### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 312 -CV

Texas P ropert y and Casu alty Insu rance G uaranty Association f or P e tr os ur anc e Ca sua lt y C om pany , I m pai r e d Ins ur e r , A ppe lla nt

v. Randy B rooks , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-03- 0010 30 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE BY RNE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Ap pe lle e Rand

y B ro ok s wa s injure d in an au tom ob ile a c c ide nt w hil e dr ivi ng ho me fr om h is j ob a s a

dr ill e r o n a

n o il r ig . A ft e r t

he Te xas D e partmen t of I ns ur a nc e Wor

ke rs ’ Compensation Division determined that B roo k s ’s injury was not compe nsable be cause he wa s

no t “in the c ours e a nd sc op e of e mpl oy me nt” a t th e tim e of

his inj ur y , B ro ok s b ro ug ht s uit

a g a ins t

a pp e lla nt T e xas P ro pe rt

y a nd Ca su a lty I ns ur a nc e Gu a ra nty As so c ia tio n (“ TPC I GA ” ) f or wo rk e rs ’ compensa tion benefits in the district court. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 406.031 (W es t 2006). After consideringcross motions for summary judgme nt, the district court fo u nd that Br ooks was in the c ourse a

nd scope of

employ ment at the time of h i s i n j u ry and g rante d summary judgme nt in his favor.

On appe al, TPCI GA conte nds that (1) th e summary judgme nt gr anted in fa

vor of Br ooks i s v o i d and must be set aside due to B rooks’s fa ilure to file a pr oposed judg ment with theBr ooks testified at the contested case hear ing that the distance from Ode ssa to Rig 17 ne ar 1 Ga rd e n Ci ty wa s 5 2 mi le s. 2 Division pursua

nt to section 410.258 of the labor code befor e the trial court enter ed i t s s u m m ary jud g me nt; a nd

(2 ) t he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y g ra nti ng summa

ry jud g ment in favo r o f B ro ok s b e c a us e Br ooks was not in the cour se and sc ope of e mploy ment at the time of his injury as a matter of law or, alter natively , that a mater ial question of fa ct exist s with respec t to that issue. We conclude that the trial court’ s summary judgme nt is not voi d. Howeve r, we find that a genuine issue of material f act e x ists with respect to whethe r B rooks was in the c ourse a nd scope of employ ment at the time of his i njury

. Acc ording ly , we rever se the summary judgme nt and

re mand thi s c a us e to t he tr ia l c ourt
.
F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

Br ooks worked f

or Patterson Dr illing Company as a driller on var ious oil rigs. F rom time to tim e, the location of Br ooks’s job site would chang e depe ndin g o n p ro d u cti on levels of various rig s. At t h e t i m e o f the a ccide nt, Brooks w orked the night shift on “Rig 17” nea r Gar den City

with three othe r Patterson e mploy ees se rving as his cre w. B rook s an d his crew

me mb ers li ved

in O de ssa , a

nd B ro ok s tr a ns po rt e d h is c re w b e tw e e n O de ssa a nd Rig 17 in h is persona l truck. 1

Br ooks and his cre w wer e paid a n hourly wag e for the t ime they spent working at the

r i g s i t e . T h e y w e r e n o t p a i d a n h o u r l y w a g e f o r t h e t i m e s p e n t t r a v e l i n g t o a n d f r o m t h e r i g s i t e . In addition to the hourly

wag e, Patterson pa id Brooks a fix ed daily amount of $50. His cre w member s d i d n o tr e c e i v e t h i s a d d i t i o n a l p a y.3 On Fe bruar

y 21, 2001, Br ooks was injured in a n automobile acc ident while re turning to O d e s s a f

r o m R i g 1 7

. H e w a s t r a n s p o rt i n g h i s c r e w m e m b e r s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c ide nt. Petrosuranc e Casualty

