GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 1999 COMBATING 

TERRORISM

Analysis of Potential 

Emergency Response 

Equipment and 

Sustainment Costs

GAO/NSIAD-99-151

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282618 Letter

June 9, 1999

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National

Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness program,1 the 

Department of Defense (DOD) and others provide training, equipment, and 

advice to enhance the capability of civilian emergency response personnel 

to respond to a possible terrorist incident involving a chemical, biological, 

radiological, or nuclear device (CBRN). In 1998, we reported that some 

local jurisdictions were deciding on equipment purchases without the 

benefit of formal threat and risk assessments based on valid threat data.2 

In the absence of defined requirements, you asked us to determine the 

potential cost of equipping and maintaining the capability of cities to 

respond to a terrorist incident involving CBRN. Specifically, we 

(1) obtained the views of federal, state, and local officials on equipment 

they believed would provide various levels of capability to respond to a 

CBRN incident and (2) determined the potential procurement and 

sustainment costs of these items. 

To conduct our work, we developed a preliminary equipment list based on 

our prior work and discussions with DOD, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

and local officials. We then surveyed 36 federal, state, and local officials 

1This program was authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV 

of P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996) and is commonly referred to by its sponsors’ names, Senators Nunn, 

Lugar, and Domenici.

2

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998); 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program

Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-LugarDomenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998); and Combating

Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency

(GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).
B-282618

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

with hazardous materials (HAZMAT) expertise—24 of whom 

responded—to determine the equipment they believed would provide 

various levels of response capability. Based on the 24 responses, we 

revised the equipment list. The list is for illustrative purposes, is not meant 

to represent a minimum or maximum of equipment needs for local 

jurisdictions, and may not reflect the actual equipment costs for a local 

jurisdiction. Appendix I further describes our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief We identified over 200 equipment items that federal, state, and local 

officials believed would enhance their capability to respond to a CBRN 

incident. These items ranged from standard items such as duct tape and 

gloves to more sophisticated devices such as mobile command posts and 

climate control systems. The officials we surveyed categorized the items to 

represent different levels of capability—basic and modest, moderate, and 

high in comparison to the basic level. A modest increase over basic 

HAZMAT would include additional detection and decontamination 

equipment. A moderate increase would include a greater array of detection 

equipment than the modest level. The high level of increased equipment 

capability would include additional and more expensive detection 

equipment. 

We estimated the potential cost of initially procuring and sustaining the 

equipment items over a 10-year period using a notional city of 500,000. As 

table 1 shows, these costs ranged from a total of about $4.6 million for 

items considered to provide a basic capability to about $43 million for 

items considered to provide a high capability. 
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Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Table 1: Possible Cost to Equip a Notional City of 500,000 to Respond to a CBRN 

Event 

This table represents a baseline and does not include some costs, such as 

those associated with equipment maintained as a stockpile, equipment 

training and certification, or some hospital and emergency medical 

response services.

Background According to the U.S. intelligence community, conventional explosives and 

firearms are the weapons of choice for terrorists at least partly because 

chemical and biological weapons are more difficult to weaponize and the 

results are unpredictable. However, intelligence agencies state that 

terrorists’ use of chemical and biological materials may increase over the 

next decade. Despite differing views, Congress authorized and funded over 

$200 million in fiscal year 1999 for numerous training and equipment 

programs, including those offered by the Departments of Justice and 

Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to prepare local 

jurisdictions for a CBRN incident. Some jurisdictions are deciding on 

equipment purchases without the benefit of formal threat and risk 

assessments using valid threat data. As we have emphasized in our 

April 1998 report and testimony, a critical component of establishing and 

expanding programs to combat terrorism is an analytically sound threat 

and risk assessment using valid inputs from the intelligence community 

and other agencies. Such an assessment is widely recognized as an 

effective decision support tool for prioritizing security investments and 

would help local jurisdictions select equipment that would provide the 

greatest benefit whether purchased with federal, state, or local funds. 

