SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

- 2959

- 18 DONELL L. PRINCE, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. CITY OF ENGLEWOOD and PRISCILLA PAJELA, Defendant

- Respondents.

____________ ____________ _

Submitted December 14, 2020

– Decided February 12 , 202 1 Before Judges Sabatino and Currier. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L

- 1679

- 17. Donell L. Prince, appellant pro se. Keenan & Doris, LLC, attorneys for respondent City of Englewood (Timothy O'Connor, on the brief). Victoria M. Brown, attorney for respondent Priscilla Pajela.
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court

. " A lthough it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited

. R

. 1:36

- 3.2 A

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Plaintiff appeals from th e summary judgment orders dismissing his claims against defendants. Pl a intiff alleged he slipped on snow and f e ll on the same day while walking on a street in Englewood and on the property owned by defendant Priscilla Pajela, his landlord. We affirm. Cl aims against Englewood On the day of these events in March 2015 , as plaintiff left the rooming house where he lived, he noticed th e re was snow on the common w alkways of the rooming ho u se property and the adjoining public sidewalks

. Because snow had been plowed from the street onto the sidewalks, plaintiff decided to walk in the street. W hile doing so , plai n t i ff stated he fell and landed on his backside and side of his bod y . He got up, continued on to a s to re to do his shopping, an d

w a lked ba c k to the rooming house. As pl ai n t iff was on the room i ng house property, he said his foot "caught on something[] and [he] fell backward on [his] back" and struck his head. Plaintiff alleged that Englewood, through its agents and employees , was negligent in faili ng to remove the snow from public sidewalks and streets, and the negligen c e caused him to fall and sustain injuries. Giving plaintiff all legitimate inferen c es as we must , Rule 4:46

- 2(c), we are satisfied the trial court3 A

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did not err in its grant of summar y judgment to Engle w ood. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 142 N.J. 520 , 5 40 (1995). It is well

- establ is hed law in thi s state that public entities have absolute immunity for all snow removal activities. Miehl v. Darpino , 53 N.J. 49, 5 4 (1968)

. The common law "immunity was based primarily on the limitless liability that could be imposed on an entity, such as a state, coun ty, municipality, or turnpike authority, that had the responsibility to clean up numerous streets and roads." Bli gen v. Jersey City Hous. Auth. , 131 N.J. 124, 131 (1993) ; s ee also Rochinsky v. State , Dep't of Transp. , 110 N.J. 399, 414

- 15 (1988) (holding that the enactment of the Tort Claims Act did not abrogate common law snow removal immunity); Lathers v. Twp. of West Windsor , 308 N.J. Super. 301 , 305

- 06 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that the municipality had immunity from suit where the plaintiff slipped and fell on a patch of ice on publicly owned sidewalk); Rossi v. Borough of Haddonfield , 297 N.J. Super. 494 , 499

- 500 (App. Div. 1997) (holding the borough enjoyed snow removal immunity where
the plaintif

f slipped and fell on ice in a municipal parking lot). Here, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Englewood. Plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell on a public street because of snow
conditions. Because E nglewood enjoys immunity from liabil ity for its snow4 A

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removal activities, i t cannot be held liable for plaintiff's alleged injuries. See Rochinsky , 110 N.J. at 41 3

- 1 4

. Claims against Pajela
P l aintiff alleged in his compl ai nt that Pajela and her employees were negligent in remo v ing snow and ice from the rooming ho u se property and the ir negli genc e caused him to slip and fall an d suffer injur i es. Plaintiff has an extensive medical history. He was involved in motor vehicle accidents in 1991 and 1995 following which he complained of pain in
hi s neck and back

. He treated with a neurologist and a neurosurgeon who prescribed pain medication. He also underwent MRI testing of his neck and back. Plaintiff has received Social Security Disability Insurance since 1997 because of his back injuries. At the time of his fall i n March 2015, pla i n t iff was
under the care of a pain management doctor and was taking Percocet to manage his chronic pain.
D uring his deposition , plaintiff stated: "I never said that my injuries were completely healed or anything like that. I would never say that." Plaintiff first sought treatment for the injuries he sustained in the March 2015 fall t hree weeks after the accident, returning to the pain management doctor and neurologist. However, he never pro duced an expert report to provide5 A