Company , the worke rs’ c ompensation ca rrier for Patterson, denied B rooks’s claim for c ompensation on the basis t hat he was not “in the cour se and sc ope of e mploy ment” at the time of t he accident as require d by the Tex as Workers’ Compensation Act. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 4 06 .0 31 . B ro ok s th e n s ub mit te d th e dis pu te to t he Te xas D e pa

rtme nt o f I

ns urance Wor

ke rs ’ Com pe ns a tio n D ivi sio n. Th e Di vis ion he ld a c on te ste d c a se he a ri ng a nd de te rm ine d th a t B ro ok s d id not have a

compensa

ble claim. An a

ppeals pa nel of the D ivision affirmed. Br ooks sought judicial r eview of the ag ency decision. Whil e the district court ac tion

wa s p e nd ing , Pe tr os ur a nc e wa s d e c lare d a n im pa ir e d in sure r a

nd TPC I GAbe c a me the re a l pa rt y in interest. See Tex. I ns. Code Ann. § 462.004(5) (West 2008) (defining “impaire d insurer” ). TPCI GA and B rooks fil ed cross motions for summary judgme nt. The ce ntral issue pre sented by their motions was whe ther the $50 pe r diem rec eived by Br ooks was compensa tion f or transporting his crew

to and from wor k such that his injury

occur red in the c ourse a

nd scope of

employ ment. The trial c ourt found that “no g enuine issues of materia l f act exis t a s to w hether [Brooks] wa s within the course and

sc op e of his e mpl oy

me nt” a nd

g ra nte d s umm a

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f B ro ok s.

Section 410.258

I n its first issue, TPC I GA conte nds that the summary judgme nt g rante d in favor of Br o o k s is v o id a n d mu s t b e s e t a s id e d u e to B r o o k s ’ s f

a il u r e to f il e a p r o p o s e d ju d g me n t with the Division before the trial cour t ent ere d its summ ary

judgme nt. Section 410.258 of the labor c ode,4

entitled “Notification of Division o f P roposed J udg ments and Settlements; Right to I nterve ne,” pr ov ide s in

re le va nt p a rt : (a) The party

who initiated a proc eedingunder this subcha pter or Subchapter

G must file any proposed judgme nt or settlement made by the par ties to the proce eding , inclu d ing a proposed defa ult judgment, with the division not later than the 30th day befor e the date on which the c ourt is scheduled t o enter the judgme nt or approve the s ettlement. The pr oposed judg ment or se ttl e me nt m

us t be ma ile d to the div isi on by c e rt if ie d ma il, return r ece ipt requested.

. . . . (f) A j udg ment enter ed or se ttlement approve d without comply ing w ith the require ments of this section is void.

Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.258 ( West 2006).

The dispute on this point concer ns the ty pe of judgme nt that must be submit ted to the Di vis ion fo r a pp ro va l un de r s e c tio n 4 10 .2 58 . T PCI GA con tends that th e statut e re qu ir e s th a t a ll judgme nts must be submi tted to the Division to be v al i d

. Br ooks arg ues that the statute doe s not apply to judgments p re p ar ed by the trial cour

t. These c ompeting vie ws arise from diffe rent int e rp re ta tio ns of

wh a t th e ph ra se “ ma de by the pa rt ie s” in s ub se c tio n ( a ) m od if ie s— “ se ttl ement ” or “pr oposed j u d gment or settlement.” See id. § 410.258(a) . TPCI GA ar g ues that “ma de by the parties” modifies only

the term “ settlement.” Unde r this theory , the par ty who initiated the proce eding must file with the Division any settlement “made by

the par ties” and an y

proposed judgme nt whether

“made by the parties” or not. Br ooks arg ues that “ma de by the par ties” modifies both “settlement” a

nd “pr o p o s ed j udg ment.” Unde r his theory , the par ty who initiated the5

proceed i n g m u st file with the Division any proposed judg ment “made by the par ties” and a

ny

se ttl e me nt “ ma de by

the pa rt ie s. ” Th is r e a din g wo uld re qu ir e the su

bmi ssi on on ly of jud g me nts “made ” or pr oposed t o the court by the parties, such as proposed judgments that have been a g ree d to by the par ties. I t would exclude from t h e s u bmission requirement all other judgme nts such as tho se e nte re d b y

the c ourt wi tho ut t he a g re e me nt o f t

he pa rt ie s. Both pa rties contend that subsection (f) supports their vi ew. Subsec tion (f) provide s that “a judg ment” ente red w ithout comply i n g wi t h t h e require ments of the statute is void. Id. § 410.258(f) . TPCI GA conte nds that b ec au s e “a judg ment” does not distinguish be tween proposed judg ments “made by the par ties” and judg ments ent er ed by the trial cour

t that have

no t be e n s ub mit te d b y

the pa rt ie s b y a g re e me nt, the le g isl a tur e int e nd e d f or th e st atu te to a

pp ly to a ny jud g me nts re g a rd le ss o f w he the r t he y a re the re su lt o f a g re e me nt o r t he a dv e rs a ri a l pr oc e ss. B ro ok s r e s p o n d s t h a t , w h e n r e a d i n g t h e s t a tu t e a s a w h o l e , t h e r e f

