FORD MOTOR COMPANY’S RECALL OF CERTAIN

FIRESTONE TIRES

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEES ON

COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

AND

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 19, 2001

Serial No. 107–45

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY’S RECALL OF CERTAIN FIRESTONE TIRES

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FORD MOTOR COMPANY’S RECALL OF CERTAIN

FIRESTONE TIRES

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEES ON

COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

AND

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 19, 2001

Serial No. 107–45

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida

JOE BARTON, Texas

FRED UPTON, Michigan

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER COX, California

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

GREG GANSKE, Iowa

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

CHARLES ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, Mississippi

VITO FOSSELLA, New York

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

ED BRYANT, Tennessee

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland

STEVE BUYER, Indiana

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

MARY BONO, California

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

BART GORDON, Tennessee

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

TOM SAWYER, Ohio

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland

GENE GREEN, Texas

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin

BILL LUTHER, Minnesota

LOIS CAPPS, California

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana

JANE HARMAN, California

DAVID V. MARVENTANO, Staff Director

JAMES D. BARNETTE, General Counsel

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida, Chairman

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

Vice Chairman

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

ED BRYANT, Tennessee

STEVE BUYER, Indiana

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana

(Ex Officio)

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

LOIS CAPPS, California

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana

JANE HARMAN, California

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

BART GORDON, Tennessee

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,

(Ex Officio)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania, Chairman

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

Vice Chairman

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana

(Ex Officio)

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida

BART STUPAK, Michigan

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,

(Ex Officio)

(II)

3

C O N T E N T S

Page

Testimony of:

Jackson, Hon. Michael P., Deputy Secretary, accompanied by Robert

Shelton, Executive Director, and Kenneth Weinstein, Associate Administrator for Safety Assurance, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ......................................................................................................... 314

Lampe, John, President and Chief Executive Officer, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc ....................................................................................................... 99

Nasser, Jacques, President and Chief Executive Officer, Ford Motor Company ................................................................................................................ 26

(III)

(1)

FORD MOTOR COMPANY’S RECALL OF

CERTAIN FIRESTONE TIRES

TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE AND

CONSUMER PROTECTION, JOINT WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in

room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cliff Stearns

(chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection) presiding.

Members present Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection: Representatives Stearns, Upton, Deal, Whitfield,

Shimkus, Bryant, Pitts, Terry, Tauzin (ex officio), Towns, Capps,

Doyle, Harman, Markey, Gordon, Deutsch, and Dingell (ex officio).

Members present Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:

Representatives Greenwood, Stearns, Burr, Whitfield, Tauzin (ex

officio), Deutsch, Stupak, Strickland, and Dingell (ex officio).

Also present: Representative Sawyer.

Staff present: Thomas DiLenge, majority counsel; Kelly Zerzan,

majority counsel; Ann Washington, majority counsel; Jennifer

Safavian, majority counsel; Will Carty, legislative clerk; Peter

Kielty, legislative clerk; Edith Holleman, micority Counsel; M.

Bruce Gwinn, minority professional staff member; and Christopher

H. Knaver, minority investigator.

Mr. STEARNS. Good morning. The joint committees will come to

order. Welcome to the joint Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection Subcommittee and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, hearings to discuss the issue of Ford’s recall of certain

Firestone tires.

I welcome all of our distinguished witnesses, including Mr. Nasser, the President and CEO of Ford Motor Company; and Mr.

Lampe, President and CEO of Bridgestone/Firestone, Incorporated;

and the Honorable Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Transportation.

It has only been 8 months since the committee last visited the

issue of tires. Last September, we held hearings on Firestone’s recall of its Wilderness ATX and ATX II and certain Wilderness tires

due to their excessive propensity to detread in high rates of speed.

This year our committee examines the tire issue again. Although

this hearing does not present such clear cut facts, we are confronted with a most unusual situation, where one company is reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
2

calling the product of another company. The day after Firestone rejected Ford’s request to recall additional tires and declared its decision to end its relationship with Ford, a historic American corporate partnership dating back 100 years, Ford Motor Company decided to voluntarily recall all Firestone Wilderness AT tires on all

of its vehicles, encompassing a total of 13 million tires at a cost of

nearly $3 billion.

Why a recall? What prompted this replacement program? Ford

tells us that this significant action was warranted based on increasing tire claim rates for certain Firestone Wilderness AT tires

and on Ford’s own laboratory testing. Firestone, on the other hand,

tells us that the Firestone Wilderness AT tire performed similar to

competitors in its own testing, and that some of the tires being replaced by Ford have little to no tire claims. Further, Firestone publicly questions the stability of the Ford Explorer, the vehicle in

which most of the tire claims have taken place.

To prove their case, both companies have conducted tests, performed experiments and hired experts. Both companies have loaded

us with charts, statistics and diagrams. Unfortunately, when asked

the same questions, the companies respond with two different answers. The information presented by both Ford around Firestone is

typically contradictory and incompatible. But the one conclusion

that cannot be questioned is that there is an increase in consumer

confusion. The position of Ford and Firestone necessarily reflects

their different vantage points, influenced by shareholders’ profits,

motives and litigation considerations.

My point is this: We cannot rely solely on Ford and Firestone to

provide us with all this information, and we can’t expect the American consumer to do the detailed and lengthy analysis that is necessary to reach a conclusion.

That is specifically why we have a government agency dedicated

to automobile safety, namely the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, or NHTSA. Pursuant to statute, NHTSA’s mandate

is to carry out safety programs under the National Traffic and

Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1996 and the Highway Safety Act of

1966. Specifically NHTSA is responsible for, among other things,

reducing deaths, injuries and economic losses resulting from motor

vehicle crashes by setting and enforcing safety performance standards and investigating safety defects in motor vehicles.

Therefore, we must look to the agency expert in these issues for

guidance, and we are fortunate to have honorable Michael Jackson,

Deputy Secretary of the Department of Transportation, here to testify, accompanied by NHTSA personnel. However, it is my understanding that while NHTSA has been investigating these tire

issues since last year, the agency has not reached any final result

and will not be providing us today with any firm conclusions. In

fact, NHTSA’s investigation is not expected to conclude until later

this summer, but meanwhile, there are a number of outstanding

safety issues. What is the proper failure rate for tires? Is there a

baseline upon which all tires should be judged, what are what

other factors should we be relying on to determine whether tires

are strong and stable? In other words, what is safe? And just as

important, is NHTSA prepared to implement the law passed by

this committee in response to the Ford Firestone problem, the

3

TREAD Act? Under the TREAD Act, truckloads of information will

soon be deposited on NHTSA’s doorstep. Is the agency prepared to

utilize this information to effectively protect the driving public?

All of these questions deserve answers, and I hope NHTSA is

prepared to offer conclusions soon. American citizens pay taxes for

government services. NHTSA provides a service and NHTSA’s customers, the U.S. taxpayers, are not getting the answers they paid

for.

Unfortunately, in the absence of NHTSA’s independent analysis

to analyze the Ford and Firestone positions, many parties will pay

a price. The effect of this voluntary recall has far-reaching ramifications well beyond the parties involved. Not only does this recall

affect Ford and Firestone, but the recall also affects car manufacturers whose customers will question the safety of Firestone Wilderness AT tires on their own vehicles. And the recall affects other

tire companies who must change production patterns to make replacement tires for Ford’s vehicles.

Caught in the middle is the consumer, who is questioning whether Firestone tires are safe and whether the Ford Explorer is stable?

But in debating this issue, it is all too easy to focus on the individual parts and miss the big picture. We are here to protect the

American consumer from both detreaded tires and allegation from

unfounded fears arising from conflicting information. This hearing

is designed to produce information that the customer can use to

best educate him or herself.

I thank the chairman of the Oversight Investigation Subcommittee, Chairman Greenwood, for jointly hosting this hearing,

and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. At this, the ranking member—acting ranking member—for an opening statement,

Mr. Dingell, the ranking member of the full committee.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kindness in

recognizing me, and I want to thank you for this important hearing. This is the second time in a year that the committee is considering safety problems involving Firestone tires. Last year, the Ford

Motor Company determined from information it requested and received from Firestone that there were an unusually high number

of claims, fatalities and injuries resulting from——

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Dingell, is your microphone on?

Mr. DINGELL. As best I can determine, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. I am just having a little trouble hearing, that is

all.

Mr. DINGELL. Should I get closer?

Mr. STEARNS. Yes. There you go.

Mr. DINGELL. At Ford’s insistence, Firestone then recalled 6.5

million tires, including all ATX tires produced for the Explorers. In

addition, Ford found that the claims were so high for other Explorer tires that Firestone produced in Decatur, Illinois that Firestone also had to recall 15-inch Wilderness AT tires produced for

Ford at that plant.

With new information it received from Firestone on May 11 of

this year, Ford determined that last year’s recall did not take care

of the problem. Instead, there are rapidly growing number of Firestone claims involving Explorer tires that are not recalled last year.

The data received in May show that there have been 110 tread sepVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
4

aration claims involving Firestone’s Wilderness AT tires compared

with only 27 claims in the data provided to Ford last August. During this same period of time, crash claims have gone from 0 to 20,

moreover, claims from 0 to 11, injury claims from 0 to 22 and fatality claims from 0 to 7.

Seeing in this new data the same safety concerns and trends that

caused last year’s recall, Ford announced on May 22nd its Firestone tire replacement program. This is not a recall, because Ford

did not make the tires. Under this replacement program, Ford will

either replace or reimburse vehicle owners for the replacement of

13 million Firestone tires. Ford estimates that it will take 9

months, as much as $3 billion to complete the Firestone tire replacement program.

Ford’s action has sparked a lot of finger pointing, but the public

rightly wants to know whether the tires on their vehicles are safe,

and they are entitled to know that. Are the tread separations Ford

has identified unique to Firestone tires, or do other tires have similar problems?

Is Firestone continuing to produce tires that endanger the public

safety? Are there particular Firestone manufacturing facilities that

are producing bad tires? Should tread separation be viewed as a

foreseeable event, as some have suggested? Unfortunately, the one

best able to answer these and other important questions has yet to

be heard from. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration began its investigation of the 47 million ATX, ATX II and Wilderness tires manufactured by Firestone more than a year ago. It

has yet to complete its testing and analysis. It is probably months

away from issuing its report and findings.

At this time, NHTSA’s task is made more difficult by the fact

that it has no permanent or even acting administrator, something

which must be cured quickly. The administration needs to give its

attention to getting control of this agency and having it complete

its work in an efficient and timely manner. Both Ford and Firestone have provided huge quantities of information to the committee and NHTSA. Particularly instructive is the data on the performance of Firestone and Goodyear tires when about an equal

number of tires from each manufacturer were put on Explorers in

model years 1995, 1996 and 1997.

Through the end of last year, data for these model years that

Ford received from Firestone reveals that there have been 1,183

claims involving tread separations on the Firestone tires, and only

two claims involving tread area problems on Goodyear tires. Furthermore, the two Goodyear tire claims were for property damage

only. No deaths injuries or lawsuits were involved. And according

to Goodyear, these claims may have involved nothing more serious

than a puncture, rather than total tread separations that have occurred on Firestone tires.

Goodyear says its tires hold up as well on the Explorer as on

other vehicles. From 1996 through the year 2000, Goodyear says

87.7 million of its tires have been used on SUVs other than Explorers, light trucks, minivans and station wagons. And during that

time, Goodyear has had no tread separation claims involving

deaths, injuries or lawsuits.

5

However, the data tells quite a different story for the Firestone

tire. Tread separation claims involving the Firestone tire on the

Explorer have continued to grow. Ford’s analysis of the data it received from Firestone in May shows that in the fifth year of use,

the 16-inch Wilderness AT tire produced at Firestone’s Wilson,

North Carolina plant has an extremely high tread separation rate

of 450 claims per million tires.

So why is there such a big difference in the claims rates for

Goodyear and Firestone tires? It has been suggested that Ford

shipped many more Explorers equipped with Firestone tires to hotweather States than did Explorers equipped with Goodyear tires.

Sounds possible, but it doesn’t appear to be true. In model years

1995 through 1997, Ford says it shipped 95,000 Explorers with

Firestone tires and 85,000 Explorers with Goodyear tires to hot

weather states, Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada

and Texas. Although most tread separation claims have come from

hot weather States, not a single one of these claims involve death,

injury or a lawsuit attributable to a Goodyear tire on the Explorer

vehicle.

It has also been suggested that there is something unique about

the Explorer that causes tread separation. Again, Firestone’s own

claims suggest otherwise. There has been a substantial number of

tread separations that have occurred on Firestone tires, like those

used on the Explorer when these tires have been installed as

aftermarket tires on other non-Explorer SUVs, including the Toyota Forerunner, the Nissan Pathfinder and the Mitsubishi

Montero, and on the Isuzu Rodeo.

Ford’s analysis has raised questions about Firestone’s manufacturing quality control. The peel strength of the rubber Firestone

used to make its tires and the durability of its tires all were found

to vary from plant to plant.

Perhaps most importantly, the amount of rubber in the critical

wedge area of Firestone’s 15 and 16 Wilderness tires was found to

vary by plant. Of the plants most recently producing tires for Ford,

the wedge rubber was smallest at Wilson, North Carolina plants

and thickest at the Aiken, South Carolina plant. Firestone’s Joliette, Canada plant ranked somewhere between the other two. However, all Firestone plants produce tires with less rubber in the

wedge stone area than Goodyear.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, given the information it had, I find

no problem with Ford having taken the action it did. In fact, for

Ford not to have replaced these tires would have raised serious

questions in the mind, I think, of the public, that proper safety and

other concerns of customers were being served.

Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and

I look forward to hearing the statements of the witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John D. Dingell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this important hearing.

This is the second time within a year that the Committee is considering safety

problems involving Firestone tires. Last year, Ford Motor Company determined

from information it requested and received from Firestone that there were an unusually high number of claims, fatalities, and injuries resulting from tread separaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
6

tions of certain Firestone tires on the Explorer vehicle. At Ford’s insistence, Firestone then recalled 6.5 million tires, including all ATX tires Firestone produced for

the Explorer. In addition, Ford found that claims were so high for other Explorer

tires Firestone produced at Decatur, Illinois, that Firestone also had to recall the

15-inch Wilderness AT tire produced for Ford at that plant.

With new information it received from Firestone on May 11th of this year, Ford

determined that last year’s recall did not take care of the problem. Instead, there

are a rapidly growing number of Firestone claims involving Explorer tires that were

not recalled last year. The new data received in May show there have been 110

tread separation claims involving Firestone’s Wilderness AT tires compared to only

27 claims in the data provided to Ford last August. During this same period of time,

crash claims have gone from zero to 20; rollover claims from zero to 11; injury

claims from zero to 22; and fatality claims from zero to seven.

Seeing in this new data the same safety concerns and trends that led to last

year’s recall, Ford announced on May 22nd its ‘‘Firestone Tire Replacement Program.’’ This is not a recall, because Ford did not make the tires. Under this replacement program, Ford will either replace or reimburse vehicle owners for the replacement of 13 million Firestone tires. Ford estimates it will take nine months and as

much as $3 billion to complete the Firestone tire replacement program.

Ford’s action has sparked a lot of finger pointing, but the public rightly wants to

know whether the tires on their vehicles are safe. Are the tread separations Ford

has identified unique to Firestone tires, or do other tires have similar problems? Is

Firestone continuing to produce tires that endanger the public’s safety? Are there

particular Firestone manufacturing facilities that are producing bad tires? Should

tread separation be viewed as a ‘‘foreseeable’’ event, as some have suggested?

Unfortunately, the one best able to answer these and other important questions

has yet to be heard from. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

(NHTSA) began its investigation of about 47 million ATX, ATXII, and Wilderness

tires manufactured by Firestone more than a year ago. It has yet to complete its

testing and analysis, and is probably months away from issuing its report and findings. At this time, NHTSA’s task is made even more difficult by the fact that it has

no permanent, or even acting, administrator. The Administration needs to give its

attention to getting control of this agency and having it complete its work in an efficient and timely manner.

Both Ford and Firestone have provided huge quantities of information to the

Committee and to NHTSA. Particularly instructive is data on the performance of

the Firestone and Goodyear tires when about equal numbers of tires from each manufacturer were put on Explorers in model years 1995, 1996, and 1997. Through the

end of last year, data for these model years that Ford received from Firestone reveals there have been 1,183 claims involving tread separations on the Firestone

tires and only two claims involving tread area problems on the Goodyear tires. Furthermore, the two Goodyear claims were for property damage only. No deaths, injuries, or lawsuits were involved. And according to Goodyear, these two claims may

have involved nothing more serious than a puncture rather than the total tread separations that have occurred on Firestone tires.

Goodyear says its tires hold up as well on the Explorer as on other vehicles. From

1996 through the year 2000, Goodyear says 87.7 million of its tires have been used

on SUV’s other than the Explorer, light trucks, minivans, and station wagons. And

during that time, Goodyear has had no tread separation claims involving deaths, injuries, or lawsuits.

However, the data tells quite a different story for the Firestone tire. Tread separation claims involving the Firestone tire on the Explorer have continued to grow.

Ford’s analysis of the data it received from Firestone in May shows that in the fifth

year of use, the 16-inch Wilderness AT tire produced at Firestone’s Wilson, North

Carolina, plant has an extremely high tread separation claims rate of about 450

claims per million.

So, why is there such a big difference in the claims rates for Goodyear and Firestone tires? It has been suggested that Ford shipped many more Explorers equipped

with Firestone tires to hot weather states, than it did Explorers equipped with

Goodyear tires. Sounds possible, but it appears not to be true.

In model years 1995 through 1997, Ford says it shipped 95,000 Explorers with

Firestone tires and 85,000 Explorers with Goodyear tires to the hot weather states

of Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, and Texas. Although most tread

separation claims have come from hot weather states, not a single one of these

claims involving death, injury, or a lawsuit is attributable to the Goodyear tire on

the Explorer vehicle.

It has also been suggested that there is something unique about the Explorer that

causes tread separations. Again, Firestone’s own claims data would suggest otherVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
7

wise. There has been a substantial number of tread separations that have occurred

on Firestone tires like those used on the Explorer, when those tires have been installed as ‘‘aftermarket’’ tires on other non-Explorer SUV’s, including the Toyota 4

Runner, the Nissan Pathfinder, the Mitsubishi Montero, and the Isuzu Rodeo.

Ford’s analysis has also raised questions about Firestone’s manufacturing quality

control. The peel strength of the rubber Firestone used to make its tires and the

durability of its tires all were found to vary from plant to plant. Perhaps, most importantly, the amount of rubber in the critical wedge area of Firestone’s 15- and 16-

inch Wilderness AT tire was found to vary by plant. Of the plants most recently

producing tires for Ford, the wedge rubber was smallest at the Wilson, North Carolina, plant and thickest at the Aiken, South Carolina, plant. Firestone’s Joliette,

Canada, plant ranked in between the other two. However, all Firestone plants produced tires with less rubber in the wedge area than Goodyear.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, given the information it had, I find no problem with

Ford having taken the action it did. In fact, for Ford not to have replaced these

tires, would raise far more serious questions in my mind about their commitment

to public safety and the customers they serve.

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I look

forward to hearing the statements of the witnesses.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague. And now for an opening

statement, the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on

Oversight and Investigations.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are here today

because 203 people have died in automobile accidents involving certain Firestone tires, mostly fitted on Ford Explorers. To date, no

one has provided the American people with a definitive answer as

to why those deaths occurred. A number of months ago, both Ford

Motor Company and the Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. company

agreed to a recall of more than 6.5 million tires. And at that time,

both companies told the American public and this Congress that

the first recall was adequate in scope and did not need to include

any additional Wilderness AT tires.

As recently as December of last year, after what both manufacturers described as extensive testing and analysis, the companies

issued root cause findings, once again concluding that no further

recall of the Wilderness AT was required.

That, of course, was good news for America’s consumers, and

these two companies, since they had been replacing many of the recalled tires with the same product from plant—plants other than

Firestone’s Decatur facility, whose products had been judged to be

unsafe.

Now nearly 6 months later, Ford has come forward to say that

it does indeed have a safety concern about additional Wilderness

AT tires, particularly the 15 and 16-inch tires that were use primarily on the Ford Explorer, and that were used as replacement

tires during last year’s recall. It argues that the new claims data

provided by Firestone in May of this year show an increasing trend

in claims, accidents and injuries involving these two tire lines.

Ford also says that its laboratory testing of these tires and competitor tire lines reveals significant differences in durability that

further support its recall action.

We are now told that on the strength of these discoveries and

after $30 million in testing, the Ford Motor Company felt compelled to recall roughly 13 million Firestone Wilderness AT tires

from its vehicles, a $3 billion business decision that has set off a

fire storm of charges and countercharges between these two companies.

8

Just last month, Bridgestone/Firestone announced that it was

severing its nearly 100-year-old history with the Ford Motor Company.

Clearly, the stakes are high for both of these companies. Industry

analysts are already openly suggesting that Ford replace the name

Explorer with a new brand name, even though this product is the

best-selling sport utility vehicle on the market. Nor is Firestone immune from this kind of treatment. Some in the industry are busy

suggesting that the venerable brand name of Firestone be retired.

But if the stakes are high for these two companies, they are even

higher for America’s consumers. These events have raised much

broader questions about the safety in general, their safety in general, tire safety in general, the relationship of tires to their vehicle

systems and possible design flaws in the rollover of compact SUVs.

Even more important, for our purposes, the fallout of these

events has led to increased concern about the role of the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA plays in ensuring

the safety of cars, trucks and automotive products.

Last year, we learned how NHTSA initially failed to investigate

seriously the claims surrounding this issue but subsequently

leaped into the fray by issuing a consumer advisory last Labor Day

weekend, which focused on a long list of other Firestone tire lines.

NHTSA took this action, we are told, because claims rates on

these products had reached the threshold of 12.6 claims per million

tires produced. Whether this claim rate was about normal or a

clear indication of a safety concern were several of the factors that

NHTSA failed to establish before announcing this advisory. More

disturbing, still, it is our own understanding that NHTSA is now

in possession of data showing claims rates of a similar or greater

value on other tire lines, including those from both Firestone and

other tire manufacturers, and yet remains silent on the potential

or perceived risk, if any, to consumers of those products.

This inability of the Federal agency charged with protecting consumers to get the facts and to get them first has allowed the situation to deteriorate into the public relations equivalent of a shouting

match between these two manufacturers, and the role of honest

broker, which is precisely the mission of NHTSA, has been surrendered to two very threatened firms, whose data, even if correct, appears to have been manipulated in the way that makes their individual conclusions highly suspect.

The committee’s review of the actual Ford tests raises important

questions about whether comparable tests were, in fact, run. For

example, it appears Ford left off its peal strength chart, the results

from some of Firestone’s newer tires, which scored higher than

comparable Michelin tires and much closer to the tested Goodyear

tires, and nearly all of the Firestone tires Ford tested had been

used, either on road—on road or as spares. In hot States, while the

Michelin Goodyear tires tested were either all new or of uncertain

prior use.

These differences certainly raise questions about the methodology and possibly the results as well. Similar questions arise with

respect to the largest testing procedure utilized by Ford, its rig

tests, in which it placed a tire on the laboratory wheel and ran it

at varying speeds, air pressures, loads and ambient temperatures.

