2016 IL App (3d) 160080

Opinion filed July 13, 2016 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2016 

In re S.W.N., )

 ) 

 a Minor ) 

 ) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

S.W.N., ) 

 ) 

Respondent-Appellant). )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 13th Judicial Circuit, 

Bureau County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-16-0080 

Circuit No. 15-JD-30 

Honorable 

Marc P. Bernabei, 

Judge, Presiding.

_____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Holdridge and McDade concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶ 1 Respondent, S.W.N., appeals from his adjudication for delinquency based on the offense 

of criminal sexual assault. Respondent argues that his confession, which was admitted at trial, 

should have been suppressed because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda 

rights. We vacate the trial court's adjudication of delinquency, reverse its order denying 

respondent's motion to suppress his confession, and remand the matter for further proceedings. 

¶ 2 FACTS
2 

¶ 3 The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship in which it alleged that respondent, 

a minor, was delinquent in that he had committed the offense of criminal sexual assault (720 

ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2014)). Specifically, the petition alleged that respondent 

"knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force by 

holding B.L. against a wall and placing his penis into the vagina of B.L." Respondent 

subsequently filed a motion to suppress statements, arguing that due to a mental deficiency he 

"was not able to sufficiently comprehend his rights per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 

(1966)." 

¶ 4 At the hearing on respondent's motion, Officer Christopher Erickson of the Princeton 

police department testified that he was a certified juvenile officer. At approximately 3:30 p.m. 

on August 11, 2015, Erickson drove to respondent's house in order to interview respondent about 

an alleged sexual assault that had taken place in the bathroom area of Alexander park the 

previous night. Once there, Erickson met with respondent and respondent's mother. He told 

them that he was investigating a sex crime. Erickson asked respondent's mother for permission 

to interview respondent at the police department, and she granted him permission. Erickson 

explained to her that she could accompany respondent for the interview, but she declined, telling 

Erickson to "just take him." 

¶ 5 Erickson testified that he and respondent made small talk on the way to the police 

department. He did not testify as to what type of vehicle he drove, where respondent sat in the 

vehicle, or whether respondent was restrained in any way. Erickson testified that though he did 

not place respondent under arrest, he believed he had probable cause to do so at that point. Once 

at the police department, Erickson asked respondent's permission to record the interview, then 

activated the recording device. Erickson testified that he "[a]dvised [respondent] that he was 
3 

there on his own accord and also advised him of his Miranda rights." The recording of 

Erickson's interview with respondent was then played in open court. 

¶ 6 The video recording begins with Erickson—who appears to be the only other person in 

the interrogation room—telling respondent: "Okay [respondent], I want you to understand 

something, okay. You came out to the police department with me willingly today, correct? 

Like, I didn't tell you you had to come, okay?" Respondent nods as Erickson is speaking. "You 

understand that you're free to leave, okay. If you don't want to talk to me, you don't have to talk 

to me. You remember how we got in here, okay? Just—at any time if you don't want to talk to 

me—if I ask you a question you don't want to answer, you don't have to answer it." Respondent 

continues to nod along, repeating "yeah" on occasion as Erickson speaks. 

¶ 7 Erickson then explains to respondent that he is going to read him his Miranda rights, 

which Erickson describes to respondent as "a statement of [his] constitutional rights." Erickson 

sets a piece of paper and pen on the table in front of respondent and states: 

"You're not under arrest, okay? I want you to understand that, okay? I'm just 

asking you some questions. You have the right to remain silent. You understand 

what that means, okay? [Respondent nods his head rapidly]. Like I said, you 

don't have to answer all my questions. Could I just have you put your initials 

right here by number one, saying you understand that? [Erickson points to paper.] 

Not saying that—" 

Respondent then looks up at Erickson, cutting him off midsentence to ask: "In cursive, or—?" to 

which Erickson replies: "However you want to sign your initials, bud." Respondent then signs 

his whole name, while Erickson tells him: "You don't have to write your whole name, just your 

initials."
4 

¶ 8 Erickson then continues through the list of rights, reading each right a second time in 

slightly different words. For example, Erickson states: "Anything you say may be used against 

you. Okay, so anything you say could be used against you in court. You understand that? 

Okay." Respondent nods his head rapidly as Erickson asks if he understands. Respondent 

continues to nod in agreement each time Erickson reads and rereads a right. Finally, Erickson 

reads: "I understand what my rights are and am willing to talk. Is that true? I mean are you 

willing to talk to me?" Respondent nods affirmatively, at which point Erickson sets the pen 

down and says "Okay, go ahead and sign your name on that right there for me if you would 

please." Erickson explains again: "You're not under arrest. You know, if you want to shut this 

down at any time, feel free to do so." Respondent nods throughout that statement. 

¶ 9 Erickson begins the interview by asking open-ended questions, but approximately 10

minutes into the interview he shifts almost exclusively to leading questions. Throughout the 

interview, Erickson accuses respondent of not being truthful. Respondent denies any misconduct 

through most of the interview, but his story evolves until he ultimately makes incriminating 

statements. Early in the interview, respondent mentions that he played on the Special Olympics 

basketball team at his high school. Erickson makes no response to that statement. At one point 

in the interview, respondent volunteers that he had twice been to teen court—once for a curfew 

violation and once for stealing a lawnmower. Throughout the interview, respondent speaks 

slowly and has a vacant expression on his face. The recording spans a total of 50 minutes, which 

includes a break in which respondent is given a bottle of water. The actual interview lasts 

approximately 43 minutes. 
5 

¶ 10 Erickson testified that after the interview, he informed respondent that he would be 

placed under arrest. Erickson notified respondent's mother, who then came to the police 

department.

¶ 11 The State introduced into evidence the Miranda waiver form that respondent is seen 

signing in the interview video. The form reads: "Before any questions are asked of you, you 

should know," then lists four rights. Respondent's name is printed in the blank space between 

the introductory sentence and the rights themselves. Respondent's signature appears at the 

bottom of the form. 