e r e n c e t o “ a

j ud g me nt” in s u b s e c ti o n ( f

) is li mi te d b y s u

b s e c ti o n ( a ) o f th e s tatu te
. H e c o n te n d s that the g e ne ra l la

ng uage o f s ub se c tio n ( f) c a nn ot a pp ly to a br oa de r r a ng e of

jud g me nts tha

n th os e

c on te mpl a te d by su

bs e c tio n (a ), wh ic h— a c c or din g to B ro ok s— a pp lie s only to p ro po se d ju dg me nts “made by the par ties.” Our primar

y objective in statutory

construction is to g ive effe ct to the leg islature’s intent. State v. Shumak

e , 199 S.W .3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). In deriving the l eg islature’s intent, we rely on the pl ain m eaning of t he st atutory text , unless a differe nt meaning is supplied by leg islative definition or is appar ent from context , or such construction lea ds to absurd re sults. City of R oc k wal l v. Hughe s , 2 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d

6 2 1 , 6 2 5 -2 6 (T ex . 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g T ex a s De p ’t o f Transp. v. Cit

y of SunsetWe o b s e r v e th a t th e b il l a n a ly s is f

o r s e c ti o n 4 1 0

. 2 5 8 o f th e la b o r c o d e p r o v ide s that the 2 statute “pre vents the use of settlement ag ree ments, and judg ments based on de fault or on a n ag ree ment of the parties, to ove rturn Appea ls Panel decisions.” SeeHouse Comm. on Bus. & I ndus., Bill Analy sis, Tex . H.B . 3137, 75th L eg ., R.S. (1997). 6 Valley , 146 S.W .3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004), Taylor v. Fireme n’s & Policeme n’s Civil Serv. Comm’n of Cit y of Lubbock , 6 16 S.W. 2d

18 7, 18 9 ( Te x. 19 81 ); University of Tex. Sw. Me d. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser , 140 S.W. 3d 35 1, 35 6 ( Te x. 20 04 ); see J ones v. Fowler , 9 6 9 S. W. 2 d 4 2 9 , 4 3 2 ( T e x. 1 9 9 8 ) ( w e c o n s id e r

s tatuto r y la n g u a g e in c o n te xt, n o t is o lati o n )

. O u r a n a ly s is o f th e s tatu to r

y te xt is also informed by

the pre sumptions t hat “the e ntire statute is intende d to be ef fec tive” and that “a jus t a nd re a so na

ble re su lt is int e nd e d, ” Te x. Go v’ t Cod e An n. § 31 1. 02 1( 2) , ( 3) (We st 2 00 5) , a s w e ll as consider ation of the “ object soug ht to be attained” by the statute and the “c o n s eq u ences of a particula r construc tion,” Id. § 311.023(1), ( 5) (West 2005). The pra ctical implications of both par ties’ interpre t at i o ns persua de us that the leg islature did not intend that the statute apply to judgments e ntere d by the trial cour

t that were not submit ted or propose d to the court by ag ree ment of the parties or the r esult of a de fault by the defe ndant. The statute was intended to pr event the parties from colluding to o v er t urn

a pp e a ls p a ne l de c isi on s. I t acc o mp li s h e s this purpose by requiringsubmissi on of judg ments “made ” 2 by the par ties—i.e. judg ments proposed to the c ourt by agreement of the parties r ather than jud g me nts e nte re d a s a

re su lt of a dv e rs a ri a l pr oc e e din g s. I f, ho we ve r, the statut e we re to a pp ly to any judgme nt, a strict re ading of the statute would require a trial c ourt to fig ure out a way to ge t the party who initiated the action to submit the judg ment the cour t is prepar ing to e nter to the DivisionThe statute r eq u i res that the party who initiat ed

the ac tion—not the court or the 3 defe ndant—timely

and cor rec tly file the propose d judgme nt with the Division. Tex . L ab. Code Ann. § 410.258(a) (West 2006). 7 for approval thi rty day s in advanc e of e ntry in ever y case . This would be true r eg ardle ss of whethe r 3 the judg ment is the result of noncollusi ve, adve rsar ial proce eding s or the re sult of an ag ree ment betwee n the par

ties. I f this were the proce dure, a party who initiated an ac tion for judicial re view of an a g ency

decision could avoid or delay entry of an a dverse judgme nt by ref using, de laying, or otherwise f