9

The way these rig test results were presented to the committee

could be considered as misleading, given that Ford disaggregated

the Firestone results by plant, while aggregating three Goodyear

plants into one plotted column, while also aggregating the 16 and

15-inch tire results, which made the percentage of the overall failure rate of Goodyear products much smaller, while allowing the difference between the two sets of tires to appear more stark. Combined with the differences in how the tests themselves were conducted, the aggregation issue becomes even more problematic.

Firestone, too, has its own set of findings based on questionable

assumptions and parameters. For example, Firestone has been very

vocal lately in claiming that the Explorer is more than twice as

likely as other SUVs to roll over, following a tire failure. Yet, when

we asked for the actual data underlying the statistic and the confidence bounds associated with it, we learn that Firestone included

all other SUVs, regardless of whether they were truly comparable

in size to the Explorer. We also found that the two State data

bases that Firestone relied on to contain a very small sample size

of accidents that fit Firestone’s queries, leading to a large—to large

ranges in possible statistical outcomes.

Indeed, the data could just as easily be read to find only a minimal and questionable increase in rollover associated with the Explorer, not the dramatic twice as likely Firestone touts publicly. In

making these observations, I am not suggesting that either company intentionally set out to mislead this committee or the American public, but we would be derelict in our duty if we did not keep

in mind that in the heat of this very public and high-stake battle,

both companies may be expected to produce their analyses in ways

that strengthen their own positions.

It is for that reason that until credible tests are done, the American consumer will not know the full truth of this matter and this

brings us again to NHTSA.

As Chairman Tauzin previously observed, there are serious questions about whether NHTSA’s current testing program will prove

any more fruitful than Ford’s or Firestone’s in ultimately answering the many unanswered questions that remain. And that is totally unacceptable.

Our role here is not to advance the interests of one company over

another or one product over another. Our role is to protect the interests of America’s consumers. NHTSA is our agent in this enterprise, and they must do the hard work to help us find honest answers. In that regard, allow me to give some useful advice to the

folks from NHTSA, which also may be appropriate for the management teams at Ford and Firestone. ‘‘Failure is the opportunity to

begin again more intelligently.’’ The man who said that knew something about success and failure and automobiles. He was Henry

Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague. The ranking member of the

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Mr. Deutsch.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. The tragedy that brings us here today is one of the worst in

auto safety history. As of yesterday, 203 people have died in the

United States because the tread has separated on a Firestone tire.

Most of those tires were on the Ford Explorers. Dozens more have

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been—dozens more have died in other countries and hundreds have

sustained permanent injuries.

To put this into perspective, when Firestone recalled the Firestone 500 tire in 1978, 34 people have died. In my State of Florida,

one of the hot States in which the tire has failed most often, more

than 28 people have died, almost as many as in the Firestone 500

recall, and more than 130 have been injured. Who is responsible?

Firestone has already admitted responsibility, but Firestone has

said that Ford should share responsibility, because the Explorer design causes excessive rollovers. Ford says it is the tire alone. Over

the past few weeks, we have all been subjected to dueling statistics

provided by Ford and Firestone. Unfortunately, we cannot resolve

these disputes here.

However, in Florida, our attorney general is leading an investigation of both Ford and Firestone for all 50 State attorney generals.

The primary allegation is that Firestone engineered a bad tire in

part because Ford kept demanding changes in the tire to make the

Explorer more stable, while maintaining the rolling resistance and

fuel economy of other tires.

The tire pressure was lowered and the weight of the tire was reduced by removing material, but the design of the vehicle was not

changed. As part of its new safety campaign, Ford is now courting

Goodyear tires. It is important to note that the Explorer was previously equipped with Goodyear tires from 1995 to 1997. In documents submitted for the record, however, Ford terminated its relationship with Goodyear due to cost concerns.

Florida’s attorney general is also concerned that the companies

did not disclose the tire failure problems in other countries to U.S.

regulators and the American public. When the Firestone tires

began to fail in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia in 1997 and 1998, we

learned in the earlier hearings, that both Ford and Firestone kept

the American consumer from knowing about the defective tires

which were recalled in those countries.

Communications documenting these disclosure problems were included in the record of our hearing last fall, and a few additional

ones have been submitted for the record today. We will hear a lot

of conflicting evidence today, but who are we and the American

people to believe? Last fall, the committee was told that the defective ATX tire came from only one Firestone plant in Decatur, Illinois, but that all ATX tires and Wilderness AT tires made in Decatur would be recalled. We were told the Wilderness ATs not made

in Decatur were safe.

However, in December of 2000 in deposition, Ford’s chief quality

control officer stated that none of the Wilderness 15-inch ATs were

robust tires that could be expected to perform under variations in

inflation, pressures, load and speed. At the same time, both companies issued root cause analysis suggesting that the defective tires

came only from one plant, despite the fact that all the tires used

identical engineering and materials. But Firestone’s experts found

belt edge cracks in tires from all plants, and Ford indicated tire design was a problem.

By January, auto safety advocates were calling for a broad recall.

Today we are being told the same by Ford, while Firestone also

blames the Explorer’s design. And what has the National Highway

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Transportation Safety Administration been doing while this debate

is going on? We are still waiting for its own analysis, which I hope

will be completed before the end of the hot season. Unfortunately,

in most cases, excessive accidents, injuries, lawsuits and consumer’s responses have removed questionable vehicles from the

road, not the Federal agency charged with protecting motorists and

passengers.

I want to add a few comments about the stability of sports utility

vehicles, including the Explorer. SUVs, by definition, have a rollover problem. SUV manufacturers work to engineer against this

propensity, but the consumer should have access to reliable and objective rollover data. I would like to encourage NHTSA to move

quickly, and with the rollover consumer information effort we mandated in the TREAD Act, so the public can make informed vehicle

choices.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague.

Now we will recognize for an opening statement the chairman of

the full committee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Tauzin.

Chairman TAUZIN. Chairman Stearns and Chairman Greenwood,

I want to thank you both and the ranking members for this hearing today, because it represents one of the most important hearings, I think, in our Congressional season. It continues this extraordinary inquiry that our investigators are making and that

hopefully NHTSA will complete soon on the question of why 203

Americans had to lose their lives on the highways, when Ford and

Firestone, and apparently many people in our Federal agency,

knew for years that there were problems with Firestone tires on

Explorers and very little was done until very recently to get those

tires off the highways.

As you know, we conducted two hearings last year after Ford and

Firestone jointly then announced the recall of more than 6 million

of those tires, fitted primarily on the popular Ford Explorer. It was

partly in response to those hearings that Chairman Upton and this

committee held that Congress passed the TREAD Act last October.

That Act requires NHTSA to start collecting information on claims

and lawsuits, and more importantly, not to wait till the body count

accelerates, but to do extensive testing to ensure that design and

preproduction phases of tire production give us information as to

whether tires should ever be put on the marketplace in the first

place.

Now, it is against that backdrop that we are here today, because

we are faced with a most extraordinary circumstance today. Normally NHTSA issues a mandatory recall on NHTSA’s data, convinces a manufacturer to do a voluntary recall. Today, Ford has announced essentially a recall, a replacement of another company’s

products. That is extraordinary and unusual, and because it involves 13 million Firestone tires, it again raises some rather

unique questions for this committee and for our safety agency.

First of all, what is the foundation for Ford’s decision for this most

unprecedented action? Before Ford announced the action, we were

given a briefing by Mr. Nasser of Ford Motor Company and a

chance to ask several questions regarding this extraordinary announcement.

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As Mr. Greenwood has pointed out, we were told that this announcement resulted from the fact that Ford, on its own, essentially, conducted extensive testing in using updated data from

NHTSA to determine that these 13 million tires should be replaced.

But Ford also told us then that the Ford—that Ford tests were conducted in very comparable tests with other tires. Our investigators

have learned something quite different, and we need an explanation of that today.

First of all, is the Ford recall or replacement overly broad? We

know that many Wilderness AT tires are being recalled that have

not been tested by Ford at all. It includes Wilderness AT tires that

have fueled any claims casting suspicion, frankly, on the entire line

of tires that other automobile manufacturers have used and continue to use as original equipment on their SUVs and light trucks,

and that, by the way, includes GM and Toyota.

If indeed these tires should be recalled by Ford, should they be

replaced by these other auto manufacturers? Second, the confusion

gets even worse when you consider, as our investigators have discovered, that some of the tires Ford is recalling have a better

claims history than those that Ford has chosen as replacement

tires.

Let me say that again. Ford is going to replace these recalled

tires with tires that have a worse claims history than some of the

tires that are coming off the Explorers. For example, our investigators have learned that one of the tires that is going to be used in

the replacement has a claims rate of 124 claims per million tires,

well in excess of the five claims per million that Ford says is a

benchmark used in this recall. Are we going to be replacing worse

tires for the tires that come off these cars?

I want to say here something that is important for this committee and its work. Our investigators have uncovered a great deal

of information about these claims and the claims ratios and this

particular tire that is going to be used as a replacement. We are

going to turn that information over to NHTSA following this hearing, and we are going to ask NHTSA to come back to us within 30

days to tell us whether this data is significant enough that Americans ought to know that the tires that they are going to have to

replace and be used as replacement tires do have, in fact, a worse

claims data than others. Is that significant? And does that make

a difference for the safety of American families?

Our problem, of course, is that we don’t know yet today, and so

we will give that information to NHTSA and ask NHTSA to come

back with—to us within 30 days that we might be able to inform

the American public. Ford, as a private company, of course, has the

right to replace any parts of their vehicles, including the tires. But

in the absence of an agreement from either Firestone or NHTSA,

the public surely must be confused today. It is the job of NHTSA

to come up with some consistent standards for when tires pose an

unreasonable safety risk to the consumer, and when one company

says that they ought to come off but they don’t come off other company’s vehicles and when replacement tires are called for that may

have a different, in fact, a worse record than the tires that are coming off, that confusion in the American public is unacceptable.

13

Firestone, too, has failed to answer some pretty basic questions

about the particular tires in question here. Ford and NHTSA have

both focused their attention on two of the Wilderness AT tire lines

used primarily on the Ford Explorer, and while the claims rates on

these two tire lines are not as high as the levels of last year’s recall, they are still much higher than most of Firestone’s other tire

lines, whether they are Wilderness or otherwise. And as NHTSA’s

latest claims data shows, more complaints of accidents and injuries

on these nonrecalled tires are coming in, yet Firestone would tell

us to be content with the fact that the injury totals experienced on

these previously unrecalled tires are not as bad as the first. I am

not sure that is a good standard by which we ought to make safety

judgments here.

Firestone’s also attempted to shift the focus from its tires to the

Explorer itself. We have consistently said from the beginning of

this controversy last year that all potentially relevant issues needed to be explored by NHTSA, including those related to how vehicles and tires interact as a system, and NHTSA is committed to

doing just that, and we have asked NHTSA, in fact, to make more

headway than they have so far.

But the review of the vehicle system issue should never replace

the primary focus on the critical event itself, which is the tire tread

separation, without which the vehicle stability issues wouldn’t

come up. Firestone can’t avoid legitimate scrutiny of its tires by

passing the buck on to the Explorer. NHTSA needs to fully explore

all these relevant issues and in a much more timely manner. We

need some answers soon, and the public should not have to suffer

through additional weeks or months of dueling charts and flying

accusations and more hearings.

And finally, I want to discuss an issue that I raised with Mr.

Nasser in our conversation several weeks ago. We all know that

Ford used Goodyear tires for the Explorer for several years in the

mid 1990’s, in addition to the Firestone tires that were used and

recalled. We also know that these Goodyear tires have had less

than a handful of claims relating to tread separations on these Explorers. The obvious question is, why did Ford stop using Goodyear

tires on the Explorer in model 1998 and return to sole sourcing

Firestone tires that have since been recalled?

Last year, the committee released Ford documents suggesting

that despite test data that show the Goodyear tire performing better than the Firestone tire, Ford, nonetheless, dropped Goodyear as

the supplier for the Explorer, because Goodyear may have been uncompetitive in terms of costs. The committee recently received additional documentation from Goodyear that clearly confirms this

point that Ford dropped Goodyear because Goodyear refused to

drop its price to be more competitive with Firestone. And as Ford

testifies today about how its recent test results and claims analysis

show superior Goodyear performance, we should all keep that bit

of history in mind.

Mr. Chairman, we won’t have all the answers today. Part of what

we do today is shed light on this Ford decision and on some of the

claims made by both Ford and Firestone. NHTSA needs to ride in

to the rescue here and clear up this confusion very rapidly. In the

letter we will send to the agency, we will ask you to respond in 30

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days, Mr. Jackson, and our private conversations, I know you told

me you intend to do that. We look forward to it. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Hon. W.J. ‘‘Billy’’ Tauzin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON

ENERGY AND COMMERCE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank both you and Chairman Greenwood for holding this joint Subcommittee hearing today, on this topic of great importance to the American people.

Last year, I co-chaired two hearings on this same topic, after Ford and Firestone

jointly announced a recall of more than six million tires fitted mostly on the popular

Ford Explorer. At those hearings, a lot of questions were raised about the thoroughness and timeliness of the internal responses of these two companies, as well as the

government’s safety regulators—all of whom had knowledge of potential problems

with these tires for years before taking any action to get them off of U.S. highways.

Those hearings also raised a lot of questions about the thoroughness of the testing

done by Ford and Firestone prior to putting these tires on these vehicles in the first

place, as well as the quality of Federal tire testing standards that were pathetically

weak and had not been updated since the 1960s.

Partly in response to those hearings, this Committee and the Congress passed the

TREAD Act last October, which required NHTSA to start collecting information on

claims and lawsuits filed against manufacturers of automobiles and tires in an effort

to better identify problems before they become bigger ones. But the Act also said,

in effect, ‘‘let’s not wait for the body count to start to conduct a post-mortem.’’ Let’s

focus on ensuring adequate testing of tires in the design and pre-production phase,

so as to improve our confidence in tires before we start driving our families around

on them.

Against that backdrop, we are here today to discuss the extraordinary and costly

action recently taken by Ford on its own to essentially recall as a precaution all

Firestone Wilderness AT tires on Ford vehicles, despite the protests of Firestone

and the inaction of NHTSA. Consistent with the spirit of the TREAD Act, Ford has

focused on updated claims data it and NHTSA received from Firestone, as well as

laboratory tests it has conducted on the tires at issue. Ford’s action certainly is

unique in modern business history, in that it involves the recall of another company’s product. By its very nature, then, it raises a host of questions that warrant

fuller exploration by this Committee.

One of those questions is the foundation for such an unprecedented action. Before

Ford publicly announced its decision several weeks ago, Mr. Nasser came to speak

with several of this Committee’s Members, including me, to discuss his planned action. When he explained the differences Ford’s tests were finding between the Firestone and Goodyear tires, one of the first things I asked him was whether the tests

were run in a comparable fashion. He said yes, but as Mr. Greenwood has pointed

out in his opening remarks, the findings from the Committee’s review of Ford’s test

data and methodology certainly call into doubt whether these tests were run as comparably as both Mr. Nasser and I would have hoped and expected.

Moreover, taking the Ford test results at face value, they certainly do not support

the breadth of the recall now underway, for that recall includes many Wilderness

AT tires lines that Ford has not tested at all. The recall also includes Wilderness

AT tire lines that have few, if any, claims—casting suspicion on an entire line of

tires that other automobile manufacturers have used and continue to use as original

equipment on their SUVs and light trucks, including GM and Toyota. While I certainly understand’s Ford interest in making this recall as easy as possible for its

customers, I am concerned that its inclusion of all these tire lines may actually

serve to confuse consumers even more.

This potential for confusion is even greater, given that consumers will soon

learn—as our investigators have discovered—that some of the tires Ford is recalling

have a better claims history than those Ford has chosen as replacement tires. Consumers also will soon learn—as our investigators have discovered—that there are

other tires on Ford vehicles that have higher claims rates than the Wilderness ATs,

but are not being recalled as part of this action.

In short, the question that neither Ford nor NHTSA has been able to answer to

date is, what should the baseline for action be here? We’re going to hear a lot of

talk today about claims rates, wedge dimensions, peel strengths, temperature profiles, and other technical issues. But the bottom line is that, right now, we are dealing in a world of subjectivity and relativity, where we might be able to say that one

15

tire performs better or has different characteristics than another, but not whether

the latter tire is in any way defective.

Ford, as a private company, need not have to prove a tire defective before deciding

it wants to take all of them off its vehicles. But in the absence of agreement from

either Firestone or NHTSA, the public surely must be confused. It is the job of

NHTSA to come up with some consistent standards for when tires pose an unreasonable safety risk to consumer. And we must act quickly to reduce the confusion

swirling around this issue before the American public starts to simply tune it out.

Firestone, too, has failed to answer some pretty basic questions about the particular tires most in question here. Ford and NHTSA have both focused their attention on two of the Wilderness AT tire lines used primarily on the Ford Explorer.

While the claims rates on these two tire lines are not as high as the levels of last

year’s recall, they are still much higher than most of Firestone’s other tire lines,

whether Wilderness or otherwise. As NHTSA’s latest data release shows, more complaints of accidents and injuries on these non-recalled tires are coming in.

Yet Firestone would have us be content to know that, in their opinion, these tires won’t reach the claims or injury totals experienced by the previously recalled tires— as if THAT should be the benchmark we should all use in judging consumer safety.

Well I, for one, am not willing to take that option either. Surely, there must be

something about these particular tires that warrants closer inspection.

Firestone also has attempted to shift the focus from its tires to the Explorer itself.

I have consistently said from the beginning of this controversy last year that all potentially relevant issues need to be explored by NHTSA, including those related to

how the vehicle and the tire interact as a system. And NHTSA committed to doing

just that when it was before the Congress last year—although it has made little

headway in the meantime. But the review of vehicle system issues should never displace the primary focus on the critical event itself—the tire tread separation, without which the vehicle stability issues would not arise. Firestone cannot avoid legitimate scrutiny of its tires by playing pass the buck to the Explorer.

NHTSA needs to fully explore all of the relevant issues, and in a much more timely manner. The public should not have to suffer through additional weeks or months

of dueling charts and flying accusations.

Finally, I want to discuss one other issue that I raised with Mr. Nasser in our

conversation several weeks ago. We all know that Ford used Goodyear for the Explorer tire for several years in the mid-1990s, in addition to the Firestone tires that

have been recalled. We also know that those Goodyear tires have had less than a

handful of claims relating to tread separation on Explorers. The obvious question

is, why did Ford stop using Goodyear tires on the Explorer in Model Year 1998, and

return to sole-sourcing Firestone tires?

Last year, the Committee released Ford documents suggesting that, despite test

data that showed the Goodyear tire performing better than the Firestone tire, Ford

nonetheless dropped Goodyear as a supplier for the Explorer because Goodyear may

have been uncompetitive in terms of cost. The Committee recently received additional documentation from Goodyear that clearly confirms this point—that Ford

dropped Goodyear because Goodyear refused to drop its price to be more competitive

with Firestone. As Ford testifies today about how its recent test results and claims

analyses show superior Goodyear performance, we all should keep that bit of history

in mind.

I want to thank all of our witnesses today, and thank both Chairman Stearns and

Chairman Greenwood for hosting today’s hearing.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the distinguished chairman.

On our list, we have Ms. Harman for an opening statement. And

let me remind the members the procedure is for a joint hearing, for

the members other than the ranking and the full chairman, to limit

their opening statements to 3 minutes. So we would be most appreciative.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I commend you for

holding this hearing, and welcome our witnesses.

I hail from California, where the blame game is in full frenzy for

the energy crisis, and where SUVs are a way of life, even when

they never go off road. 203 people have died because of tire failures, 203 people have died, and it is critically important that the

heads of the companies who manufacture the vehicles and the tires

involved in their deaths are here voluntarily and that we are here,

16

too. The blame game won’t bring those people back, and it won’t

make cars or tires safer.

Actions the executives here take can make people safer. Actions

that NHTSA takes can make people safer. Actions we take can

make people safer. That is our job to protect the health and welfare

of our constituents. The blame game stops here. And this hearing

is about how we are going to go forward with safer cars and safer

tires. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Deal.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with what Ms.

Harman has just said. We find ourselves in multifaceted positions

from time to time as Members of Congress in listening to the opening statements thus far, certainly a number of very important

issues have been raised. However, I have the feeling that we are

about to engage in a plaintiff’s trial lawyer discovery frenzy today

of finger pointing. I am not particularly interested in that aspect,

because I do not view that necessarily as a role for Congress to engage in.

But as Ms. Harman said, our primary purpose is public safety.

So to that end, all of us will be interested in hearing what has been

done to correct problems if problems did, in fact, exist, and what,

if anything, needs to be done in the oversight responsibility that

Congress has delegated to NHTSA in carrying out that role, and

does anything from a legislative standpoint need to be done further

in keeping with what we have previously done in the last Congress

with the TREAD Act? Those are the kinds of inquiries that I view

as relevant to the matter that is before this committee today. I

yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. He yields back the balance of his time. Mrs. Capps

is recognized for an opening statement.

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say that

I am pleased that we are holding this hearing today, but I am not.

I am not, because of the original circumstances that have brought

us here today, tragedy. As we all know, over 200 people have died

in car accidents because of faulty tires, faulty car design or maybe

some combination of both. Hundreds more have been injured. The

lives of the families and friends of these people have been upended, and we are here today to try to sort through the facts that

have caused this damage.

But I am also not pleased because today’s hearings will likely be

a continuation of the charges and countercharges between two legendary American companies. Ford has now offered to replace all of

Firestone Wilderness AT tires. The company says they are doing

this out of concern for their customer’s safety. Firestone questions

the motives of Ford and produces studies that claim its tires are

not the reason behind the rollovers that have caused the deaths of

so many people.

So Ford produces studies that show its Explorers are safe. Both

sides have experts supporting them, and today’s Washington Post

has a story about the lobbying efforts that are going on so each side

can get out its story.

Maybe there is nothing wrong with this, but I don’t know if it

is actually getting us much closer to the truth. So today’s hearing

17

will likely be a continuation in this battling of charges and

countercharges, each side producing credible studies to make its

point. Quite frankly, I am not sure who to believe, and I will not

make any statements that call in question the legitimacy of either

side. But I am sure of one thing. I want us to get to the truth of

this matter. I want American consumers to know that when they

get behind the wheel of their car, they can know that that car and

all its parts are as safe as they can be, that there have been no

corners cut, no edges shaved. That, after all, is one of the jobs of

our government, to make sure that the market works and produces

safe products.

In this case, we clearly need a judge, someone who can look at

the technical claims that companies are making and make some

sense of them. That judge is supposed to be the Federal Government, specifically the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration. So I will be interested to hear from NHTSA, and I will

continue to push them to get to the bottom of this matter.

American consumers are depending on them and on us. Thank

you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague.

Mr. Shimkus, opening statement?

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be brief. We

want to welcome our two CEOs and the director of NHTSA here,

two great companies that we are in conflict with today. Basic business MBA says the CEO’s job is to maximize shareholder wealth.

