In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 24, 2021

S21A0591. SMITH v. LONG COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS 

AND REGISTRATION et al.

 MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Appellant Bobby Harrison Smith ran against Teresa Odum for 

the office of Probate Judge of Long County on June 9, 2020 (the 

“Election”).1 Following Odum’s victory, Smith filed a petition to 

contest the Election results, alleging there were (1) irregularities 

committed by election officials, (2) illegal votes cast in the election, 

and (3) wrongfully rejected votes (collectively “irregularities”). After

a three-day bench trial, the trial court concluded that the evidence 

was insufficient to cast doubt on the results of the Election and 

denied the petition. Smith now appeals, asserting in four related 

enumerations of error that the trial court erred by not ordering a 

 1 A number of candidates for other offices were also on the ballot, but 

they are not at issue in this appeal. 
2

new election. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Construed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling,2 the evidence shows that the results of the Election were 

certified on June 19, 2020, showing a total of 2,735 votes, with 1,372 

cast for Odum and 1,363 cast for Smith. The Long County Board of 

Elections and Registration (the “Board”) conducted a recount of the 

Election results, in which additional mail-in absentee ballots were 

located and one provisional ballot allocated to Odum was reallocated 

to Smith. The results of the recount were certified on June 26, 2020, 

showing the same nine-vote margin of victory for Odum with a total 

of 2,741 votes – 1,375 cast for Odum and 1,366 cast for Smith. Smith 

filed a “Petition to Contest Election Result and Request for New 

Election” against the Board and Odum on July 1, 2020, which he 

amended on August 28, 2020. 

Smith claimed that 30 votes were improperly or irregularly 

 2 See, e.g., Smith v. Northside Hospital, Inc., 302 Ga. 517, 520 (807 SE2d 

909) (2017) (“In reviewing a bench trial, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court’s rulings, defer to the trial court’s credibility 

judgments, and will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they 

are clearly erroneous.” (citation omitted)).
3

cast and categorized these votes at trial into five different “Buckets.” 

According to Smith, eight “Blanks” failed to properly complete their 

absentee ballot applications or absentee ballots. Five “Outsiders” 

who lived outside of Long County improperly cast a vote in the 

Election, and two “Movers” allegedly voted in the Election despite 

having moved out of Long County more than 30 days before the 

Election. Seven “Doubles” allegedly cast two ballots in the Election. 

In the final Bucket, Smith challenged eight “Unverifieds,” whose inperson early voting applications do not indicate that their 

identification was checked by the poll workers.3 Odum and the 

Board acknowledge that seven votes were improperly cast: six 

individuals who voted twice and another individual who had never 

resided in Long County. At trial, the following evidence was 

presented. 

(a) Blanks. Mele Savea, who Smith contends failed to sign the 

 3 Because the parties and the trial court adopted Smith’s nomenclature, 

we use these terms in this opinion only for the sake of clarity and specifically 

note that we do not endorse this terminology. 
4

oath of elector (“Oath”) on her absentee ballot, testified that she 

voted for the first time in 2020 and that she accidentally did not sign 

on the line provided for her signature on the Oath.4 She also testified 

that she did not receive anything from the Board telling her that she 

needed to correct anything on her ballot and that the absentee ballot 

she submitted accurately reflected the vote she wanted to cast. 

Lonnie Fowler testified that he cannot read or write and that 

he asked his wife, who helps him with all his “legal matter[s],” to fill 

in his choices and sign the Oath for him on his absentee ballot. 

Smith alleged that Sajah Jones, who was unavailable to testify 

at trial due to her active military duties, failed to sign her absentee 

ballot application and that her signature for the Oath did not match 

her voter registration signature. Sajah’s mother, Fredericka Jones, 

testified that Sajah was excited to vote for the first time and that 

she saw Sajah sign the Oath, but Fredericka agreed that Sajah’s 

signature on her voter registration card looked different from the 

 4 Savea’s Oath was submitted as an exhibit at trial and shows that Savea 

wrote her name on a line directly under the line provided for the signature. 
5

signature on her Oath. Fredericka received correspondence from the 

Board regarding verification of Sajah’s signature,5 but forgot about 

it because she was preparing her daughter for basic training. 