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Erickson elaborated on his training as a juvenile officer. He 

explained that in his role as a juvenile officer he is tasked with making sure an interviewee 

understands his or her constitutional rights. Erickson testified that if a person did not understand 

their rights, he was trained to "explain it in a different way that perhaps they may. The point of 

the class was that children of younger ages are developmentally different than adults." Erickson 

affirmed that these special steps are necessary because children are not as knowledgeable and 

understanding as adults. He agreed that as a juvenile officer, his duty was to "look out for" the 

welfare and best interests of the minor.

¶ 13 Erickson testified that he had no contact with respondent prior to meeting him at his 

house. Nothing in his interactions with respondent during the car ride to the police department 

provided Erickson with any indication as to respondent's education level or cognitive ability. He 

did not ask respondent any questions regarding respondent's cognitive abilities or intelligence 

quotient (IQ) level. Erickson agreed that the manner in which he read the Miranda warnings to 

respondent was the same manner as he would read them to adults of average intelligence. 
6 

Erickson acknowledged that he read the Miranda warnings to respondent "with very little 

explanation of what they mean." 

¶ 14 Erickson testified that respondent's statement regarding the Special Olympics "led 

[Erickson] to believe that [respondent] had somewhat of diminished cognitive function." 

Erickson did not ask respondent about his cognitive impairment because he didn't "know that 

[respondent] would have been able to answer that question." Erickson testified that knowing an 

interviewee to be in the "extremely low range in regards to mental abilities" would not affect the 

way he read Miranda warnings to that person, and that he would read the rights to that person in 

the same way he would to any adult. On redirect examination, Erickson testified that respondent 

appeared to be understanding the Miranda warnings as Erickson read them. 

¶ 15 The State called as its next witness Dr. Patricia Grosskopf, an expert in the field of 

forensic psychology. She testified that she performed three tests on respondent as a part of a 

cognitive ability examination: the Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fifth Edition, 

Integrated (WISC-V); the Bender Gestalt II Perception Test (Bender Test); and the Trail Making 

Test Part A and B (Trails Test).

¶ 16 Grosskopf testified that respondent scored a 70 on the WISC-V, indicative of "extremely 

low intellectual function." She characterized the score as an IQ of 70. Following her 

examination of respondent, Grosskopf filed a report, which was entered into evidence. The 

report clarified that respondent scored in the second percentile on the WISC-V, meaning that he 

performed better than approximately 2 out of 100 peers. His score on the verbal comprehension 

index, which measured his "ability to use word knowledge, verbalize meaningful concepts, and 

reason with language-based information," was in the tenth percentile, or the low-average range. 

Respondent's score on the fluid reasoning index, which measured his "logical thinking skills and 
7 

his ability to use reasoning to apply rules," was in the 0.1 percentile, or the extremely low range. 

Respondent's weakest area of performance was the working memory index, which measured his 

"attending, concentration, and mental control." In summary, the report concluded, in part, that 

respondent "present[ed] with limited concentration and although he may present as focused, 

internally he is not." For treatment, Grosskopf recommended: "Having [respondent] relay back 

information to assure that he is on task will be imperative for success. This should be 

consistently done, as [respondent] can give the impression he is focused, when in fact he is not." 

Grosskopf also recommended: "Information presented to [respondent] should be done so clearly, 

repetitively, and consistently." 

¶ 17 Grosskopf testified that the Bender Test and Trails Test measure executive function. 

Respondent scored in the normal range on those tests, indicating no impairment in executive 

functioning. Grosskopf explained that executive functioning controls "[t]he ability to plan and 

the ability to have or understand consequences to behavior." Grosskopf's report described the 

Bender Test as follows:

"[The Bender Test] is *** used to evaluate visual-motor functioning and 

visual perception skills ***. Scores on the test are used to identify possible 

organic brain damage and the degree maturation [sic] of the nervous system. The 

[Bender Test] is used to evaluate visual maturity, visual motor integration skills, 

style of responding, and reaction to frustration, ability to correct mistakes, 

planning and organizational skills, and motivation." 

The same report described the Trails Test as follows:

"The [Trails Test] is a neuropsychological test of visual attention and task 

switching. It consists of two parts in which the individual is instructed to connect 
8 

a set of 25 dots as fast as possible, while still maintaining accuracy. It can 

provide information about visual search speed, scanning, speed of processing, 

mental flexibility, as well as executive functioning. It is also sensitive to 

detecting several cognitive impairments."

The report indicated that respondent's time fell "within an acceptable range."

¶ 18 When asked if she had an opinion regarding respondent's ability to understand his 

Miranda rights, Grosskopf responded: "I don't have the ability nor would I want to say if, during 

that interview [with Erickson], he would understand it." Later, she said that she had not asked 

respondent about the Miranda warnings.

¶ 19 Grosskopf testified that she examined respondent over the course of nine hours, and that 

"he had no problem comprehending" the testing. Based on her interaction with respondent, 

Grosskopf did not believe that respondent would automatically respond in agreement to a 

question that suggested the answer. Grosskopf testified that respondent did well on reading 

comprehension, and that he would ask questions if he did not understand something. She opined 

that respondent would have understood the questions Erickson asked during the interview. 

Grosskopf testified that she "couldn't give [respondent] a diagnosis of mental–well, mental 

retardation is the old terminology, but impaired extreme functioning." Nothing from her 

examination of respondent or her review of Erickson's interview led Grosskopf to believe that 

respondent's statements were not made voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently. 

¶ 20 At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, respondent moved for a judgment in his 

favor. The trial court denied respondent's motion. 

¶ 21 Respondent called as his first witness Andrew Puck, a driver's education teacher at 

Princeton High School and respondent's Special Olympics basketball coach for three years. 
9 

Puck testified that he had given respondent driving lessons the previous spring. Respondent was 

in a separate class for "adaptive special needs kids" with a different instructor, however Puck 

was respondent's instructor for the in-car lessons. Puck testified that he was unable to complete 

the required six hours of driving with respondent in the spring "because of [respondent] not 

functioning at a higher level." They had planned to resume lessons in the fall. 