We all know that you do that by protecting public safety, because

it is not good business to impinge on public safety. No one would

take that risk. But as everyone agrees on both sides of the aisle,

we are searching for some certainty, legal certainty. We talk about

that in all lines of the business that we do here on the commerce

committee, legal certainty on who is doing what and how to resolve

this. We did pass the TREAD Act last year in response initially,

and unfortunately, haven’t had much time to get the full impact of

the TREAD Act, along with the additional dollars needed to affect

that law, and we’re already back in front of this committee.

My questions will be directed to both the CEOs and to NHTSA

as to what should NHTSA do, Ford Motor Company? What should

NHTSA do, Firestone? And NHTSA, what do you think you should

do, and what resources do you need to get it done? You can tell

there is a lot of frustration up here. We did not want to be here

less than a year after the last hearing, and we hope that we can

get to some conclusions so we are not here again in the next couple

of months. Thank you, Mr. Chairman I thank the gentleman for

yielding.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, is recognized

for an opening statement.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. This is an

unprecedented hearing before this committee. We have two corporations, each of which has leveled a blistering, scalding indictment of the other company. Obviously we need answers. We have

a corporate schoolyard brawl that has broken out here. We need an

impartial referee to determine who was right and who was wrong

on each one of the allegations. This hearing is not going to deterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
18

mine that. We need NHTSA, the independent agency, to play the

role of referee, calling each one of the shots on each one of these

issues in a way that ascertains the truth for the American people.

Now, it is true, and today the President has designated his nominee to be the head of NHTSA. We haven’t had anyone running

NHTSA for the last several months there was a Presidential designee. This, in the aftermath of this committee and the Congress

passing a law last year which gave a very serious homework assignment to NHTSA. Now, NHTSA tells us that they are at least

a month away from finishing their information. In addition, we

have to know how much progress they have made in implementing

the TREAD Act, implementing the law which we passed last year.

After all, that is the only way in which the safety recommendations and requirements which we passed into law last year are

going to be put on the books, and the public will be protected and

every subsequent year in because of those additional safety protections. So I wish that there was an urgency in this administration

that would have designated a new head of highway safety back 5

months ago.

That would help us to know who is right and who is wrong in

every one of these issues. Obviously, the very viability of at least

one of these companies is going to be determined by the answers

to those questions. We know that there is a toxic cocktail that is

created when Ford Explorers and Firestone tires are put together.

That warning is out there now to the public. Ford is now saying

that it is more than the 6 million tires. Now an additional 13 million Ford—Firestone tires that put their vehicles at risk.

But we do know this as well: Even as the information has been

made available to Ford over the last several years, they continue

to increase the weight of their SUVs, knowing that there is a direct

correlation between the weight of these vehicles and their propensity to roll over and to endanger American families. And so, Mr.

Chairman, we couldn’t have a more important hearing, but everything that happens today is merely preliminary to the ultimate decisions made by NHTSA as to who is right and who is wrong, and

I hope that we can get a confirmation on the President’s appointee

and a quick resolution of these issues for the sake of the public,

because we know these accidents occur on hot summer days on

long rides, and that is where we are in America today, with the

American public at greatest risk for the next several months without the answers which every one of these families deserve.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleague.

The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Terry, is recognized for an

opening statement.

Mr. TERRY. Thank you all. I will be succinct, and my focus here

is going to be on my own government agency and their tardiness

in supporting the process and supplying us with data. The reason

why I want to focus on them is because I am going to work from

a basic assumption, that there is self-motivation involved in both

Firestone and Ford’s testing. There is a billion dollars at stake here

in lawsuits. There are trials strategy taking place, and as layman

up here in most of the public, we could read the data, the summaries of the testing and we can see—well, I won’t say it is fairly

convincing. The oversteer of the Ford Explorer that Firestone has

19

provided us, likewise the peal strength and the other data that

Ford has supplied us about the Firestone—Firestone tires, the data

that they have accumulated.

When you read the summaries, to us they all are convincing, but

keep—what keeps popping in my mind is that there is a lot of dollars at stake here in lawsuits. Each in a trial strategy have the

ability, and it is pretty typical trial strategy to try and bring somebody else in as a defendant and share the blame.

So what we need is reliable independent data that we can rely

on that can shift through the new answers that some of my colleagues might have brought out in their opening statements of just

the little things that you can tweak, the type of vehicles that are

used, the age of the tires that are used that can tweak the outcome, can tweak the data to where layman wouldn’t notice. That

is why we rely on NHTSA, and so I think that is where I am going

to focus upon today, and the hard questions will be asked.

It will be good questions for Firestone and Ford as well, but we

need that independent body, the American public needs that independent body, and we haven’t been able to provide that. I yield

back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

Thank you.

Mr. Strickland, is recognized for his opening statement.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Sawyer is—— Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Sawyer is not on either subcommittee, but we

certainly invited him to participate, and we are under the customary procedure allowing him to do his opening statement after

the members of both subcommittees have spoken first.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. So you are recognized.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, sir. I’ll just take a few moments.

Sitting here, I listened to my colleagues and I’ve concluded what

I frequently conclude when I attend these kinds of meetings and

that is, where do we as Members of Congress go for the truth? How

can we take the information that is provided to us, sort through

it, determine credibility and reliability, and then make an informed

decision?

And I think that’s what we must, at least in part, depend upon

our witnesses today to provide for us and to us. But ultimately I

think we do need this objective judgment from the Federal agency

that’s responsible for providing us with these kinds of data.

I am more than a distant observer, I guess. I drive a Ford Explorer with Wilderness AT tires, and I have a district where it

takes me about 5 hours to drive from end to end, and I plan to do

that throughout the coming summer months. So I hope we reach

some conclusions today so that I, and my constituents especially,

can face the summer months feeling some degree of confidence.

I yield back.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from

Tennessee, Mr. Gordon, is recognized for an opening statement.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we’re at the

point of opening statements, where there is the cliche, ‘‘Everything’s been said, just everyone hasn’t said it.’’ so I will just make

a quick observation.

20

When I was practicing law in a small town, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, I think I discovered what we’re going to find out today. Mr.

Tauzin and Mr. Greenwood particularly did a good job—and Mr.

Deutsch—of laying forth a lot of serious questions that we need to

have answers to.

A month of hearings won’t bring answers to all those, so as has

been said, we need to move forward and hear from NHTSA, because I think we are going to find out what I found in

Murfreesboro, that you can take the two or three witnesses seeing

the same accident or a dog bite and they’re going to come back with

different views. Whether it was the direction, or their angle for seeing the accident, whether it is an internal prejudice, they simply

bring back different views. So, hopefully, NHTSA will get its act together shortly and do a more thorough investigation.

So what I want to do in my time is really ask the same questions

of all three witnesses, to try to set up a benchmark, so we can

move forward. And thank you again.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

Mr. Stupak is recognized for an opening statement.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, more of

a parliamentary inquiry if I may. As I was coming flying out here

today I went through Detroit. I grabbed the Detroit Free Press because it talks about new tires, new worries. And on the majority

side, we’ve had some discussion this morning in opening statements about the replacement tires having a worse safety record

than the Firestones.

My question is directed to the Chair: Are we going to see that

information? Is it going to be part of this hearing? Can we see it?

My friend, Mr. Strickland, and I both have a Ford Explorer.

After last year’s hearing, I replaced my tires, so I want to make

sure if I replaced them, I replaced them with good tires; and I

think we’re misleading the American public if we say we replaced

them with worse tires. But we are not getting the data.

Mr. STEARNS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. STEARNS. I think as we go through this hearing there is a

nuance here between safety and claims reporting and what this

claims reporting means versus actual safety. So I think what

they’re alluding to is the claims reporting, which is not necessarily

a clear proportionate with the safety.

But I think your concern is welcome and I think one of the reasons that we had this hearing is because both members and the

consumers want to understand the nuances between this claim

data and what it means. And so when we move forward, I think

some of the questions that you have might allude to that fact.

Mr. STUPAK. I see the chairman is here. Maybe he may have that

information.

Will that be provided to all of us, Mr. Chairman, the information

you brought up about some tires have worse safety records than

the ones that are being—— Mr. STEARNS. It’s not a safety record. We are talking about just

claims data, which is not a safety record.

Chairman TAUZIN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. STUPAK. Can we have that data?

21

Chairman TAUZIN. Will the gentleman yield? Some of the data is

apparently NHTSA’s data. Some of it has been provided to us on

a confidential basis from other tire manufacturers, and frankly, we

don’t know how valid this information is. NHTSA has not looked

at it to see whether this information that’s privately supplied to us

is validated yet.

At a meeting right before this hearing I asked Mr. Jackson if we

supplied him with this information immediately following this

hearing, again because it is confidentially supplied to our investigators—first, supply it to NHTSA, would they within 30 days be able

to give us, as quickly as possible, information as to whether or not

that information we received is, No. 1, valid, and No. 2, whether

or not it’s consequential information that consumers need to know

immediately, if in fact the Ford criteria for this recall are valid.

Mr. DINGELL. Would the gentleman yield to me?

The question, I think, that has to be answered is, are we comparing apples and oranges. I would note that some of the information that shows that the new tires from Firestone are safer than

other manufacturers comes from a plant where there is no history

of manufacturing of those tires at that plant, and as a result, there

is no record of failures of tires coming from that plant.

Now, is that not so?

Chairman TAUZIN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. STUPAK. I ask for unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes with the colloquy going.

Chairman TAUZIN. I would say to my friend that there are several questions we do not know the answer to, and that is, one,

whether, first of all, we think the data we are getting is valid. But

we need to have that verified by NHTSA. If, in fact, a tire that is

going to be replaced by Ford is going to be replaced with a tire that

has a much worse claims record than a tire being replaced, is that

information significant enough for Ford perhaps to make a different decision or for consumers to make a different decision?

That’s a question that we are going to ask NHTSA at the end of

this hearing.

The gentleman is correct, there’s a lot of claims data that goes

to NHTSA. Some of it goes to the individual tire companies; and

we need to know whether or not we have duplicate numbers, how

valid is it, and how significant are those numbers before we ask

NHTSA to release them to the public, I think.

Mr. STUPAK. I want to reclaim my time here.

Whether it’s claims data or safety claims, if we have information,

I hope that it can be shared with all members of the committee,

because I can wait for Ford. Like I said, I replaced my own tires

on my Explorer, and when you have an accident, it’s an accident—

they don’t call it ‘‘safety data’’ or ‘‘claims data,’’ it’s an accident for

the people out there.

And I think the purpose of these hearings is to clarify this stuff

for the American people, and all we are doing is confusing them by

saying we have new tires and new worries, but yet we are not

sharing this information with the American public.

So I hope by the end of the day we could get that information,

and someone on the majority side—that we have plaintiff trial lawVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
22

yers discovery. Well, being a plaintiff trial lawyer, I certainly hope

we do because plaintiff trial lawyers usually increase public safety

and get to the truth of the matter.

Chairman TAUZIN. Will my friend yield again?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Chairman TAUZIN. I hope you understand that is precisely the

reason why I’m asking that the committee request NHTSA to clarify this information for us rapidly. I don’t want us to be party to

releasing bad information to the American public which causes

them either distress, worry or to make a bad decision.

One of the reasons for this hearing today is to examine Ford, its

decision in that light, as Ford ordered a recall. Has it recalled tires

that other companies should recall? And the information we’ve discovered leads us to some new confusing areas.

I think it’s critical that before we confuse the public with this information that we get it verified by NHTSA, and more importantly,

that they indicate the significance of these numbers to us so that

we can make a proper report to the American public without further confusion.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said before you came in,

someone’s already released the information. It’s already confusing

the public when you have the headlines ‘‘New Tires, New Worry.’’ so I think we have to get that squared away as soon as we can.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman Mr. Sawyer, who is not a member of either subcommittee, but is welcome to provide an opening statement.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing and for the chance to take part in this way. I am from Akron,

Ohio, and although we haven’t built a passenger car tire in Akron

for 22 years, it remains a center of research and development, production technology, command and control in this global industry for

more than a century.

It is matter of personal concern that we resolve questions of continuing safety in this important industry to people all over my district. In that sense, understanding these tragedies is rightfully this

committee’s work; reducing their likelihood in the future is our

purpose. And so while there are many things that have been said

today, I’d like to return to three fundamental points that I made

a year ago.

What I said last year I feel just as strongly about today. That

is this: You cannot evaluate tire performance separately from the

vehicle on which it is equipped. Nor is a vehicle performance evaluation complete without the tire. In one sense, a tire may be the

single most important component of a vehicle in translating that

vehicle’s design characteristics into actual performance on the road.

The tire and vehicle work together in determining acceleration,

braking, cornering, comfort and, most important, safety and do it

through four very small contact patches with the road. In that

sense, the question that we have to answer is how the vehicle and

its tires function together.

Second, let me just say that I’m deeply troubled by the underlying notion that tires are never supposed to fail. I remind all of

us that the tire remains the only piece of equipment on the vehicle

that has a backup. This is not by chance. Tires are complex, they’re

23

highly engineered products that operate in one of the most extraordinarily violent environments of any product that we use in our

daily lives and they wear out. They are consumable products.

Third, typically tires contain more than scores of different design

elements of rubber, steel, polyester, chemicals, carbon black, depending upon their application in design of the tire. Many tires are

designed for specific vehicles, for specific performance; consequently, tires perform differently depending on the type and design of the vehicle on which they’re mounted and how and where

that vehicle is used.

With this in mind, it is clear it would be a serious mistake, in

my judgment, to try to set one standard for tire performance for

the tire industry. Each tire design and application, it seems to me,

must be evaluated in its own setting. When tires do fail through

road use, damage or abuse, or misapplication to the wrong vehicle,

or wearing out at the end of its useful life, or as the result of a

design or manufacturing flaw, NHTSA’s got to have the appropriate data so that it can evaluate the tire in its appropriate vehicular environment. That’s the best way to protect consumers.

When Congress passed the TREAD Act last year, it took a major

step in making sure this happens by requiring an early warning

system, one that works—actually two that work: one, to use performance statistics through the reporting of data to identify problems early in the life of a design.

We heard a number of different dimensions that have reporting

data. Comparability is another one, to make sure that you’re getting the same data from different corporate settings.

The second is an early warning device to warn the vehicle’s operator with accuracy when his vehicle’s tires begin to lose pressure.

I know that NHTSA’s working diligently on the regulations to

implement the act in this provision, and I look forward to hearing

them and the witnesses in this process.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for your indulgence.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank the gentleman.

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today to examine the reason and

ramifications for the Ford Motor Company’s recent recall of additional Firestone

tires.

This issue touches many of our constituents. I have heard from many individuals

in my district who have expressed concerns about tire and vehicle safety. It is terrible that the increased attention to this issue comes as a result of tragic accidents

and highway fatalities. I hope that this situation can help improve public awareness

of the need to monitor tire pressure and engage in regular vehicle maintenance.

Many consumers, including Members of Congress, are confused by the various

data coming from both Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone. Are the Firestone tires the

cause of the problem, or is it a result of the design of the Explorer? Whose data

should the public believe? What is the proper role of the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA) in making these determinations?

I hope that this hearing gives the respective parties a chance to highlight their

findings and provide answers to these Subcommittees on issues that greatly impact

American consumers. I am particularly interested to know if there is any documentation or claims for accidents that have occurred in an Explorer with non-Firestone tires. Has NHTSA conducted the necessary testing to ascertain whether these

problems are limited to the Firestone Wilderness AT line, or have they received

claims for similar Explorer accidents with competitors’ tires?

24

Mr. Chairman, with the summer in full swing, many families are piling into sport

utility vehicles (SUVs) and heading out for summer vacations. In order to ensure

the greatest protection for the safety of those families, it is incumbent on us to obtain the most accurate and comprehensive information possible. We must also increase our efforts to raise public awareness of tire and vehicle safety issues, so that

every driver realizes the importance of proper vehicle maintenance, including gauging tire pressure.

I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

for holding this important hearing.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA CUBIN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe it is important today to convene this hearing

to disseminate information to the American consumer—especially those that own

Ford vehicles or any vehicle with Firestone tires.

Not wanting to speak for other members of the subcommittee, I’d like to make

an initial statement to our witnesses today from Ford and Firestone: please stop

playing this juvenile blame game; please stop publishing graphs and charts that

only support one side of the story; and by all means please stop sacrificing the safety of American families at the alter of public relations.

We know that different tires seem to react differently to certain conditions. We

also know that automobiles, especially SUVs, tend to react differently than passenger vehicles in certain conditions. When you put those two very uncertain situations together we seem to get a very tenuous outcome.

In a situation such as this we tend to look to the companies to resolve the problem

to ensure that their customers’ safety is protected. We don’t seem to have that in

this case. Maybe if the companies get past pointing fingers at each other they’ll

begin concentrating on the safety aspects.

Until then, it is very important that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) be a leader in answering many of the outstanding questions surrounding what has become an absolute debacle.

I’m pleased to read in Mr. Jackson’s testimony that NHTSA’s testing may be completed as early as next week.

However, I’m concerned that any delay in getting accurate information out to the

public will jeopardize the lives and safety of our families.

Additionally, many local businesses are dependent on selling these goods and

services. Timely, accurate information is critical to ensure confidence in both Ford

and Firestone products.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. I yield back my time.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ED BRYANT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF TENNESSEE

Chairman Stearns, Chairman Greenwood, I thank you for holding this joint hearing today on an issue of obviously great importance.

I, like others on the committee, have interests on both sides of this issue, having

constituents that are directly involved with both Firestone and Ford. As I prepared

for this hearing over the last weekend, I met with Ford dealers in my district, and

in Tennessee we have the headquarters of Firestone as well as a number of Firestone distributors and dealers.

After the recall of the 15-inch Firestone ATX and Decatur Wilderness AT tires

last year, and now after the discussions surrounding Ford Motor Company’s ‘‘re- placement program,’’ I think that the American people frankly aren’t real sure what

to make of the situation.

Ford says this is a tire problem and Firestone says it is the Explorer. Last year

we learned that there was indeed something that went wrong at the Decatur plant

to make so many Firestone ATX tires fail.

Obviously, there is not the same consensus today.

Firestone’s studies indicate that the Firestone AT tires on vehicles other than the

Ford Explorer have not had the same problems with tread separation as the tires

on the Ford Explorer.

But, then Ford points out that the reliability of Goodyear tires on the Explorer

is evidence that the Explorer is not to blame.

Ultimately the reason we are here today, and the reason we are not leaving this

to the courts and solely NHTSA (the regulators whose job it is to do these things)

is that we are trying to move quickly and determine what safety concerns are out

25

there. We need to make sure that folks in NHTSA are doing their job, but the bottom line is that we are trying to protect the consumers’ interests.

This hearing is a great opportunity for Congress to sift through the studies and

statistics conducted by both parties, and try to reconcile the information so we can

better understand what is going on here.

It is indeed a shame that such a long working relationship between these two

companies has been severed. I encourage the two parties to try and work together

and be forthright with the American people. The interests we are looking out for

today is that of the consumer, and I hope that this hearing helps to better inform

the consumer of the safety of both the Firestone Wilderness AT tire and the Ford

Explorer.

Again, I thank the two chairmen for having this hearing, and I also thank the

members of the panels for coming today—Mr. Nasser, Mr. Lampe, Secretary Jackson, Mr. Shelton, and Mr. Weinstein—thank for bringing your cases before us today.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDOLPHUS ‘‘ED’’ TOWNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for convening this timely hearing on Ford’s replacement of Firestone’s Wilderness AT tires. I would also like to thank today’s scheduled

witnesses for appearing: Jacques Nasser of Ford, John Lampe of Firestone as well

as the representatives from NHTSA. I do not expect that we will reach any conclusions today, but I hope that by bringing the parties together we will provide the

American people with the information necessary to make more informed decisions.

We are here because of the more than 2100 tread separations of Firestone ATX and

at tires that have resulted in the deaths of over 200 people. One of the goals of the

Consumer Protection Committee—as the name suggests—is to protect consumers.

When over 200 people die as a result of a similar cause it is time to examine the

problem more closely.

Last year, Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires after confronting the accident and

fatality reports with Ford and NHTSA which indicated that there was a problem

directly linked to Firestone’s 15’’ inch ATX tires and Wilderness AT tires produced

at its decatur manufacturing facility. The number of accidents and fatalities linked

to the Firestone tires in question clearly indicated that something needed to be done

to address a worsening situation. Ford and Firestone largely worked together and

took responsibility for the problem. At the time, all parties committed to continue

looking for the root cause of the tread separation problem. In addition, questions

were raised regarding whether or not the initial recall was broad enough. To date,

we have heard from Ford and Firestone regarding their findings. We have yet to

hear the findings from the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) study of the recalled tires, Firestone’s Wilderness AT tires and

possibly some aspect of the Ford Explorer.

Last year’s recalled tires had claim rates of 363 per million to 41 per million. The

tires currently in question have claims rates which have roughly doubled from their

previous levels to the most recent available statistics—from the september 2000 to

December 2000 reporting period—of 19.3 and 17.4 per million. While this increase

is significant it is two to twenty times smaller than the claims rates of the previously recalled tires. Ford maintains that they had to act because the claims trends

suggested increasing tire problems and a potential increasing risk to consumer safety. Ford should be lauded for their extraordinary efforts to safeguard consumers.

However, it is very difficult to analyze the basis for Ford’s decision without any

baseline standards from NHTSA.

Firestone for their part has been cooperating with NHTSA as well. I do not believe that anyone is served by the chart wars that we have seen from both Ford

and Firestone over the past several weeks. I would urge both parties to continue

cooperating with NHTSA and allow NHTSA to do the job that it is supposed to do.

In addition, I point out that the battle of self-serving statistics has only brought into

doubt the creditability of both sides in this dispute. Currently, the biggest problem

facing the American people regarding this matter is the lack of any information

from an independent third party. Again, I urge NHTSA to release their conclusions

as soon as possible. In addition, I would ask NHTSA to answer the following questions:

It is nearly impossible to judge the value of the information provided by the two

sides of this dispute without any definitive baseline information to clarify the companies’ competing claims from NHTSA. Does NHTSA have baseline information regarding the number of claims per million for tires?

What can be done to make NHTSA’s information more user friendly?

26

Does the lack of an Administrator for NHTSA hamper its ability to serve the

American people?

How will NHTSA be able to deal with the vast amounts of additional data it is

scheduled to receive under the Tread Act, if NHTSA has its hands full with the information that it already receives?

Does NHTSA need additional resources to do its job more effectively?

Mr. STEARNS. Now we’ll have the first panel; I think we have

completed our opening statements. But before we do, I would like

to ask unanimous consent of the subcommittee to place into the

record documents that are both from the minority and the majority

side; and without objection, it’s so ordered.

We welcome Mr. Jacques Nasser, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Ford Motor Company. And let me just say that we

appreciate your patience in coming here; and at this point, it’s customary, Mr. Nasser, to swear you in, and I think we’re going to

have Mr. Greenwood swear you in.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Good morning, Mr. Nasser. You’re aware that

this committee is holding—this joint committee is holding an investigative hearing and as is our custom, we take our testimony—witnesses give their testimony under oath. Do you have any problem

in testifying under oath?

Mr. NASSER. No.

Mr. GREENWOOD. You are entitled also to have counsel. Do you

wish to be represented by counsel during your testimony?

Mr. NASSER. No, I don’t.

Mr. GREENWOOD. In that case, if you will raise your right hand,

I will swear you in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. GREENWOOD. You’re now under oath and may testify.