Wesley Worthy testified that he is active-duty military and a 

permanent resident of Long County. Although his step-mother, 

Thelma Worthy, assisted him in the application process for an 

absentee ballot, he personally signed the Oath on the absentee

ballot. He confirmed that the signatures on his voter registration 

card and the Oath were his. He agreed that the signatures may 

appear “a little different” because he signed his voter registration 

card on an electronic pad. Thelma testified that she did not know 

she was not permitted to request an absentee ballot for her step-son, 

whom she had raised since he was an infant. She denied filling out 

the actual ballot or signing the Oath for him. 

Roy Odum (no relation to Teresa Odum) testified that his wife 

Bethany Odum filled out his absentee ballot application to help him 

while he was working out of town. He testified that he personally 

 5 This correspondence is not included in the record. 
6

signed the Oath on the ballot and that it looked like his handwriting 

and not his wife’s. He also confirmed that the handwriting on both 

the Oath and his voter registration card was his. Although he agreed 

the signatures looked different, he explained that sometimes his 

signature looks different depending on when and how he signed it. 

Bethany testified that she and her husband discussed the 

candidates he wanted to vote for, that she filled in the bubbles on 

the ballot, and that they then confirmed that his choices were 

reflected on his absentee ballot before Roy personally signed the 

Oath. 

Elizabeth Elarbee, who was 84 years old at the time, did not 

sign her absentee ballot application. However, she testified that she 

completed the application herself and must have accidentally failed 

to sign the application. She confirmed that she signed the Oath on 

the absentee ballot she submitted. 

Mary Poppell testified that her daughter-in-law helped request 

her absentee ballot because Poppell was caring for her dying 

husband at the time. She later filled out the absentee ballot she 
7

received without assistance and signed the Oath herself. She 

testified that the ballot accurately reflected her vote. 

Eva Ashley testified that she filled out the information in the 

absentee ballot application herself but must have forgotten to sign 

it. She later completed the absentee ballot at home and signed the 

Oath. 

Trynina Harris, the Board’s Supervisor, testified that the 

Board sent affidavits to those voters who did not sign their absentee 

ballot applications or whose signatures did not appear to match 

their voter registration card, but did not specifically testify whether 

affidavits had been sent to the Blanks. She also did not have 

personal knowledge of which voters returned their affidavits. She 

explained that if a voter printed his or her name instead of signing, 

the Board tried to compare the writing to that on the voter’s 

registration card. Harris also testified that citizens who requested

an absentee ballot for someone they were assisting were sometimes 

confused by the application and signed the application as the 

requester rather than the assister. 
8

(b) Outsiders. Smith called Mark Davis as an expert witness in 

digital mapping and geocoding and voter data analytics. Relying on 

United States Census data, Davis testified that David and Cheryl 

Keetch, Stanley and Diana Edwards, and Shaana Ito actually live 

in Liberty County and that the Long County property tax records 

were incorrect. He admitted that geocoding is “not a perfect science” 

and that surveys conducted with modern survey equipment are 

“extremely accurate,” but testified that the United States Census 

Bureau should have the most updated county lines. 

Each of the Outsiders testified at trial that, although they have 

a Hinesville6 address for mailing purposes, they believed their 

property to be located in Long County, they paid property taxes in 

Long County, they had held themselves out to be Long County 

residents for years preceding the election, and they were registered 

voters in Long County when they voted in the Election. Scott Wall, 

the mapping and GIS supervisor for the Long County Board of 

Assessors, testified that in 2011, the Southeast Georgia Surveying 

 6 Hinesville is the county seat of neighboring Liberty County. 
9

Company was commissioned to conduct a survey based on the legal 

description contained in the 1920 amendment to the Georgia 

Constitution that created the Long County boundaries. The 

resulting survey was accurate to within one foot. Through Wall, the 

Board introduced certified copies of the commissioned survey map 

and the Long County tax map, both of which showed that the 

Outsiders’ homes were located inside Long County. Wall explained 

that, although one property was located in both Long County and 

Liberty County, the county commissioners agreed that the property 

would be taxed in Long County because the driveway to the property 

was in Long County.

(c) Movers. The Board and Odum concede that one Mover was 

never a resident of Long County and should not have voted in the 

Election. The remaining Mover, Grant DeLoach, is Smith’s first 

cousin. At trial, DeLoach claimed that he moved to Chatham County 

in 2017, that he had filed for a homestead exemption in Chatham 

County, and that his driver’s license listed a Chatham County 
10

address.7 On cross-examination, however, DeLoach admitted that he 

was aware that someone had challenged his eligibility to vote in the 

Election, where both his mother and father were also on the ballot, 

and that he assumed that the Board determined that he was eligible 

to vote in Long County because he received the absentee ballot he 

had requested. He did not register to vote in Chatham County until 

several months after the Election. 

