49792 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 187 / Tuesday, September 29, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

PART 585—PROHIBITED SERVICE AT 

SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING 

COMPANIES 

■ 1. The authority citation for 12 CFR 

part 585 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1462, 1462a, 1463, 

1464, 1467a, and 1829(e). 

■ 2. Amend § 585.100(b)(2) introductory 

text to read as follows: 

§ 585.100 Who is exempt from the 

prohibition under this part? 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(2) This exemption expires on 

September 30, 2010, unless the savings 

and loan holding company or the person 

files an application seeking a case-bycase exemption for the person under 

§ 585.110 by that date. If the savings and 

loan holding company or the person 

files such an application, the temporary 

exemption expires on: 

* * * * * 

Dated: September 23, 2009. 

By the Office of Thrift Supervision. 

John Bowman, 

Acting Director. 

[FR Doc. E9–23432 Filed 9–28–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–1117; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–106–AD; Amendment 

39–16026; AD 2009–20–03] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 727 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Boeing Model 727 airplanes. This AD 

requires inspections for cracking of the 

left- and right-side shear ties and web 

posts of the kickload beam and the 

adjacent structure in the vertical 

stabilizer, and corrective actions if 

necessary. This AD results from a report 

of cracking of the left- and right-side 

web posts and shear ties of the kickload 

beam. We are issuing this AD to detect 

and correct cracking of the left- and 

right-side web posts and shear ties of 

the kickload beam, which, when 

coupled with failures in the adjacent 

structure, could result in structural 

failure of the vertical stabilizer, and loss 

of control of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective November 3, 

2009. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of November 3, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; e-mail 

me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Berhane Alazar, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 917–6577; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to all 

Boeing Model 727 airplanes. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on October 29, 2008 (73 FR 

64284). That NPRM proposed to require 

inspections for cracking of the left- and 

right-side shear ties and web posts of 

the kickload beam and the adjacent 

structure in the vertical stabilizer, and 

corrective actions if necessary. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received from 

the commenters. 

Support for the AD 

Boeing concurs with the contents of 

the NPRM. 

Request To Revise Method of 

Determining Compliance Times 

ASTAR Air Cargo (ASTAR) states that 

the flight hours/flight cycles compliance 

methods are inconsistent. ASTAR states 

that it will have 24 airplanes that will 

need to be initially inspected within 

4,000 flight hours or 3,000 flight cycles 

if it uses the flight-hour compliance 

method specified in the NPRM. 

However, ASTAR asserts that it will 

have only eight airplanes that will need 

to be initially inspected within 4,000 

flight hours or 3,000 flight cycles if it 

uses the flight-cycles compliance 

method. 

From this comment, we infer that 

ASTAR requests that we revise the 

method we used to determine the 

compliance times proposed in the 

NPRM. We disagree. We acknowledge 

that the time each airplane will reach 

the required compliance time will vary 

depending on each operator’s particular 

utilization. However, we have 

confirmed that there is no inconsistency 

with the method used to determine the 

compliance time. 

We point out that the manufacturer 

recommended the flight-cycle/flighthour method for determining the 

compliance time in Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 727–55– 

0093, dated March 12, 2008. This 

recommendation was based on the 

average utilization rate and age of the 

affected airplanes yet to be inspected, as 

well as the age of the airplanes on 

which the subject unsafe condition was 

identified. 

In developing an appropriate 

compliance time, we considered the 

safety implications, the manufacturer’s 

recommendation, the time necessary to 

complete the rulemaking process, and 

the operators’ normal maintenance 

schedules for timely accomplishment of 

the required actions. In light of these 

items, we have determined that the 

method for determining the initial 

compliance time is appropriate. 

However, paragraph (l) of the final rule 

provides an affected operator the 

opportunity to apply for an adjustment 

of the compliance time if the operator 

also presents data that justify the 

adjustment. We do not find it necessary 

to change the final rule in this regard. 