Mr. STEARNS. As I was saying, Mr. Nasser, we want to thank you

for coming here and to recognize that you came to us early to speak

with us about this controversy. And we appreciate your willingness

to come forward in talking to us, and we give you the floor.

TESTIMONY OF JACQUES NASSER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Mr. NASSER. Thank you very much, Chairman Stearns.

Mr. STEARNS. You might have to put that a little closer to you.

That’s a little better. Thank you, sir.

Mr. NASSER. Chairman Stearns and Chairman Greenwood, Congressman Dingell and members of the committee, at the outset I’d

like to express on behalf of the women and men of Ford Motor

Company our sincerest sympathies to those families who have lost

loved ones in these tragic accidents.

Today, as we’ve already seen, the committee is going to be battered with competing data and competing analyses, research and

statistics, charts and graphs, experts and opinions, all striving to

settle the disagreements surrounding our decision to replace 13

million tires on Ford vehicles. I’m here to explain the reasons behind our decision and to answer any questions the committee may

have about the actions that we have taken to protect the safety of

our customers.

As mentioned earlier, last year Firestone recalled about 6.5 million tires, primarily on Ford vehicles; and at that time, I pledged

27

to this committee that Ford would implement an early warning

system to help identify potential tire problems.

We promised our customers and all of you that we would use the

lessons learned, combined with the aid of new technology, to keep

our customers safe; and Ford Motor Company supported passage of

the TREAD Act, which in many ways encouraged the very same

vigilence.

Public awareness of tire safety has intensified since last year,

and our expectations within the Ford Motor Company of tire performance has also changed. In many ways, maybe in all ways, the

bar has been raised.

Without question, detecting the possibilities of a future tire defect carries much greater weight than it ever did before. We’ve also

moved from seeking remedies for bad tires to identifying and eliminating faulty tires before the safety of customers is compromised.

Last summer, field data and government data revealed highly

elevated tread separation rates on Firestone ATX and certain Firestone Wilderness AT tires. Those tires were recalled even before we

knew why they were failing.

Clearly, we needed to learn more to be able to prevent this from

happening again, so we started digging deeper and deeper, and we

began the most intensive scientific investigation in Ford Motor

Company’s history. Hundreds of engineers and scientists looked at

the tires; then they looked at the tires together with the vehicle,

and they also looked at the vehicle itself.

Our lab tests and real-world data, including Firestone’s own

claims data, indicated that many of the remaining Firestone Wilderness AT tires will experience elevated failure rates, particularly

as they age. The data convinced us to act now and to act on behalf

of the people who drive our vehicles.

We must admit that we’re dealing with very early warning signals, but they’re warnings that we have taken very seriously, and

we could not ignore them. We believe that this issue will grow into

a more serious problem, particularly as the tires wear and age, and

in short, without this action, our customer safety would have been

at risk.

So on May 22, we announced our tire replacement program, and

thanks to the dedication of our dealers and employees and the cooperation of the other tire companies, we’re moving ahead swiftly.

About 2 million tires are now in the pipeline, and we have replaced

about 1 million tires as of this morning.

I’d like to thank the many dealers and thousands of UAW workers who are in Washington today to show support for their company and for our actions. It means a great deal to us.

Let me talk about the Explorer, and let’s get to the heart of the

issue. The Ford Explorer is and always has been a safe vehicle. The

criticism from Firestone challenging the Explorer’s safety is not

based on fact. Real-world data that is compiled by the Department

of Transportation shows that the Explorer is among the safest

SUVs on the market. And let’s go through that data.

The Explorer is 27 percent safer than passenger cars. The Explorer is safer than comparable SUVs in all crash types, front, side,

rear and roll-over. The Explorer is involved in 19 percent fewer accidents of all types than the typical sports utility vehicle.

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From another angle, the Explorer has scored four or five stars in

government frontal and side-crash tests. Explorer has also received

the second highest ranking from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety in its frontal offset crash tests; and just one other SUV

got a better rating, while four received lower ratings.

When you stand back from it all, in all, no other sport utility vehicle has such a strong combination of field and testing performance. Those are the facts, not the headlines.

In addition, we have closely examined the relationship between

sport utility vehicles, as was mentioned earlier, and tires. We performed hundreds of tests with the Explorer and competitive sport

utility vehicles, and this exhaustive analysis filled millions of pages

of information which we have shared with NHTSA, we have shared

with Firestone and we have shared with this committee. That book

to my left is a summary of that data and it shows that the Explorer

is a superbly designed vehicle and is a safety leader.

Last month, Chairman Tauzin asked NHTSA to review the performance of the Explorer compared to other sport utility vehicles.

We agree that there is much misinformation and some confusion

about the safety of these vehicles. So we welcome and we encourage NHTSA’s review and analysis of all the data on Explorer and

peer vehicles, and we will fully cooperate in this effort.

We’re also very confident of the outcome because the Explorer

has 10 years of real-world safety data and that doesn’t mislead.

And there’s more, probably the clearest demonstration yet that

this is a problem with the tires and not with the vehicle; and this

is the real-world performance of two groups of Explorers totaling

more than 1 million vehicles manufactured over a 3-year period.

Everything about these two groups of Explorers was exactly the

same except that half the Explorers used Goodyear tires and the

other half used Firestone tires. We gave both tire manufacturers

the same performance criteria and both sets of tires had the same

recommended tire pressure.

This is the only real-world comparison that is truly apples to apples, and the results are very clear. There were 1,183 tread separations on the Firestone tires; there were two on the Goodyear tires.

The only variable was the tire. Everything else was the same—the

same drivers, the same vehicles, same parts of the country, same

roads, same driving conditions, same loads and the same tire pressure.

So it bears repeating, this is a tire issue and only a tire issue.

I’ve heard some of the comments made earlier this morning, and

I want to make it clear that we do not get any satisfaction from

this dispute with Firestone, but we cannot and we will not let them

decide when or how the Ford Motor Company will act to protect

our customers’ safety. Our customers count on Ford to place their

safety and interests above all else, and we do.

One year ago, I came before this committee to discuss the recall

of Firestone tires, and at that time, you asked what we could do

to assure the public that this type of safety calamity would not

happen again. I pledged to you and to our customers that we would

be vigilant in our efforts to identify the problems and to identify

them early and to fix them.

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So I’m very proud of the Ford Motor Company’s strong commitment to safety, and I am grateful for the Secretary’s recognition of

that commitment. And as I said last year, this is a tire problem,

not a vehicle problem. And the government confirmed last year

that this is a tire problem.

Although we’re back before your committee again this year to

discuss an even larger recall, this still remains a tire problem. Our

goal is to make sure that it does not become a safety problem for

the public.

Thank you for your attention, and I’ll be pleased to answer any

questions.

[The prepared statement of Jacques Nasser follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUES NASSER, FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dingell and members of the committee. I am Jacques Nasser, President and CEO of Ford Motor Company. I am here

today to explain the reasons behind our decision to replace 13 million Firestone tires

on Ford vehicles. I am also here to answer any questions the committee may have

on the steps we have taken to protect the safety of our customers.

For nearly 100 years, our Company has thrived because we have been responsive

to our customers and our communities around the world. In all the actions we have

taken, we have been guided first and foremost by our commitment to safety. We

have also been driven by facts—real world performance data, as well as laboratory

analyses. We have shared all the data and analyses openly, and have worked with

NHTSA and with Firestone to better understand the causes of the tread separation

problem with Firestone ATX and Wilderness AT tires.

Why We Are Replacing the Tires

On May 22nd of this year, Ford announced that we would replace all Wilderness

AT tires used on Ford vehicles because of concerns about the performance of the

tires as they age, creating unnecessary risks for our customers. While some of the

tires being replaced do not show a substantial failure risk, we are replacing all Wilderness AT tires to avoid any confusion for our customers and eliminate any doubt

about the quality of their tires.

Last summer, while the data indicated elevated rates of tread separation on the

6.5 Million ATX and Decatur-built Wilderness AT tires (Exhibit 1), which resulted

in the Firestone recall, we did not have enough information to understand why the

tires were failing.

Immediately after the recall, we assembled a team of technical experts to find the

causes of the tread separation problem. The purpose of the investigation was simple:

we had to be certain that the tires on our vehicles were as safe as possible for our

customers. The ‘‘Tire Team’’, as it became known, spent more than 100,000 personhours analyzing real-world data, investigating accidents, testing tires and vehicles,

running computer simulations and studying tire designs. Our Tire Team worked

closely with NHTSA every step of the way. We also shared our data and analysis

with Firestone and Dr. Sanjay Govindjee, who conducted an independent investigation at Firestone’s request.

As part of that intensive work we developed a laboratory test to duplicate the failure mode experienced in the field. We developed better statistical analysis of claims

data that allowed prediction of trends in failure rates. We worked with NHTSA to

understand failure rates in competitive tires. And we did detailed engineering analyses of failed tires to give us an understanding of real-world failure mechanisms.

Our findings proved consistent with the findings of Dr. Sanjay Govindjee.

We reached the following conclusions based on our data and analyses:

• Firestone’s Wilderness AT tires experience higher rates of tread separations than

other tires, including the Goodyear tires used on the Explorer.

• Firestone’s ATX and Wilderness AT tires fitted to Ford vehicles have temperature

characteristics, wedge design characteristics and rubber properties, including

peel strength, that demonstrate they are more sensitive than other tires to the

stresses caused by ordinary use. This correlates with their significantly higher

failure rates in the field.

• Firestone’s ATX and Wilderness AT tires have different designs, constructions and

performance characteristics depending upon when and where they were manuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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factured. The Goodyear tires used on Explorers do not exhibit this degree of

variability.

• Firestone’s Wilderness AT 16’’ tires with a recommended inflation pressure of 30

psi perform about the same on the Explorer as the 15’’ tires with a recommended inflation pressure of 26 psi from the same Firestone plant.

Based on our laboratory testing and results, we were able to make predictions

that could be confirmed by real-world data. Then, on May 11th of this year we received the latest claims data from Firestone which showed a rising trend in failure

rates for Wilderness AT tires, further validating our analyses and predictive model.

With these pieces of the puzzle coming together, we felt we had sufficient information to take action in the best interest of our customers (Exhibit 2).

Last summer the elevated levels of tire failures on the recalled tires sent a very

strong signal. What we learned since then allowed us to analyze failure trends more

precisely. So, while claims alone today do not present as strong a signal as last August, our model suggests that the rate of failures is increasing significantly as the

tires age, a risk that we cannot ask our customers to accept.

We really had only two choices—wait until more failures proved conclusively there

is a growing problem, or act now on the basis of our analyses and the data available. With hot weather driving conditions approaching, we knew the risk of tread

separations would increase. As a result, in the interest of the safety of our customers, we could not wait.

Progress to Date

In the first week of June, after reviewing our proposed customer letter with

NHTSA, we notified millions of customers of our analysis and the details of our replacement program. At the same time, we were qualifying tires as fit for replacement through our testing processes. We have, so far, identified approximately 60

types of replacement tires. We also reviewed the list with NHTSA to ascertain that

there were no pending concerns with the qualified tires.

To build the pipeline of replacement tires, we entered into discussion with tire

manufacturers. So far, an additional 2 million tires have been made available, and

we have taken 2-3 down weeks at several of our plants to help fill the supply pipeline and give the tire manufacturers time to ramp up production. The desire to

quickly increase replacement tire production was another reason we felt we had to

announce the replacement program as soon as possible.

We are qualifying tires based on the new testing procedures developed by the Tire

Team. In addition, the tire manufacturers are providing claims data from the early

warning system developed as a result of the TREAD Act. These data, together with

our predictive models, give us confidence that the replacement tires will meet the

needs of our customers.

The Explorer is a Safe Vehicle

The data tell us that the problem is with the tires and not the vehicle. There are

about 3 million Goodyear tires that were built to the exact same Ford specifications

and were put on Explorers during 1995-1997 (and as replacements for these vehicles

in subsequent years). These tires are performing almost flawlessly, having generated only 2 tread separation claims. At the same time, a similar number of Explorers built at the same assembly plants but equipped with Firestone tires have

experienced 1183 tread separations (Exhibit 3), with the same type of customer and

the same geographical/climatic distribution of vehicles (Exhibit 4). The difference in

tire failure rates therefore cannot be attributed to the Explorer.

It has been alleged that the reason Goodyear tires had few tread separations is

that they are a ‘‘B’’ graded tire according to the Uniform Tire Quality Grading

Standards (UTQGS), while the Wilderness AT has a ‘‘C’’ rating. In fact, millions of

tires on GM and Toyota vehicles, for example, are ‘‘C’’ rated, but have not had tread

separation problems.

Another charge is that the Explorer had insufficient load reserve—or margin of

safety—for the tires. The field data show, however, that there is no correlation between load reserve and tread separation claims on these vehicles. Goodyear tires

had the same load reserve at 26 psi yet had no tread separation problem. Furthermore, the Firestone 16’’ Wilderness AT tires, which are specified at 30 psi, had elevated claims even with 300 pounds more load reserve. Lastly, the Explorer’s load

reserve is similar to other SUVs.

There have also been allegations that Explorer is causing the tire ‘‘problem’’ since

Ford Ranger is fitted with the same tire, yet experienced fewer tread separations.

The only time the same size tire was used on the Ranger and Explorer was as an

option on the four-wheel drive model of the Ranger. The vast majority of these vehicles were sold in northern climates where four-wheel drive is in high demand. When

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Decatur-built Wilderness AT tires (these were recalled by Firestone last August)

were placed on 4x4 Ranger pickup trucks in the hot states, they failed at statistically similar rates as the tires on the Explorer.

The Wilderness AT tires used as original equipment on the Explorer are also installed as aftermarket tires on a wide variety of non-Ford vehicles and these vehicles have experienced a significant number of tread separations, some resulting in

accidents. There are a total of 167 non-Ford claims of tread separation and 66 of

these are on competitive SUVs. These claims include claims for tread separations

on tires not included in last year’s recall. The total number of Wilderness tires used

as aftermarket replacements on competitive vehicles is not known, but is believed

to be relatively small, suggesting an elevated failure rate, comparable to that experienced by original equipment Firestone tires on the Explorer (Exhibit 5). In addition,

there are 236 claims on Ford vehicles that are not Explorers on these same tires,

again suggesting that the problem is with the tires.

In spite of this strong statistical evidence that this is a Firestone tire problem,

we were not satisfied to stop at an investigation of the tires alone. As a designer

and manufacturer of vehicles for almost 100 years, Ford used its knowledge of vehicle engineering to do an unblinking review of tire-vehicle interaction. All through

this process we shared our findings with NHTSA and Firestone.

We conducted 4 major analyses in our safety investigation that focused specifically on the vehicle. We looked at whether the Explorer design could cause an elevated rate of tread separation claims, and we found that this was not the case: we

were able to reproduce the tire failure mode in the laboratory, independent of the

Explorer, confirming the field data on Firestone and Goodyear tires.

We looked at whether the Explorer behaved differently, compared to peer vehicles,

during a tread separation. In all, we tested 24 different vehicles in 60 tread separation tests and more than 1000 vehicle dynamics tests and hundreds of computer

simulations; the data we generated confirmed that the Explorer behaves similarly

to other SUVs. We looked at whether Explorer behaved differently after a tread separation, and the data show that its performance falls within the range of other vehicles in its class. And we looked at the crashworthiness of the Explorer, and again

found that it was comparable or better than peer vehicles. Overall, the Explorer performed similarly to other SUVs before, during and after a tread separation.

Importantly, the results obtained in thousands of hours in the laboratory and on

the test track are confirmed by 10 years of real world performance.

The analysis of government data show that the Explorer is among the safest of

the comparable SUVs (Exhibit 6):

• The Explorer is 17% safer than the typical comparable SUV in all types of fatal

crashes (Exhibit 7).

• The Explorer is 19% safer than the typical comparable SUV in fatal rollover accidents (Exhibit 7).

• The Explorer is safer than the typical comparable SUV in all crash types—front,

side, rear and rollover crashes.

• The Explorer is involved in 19% fewer accidents of all types (fatal and non-fatal)

than the typical comparable SUV (Exhibit 8).

Explorers have successfully traveled enormous distances in the last 11 years.

More than 4 million Explorers have been sold, and over 3.5 million of these are still

in service. Explorer drivers have collectively driven the equivalent of more than 13

million years. Explorers have been driven more than 150 billion miles.

Insurance data also show the Explorer has a strong safety record. Data published

by the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) show that the Explorer in all its derivatives (such as model type—2 door versus 4 door and 2 wheel drive versus 4 wheel

drive) has an injury loss claims record better than the average car, ranging up to

32 percent better.

Explorer has a fine record in government and consumer testing:

• Explorer has scored 4 or 5 stars (the highest rating) in government NCAP frontal

and side crash tests.

• Explorer is similar to competitive SUVs in the government’s experimental rollover

resistance rating, based on the static stability factor (SSF).

• Explorer received the second-highest rating from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) in its frontal offset crash tests. Just one SUV got a better

rating, while four received lower ratings.

All in all, no other SUV has such a strong combination of field and testing performance.

Analysis of Firestone tire claims data also confirms that the accident and the rollover risk for the Explorer when a tread separation occurs is comparable to other

SUVs (Exhibit 9). Since tread separation accidents are still relatively rare events,

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the sample size of the data is quite small and the confidence interval is wide. We

will continue to share our analysis with NHTSA and Congress to confirm our understanding. However, nothing in the data that we have analyzed supports recent accusations that the Explorer is behaving atypically among SUVs. The Explorer is as

safe as other SUVs before, during and after a tread separation.

A recent analysis conducted by Dennis Guenther at the request of Firestone purports to show deficiency in the safety of the Explorer on the basis that it does not

have enough ‘‘understeer margin’’ to prevent oversteer in the linear range when it

suffers a tread separation at the rear. We strongly disagree with the statements

made by Firestone regarding this study. The Firestone test is unreliable because it

did not test enough vehicles or conditions to support their conclusions.

• It used too few models (only 2 compared to Ford’s 15 SUV tests).

• It has test repeatability and data reduction issues.

• It tested only on one road surface.

• It did not test the actual event of tread separation.

• It did not test under the demanding circumstances in which tread separations

occur in the real world.

• Its results are inconsistent with real-world accident data.

Firestone’s allegations would imply that not only Explorer, but 12 other vehicles

we tested made by the world’s leading motor vehicle manufacturers also do not meet

Guenther’s understeer criteria (see table below). This illustrates the absurdity of

Firestone’s position.

Vehicles That Show Linear Range Oversteer with a Rear Tread Removed

(All vehicles tested fully loaded)

2001 BMW X5 4x4 2001 Honda Odyssey 1996 Chevrolet Blazer4x2

1995 Isuzu Rodeo 4x2 2001 Chevrolet TrailBlazer 4x2 2001 Jeep Liberty 4x4

2001 Dodge Durango 4x4 1995 Nissan Pathfinder 4x2 2001 Honda Accord

2000 Toyota 4-Runner 4x4 2001 Honda CRV 4x4 1994 Toyota 4-Runner 4x2

The Explorer, like all its peers and every vehicle made, has handling characteristics which are optimized for safety with four treaded tires. According to our test results, its handling and steering characteristics are remarkably close to those chosen

by BMW and Mercedes Benz, as well as the most recent entries from Jeep, Dodge,

and even the new TrailBlazer has less understeer than the Explorer. These characteristics help the driver to achieve safe operation in all foreseeable circumstances.

Even the two vehicles that meet Firestone’s understeer criteria have experienced

rollover accidents after a tread separation on Firestone tires in the real world.

Finally, we will not accept that a tread separation is a ‘‘normal foreseeable event’’

that manufacturers must accommodate through vehicle design as asserted by Firestone. No vehicle we have tested can deal with a tread separation well enough to

avoid a small but significant risk of loss of control with a treadless rear tire. As

indicated in Exhibits 10 and 11, other tire manufacturers such as Continental and

Goodyear do not accept that tread separation is a normal or common occurrence

that should be part of the vehicle design requirements.

NHTSA’s data show that other tire manufacturers have demonstrated that it is

possible with current technology to design tires that do not separate. We know the

best way to prevent accidents caused by tread separations is to prevent tread separations and that is why we are replacing the Firestone Wilderness AT tires on our

vehicles.

Conclusion

In summary, we have been guided throughout by our number one priority, the

safety of our customers.

Ironically, last summer we were criticized by some for acting too slowly. Now, we

are being criticized for acting too swiftly. In both cases, we have been driven by the

facts and analyses available. We have shared data continuously with NHTSA, Congress, and Firestone. I assure the committee that the decision that we took to replace these Firestone Wilderness AT tires was not taken lightly. The cost of the replacement program is about 3 billion dollars. We feel this expenditure is necessary

to protect the safety of those who have put their trust in us. And, we will make

that decision any time that the safety of our customers is at risk.

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Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Nasser, thank you very much.

Before we start, I just want to caution the audience that we have

to have an aisle between the different rows of chairs. So if you can’t

find a seat, certainly open up that aisle, so that from the fire marshal’s standpoint, we can move about.

Mr. Nasser, we certainly welcome the UAW employees here.

You’ll be happy to know that a lot of the Ford dealerships have also

called us, so we’re getting a lot of participation from Ford, and we

like to hear from our constituents.

I’m going to open up and when I’m in a similar situation, like

yourself, I always say, I am open for hospitable questions. So that’s

where you are today. And I want you to know that this committee

is intent, while some of these questions might be pointed, that the

purpose is with our not having the knowledge you have, or

NHTSA. We are struggling, as Mr. Strickland said, to understand

what these claims data mean.

Is it operator error? Or is it possibly just a case of a malfunction

of—a one-time malfunction? Or is there a consistency here from an

engineering standpoint that we need to correct?

So if you will bear with us as we go through this, we’ll be asking

some questions, hopefully just to try and educate us as well as the

public.

On the issue of Ford’s temperature test—I’m from Florida where

there’s a lot of heat. After reviewing your data, I wonder whether

these temperature tests were truly a valid comparison of the Firestone tire. As I understand it, you tested a total of 40 tires of varying sizes. Out of these 40 tires, 33 were Firestone tires.

Could you explain how these tests, when a majority were Firestone tires, are a valid comparison of the other tires; and also,

since most of us have a lot of questions here, it would be very helpful if you could be concise in your answers so that we could just

move quickly through.

Mr. NASSER. We did have exhaustive tests of tires, both old tires

and new tires, and we analyzed field data of 146 cases. We conducted extensive vehicle on-road testing, including 24 different vehicles, and we tested——

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Nasser, as I understand, those were not, the

146, temperature tests. The temperature tests you did, at least

from my notes, were on 40 tires, of which 33 were Firestone tires;

is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. That is correct.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. So we are not talking about 146.

Mr. NASSER. Ford’s testing was consistent. I heard earlier that

we were testing old tires versus new tires. That is not true. We

tested old Goodyear tires versus old Firestone tires. And the reason

we had to test only Goodyear is because they were the only tires

that were fitted previously on Firestone—on Explorer, other than

Firestone tires.

And we did test new Goodyear versus new Firestone versus new

Michelins, and also new General/Continental tires. So in our

view—and we’ve shared all this data—we think the testing was

valid, indicative of what we’d expect tires to go through, and we

think it was a fair test between the brands.