Dollars in millions

Equipment 

level

Initial

procurement cost

Sustainment cost

over 10 years

Total

 cost

Basic HAZMAT $1.3 $3.3 $4.6

Modest $5.2 $13.1 $18.3

Moderate $8.3 $20.9 $29.2

High $12.2 $30.7 $42.9
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While no valid set of equipment requirements has been defined or 

established for equipping a local jurisdiction to respond to a CBRN terrorist 

incident, the InterAgency Board3

 for Equipment Standardization and 

InterOperability recently developed a list of standardized equipment. The 

list can be used by emergency personnel as a guideline when acquiring 

CBRN response equipment and is intended to promote interoperability and 

standardization among the response community at the local, state, and 

federal levels. Use of the list, however, is voluntary, and state or local 

jurisdictions decide the manufacturers, types, and quantities of the items to 

be selected to meet their perceived operational needs. 

No Defined 

Requirements and 

Little Consensus on 

Needed Equipment

There is no assessment that would provide a basis for clearly defined and 

prioritized equipment requirements based on threat and risk, and there is 

little consensus among federal, state, and local officials on the types of 

equipment needed for a city to prepare for a CBRN terrorist incident at 

various levels. Based on our previous work, the Board’s list, and 

discussions with agency officials, we identified about 200 equipment items 

that might be used to respond to a CBRN incident. We then surveyed 

36 federal, state, and local officials on the equipment they believed would 

provide a basic HAZMAT equipment capability and various increments of 

increased equipment capabilities to respond to industrial chemical spills 

and/or CBRN terrorist events. Twenty-four of these officials responded. 

The results of our survey identified additional protective, detection, 

decontamination, and communications equipment to illustrate incremental 

increases in equipment capability over basic HAZMAT. The modest 

increase in equipment capability included more detection, 

communications, and decontamination equipment, such as 

decontamination showers. The moderate increase in equipment capability 

included additional detection and decontamination items, such as gas 

chromatograph/mass spectrometers. The high level in equipment capability 

included more expensive detection equipment, such as perimeter sampling 

systems and a Fox vehicle.

3

The Board is an advisory board to the National Domestic Preparedness Office at the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation and consists of officials from local, state, and federal government organizations, including 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Director of Military Support, 

Department of the Army. Its charter is to establish, maintain, and update a standard equipment list that 

the interagency community could use to prepare for and respond to terrorism.
B-282618

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

All 24 survey respondents agreed that boundary marking tape was a basic 

HAZMAT item. Respondents varied widely as to the level of capability 

other equipment could provide. For example, six respondents designated a 

chemical agent water test kit4

 as basic HAZMAT equipment, four indicated 

that it represented a modest increased capability above basic HAZMAT, 

three indicated that it represented a moderate level of increased capability, 

and seven indicated it represented a high level of increased capability. 

Four respondents did not place the kit in any category. The thermal 

imaging camera also received a varied response. For basic HAZMAT and 

modest, moderate, and high levels of increased capability over basic 

HAZMAT, the responses were eight, two, seven, and five, respectively. 

Two respondents did not place this item in any category. 

Procurement and 

Sustainment Costs

No one has created a validated list of equipment to provide a sound basis 

for determining costs to initially equip and sustain various levels of 

equipment capability for a local jurisdiction to deal with a CBRN incident. 

However, using the weighted results of our survey to establish which 

equipment would go into which category, we estimated the potential costs 

to initially equip a notional city of 500,000 people.5

 The notional city has 

1,337 first responders, 112 of which are technically trained.6 As shown in 

figure 1, the estimated costs range from $1.3 million (basic HAZMAT) to 

$12.2 million (high level of increased equipment capability).

4

A chemical agent water test kit evaluates any chemical warfare agent contamination in a water source.

5Because of the widely varying opinions on which equipment belonged in which category, we 

reconciled the results through weighting. Based on how a respondent rated each item in our survey, we 

assigned a score to that response and then divided the total by the number of responses. 

