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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41594

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANGELA MARIE BOEHM,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2015 Opinion No. 10

Filed: February 25, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. John R. Stegner, District Judge; Hon. Scott Wayman, 

Magistrate.

Order of the district court affirming magistrate’s orders denying motion to sever,

motion to withdraw guilty plea, and motion in limine, affirmed. 

John Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender; Jay W. Logsdon, Deputy Public 

Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

KIDWELL, Judge Pro Tem

Angela Marie Boehm was involved in a two-vehicle accident that resulted in her being 

cited for driving under the influence and driving without privileges. She later entered a 

conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence and driving without privileges, reserving 

the right to appeal the denial of certain pretrial motions in the magistrate division. Boehm then 

moved the magistrate to withdraw her guilty plea, which the magistrate denied, and Boehm 

appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed. Boehm now appeals from the district 

court’s order affirming the magistrate’s decisions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
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I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

A Coeur d’Alene Police Department officer was on patrol one night in January 2013 

when he came upon a two-vehicle accident involving Boehm and another motorist. The officer 

observed that Boehm, who was standing outside her car, was on her cell phone and was slurring 

her words and swaying back and forth while speaking on the phone. When the officer attempted 

to speak with Boehm, she turned away from him. In addition, the officer smelled the odor of 

alcohol emanating from Boehm. After the officer directed Boehm to end her phone call, Boehm 

informed the officer that she had slid through a stop sign and that her car was struck by the other 

motorist. In response to a question from the officer, Boehm also informed the officer that she 

had one drink approximately three hours before the crash. 

The officer had Boehm perform field sobriety tests, which she failed, and the officer took 

Boehm into custody. Boehm was then transported to the Kootenai County Public Safety 

Building for the purpose of conducting breath alcohol tests. There the officer observed Boehm 

for the required observation period, provided her with the administrative license suspension 

form, and read a second form to her. After informing the officer that she understood her rights 

and initialing a document, Boehm provided two breath test samples. The results of the breath 

tests were alcohol concentrations of 0.192 and 0.183. Subsequently, the officer also learned that 

Boehm’s driver license was suspended in Washington. Boehm was then issued misdemeanor 

citations for driving under the influence and driving without privileges. 

During the pretrial phase in the magistrate division, Boehm filed a motion to sever, a 

motion in limine to exclude evidence of the breath test results, and a motion to compel the city 

prosecutor to turn over certain documents. The magistrate denied the motion to sever and 

motion to compel, and “denied” the motion in limine, explaining that it would defer ruling on 

that motion until trial. Boehm then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to 

appeal the magistrate’s decisions on the three motions. Prior to sentencing, the United States 

Supreme Court released Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), and Boehm 

filed a motion to withdraw her conditional guilty plea, asserting that McNeely had impacted 

Idaho’s implied consent statute. The magistrate denied Boehm’s motion to withdraw her guilty 

plea.
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Boehm appealed to the district court, challenging the magistrate’s denial of the three 

motions prior to the guilty plea and the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 

Following a hearing, the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decisions. Boehm appeals from 

the district court’s order affirming the magistrate’s decisions.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity, our 

standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 

reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence 

to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law 

follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). If 

those findings are so supported and the conclusions following therefrom, and if the district court 

affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of 

procedure. Id. Thus, we do not review the decision of the magistrate. State v. Trusdall, 155 

Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm 

or dismiss the decisions of the district court. Id.

III.

ANALYSIS

Boehm contends that the district court erred by affirming the decisions of the magistrate. 

Specifically, Boehm argues (1) that joinder would have resulted in unfair prejudice at trial, and 

thus the magistrate should have granted the motion to sever; (2) that the prosecutor violated 

Boehm’s right to due process and right to effective assistance of counsel by not seeking out 

evidence and by refusing to provide copies of certain documents to Boehm; (3) that the 

magistrate should have granted the motion in limine, because it involved a question of law; and 

(4) that McNeely changed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, specifically impacting Idaho’s 

implied consent statute, and provided a just reason for withdrawing Boehm’s plea. We address 

these issues in turn.