45

Mr. STEARNS. The only thing that I first felt when I heard that

out of the 40, 33 were Firestone, you would think that you would

have more Goodyear, or at least there’d be a more disparate representation.

So—I mean, that’s what I’m trying to get at because it’s that decision on your part, on that test dealing with temperature, which

is—I am from Florida—is a very important test. I am trying to understand how you could make a decision under that kind of statistic where you had—33 were Firestone out of 40.

Mr. NASSER. Every test that we did went through data, statistical analysis, in terms of its significance; and we will share that

data with you. And if you—if you look at it, we believe is it statistically significant.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. Let me move on to another area that all of

us were a little concerned about, and it’s dealing with the ratings

on these tires.

I don’t think my wife when she goes to look at a tire knows

whether it’s a C-rated or B-rated; and frankly, at this stage of my

life, I am not looking at it either. But you supplied this committee

with charts showing that the Firestone Wilderness AT 15-inch tire

runs hotter than the Goodyear Wrangler RTS 15-inch tire. The

Firestone tires you tested had a C rating, whereas all the other

tires you tested had a B rating.

Because Ford designed the specifications, you sat there and said, ‘‘These are the specs that you must abide by, Subcontractor.’’ Was there any real surprise that the Firestone tires tested hotter

than the Goodyear tires, just based upon that rating; and is that

C and B meaningful?

Mr. NASSER. Well, the first thing is, we do not specify a B- or

C-graded tire, and neither does any other manufacturer. We don’t

specify a temperature grade. We’ve got performance specifications

that are the same.

Mr. STEARNS. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Nasser.

Is there a difference between a C and B rating on a tire? Does

it have any meaningful difference?

Mr. NASSER. There may be some difference. We don’t believe is

it anything significant in terms of tread separation.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay.

Mr. NASSER. And by the way, I should add—— Mr. STEARNS. Yes?

Mr. NASSER. [continuing] that many of our competitors, including

Toyota and General Motors, use C-grade tires on sport utility vehicles.

Mr. STEARNS. Well, just the data we had from General Motors,

they indicate it should be a B-rated tire. You know, that’s just one

competitor.

Mr. NASSER. They use C-rated tires, and interestingly enough,

Firestone did not mark the tires with a temperature grade until we

believed, sometime in 1999 or the year 2000, and on at least two

occasions, in 1995 and in 1999, we were told by Firestone that the

tires were B-class tires.

Mr. STEARNS. We have a couple of charts here that we have put

together, our staff, based upon the information you gave us. That

one the staff is just putting up will show that the General Grabber

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AT tire, based upon the information you gave us, has a higher rating than the Wilderness AT; and that the Wilderness AT, relative

to the General GS 60 and the other tires, is, you know, a little

higher. But it’s not so significantly higher to, in our minds, understand why such a major recall decision would be made.

And so I am saying, this is a graph we’ve put together from your

information.

Mr. NASSER. You know, I go back to the initial discussion. We

can peal this data, piece by piece. We can look at temperature, we

can look at peel strength, we can look at all different types of

things. In the end, you’ve got to look at field data.

One particular element, an attribute of a tire doesn’t tell the

complete story, and that’s part of the confusion that we’re getting

in the marketplace, and that’s part of the reason Congressman Stupak highlighted that headline in the press.

You cannot take one particular aspect of a tire. You must look

at the overall performance, and that’s what we did.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank you. My time has expired.

The gentleman, my colleague from Florida, Mr. Deutsch.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Nasser, for your testimony.

I’d like to focus a little bit on the chairman of the full committee,

and really, I appreciate his effort. And this—really part of our job

in just trying to inform consumers a bit more, and as has been discussed, by the end of this hearing, I don’t think we’ll get to the

final answers, but I think we can provide that function reasonably

well.

Obviously, you know, you express the condolences—I think all of

us do—of the deaths that occurred from the Firestone tire failures.

Most of these failures, as you well know, were also on Ford Explorers. From a consumer perspective, I think hearing your answer to

this question is helpful.

Why is the Explorer so difficult to control when there is tire— when there is tread separation?

Mr. NASSER. That’s your question?

Mr. DEUTSCH. Yeah.

Mr. NASSER. All vehicles have, the Explorer does not handle any

differently than any other sport utility vehicle. It’s in the middle

of the pack, and we have testing that will support that.

Most vehicles do not handle very well when you lose a tread. Vehicles are not designed and specified and set up so that they can

handle tread separation easily, although you would have to say

that even with—even from Firestone’s own data, 90 percent of the

Explorers do not roll over even when there is a catastrophic tread

separation.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Let me follow up.

Mr. NASSER. So I’m not sure, what is the thrust of your question.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Well, the thrust, I guess, is——

Mr. NASSER. If the thrust of the question is for manufacturers to

design vehicles that would handle tread separation, I think that

would be a losing proposition for our customers.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Let me just refer to a memo from Donald Tandy

of Car Engineering, which is in the packet we’ve submitted for the

record. Mr. Tandy was a frequent expert witness for Ford, says

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that the driver of an Explorer died when the tread separated because the driver did not steer the vehicle in a controlled way.

Mr. Tandy has given this testimony in numerous lawsuits. Last

year he told the committee staff how simple it was to handle a

tread separation at highway speeds, and we have videos of Mr.

Tandy’s demonstrations.

Is it still your position that the average driver is different from

Mr. Tandy, who’s testified for Ford, and should be able to drive

safely on the shoulder and stop a vehicle in this situation?

Mr. NASSER. Our contention is that tread separations should be

a very, very unlikely event; and different—different drivers will

react in a different way. So I am not trying to predict how drivers

will react because they will react in a very different fashion.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Well, let me just repeat the question. Is it the position of Ford Motor Company that an average driver of a Ford Explorer ought to be able to drive safely to the shoulder and stop a

vehicle without an incident when there’s tread separation?

Mr. NASSER. That is true. But it also—I should say that the Explorer doesn’t handle or behave any differently than a typical sport

utility vehicle in that situation.

Mr. DEUTSCH. So I guess I am trying to understand if that is a

catastrophic thing that we can’t plan for, or deal with; or is it

something that if it occurs, you ought to a be able to drive to the

shoulder of the road and not die.

Mr. NASSER. In most cases, you should be able to drive to the

side of the road and based on all the data that we have, including

the Firestone data, nine times out of ten, that does happen.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Okay. And is that the case in the 203 people who

died? There were 2,000 incidents and only 10 percent—— Mr. NASSER. Mr. Deutsch, we feel very sad about those 203 people. That’s why we are moving to replace 13 million tires. That’s

exactly what we’re doing. We don’t want to be sitting here talking

about further tragic deaths and accidents and having esoteric discussions about the behavior of a vehicle when a tread separation

occurs.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Okay. And again I guess I am just trying to focus,

from a consumer perspective in terms of driving a Ford Explorer.

Is that Mr. Tandy, who my understanding is your lead expert in

terms of the court case that is involved in this, then his testimony

is correct or not correct?

Mr. NASSER. I have to look at his testimony in detail. I haven’t

done that. I am answering your question in the spirit it was asked.

The Explorer handles in a typical fashion, as other SUVs nine

times out of ten, based on the data Firestone provided.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Let me in the final question in a deposition on

Thomas Bogaman, Ford’s quality control officer, taken on December 21st, Mr. Bogaman testified that it was his opinion that all

Firestone Wilderness AT 15-inch tires were not, and I will quote,

‘‘robust against variations in inflation pressure and in operating

condition, load and speed’’ close quote. If Mr. Bogaman knew that

last December, why didn’t Ford recall the Wilderness tires at that

time?

Mr. NASSER. It’s Mr. Tom Baughman. He is an engineer with

Ford, and he’s a very competent engineer. In that particular inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
48

stance, as an example, we don’t agree with his conclusion; and

that’s not a problem for us. You know, we have a company where

we encourage people to develop theories and knock them down and

look at data; and if you look at the data, it isn’t supported by

his——

Mr. STEARNS. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The chairman of the Oversight and Investigations Committee,

Mr. Greenwood, is recognized.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Good morning, Mr. Nasser. I don’t envy you.

You have a very difficult challenge on your hands to—I believed

you and took you at your word when you sat with me and members

of the committee 4 weeks ago and told us that you felt a strong obligation to your consumers to protect their safety; and they think

you’re doing that. And I think it’s obviously understandable that

you have a obligation to your stockholders and your employees to

do what’s right for the company at the same time. But I do want

to get to this comparison.

One of the questions that’s plagued us as we looked at this is

this question of which tires one would choose to recall and which

tires one would use to replace them, and the confusing sets of data

that I’m sure you needed to rely on to some extent and were confronted with.

If you compare the Firestone Wilderness AT and the Goodyear

P235/75R15 tires, the committee’s prepared a chart that sets forth

the percentage of tires that had belt leaving belt at each plant; and

that chart is available to your left. So according to this chart,

which was prepared using data supplied by Ford, the Goodyear

Lawton plant has a very similar belt-leaving-belt percentage, as do

the Firestone Wilson and Joliette plans.

Can you follow that there, sir?

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Okay.

However, the Firestone Aiken plant has had no tires tested with

belt leaving belt.

So the question is, how could Ford—how did Ford decide to replace Firestone tires with no tread separation from its own tests

with a Goodyear Wrangler RTS tire that has tread separation?

Mr. NASSER. Mr. Chairman, this was one of the toughest decisions for us, because we’re generally data driven. We look at it and

we try and decide strictly on data; and in this case, we had to go

a little bit further. And I’d like to just take you through the thinking and the rationale behind the parameters of the tire recall, the

13-million-tires recall; and they really fall into four categories, and

they’re different, and that’s why I say this is complex.

The first one is, we looked at field data and we saw the field data

increasing, real-world data, what was going on in the field. And

when we looked at that, it was very clear that the Wilson plant

tires were a risk.

In addition to that, we looked at statistical analysis, what we call

a hazard plot, which looks at the prediction of aging of these tires

over time. And that showed rising trends for Wilson and Joliette.

So at this point we had Wilson because of field data, we had Wilson

and Joliette because of field data and our statistical prediction of

aging.

49

We then went through our lag tests where we looked at peel

strength, wedge width and also temperature, and that showed risk

of failure for Wilson, Joliette and also Decatur. So now we had almost all the population of these tires.

We were left with the Aiken plant. Aiken is a new plant. It’s very

automated. Its manufacturing and quality variability is the best of

the Firestone plants. Based on everything that we’ve seen, is it a

world-class plant. But our customers’ confidence in all of these Wilderness AT tires, we knew just wouldn’t be there.

So when we sat back from it all, we didn’t want our customers

to be crawling under their vehicles looking for Aiken manufacturing. We didn’t want them to be sitting here a year from now,

because we didn’t have a lot of experience on Aiken. Aiken’s a new

plant, the tires maybe haven’t been out there long enough.

So we made a judgment call on Aiken, and your data is probably

right there. Aiken would fall within the category of a pretty good

tire.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Did you do a similar analysis of the Goodyear

tires that would have shown that there are Goodyear Wrangler

RTS tires with tread separation?

Mr. NASSER. We did, we did—all very similar analysis on Goodyear. But in the final analysis, all of the testing and all of the

hypotheses doesn’t really mean anything unless you can correlate

it to real-world data, field data. And in the case of Goodyear, we

went back to the field and, guess what, the tires performed well

with customers.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Okay. Let me go to another question here.

Ford has emphasized the rig test results, asserting that it could

not fail a Goodyear tire at less than 26 pounds of air pressure, or

anywhere from 40 to 42 percent of Firestone’s Wilderness AT tires,

depending on the plant, failed at such lower pressures. What Ford

didn’t tell us, however, was that several of the Goodyear tires failed

at exactly 26 psi.

Ford also didn’t tell us that it did not test any 16-inch Goodyear

tires at less than 26 psi during its rig tests, yet it included the 16-

inch test results in its various presentations to this committee. And

even though it did test a small number of 15-inch Goodyear tires

at low inflation pressures, without failure, almost half of those

Goodyear tires were new tires as compared to the Firestone tires

tested at those same pressures, 85 percent of which had been designated by Ford as ‘‘old’’ because they had been used on vehicles

for more than one summer.

Do you really think that these tests were comparable?

Mr. NASSER. First of all, we always go back to the field data. Second, we do believe those tests were comparable because we tested

old versus old and new versus new in every case.

Mr. GREENWOOD. If I can interrupt you, sir, we’re trying to make

a separation here between the field testing and the rig testing because you’ve presented data from both sources.

If you look at that chart there, you see that when it came to testing the Firestone tires, 85 percent of the tires you tested were old

tires; then you went over to do similar rig testing on the Goodyears. Only 54 percent of those were old tires. So I am not sure

how you call that a comparable test.

50

Mr. NASSER. We can debate the e-percentages all you like. Those

percentages are probably meaningless, frankly, because in the end

you have a sample size that is—statistically gives you confidence,

and we think it does, and doesn’t represent an apples-to-apples

comparison, and we think it does. Those percentages could——

Mr. GREENWOOD. In all due respect, sir, to some extent you’ve

got old apples versus new apples, and that is significant.

Mr. NASSER. I don’t know whether that is true or not. We tested

old versus old and new versus new, and if you’ve got data that

shows we came to conclusions by comparing old to new and new

to old, please show us that data.

Mr. GREENWOOD. My time has expired.

Mr. STEARNS. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Dingell, from

Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Nasser, I think these questions will be susceptible to yes or

no answers. Does Ford tell its tire suppliers, like Firestone, what

materials must be used to build a tire for a Ford vehicle?

Mr. NASSER. No.

Mr. DINGELL. Does Ford specify how wide the wedge rubber between the belts on the tires should be?

Mr. NASSER. No.

Mr. DINGELL. What about the skim stock for the tire does Ford

dictate that this tire compound should be of one kind or another

to its tire suppliers.

Mr. NASSER. No.

Mr. DINGELL. Does Ford tell its tire suppliers how many body

plies or steel belts should be in a tire?

Mr. NASSER. No.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Nasser, with regard to the Firestone ATX and

Wilderness AT tires that have been recalled over the last year, did

Firestone make all these decisions regarding engineering and construction of the tires?

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Nasser, why doesn’t Ford indicate in its specifications for the construction of tires?

Mr. NASSER. Well, no other manufacturer does that. The tire

manufacturers are the experts on producing the tire, the design

and manufacture of the tire. And the way we specify tires, we believe is consistent with other automotive companies; and the way

we specify tires for Firestone is the same way we specify tires for

Goodyear and the other companies.

Mr. DINGELL. So Ford requirements are performance specifications, not engineering, construction standards?

Mr. NASSER. That is right.

Mr. DINGELL. And you gave the same to all the manufacturers

for the same vehicle; is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. That’s true.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Nasser, what sort of requirements does

Ford identify in its performance specifications?

Mr. NASSER. We look at a whole list of different specifications

which include speed ratings and handling, wet weather conditions,

51

snow conditions and probably four or five other characteristics that

relate to the tire and the way it relates to the vehicle.

Mr. DINGELL. So the performance specifications Ford gave Firestone for Wilderness AT tires were essentially identical to specifications you provided to Goodyear and other manufacturers when they

supply tires for the Explorer; is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. Congressman, I looked at the specification sheets

for Firestone and Goodyear recently, dating all the way back as

many years as we could go, and they are identical.

Mr. DINGELL. I would ask unanimous consent that those be put

in the record; and I’ll submit them to the committee, Mr. Chairman.

So both Firestone and Goodyear built these tires for Ford based

on the same information and specifications; is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. And so even though two suppliers built tires for

Ford Explorers based on the same performance standards, we see

that the result was different. Firestone tires had over 1,100 tread

separations and Goodyear tires had only two; is that right?

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. And the number of tires manufactured by both of

these was not startlingly different; they were within a few percentages of the total number of tires, of equal parts of the——

Mr. NASSER. Millions of tires on similar vehicles, and these vehicles operated in very similar geographic conditions.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Nasser, it’s been said that Ford shifted

from Goodyear to Firestone because Firestone would give you a better price. Did that change the performance specifications of the

tires, the requirements for safety of the tire on the vehicle?

Mr. NASSER. No, it didn’t, and——

Mr. DINGELL. Should it have?

Mr. NASSER. Absolutely not.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time;

and the distinguished chairman of the full Energy and Commerce

Committee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Tauzin, is recognized.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nasser, let me first start by frankly thanking you and Ford

Motor Company for doing what the TREAD Act intended, and that

is taking time and money and spending it on extensive testing,

rather than relying upon body counts to make a decision as to

whether a product is safe for the road. And, frankly, I hope in 30

days to be able to express similar thanks to NHTSA.

I am going to reserve judgment until I see how good a job they

have done with dollars and the new authority we’ve provided under

the TREAD Act, so I’ll wait and see.

But having said that, let me also acknowledge that Ford has an

absolute right to replace any part of, you know, the product line

that you want to replace, in your opinion, for the safety of your customers. I think you have every right to do that; and frankly, I

again want to applaud you for making a very expensive decision to

52

do that, because you believe it’s in the interest of your consumers’ safety.

But having said that, we’re still left with a great deal of confusion as to some of the decisions you made, and why, and what implications it has for the consuming public, particularly people who

are using the same tires on other vehicles made by other companies. And that’s why we’re getting into these questions of how comparable were these tests, and how broad your recall was, and what

implications it has for the consuming public and for other companies.

You’ve heard, I think, one of the members make the point that

this massive recall has the potential of severely rocking the solvency and the future of the Firestone company itself. It is so massive and implies so much about confidence in the Firestone product

that, obviously, questions arise as to why so massive a recall; and

so I’m going to ask you a few questions about that.

First of all, is it true that you have recalled some lines of Wilderness AT tires that Ford never even tested?

Mr. NASSER. I don’t know whether that’s true, but I—I wouldn’t

doubt that because we looked at a broad range of tires; and as I

said, in the end, it became a question of what is right for our customers.

Chairman TAUZIN. Well, here’s our problem: You see, we’ve identified four other lines that you’ve recalled, one a Wilderness tire,

P215/72R15, that is not only used on the Ford Ranger, but it’s used

on the Isuzu Rodeo and on a Mazda vehicle; and you have not— according to our information, you have not run any tests on those

tires, on that line of Wilderness tires.

You’ve also recalled a tire that is used on—another tire used on

a Mazda on which you’ve made no tests.

There’s a third line of Wilderness tires that is used on General

Motors products—Suburbans, for example, and Blazers, Sierras,

Yukons—that you have recalled and run no test.

Mr. NASSER. Mr. Chairman, they’re different tires.

Chairman TAUZIN. They’re the tire that you recalled; the P265/

75R/16 has been recalled.

Mr. NASSER. They are different tires.

Chairman TAUZIN. How—how are they different?

Mr. NASSER. They are different tires. I can tell you that, and you

can believe me or you can have it checked. They are different tires.

Chairman TAUZIN. Well, are the Wilderness tires used on Isuzu

and Mazda different tires?

Mr. NASSER. Mazda is part of the Ford Motor Company, so I’m

not sure about that specific tire.

Chairman TAUZIN. You understand that they’re the same tire,

and in addition, we have another one, Wilderness AT1/P265/75R15,

that’s also used on a Mazda that you’ve recalled.

Mr. NASSER. Mr. Chairman, we didn’t test every single tire ever

made in the history of this world. We didn’t. We had to stop. It was

a question of, do we keep testing, do we keep studying, do we keep

reviewing; or do we go out there and act in the interests of our customers?

And, yes, we are guilty; we decided to go out there and be nimble

and act for our customers. I took——

53

Chairman TAUZIN. But you—Mr. Nasser, I have got a limited

amount of time.

The problem we have, sir, in understanding this recall and shedding light on it is that tire lines are being recalled, and your company has provided our committee with no data indicating the basis

upon which these particular lines are being recalled.

Can you—— Mr. NASSER. Mr. Chairman—— Chairman TAUZIN. If I ask you for this on the record, would you

agree to supply to us any data you have that indicates why these

tire lines were recalled?

Mr. NASSER. If we have the data, we’ll supply it to you. If we

don’t have the data, and you want us to test it, we’ll go and test

it; but in the absence of that, we acted for the safety of our customers.

Chairman TAUZIN. I am not questioning your motives.

Mr. NASSER. But I am not sure where the question is heading.

Chairman TAUZIN. The question is simply that if these tires are

being used on other vehicles—— Mr. NASSER. They’re different tires except for the case of Mazda.

Chairman TAUZIN. Mr. Nasser, in some cases, they’re the same

tire; and if they’re being recalled only on the Ford vehicle, but not

on the other vehicle, what—what—how much confusion does that

create for the consumers on the other vehicle?

Mr. NASSER. Mr. Chairman, we are recalling the Mazda vehicles.

Chairman TAUZIN. All right.

Second, you’re replacing some of these recalled tires with tires

manufactured by other companies, other than Firestone, and you

have heard some of the conversations we have had regarding this.

We’re giving this information to NHTSA, but our investigators tell

us that one of those tires, one of the replacement tires, has a

claims rate of 124 per million, way in excess of the 5 per million

that you indicated to us was the benchmark for this recall.

How can you justify replacing a tire that fails 5 out of a million

with one that has a claims failure rate of 124 out of a million; and

are we going to be in another cycle of recall later on?

Mr. NASSER. Well, we can’t justify it, and if the facts are right,

the first time we heard about it is when we read about it in the

newspaper this morning. Every tire that we put on the replacement

list was looked at and reviewed by NHTSA. We wanted to see

whether there was any indication of that data.

There is one tire—— Chairman TAUZIN. Mr. Nasser, let me stop you there. NHTSA

will testify later today that your company did, in fact, ask if there

was any data on these replacement tires that indicated that they

were the subject of a safety investigation.

Mr. NASSER. Right.

Chairman TAUZIN. NHTSA will testify they did not approve the

replacement tire lists that you submitted, and I just want to put

that on the record.

Mr. NASSER. Okay, I agree with that. I didn’t say——

Chairman TAUZIN. But my question is, if NHTSA determines in

the next 30 days that some of these replacement tires that you

have on your Web site as authorized replacement tires for the FireVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
54

stones you’re taking off do, in fact, have a safety concern or a worse

safety record than the Firestone tire you’re taking off, what do you

plan to do about that?

Mr. NASSER. Mr. Chairman, we shouldn’t be waiting 30 days if

that data is accurate; we should be acting in 30 minutes. I think

it’s a question of determining, is the data that you have, that no

one else seems to have, if you have it and it’s accurate, we’ll act

on it; if it isn’t, then we’ll continue.

Chairman TAUZIN. If I can have 1 additional minute, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. Without objection.

Chairman TAUZIN. The third question is one I told you I would

ask you on the record, and I need an answer to it. You said the

real-world test, regardless of all these tests—and we can debate

how accurately and comparably they were done, or how comparably

Firestone’s test of your vehicle was done—the real-world test was

when Goodyear tires were actually put on Fords, and they performed better than Firestone tires in the mid-90’s.

But the evidence, the evidence you just submitted to us, was apparently a message to Gary Hagan of Goodyear in 1998, and I’ll

read it to you. ‘‘Though Goodyear has previously reviewed the price level, your

quote for 100 percent of the tire volume, which is the same as the

current price, based on today’s 68 percent supply’’—apparently you

were using 68 percent Goodyear tires up until this point that— ‘‘your quote for 100 percent sole sourcing is not competitive. As

you’re aware, we’re investigating a single-sourcing of the tire based

on your uncompetitive price. Goodyear cannot be sourced on this

fit.’’