ailing to submit the judg ment to the Division. I n ad d i t i o n , j udg ments entere d afte r a failure to a

ppear by the plaintiff or afte r a failure to pr osecute or on the co u rt ’s m o t i on on jurisdictional gr ounds would have to be s u bmitted to the Divisi on befor e entr y even if “the party who initiated the procee d ing” is not available or is not intere sted in making the submission. Section 410.258 does not addre ss these ty pes o f si tuations, where the entry of judg ment may

be

a pp ro pr ia te bu t th e jud g me nt ha s not be e n pro po se d or “m a de ” by the pa rt ie s. No r doe s th e statut e provi d e a p ro ce dure f

or addr essing such situations or specify who is responsible for

making the submissi on to the Divi sion if the “party who i nitiated the proc eeding ” is not available or no long er actively involved in the litigation. We a re of the view that the statute does not a ddress such situations beca use it was not desig ned to addr ess them. I t was desig ned to addr ess jud gm en t s p re pare d and propose d by the p ar t i es—i .e. “ma de by

the par ties”—to avoid collusion betwee n them without the Division’s kn o wl ed ge. S u ch co l l u s i o n c o u l d d i s t o rt t h e l i t i gat i o n p ro ce s s . I f t h e p ar t i es ar e n o tp ro p o s i n g a judgme nt or settlement by ag ree ment, the litigation proc ess is running its course without threat of collusion or distortion. The statute’s placingthe burden of submitt ing a propose d judgme nt on the8

party who i nitiated the proceeding makes sense in the context of an ag ree d proposed judg ment that the par ty has an inter est in seei n g en t er ed

. This burden doe s not make sense in the context of a judgme nt entere d afte r fully adver sarial pr ocee dings or proce eding s in which the par ty who initiated the proc eedinghas fa iled to appea r or f ailed to prosec ute. We c onclude that section 410.258 does not r equire the Division to rece ive adva nce notice of e very

judgme nt in a proce eding initiated under subcha pter F or G of the labor c ode. I nste a d , w e a r e o f th e o p in io n th a t th e s tatu te r e qu ir e s th e D iv is io n to r e c e iv e n o ti c e of propose d judgme nts “made by

the par ties”—i.e. without judicial oversig ht or without fully adver sarial proce eding s—and settlement ag ree ments made by the par ties. This inter

preta tion e nsures that the trial court doe s n o t s i gn o ff on a proposed judg ment made or ag ree d to by

the par ties befor e the Division has been notified a nd g iven an opportunity to intervene . Additionally , this int erpr etation does not place impractica l proce dural burdens on the t rial cour t or permit a pa

rty who initiated the proce eding to avoid or delay entry of an adver se j udg ment by ref using to submit the judgme nt to the Di vis ion . T his int e rp re ta tio n a lso g ive s me a nin g t o the ph ra se “ ma de by the pa rt ie s” that is consistent with the purpose of the statute. We rec og nize that our holdi ng in this case is inconsistent with the El Paso Court of Appea ls’ opinion in Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania v. M artinez , 18 S.W .3d 844 (Tex. App.—El P as o 2 0 0 0, no pet.). In Martinez , the cour t held that a summary judg me n t p r e p a r e d

b y th e tr ia l c o u rt w a s v o id

b e c a u s e th e D iv is io n d id

n o t r e c e iv e n o ti fica tion pursuant to sec tion 410.258. Id. at 848. I t specifica lly stated that “[ b]efore the trial court enter ed summary

judgme nt, no notification was filed w ith th e co m m i s sion as mandated by9

Se c tio n 4 10 .2 58 . T he tr ia l c ourt wa s, the re for e, wi th ou t juri sd ic tio n to re nd e r j ud g me nt, a nd it i s void.” Id. For

the re asons dis cu s s ed above, we re spectfully disag ree with the interpre tation of section 410.258 in Martinez

.