¶ 22 Puck explained why respondent had difficulties in his driving lessons: 

"With [respondent], there are a lot of disconnects. And *** it has always been 

typical of [respondent] to where we would visit something, whether it is 

basketball or, you know, driving, and yes, yes, yes; I got it, coach; I got it. And 

30 seconds later we are having to revisit that again." 

Puck further described respondent's struggles as "information overload to where we would have 

to really make things as simple as possible." Puck described respondent as "a people pleaser," 

testifying that respondent would "say whatever he possibly [could] to please you." Puck testified 

that respondent tended to have a deference to authority figures and a short attention span. 

¶ 23 Puck had the opportunity to review the video recording of Erickson's interview with 

respondent. Puck opined that respondent did not understand what Erickson meant by the right to 

counsel. He also opined that respondent did not understand when Erickson told him that 

anything he said could be used against him in court. Puck opined that respondent did not 

understand what Erickson meant when he told respondent that a lawyer would be appointed if he 

could not afford one. 

¶ 24 On cross-examination, Puck testified that he did not have a background in psychology. 

He testified that respondent was "more responsive" in one-on-one situations. He agreed that 

outside stimuli also affected respondent's ability to understand driving lessons. Ultimately, 
10 

however, respondent's understanding was most affected by his mood on any given day. Puck 

agreed that to understand whether or not respondent actually understood Erickson, he would 

have to know what kind of day respondent was having. 

¶ 25 Respondent's next witness was Audrie Lundquist, a speech pathologist at Princeton High 

School. The court qualified Lundquist as an expert in speech pathology. Lundquist testified that 

she provided respondent with individual therapy sessions in speech and language at the high 

school. She met with respondent on a weekly basis. 

¶ 26 Lundquist testified that she administered an expressive vocabulary test to respondent 

when he was 15 years old. In the test, respondent was shown a picture and tasked with giving a 

word for that picture. Respondent scored in the 0.1 percentile on the test, equivalent to a child 

aged seven years and five months. Lundquist also administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 

test, which measured respondent's understanding of a word. Respondent's results on this test 

placed him at an age level of 10 years and 9 months. Lundquist performed a third examination, 

testing "[h]ow [respondent] understands language when it is presented to him." On a scale of 

0 to 150 on that test, respondent scored a 65. Lundquist testified that "[t]he normal range" was 

between 85 and 115. 

¶ 27 Lundquist testified that multiple-step instructions were difficult for respondent, and that 

repetition was helpful for him. Lundquist also found it helpful to have respondent repeat back 

instructions in his own words. 

¶ 28 Lundquist had the opportunity to review the video recording of respondent's interview 

with Erickson. She opined that respondent would understand the sentence "you have the right to 

remain silent," but would not be able to apply his understanding. "That's the difference there 

where [respondent] understands the sentence because he has heard it over and over again; we all 
11 

have. But to not–if he asks a question, for him to think I don't have to answer that, he wouldn't 

be able to act on that." Lundquist further opined that respondent did not knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to have a lawyer appointed for him. She offered that 

the only word respondent would have understood was the word "free."

¶ 29 On cross-examination, Lundquist elaborated on the distinction between understanding the 

words in a sentence and being able to apply the concept. She explained that the speech and 

language component was distinct from the ensuing cognitive functions. Lundquist admitted that 

she did not perform cognitive tests, and that she did not rely upon them in her own testing. She 

admitted that respondent's cognitive ability could impact her previous answers regarding 

respondent's understanding of the Miranda warnings. Lundquist performed her testing from

mid-November to early December 2013, approximately 21 months prior to the incident in 

question. She would not expect respondent's scores to decrease, but allowed that scores can 

improve over time. Her last contact with respondent was in May 2015, for approximately 30 

minutes per week.

¶ 30 Upon examination from the trial court, Lundquist testified that respondent scored an 83 

on a receptive vocabulary test, which was considered a strength for respondent because it was 

just two points shy of the low-normal threshold of 85. Lundquist explained that that test 

measured respondent's strengths with individual words, but that language as a whole was more 

complicated. When asked by the trial court to put her testimony in the context of the Miranda

warnings, Lundquist explained that respondent would understand each word in "you have the 

right to remain silent," but that he likely did not fully understand the concept. 

¶ 31 Respondent next called Patricia Marquis, a special needs teacher at Princeton High 

School. She was respondent's case manager, and interacted with him on a daily basis, both 
12 

before and after school. She also saw him every other day in personal communication and 

American history skills classes. She also spent some lunch periods with him. Marquis testified 

that his reading and math abilities were higher than some students in the special education 

classroom, but his ability to concentrate was lower than many students in that classroom. 

¶ 32 With regard to instructing respondent, Marquis testified that respondent "needs to be 

redirected quite often because his attention span is very short and limited." Marquis testified that 

she would ask respondent to explain in his own words what they had been discussing. She 

would also ask him to break things down into steps. 

¶ 33 Marquis testified that respondent had previously indicated he understood instructions 

when he actually did not. Marquis explained that this tendency was due to respondent's desire to 

please people. She went on to testify that "you have to further query him about, you know, what 

you are asking to make sure that he understands it." Marquis observed that respondent would 

"shake his head yes" to indicate he understood something when he actually did not understand. 

She expounded: 

"And then I would have to–then I would often times ask him a little bit more to 

make sure, because a head shake to me doesn't indicate to me that he understands 

the material. So I would ask him further or a little more deeply, you know, what 

he does know or what he doesn't know to answer the question." 

Marquis testified that respondent "reads much better than he understands what he is reading ***. 

He reads the words much better than really comprehending what they mean." 

¶ 34 Marquis had also reviewed the recording of the interview between respondent and 

Erickson. She believed that respondent did not understand all of the questions Erickson asked. 

Marquis opined that respondent would understand the words in you have "the right to remain 
13 

silent." She continued: "Whether he understands the broad scope of all of it, I'm not sure about 

that." Marquis elaborated:

"He knows the definition of a word. He knows the vocabulary of the 

word, but then how that affects him or how that–the understanding of what he is 

saying, I'm not sure that he would have understood all of that, if that is clear. He 

knows what a word means but not necessarily what the whole scope of it would 

mean to him." 