Mildred Hopkins, the Board’s Deputy Registrar, testified that 

DeLoach’s eligibility to vote in the Election had been challenged 

after DeLoach requested an absentee ballot, but the Board deemed 

him eligible and allowed him to vote. She did not, however, have 

personal knowledge of the substance of that determination. 

(d) Doubles. Each of the seven Doubles testified at trial. The 

Board concedes that six of those voters cast an in-person ballot in 

the Election without their absentee ballots being properly 

 7 Smith did not introduce any documentary evidence in support of these 

claims. 
11

cancelled.8 As to the final voter, Charles Sayre testified that he had 

requested an absentee ballot but never received it, so he voted in 

person on the day of the Election, which was the only time he voted 

in the Election. Harris explained that Sayre had requested a mailin absentee ballot, but when she received his application, she was in 

the middle of processing both absentee applications and in-person 

early voters and accidentally entered him in the system as an inperson early voter. She was certain that Sayre had only voted once 

– on the day of the Election. She recalled a poll worker contacting

her on the day of the Election to confirm whether Sayre had voted, 

and she was able to determine that she had made an error and told 

the poll worker to allow Sayre to vote in person. 

(e) Unverifieds. Smith claimed that the applications of eight 

voters for an in-person absentee ballot9 failed to show that 

government-issued proof of identification was checked at the time 

 8 The Board presented testimony that many voters were confused when 

the Election was postponed from May to June 2020 during the COVID-19 

pandemic. 

9 Early in-person voting is a type of absentee voting. See OCGA § 21-2-

385 (c).
12

the voters cast their ballots. Every voter identified by Smith testified 

that they remembered providing an appropriate election official 

with identification when they cast their vote. Hopkins testified that 

every in-person voter’s identification is checked twice before they are 

allowed to vote; that she was confident that an individual would not 

have been allowed to vote without appropriate identification; and 

that it would have been a “clerical error” if an in-person ballot 

application did not indicate that identification had been checked. 

Both Hopkins and Harris testified that the section of the ballot 

application regarding the type of identification presented to the poll 

worker is for the Board’s internal office use. 

(f) The trial court’s order. In its detailed order denying the 

petition, the trial court found that six absentee ballots were issued 

from flawed applications or the voters had submitted flawed 

absentee ballots, including one ballot without an executed Oath and 

one ballot with a signature that did not match the voter registration 

card. However, the trial court noted that, of these technical flaws, 

only one was brought to the voter’s attention and there was no 
13

evidence that the ballots were the result of undue influence or 

otherwise did not reflect the will of the voters. With the exception of 

a single Mover, the trial court found no evidence that any voter or 

election official knowingly acted with possible fraudulent or 

malicious intent. The trial court, however, specifically questioned

the credibility of DeLoach and concluded that Smith’s assertion that 

DeLoach’s vote was evidence of an irregularity was “quite 

disingenuous.” The trial court also found the testimony of the 

Unverifieds credible and that the evidence demonstrated that they

produced compliant identification. Finally, the trial court found that 

the Board produced sufficient evidence of a certified survey to 

demonstrate that the Outsiders are residents of Long County. 

1. Smith first alleges that the trial court applied an incorrect 

standard in denying his petition for a new election. We begin by 

emphasizing that

[e]lections are critical to our democratic republic. We give 

great credence to the choices citizens make when they 

engage in the democratic process by voting to select their 

representatives [a]nd . . . afford great weight to election 

results. Indeed, the setting aside of an election in which 
14

the people have chosen their representative is a drastic 

remedy that should not be undertaken lightly, but instead 

should be reserved for cases in which a person challenging 

an election has clearly established a violation of election 

procedures and has demonstrated that the violation has 

placed the result of the election in doubt. 

Martin v. Fulton County Bd. of Registration & Elections, 307 Ga. 

