[Cite as In re Adoption of H.P., 2021-Ohio-4567.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

VAN WERT COUNTY 

 

IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: CASE NO. 15-21-03 

 H.P., 

[KAIDIN W. - APPELLANT] O P I N I O N 

 

Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court 

Probate Division 

Trial Court No. 20204017 

Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: December 27, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Elizabeth M. Mosser for Appellant 

Jerry M. Johnson for Appellees, Jeffrey and Nicole P. 

John C. Huffman for Appellee, Josephine D. 

 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-2- 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant Kaidin W. (“Kaidin”) brings this appeal from the judgment 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Van Wert County, Probate Division, denying his 

motion to be joined as a party and finding that his consent to the adoption of H.P. 

was unnecessary. On appeal, Kaidin claims that the trial court erred in 1) holding 

that the putative father statute applied in his case once paternity was established, 2) 

denying his motion to be joined as a party, 3) applying R.C. 3107.06(B)(3) in an 

unconstitutional manner. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is reversed. 

{¶2} The trial court in this case made the following findings of fact. Prior to 

February 2020, Kaidin and Josephine D. (“Josephine”) were in a dating relationship. 

Doc. 27 at 1. In February 2020, Josephine advised Kaidin that she was pregnant. 

Doc. 27 at 1. Josephine indicated she wished to place the child for adoption, but 

Kaidin told her he wanted to keep the child. Doc. 27 at 1. For the next several 

months, Kaidin spoke weekly with Josephine or her father James D. (“James”) about 

the pregnancy. Doc. 27 at 2. This continued until Josephine asked him not to call 

so frequently, when he reduced his contact to every other week. Doc. 27 at 2. 

Kaidin was informed that the due date of the child was September 5, 2020. Doc. 27 

at 2. Kaidin retained counsel who advised him to register with the putative father 

registry after the birth of the child. Doc. 27 at 2. On August 26, 2020, Kaidin’s 

attorney advised Kaidin that Josephine and her family did not want him to contact 

them anymore. Doc. 27 at 2. H.P. was then born on August 31, 2020. Doc. 27 at 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-3- 

2. On September 3, 2020, H.P. was placed for adoption with Jeffrey and Nicole P. 

and they filed their petition to adopt the child on the same day in the Van Wert 

County Probate Court. Doc. 27 at 2. On September 16, 2020, counsel for Kaidin 

learned of the birth of the child and he notified Kaidin of the birth, advising him to 

register on the putative father registry immediately. Doc. 27 at 2. An hour or so 

later, the attorney learned the actual birthdate of the child and notified Kaidin of the 

time. Doc. 27 at 2. On September 17, 2020, Kaidin filed a petition to determine 

paternity and obtain custody in the Logan County Juvenile Court. Doc. 27 at 2. 

Kaidin also filed in the Van Wert County Probate Court a motion to intervene in the 

adoption case along with an affidavit indicating that he was objecting to the adoption 

and that he wanted custody of H.P. Doc. 7, 18. 

{¶3} The hearing on the adoption petition was held on January 21, 2020. 

Prior to the hearing, the juvenile court established that Kaidin was the father of H.P. 

Although Josephine defended the paternity finding, no appeal was taken from the 

judgment. At the consent hearing, the parties stipulated that Kaidin had been legally 

determined to be the father of H.P. pursuant to R.C. 3111.04. Doc. 27 at 2. The 

trial court noted this finding and also noted that Kaidin had demonstrated a deep 

commitment to parenting H.P. Doc. 27 at 3. However, the trial court determined 

that since Kaidin was a putative father at the time of the filing of the adoption 

petition and had not filed with the registry in a timely manner, his consent was not 

needed for the adoption. Doc. 27 at 4. The trial court then denied the motion to 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-4- 

intervene. Doc. 27 at 4. The trial court did not address Kaidin’s status as biological 

father as was determined by the juvenile court and stipulated by the parties. Kaidin 

appeals from this judgment and raises the following assignments of error. 

First Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred by overruling [Kaidin’s] objection to the

adoption and finding his consent unnecessary. 

Second Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred by denying [Kaidin’s] motion to be joined as 

a party. 

Third Assignment of Error 

R.C. 3107.06(B)(3) is unconstitutional as applied in this matter 

when parentage is legally established at the time of the consent 

hearing. 