Also, from this comment, we infer 

there is a misunderstanding that an 

operator has a choice between using the 

total flight cycles or the total flight 

hours on an airplane to determine the 

applicable compliance time. This AD 

does not provide such an option. To 

clarify, the ‘‘Condition’’ column of 

Table 1 in paragraph 1.E. of Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 727– 


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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 187 / Tuesday, September 29, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 49793 

55–0093, dated March 12, 2008, 

specifies, ‘‘All airplanes with more than 

52,000 total flight hours or 39,000 total 

flight cycles.’’ This condition means 

that for a given airplane that has 

accumulated more than either the 

specified flight hours or flight cycles, 

the corresponding compliance time is 

within 4,000 flight hours or 3,000 flight 

cycles, whichever occurs first, as 

specified in Table 1 of paragraph 1.E. of 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 727–55–0093, dated March 12, 

2008. 

Due to the issues discussed 

previously in this section, we have 

clarified the compliance time table 

specified in paragraph 1.E. of Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 727– 

55–0093, dated March 12, 2008, by 

adding new paragraphs (i) and (j) to this 

AD, described below. We have 

reidentified the subsequent paragraphs 

accordingly. We have also revised 

paragraph (f) of this AD to refer to 

paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD. 

Paragraph (i) of this AD specifies that 

the ‘‘Condition’’ column of Table 1 of 

paragraph 1.E. of Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 727–55– 

0093, dated March 12, 2008, refers to 

total flight hours and total flight cycles 

‘‘at the date on this service bulletin,’’ 

but that this AD applies to the airplanes 

with the specified total flight hours and 

total flight cycles as of the effective date 

of this AD. 

Paragraph (j) of this AD specifies that 

the ‘‘Condition’’ in the first row of Table 

1 in paragraph 1.E. of Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 727–55– 

0093, dated March 12, 2008, applies to 

airplanes with less than 52,000 total 

flight hours ‘‘or’’ 39,000 total flight 

cycles, but that for this AD, the first row 

of the table is applicable to airplanes 

with less than 52,000 total flight hours 

‘‘and’’ less than 39,000 total flight 

cycles. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate 

FedEx Express states that Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 727– 

55–0093, dated March 12, 2008, 

provides two options for accessing the 

required inspection area specified in the 

NPRM. FedEx Express explains that the 

first option is to remove an access panel 

and proceed down the manholes to the 

inspection area inside the vertical 

stabilizer, and the second is to remove 

the number 2 engine and the aft section 

of the intake duct. FedEx Express asserts 

that the second option requires an 

additional 34 work-hours to the 

inspection, which will increase the time 

the airplanes must be out of service for 

heavy maintenance. The additional time 

in maintenance concerns FedEx Express 

for economic reasons. 

FedEx Express further points out that 

the NPRM specifies that 10 work-hours 

are necessary to do the required 

inspection; however, FedEx Express 

reiterates that the number of required 

work-hours depends on the access 

method used. 

From these comments, we infer that 

FedEx Express requests that we revise 

the cost estimate provided in the NPRM 

to include separate labor costs for 

inspection based on which option is 

used. We do not agree to revise the 

proposed cost estimate. We 

acknowledge that access option 2 in 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 727–55–0093, dated March 12, 

2008, would take significantly more 

time and could increase the airplane 

down-time. However, the cost 

information below describes only the 

direct costs of the specific actions 

required by this AD. Based on the best 

data available, the manufacturer 

provided the number of work hours (10) 

necessary to do the required actions. 

This number represents the time 

necessary to perform only the actions 

actually required by this AD. We 

recognize that, in doing the actions 

required by an AD, operators might 

incur incidental costs in addition to the 

direct costs. The cost analysis in AD 

rulemaking actions, however, typically 

does not include incidental costs such 

as the time required to gain access and 

close up, time necessary for planning, or 

time necessitated by other 

administrative actions. Those incidental 

costs, which might vary significantly 

among operators, are almost impossible 

to calculate. We have not changed the 

final rule in this regard. 

Request To Verify Adequate 

Replacement Parts 

FedEx Express points out that limited 

numbers of web post and shear tie 

kickload beams are available according 

to the Boeing Parts Page on Boeing’s 

Web site. Further, FedEx Express asserts 

that the Boeing Parts Page did not 

provide any information about the 

timeline for stock replenishment of 

these parts. 

From this comment, we infer that 

FedEx Express is requesting verification 

that adequate replacement parts will be 

available to operators. Since 

replacement of web post and shear tie 

kickload beams is required only under 

certain conditions, the total number of 

replacement parts needed cannot be 

determined until inspections required 

by the AD are done. Therefore, we 

cannot predict the total number of parts 

needed prior to issuance of the AD. 