193, 193-94 (835 SE2d 245) (2019) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). To that end, “[i]t is presumed that election returns are 

valid, and the party contesting the election has the burden of 

showing an irregularity or illegality sufficient to change or place in 

doubt the result of the election.” Meade v. Williamson, 293 Ga. 142, 

143 (745 SE2d 279) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). The 

challenger need not establish for whom the disputed electors cast 

their ballots, only that the illegal or irregular ballots were sufficient 

in number to cast doubt on the results of the election. See Taggart 

v. Phillips, 242 Ga. 454, 455 (249 SE2d 245) (1978). See also 

McIntosh County Bd. of Elections v. Deverger, 282 Ga. 566, 566 (2) 

(651 SE2d 671) (2007) (A challenger “need not establish how the 

rejected voters would have voted; he need only establish that 
15

sufficient legal votes were rejected to change or place in doubt the 

result.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 

Elections in Georgia can be set aside under two different, but 

related circumstances. In the majority of cases, involving the first 

paradigm, we have focused on the margin of victory as the threshold 

of materiality required to place the election’s results in doubt. See 

Meade, 293 Ga. at 148 (1) (even if all 14 disputed votes were 

invalidated, the results of the election would not be changed where 

the margin of victory was 39 votes); Deverger, 282 Ga. at 568 (3) 

(given four-vote margin of victory, wrongful rejection of four votes 

was sufficient to place results in doubt); Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga. 

268, 271 (601 SE2d 99) (2004) (“[T]he focus in an election contest 

involving illegal ballots is on whether they exceeded the margin of 

victory.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). “The second paradigm 

involves cases where a party alleges systemic irregularities in the 

election process that may not be measurable in the same discrete 

manner that is used in cases falling within the first paradigm.” 

Martin, 307 Ga. at 223 (3) (a). “Under this second set of 
16

circumstances – which we have identified in far fewer cases – we 

have recognized that the result of an election may be voided where 

systemic irregularities in the process of the election are sufficiently 

egregious to cast doubt on the result.” Id. (citation and punctuation 

omitted).10 Under either paradigm, we will not disturb a trial court’s 

findings in an election contest unless clearly erroneous. See Meade, 

293 Ga. at 143; Banker v. Cole, 278 Ga. 532, 533 (1) (604 SE2d 165) 

(2004). 

Smith, expressly focusing on the first paradigm,11 asserts that 

the trial court applied the wrong standard by requiring that each 

Bucket contain sufficient irregularities, as opposed to requiring the 

cumulative total of irregularities to be greater than the margin of 

 10 As we noted in Martin, however, the margin of victory remains 

relevant “in evaluating whether a contestant has cast doubt on an election, 

even when a party alleges systemic irregularities,” and under both paradigms, 

“the margin of victory serves as a kind of materiality threshold for evaluating 

whether a party has placed in doubt the result of an election.” 307 Ga. at 227

n.32 (3) (d) (citation and punctuation omitted). No party challenges the trial 

court’s determination that the nine-vote margin of error is the materiality 

threshold in this case. Accordingly, we need not address our continued doubts 

regarding the mathematical formula set out in Fuller v. Thomas, 284 Ga. 397, 

397-98 (1) (667 SE2d 587) (2008). See Martin, 307 Ga. at 228 n.33. 

11 Because Smith does not provide any argument on the second 

paradigm, we do not address it. 
17

victory. To support this argument, Smith points to language in the 

trial court’s order stating that “[n]one of the ‘buckets’/categories 

offered overcome the margin of victory in this election standing 

alone.” After reviewing the record as a whole and the context of the 

quoted language in the order, we do not agree with Smith’s reading 

of the trial court’s order. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the 

trial court engaged in a lengthy discussion with the parties 

regarding both the factual disputes and the standard to be used in 

reaching its conclusion. In particular, the trial court agreed that 

Smith was required to show that at least nine votes were irregular, 

stating:

Because the way I’m looking at it, . . . is that our threshold 

number is nine. . . . [The Doubles are] six to start off with 

being illegal period. [A Mover,] is number seven. . . . I’ve 

got to determine whether or not there are two others, as 

to whether or not they’re illegal or irregular.

Thus, the trial transcript shows that the trial court correctly 

considered the cumulative effect of the Buckets in determining 

whether Smith had reached the proper threshold. And in its order 

denying Smith’s petition, the trial court quoted extensively from 
18

Martin before concluding that under either paradigm identified in 

that case, the margin of victory was relevant in evaluating whether 

a petitioner has cast doubt on an election and that Smith had shown 

only six Doubles and one Mover cast irregular votes, such that he 

was unable to prove sufficient voting irregularities to cast doubt on 

the results of the Election.12 In other words, the trial court found 

that Smith had cast doubt on a total of only seven votes in an election 

where the margin of victory was nine votes. Accordingly, this 

enumeration of error fails. 