The conclusion we reach is that in 1998 you switched back to

sole-sourcing Firestones solely because of price differentials with

Goodyear; is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. I wish we’d stayed with the Goodyear tires, Mr.

Chairman, in retrospect.

But I’d have to say no, because during the same period, the answer to your direct question—if you look at the same period, that

same year and the year following that—Goodyear’s percentage of

Ford tires, tires used on Ford vehicles, actually went up; and it

went up because during that period we wanted to balance tire

sourcing between the companies. Goodyear went from 20 percent,

22 percent of total supply to about 35 percent on an overall basis.

Now, that doesn’t get to your specific question.

Chairman TAUZIN. Could you get to it for me? Why did Ford

start buying Goodyear tires in 1996 and stop buying them in 1998

for the Explorer, when you now know that Goodyear was much better?

Mr. NASSER. Goodyear is much better, and the reason primarily

was driven by—and we did it on many other components, other

than tires, that is, to have a single design source for major components, because you don’t want to go engineering, validating, testing

multiple sources.

I would like to say, however, based on your question, that decision was made in 1994, I believe. Between 1994 and 1997, Goodyear reduced the price of their tires greater than Firestone reduced

55

the price of their tires; and the difference between Goodyear tire

costs and Firestone tire costs by 1997 was 10 cents a tire, and I

don’t think we would get down to making major sourcing decisions

that would compromise any vehicle attribute over 10 cents.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Strickland is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nasser, we’re not talking about a recall, are we? Isn’t this

something other than a recall that we’re discussing here?

Mr. NASSER. You know, that’s a good question, because in almost

every sense this is a recall. We call it a replacement program for

a number of reasons.

The first reason is not all of the tires obviously have a safety defect. Second, traditionally the tire company would institute and

manage the recall. And I think, third, we wanted to move quickly.

We’re handling everything else from a customer viewpoint as if it

were a recall.

Mr. STRICKLAND. Another question. Is it possible that the recall

is as large and massive as it is, not only related to safety concerns

but because as a company, you’re concerned about consumer confidence?

Mr. NASSER. When I described the four steps that we went

through in terms of determining the scope of the recall, the Aiken

tires in particular—and I think one other Firestone tire—would fall

in the realm of a world class tire. So I would classify that as a customer quality assurance action.

Mr. STRICKLAND. I asked that question based on my own experience, because I had tires that weren’t recalled during the first recall, and lots of my constituents would walk out, look at my tires

and say, why are you driving on those tires, you should get those

replaced; and I would explain to them that they weren’t a part of

the initial recall.

But I assume—and this is—this is an assumption that I am making, but I have assumed that from a company standpoint, you want

to make sure that your customers have a high level of confidence

in the product that you’re getting—that they’re getting from you.

I direct that question to you, because there have been questions

raised here this morning about why you’re doing this, and several

people have said, you’ve got a right to do it, you know——

Mr. NASSER. I’ll say to you, we have no doubt about why we’re

doing it. We’re doing it in the interest of our customers’ safety and

peace of mind. It is as simple as that, and, you know, you hear a

lot of reports about how difficult a decision this is and maybe there

are other factors behind it. It’s straightforward, very straightforward. That is the type of company we are. We are doing it because we believe strongly that it’s what our customers would want

the Ford Motor Company to do.

Mr. STRICKLAND. In one of your answers to Mr. Dingell, you indicated that you have a performance standard which you require of

the manufacturers of the tires you use. There have been questions

raised about why you went to Firestone as a sole source, and implications raised that you did that in order to save money. But if in

fact you have the same performance standards, it seems to me that

56

it just makes sense to go to the company that can provide a product

for the cheapest price, if the performance standards are identical

and have not been compromised. Is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. It is. And I should say, you know, we’re perhaps

painting everything in a very negative sense here. Firestone and

Ford had a very long history, and Firestone produced incredibly

good tires over a long, long period, and during that period when—

in the early nineties when the sourcing decisions between Firestone

and Goodyear were being undertaken by the company, Firestone

ranked as the No. 1 quality tire supply. So there was no question

at that point of Firestone’s quality and their commitment to high

standards.

Mr. STRICKLAND. This action is costing Ford a great deal of

money.

Mr. NASSER. It is.

Mr. STRICKLAND. And that is a burden that’s being borne directly

by Ford Motor Company, without any assistance from Firestone,

the supplier of the tires. Right?

Mr. NASSER. It wasn’t even a consideration for us as to who

should pay this, and our primary concern was we needed to move

quickly. And I am sure in hindsight we’ll go back and there will

be some little bits and pieces that we didn’t do absolutely perfectly

right, but I’d settle for that, because we wanted to move quickly

to safeguard the safety of our customers. And we didn’t really

waste a lot of time sitting back saying, well, I wonder who will pay

for all of this.

Mr. STRICKLAND. One final quick question. Are you somewhat

puzzled at the reaction that you’re receiving some—from some of

us?

Mr. NASSER. Not anymore, I’m not.

Mr. STRICKLAND. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Deal.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nasser, in your opening statement, you made a great deal

about the difference between the Firestone tires’ performance and

the Goodyear tire performance and the failure of Firestones in excess of 1,100 versus 2 failures by Goodyear. When did that information first become known to Ford?

Mr. NASSER. We started to look at that information during last

year’s 6.5 million recall. Up to that point, even the 1183, although

it sounds like a high number, you know, when you’re dealing with

millions and millions of tires, it really wasn’t very evident to us.

So it was during the investigation of last year’s recall.

Mr. DEAL. So not until 2000 did these statistics begin to attract

any attention?

Mr. NASSER. I’m sure they were around, both in the company

and in the tire companies as well, but they didn’t raise the awareness to a point where it was alarming to us.

Mr. DEAL. And your statement that you have to look at field data

as the best basis for making any decision—now, when these Firestone tires were selected, you had no field data at that time, did

you?

57

Mr. NASSER. If you recall, one of the provisions of the TREAD

Act that was passed last year by Congress was that field data

would become readily available on a prompt basis so that we could

look at it and that—it was transparent to everyone, not only to the

tire companies.

Mr. DEAL. But you first of all had no field data when the tires

were selected. What field data did you attempt to compile between

the years these tires were first put in place and 2000 of last year

when these statistics became available and knowledgeable on your

part?

Mr. NASSER. I don’t understand the question. I’m sorry.

Mr. DEAL. Did Ford conduct any tests or maintain any records

of field data during the time these tires were first selected, which

had no history, and 2000? Did you maintain any records?

Mr. NASSER. I don’t know the specific answer to that question.

I’ll get to you on it.

Mr. DEAL. So if the chairman’s date of 1998 is correct when you

switched to Firestone as the sole source and dropped the Goodyear

tires which in 2000 you learned had been performing very, very

well, you indicated that it obviously was not on a price factor, because Goodyear had reduced their prices greater than Firestone between 1994 and 1997, you said.

Mr. NASSER. Congressman, I should say that the decision to drop

the Goodyear tires on Explorers was actually made before we fitted

the first Goodyear tire on an Explorer. So there wasn’t any field

data available anywhere.

Mr. DEAL. So it was—so when you say that——

Mr. NASSER. We dropped the tire before it was even sourced on

the Explorer. We made the decision to source Goodyear, and we

made the decision to desource Goodyear on Explorer before the first

Goodyear tire was actually installed on an Explorer.

Mr. DEAL. So it appears to me, Mr. Nasser, you’ve made two conflicting statements. On the one hand you said that you make decisions based on field data, which you now say you had none. Second,

you said you did not make a decision based on price, since you said

there was only a 10 cents difference. Then if you did not make it

on field data and you did not make it on price, on what basis did

you make the decision?

Mr. NASSER. Oh, no. I didn’t say that at all.

Mr. DEAL. Which part did you not say?

Mr. NASSER. Let me go back, because your question came at me

from 10 different questions and I couldn’t handle 10 different directions. Let me tell you exactly what we did.

Mr. DEAL. Yes, sir.

Mr. NASSER. We were—we made a decision to source Goodyear

tires, because there was a corporate decision to increase the level

of Goodyear tires overall, and Goodyear went from 20-odd percent

to 30-odd percent of our total tire sourcing. That happened.

At the same time, we were sourcing an added plant for the Explorer. The Explorer was produced in one plant. It was going to two

plants. So we went out, and we asked Goodyear and Firestone for

sourcing on that tire for that plant. Goodyear won the contract.

Mr. DEAL. On what basis?

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Mr. NASSER. They won the—the specifications are the same, and

there wasn’t any field data, because we didn’t have any Goodyears

on Explorers. So the tire performance specifications were the same,

and Goodyear and Firestone’s prices were about the same at that

point. As a matter of fact, the initial Goodyear quote was actually

below Firestone.

Subsequent to that, a decision was made that we would single

source tires on a particular vehicle, because you didn’t want to go

through the inefficiency of duplicate engineering and testing on one

vehicle with two different tires. If you look at most of our vehicles,

they have got a single source of tires. We asked both Goodyear and

Firestone to quote on getting 100 percent of the tires. Goodyear

wanted a price increase. Firestone did not. So we sourced it to Firestone. It’s as simple as that.

During the period when Goodyear was still supplying tires,

which was after this decision of desourcing was made, Goodyear

continued to reduce the cost and the price of their tire, to the point

where in 1997 there was only 10 cents difference between a Goodyear tire and a Firestone tire.

Mr. DEAL. But the decision to go with Firestone and drop Goodyear as a source for the Explorer was made the following year of

1998.

Mr. NASSER. It was made in December 1994 for a 1998 model.

Mr. DEAL. All right, and—— Mr. NASSER. I think that clears it up. It was made in December

1994.

Mr. DEAL. And you had field data at that time, did you not?

Mr. NASSER. We did not. In December 1994, we did not have

any—as far as I’m aware, we didn’t have any field data, because

we hadn’t even fitted a Goodyear tire.

Mr. DEAL. So your best source of field data, you had none in any

of these decisions, then?

Mr. NASSER. It’s difficult to have field data when there are no

tires in the field.

Mr. DEAL. So you had no field data?

Mr. NASSER. On Goodyear. That’s right.

Mr. DEAL. What about Firestone?

Mr. NASSER. I don’t think we had field data on Firestone then.

I’ll get back to you on that particular question. But I’m not sure

where you’re heading.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. The

chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Gordon.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a quick first observation after listening to that exchange and some of the others.

First, Mr. Nasser, let me welcome you. I’m sure there are other

places you would like to be.

Mr. NASSER. Oh, I truly love it here every year.

Mr. GORDON. After listening to these last exchanges, it seemed

to me like the easy answer would just be to say that these last replacements were really image- and market-driven, not data-driven,

and you have a right to put whatever tire, radio or antenna on

your automobile or vehicle that you want, as long as it is——

Mr. NASSER. That may be the easy way, but it wouldn’t be the

truth.

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Mr. GORDON. It wouldn’t be?

Mr. NASSER. The truth is that it’s a mixture of data and field and

predictive analysis and customer assurance. That’s——

Mr. GORDON. Customer assurance marketing?

Mr. NASSER. Customer assurance is the confidence—it goes back

to the Congressman’s question. People have lost confidence in these

tires.

Mr. GORDON. I would like to get on—I mean, again, I think you

can put whatever tire you want on there. I mean, you know, it’s

your business. Just don’t—as long as safety isn’t compromised. And

you spend a lot of money on TV, this is just another way to do marketing, and, you know, that’s your business.

I think a lot of the discussion that we’ve had——

Mr. NASSER. Excuse me——

Mr. GORDON. I only have 5 minutes, but I——

Mr. NASSER. You’re putting words in my mouth and that’s not

what I said.

Mr. GORDON. I don’t mean to. That is what I said. I think a lot

of the problem that we have is sort of a—your basic apples and apples or apples and orange type comparisons. And that’s why I want

to ask you and the other witnesses two questions, and they will be

the same questions so that we have a benchmark.

The first is, it’s my understanding that the same Firestone tires

used on the Ford Explorer are also used as original equipment on

the Ford Rangers. These same tires are evidently used on two

other popular SUVs, the Toyota 4-Runner, as well as the Jeep

Grand Cherokee. Claims data shows that the owners of vehicles

other than Explorers have virtually no problems with tread separation, leading to rollovers. The question, then, is what does this suggest about the Explorer’s design or handling characteristics and

their contribution to the problem?

Mr. NASSER. The competitive tires that you mentioned—you

mentioned Toyota—and what other tire?

Mr. GORDON. The same—the Wilderness AT are designed I think

for General Motors as well as Toyota.

Mr. NASSER. They are different tires.

Mr. GORDON. And the—are they different tires than are on the

Ford Ranger?

Mr. NASSER. No. They’re the same tires.

Mr. GORDON. Are they the same tire as the Toyota 4-Runner and

the same tire as the Jeep Grand Cherokee?

Mr. NASSER. No, they are different tires.

Mr. GORDON. How are they different?

Mr. NASSER. The treads are different—you’d have to ask the tire

manufacturers, but they are different tire.

Mr. GORDON. Okay, but is it the same tire as the Ford Rangers?

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. Yet you’re not having problems with Ford Rangers?

Mr. NASSER. We’re recalling the Ford Rangers.

Mr. GORDON. But is that—did you have the problems——

Mr. NASSER. I think the incidence level is about the same in

terms of the tread separation. I don’t think there’s any significant

difference, but I’d have to get back to you on that.

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Mr. GORDON. So if they—well, let me just—so I’ll ask you this.

If these are the same tires on the Ford Rangers, the Toyota 4-Runner and the Jeep Grand Cherokee, and they’re not having problems

and you are having problems, is that a problem?

Mr. NASSER. I just said that they’re not the same.

Mr. GORDON. What, they’re not—and I——

Mr. NASSER. You want me to answer a hypothetical question?

Mr. GORDON. If they were the same, that would be a problem,

wouldn’t it? Would you like to address that, if they were the same,

at a later date?

Mr. NASSER. Absolutely. If they were the same, I’d look at it,

yeah.

Mr. GORDON. I’ll get to my second question. One year ago, Ford

initiated an almost identical replacement problem in Venezuela to

replace Firestone——

Mr. NASSER. By the way, Congressman, if I may——

Mr. GORDON. I don’t want to lose my time here.

Mr. NASSER. The Ranger/Explorer comparison is very interesting,

and we address it in our written statement.

Mr. GORDON. Sir, I really don’t want to be discourteous. It’s just

that I won’t have a chance to ask my question. If I can get that

in, then I think you should have the full right to respond what

you’d like and I’d like to learn more about that.

One year ago, Ford initiated an almost identical replacement program in Venezuela to replace Firestone tires with other brands.

Even though Explorers are now using other brands of tires in Venezuela, it’s my understanding that the Explorer rollovers have continued at a high enough rate to cause the head of the country’s consumer protection agency to suggest banning sales of Explorers.

Why has the replacement of Firestone tires in Venezuela not

brought an end to this problem, and will the replacement of Firestone tires on Explorers end the problem in the United States?

Mr. NASSER. The Explorer is not suffering levels of rollover in

Venezuela that are different than other competitive SUVs. If you

look at the percentage of rollovers that the Explorer has in Venezuela, it’s about 8 or 9 percent, which is Explorers’ market share

in that market.

Mr. GORDON. Has that changed since you changed the tires? Has

that ratio changed?

Mr. NASSER. I’m referring to the Goodyear tires on Explorer. If

you go through the data—and I lived in Venezuela for 3 years, so

I know—I know a lot about that market and the data that is in

that market. If you go through that data and look at the statistics

that relate to Explorer, you’ll find vehicles there that Fiestas, that

are pick-up trucks, that are cars. You’ll find fender bender-type accidents in there. These are not data that when you go through

them and filter them, clearly that will show an Explorer problem

following the replacement of the Firestone tires——

Mr. GORDON. But with your data, have you determined that

there is a difference in the rollover situation between the Firestones and the replacement tires in Venezuela?

Mr. NASSER. The Goodyear tires are performing much better, yes.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The gentleman’s time has expired.

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Mr. GORDON. I would like to ask permission for him to respond

to my last question, which was asked before the time was up.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objection.

Mr. GORDON. Which was, will the replacement of Firestone tires

on the Explorer end the problem in the United States?

Mr. NASSER. Will the—— Mr. GORDON. Will the replacement of Firestone tires on the Explorer end the problem in the United States?

Mr. NASSER. Oh, man. I mean, last year we were very confident

about all the data that we had, and this year we’re taking all of

the tires off the road, so—all of the Wilderness AT tires off the

road. And if anything, as you suggested earlier, we may have overreached because of the need to instill some confidence back in the

marketplace. So I am hoping we’ve done that.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. GORDON. Thanks for your patience.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Mr. Nasser, I would just like to point out to

you from data that Ford supplied to us, a chart that reads Explorer

and Ranger tread separation in rollover comparison 1993 through

2001 model years, the number of claims for Ford Explorer was 299.

The number of claims for the Ranger was apparently 3. Well, let

me compare 1997 to 2001 in those cases. It’s 299 versus 3. So there

does seem to be a significant number. I don’t know if that represents the percentage of vehicles on the road, but it seems to—the

claims rate is a 47 rates of claims per million with the Explorer

versus only 4. There seems to be a tenfold difference between the

Ranger and the Explorer, and I would ask unanimous consent for

a minute of time so you might respond to that, since it seems to

be quite different than the answer you responded to Mr. Gordon.

Mr. NASSER. No. It is very much consistent. Ranger is having a

problem. That is why we have recalled and replaced these tires.

The Ranger 4x4 is the vehicle that has the tires that are also on

the Explorer. The—and the Ranger 4x4 with the Explorer tires is

a very small percentage of Ranger. So the sample size are small.

And that in itself isn’t the issue.

The other issue is that because they’re 4x4 models, they tend to

be in the North, not in the South. And in addition to that, it has

used—it’s used Decatur tires on the 4x4. So you’ve got a mish-mash

of different geographies, low installation rates on the 4x4 model,

and a different plant because of the heavy use of the——

Mr. GREENWOOD. I won’t—sir, I won’t question those facts as

you’ve just laid them out. I don’t believe we need to take this any

further than we need to, but I think you did respond to Mr. Gordon

that the claims rates are similar——

Mr. NASSER. They are similar when you adjust to an apples-toapples comparison.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Well, you may have to. That may be a fairer

answer, that when you adjust out for climate and so forth, that

they’re similar. I don’t have data on that.

The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes Mr. Shimkus.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One thing that we need

is a historical perspective, which I know we don’t have the ability

to do, to check tires and manufacturers of vehicles in the sixties

and the eighties. We all mourn the loss of life and wrecks and stuff.

62

In comparison to the sixties or the seventies, are we better off or

are we worse? I would submit we’re probably better off. We’re just

a lot more stringent with information and getting data out to the

public, and that’s part of the frustration.

Well, this is a very serious hearing, but for the sake of levity, I

think most of our constituents would appreciate at least one time

getting dealers to their knees, and because I want to apologize to

the dealers who are sitting on the floor or kneeling, because we finally brought dealers to their knees, and it had to be in the Commerce Committee room. Usually they seem to get the upper hand

of——

Mr. NASSER. They will come back. Don’t worry.

Mr. SHIMKUS. That’s right. You in your opening statement mentioned, Mr. Nasser, that the bar has been raised seeking remedies

that are proactive and forward looking, because we’re in a new paradigm of safety and looking at industry and the people you do business with. Mr. Dingell asked you some questions which I find very

interesting, and talked about the standards of tires and the width,

the skin stock, the body, the belt, and basically the response was— you set performance specs up for the industries to compete, and

some of the types of performance specs were speed, handling, wet

weather, snow.

My question is, is—do you have a performance spec on ride, how

smooth the ride is?

Mr. NASSER. Yes. Yes, we do.

Mr. SHIMKUS. And that brings me to my question which deals

with a statement you made just a few minutes ago, and that’s why

it’s sometimes beneficial to hang around and hear the questions

and answers. For 10 cents a tire, you know, you mentioned that it’s

worth 10 cents a tire to move forward on safety considerations— and my question is, what about $1.40, $1.40 a tire, which if you

remember back to last year when we were sitting through these

hearings, I raised the issue of the nylon caps are—and the fact on

nylon caps help prevent tread separation. Why Mr. Dingell’s questions were good for me, because they provided me, again, with the

challenge between specifications and actual material, design and

requirements to meet the specifications.

So I would ask, based upon the information that I have, that it’s

$1.40 per tire to provide a nylon cap, why in this new paradigm

of the bar being lifted higher, seeking forward remedies, why not

move from specs to some specific requirements to the people who

are providing a major part of your product?

Mr. NASSER. To move from tire performance to actually specifying the——

Mr. SHIMKUS. Well, you have a specification that says ride; why

not have a requirement that says nylon caps?

Mr. NASSER. Okay. You’d have to ask the tire experts specifically

on nylon caps. It is interesting that based on what I know at least,

nylon caps would not help tread separation to any great degree. I

think nylon caps are mostly reserved for very high-speed driving,

and you’ll find them on the higher speed rating tires. But you’d

have to get the tire experts on that.

Mr. SHIMKUS. But did you require nylon caps for the Explorers

used in the Middle East and Venezuela?

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Mr. NASSER. I don’t know whether we specified it or the tire company specified it. But you just keep going back to the U.S. The

Goodyear tires didn’t have nylon caps. The majority—and maybe

even all, but I certainly know that the majority of the volume

sports utility vehicles in the U.S. have tires without nylon caps. So

I don’t think there is one silver bullet here, and there is a danger

of trying to choose one solution or one improvement, without looking at the total benefit of handling and ride and stability.

Mr. SHIMKUS. And, again, I understand and appreciate the responsibility you have in providing jobs, providing a product and

making sure it is as safe as possible, within the means of being

able for consumers to purchase. This is just a follow-up to questions that I had asked last year on the nylon caps. We tried to get

it inserted into the TREAD Act. We were unsuccessful, and we may

try again in the future. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. The

chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Stupak.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nasser, last September when we were having the hearing, I asked the question on

whether Ford would join with me in calling for a—and cooperating

with a blue ribbon independent panel to perform a review of the

AT, ATX Wilderness tires to determine the cause and proposed solutions. Is Ford still committed to its blue ribbon independent committee?

Mr. NASSER. Yes, we are.

Mr. STUPAK. Has Ford initiated or had any contact with NHTSA

on trying to put together this committee?

Mr. NASSER. I know we’re in contact with them. I don’t know

what the status is.

Mr. STUPAK. The information that you’ve testified to about the

1,083 separation of the Firestone tire, the field data, as you call it,

versus 2 separations of the Goodyear tire, have you shared that

data with Firestone?

Mr. NASSER. Yes, that data was available, as far as I know, last

year, similar data. So it’s——

Mr. STUPAK. Everybody has it.

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Firestone had it, NHTSA has it, this committee has

it, we all have it?

Mr. NASSER. Uh-huh.

Mr. STUPAK. The chairman in his statement—opening statement,

stated that—there were words to this effect, that some of the nonFirestone replacement tires have property and injury claims greater than those nonrecalled Wilderness AT tires. I take it from the

exchange that went on earlier, you don’t have that information?