¶ 35 When asked whether respondent would understand what the right to an attorney meant, 

Marquis responded: "He knows what the word right means. He knows what the word attorney 

means. But I'm not sure he would understand the language of all of that, what that really means 

to him." She testified similarly as to respondent's right to have counsel appointed for him. She 

did not believe respondent would understand the word "waiver," or what it meant to waive his 

rights. Marquis testified that she would have asked respondent more follow-up questions had 

she been in Erickson's shoes. She admitted that she knew to ask more questions from her three 

years of knowing respondent. She knew that respondent's first answer is frequently incorrect and 

merely his attempt to tell her what he thinks she wants to hear. 

¶ 36 In watching the video recording, Marquis observed that respondent was trying to please 

Erickson by providing the answers Erickson sought. She also noted that the evolution of 

respondent's answers over the course of the interview was similar to her own experiences with 

respondent when he was in trouble. She testified: "It is a process you go through with him to get 

to the real truth ***."

¶ 37 On cross-examination, Marquis testified that she had seen improvement from respondent 

over the previous two years. Marquis agreed that respondent would know what was meant by
14 

"you are free to go home." Marquis testified that respondent would benefit from being told 

something while being shown the same thing contemporaneously. She reiterated that she did not 

believe respondent understood the things Erickson said to him in the video. Marquis agreed that 

outside distractions would also impair respondent's understanding. 

¶ 38 On redirect examination, Marquis testified that reading comprehension was one of 

respondent's areas of deficit. She testified that each of respondent's classes at Princeton High 

School was a special needs class.

¶ 39 Respondent's final witness was Paul Muskopf, who the trial court qualified as an expert 

in school psychology. Muskopf had taken part in respondent's most recent 3-year reevaluation in

February 2014, approximately 19 months before the incident in question. Muskopf had reviewed 

the video recording of respondent's interview with Erickson. He testified that respondent would 

likely have understood the words "you have the right to remain silent," but he believed that "it 

would be hard for [respondent] to understand the implications of waiving, or whatever action he 

took on Miranda rights, that he would understand the implications of doing that." 

¶ 40 In regard to the warning "anything you say may be use against you," Muskopf again 

opined that respondent likely understood the words, but not how they applied to him. When 

asked if respondent would have been capable of knowingly and voluntarily waiving that right, 

Muskopf responded: "I think it's possible that [respondent] may have understood them, but I 

think there's a greater probability that he would have not understood, when he waived those 

rights, what that implied." Muskopf's testimony was similar in regard to respondent's right to 

have an attorney present. Muskopf did opine, however, that respondent would understand the 

words and application of a lawyer being provided for free.
15 

¶ 41 In regard to his 2014 evaluation of respondent, Muskopf testified that respondent's basic 

reading skills—what Muskopf described as "his ability to look at words and be able to pronounce 

and sound the words out"—was at approximately a ninth grade level, a level higher than 

Muskopf had anticipated. Respondent's reading comprehension, however, was at a fourth grade 

level. Muskopf could not opine on respondent's ability to understand what was told to him 

verbally, and suggested Lundquist would have a better understanding of respondent's expressive 

language skills. Muskopf's testing indicated that on November 25, 2013, respondent had a fullscale IQ of 68. A similar test administered two years earlier—when respondent was 12 years 

and 4 months old—yielded an IQ score of 58 for respondent, which, according to Muskopf, 

"would be considered a moderate rate of mental retardation."

¶ 42 On cross-examination, Muskopf testified that the 10-point difference between the two 

earlier IQ tests fell "within [the] range of confidence." He testified that IQ scores do change over 

time, and that such scores are less reliable the younger a person is. He also testified that "it's 

difficult for [respondent] oftentimes to follow a conversation and to give an appropriate answer."

¶ 43 Following arguments, the trial court found that respondent was not in custody during his 

interview with Erickson, and that Erickson was therefore not required to deliver the Miranda

warnings. In support of this conclusion, the trial court relied primarily on the fact that 

respondent had been told repeatedly that he was free to leave. The court also pointed out that 

respondent had never been handcuffed or restrained in any way, Erickson had never drawn or 

brandished a weapon, and there was apparently only one officer interrogating respondent. The 

court further noted that there had been no formal indicia of arrest, such as fingerprinting or 

booking. The court also found it relevant that respondent "wasn't inexperienced with the police," 

referencing respondent's two experiences with teen court. Though Erickson had delivered 
16 

Miranda warnings, the court commented that law enforcement should be encouraged to provide 

the Miranda warnings whether a suspect is in custody or not, opining that such a tactic was 

"better safe than sorry." The court further found that there was no indication of any sort of 

coercion on Erickson's part, and that respondent's statements were purely voluntary.

¶ 44 The court proceeded to find that even if respondent was in custody such that the Miranda

warnings would be required, those warnings were properly delivered, and respondent knowingly 

and intelligently waived the rights therein. The court repeatedly acknowledged that respondent 

had a diminished capacity, at one point stating: "There is a limited intellectual ability, there's no 

doubt about it." The court further acknowledged that "there was an absence of a parent or other 

concerned adult" at respondent's interview. This included a deprivation of the presence of a 

juvenile officer, as Erickson could not serve as interrogator and juvenile officer simultaneously. 

The court found that these factors, however, were outweighed by a number of other factors that 

suggested respondent's waiver was knowing and voluntary. In particular, the trial court found 

that Erickson's delivery of the Miranda warnings was more than satisfactory. The court stated 

that the information in the warnings "was presented clearly and repetitively and consistently. 

And there were clear guidelines and consequences conveyed ***." Moreover, the court found 

that Erickson "took great care" in advising respondent of his rights. The court commented that 

Erickson "went considerably farther than just a mere ritualistic recital of the Miranda warnings."