2. Smith next asserts that the trial court erred by finding that

the ballots cast by the Blanks were properly counted in the Election.

We disagree.

Former OCGA § 21-2-381 (b) (1)13 requires that when election 

officials receive a timely absentee ballot application, they 

shall determine . . . if the applicant is eligible to vote in 

 12 Within this enumeration of error, Smith also argues in passing that 

the trial court erred in its determinations regarding the Unverifieds and one 

Double. However, for the reasons set forth below in Divisions 3 and 4, this 

argument also fails. See Banker, 278 Ga. at 533 (1) (we will not disturb a trial 

court’s findings in an election contest unless clearly erroneous).

13 OCGA § 21-2-381 was amended as of July 1, 2021. 
19

the primary or election involved. In order to be found 

eligible to vote an absentee ballot by mail, the registrar or 

absentee ballot clerk shall compare the identifying 

information on the application with the information on 

file in the registrar’s office and, if the application is signed 

by the elector, compare the signature or mark of the 

elector on the application with the signature or mark of 

the elector on the elector’s voter registration card. 

According to Smith, the requirement to properly complete an 

absentee ballot application pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-381 (b) (1) is 

not a ministerial task and the Blanks’ failure to do so rendered their

subsequently cast ballots invalid.14 We have explained, however, 

that “not every irregularity will invalidate an elector’s vote.” Jones 

v. Jessup, 279 Ga. 531, 532 (615 SE2d 529) (2005). And, “[w]here the 

election is held in substantial compliance with the law, it should not 

be rendered void merely because of isolated failures to conform 

strictly with the law unless it appears that such failures changed 

the results of the election.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

 14 Smith’s reliance on Brodie v. Champion, 281 Ga. 105, 106-07 (636 

SE2d 511) (2006), is misplaced. In that case, we explained that where the 

voters had cast their ballot for a write-in candidate who was not 

constitutionally qualified to hold office, their votes were considered a nullity, a 

situation that is not presented here. 
20

OCGA § 21-2-381 (b) (3) provides that if an elector is found 

ineligible, the board of registrars

shall deny the application by writing the reason for 

rejection in the proper space on the application and shall 

promptly notify the applicant in writing of the ground of 

ineligibility . . . . However, an absentee ballot application 

shall not be rejected due to an apparent mismatch 

between the signature of the elector on the application 

and the signature of the elector in file with the board of 

registrars. In such cases, the board of registrars or 

absentee ballot clerk shall send the elector a provisional

absentee ballot with the designation “Provisional Ballot”

on the outer oath envelope and information prepared by 

the Secretary of State as to the process to be followed to 

cure the signature discrepancy. If such ballot is returned 

to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk prior to 

the closing of the polls on the day of the primary or 

election, the elector may cure the signature discrepancy 

by submitting an affidavit to the board of registrars or 

absentee ballot clerk along with a copy of one of the forms 

of identification enumerated in subsection (c) of Code 

Section 21-2-417 before the close of the period for 

verifying provisional ballots contained in subsection (c) 

of Code Section 21-2-419. 

This subsection makes clear that the remedy for receipt of an 

ineligible absentee ballot application is to notify the elector and 

provide an opportunity to cure any discrepancy, not to automatically 

reject any subsequent ballot that may be issued. See Ga. Comp. R. 
21

& Regs., r. 183-1-14-11 (“During early voting, . . . the board of 

registrars . . . shall mail or issue official absentee ballots or 

provisional absentee ballots, if appropriate, to . . . applicants 

immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board . . . shall 

make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots; 

provisional absentee ballots, if appropriate, or notices of rejection of 

absentee ballot applications . . . within 3 business days after 

receiving the absentee ballot applications.”). “[I]ndeed, in the

absence of notice to the challenged voter it may be unconstitutional, 

as well as a violation of state law[],” to disenfranchise the voter.

Malone v. Tison, 248 Ga. 209, 213 (3) (282 SE2d 84) (1981) (even 

where a statutory requirement is mandatory, the appropriate 

mechanism for enforcement may be by mandamus or injunction 

against the registrars in the future rather than disenfranchisement 

of current voters). 