Mr. NASSER. We don’t, but we’re clearly, once we finish with the

hearing, we’ll get to look at that data and see how it impacts what

we’re doing.

Mr. STUPAK. You believe you’ll get it right after the hearing, or

do you think you’re going to have to wait until after 30 days when

NHTSA is done with it?

Mr. NASSER. I think we can get the basic data pretty quickly if

it’s available.

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Mr. STUPAK. If you do, would you share it with the rest of this

committee?

I’m sorry to have to put you through that——

Mr. DINGELL. We’ve had a lot of talk about this information or

data or whatever it might be. I ask unanimous consent at this time

that that data be inserted in the record at this point. All of it.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair advises the gentleman that that request will be taken under consideration.

Mr. DINGELL. I believe I——

Mr. GREENWOOD. If I may continue——

Mr. DINGELL. I believe I’m entitled to have a——

Mr. GREENWOOD. Just a moment. I’ll recognize the gentleman in

a moment. What needs to be taken into consideration is that there

are differences between the data that—raw data that’s been provided to us by some of the tire manufacturers and NHTSA versus

the computations that were done by our investigative staff.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr.——

Mr. GREENWOOD. And it is the work product that involves these

computations that has been referenced and we are taking into consideration whether or not it—such computations should or should

not be entered in the record.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I have made a unanimous consent

request. I will repeat it for the benefit of the Chair. And that is

that all of the data referred to be inserted into the record at this

particular point so that we can all know what we’re talking about

and so that the meaning of which has been referred to no less than

three times this morning, we’ll be able to see what is—what is

done.

I would ask that in addition to that, the comments of all of the

three major participants to these proceedings, Ford Motor, Firestone, and also NHTSA be included as soon as it can possibly be

done. I’m entitled to have that unanimous consent request ruled

upon or objected to.

Mr. DEAL. Mr. Chairman, based on the comments made by the

chairman previously that some of the information was confidentially received, I would object to at this time.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, I will make——

Mr. GREENWOOD. The objection is heard to the gentleman’s unanimous request.

Mr. DINGELL. I would request that the gentleman from Georgia

tell us what it is he wants hidden.

Mr. DEAL. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. GREENWOOD. I recognize the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. DEAL. As the ranking member heard the chairman state earlier, some of the information was obtained in confidence. I think it

is the responsibility of this committee to honor the confidences that

the chairman has requested be respected.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, then I will——

Mr. DEAL. It is on that basis that I make the objection.

Mr. DINGELL. Then I will make a further unanimous consent request, and that is that the press releases and documents related

to the story—an article which appears in Yahoo News on today’s

date, June 19, entitled ‘‘House Queries Ford Replacement Tires,’’ be

65

inserted in the record. I believe this is properly a part of the

record, so that we can all know what we’re talking about.

Mr. DEAL. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Tuesday June 19, 2001—The New York Times]

HOUSE QUERIES FORD’S REPLACEMENT TIRES

By Nedra Pickler, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP)—Ford Motor Co. may be replacing Firestone tires on its vehicles with other brands that have higher failure rates, according to an analysis by

congressional investigators.

The House Commerce Committee unveiled the results of its five-month inquiry

into the safety of America’s tires at a hearing Tuesday.

Rep. Billy Tauzin, R-La., the committee chairman, said congressional investigators have analyzed the failure rates of replacement tires Ford is using—made by

Michelin, Continental, Goodyear, General, BF Goodrich and Uniroyal—and found

some fail more often than the Firestone Wilderness AT tires Ford recalled last

month.

‘‘Ford is going to replace these recall tires with tires that have a worse claims history than some of the tires that are coming off the Explorers,’’ Tauzin said. ‘‘For

example, our investigators have learned that one of the tires that is going to be used

in the replacement has a claims rate of 124 per million tires, well in excess of the

five claims per million that Ford says is the benchmark in this recall.’’

‘‘Are we going to be replacing worse tires for the tires that come off these cars?’’

he asked.

Tauzin spokesman Ken Johnson also said the committee found that two additional Firestone tire models used on Ford vehicles—the Wilderness HT and the

FR480—had higher rates of claims for property damage than the Wilderness AT.

Ford does not have access to the same information because tire makers keep their

property damage claims rates confidential. The Commerce Committee has been collecting that information from the tire makers in the past several months.

Tauzin refused to make his data public yet, saying he wanted federal safety officials to analyze the information first.

‘‘I don’t want us to be a party to releasing bad information to the American public,’’ he said.

But Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich., called on Tauzin to release the data immediately,

considering he and other Americans replaced the Firestone tires on their Ford Explorers.

‘‘I want to make sure if I replaced them, I replaced them with good tires,’’ Stupak

said. ‘‘I think we’re misleading the American public if we say we’re replacing them

with worse tires, but yet we’re not getting the data.’’

Ford officials said they asked the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

about the replacement tires they planned to use and the agency did not raise any

safety concerns.

‘‘We feel that the replacement tires are good tires,’’ said Sue Cischke, Ford’s vice

president for environmental and safety engineering.

Cischke said Ford was aware of a higher claim rate on the FR480, but that only

a relatively few of those tires are still on the road. She also said Ford was aware

of a few claims involving the Wilderness HT, but said none involved accidents.

The Wilderness AT has been at the center of a nearly year-long debate over the

safety of Firestone tires. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.’s voluntary recall of 6.5 million

tires last August included the 15-inch version of the Wilderness AT, made at its

plant in Decatur, Ill.

The company insisted that other sizes of the tire made at other plants were safe.

But last month Ford said it was concerned about safety and announced it would replace all 13 million Wilderness ATs still on its vehicles.

A day earlier, aware of the impending announcement, Bridgestone/Firestone

ended its 96-year relationship with Ford.

The Wilderness AT has been standard equipment on the Ford Explorer, the

world’s best-selling sport utility vehicle. Many of the 203 fatal accidents among the

thousands of crashes reported to the highway safety administration in the last year

were rollovers of the Explorer that occurred after the tires failed.

Ford insists the problem is the result of flawed tires, but Bridgestone/Firestone

says the design of the Explorer also is a factor.

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Jacques Nasser, chief executive of Ford, blamed the problem on the tires. He said

Bridgestone/Firestone’s tests showing the Explorer as part of the problem were ‘‘unreliable’’ and ‘‘not based on facts.’’

‘‘The Ford Explorer is and always will be a safe vehicle,’’ Nasser insisted.

John Lampe, chief executive of Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., in turn said Ford’s

tests were ‘‘grossly unscientific and must be disregarded.’’

‘‘We have had a growing and ultimately overwhelming conviction that tire design

and manufacturing issues alone simply cannot account for what has been happening

to the Explorer,’’ Lampe said in his prepared statement.

Lawmakers called on NHTSA to quickly finish its investigation so people can

know who to believe. ‘‘We have a corporate schoolyard brawl breaking out here,’’

said Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass. ‘‘We need an independent referee.’’

In announcing its recall last month, Ford officials said they were particularly concerned with the Wilderness AT tires built at Bridgestone/Firestone’s plant in Wilson, N.C. The automaker said the 15-inch version built at that plant has 19 tread

separation claims per million tires produced and the 16-inch version has 17 claims

per million.

That is much lower than the 300 per million failures on some of the tires included

in Bridgestone/Firestone’s original recall.

About 2,000 United Auto Workers planned to drive around the Capitol and then

rally Tuesday to show their confidence in the Explorer.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. GREENWOOD. Is the gentleman, Mr. Stupak, reclaiming his

time?

Mr. STUPAK. Yes, I’d like to reclaim my time and get a moment

or two further. But I’d like to expand upon the motion. I guess I’d

ask the unanimous request, then, of the committee to do this. If it’s

the data that is so confidential, then the thing that is not confidential would be the manufacturer name and the brand name of the

tire. Would the majority staff at least tell us who is the manufacturer and the brand name of the title? So—I’ll do one better than

Yahoo News, Mr. Dingell, I’ll do the Detroit Free Press—so we’re

not getting the questions, ‘‘New Tires, New Worries.’’

Now, we have a notice out from Ford to replace our tires. I did

mine beforehand. My father-in-law for his Expedition just got his.

Now, he’s going down to make his replacement tires—to get them

from Ford.

Now, if we have a brand and a manufacturer and a brand tire

that is defective 124 times versus 5 times, as has been claimed by

the majority, then at least tell the American people what the tire

is, and the brand name, my father-in-law and others are not out

replacing their tires with possibly worse tires which have a worse

safety record.

So I’d ask unanimous consent that this committee at least tell us

the manufacturer of the tire and the tire brand, and that way we

don’t have to worry about disclosing confidential data.

Mr. GREENWOOD. In response to the gentleman’s inquiry, I would

object and state my reasons as follows. In the first place, the gentleman needs to know that the minority staff has access to all of

the same data as the gentleman—the minority staff has access to

all the same data from NHTSA as our staff does. The majority—

minority staff is——

Mr. STUPAK. This is not in NHTSA’s hands, from all the testimony thus far. You’re going to give it to NHTSA at the end of this

hearing, and then we’re going to get 30 days. So can we get it as

part of this record? I mean, if we’ve got to wait for NHTSA, that

will be 30 days later.

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Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask that under my rights as a

member of this committee, under the rules of the House of Representatives, that the data compiled by the committee staff and the

analysis of the committee staff be promptly made available to all

members of the committee. The House rules provide that it is my

right to have that made available to me. I ask that it be made

available to me for—— Mr. GREENWOOD. Pursuant to the gentleman’s—— Mr. DINGELL. I mean now, Mr. Chairman, not—— Mr. GREENWOOD. Pursuant to the gentleman’s—— Mr. DINGELL. Not at the whim of the Chair or at some later time,

but now.

I have requested the data. I ask the staff to come forward and

present it to me.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Would the gentleman desist for a moment?

Mr. DINGELL. The House rules so provide. I speak as a member

of the committee, requesting that the rules—— Mr. GREENWOOD. The gentleman’s request is on the record. The

Chair will consult with the attorneys and respond promptly.

Mr. DINGELL. I don’t ask for consultation with the attorneys. I

asked that the information be made available—— Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair asks for—the Chair is asking for a

consultation with his attorneys, and the Chair will respond to the

gentleman’s request promptly.

Mr. DINGELL. I will read the rule to the Chair, if that will be

helpful.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The gentleman has stated the rule correctly,

and the Chair recognizes the rule as stated. We’d ask that the gentleman politely desist for a moment.

Mr. DINGELL. I apologize to my good friend from Michigan for intruding into his time.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The gentleman from Michigan correctly states

his rights under the rules of this committee and that he—the Chair

will see to it that the staff presents to the gentleman, promptly,

the——

Mr. DINGELL. Promptly?

Mr. GREENWOOD. Immediately.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair would also ask this of the gentleman. I believe that the gentleman from Michigan was here when

Mr. Tauzin stated his concerns about the release of this information and the implications that it might have, and would simply ask

the gentleman from Michigan to make his own decision based on

his own judgment and what the—the concerns expressed by the full

chairman, as to whether or not the chairman chooses to divulge

that information.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, I would simply note that the chairman of the

full committee has made this observation and is so quoted in the

press. I don’t want to be a party to releasing bad information to

the American public. However, I would note that that did appear

on the news media already, and since we are going to let this hang

out, I suggest it should all hang out.

Mr. GREENWOOD. I am advised by staff that the gentleman—gentleman’s request will be responded to in the following fashion: The

68

material, the data submitted to the majority staff by the tire companies, will be copied promptly and submitted to the gentleman

from Michigan as quickly as that can be mechanically done, which

I would assume would be a matter of minutes.

Mr. DINGELL. And I am requesting that which is alluded to in

the news article referred to by Mr. Stupak.

Mr. GREENWOOD. That is the data in question.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, I’ll reclaim my time.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Your time has long since expired.

Mr. STUPAK. I realize that, but—— Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Chairman, I ask that you grant the gentleman

an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. STUPAK. A point of clarification, if I may. While I understand

that the information would be released to the gentleman from

Michigan, Mr. Dingell, I take it it would be released to all members

of this committee?

Mr. GREENWOOD. Certainly. Certainly.

Mr. STUPAK. And I also understand from the rules of this committee and also rules of the House, that if the information is

deemed confidential by the committee, then it cannot be released

publicly, whether it is Yahoo News or Detroit Free Press. Is that

the ruling of the Chair?

Mr. GREENWOOD. That is my understanding of the rules, but it

is also my understanding of the facts that no such data was released by the committee staff.

Mr. STUPAK. So for further clarification, the information we will

be receiving, the data if you will, is that considered confidential information, not to be released publicly? Or—as turned over to each

committee member, we can do—since it’s part of the record, it then

becomes a public record and can be released?

Mr. GREENWOOD. The—I am advised by counsel that there is no

committee rule with respect to the release of confidential information. There are rules with respect to information that is obtained

by subpoena. In some cases it is—requires a vote of the committee

to release data acquired by subpoena. That does not describe the

data in question.

Mr. DINGELL. That this data and information and papers did not

fall into the hands of this committee pursuant to the subpoena

process?

Mr. GREENWOOD. That is correct, which is why in fact no vote is

required.

Mr. STUPAK. And, therefore, once released to members, it can be

released publicly as part of this record?

Mr. DINGELL. I would call on the Chair, for a prohibition against

this being released, to please inform the gentleman from Michigan,

Mr. Stupak, or the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell, as to

what the prohibitions are under the rules of members of this committee of discussing this information in other places, since it has

already been discussed by the chairman of the committee.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair will reiterate and hopefully summarize so we can get to the next line of inquiry. The data supplied

to the committee by the—from the tire companies will be made

available within minutes to the minority members. The minority

69

members have the right, of course, to release all of that information publicly. I have reiterated the admonition—expression of concern which this member believes is legitimate, that the use of that

information—and would ask that the members use it responsibly,

understanding—and hopefully before they make any decisions

about releasing it, understanding what the data is and what the

data is not.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. Chairman, that unanimous consent request and my demand for information included the committee staff

analysis of this, which I am sure the Chair agrees is property of

the entire committee and should be available to all members, including minority members.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Dingell, does that include all my notes, too?

Mr. DINGELL. Do you have notes? I’ll tell you what. I promise to

return your notes to you.

Mr. STEARNS. Can I get all your notes, too?

Mr. DINGELL. I haven’t got any notes on this matter, but if I generate any, I will assure you that I will make——

Mr. STEARNS. Will the Chair allow me just unanimous consent

to speak 1 minute on the subject?

Mr. DINGELL. What I requested, Mr. Chairman, just to make it

very clear, is the staff analysis.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Yeah. I understand.

Mr. DINGELL. Staff analysis, not the notes of my dear friend from

Florida, although I’m sure they’re probably of greater merit than

the staff.

Mr. STEARNS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair reiterates that the information that

is available to the majority members of the committee will be made

available to the minority members of the committee, and I would

suggest that the gentleman from Michigan and the other members

of the minority review that material when it is provided to you,

which, as I said, will be promptly. If you have further questions as

to whether or not it meets your demands, I would ask you to raise

them at that time.

Mr. DINGELL. I will do so. Just to assist the Chair and the members of the committee, Mr. Tauzin is quoted in the press this morning as having said as follows: Representative Billy Tauzin, R., LA,

the committee chairman, said congressional investigators have analyzed the failure rates of replacement tires Ford is using, including

using those made by Michelin, Continental, Goodyear, General,

BFGoodrich, and Uniroyal, and found some failed more often than

the Firestone Wilderness AT tires Ford recalled last month.

I very specifically need that, because I am sure you can understand the importance of this information which has today fallen

into the public domain.

Mr. GREENWOOD. As the gentleman knows, if the gentleman read

it in the newspaper, it must be so.

The Chair recognizes——

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Dingell, the only thing—I’d make two points.

One is that when this information is given to you, as Mr. Stupak

and I talked earlier, that a lot of this information—you have to understand one of the assumptions that make up this information.

70

And just to take this information and suddenly give it to the press

without a full understanding—let me just finish.

Mr. DINGELL. I——

Mr. STEARNS. So I think the chairman is saying that each member has a fiduciary responsibility to decide if he’s going to give it

out, that he should know all the underlying assumptions.

My second point is, all the analysis that our staff has done on

this side is revealed in the questions we have. Most of these questions provide the data, together with the charts. So the analysis

that you’re seeing from our staff is transparent with all these

charts that we’re bringing here.

So I just reiterate to the distinguished member from Michigan

that what we’re trying to do here in a bipartisan way is to make

this information more available to the consumer so that the consumer can make a decision, and that’s—we have no intent, no

agenda, other than trying to make the consumer feel a certain level

of confidence that he or she understands this information. So, you

know, I think here we have a—perhaps a misunderstanding, if you

don’t realize that we’re trying to provide you all the analysis, either

through our questions or our charts.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, I want to thank the gentleman for that point,

and I want to say that I am mightily reassured. I would also like

to observe that I had not been given a copy of this analysis before

and, as Mr. Stupak had to, I had to read about it in the press.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The gentleman from Michigan has made his request. The Chair has ruled, and the Chair now recognizes for 5

minutes the gentleman, Mr. Bryant——

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. GREENWOOD. Does the ranking member of the Oversight and

Investigations Subcommittee seek to make a—raise a parliamentary question for——

Mr. TOWNS. Yes. I’d like to make a unanimous consent request.

Mr. Stupak’s time was really eaten into by other members. So if

we can grant him 1 additional minute.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objections, the gentleman from—the

gentleman, Mr. Stupak, is recognized for 1 minute for purposes of

inquiry toward the—directed toward the witness.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, if I may use my 1 minute, I am done

with inquiry. We’ve got what we want.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Then that is inconsistent with the gentleman’s

unanimous request——

Mr. STUPAK. But I asked unanimous consent——

Mr. GREENWOOD. Unanimous consent request.

Mr. STUPAK. I asked unanimous consent to keep the record

clear—I told you I’d get back to my plaintiff trial lawyer days—and

I ask that the record be clear that we enter in—unanimous consent, enter in the Detroit Free Press, June 19th, 2001 edition, Page

1 and Page 6-A.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objection.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

71

[Tuesday, June 19, 2001—Detroit Free Press]

COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN SAYS FORD REPLACES FIRESTONE TIRES WITH SUBSTANDARD

ONES

By Jennifer Dixon

Ford Motor Co. has been replacing Firestone tires on its trucks and sport-utility

vehicles with tires that, in some cases, have worse performance records, a spokesman for the House Energy and Commerce Committee said Monday.

And, while the Dearborn automaker is taking tires that have not had problems

off its vehicles, it is leaving other poor-performing tires on some trucks, the spokesman said.

The chiefs of Ford and tire maker Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. are expected to be

confronted with those findings, the work of committee investigators, when they testify before two Energy and Commerce subcommittees this morning in Washington,

D.C.

The hearing is the second time in a year that Congress has looked at whether

Firestone tires, Ford’s popular sport-utility vehicle, the Explorer, or the combination

of the two are responsible for hundreds of deaths and injuries.

Late Monday, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration announced

that it has now linked 203 U.S. deaths—up from 174—and more than 700 injuries

to some of the 50 million Firestone ATX, ATX II and Wilderness AT tires that it

has been investigating since last year. Many are on Ford vehicles.

Last August, Firestone recalled 14.4 million 15-inch tires, many of them on the

Explorer, prompting the first set of hearings.

In May, Ford announced it would spend $3 billion to replace 13 million additional

Firestone Wilderness AT tires on its vehicles.

Ken Johnson, a spokesman for the Energy and Commerce Committee, called the

results of the congressional investigators’ analysis of claims data troubling and puzzling.

He said they found three problems with Ford’s replacement program and the Firestone recall:

Ford in some cases is replacing Firestone tires with brands that have worse track

records.

At least two other Firestone tires, the 16-inch Wilderness HT and the 15-inch

FR480, have much higher claims rates than the ATs that are being replaced. The

15-inch FR480 was used on the Explorer in the early- to mid-1990s, while the Wilderness HTs have been used since 1995 on the F150 pickup, the nation’s best-selling

vehicle.

Some of the Wilderness AT tires being replaced by Ford have never had a claim

against them, yet are being replaced by brands ‘‘that have a spotty track record.’’

Johnson said.

‘‘I suspect this new information will generate a lot of interest among our members,’’ Johnson said. ‘‘It’s common sense: You don’t replace a tire with another tire

that has a worse track record.’’

Ken Zino, a spokesman for Ford, said the company tested replacement tires from

other companies in the lab and on the road. He said NHTSA looked over its list

of replacement tires and had no issue with those tires.

‘‘We are as confident as anybody can be that this a good set of replacement tires,’’

Zino said.

He said there are few FR480s left on the road, and that there have been only a

handful of claims against the HT.

Jill Bratina, a spokeswoman for Nashville-based Bridgestone/Firestone, said the

tires that Ford is replacing come from a ‘‘universe of tires performing at world-class

levels.’’

She also pointed the finger, once again, at the Explorer.

‘‘You can take every Firestone tire off the Explorer, and the rollovers will continue. We believe that there are serious safety concerns with the Explorer and you

can’t look at the tire in isolation.’’

In addition to quizzing Ford on its replacement program, committee members are

expected to ask why it has taken NHTSA more than a year to conduct its analysis

of Firestone tires.

An aide to a Republican member of the Energy and Commerce Committee said

lawmakers would be asking ‘‘where is NHTSA’’ during today’s hearings.

‘‘Here we are, 12 months out, and we still don’t know definitively that it’s a tire

problem,’’ the aide said, speaking on condition of anonymity. ‘‘Where is that investigation?’’

72

Tim Hurd, a NHTSA spokesman, said the investigation is continuing. Such investigations typically take a year to 18 months.

Perhaps in anticipation of congressional scrutiny, the White House announced

Monday that President George W. Bush will nominate a North Carolina doctor who

specializes in emergency medicine to lead the safety agency. NHTSA has been without an administrator since January.

Jeffrey Runge is assistant chairman of the department of emergency medicine at

the Carolinas Medical Center in Charlotte and is an expert in motor vehicle injury

care and prevention, according to the White House.

In a show of support for the vehicle that has been the best-selling sport-utility

since its introduction in 1990, hundreds of Explorers driven by UAW members,

rolled into Washington, D.C., on Monday.

Thousands of UAW members from Ford plants around the country are to receive

up to eight hours a day in pay from Ford to rally behind the vehicle that has contributed more than any other Ford car or truck to their profit-sharing checks.

‘‘We want to demonstrate to Congress and the public that we do build and assemble quality, safe vehicles,’’ said UAW Vice President Ron Gettelfinger. ‘‘There are

millions of miles of real world history to prove that fact.’’

Today, they are expected to drive in a convoy of 800 Explorers, with police escort,

around the National Mall. They also plan to rally at a park near the Senate office

buildings at 11:30 a.m.

Staff writer Ruby Bailey and Craig Linder of

States News Service contributed to this report.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Bryant, for 5 minutes.

Mr. BRYANT. I thank the Chair, and I thank the witness for his

patience with us, as all witnesses have to endure, it seems. And I

think back, as I prepared for this hearing over the last weekend

and the meeting with constituents, Ford dealers in my district, two

of which are in Washington today, I think driving around the Capitol as I understand from reading the newspaper perhaps, but also

in Tennessee we have the headquarters for Firestone as well as a

number of Firestone distributors, dealers that sell the tires.