A. Motion to Sever

In the magistrate division, Boehm filed a motion to sever the driving under the influence 

charge from the driving without privileges charge. See Idaho Criminal Rule 14. In that motion, 

Boehm contended that there was a risk that the jury, if it found that Boehm had driven a vehicle 
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without privileges, would find that she “would also be the type of person who would drive while 

intoxicated.” See State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 868, 664 P.2d 772, 775 (1983) (“The risk is that 

the jury may conclude that the defendant while not guilty of the specific charged offense is a bad 

person and will reach a guilty verdict on that basis.”). At the hearing, the magistrate denied the 

motion to sever, explaining that the joinder of the offenses would not prejudice the ability of the 

defense to defend either charge. In addition, the magistrate commented that the jury would be 

instructed to consider each count separately. The district court affirmed without explanation.

On appeal, Boehm reiterates her argument that there is a risk that the jury will believe 

that one crime is proof of the other, based upon the type of person Boehm is.1

 The State argues 

that Boehm has not demonstrated prejudice from the joinder. 

1. Standard of review

Although Boehm initially asserted that the magistrate and district court applied the 

incorrect standards of review, Boehm conceded in her reply brief that a motion to sever is 

committed to the trial court’s discretion. State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 227, 307 P.3d 1247, 

1253 (Ct. App. 2013). Thus, we review the denial of a motion to sever for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 

court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries 

of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 

before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. 

Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 537, 817 P.2d 646, 651 (1991); State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 

768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). The inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant presented facts 

demonstrating that unfair prejudice would have resulted from a joint trial. See Tankovich, 155 

Idaho at 227, 307 P.3d at 1253.

2. Unfair prejudice

In considering whether there is a risk that the jury may find the defendant is “a bad 

person and . . . reach a guilty verdict on that basis,” the Idaho Supreme Court has examined 

whether the evidence of each of the counts, if the counts had been tried separately, would have 

been admitted at the different trials. Abel, 104 Idaho at 868, 664 P.2d at 775 (applying the 

 1 Boehm does not argue that the initial joinder was improper, as a matter of law, under 

Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a). 
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analysis used by federal circuits). However, even if the separate evidence would not be 

admissible in the different trials, federal and state courts have not found an abuse of discretion in 

denying a motion to sever where the jury can “‘compartmentalize the evidence’ so that evidence 

of one crime does not taint the jury’s consideration of another crime.” United States v. Johnson, 

820 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1479 

(9th Cir. 1986)); accord United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 581 (9th Cir. 2007); State v. 

Bythrow, 790 P.2d 154, 158 (Wash. 1990); see also State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908-09, 55 

P.3d 896, 901-02 (Ct. App. 2002) (considering the criminal disposition risk of prejudice and 

concluding that there was little risk that the jury would confuse and cumulate the evidence 

because the evidence was separate and distinct).

In this case, we presume that Boehm’s breath test results would not have been admissible 

in the driving without privileges trial, if conducted separately. Nevertheless, we are persuaded 

that the jury would have been able to compartmentalize the evidence supporting the driving 

without privileges charge (namely evidence proving that Boehm had knowledge that her driver’s 

license was suspended in Washington), from the evidence supporting the driving under the 

influence charge (the breath tests results). This is due to the relative simplicity, but also distinct 

nature, of the issues. Moreover, the magistrate indicated that it would provide the jury with an 

instruction to consider the counts separately, and we presume that a jury follows jury 

instructions. Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 909, 55 P.3d 896, 902 (considering Eguilior’s argument that 

the jury would have used his bad character against him and finding no abuse of discretion, 

relying in part on the fact that the district court instructed the jury to consider the counts 

separately). Because of the relative simplicity of the issues and because we are persuaded that 

the jury would have been able to compartmentalize the issues, in conjunction with the jury 

instruction, we conclude that the district court did not err by affirming the magistrate’s denial of 

Boehm’s motion to sever. See Johnson, 820 F.2d at 1071 (“[I]n light of the relative simplicity of 

the issues and the straightforward manner of presentation, we conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever the offenses.”). 