Here, based on the testimony and other evidence presented at 

trial, the trial court was authorized to find that, although the 

evidence was conflicting as to whether the Board failed to provide 
22

notification and an opportunity to cure application irregularities in 

all but one instance, each of the Blanks was otherwise eligible to 

vote in the Election and their absentee ballots accurately reflected 

their choices. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to 

reject the Blanks’ ballots. See Meade, 293 Ga. at 147 (1) (“Just as we 

have previously held that a voting officer’s blunder in failing strictly 

to comply with the law should not serve to disenfranchise the voter, 

likewise the blunder of the person assisting an absentee voter by 

failing to specify the reason the voter needed assistance should not, 

without more, require the invalidation of these isolated ballots.”);

Jones, 279 Ga. at 532 (failure to comply strictly with provisions of 

former OCGA § 21-2-381 did not warrant rejection of electors’ votes); 

Johnson v. Rheney, 245 Ga. 316, 319-20 (6) (264 SE2d 872) (1980) 

(concluding that 12 absentee ballots that were issued to electors who 

did not apply for them but were properly executed and returned 

nonetheless expressed the will of the voter and were not sufficient 

to overturn the election); Hastings v. Wilson, 181 Ga. 305, 307, 308-

09 (182 SE 375) (1935) (failure to observe directory provisions of 
23

election statutes will not, in the absence of fraud, nullify an election 

that shows a fair and honest expression of the elector’s will). 

3. Smith next argues that the trial court erred by finding that 

DeLoach was eligible to vote in the Election because DeLoach 

testified that he considered himself a resident of Chatham County.

Again, we disagree. 

Among other qualifications, a voter must be a resident of the 

county or municipality in which he or she seeks to vote. See OCGA 

§ 21-2-216 (a) (4). An individual’s residence is “that place in which 

such person’s habitation is fixed, without any present intention of 

removing therefrom.” OCGA § 21-2-217 (a) (1). And a person does 

not lose residence by leaving his or her home and going into another 

state or county “for temporary purposes only, with the intention of 

returning, unless such person shall register to vote or perform other 

acts indicating a desire to change such person’s citizenship and 

residence.” OCGA § 21-2-217 (a) (2). “Findings of fact regarding 

voters’ residency shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 

due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
24

judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Holton v. Hollingsworth, 270 

Ga. 591, 594 (5) (514 SE2d 6) (1999) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). 

Here, the evidence showed that DeLoach was aware that 

someone had challenged his eligibility to vote in the Election15 and 

that he nonetheless received an absentee ballot for the Long County 

Election that he had personally requested. In addition, Odum 

elicited on cross-examination that DeLoach was raised in Long 

County, where he had always previously voted, that he had only 

registered to vote in Chatham County two weeks prior to trial, well 

after the Election, and that he was related to Smith. Records further 

showed that the absentee ballot completed by DeLoach in connection 

with the Election identified his permanent residence in Long 

County. The trial court was free to disregard DeLoach’s testimony 

to the contrary, including that he “considered [his] permanent 

residence to be in Chatham County,” particularly where no 

 15 See OCGA § 21-2-230 (permitting an elector to challenge a person’s 

right to vote in a particular election). 
25

corroborating documentation was provided. See Mathenia v. 

Brumbelow, 308 Ga. 714, 716 (1) (843 SE2d 582) (2020) (trier of fact 

is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is 

uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the 

testimony). Thus, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding in this 

respect was clearly erroneous. See Parham v. Stewart, 308 Ga. 170, 

174 (2) (a) and (b) (839 SE2d 605) (2020) (affirming trial court’s 

rejection of election challenge where trial court did not clearly err in 

its credibility determinations). 

4. In his final enumeration of error, Smith maintains that the 

trial court erred by finding that the Outsiders were eligible to vote. 

Although the evidence was conflicting, because the Board 

introduced a certified survey showing that the Outsiders were 

located within Long County and paid property taxes to Long County, 

we cannot say that the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous. 

See Bell v. Cronic, 248 Ga. 457, 461 (2) (283 SE2d 476) (1981) (trial 

court’s finding regarding voters’ residency was authorized based on 

property survey evidence). 
26

5. In conclusion, the evidence presented at trial supports the 

trial court’s determination that, of the challenged electors, only the 

ballots of six Doubles and one Mover should be rejected. Those seven 

ballots are not sufficient to place the results of the Election in doubt 

given the nine-vote margin of victory in this case. Accordingly, we 

discern no error in the trial court’s denial of Smith’s petition to 

contest the Election. See Meade, 293 Ga. at 148 (1).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Boggs, P.J., 

and Peterson, J., not participating.