We have investigated this issue 

further and have determined that 

operators may produce their own parts 

in accordance with Section 21.303 

(‘‘Replacement and Modification Parts’’) 

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 21.303) so that the actions required 

by this AD can be accomplished within 

the specified compliance time. We have 

revised paragraph (f) of this final rule to 

specify that, as an alternative to using 

the parts specified in Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 727–55– 

0093, dated March 12, 2008, operators 

may fabricate their own parts in 

accordance with FAA-approved Boeing 

data. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. If 

final action is later identified, we might 

consider further rulemaking then. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 364 

airplanes of U.S. registry. The following 

table provides the estimated costs for 

U.S. operators to comply with this AD. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours 

Average 

labor rate per 

hour 

Parts Cost per product 

Number of 

U.S.- 

registered 

airplanes 

Fleet cost 

Inspection ..................... 10 $80 $0 $800, per inspection 

cycle.

364 $291,200, per inspection cycle. 


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49794 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 187 / Tuesday, September 29, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2009–20–03 Boeing: Amendment 39–16026. 

Docket No. FAA–2008–1117; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–106–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective November 3, 2009. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to all Boeing Model 

727, 727C, 727–100, 727–100C, 727–200, and 

727–200F series airplanes, certificated in any 

category. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from a report of 

cracking of the left- and right-side web posts 

and shear ties of the kickload beam. We are 

issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking 

of the left- and right-side web posts and shear 

ties of the kickload beam, which, when 

coupled with failures in the adjacent 

structure, could result in structural failure of 

the vertical stabilizer, and loss of control of 

the airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

Inspections and Corrective Actions 

(f) At the times specified in paragraph 1.E., 

‘‘Compliance,’’ of Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 727–55–0093, dated March 

12, 2008 (‘‘the service bulletin’’), except as 

provided by paragraphs (g), (h), (i), and (j) of 

this AD: Do the inspections to detect cracking 

of the left- and right-side web posts and shear 

ties of the kickload beam, by doing all of the 

actions specified in Part 2 and the applicable 

corrective actions specified in Part 3 of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of the service 

bulletin, except as provided by paragraph (k) 

of this AD. Do all applicable corrective 

actions before further flight. Repeat the 

inspections thereafter at the intervals 

specified in paragraph 1.E. of the service 

bulletin. As an alternative to using the parts 

specified in Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 727–55–0093, dated March 12, 2008, 

operators may fabricate their own parts in 

accordance with FAA-approved Boeing data. 

Clarifications and Exception to the Specified 

Compliance Times 

(g) To determine the compliance times for 

airplanes having exactly 52,000 total flight 

hours or 39,000 total flight cycles, for the 

purposes of this AD, these airplanes are 

grouped with airplanes having ‘‘less than’’ 

52,000 total flight hours or 39,000 total flight 

cycles, as specified in paragraph 1.E., 

‘‘Compliance,’’ of Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 727–55–0093, dated March 

12, 2008. 

(h) Where Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 727–55–0093, dated March 12, 2008, 

specifies a compliance time after the date on 

the service bulletin, this AD requires 

compliance within the specified compliance 

time after the effective date of this AD. 

(i) Where the ‘‘Condition’’ column of Table 

1 of paragraph 1.E. of Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 727–55–0093, 

dated March 12, 2008, refers to airplanes 

having accumulated the specified total flight 

hours and total flight cycles ‘‘at the date on 

this service bulletin,’’ this AD requires 

compliance for airplanes having accumulated 

the specified total flight hours and total flight 

cycles as of the effective date of this AD. 

(j) The ‘‘condition’’ in the first row of Table 

1 of paragraph 1.E. of Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 727–55–0093, 

dated March 12, 2008, applies to airplanes 

‘‘with less than 52,000 total flight hours or 

39,000 total flight cycles.’’ For this AD, the 

first row of Table 1 is applicable to airplanes 

‘‘with less than 52,000 total flight hours and 

less than 39,000 total flight cycles.’’ 