B. The Prosecutor’s Response to the Motion to Compel

While in discovery, Boehm served a written request upon the prosecutor for certain 

items, as permitted under Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b). Boehm later filed a motion to compel, 
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alleging that seven items had not been turned over to her.2

 The prosecutor filed a response 

addressing each of the items listed by Boehm. Relevant to this appeal, the prosecutor explained 

what he had provided and explained that he had informed Boehm’s attorney that additional 

information could be obtained by making an appointment with the prosecutor. The prosecutor 

also explained that he had referred Boehm to the Kootenai County Sheriff for certain items 

requested by Boehm (presumably, because the breath testing apparatus maintained at the 

Kootenai County Public Safety Building is owned and maintained by the Kootenai County 

Sheriff).3 

At the hearing on the motion to compel, Boehm’s attorney contended that the prosecutor 

had an ethical and constitutionally imposed duty to turn over the documents and argued that the 

prosecutor’s response led to Boehm not receiving effective assistance of counsel. The magistrate 

denied the motion to compel, finding that the prosecutor had complied with I.C.R. 16 and 

reasoning that several of the requested items were not within the prosecutor’s possession or 

control. Boehm appealed to the district court, arguing that the magistrate erred by not finding 

that the prosecutor had violated Boehm’s constitutional rights by refusing to seek out and turn 

over the items requested. The district court affirmed without explanation.

 2 The seven items were (1) a copy of any record relating to the breath testing experience of 

the officer who performed the breath tests on Boehm; (2) a copy of the manual governing the 

administration of breath tests utilized by the Kootenai County Public Safety Building; (3) the 

dates and nature of repairs or maintenance on the breath testing machine used to test Boehm’s 

breath from the date of testing Boehm’s breath to the date of trial; (4) the dates and nature of 

maintenance on the breath testing machine used to test Boehm’s breath in the three months prior 

to the testing on Boehm; (5) the number of times that the breath testing machine used to test 

Boehm’s breath had been tested to determine its ability to detect “interferants”; (6) a copy of any 

repair or maintenance log kept with regard to the machine that was used to test Boehm’s breath; 

and (7) the curriculum vitae and intended testimony of expert witnesses the prosecutor planned 

to call at trial. 

3 For item (1), the prosecutor explained that he had provided this information to the public 

defender’s office prior to Boehm’s arrest and that the public defender could make an 

appointment to inspect the various certificates and training experience of the officer. For item 

(2), the prosecutor noted that he referred Boehm to a manual on the Idaho State Police website. 

For items (3), (5), and (6), the prosecutor explained additional information could be obtained 

from the Kootenai County Sheriff. For item (4), the prosecutor recalled that he had provided a 

log. Additionally, for item (3), the prosecutor explained that he would supplement his discovery 

with a log sheet. Finally, for the seventh item, the prosecutor explained that the curriculum vitae 

of any experts were available for inspection. 
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On appeal, Boehm reiterates that the magistrate erred by not finding that the prosecutor 

had violated Boehm’s right to due process by not seeking out evidence and by refusing to 

provide copies of the items requested to Boehm. Boehm also argues that the prosecutor violated 

her right to effective assistance of counsel by not providing copies of the documents requested. 

The State argues that the prosecutor complied with I.C.R. 16, and thus provided the requisite due 

process.

1. Standard of review

Boehm raises questions of law, over which we exercise free review. State v. O’Neill, 118 

Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990).

2. Due process

The prosecutor does not have a general duty to collect evidence. State v. Bryant, 127 

Idaho 24, 28, 896 P.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1995). Nor is there a “constitutional requirement that 

the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police 

investigatory work on a case.” Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); accord United States 

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (“[T]he prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to 

defense counsel.”). Due process, though, requires that the prosecutor disclose to the defendant 

all material exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor or in his possession.4

 State v. Lewis, 

144 Idaho 64, 66-67, 156 P.3d 565, 567-68 (2007); see also State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 

433, 885 P.2d 1144, 1149 (Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that the duty under Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963) is an obligation of not just the individual prosecutor assigned to the case, but 

of all the government agents having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the 

offense). The duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence is also found in I.C.R. 16(a). 

