If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re M. R. SIVANOV, Minor. February 17, 2022

No. 357796

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2020-000754-NA

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and SAWYER and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating his parental rights to his child, MRS, 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused physical injury or physical or sexual abuse to 

the child or a sibling of the child), (j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if returned 

to parent), and (k)(ii) (sexual abuse of the child or a sibling of the child with criminal sexual 

conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate). On 

appeal, respondent argues that (1) the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate 

his parental rights because petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to meet its 

burden under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii), and (2) the trial court erred by finding that 

it was in MRS’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The trial court first acquired jurisdiction over MRS following a Department of Health and 

Human Services (DHHS) petition for permanent custody alleging that respondent had sexually 

abused MRS’s sibling and had a criminal history. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

determined that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of 

respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii). The trial court also 

determined that petitioner established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was in MRS’s best interests. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSES

Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that petitioner 

presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii). We disagree.
-2-

In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that a statutory ground has been 

established by clear and convincing evidence. In re MOTA, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 

881 (2020). The trial court’s findings and rulings regarding statutory grounds are reviewed for 

clear error. Id. “A finding . . . is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted) 

(omission in original). Furthermore, “regard [must] be given to the special opportunity of the trial 

court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” Id. (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). 

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) if it finds by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent’s child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury 

or physical or sexual abuse under circumstances in which “[t]he parent’s act caused the physical 

injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 

child will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.” 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i).

We conclude that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that MRS and MRS’s 

sibling suffered sexual abuse from respondent’s actions. The sibling’s uncontradicted testimony 

established not only a pattern of inappropriate touching, but also numerous, specific instances of 

sexual assault involving penetration by respondent over a roughly five-year period. Furthermore, 

while less severe than respondent’s actions toward MRS’s sibling, there was also evidence from 

the sibling’s testimony that respondent had abused MRS via inappropriate touching. And despite 

respondent’s criticism that the trial court’s findings were based almost completely on the sibling’s 

testimony, the trial court determined this testimony to be credible. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 

444, 460; 781 NW2d 105 (2009) (“It is not for this Court to displace the trial court’s credibility 

determination.”). 

We also conclude that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that there was a 

reasonable likelihood that MRS would suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if he 

were returned to respondent’s care. Critically, “[e]vidence of how a parent treats one child is 

evidence of how he or she may treat the other children.” In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 266; 

817 NW2d 115 (2011). Though respondent was not the legal or biological father of MRS’s sibling, 

he still held himself in a fatherly role, and his egregious abuse of MRS’s sibling is thus indicative 

of how he may treat MRS in the future. And though no evidence was presented showing that 

respondent had sexually assaulted MRS on any specific occasion to the same degree as MRS’s 

sibling, the sibling highlighted frequent inappropriate touching between respondent and MRS.

MRS’s vulnerability also heightens the risk of future abuse. As the trial court recognized,

MRS’s intellectual limitations render him unable to report inappropriate conduct, making him an 

easy target for exploitation. Considering all of this evidence, we conclude that there is a substantial 

risk that MRS would be subjected to future abuse if respondent’s rights were not terminated. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err when it determined that petitioner presented clear and 

convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(i).

Only one statutory ground need be established to support termination of parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3). In re Martin, 316 Mich App 73, 90; 896 NW2d 452 (2016). Therefore, 
-3-

termination of respondent’s parental rights was appropriate based upon MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) 

alone. Nonetheless, we address the additional statutory grounds for termination in turn, 

recognizing that there exists substantial factual overlap when analyzing these three provisions.

Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that petitioner 

presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We disagree.

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if it finds by clear 

and convincing evidence that “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity 

of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). As previously discussed, petitioner presented clear and convincing 

evidence that there was a reasonable likelihood that MRS would suffer from injury or abuse in the 

foreseeable future if MRS were returned to respondent’s care. It thus follows that, because any 

future abuse would certainly be harmful to the child, there is also a reasonable likelihood that MRS

would be harmed if returned to respondent’s home. Specifically, respondent’s prior assaults of

MRS’s sibling and his inappropriate touching of both children place MRS in harm’s way were he 

to be returned to respondent’s custody. This is especially true considering MRS’s intellectual 

limitations and inability to report possible future abuse. Therefore, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was 

sufficiently established by clear and convincing evidence.

Respondent next argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that petitioner 

presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii). We disagree.

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii) if it finds by 

clear and convincing evidence that “the parent abused the child or a sibling of the child” through 

“[c]riminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or assault with intent to 

penetrate” and that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to the 

care of the parent.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii). Furthermore, “a parent need not be criminally 

charged with or convicted of criminal sexual conduct” so long as the requisite act(s) are established 

by clear and convincing evidence. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 410; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).

As noted, MRS’s sibling testified to three specific assaults that respondent committed 

against her, all of which allegedly involved penetration (though the sibling did not explicitly recall 

penetration during the second incident, this was a reasonable inference to make considering she 

woke up to respondent pulling up her pants and noticed white stuff in her underwear). And the 

trial court found this testimony credible. Additionally, for those reasons mentioned earlier, there 

is a reasonable likelihood that MRS would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. We thus 

conclude that MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii) was sufficiently established by clear and convincing 

evidence.

Respondent finally argues that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in MRS’s best interests. We disagree.

Whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests must be established 

by a preponderance of evidence. In re MOTA, 334 Mich App at 320. The trial court’s findings 
-4-

and ruling that termination is in the child’s best interests are reviewed for clear error. Id. “A 

finding . . . is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted) (omission in original). 

Furthermore, “regard [must] be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best 

interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (citation omitted). To 

determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the court should 

consider factors including “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s 

need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s 

home.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “If the court finds that there are grounds for 

termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, 

the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification 

of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5).

Here, the trial court explicitly acknowledged factors weighing against termination, 

including that MRS was currently safe in placement with his mother and respondent was in 

custody. But the court nevertheless concluded that termination was in MRS’s best interests because 

of MRS’s vulnerability and the potential of future harm. Given respondent’s actions toward MRS

and MRS’s sibling, as well as MRS’s cognitive limitations, it was not clearly erroneous to conclude 

that termination was in MRS’s best interests. 

And though respondent claims that the trial court erred by failing to consider his home 

environment, employment, parenting skills, or any substance abuse issues, the trial court is merely 

obligated to weigh all available evidence in evaluating a child’s best interests. Respondent was 

free to testify himself or present witnesses on any of these potentially mitigating factors, but he 

failed to do so. The trial court thus properly evaluated the evidence that was presented, which 

mostly consisted of the uncontested testimony of MRS’s sibling concerning the abuse perpetrated 

by respondent. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it determined 

that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in MRS’s best interests under MCL 

712A.19b(5).

Affirmed.

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Michael F. Gadola