6

The numbers of first responders, the size of response teams, and our equipment list were derived from 

assumptions discussed in our scope and methodology and are for estimating purposes only. We do not 

intend to imply our concurrence with the appropriateness of such resources for responding to a CBRN 

incident, and our cost estimate is not to be considered a recommendation for how a city should be 

structured or equipped.
B-282618

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Figure 1: Estimated Procurement Costs 

Source: Our analysis.

Each local jurisdiction has its own perceived HAZMAT needs and opinions 

on what types of equipment it would need to respond to a CBRN incident. 

Depending on the types of equipment, the number of items, the 

manufacturer, and discounts for quantity purchases, the actual costs to 

equip a city to respond to a CBRN incident could vary greatly. For 

example, a level A protective suit can cost between $600 and $2,000. 

As shown in figure 2, the estimated cumulative costs to sustain the 

equipment (in current year dollars) over a 10-year period range from 

$3.3 million for basic HAZMAT equipment to $30.7 million for a high level 

increased capability.

0

5

10

15

Basic Level Modest

Level

Moderate

Level

High Level

Basic Modest Moderate High

12.2

8.3

5.2

1.3

Dollars in Millions
B-282618

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Figure 2: Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs

Source: Our analysis.

Sustainment costs, however, can also vary because some items have an 

indefinite shelf life (e.g. traffic cones and hard hats) while others have a 

limited shelf life. For example, level A protective suits have a shelf life of 

up to 5 years, while chlorine bleach, which is used for decontamination, 

has a shelf life of 6 months. In addition, the environment and/or the 

frequency that items are used can affect their useful life. For example, 

according to Los Angeles County Operational Terrorism Working Group 

officials, from mid-December 1998 to mid-April 1999, first responders from 

the Los Angeles County operational area addressed approximately 

60 chemical and biological threats that were hoaxes. When responding to 

these hoaxes, first responders routinely wore hooded chemical resistant 

clothing or other appropriate clothing. Some hooded chemical resistant 

clothing can be worn only one time. As such, the county has had to replace 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Basic Level Modest

Level

Moderate

Level

High Level

Basic Modest Moderate High

30.7

20.9

13.1

3.3

Dollars in Millions
B-282618

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

approximately 200 of these items within the past 4 months. Furthermore, 

technical equipment has to be calibrated periodically to ensure that it 

functions properly, and some equipment becomes obsolete and is replaced 

by improved models. All of these factors can affect sustainment costs for 

items and equipment used to deal with a possible CBRN terrorist incident. 

The cost factor we used to estimate our sustainment costs included most of 

these issues, factoring in various assumptions about shelf life and usage.

If an average inflation rate of 2.1 percent is included, the cumulative 

estimated sustainment costs range from $3.6 million for basic HAZMAT 

equipment to $34.2 million for the highest level of equipment capability 

(see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs

Source: Our analysis.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Basic Level Modest

Level

Moderate

Level

High Level

Basic Modest Moderate High

34.2

23.2

14.5

3.6

Then-year Dollars in Millions
B-282618

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred and noted 

the difficulties of developing procurement and sustainment costs for 

equipment needed to enhance the response capability of cities to respond 

to a terrorist incident involving CBRN. DOD also noted that our report 

provided a good base for decision-making entities to work from. DOD’s 

comments are included as appendix V. DOD provided technical comments, 

which we have addressed in our report where appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 

30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the 

appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Honorable Louis J. Freeh, 

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; 

other federal agencies discussed in this report; and other interested parties. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512–5140. The major contributors to this report were Carol R. 