Gardner, 126 Idaho at 432, 885 P.2d at 1148 (noting that I.C.R. 16(a) is in tandem with this 

constitutional obligation stemming from the Due Process Clause). Idaho Criminal Rule 16 also 

provides that the defendant may request that the prosecution disclose other items. See 

I.C.R. 16(b). Relevant to this appeal, the prosecutor may satisfy the requirements of I.C.R. 16(b)

with respect to documents, papers, tangible objects, and reports of examinations and tests by 

 4 Exculpatory evidence includes impeachment evidence, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 

150, 154 (1972), but “the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material 

impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant,” United 

States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
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“permit[ting] the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph” the items. I.C.R. 16(b)(4) & 

16(b)(5). 

In this case, Boehm has not alleged that the prosecutor withheld material exculpatory 

evidence known to the prosecutor, which would violate due process, nor has she alleged that the 

prosecutor failed to comply with I.C.R. 16. Rather, Boehm argues that the prosecutor’s response 

that referred her to set up an appointment with the prosecutor or referred her to other offices 

denied her due process. Yet, due process does not require that the prosecutor turn all evidence 

over to the defendant, but only requires the disclosure of evidence that is known to the 

prosecutor and that is material and exculpatory. It is a court rule, I.C.R. 16(b), which permits the 

defendant to request access to documents that are not covered by due process, and thus it is a 

court rule that provides the broader protections and procedure that Boehm complains about. 

Again, because Boehm does not contend that the prosecutor failed to disclose known material 

and exculpatory evidence, and because the prosecutor does not have a general duty to collect 

evidence, Boehm has not asserted a due process violation. Accordingly, neither the district court 

nor magistrate erred by not finding a due process violation or a violation of Rule 16(b).

3. Effective assistance of counsel

Boehm also includes a statement in her brief that “it is a violation of the defendant’s right 

to effective assistance of counsel . . . for the state to refuse to provide copies of the documents 

requested in this case.” Boehm has not presented a cogent argument, backed by authority and 

citations to the record, in support of this contention, and we will not consider this issue on 

appeal. See State v. Li, 131 Idaho 126, 129, 952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998) (“Claims not 

supported by cogent argument or citations of authority will not be reviewed on appeal . . . and Li 

has waived these issues since either authority, argument or both are lacking on each issue.”). 

C. Motion in Limine

Boehm filed a motion in limine, contending that evidence of the breath test results must 

be excluded. Boehm asserted that I.C. § 18-8004(4) mandates that alcohol concentration testing 

be done in accordance with methods approved by the Idaho State Police and that the Idaho State 

Police’s Standard Operating Procedures for breath alcohol testing were not promulgated as 

required under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Thus, Boehm contended that the Idaho 

State Police had not complied with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4) and had not provided 

proper rules by which the reliability of breath testing could be established.
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At the hearing, the magistrate denied the motion in limine, but explained that it was 

actually deferring its ruling:

What I’m holding is you filed a motion in limine seeking to--a pretrial 

ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence, the breath test results and the 

evaluations here.

And I’m exercising my discretion in declining to rule in advance of trial, 

because I want to see what the trial evidence would be regarding the foundations 

that may be presented on those issues by the State. They may have an expert 

witness come in, or not, I don’t know, who will come in and explain everything to 

a T, or they may not. I haven’t a clue at this point as to what the State may or 

may not present as far as an evidentiary foundation.

And at that point, we’re in a much better position, based on whatever the 

record is in front of the court, to issue a ruling on the admissibility or lack thereof, 

of these breath test results. 

Sometimes these motion in limines I can grant them. This is not one, I 

don’t think, I could grant without having both sides have the ability to present 

their evidence at trial regarding the admissibility and preserve those arguments at 

trial.

The district court determined that the issue relating to the motion in limine was not preserved for 

appeal, reasoning that the magistrate had, in effect, deferred ruling on the motion.

