previous ruling on a motion for sanctions. 

To conserve judicial resources, we find it prudent to apply the rationale of 

Stotts as sufficiently analogous to this case to be instructive. Due to the previous 

ruling preventing Boon “from presenting any evidence or testimony or calling any 

witnesses as part of his case that should have been included in the responses to 

the Interrogatories and request for production documents,” and having reviewed 

the extent of the request for production and interrogatories requesting all witnesses 

and supporting documents that support his claim, the outcome of remanding for 

Hunold to file a motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss 

would not produce a different result.7 Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of 

Boon’s petition to vacate. 

III. Appellate Attorney Fees

Hunold requests that this court award her appellate attorney fees. “An

award of appellate attorney’s fees is not a matter of right but rests within the 

 

7 Boon’s argument in resistance to the motion to dismiss states that Hunold was

“somehow attempting to speculate as to what evidence would be presented even 

though trial has not begun.” Such argument is contrary to the purposes of 

discovery. See Whitley v. C.R. Pharmacy Serv., Inc., 816 N.W.2d 378, 386 (Iowa 

2012) (concluding our discovery rules exist to avoid surprise and that the duty to 

supplement responses is intended “to clarify issues prior to trial, avoid surprise to 

parties, and allow a complete opportunity to prepare for trial”).
13

discretion of the court.” In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 

1996). In exercising such discretion, “we consider the needs of the party making 

the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the 

request was obligated to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal.” In re Marriage 

of Gaer, 476 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Iowa 1991). Although Boon was unsuccessful on 

appeal and Hunold was required to defend the trial court decision on appeal, we 

decline to award appellate attorney fees as the record is void of the parties’ current 

financial conditions. We assess costs on appeal to Boon.

AFFIRMED.