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an analysis of his pre

- existing injuries and conditions and any injuries that may have been caused by his fall. Nor did he present any evidence to differentiate between the two falls. There was no medical expert to present the j ury with an opinion as to whether any of plaintiff's current complaints were causally related to the fall on Pajela's property. A plaintiff has the burden to prove the elements of a negligence claim "by some competent proof." Townsend v. Pierre , 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). This includes the element of proximate cause. Plaintiff must prove any injuries he sustained were proximately caused by the fall on the rooming house property. Because of plaintiff's complicated medical history and his ongoing treatment at the time of his fall, he required expert opinion to prove proximate

cause. The medical issues presented here are beyond the ken of an average juror. 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc. , 272 N.J. Super. 478, 490 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that expert testimony is necessary where proximate causation cannot be established through common knowledge). Plaintiff had preexisting injuries and an earlier fall on the same day. Therefore, he was required to obtain6 A

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an expert to opine whether the fall at the rooming house c aused a new injur y . 1 Without an expert report, plaintiff could no t sustain his personal injury claims pertaining to the fall. Plaintiff made additional allegati o ns against Pajela in her capacity as a rooming house operator. He allege d that Pajela and other unknown parties harassed and intimidated plaintiff in an attempt to force him out of the rooming house. Plaintiff allege d that he complained to Pajela in 2013 about drug use by other tenants and cracked heating pipes which caused black mold in the rooming house bathroom. After p laintiff reported his grievances to the Department of Community Affairs in 2013 , a n inspector evaluated the property and found it was in full compliance with the law. Plaintiff contended, that after the inspection, Paj ela r etaliate d against plaintiff by drilling holes into the walls and windows of his room to "blow [] drugs . . . [ and ] other chemical toxins into plaintiff [ ' ] s room[.]" Plaintiff allege d Pajela and her agents and employees failed to comply with the Rooming and Boarding Houses Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 55:13B

- 1 to

- 21 , and Regulations Governing Rooming and Boarding Houses, N.J.A.C. 5:27

- 1.1 to

- 14.1. In

1 Plaintiff advised the trial court during oral argument that he was not pleading an aggravation of any prior injury or condition.7 A

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addition, he contended that Pajela and her employees intentionally harmed h im

" by way of drugs " and " other chemical irritants ," depriv ing him of a safe living environment. Plaintiff did not produce any expert opinion relating his alleged injuries to Pajela 's conduct. In granting Pajela summary judgment, the trial court stated: The court find[s] no genuine issue of material fact. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 142 N.J. 520 (1995). To the extent plaintiff argues that his personal injury claims related to drug use by other boarders at his residence caused him illness an d injury, were not dismissed by prior order of the court, the court finds there is no evidence, to include an expert report, medical or otherwise, which would relate the alleged injuries to the actions complained of nor how defendant was liable therefore. The balance of [the] allegations concerning harassment in 2013 are barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:14

- 2. Plaintiff's amended complaint was filed in 2018. Allegations regarding incidents alleged to have occurred in 2013 or prior were adjudicated by the Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House Standards, which found [the boarding house] to be in full compliance with the Rooming and Boarding House Act and the R egulations governing Rooming and Boarding Houses. Plaintiff continues to reside at the boarding house. Again, in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the

non - movant, we are satisfied he has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact to withstand summary judgment. R. 4:46

- 2. Plaintiff's complaints of8 A

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violations of the Roomin g House Act in 2013 were investigated and dismissed by the regulating agency. Moreover, as discussed above, without an expert opinion to connect his allegations of misconduct by Pajela or the other boarders to an alleged injury or illness, plaintiff canno t support his claims

. In light of our de novo determination that the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defe n dant s and the dismissal of all of plain t iff's claims was supported by the record , we need not address pla i n t iff's remaining contentions reg arding the denial of other motions and cross

- m o t i on s. Affirmed.