¶ 45 In regard to respondent's diminished capacity, the court found that the factors of age and 

intelligence "weigh in favor of both sides." The court stated: 

"[Grosskopf] testified that his learning disability did not appear to significantly 

affect his functional communication skills.
17 

We have some conflicting evidence on that point, but I am most persuaded 

ultimately that it did not appear to significantly affect his functioning 

communication skills insofar as ability to understand and waive Miranda and 

make a voluntary statement." 

¶ 46 The court also put great emphasis on the video recording of the interview, finding the 

suggestion that respondent did not understand his rights was belied by the video. The court 

found that respondent appeared relatively calm, "appear[ed] to understand the situation," and was 

able to provide clear answers to Erickson's questions. The court found that respondent's repeated 

nods "constituted a full acknowledgment of his rights in context." On that point, the court noted: 

"[H]e is nodding emphatically, as he always does when it's clear that he understands what is 

going on." Further, the court stated: "I saw a kid in that video that was very focused. He was 

with Officer Erickson every step of the way." 

¶ 47 The court also discussed respondent's experience with teen court as well as its finding

that respondent possessed "street smarts." Though the court acknowledged that "[t]here [was] no 

evidence that [respondent] has ever been exposed to Miranda warnings before, and I don't 

assume he was just because he was arrested because there would have to be evidence of that," it 

nevertheless referenced respondent's teen court experiences and his "street smarts" no fewer than 

10 times in delivering its ruling. In going through each Miranda right, and discussing whether 

respondent would have understood how they applied to him, the court repeated twice: "we have 

the teen court experience."

¶ 48 With respect to the witnesses at the hearing, the court found that the tests performed by 

Grosskopf, on balance, "support[ed] the State's position." In particular, the court pointed out that 

respondent's executive functioning and verbal comprehension were among his highest scores. 
18 

The court noted that respondent "has difficulty with maintaining focus, listening and processing 

what others are saying to him," but found that respondent was focused in the interview, crediting 

this in part to respondent's "street smarts." The court also gave weight to Erickson's opinion that 

respondent had understood the Miranda warnings, finding that Erickson was "in a position to 

give his opinion, just like everybody else was." 

¶ 49 The court described respondent's witnesses as "[a] long list of very impressive witnesses, 

good people, solid citizens, excellent in their job, heartfelt observations." Referencing Puck's 

testimony that respondent could lose focus as conversations wear on, the court pointed out that 

the Miranda warnings were delivered at the beginning of the interview. In regard to Lundquist's 

testimony, the court found that Lundquist's tests had been performed in 2013 and that two years 

is "a long, long time *** in the life of a 17-year-old, in terms of intellectual capacity, 

development, experience, learning." In regard to Marquis' testimony that respondent benefitted 

from repetition and from having things broken down for him, the court found that Erickson had 

done just that. The court pointed out again that respondent was focused "like a laser beam" 

during the interview. The court also noted that Marquis had testified that respondent was 

stronger with verbal instruction, and that he benefitted from one-on-one interactions with 

minimal distractions. The court found Erickson's delivery of the Miranda warnings comported 

with these conditions. 

¶ 50 The matter proceeded to a bench trial on December 14, 2015. Witnesses at trial included 

the alleged victim, as well as respondent testifying in his own defense. The parties stipulated to 

the video recording, as well as Erickson's testimony. Regarding his Miranda rights, respondent 

testified that he did not understand what "anything he said could be used against him" meant. 

When asked what about that right he did not understand, respondent replied, "[t]he right of it." 
19 

Respondent also described a lawyer as "[s]omeone who works for the State." Respondent 

testified that he did not have a right to have a lawyer with him during Erickson's interrogation, 

and only had the right to a lawyer afterwards. He further testified: "I didn't really understand the 

part of that, like, you say intelligently and knowingly waive your rights." On cross-examination, 

respondent testified: "I didn't know that I didn't have to answer [Erickson's] questions and that." 

¶ 51 The court found respondent guilty of criminal sexual assault and adjudicated him 

delinquent. On January 25, 2015, the court sentenced respondent to the Department of Juvenile 

Justice for a term not to exceed 15 years or his 21st birthday, whichever comes first. 

Respondent's motion to reconsider sentence was denied. 

¶ 52 ANALYSIS

¶ 53 Respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was not in custody during 

his interview, and that Miranda warnings were therefore required. In turn, respondent argues 

that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. We find that respondent 

was in custody for fifth amendment purposes and that he did not knowingly and intelligently 

waive his Miranda rights.

¶ 54 In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that a person being 

questioned by law enforcement must first be advised "that he has a right to remain silent, that 

any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the 

presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Miranda

court further held that a "defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver 

is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. 

¶ 55 In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that advisement of one's rights was only mandated 

in circumstances of custodial interrogation, or "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
20 

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way." Id. In other words, where there is no custodial interrogation, neither the 

Miranda warnings nor knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda rights are mandated. See 

People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 159 (2008). Accordingly our analysis must begin with a 

determination as to whether respondent was in custody when he was interrogated by Erickson. 

¶ 56 I. Custody 

¶ 57 In determining whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes, a reviewing court 

must determine whether, given the circumstances of interrogation, " 'a reasonable person [would] 

have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.' " People v. 

Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 506 (2003) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). 

Our supreme court has found that the proper test for such an inquiry is "what a reasonable 

person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he or she been in the defendant's shoes." 

Id. Though the question of whether respondent was in custody is technically intermediate to the 

ultimate question of whether suppression is warranted, we review the issue de novo as a mixed 

question of law and fact. See id.

¶ 58 Factors relevant to determining whether statements were made in a custodial setting 

include: 

"(1) the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the questioning; (2) the number 

of police officers present during the interrogation; (3) the presence or absence of 

family and friends of the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure, 

such as the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or 

fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of 
21 

questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused." 

Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150. 

Our supreme court has also found the reading of the Miranda warnings to be a factor relevant to 

a custody analysis, noting that the warnings "might be perceived by a suspect as an indication 

that he is under arrest." People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 438 (1992). Moreover, the United 

States Supreme Court has found that the interrogating officer's subjective beliefs of the suspect's 

guilt, if disclosed to the suspect, can be indicative of custody. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 

318, 324-25 (1994); see also People v. Brown, 136 Ill. 2d 116, 125 (1990) (listing "the extent of 

knowledge of the officers and the focus of their investigation" as a factor relevant to custody 

inquiry). 