Fourth Assignment of Error 

R.C. 3107.07(B)(1) is unconstitutional as applied in this matter 

when [Kaidin] registered with the putative father registry prior 

to the consent hearing, was present at the consent hearing, and

petitioners had notice of such registration and objection to the 

petition within two weeks of their petition being filed.

{¶4} In the first assignment of error, Kaidin claims the trial court erred by 

overruling his objection to the adoption and finding his consent was unnecessary as 

a putative father. In re Adoption of H.N.R., 145 Ohio St.3d 144, 2015-Ohio-5476, 

¶ 16, 47 N.E.3d 803. At the time of the filing of the adoption petition, Kaidin had 

not registered with the putative father registry and did not do so within 15 days of 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-5- 

the birth.1

 “For the purpose of preserving the requirement of his consent to an 

adoption, a putative father shall register before or not later than fifteen days after 

the birth of the child.” R.C. 3107.062. The consent of a father who fails to register 

in a timely manner is not needed for the adoption to proceed. R.C. 3107.07. There 

is no question that Kaidin, at the time the petition to adopt was filed was a putative 

father. There is also no question that Kaidin did not register within 15 days of the 

birth of H.P. As a matter of law, Kaidin’s consent as a putative father was not 

necessary. The trial court did not err in making such a determination. 

{¶5} Although the trial court did not err in finding Kaidin’s consent was not 

necessary as a putative father, that is not the end of the consideration because at the 

time of the hearing Kaidin had a second status, that of biological father whose 

paternity had been judicially determined. 

[S]eparate from [the putative-father] process, a father still has the 

option of securing the right to receive notice of the filing of an 

adoption petition and the right to withhold consent to an adoption 

by establishing legal paternity through court or administrative

proceedings[.] 

H.N.R., supra at ¶ 19. The failure to timely register merely “precludes him from 

receiving notice and an opportunity to prove that his consent as a mere putative 

1

 This court notes that the trial court’s findings of fact show that despite the failure to register with the putative 

father registry, Josephine was aware of Kaidin’s objections. Prior to the birth, Josephine and her family broke 

off all communication with Kaidin and told him to not contact them. When the child was born, no one 

contacted Kaidin and Josephine proceeded to place the child for adoption even knowing that Kaidin objected. 

Kaidin did not even learn of the child’s birth, which was early, until after the time to register had passed. The 

trial court also found that Kaidin’s counsel was the one who told him not to register until after the birth. 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-6- 

father should be required for a child’s adoption.” Id. This court notes that this issue 

stems from the fact that two different courts were exercising their original exclusive 

jurisdiction at the same time. Prior to 2016, the rule in Ohio was if one court was 

exercising jurisdiction over a child, other courts would stay any proceedings filed 

until the first court was finished exercising its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of 

Ohio has since changed this rule to allow a juvenile court and a probate court to 

exercise their exclusive original jurisdiction over a child at the same time. State ex 

rel. Allen County Children Servs. Bd. v. Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, 

Probate Division, et al., 150 Ohio St.3d 230, 2016-Ohio-7382, 81 N.E.3d 380. In 

that case, the Court held that a probate court could proceed with an adoption case 

despite the fact that a juvenile court was already exercising jurisdiction over the 

child by having awarded temporary custody of the child to the Allen County 

Children Services Board. Using the logic set forth in that case, the juvenile court 

had jurisdiction to hear the paternity case although the adoption petition was filed 

first. The juvenile court proceeded to reach a conclusion that Kaidin was the 

biological father of H.P., thus setting forth a second status for Kaidin. 

{¶6} The facts of this case, as stipulated by the parties and found by the trial 

court, show that paternity was established prior to the consent hearing.2

 Although 

the paternity action was not filed before the petition to adopt, R.C. 3111.04 does not 

2

 This Court notes that no continuances or stays were granted to Kaidin to allow him extra time to have the 

paternity proceeding completed before the consent hearing on the adoption. 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-7- 

set a time limit for when the action must be filed. Likewise, the Supreme Court of 

Ohio has not strictly construed the requirement set forth in R.C. 3107.06(B)(3), 

which states that to be considered a father whose consent is necessary, the paternity 

must be established prior to the filing of the adoption petition. In re Adoption of 

Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647. Instead, the Court 

has held that even though the paternity was not established prior to the filing of the 

petition, it was not “too late for the paternity action to render the man contesting the 

adoption a ‘father’”. In re Adoption of P.A.C., 126 Ohio St.3d 236, 2010-Ohio3351, ¶ 12, 933 N.E.2d 236. In P.A.C., the biological father had filed his complaint 

for allocation of parental rights in the juvenile court prior to the filing of the adoption 

petition in the probate court, but it was not finalized, as required by the statute for 

consent to be necessary. The probate court granted a stay in the adoption proceeding 

pending the outcome of the juvenile court paternity action. As discussed above, this 

was done because the juvenile court was already exercising its exclusive original 

jurisdiction at the time that the petition to adopt was filed to invoke the exclusive 

original jurisdiction of the probate court. Since juvenile and probate courts can now 

exercise their exclusive original jurisdiction concurrently, there no longer is a “race 

to the courthouse” to see which can be filed first. Instead, apparently as a result of 

the Supreme Court’s allowance of two courts to simultaneously exercise jurisdiction 

over a child, it has become a race to see who can get the judgment completed first. 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-8- 

{¶7} This is not to say that there is no logic in allowing the paternity action 

to proceed without a stay. 

“[T]he right of a natural parent to the care and custody of his

children is one of the most precious and fundamental in law.” In 

re Adoption of Masa (1986), [23 Ohio St.3d 163, 164, 492 N.E.2d 

140] citing Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 

1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599. Santosky has been characterized as 

“requiring a clear and convincing standard for termination of 

parental rights because the parent’s interest is fundamental but 

the State has no legitimate interest in termination unless the 

parent is unfit, and finding that the State’s interest in finding the 

best home for the child does not arise until the parent has been 

found unfit.” Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Health (1990), 497 

U.S. 261, 319, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (Brennan, J., 

dissenting). 

“Few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance 

of natural family ties.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 

71 L.Ed.2d 599 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Because adoption 

terminates fundamental rights of the natural parents, “we have 

held that ‘* * * [a]ny exception to the requirement of parental

consent [to adoption] must be strictly construed so as to protect 

the right of natural parents to raise and nurture their children.’” 

[Masa, supra at 165] quoting In re Schoeppner (1976), [46 Ohio 

St.2d 21, 24, 345 N.E.2d 608]. With “a family association so 

undeniably important * * * at stake,” we approach the case before 

us “mindful of the gravity” of the circumstances and the longterm impact on all the concerned parties. M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996), 

519 U.S. 102, 117, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473. 

P.A.C. supra at ¶ 5-6. Likewise, this Court has previously held that we must strictly 

construe the language in the adoption statutes to protect the interests of the 

nonconsenting parent who may be subjected to the loss of his or her parental rights. 

In re Adoption of S.S., 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-17-06, 2017-Ohio-8956, ¶ 18, 101 

N.E.3d 527. 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-9- 

{¶8} The trial court correctly considered whether Kaidin’s consent as a 

putative father was required and determined that, pursuant to the statute, it was not. 

However, as Kaidin had obtained a determination of paternity prior to the consent 

hearing, he also had the status as the legal father with all of the rights and 

responsibilities that entails. That includes the right to have the trial court determine 

whether his consent is necessary pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A). This question was 

not considered by the trial court. This matter must be remanded for the trial court 

for such consideration. Thus, the trial court erred by finding Kaidin’s consent was 

not necessary solely because of his status as a putative father and the first assignment 

of error is sustained. 

{¶9} Kaidin alleges in the second assignment of error that the trial court erred 

in denying his motion to intervene because he failed to register as a putative father. 

As discussed above, Kaidin has a second status as legal father based upon the 

judicial determination of paternity by the juvenile court. As the legal father, Kaidin 

is entitled to be a part of the proceedings. Thus, the trial court erred in denying the 

motion to intervene. The second assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶10} In the third and fourth assignments of error, Kaidin alleges that the 

statutes at issue in this case were unconstitutional as applied. Based upon our 

holdings in the first two assignments of error, the third and fourth assignments of 

error are rendered moot. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). This court thus issues no opinion on 

them. 
Case No. 15-21-03 

-10- 

{¶11} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Van Wert 

County, Probate Division, is reversed and the matter is remanded for further 

proceedings in accord with this opinion. 

Judgment Reversed 

And Cause Remanded 

ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur. 

/hls