On appeal, Boehm contends that the district court and the magistrate should have 

addressed the issue raised in the motion in limine, but argues that this Court may review and 

decide the issue presented in the motion in limine. The State responds that the magistrate 

properly denied the motion in limine pending the introduction of evidence at trial. The State 

further argues that even if this Court were to address the issue raised in the motion in limine, 

Boehm would not prevail. 

1. Standard of review

We review decisions on a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527, 328 P.3d 504, 507 (2014).

2. Deferral

When considering a motion in limine, a trial court may “decide that it is inappropriate to 

rule in advance on the admissibility of evidence based on a motion in limine” and “may defer 

[its] ruling until the case unfolds and there is a better record upon which to make [its] decision.” 

State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 700, 760 P.2d 27, 39 (1988). Here, the magistrate, although it 

stated that it was denying the motion, explained that it was deferring its ruling until trial because 

it was uncertain what other evidence the State would offer for foundation. See id. at 699-700, 
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760 P.2d at 38-39 (“It is often difficult, and sometimes impossible, for the trial judge to make a 

proper ruling without the benefit of all the other evidence admitted at trial.”). The magistrate had 

the discretion to defer ruling until trial, and thus we cannot say that the district court erred by 

affirming the magistrate’s deferment of a ruling on the motion in limine.5

Boehm, however, argues that the magistrate should have addressed the issue and 

excluded the evidence, citing Johnson v. Emerson, 103 Idaho 350, 647 P.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1982). 

In Johnson, this Court considered an appeal involving a civil tort action. Johnson contended that 

the trial court erred by not granting her motion in limine concerning evidence of a prior accident. 

This Court held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff’s prior accidents were not admissible in a

tort action and remarked that a motion in limine excluding reference to such accidents should be 

granted, unless the defendant shows that the accidents can be connected to the injuries claimed. 

Id. at 354, 647 P.2d at 810. This Court further explained that on remand, “if a similar motion in 

limine is made before a new trial, it should be granted unless the requisite showing is made.” Id. 

Of course, Johnson is factually and procedurally different than Boehm’s appeal, but Johnson 

recognized that certain motions in limine may be decided at the pretrial stage, where a trial judge 

may make an informed ruling on the admissibility of evidence--this was especially the case in 

Johnson where the appellate court had already made a decision as a matter of law, prior to 

remand, to exclude the evidence at issue. Nonetheless, Hester confirmed that magistrates have 

the discretion to defer ruling on a motion in limine until trial so that they may make a ruling 

based upon the evidence offered at trial. For this reason, we cannot say that the magistrate 

abused its discretion in this case. Given this conclusion, we need not address the merits of the 

motion, as the merits were not preserved for appeal.

D. Motion to Withdraw the Conditional Guilty Plea

Prior to sentencing, Boehm moved the magistrate to withdraw her conditional guilty plea. 

In the motion, Boehm explained that “her attorney failed to realize that Idaho’s statutory implied 

consent scheme violated her federal constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches.” In 

support of her contention, Boehm cited to McNeely, which was decided after she entered her 

guilty plea. The magistrate denied the motion, finding that Boehm had not presented a just 

 5 Even though it may have been better practice for the magistrate to state that it was 

deferring its ruling until trial, rather than using the word “denying,” we are persuaded that the 

magistrate’s decision was the equivalent of the deferral permitted in State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 

688, 760 P.2d 27 (1988).
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reason for withdrawing the plea. The magistrate explained that McNeely was factually different 

from Boehm’s case and also commented that Boehm could have argued that the implied consent 

statutes violated her Fourth Amendment rights prior to the entry of the guilty plea. The district 

court affirmed, similarly noting that McNeely and Boehm’s case were factually distinguishable.

On appeal, Boehm argues that McNeely changed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence such 

that the opinion affected the validity of Idaho’s warrantless breath testing scheme, especially 

Idaho’s implied consent statute. The State counters that the issuance of McNeely did not provide 

a just reason for withdrawing the plea. The State further asserts that Idaho’s implied consent 

statute would withstand scrutiny. 

1. Standard of review

The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of 

the trial court. State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966, 969 (2008). On appeal, we 

review the denial of such a motion to determine whether the trial court exercised sound judicial 

discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action. Id.