¶ 59 In Braggs, our supreme court clarified that the reasonable person standard for custody 

inquiries must take into account the age and mental capabilities of the person being questioned. 

Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 507-09. The Braggs court reasoned that the factors of age, intelligence, 

and mental makeup are "analytically intertwined" with the reasonable person standard. Id. at 

507. As the court stated, in pertinent part: 

"If *** we are concerned with what a reasonable person 'in the defendant's shoes' 

[citation] would have thought about his or her freedom of action, the reasonable 

person we envision must at least wear comparable footwear; otherwise, we ought 

to simply abandon the legal charade that the defendant's characteristics, 

perspective and perception matter at all." Id. at 508 (quoting People v. Lucas, 132 

Ill. 2d 399, 418 (1989)). 

¶ 60 The Braggs court first expounded on this reasoning in regard to the age of a defendant. 

Id. at 508-09. The court began by pointing out "the now firmly established legal principle" that 
22 

juvenile defendants are generally more susceptible to police coercion, and that this susceptibility 

must be taken into account when establishing procedural safeguards attendant to custodial 

interrogation. Id. at 509; see, e.g., Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). Relying on 

the Ninth Circuit case of Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2002), the Braggs court 

found that this logic extended to the initial custody analysis: " 'If a juvenile is more susceptible to 

police coercion during a custodial interrogation, then the same juvenile is also more susceptible 

to the impression that he is, in fact, in custody in the first instance.' " Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 509 

(quoting Alvarado, 316 F.3d at 8431).

¶ 61 The Braggs court found that the above reasoning extended with equal force to defendants 

with mental impairments. Id. at 510. The court declared: "The same rationale that requires 

modification of the reasonable person standard to take into account the general characteristics of 

 1

After our supreme court issued its decision in Braggs, the United States Supreme Court 

reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alvarado, finding that "[the Supreme Court's] opinions 

applying the Miranda custody test have not mentioned the suspect's age, much less mandated its 

consideration." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004). The precise ground for 

reversal in that case was that the habeas court had extended a rationale, rather than applying a 

clearly established legal principle, in violation of federal statute. Id. at 666-67. In any event, the 

Illinois Supreme Court has consistently found—both before and after the Supreme Court's 

decision in Alvarado—that age, intelligence, and mental makeup are factors to be considered in 

the custody analysis. E.g., Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d at 417; Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150; see also 

California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983) ("It is elementary that States are free to 

provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution 

requires.").
23 

juveniles also militates in favor of such a modification where the mentally retarded are 

concerned." Id. In other words, just as the mentally impaired are more susceptible to police 

coercion, they are more susceptible to the impression that they are in custody. Id. at 511. 

¶ 62 Under the circumstances of Erickson's interrogation of respondent, a reasonable person of 

respondent's age and mental capabilities would not have felt free to terminate the interrogation 

and leave. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that Erickson testified that respondent was 

not formally placed under arrest, and that Erickson repeatedly told respondent before the 

interrogation that he was free to leave at any time. An officer's informing a defendant that he is 

free to leave, however, is only one factor in our analysis. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 150 Ill. App. 

3d 524, 526 (1986) (defendant found to be in custody despite officer's repeated warnings that she 

was not under arrest and was free to leave). In the present case, the many factors weighing in 

favor of custody contradict Erickson's statements. 

¶ 63 The interrogation here took place in a small room at the Princeton police department in 

the middle of the day. The interrogation lasted approximately 43 minutes. The testimony 

presented at the suppression hearing regarding respondent's inability to focus suggests that this 

comparatively short time period likely had a unique effect upon respondent. More importantly, 

the substance and mode of Erickson's questions surely indicated to respondent that Erickson was 

not merely searching for more information, but that respondent was Erickson's one and only 

suspect. See Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 512 ("[E]ven a mentally retarded suspect might well have 

regarded herself as [a suspect] after [the officer] had expressed disbelief of her version of events 

and had asked her to take a polygraph examination."). Erickson repeatedly and consistently 

expressed his disbelief in respondent's version of events until respondent subsequently changed 

his declaration of innocence to agree with Erickson's version of events. 
24 

¶ 64 Also Erickson drove respondent from respondent's home to the police department. 

Though no evidence was presented regarding the type of car Erickson drove, or whether 

respondent sat in the front or backseat of that car, Erickson was respondent's transportation. 

Though Erickson assured respondent that he was free to get up and leave at any point, it is 

unclear where respondent could go, or how he would get there.

¶ 65 Further, though respondent was not subjected to such formal indicia of arrest as booking 

or fingerprinting, he was read his Miranda rights. While the trial court suggested that a "better 

safe than sorry" approach is ideal when it comes to the Miranda warnings, it is well-settled that 

the reading of the warnings is itself an indicator of custody. See Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 438. This

factor should apply with even greater force where the suspect is a juvenile with cognitive 

impairments. In such cases, years of cultural exposure to the Miranda rights being read 

contemporaneously to an arrest are more likely to undermine the officer's own declaration that 

the suspect actually was not under arrest.

¶ 66 It is also notable that respondent was not accompanied by a concerned adult at any point, 

either on the ride to the police department or during the interrogation. Though the State points 

out that respondent's mother declined an invitation to accompany respondent at the interrogation, 

neither the invitation nor the mother's seeming indifference are probative as to whether 

respondent felt free to leave the interrogation room. We find this factor particularly compelling 

here, as a juvenile with cognitive impairments could surely have benefitted from a concerned 

adult equipped to explain the situation to respondent. Cf. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 511-12 (finding 

custody even where mentally impaired suspect was accompanied by a concerned adult who 

"acted as a translator of sorts and actually facilitated the police interrogation").
25 

¶ 67 Finally, respondent's age, intelligence, and mental makeup in general indicate that a 

reasonable person of those attributes would not have felt free to leave the interrogation room. At 

age 17, respondent, of course, "is on the older end of the juvenile scale." People v. Murdock, 

2012 IL 112362, ¶ 44. His age, however, must be considered in light of his intelligence and 

mental capabilities. To this point, the trial court found that "[t]here is a limited intellectual 

capacity, there's no doubt about it." The record overwhelmingly supports this finding. 