Our holding does not , howeve r, conf lict with the Houston court of a ppeals’ opinion in Metropolitan Transi t A u t h o r i t y v. Jack son , 212 S.W .3d 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)

. That case was tried t o a jury and a verdic t was render ed. The parties e ng ag ed in po s t- v e r d ic t n e g o ti a ti o n s b e f o r e a ju d g me n t w a s e n te r e d

. A s a r e s u lt o f th o s e n e g o ti ations, the parties a g ree d to a judg ment awa rding J ackson suppleme ntal benef its and attorney s’ fe es. Id. at 799. The trial c ourt signe d a judg ment ref lecting the par

ties’ ag ree ment. Id. On appea l, it was undisputed tha t Ja c k s o n d id

n o t s u b mi t t h e p r o p o s e d

ju d g me n t t o th e D iv is io n p u r s u a n t t o s e c ti o n 4 1 0

. 258. Id. a t 80 0. Ac c or din g ly , the Ho us ton c ourt of a pp e a ls he ld that the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt w a s v oid due to noncompliance wi t h t h e statute. Id. at 801. This was a situation where the parties a g ree d upon a re sult and submitt ed a pr oposed judg ment to the t rial cour t for appr oval. I t was a judg ment made a nd proposed by

the par ties. The fa ct that it wa s proposed post-ve rdict does not af fec t the analy sis. We ag ree that, under the circ umstances pr esente d in the Jack son c a se , no nc omp lia

nc e wi th section 410.258 re nders the judg ment void.

I n th is c a se , h ow e ve r, the re is no e vid e nc e in the re c or d that the tr ia l c ourt ba se d it s summary judgm e n t o n a n y k in d o f a g r e e me n t o r r e s o lu ti o n o f th e c a s e ma d e o r p r o p o s e d b y the pa rt ie s. Th e re wa s n o p ro po se d ju dg me nt “ ma de by the pa rt ie s” that B ro ok s c ou ld have fi le d w ith the Di vis ion . T he tr ia l c ourt pr e pa re d a nd e nte re d a jud g me nt b a se d o n its e va luatio n of the me ri ts of the c ase a

nd the cr oss motions for summary judgme nt fi l ed b y t h e par ties. The judg ment was10

enter ed af ter fully adver sarial pr ocee dings a nd without threat of c ollusion between the pa rties that could pot entially distort the result. Such a judg ment is not “made by the par ties” as c ontemplated by section 410.258. We hold that the summary judgme nt gr anted in fa

vor of B rooks is not void.

Sum m ar y J udgm e nt

I n its second issue, TPCI GA contends that the t rial court err ed by g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of Br ooks beca use Brooks was not a cting in the course and scope of employ ment

a t th e tim e of his inj ur

y a s a matt e r of law or , alt e rn a tiv e ly , tha t a ge nu ine iss ue of ma te ri a l f a c t e xists with respec t to that issue.

We revie w t he sum mary judgme nt de novo. J oe v . Two Thi rty

Nin e J oin t V e ntu re , 14 5 S. W.3 d 1 50 , 1 56 (T e x. 20 04 ). Th e st and ards for r e vie wi ng a su mma ry jud g me nt a

re we ll established: (1) the movant must demonstrate that there is no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct and that it is entit led to judgme nt as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether a dis puted i ssue of mate rial fa ct exis ts that would preclude summary judgme nt, we take all evidenc e fa vorable to the non-movant as true; and ( 3) we indulge ever y rea sonable i n ference and re solve any doubts in favor of the non-movant. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985)

. When, as here , both parties file motions for summary judgme nt and the cour

t denies one and g rants the other, w e must review the summar

y -judg ment evidenc e pre se n te d b y b o th s id e s , d e c id e a ll q

u estions presente d,

an d rende r the judg ment that the trial cour t should have re ndere d. Ci ty o f G a r la n d

v . Dallas Mo rn ing Ne ws , 22 S.W .3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000). Under the Wo rk er s’ Compensation Act, an insura nce c arr ier is liable for compensa tion for an e mploy ee’ s injury if the injury

arises out of a

nd in the course and scope of11

em p l o y m en t
. Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 406.031. The primary test for de termining whether an employ ee is a cting within t h e co urse a nd scope of

employ ment is whether the employ er ha s th e ri g ht t o d ir e c t and con tr ol the e mpl oy e e ’s pe rf or manc e a t th e tim e of

the a c t. A r b elaez v . Just Brake

s Corp. , 1 4 9 S. W. 3 d 7 1 7 , 7 2 0 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s ti n 2 0 0 4 , n o pet.) (c i t i n g St. J

os e ph Ho sp . v . W

olf f , 94 S.W .3d 513, 542 (Tex. 2003)). Ge nera lly , an employ ee is not in the course and scope of his e mploy ment while driving his ow n vehicle to a nd from his place of work. Soto v. Sev en Sev entee n HBE Corp. , 52 S.W .3d 201, 205 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 20 00 , n o p et.) ; Upton v. Ge nsco, Inc