Schuster, Davi M. D’Agostino, James F. Reid, and Lisa M.Quinn.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, National Security

 Preparedness Issues
Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Scope and 

Methodology

12

Appendix II

Equipment List Sorted 

by Equipment 

Capability Level

14

Basic HAZMAT Equipment Capability 14

Modest Increase in Equipment Capability 16

Moderate Increase in Equipment Capability 18

High Level of Equipment Capability List 19

Appendix III

Survey Respondents

20

Local Jurisdictions 20

Federal Agencies 21

Associations 21

Contractor 21

Appendix IV

Additional Offices 

Consulted for Our 

Review

22

Local Jurisdictions 22

Federal Agencies 22

Appendix V

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

23

Appendix VI

Terrorism Related GAO 

Products

27
Contents

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Tables Table 1: Possible Cost to Equip a Notional City of 500,000 to 

Respond to a CBRN Event 3

Figures Figure 1: Estimated Procurement Costs 6

Figure 2: Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs 7

Figure 3: Estimated 10-Year Sustainment Costs 8

Abbreviations

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear device

DOD Department of Defense

HAZMAT hazardous materials
Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApeInxdi

To estimate the procurement costs for equipment that might be required by 

a city responding to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear device 

(CBRN) incident, we first developed a preliminary equipment list based on 

our previous work and input from the Army’s Director of Military Support 

and its Technical Escort Unit, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 

Virginia’s Fairfax County Hazardous Materials Unit. This list formed the 

basis for our survey of city, state, and federal officials with expertise in the 

field of hazardous materials (HAZMAT ) and/or CBRN response equipment. 

The survey requested an evaluation of equipment that represented the four 

levels of capability, defined on page 2, that we constructed to analyze and 

illustrate potential costs. On the basis of our analysis of the survey 

responses, we compiled a master equipment list that reflected the different 

levels of capability. Because of the varying opinions on which equipment 

belonged in which category, we reconciled the results through weighting.1

Appendix III contains a list of survey respondents and appendix IV contains 

a list of additional offices that we consulted for our review. 

We then determined the amount and types of items and equipment that 

could be used by choosing a notional city and identifying the number of 

first responders. We chose a population size of 500,000 for a notional city, 

which is slightly above the median size of the 100 most populous U.S. cities. 

Cleveland, Ohio, and New Orleans, Louisiana, are within about 5,000 

people of the notional city population size; therefore, we included them in 

our analysis to obtain the number and types of first responders—including 

their levels of training—assigned to their respective jurisdictions. From 

this information, we derived an average number of first responders for the 

notional city. We then consulted with local and federal officials, such as the 

Hazardous Materials Coordinators for the cities of Chicago, New York, and 

Baltimore and the Army’s Director of Military Support, to identify the 

amount of equipment, at each level of capability, that could be used by first 

responders. Our master equipment list, notional city size, and numbers of 

first responders are for illustrative purposes only and are not meant to 

imply that we agree with the appropriateness of such equipment or with 

how a city should be structured.

1

Because of the widely varying opinions on which equipment belonged in which category, we 

reconciled the results through weighting. Based on how a respondent rated each item in our survey, we 

assigned a score to that response and then divided the total by the number of responses.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

We are aware that many items on our equipment list are being used in local 

jurisdictions for fire fighting and HAZMAT operations; however, for the 

purposes of identifying procurement costs, we assumed the notional city 

would have no preexisting HAZMAT capabilities. We consulted with 

federal government officials to derive procurement costs. As mentioned 

previously, our procurement costs are for operational equipment, do not 

reflect additional equipment that might be maintained as a stockpile, and 

may not reflect the actual prices a local jurisdiction might pay. Differences 

might occur based on the equipment manufacturer, quantity discounts, or 

the use of alternative equipment to serve the same function.