Respondent's IQ was most recently measured to be 70, and it was measured to be 68 less than 

two years earlier. Respondent's scores on the individual sections of the WISC-V were 

consistently in the extremely low percentiles. Each of his classes at Princeton High School was a 

special needs class, and he played on the Special Olympics basketball team. Moreover, the video 

recording of the interrogation shows respondent laboring under some sort of cognitive 

impairment. See infra ¶ 86. 

¶ 68 Considering respondent's intellectual limitations along with the factors listed above, we 

find that respondent was subjected to a custodial interrogation, and that the Miranda warnings 

were therefore required. See Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 159. 

¶ 69 II. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver of Miranda Rights

¶ 70 A defendant's incriminating statements will be deemed inadmissible at trial unless the 

State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant validly waived his Miranda

rights. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 327 (1995). Our supreme court has explained what 

constitutes a valid waiver:

"To be valid, the waiver must reflect an intentional relinquishment or 

abandonment of a known right or privilege. The accused must possess a full 

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences 
26 

of the decision to abandon it. [Citation.] To waive rights intelligently and 

knowingly, one must at least understand basically what those rights encompass 

and minimally what their waiver will entail. The mental state that is necessary to 

validly waive Miranda rights involves being cognizant at all times of the State's 

intention to use one's statements to secure a conviction and of the fact that one can 

stand mute and request a lawyer." Id. at 327-28. 

¶ 71 The obligation of the State to prove that a waiver was knowing and intelligent was 

described by the Miranda court as a "heavy burden." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. Courts will

" 'indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." 

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy ex rel.

Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)). "Once the State has established its prima facie case, the 

burden shifts to defendant to show that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary." 

People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 51 (1990). 

¶ 72 "Whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent is determined by the particular facts and 

circumstances of the case, 'including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' " 

Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 515 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464). It is well-settled that special care 

must be taken to ensure that a juvenile's Miranda waiver is knowing and intelligent. See People 

v. Wipfler, 68 Ill. 2d 158, 171 (1977) ("[S]pecial care must be taken when determining the 

voluntariness of a minor's waiver of rights."); Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 24 ("Because 

defendant was a juvenile, greater care must be taken to ensure that the statements were not the 

result of fright, ignorance of rights, or adolescent flights of fantasy."). As the Braggs court 

explained, this "special care" requirement extended to defendants with cognitive impairments: 
27 

"[I]t is generally recognized that the mentally retarded are considered more 

susceptible to police coercion or pressure than people of normal intellectual 

ability, they are predisposed to answer questions so as to please the questioner 

rather than to answer accurately, they are more likely to confess to crimes they 

did not commit, they tend to be submissive, and they are less likely to understand 

their rights." Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 514. 

¶ 73 By way of reference, we note that section 1-116 of the Mental Health and Developmental 

Disabilities Code previously defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general 

intellectual functioning which exists concurrently with impairment in adaptive behavior and 

which originates before the age of 18 years." 405 ILCS 5/1-116 (West 2010). Effective 

January 1, 2012, the term "mental retardation" was replaced by the term "intellectual disability," 

while the definition remained the same. 405 ILCS 5/1-116 (West 2012). Mental retardation has 

been described as requiring an IQ of less than 70 (see People v. Daniels, 391 Ill. App. 3d 750, 

754 (2009)), and of less than 75 (see People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 59). The 

Braggs court's use of the term "mentally retarded" was referring generally to persons below a 

range of "normal intellectual ability." Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 514. In other words, the court gave 

no indication that, for example, a defendant with an IQ of 69 would require special care while a 

defendant with an IQ of 71 would not require such care. Thus, while a medical diagnosis of 

intellectual disability or mental retardation is relevant, it is not strictly necessary to a 

determination that a defendant's mental makeup warranted special care. In the present case, it is 

undisputed that respondent suffered from, in the trial court's words, a "limited intellectual 

ability." See supra ¶ 67. 
28 

¶ 74 The overwhelming weight of the evidence in the present case warrants a finding that 

respondent did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Initially, we note that 

Erickson provided very little explanation to respondent as to what his rights entailed. With the 

exception of respondent's right to remain silent, which Erickson repeated in various forms, such 

as telling respondent he did not have to answer questions, the only explanation Erickson 

provided was to repeat the warning using slightly different wording. The trial court's finding that 

Erickson had taken great care and gone beyond a ritualistic recitation, was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. See People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 18 (reversal of a trial court's

findings of fact is warranted when those findings are against the manifest weight of the 

evidence). Indeed, Erickson himself testified that he had delivered the warnings in the same 

fashion he would to an adult of average intelligence. Erickson agreed that he had read the 

Miranda warnings to respondent "with very little explanation of what they mean," falling short 

of the "special care" required in taking confessions from juveniles and intellectually impaired 

individuals. See Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 514. 

¶ 75 Moreover, each of respondent's four witnesses testified in some form that respondent was 

either unable to understand his Miranda rights or unable to understand what waiver of those 

rights entailed. The trial court commented that those witnesses were "very impressive witnesses, 

good people, solid citizens, excellent in their job, heartfelt observations." 

¶ 76 Puck, who had become acquainted with respondent through the Special Olympics and 

driver's education, testified that respondent had a tendency to assure him that he understood 

something, only for Puck to have to explain it again "30 seconds later." This stemmed from 

respondent's deference to authority figures as well as his inclination to "say whatever he possibly 
29 

[could] to please you." Puck had watched the video recording of Erickson's interrogation and 

opined that respondent would not have understood his rights. 