. , 962 S.W .2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997, pe t. de nie d)

. Ho we ve r, the te rm “ c ours e a nd sc op e of e mpl oy me nt” may

inc lud e tr a ns po rt a tio n to and fr om the pl ace of employ ment when the transporta tion is furnished as a part of t he contr act of employ ment or is paid for by

the employ er. Tex. L ab. C ode Ann. § 401.011(12) ( West S upp. 2008). I n th is c a se , th e pa

rt ie s disp ute wh e the r the a dd iti on a l $5 0 B ro ok s r e c e ive d o n a da ily basis was pa

y ment for tra

nsportation that would place his drive to and f rom oil rig sites within the

“ c ours e a nd

sc op e of e mpl oy me nt. ” Som e of

the e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d s ug g e sts that Pa tte rs on pa id B ro ok s $ 50 pe r d a y

to t ra ns po rt his c re w t o a

nd fr om w or k. B ro ok s te sti fi e d at the c on te ste d c a se hear ing that the $50 daily pay ment was “re g ularly ref

err ed to a s driving pa

y on the rig ” and “ [t ]hat 50 do lla rs a da y is s o y ou ’l l sh owup wi th a ful l crew.” Ad dit ion a lly , th e “ Dr ill ingRigSa fe ty Orienta tion” manual provide d by Patterso n to Brooks a nd admitted into evidence stated:

“ [t]he [d]r ill e r o n e a c h to ur is d ir e c tly

re sp on sib le to ins ur e that his pe rs on ne l arr ive a t th e wo rk sit e prepa red to work.” The recor d also contains t he affidavit of Ron Simonds , a tool pusher at Patterson who hired B rooks to work on a rig in Fort Stockton, which stated:12 Pa tte rs on re fe rred to t

he a dd iti on a l $5 0. 00 pa

y me nt a s “ pe r d ie m” pa y . Ho we ve r, a t the tim e , mor e tha n fi ve y e a rs a ft er M r. Broo ks ’ hire, I do not spe cifica lly rec all if I ref err ed to this additional amount as “pe r diem” when I hired Mr. Br ooks. I may have refe rre d to it as

“ dr ivi ng pa

y ” be c a us e that wa s a ter

m fr e qu e ntl y us e d b y

wo rk e rs in the field.

On the other

hand, the r ecor d also contains evide nce sug g esting that Patterson did not pay Br ooks $50 per day

to transport his cre w to and fr om the rig site. When asked at the c ontested

case hear ing w hether “any body at P atterson ever instruct[ ed] y ou or t [ol d] y ou that y ou had to ca rry crew, ” Brooks re sponded “no.” Additionally , Mark Cullifer, vic e pre sident of oper ations at Patterson, testified that Patterson pa id ever y driller $50 re g ardle s s of whe ther that driller drove himself to th e r ig , tr a n s p o rte d me mb e r s o f h is c r e w to th e r ig , o r e v e n w a lk e d to th e r ig

. He exp la in e d th e r e a s o n f

o r th e $ 5 0 d a il y p a y

me n t a s f o ll o w s : “ [w ]e w e r e lo s in g dr il le rs to our competition, and Mr. Patterson thoug ht [ th e d rillers] were making as much a s they should make hourly

. And t o b e h o n e s t w it h y o uw e

—

w h e n w e r a is e w a g e s it

c o s ts u s a

lo t o f mo n e y in o th er

wa y s, so e xpe ns e wa s th e wa y that th e y ra ise d the ir wa g e s. ” L a stl y , Si mon ds state d in his a ff ida vit ,

“ Idid no t te ll M r. B ro ok s th a t th e a dd iti on a l $5 0 p e r d a y wa s fo r tr a ns po rt ingPa tte rs on ’s e mpl oy e e s, or his cre w, to the rig . Ialso did not tell Mr. B rooks that the pay ment was to r eimburse him f or the expense of oper ating his vehicle.”

On this recor d, we co n clude that a fac t issue exi sts with respect to whe ther the $50 daily pay ment provided to B rooks was c ompensation for transporting his crew to and from wor

k and, ther efor e, tra

nsportation furnished or paid for by the employ er, or some other ty pe of a dditional13

co mp en s at i o n . W e r ev er s e t h e s u m m ar y j u d gm en tan d

re m an d t h i s ca u s e f

o r f u rt h er p ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this opi nion.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J ustice Patterson Reverse d and Remande d Filed: August 8, 2008