2. Just reason

In a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, a defendant must demonstrate a 

just reason for withdrawing the plea. I.C.R. 33(c); Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222, 177 P.3d at 969. A 

constitutional defect in the plea is not necessary in order to show a just reason. State v. Stone, 

147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). We have previously explained that a 

just reason is “a plausible reason to justify the withdrawal.” State v. Rose, 122 Idaho 555, 559, 

835 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Ct. App. 1992).

Underlying this issue is Boehm’s contention that a post-plea, but presentence change in 

Supreme Court precedent that impacted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence may provide a just 

reason for withdrawing a plea. The State does not dispute this general proposition, and Boehm’s 

argument has some support. See United States v. Mays, 593 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(“There is some authority for the proposition that a post-guilty plea, pre-sentence change in 

Supreme Court precedent that bears on a defendant’s legal innocence may constitute a fair and 

just reason for permitting the withdrawal of the plea.”) (citing United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 

376 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Presley, 478 F.2d 163, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1973)).

Even so, we are not persuaded that the issuance of McNeely provided a just reason for 

Boehm to withdraw her guilty plea. In McNeely, the question presented was “whether the 
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natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an 

exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all 

drunk-driving cases.” McNeely, ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1556. The United States Supreme 

Court held “that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the 

bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood 

test without a warrant.” Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1568. The United States Supreme Court did not 

directly address implied consent statutes, although referencing the fact that all fifty states had 

adopted such statutes. See id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1566; see also State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 

774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014) (“In [McNeely], the United States Supreme Court did not 

address whether implied consent could be withdrawn, undoubtedly because the Missouri 

Supreme Court did not address the State’s arguments based upon its implied consent law.”). 

Even though subsequent Idaho Supreme Court cases have analyzed implied consent after the 

issuance of McNeely and the grant of the petition for a writ of certiorari in Aviles v. Texas, ___ 

U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 902 (2014), McNeely, by itself, did not analyze implied consent.6

 Because 

McNeely did not directly address the issue that would have been raised by Boehm concerning 

implied consent, had she been permitted to withdraw her guilty plea, we are not persuaded that 

the issuance of McNeely provided a just reason for withdrawing Boehm’s guilty plea. 

 6 Even the impact of the Idaho Supreme Court opinions on Idaho’s implied consent statute 

is uncertain. Indeed, it is unknown whether Idaho’s implied consent statute can ever provide an 

exception to the warrant requirement or whether the law is still valid until the defendant objects 

or refuses consent. In State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014), the Court 

concluded that “the district court properly concluded that Idaho’s implied consent statute was not 

a valid exception to the warrant requirement,” recognizing that “Idaho’s implied consent statute 

operated as a per se exception,” and thus it “does not fall under the consent exception to the 

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” 

However, approximately a month after Wulff, the Court decided State v. Halseth, 157 

Idaho 643, 339 P.3d 368 (2014), another case involving Idaho’s implied consent statute. The 

Court in Halseth, without citing to or even referring to Wulff, held that “an implied consent 

statute such as Washington’s and Idaho’s does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver 

who refuses to consent, as did Aviles, or objects to the blood draw, as did Defendant in this 

case.” Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646, 339 P.3d at 371 (emphasis added). 

Further, adding to the question is a case released about two weeks after Halseth. In State 

v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014), the Court cited to Wulff and Halseth

for the proposition that “a suspect can withdraw his or her statutorily implied consent to a test for 

the presence of alcohol.”
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Accordingly, the district court correctly affirmed the magistrate’s decision to deny the motion to 

withdraw the conditional guilty plea.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly affirmed the magistrate’s decisions denying the motion to 

sever and motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The district court also correctly determined that 

the issue concerning the motion in limine was not properly preserved for appeal because the 

magistrate had appropriately exercised its discretion in deferring ruling on the motion in limine 

until trial. Finally, neither the district court nor magistrate erred by not finding a due process 

violation, as there was no due process violation in the prosecutor’s response to Boehm’s 

discovery request. Accordingly, the district court’s order affirming the decisions of the 

magistrate is affirmed.

Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.