Exception to the Specified Corrective 

Actions 

(k) If any cracking is found during any 

inspection required by this AD, and Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 727–55– 

0093, dated March 12, 2008, specifies 

contacting Boeing for appropriate action: 

Before further flight, repair the cracking or 

damage using a method approved by the 

Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO), FAA. For a repair method to be 

approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO, as 

required by this paragraph, the Manager’s 

approval letter must specifically refer to this 

AD. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA, 

ATTN: Berhane Alazar, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; telephone (425) 917–6577; fax (425) 

917–6590; has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector 

(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District 

Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 

FSDO. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair 

required by this AD, if it is approved by an 

Authorized Representative for the Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes Delegation Option 

Authorization Organization who has been 

authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to 

make those findings. For a repair method to 

be approved, the repair must meet the 

certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically refer to this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(m) You must use Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 727–55–0093, dated March 

12, 2008, to do the actions required by this 

AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 


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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 187 / Tuesday, September 29, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 49795 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 

5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; 

Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221 or 425–227–1152. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_

locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 15, 2009. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–22871 Filed 9–28–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–0390; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–260–AD; Amendment 

39–16028; AD 2009–20–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A318, A319, A320, and A321 Series 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

Several cases of cracks on the main landing 

gear (MLG) door hinge fitting and MLG door 

actuator fitting on the keel beam were 

reported. 

Such failure could lead to the loss [of] the 

MLG door and could cause damage to the 

aircraft and/or hazard to persons or property 

on the ground. 

* * * * * 

We are issuing this AD to require 

actions to correct the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

November 3, 2009. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of November 3, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim 

Dulin, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–2141; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on January 9, 2008 (73 FR 

1556). That NPRM proposed to correct 

an unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

Several cases of cracks on the main landing 

gear (MLG) door hinge fitting and MLG door 

actuator fitting on the keel beam were 

reported. 

Such failure could lead to the loss [of] the 

MLG door and could cause damage to the 

aircraft and/or hazard to persons or property 

on the ground. 

This Airworthiness Directive (AD) 

mandates a onetime detailed visual 

inspection (DVI) and special detailed 

inspection (SDI) of the MLG door hinge 

fitting and actuator fitting. 

The inspections are for cracking, 

damage, correct installation, and correct 

adjustment. The corrective actions 

include correcting incorrect adjustments 

and installations, and contacting Airbus 

for instructions to repair damage and 

cracking. You may obtain further 

information by examining the MCAI in 

the AD docket. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received. 

Request for Partial Credit for 

Inspections 

Air Transport Association (ATA) on 

behalf of its member Northwest Airlines 

(NWA) requests that the AD give partial 

credit for inspections previously 

accomplished in accordance with 

Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI) 

Task 533154–02–1. NWA specifies that 

after the ALI task is accomplished, full 

compliance would then require that 

certain aircraft maintenance manual 

(AMM) actions also be performed 

within the time limits specified in the 

NPRM. The AMM actions include 

confirmation that the door actuator and 

door hinge are correctly installed and 

adjusted, and that ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘H’’ 

dimensions are correct as specified in 

the service information referred to in the 

NPRM. 

We disagree with the request to 

change the AD to give partial credit for 

accomplishing the ALI task. If the 

actions specified in the ALI task are 

exactly the same as certain inspection 

requirements of the AD, then the 

operator would be in compliance with 

the corresponding requirements of the 

AD, as specified in paragraph (f) of the 

NPRM, which says, ‘‘Unless already 

done, do the following actions.’’ In 

order to receive credit for accomplishing 

the actions, an operator would need to 

provide verification, in accordance with 

the maintenance recording requirements 

specified in Section 121.380 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.380). However, if the actions 

specified in the ALI task are not exactly 

the same then, under the provisions of 

paragraph (g)(1) of the final rule, we will 

consider requests for approval of an 

alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) if sufficient data are submitted 

to substantiate that the alternative 

method would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. We have not changed the 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Clarify Root Cause of 

Cracking 

ATA and NWA state that improper 

rigging might not be the root cause of 

the cracking identified in the NPRM. 

NWA states that Airbus identified 

proper rigging of the main landing gear 

(MLG) door in accordance with the 

recently revised AMM as corrective 

action for preventing cracking. NWA 

states that it has been rigging the MLG 

door on its Airbus Model A319 and 

A320 series airplanes for many years 

before the AMM was revised and has 

had no known cracking at this location. 

Therefore, NWA questions whether or 

not the root cause of the cracking is due 

to improper rigging. 

We acknowledge that NWA has had 

no known cracking at this location, but 

note that, according to Airbus, several 

cases of cracked structures due to 

improper rigging have been found 

elsewhere in the fleet. Improper rigging 


CPrice-Sewell on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with RULES