To calculate the equipment sustainment costs, we applied a factor of 

25 percent of the initial procurement cost (in current-year and then-year 

dollars) to each item for every year of our analysis. This factor was derived 

from discussions with local and federal officials, and it represents an 

average sustainment factor. A heavy vehicle would actually require a 

higher relative sustainment cost than an article of clothing. The average 

sustainment factor accounts for (1) general wear and tear, instrument 

calibration, and general maintenance costs of the equipment and 

(2) replacement costs for small-scale incidents and hoaxes. For example, a 

small-scale incident would be in a localized area and would not include 

mass casualties. Replacement costs due to a large-scale incident, such as 

the Oklahoma City bombing, were not considered. We did not include 

training and certification costs in our sustainment estimates. 
Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II

Equipment List Sorted by Equipment 

Capability Level ApeInxdi

Basic HAZMAT 

Equipment Capability

Level A fully encapsulated chemical resistant suit ensemble

Hooded chemical resistant clothing

Chemical resistant gloves (Butyl)

Chemical resistant gloves (Nitrile)

Inner gloves

Hard-hat with face shield

Safety glasses

Duct tape

Chemical resistant boots, steel or fiberglass toe and shank

Outer booties

Safety boots or shoes

Two-way local communications, push to talk

Personal alarm system to alert for downed personnel

HAZMAT gear bag

Surgical masks

Appropriate air monitoring instruments

Boundary marking tape: yellow-caution/red-danger

Restricted access and caution warning signs

Combination meter

Combustible gas indicator

pH paper and water finding test paper

Radiation monitoring equipment

Leak detectors (soap solution, ammonium hydroxide, etc.)

pH meter or pen

Water finding paste

Gauging stick 

Squirt bottle

Distilled water

Ammonia for chlorine detection

Drum thieves

Grab sampling tubes

Glass or plastic pipettes with aspiration bulb

Tweezers, plastic

Flags, wire stakes

Wind socks

Contaminated material disposal containers

Traffic cones

Brushes, long handle

Garden hose with nozzles

Polyethylene sheeting

Containment basins, vehicle and personnel sized
Appendix II

Equipment List Sorted by Equipment 

Capability Level

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

5-gallon buckets

55-gallon plastic bags

Disinfectant, detergent, bleach, and sodium bicarbonate

Hand-operated diaphragm pumps with hoses

Small garden sprayers

Backless stools

Folding tables, folding (6 foot)

Trauma-type first aid kit

Emergency eye wash

Timer or stopwatch

Safety harness with 150 foot dry line retrieval ropes, 9.5mm-10.5mm.

Locking carabiners

20-lb. ABC fire extinguisher

Hand lights, explosive proof

Portable lights

Air compressors and generators, 8kw, 15kw, and 50kw

Electric cord reels

Copper grounding rods, 3⁄4 x 4 feet (minimum length)

Grounding cables, point-type clamps on both ends, 1/8 stainless steel

 (uninsulated) 50-foot minimum

Traffic safety vests

Megaphone/ public address system

Overpacks: 35, 55, and 85 gallon poly-drums

Miscellaneous non-sparking tool kit, to include bun and spanner wrenches

Small, medium, and large equipment bags

Handheld illumination

Cellular telephone (satellite capability is optimal)

Facsimile, copier, computer printer, and scanner (combined or individual

 machines)

Binoculars

Camera, self-developing

Computers (laptop, desktop, or docking station) with common data and

 word processing software for stand-alone, local, and wide area networks

Office supply kit (notepads, pencils, etc)

Personal Protective Equipment Selection Guide

CHRIS Manual, 1993 edition

Merck Index, 12th edition

Emergency Action Guides, Association of American Railroads 

Emergency Handling of Hazardous Materials in Surface Transportation
Appendix II

Equipment List Sorted by Equipment 

Capability Level

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Association of American Railroads, 1996 edition

Farm Chemicals Handbook, Meister Publishing, 1997 edition

First Responder’s Guide to Agriculture Chemicals Accidents, 

 Foden-Weddell, 1993 edition

NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, 1995 edition

GATX Tank Car Manual, GATX 6th edition

Hawley’s Condensed Chemical Dictionary, Sax & Lewis, 13th edition

Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals and Carcinogens, Sittig, 

 3rd edition

TLVs and BELs Guidebook, ACGIH, 1996 edition

Quick Selection Guide to Chemical Protective Clothing, Forsberg, 

 3rd edition

Household Chemicals and Emergency First Aid, Foden-Weddell, 1993

Gardner’s Chemical Synonyms and Trade Names, Ash, 10th edition 

Modest Increase in 

Equipment Capability 

Personal cooling system; vest or full suit

Bio-pack rebreather (2-, 3-, or 4-hour supply, preferred) 

Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)

Chemical/biological resistant coveralls

Spare ice packs for cooling systems

Extraction gear

Level A pressure test kit

Full Face air purifying respirators with appropriate cartridges

Emergency escape breathing apparatus (EEBA)

Paper/disposable chemical/biological overgarments, including gloves and

 booties 

Hazard categorizing (HazCat) kit

Air and liquid detector tube system

Colormetric tube kit with additional tubes 

Photoionization detector (PID)

Flame ionization detector (FID)

Pesticide screening kit

PCB test kits

Petroleum finding paste

Chemical spill classifier kit

Waste water classifier kit

Heat sensor, infrared

Surface thermometer
Appendix II

Equipment List Sorted by Equipment 

Capability Level

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Plastic or brass scoops and trowels

Sample jars: 8 oz. wide mouth, with Teflon lids, 16 oz. wide mouth with

 Teflon lids

Thermal imaging camera

Meteorological stations (temperature, wind, and humidity)

Decontamination shower for individual and mass application

Decontamination system supplies (secondary)

Water bladder, decontamination shower waste collection 

Spill containment pillows and devices

Contaminated water run-off and collection pools

Water pumps, hoses, couplers, and nozzles (electric and manual)

Emergency decontamination shelter 

Air inflatable tents

Sodium hypochlorite powder (15 lb. buckets)

85 gallon poly over pak drums

Disposable personal property bags

Paper hospital gowns

Colored/nonviewable cadaver bags (Center for Disease Control standard)

HEPA (high-efficiency particulate air) vacuum for dry decontamination

Ambu bag, chemical filtered

Green line/red line battery activated marking system

Class D fire extinguisher

Ohm meter, intrinsically safe

Ground resistance tester

Explosive-proof exhaust fans

Stretcher, litter decontamination mass casualty and field cart

General purpose freezer/refrigerator

Head area lighting system

Portable area illumination

Water trailers/source (potable and nonpotable)

Heat stress monitor

Hazardous material shipping containers

Vehicle support

Chlorine A (cylinder), B (1-ton cylinder), and C kit (railcar) w/appropriate

 tools

Portable air cylinder carts

Modular back packs

Duty gear and modular load bearing systems/operational vests

Medical/casualty bags

Optics: day and limited visibility
Appendix II

Equipment List Sorted by Equipment 

Capability Level

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Multi-channel (UHF/VHF) encrypted, push to talk radios with chargers and

 two extra batteries and accessories and trickle chargers with field

 programming capability

Micro-tape recorders with audio in/out feature

Camera, 35mm with flash, telephoto lens

Camera, digital

Camera, video, VHS

Light amplification lenses

Standardized NBC/commercial chemical hazard software and response

 system

Portable repeater 

Two-way pagers (secure preferred)

Miscellaneous adapter cables and connectors

Bull horns and portable sound system.

Matheson Gas Data Book , Matheson, 6th edition

Effects of Exposure to Toxic Gases; First Aid and Medical Treatment,

 Matheson, 3rd edition

Hazardous Material Injuries, Stutz, 3rd edition

Emergency Care for Hazardous Materials Exposure, Bronstein, 2nd edition

Clinical Toxicology of Commercial Products, Williams & Wilkens, 5th

 edition

Joint Information Center (JIC) Manual

Gloves Plus (computer program)

Medical Management of Bio Casualty Book

Medical Management of Chemical Casualty Book

Moderate Increase in 

Equipment Capability

Escape mask

Tents, standard or air inflatable with climate control and chemical/ 

 biological liners

M-8 detection paper for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection

M-9 detection paper (roll) for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection

M-256 detection kit for chemical agent (weapons grade) detection

M-18 series, chemical agent detector kit for surface and vapor chemical

 agent

Point chemical agent detector and alarm

Stand-off chemical detector, FTIR

Hand-held chemical agent monitor with training set

Chemical agent water test kit, M-272
Appendix II

Equipment List Sorted by Equipment 

Capability Level

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Container, sample transfer/small infectious substance

Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS)

JPO-BD immunoassay tickets

Sampling kit with aerosol collector

Aerosol samplers

M-295 equipment decontamination kit for chemical warfare agents

M-291 skin decontamination kit

Cryogenic shipment containers

Liquid nitrogen for cryogenic shipment containers

Decontamination trailer, multi-water source, and prime mover

High pressure hot water system

Ultraviolet lighting

Tents for contaminant containment|

Vaporized hydrogen peroxide solution 

2PAM chloride autoinjector

Atropine 2mg/ml, 25ml vial

Atropine autoinjector

CANA (Diazepam) autoinjector

Commercial vehicles with run-flat tires: vans, sport utility vehicles and

 trucks for personal transportation and equipment

Mobile command post or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear

 incident response operations center

Portable area climate control system

Forward vehicle and equipment maintenance packages

Solar battery chargers

Vehicle-mounted communication systems for long-range, encrypted, voice,

 video, and data transmission capable of cross-band repeat

Bi-direction amplifiers

Secure telecomputer encryption

High Level of 

Equipment Capability 

List

Automated perimeter sampling system (portal shield)

Portal shield sampling kits

Fox vehicle
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Appendix III

Survey Respondents ApIenxdi

Local Jurisdictions Battalion Chief

Downers Grove Fire Department

Downers Grove, Ill. 

Department of Emergency Services

Richmond, Va.

District Chief

Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service

Rockville, Md.

Emergency Operations Bureau

Los Angeles, Calif.

Fire Station 39

Van Nuys, Calif.

HAZMAT Coordinator

Chicago, Ill.

HAZMAT Coordinator

Baltimore County Fire Department

Towson, Md.

Oahu Civil Defense Agency

Honolulu, Hawaii

Office of Emergency Management

Denver, Colo.

Office of Emergency Management

New York, N.Y.

Office of Emergency Management

Philadelphia, Pa.

Office of Emergency Management

Seattle, Wash.

Office of Emergency Preparedness

New Orleans, La.
Appendix III

Survey Respondents

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Office of Public Safety

Columbus, Ohio

Terrorism Coordinator

Los Angeles County Fire Department

Los Angeles, Calif.

Federal Agencies Commander

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

Department of Army

Technical Escort Unit

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

Department of Army 

Office of Emergency Response

Department of Energy

Office of the Emergency Coordinator

Environmental Protection Agency 

Associations International Association of Fire Chiefs1

International Association of Fire Fighters

National Fire Protection Association

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

National Volunteer Fire Council

Contractor MKI Systems

1

The HAZMAT Coordinator for Chicago, Illinois, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs 

submitted a joint response.
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Appendix IV

Additional Offices Consulted for Our Review ApVenIxdi

Local Jurisdictions Department of Public Safety 

Cleveland, Ohio

HAZMAT Coordinator

City of Baltimore

Baltimore, Md.

HAZMAT Unit

Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department

Fairfax, Va.

Federal Agencies Director of Military Support

Department of the Army

Hazardous Materials Response Unit

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The National Domestic Preparedness Office

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of National Security Affairs

Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Appendix V

Comments From the Department of Defense ApVendxi
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Appendix VI

Terrorism Related GAO Products ApenVxdiI

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear

(GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999)

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist

Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999)

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public

Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: FBI’s Use of Federal Funds for CounterterrorismRelated Activities (Fiscal years 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic

Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires

Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the

Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National

Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas

(GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices

(GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

Lret
Appendix VI

Terrorism Related GAO Products

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-151 Combating Terrorism

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection

Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing

Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, 

Apr. 15, 1997).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed 

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives

and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security 

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and

Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, 

Mar. 27, 1996).

(701149) Lret
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