¶ 77 Lundquist, an expert in speech pathology, met with respondent once a week at Princeton 

High School. When respondent was 15 years old, she administered a test designed to measure 

"how [respondent] understands language when it is presented to him." Respondent had scored 

well below "[t]he normal range" on that test. On other vocabulary tests administered by 

Lundquist at the same time, respondent's scores placed him at an age level of 7 years and 5 

months, and 10 years and 9 months. Lundquist also testified that respondent could not have 

knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, opining that while respondent may have 

understood certain words, he would not have understood their application, or how to put those 

rights into effect.

¶ 78 As respondent's special needs case manager, Marquis interacted with him on a daily basis 

at the high school. She testified that respondent had a short attention span and struggled to 

concentrate. She had observed that respondent would often indicate he understood instructions 

when he actually did not, opining that this stemmed from his desire to please people. 

Specifically, respondent would often "shake his head yes" to indicate understanding when he 

actually did not understand. Marquis testified that respondent may have understood the words 

comprising his Miranda rights, but doubted he could have understood their application, or what 

the rights meant to him.

¶ 79 Finally, Muskopf, the school psychologist, testified that while respondent's basic reading 

skills were adequate, his ability to comprehend what he was reading lagged far behind. He 

testified that "it would be hard for [respondent] to understand the implications of waiving, or 
30 

whatever actions he took on Miranda rights, that he would understand the implications of doing 

that." Muskopf did suggest that respondent might have known what a "free lawyer" meant.

¶ 80 In contrast to the four witnesses who testified that respondent would not have understood 

his Miranda rights, how they applied to him, or what their waiver meant to him, Grosskopf, 

State's expert, declined to give an opinion on the matter. See supra ¶ 18. Grosskopf did testify 

that respondent scored a 70 on the WISC-V, indicative of "extremely low intellectual function." 

His score on the verbal comprehension index, which measured his "ability to use word 

knowledge, verbalize meaningful concepts, and reason with language-based information," was in 

the tenth percentile, or the low-average range. Respondent's weakest area of performance was 

the working memory index, which measured his "attending, concentration, and mental control." 

Grosskopf's report emphasized respondent's inability to concentrate. 

¶ 81 Grosskopf did testify that, in her observations, respondent would ask questions if he did 

not understand something, and that he would not automatically agree with something if he did 

not understand. She opined that the incriminating statements respondent ultimately made to 

Erickson were given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. She also testified that respondent 

scored in the normal range on the Bender Test and Trails Test, indicating no impairment in 

executive functioning. 

¶ 82 The trial court emphasized the Bender Test and Trails Test above all others in delivering 

its ruling. However, the actual description of those tests demonstrate they are far less probative 

concerning respondent's cognition and possible understanding of the Miranda rights than the 

WISC-V or the tests performed by Lundquist. The Bender Test and Trails Test—literally tests 

that require the taker to connect dots—primarily measure physiological characteristics, such as 

executive functioning, motor skills, and maturation of the nervous system. Though Grosskopf's 
31 

report noted that the Trails Test "is also sensitive to detecting several cognitive impairments," 

there was no explanation of what those impairments are, such as how dot-connecting is probative 

of respondent's ability to understand Miranda warnings and their waiver. 

¶ 83 In the video recording of Erickson's interrogation, respondent appears consistently dazed 

and adrift. While he answers most of Erickson's questions, he does not appear altogether present 

in the interrogation room. An example of respondent's aloofness throughout the interrogation is 

his response to Erickson's request that he place his initials next to each Miranda right to indicate 

he understands them. Instead, respondent becomes caught up with whether he should print or 

sign his name, ultimately printing his whole name above the entire paragraph of Miranda rights. 

Moreover, while Erickson reads the Miranda warnings, respondent responds each time with the 

nodding of his head. The court stated: "[H]e is nodding emphatically, as he always does when 

it's clear that he understands what is going on," however, this is contradicted by the evidence. As 

Puck testified, respondent's head nods are indicative of his not understanding something. See 

Daniels, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 792 ("[A] defendant's affirmative responses to questions regarding 

her understanding of Miranda warnings are of little value where defendant lacks the ability to

understand those warnings."). 

¶ 84 Further, the court's references to respondent's "laser beam" focus, is also contrary to the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Not only does the video recording itself belie the court's 

conclusion, but every witness to testify at the hearing, except for Erickson, testified to 

respondent's short attention span and his inability to concentrate. 

¶ 85 Finally, while previous exposure to the criminal justice system has been deemed relevant 

to a determination of whether a defendant understood his rights (see, e.g., Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 58), 

this factor does not militate in the State's favor in this case. As the trial court aptly pointed out, 
32 

respondent's two experiences in teen court provide no evidence as to whether or not respondent 

had ever been read his Miranda rights before. Of course, even if respondent had been read those 

rights before, that "in no way means that he understood what was read to him." In re J.M., 2014 

IL App (5th) 120196, ¶ 35. 

¶ 86 The totality of the circumstances indicate that respondent did not understand his Miranda

rights, nor did he comprehend what their waiver would entail. No special care was taken to 

ensure that respondent, an intellectually impaired juvenile, understood the nature of the rights or 

the consequences of waiving them. Accordingly, respondent could not have knowingly and 

intelligently waived those rights, and the incriminating statements he made while in custodial 

interrogation are inadmissible. See W.C., 167 Ill. 2d at 327. 

¶ 87 We do not find that the admission of respondent's incriminating statement was harmless. 

See People v. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d 95, 114 (1988) ("Confessions carry 'extreme probative 

weight,' and therefore the admission of an unlawfully obtained confession rarely is harmless 

error.); People v. R.C., 108 Ill. 2d 349, 356 (1985) ("[A] confession is the most powerful piece of 

evidence the State can offer, and its effect on a [trier of fact] is incalculable."). Indeed, the State 

does not argue that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

¶ 88 Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's adjudication of delinquency, reverse its ruling on 

the motion to suppress respondent's confession, and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 89 CONCLUSION

¶ 90 The judgment of the circuit court of Bureau County is vacated in part, reversed in part, 

and remanded for further proceedings. 

¶ 91 Vacated in part and reversed in part. 

¶ 92 Cause remanded.