So, like I suppose everyone on this committee, we have interests

on both sides, constituents that are directly involved, whether they

are Firestone or Ford. And ultimately the reason we’re all here and

the reason we’re not leaving this to the lawsuits and the many

courts that will be involved in this at some future date, and that

we’re not leaving it solely to NHTSA, the regulators whose job it

is to do these things, the reason we’re not in this congressional

committee leaving it to those groups now, is that we’re trying to

move quickly and determine what safety concerns there are out

there, make sure that folks in NHTSA are doing their job, but

mainly trying to protect the consumers’ interests, I guess, is the

bottom line.

And after our first hearing last September, I was here and heard

different people testify on behalf of Ford and Firestone and

NHTSA. We thought maybe this process was moving along toward

cooperation and repairing this problem. I know there was a problem in the Firestone—I think it was the Decatur, Illinois plant—

and there was a recall of those tires, and we assumed it was rectified and the American consumers were safe again.

And then we get into a situation where we start reading about

finger pointing, and it—from an outsider’s view, it doesn’t appear

that there’s very much cooperation between Firestone and Ford.

And every day it seems there’s a different story, accusations being

swapped and expert witnesses and statistics and so forth, charges

being made.

73

And I’m just wondering, Mr. Nasser—I know specifically you said

that you pledged to this Congress to cooperate and—with Firestone—help get to the bottom of this. And I just wonder, as I hear

from Firestone people, that perhaps that was not—they couldn’t get

the information they needed from Ford. You told Mr. Stupak earlier that you had shared information with Firestone since that

hearing. Where—very quickly, I guess, because I have a couple of

other questions—where are we on that cooperation, or have we just

all backed away and hired lawyers and hunkered down?

Mr. NASSER. I think that is a good question, and obviously if

you—to read the press, you would believe that we are in a bitter

feud. I don’t think that’s the case at all. We have a viewpoint about

our customers, and we’re trying to protect their safety. And I think

Firestone would basically agree with that. They have a different

viewpoint, and I think they’re entitled to it.

We have had very good cooperation with Firestone since the last

time we met. I think there have been something like 48 different

meetings and interactions between the Ford tire team and technical people and scientists and the Firestone people. And there

have been an incredible—millions and millions of pages of documents, that have verified the testing and the lab work and the rig

testing and the field data between the two companies at a very

high level in the company.

In addition to that, we set up a Web site where we basically deposit all of the data that we have. And it was interesting, before

I came along here I said, I wonder how many times the Firestone

company people have accessed that Web site, and they have

accessed it over 40,000 times. So I would say the face-to-face interaction with Firestone has been great in terms of data exchange,

and the signer interaction obviously has been very active as well.

It is an emotional issue when you’re dealing with customer safety.

So we understand the emotion and passion around it.

Mr. BRYANT. And I appreciate your answer. You know, it is a

shame that such a longstanding relationship of probably a hundred

years is in jeopardy, and maybe well beyond that at this point. But,

again, I know both companies are vitally—as you say, vitally interested in the consumers’ safety. And I—I was struck as I moved

about the district talking to my two dealers this weekend, at different ends of the district, with the chart that you’ve used that

shows Firestone having 1,183 separations and Goodyear 2. And

coming from a practice of law—and when I’ve used charts and put

together information, you always have to look at the underlying

data. And I bring that up not to question anyone’s ethics or honesty in this, but I see another chart that conflicts with—I guess

just really the backup chart to that in terms of the climate and

where these Explorers were sent in relation to hot States. And I

see Ford’s as this, and I see one from Firestone that shows substantially different numbers that supposedly are based on information from Ford.

And now I just wonder, as we look at the first chart again, the

underlying data, is that—is that really a reliable picture?

Now, we’ve talked today about context and things of this nature.

I think back to the hearing, and we had, you know,—of the Decatur

tires in there, the situation that Firestone has rectified, and that

74

is not really at issue here—you know, or the B grade tires versus

the C grade tires issue, has that taken into consideration apparently the fact that apparently Goodyear has supplied B grade and

Firestone C grade at the request of Ford? The climate issue, where

more of the Firestone tires in the southern hot areas—which we all

understand is very important in this issue—than the Goodyear

tires on the Explorers? Because, again, there are different charts

here, the recommendation I recall back from the last hearing that

Ford seemed to make that—on psi inflation to the tire that was

lower than what Firestone recommended for their tire and the tire

safety, and these issues—well, I guess my bottom line on this—and

I have some other questions I could ask. You can use statistics and

experts—you know, I’ve seen it used in courts. And one says the

sky is falling. The other says it is not.

In the end, what we’re trying to do in this hearing is protect the

American consumer. It seems to me it would be in the interest of

both companies to come together—you’re going to end up together

in a courtroom, against some other folks, probably, that were injured in this—these—or the heirs of people that were killed in

some of these accidents. So it seems to be in your interest to come

together and work to get to the bottom of this so that we can be

safe and confident that if we’re driving Explorers around with Firestone tires, we’re going to be safe and in other vehicles with those

tires and other SUVs.

And I would just encourage you to do that, and I’m going to ask

the same thing from Mr. Lampe when he comes in next. And I

probably know him a little better than I know you, and I feel confident that he will do that, and Firestone has that interest, too. So

I would ask that, and since I am being gaveled now, I will yield

back the balance of my time.

Thank you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Doyle, for 5 minutes for

inquiry.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nasser, welcome.

Mr. NASSER. Thank you.

Mr. DOYLE. I’m a new member to the committee, so I wasn’t here

last year when you appeared, but it’s my understanding that back

then, that obviously it’s a fair statement to say that contrary to

some of these statements last year at the committee hearing, that

Firestone and Ford can’t seem to agree on what the root causes of

the tire problem is. That’s—you don’t agree with that? You don’t

agree on what, or—or you haven’t been able to agree on what the

root causes of this tire problem is?

Mr. NASSER. I would say generally that’s an accurate statement.

Mr. DOYLE. Now, it’s my understanding that last year, it was

suggested that an outside consultant take a look at this, and it’s

my understanding that Firestone did hire an outside consultant to

study the problem and that your study was done in-house. Is that

correct?

Mr. NASSER. We did a study in-house, but also cooperated with

the—are you talking about the Govindjee study——

Mr. DOYLE. Yes——

Mr. NASSER. [continuing] that Firestone undertook?

75

Mr. DOYLE. Yes.

Mr. NASSER. Yes, but there was cooperation between us on that

study as well.

Mr. DOYLE. I see. But you also did a study and yours was done

in-house?

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Mr. DOYLE. But I did hear you say to Mr. Stupak that you’re not

opposed to this idea of an outside independent group studying this

problem; a blue ribbon panel, as Mr. Stupak referred to it?

Mr. NASSER. Our preference, obviously—and this is what we said

last time and this is what we concluded with Firestone in October

of last year—is that we provide all the data to NHTSA, who are

in the best position, we believe, and I think the committee believes,

based on what I’ve heard earlier in the opening comments, to be

able to make an independent review of all the data of the tires and

of the vehicles and comparable peer SUVs.

Mr. DOYLE. So then you’d agree—I mean, the Congress and—or

the American public is not going to be able to resolve your dispute

here. I mean, some of us up here have the expertise to ask some

questions and we know that statistics can be manipulated to either

person’s benefit. But we’re not engineers up here. I guess that, you

know, a lot of people back in my district and across America are

wondering who’s going to give them the definitive answer as to

what the cause of this tire failure is, so that they can have confidence when they go out to buy an automobile or a tire and—— Mr. NASSER. We agree with the American public. That’s why we

stopped debating and we stopped talking and we stopped discussions and we acted. And that’s what the 13 million Firestone tire

replacement plan is all about.

Because we are sick and tired of debating and fighting on this

issue. Our customers want it resolved and they want those tires off

the road. And that’s what we’re doing. So I agree with you. You’re

absolutely right; let’s stop this discussion and debating and analysis and finger-pointing, if that’s what you want to call it, and act

for the benefit of our customers. And that’s what we did.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you. Can you describe the difference for the

committee—I am just—the difference in usage and engineering between Ford Explorers and Ford Rangers?

Mr. NASSER. Well one is a pick-up truck, and obviously it has different use than a sport utility vehicle which tends to be more of

a passenger-type vehicle.

Mr. DOYLE. Now, do tire companies manufacture tires to different standards for SUVs and trucks or are they the same?

Mr. NASSER. In some cases they’re the same. In some cases

they’re different. If where you are going is should we be using the

same tire on a sport utility vehicle and a pick-up truck, in actual

fact the specifications are adequate for both, and it’s not uncommon

in the industry to have a similar performance tire across different

derivative fronts.

Mr. DOYLE. So it wouldn’t have been uncommon to have the Firestone tire on the Ranger and on the Explorer?

Mr. NASSER. It’s been that way for a long time.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much. I yield back my time, Mr.

Chairman.

76

Mr. GREENWOOD. Gentleman yields back the time. The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes for inquiry the gentleman, Mr. Terry.

Mr. TERRY. Thank you. I appreciate that opportunity.

Sir, if you could help me just kind of get down to the lowest common denominator here, I read through inches of material, and if

you could help me in defining if defect—because we have heard testimony about tire pressure, load, heat variances, but specifically— and we’ve also heard a variety of testing, field testing that shows

something is wrong, shows the belt is coming apart.

Now you have done a variety of advance testing, more field testing under controlled circumstances, laboratory testings. In a layman’s way that we as laymen can understand, what has Ford determined to be the specific defect or defects of these Firestone

tires?

Mr. NASSER. You can’t summarize it with one defect, unfortunately.

Mr. TERRY. It’s multiple.

Mr. NASSER. It is very complicated and it varies, and it isn’t only

tire design and temperature and wedge strength and peel strength

but it’s also variability in the design process, because it seems as

if the design changed over a period of time and variability within

the manufacturing process of the Firestone plants.

Mr. TERRY. That’s interesting, because I was going to ask you to

break it down into whether or not these defects that you found

were part of design or manufacturing, and you’re saying it’s combination of both. Could you be specific about what type of design

defects have been found by Ford that they believe lead to this problem and the manufacturing process as well?

Mr. NASSER. Well, it’s difficult to be specific because it varied depending on the period of tire manufacturer. It really did vary year

by year. In addition to that, what is very unusual is that when you

look at the Firestone tire performance by plant, by Firestone plant,

it varies dramatically. Which further indicates that the vehicle

itself, the Explorer, is the same vehicle; yet there is tremendous

variability depending on where the tire comes in from, and we

know the Explorer is a superb vehicle and a very intelligent vehicle, but I don’t think it can sit back and say this is a Decatur tire,

I don’t want to behave now; this is an Aiken tire, I will behave

now. So there’s just so much variability between plant and design

and, we think, manufacturing process.

Mr. TERRY. Well, I guess that’s what’s at the heart of trying to

figure out the scope of the recall, for want of a better word.

Mr. NASSER. Which is one of the reasons we, in the end, said,

look, we can continue to study this for many, many more months

and face the situation of increasing tragedy on the roads, or we can

act now in the interests and the safety of our customers. And we

decided to act. It wasn’t an easy decision, yet it was easy once we

really got down to the priority of protecting our customer.

Mr. TERRY. Thank you. I’ll yield back. I yield to you, Mr. Bryant.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The gentleman yields time to Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. Yes, Mr. Nasser, while you were mentioning that,

it reminded me of a question I had in terms of what is being done

to improve the tires. As I understand, the year 2001 Explorer is

also being redesigned to some extent. Particularly, would you share

77

with this committee those redesigns, those improvements to safety

as they pertain to the stability of the vehicle?

Mr. NASSER. Well, it’s a 2002 Explore, and many of the gentlemen in the room today drove them for hundreds of miles across the

country to be here with us this morning. We did take the opportunity to redesign the Explorer. It’s a superb vehicle, the 2002

model. But it’s got big shoes to fill because the Explorer—the previous Explorer had been around for 10-years, over 10 years, and it

had one of the best safety records anywhere in the world for a sport

utility vehicle. It was the top selling sport utility vehicle in the

U.S.A., the top selling sport utility vehicle in the world.

But you get to a point after 10 years where you do need to take

the opportunity to upgrade it substantially, and we did, and we upgraded it primarily to make the interior more efficient because we

wanted to go to three-row seating and seven-passenger seating

with the Explorer. We went to an independent rear suspension in

the rear so that we could get better ride, but primarily to get better

space sufficiency in the rear. And, you know, things have moved on

over the years, and we’ve taken the opportunity to upgrade it in

almost every respect.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair

recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, for 5

minutes.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I’ll begin by

saying that while I know that there’s still a dispute as to whether

or not the minority, the Democrats, are going to receive access to

the analysis that’s been done by the majority as to these additional

tires that may be endangering the American public, that the contention that is being made is that the information is still incomplete, and as a result can’t be shared with us. But if the information is incomplete, then it shouldn’t be used to scare the American

public either. I think that at a point at which you had completed

your analysis, you should have presented it both to us and to the

American public, but to not use incomplete data.

Mr. GREENWOOD. If the gentleman will yield, it has not been the

statement of the majority, of this Chair, or any other Members that

the data is incomplete.

Mr. MARKEY. If the data is not incomplete, then we should receive the analysis. If the analysis is incomplete, then it should not

be commented upon until it is complete. You can’t have it both

ways, and releasing it partially in terms of results that you think

may ultimately be proven to be true in a way that scares the public

but also damages companies and then say that it cannot, that same

information cannot be given to the minority, to the Democrats, that

so we can analyze it as well.

I thought we did a good job last year actually working together.

In fact, the TREAD Act does include two amendments which I was

successful in having the committee adopt. One was to have NHTSA

establish a dynamic rollover consumer information program so that

consumers were better informed about the likelihood of certain vehicles to roll over in particular situations, and NHTSA hopefully is

in the midst of a very rapid rulemaking on that issue so that the

public can get the information.

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And second, I authored an amendment which requires NHTSA to

develop an early warning system in vehicles to alert drivers when

their tires are significantly underinflated, again more information

for consumers so they can protect their own family. I hope that

they’re moving as well, NHTSA, rapidly toward putting those rules

in place.

Mr. Nasser I’d like to discuss with you a little about the design

and development of the Ford Explorer. Most vehicles are designed

with something called understeer. Understeer means that your

wheels turn less than how far you turn your steering wheel in the

car. This is designed for stability reasons.

Firestone’s outside expert found that the opposite phenomenon,

oversteer, happens to a greater degree than on other similar vehicles when one of the tires detreads. In other words, Firestone says

that a driver of a Ford Explorer is at greater risk because the car

will oversteer, the wheels will turn further than the operator turns

the steering wheel. This creates obvious instability and increases

the likelihood of Explorer rollovers.

Second, Firestone alleges Ford cut safety corners on their tires

by reducing recommended tire pressure for the Explorer.

And third, Firestone notes that one of the key factors in tire safety and design is the anticipated load placed on those tires. Firestone notes in its testimony that over time, Ford actually increased

the weight of the Ford Explorer.

I’ll quote from Firestone: In fact, through 1996, Ford continually

added weight to the Explorer. In 1990 the 4x4 4000 Explorer increased from about 5,000 pounds to nearly 5,400 pounds in 1993

to well over 600 pounds in 1996. It is no surprise that a significant

majority of claims that Firestone has received is on the heavier Explorers, unquote.

That’s from Firestone. Did you ask for redesign of these tires

when you increased the Explorer’s weight? So if you could deal

with those issues, the oversteer issue, the question of design, and

also the question on the load placed upon the tires?

Mr. NASSER. We have looked at the study that Firestone commissioned on the handling of sport utility vehicles and we think that

study is seriously flawed. We do not agree with it, and we think

the sample for the testing was inadequate to draw any meaningful

conclusions at all. They used 3 vehicles compared to 15 that we

used. They tested a limited number of models. They only tested on

one road surface. They did not test under actual event of tread separation. And the data is inconsistent with real world data.

We then looked at the criteria that they used. By the way—

understeer, oversteer—in the end, you want a vehicle that’s responsive and the Explorer is a very responsive vehicle. But we used the

criteria that Firestone used in terms of vehicle handling, and we

looked at 19 other vehicles. Twelve of the 19 vehicles would fall

outside of the criteria that they established as a good handling vehicle. And the interesting thing is the more modern vehicles, the

vehicles such as the new—they tested the old Chevy Blazer. You

test the new Chevy Trailblazer, interestingly enough, it’s very close

to the old Explorer in terms of understeer or oversteer. So the bottom line is, from a handling viewpoint, Explorer performs exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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tremely well and we think well balanced to not only handling but

for accident avoidance.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MARKEY. He did not answer my question.

Mr. NASSER. I’ll answer.

Mr. MARKEY. Did you ask for a redesign of the tire when you increased the load inside of the Explorer that the tire had to carry?

Did you ask Firestone to redesign the tire?

Mr. GREENWOOD. Would the gentleman request a unanimous

consent for an additional 30 seconds?

Mr. MARKEY. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. NASSER. It is insignificant, all that you’re looking at that

there——

Mr. MARKEY. You’re saying the load increase was insignificant?

Mr. NASSER. The vehicle weight of the Explorer increase was insignificant. The data that you’re looking at there is not apples to

apples. What they did, if you go back and look at the Explorer,

there are optional—there was optional equipment on the Explorer

that was made standard. That optional equipment was heavily

marked as options by our customers. So there wasn’t a very large

increase in weight at all insignificant.

Mr. MARKEY. Five thousand pounds to 5,600 pounds is more than

a 10 percent increase in the weight of the vehicle.

Mr. NASSER. That does not take into account optional equipment.

The 5,000 pounds on the 5,600 hundred pounds is standard equipment. If you add a typically equipped vehicle the difference is very

small. We can share that data with you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan,

Mr. Upton.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I’m a little

late. I caught a red-eye back from the other side of the country to

come back this morning. And as you know, I was an author, I was

the author of the TREAD Act, an act that looked at the many problems over the last couple of years, particularly as it related to the

Firestone recall last year.

And I have a little story to relate. Part of it is from my Chairman, Billy Tauzin, who tells the tale that because of the hearings

that we had last fall, a dear colleague of ours, Jack Field’s wife,

checked her tires and in fact there was a problem. She wouldn’t

have known about the situation unless she had checked.

My daughter’s a Girl Scout. She just came back from a trip a

couple of weeks ago caving, and we stopped at the house next door

to—a neighbor’s house, who was one of the Girl Scout leaders, and

I saw he drives an Explorer, and I saw a pile of tires in his garage.

These tires were not recalled, but they should have been, could

have been; because in fact when you press down on this one, when

they took them into the local gas station for inspection and wanted

them rotated, thank goodness the mechanic said—and I think it’s

right here—press down on them, you can see that they’re about

ready to separate. These tires were never on the recall list, but

thank God he checked them out. And the mechanic said, I think

you ought to replace them, and he did.

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That to me underscores your statement a little bit earlier that

I heard about increasing—Ford not wanting to increase the tragedy

or act, we would have seen with some of these Firestone tires on

behalf of the consumer, your customer. And in all of the discussions

we’ve had over the last couple of weeks, I believe that very strongly; that you in fact did realize that there were more tires on the

road that should have been replaced, going far beyond what the recall did this last year. These tires might have taken the life of my

daughter, might have taken the life of our colleague, Mr. Fields.

Thank goodness the work of this committee and the TREAD Act

were able to expose a number of the flaws so that in fact we could

take those tires away from folks who might have had a real tragedy in their home. And I want to thank you for Ford’s action on

replacing those.

This morning getting on the plane in Denver and coming back,

I saw the story in USA Today. This afternoon I read the Post story

about the Explorer probe, but considered some headline accident

data under review, official to say. When did you find out about

these charges that came out in the press today?

Mr. NASSER. Congressman, the charges relating to the tires

or——

Mr. UPTON. The charges that in fact you were replacing tires

with greater flaws than the one you had been—were on the tires

themselves. Were you aware of this before today’s hearing?

Mr. NASSER. We were not, and there’s been considerable discussion on that.

Mr. UPTON. I’m sorry that I missed that because I literally just

got off the plane and drove in from Dulles.

Mr. NASSER. Mr. Chairman, I think I’ll leave it to you—— Mr. UPTON. Is there going to be ample time for you to be able

to respond to that?

Mr. NASSER. Yes. Where we came out, Congressman, is that if

that data is true, then we’d like to see it. And Chairman Tauzin

said let’s have 30 days to look at this. I said let’s take 30 minutes,

let’s look at it, and if it’s real we’ll—we’ll change the—the recall

tires that we’ve got out there; and if it isn’t, then let’s not scare

the American public. It’s as simple as that.

Mr. UPTON. You know, this last weekend in Michigan, I chatted

with all of my Ford dealers in West Michigan that I represent, and

they felt that Ford was doing the right thing. They felt that the

customers themselves coming in, they thought that there were adequate material that was being presented. There wasn’t a panic like

perhaps there had been before, and we had worked with a number

of my constituents who are very fearful about driving on the tires

that were being recalled last year. But I want to compliment you

on what you have done and the challenges that you’re undertaking.

I see my time has expired, so I would yield back. Thank you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair

recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Sawyer, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nasser, the good part about this means you’re close to the

end. I want to touch on three points that are really more prospective than retrospective. It goes to the question of how we deal with

this sort of problem in the future.

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I agree with you when you say on page 13 of your statement that

we, Ford, will not accept that a tread separation is a normal foreseeable event that manufacturers must accommodate through vehicle design, as asserted by Firestone. I agree with that. But I’m sure

you would agree with me that there are many different causes of

tire failure, some of which have nothing to do with design but have

to do with road damage and abuse of various kinds. I am really

concerned about unrealistic expectations of performance, not only

for tires but for vehicles, anything that can be abused in a practical

road situation. So when Ford went to NHTSA earlier in the year

and in its presentation in March asserted, I quote, Explorers have

a margin of safety, as designed, to accommodate to a reasonable

level component failures including tread separation, I want to ask

you what is a reasonable level?

Mr. NASSER. If you look at the market situation, real world field

data, in 90 percent of examples, Explorers and other SUVs are very

manageable with a tread separation incident, and in 10 percent

they are not. And every one of those incidents is tragic, but that’s

the way it is. A tread separation is a catastrophic event and it is

virtually impossible to design a vehicle around such a catastrophic

event.

Mr. SAWYER. There are many different circumstances involving

tire failure, however. As Goodyear, as you asserted in your testimony, wrote: While tire—tread separation is a rare occurrence for

tires, everyone needs to understand that it is a condition that can

occur through misuse, abuse, overloading, severe underinflation,

accidental road hazard, and so forth.

Is that not a reasonable assumption—and I am trying to get at— here’s what I’m trying to get at. We are going to ask NHTSA to

put some standards on what we see as appropriate levels of concern that are raised by real world data. And you talk about what

is a reasonable level that a vehicle and a tire together ought to be

designed to in order to deal with component failures, including

tread separation.

And I’m trying to get at a—at a very basic question; and that is,

how do we measure that?

Mr. NASSER. I don’t think we know at this point. And as I recall,

NHTSA had until June of next year to work with the industry to

develop these tire standards, and I think it will take that long to

do it. It’s complex and it’s important.

Mr. SAWYER. I couldn’t agree with you more, particularly at a

time when we are seeing tire production techniques change, not

only in this country but European manufacturers as well. I think

we can probably foresee a time when much, much shorter production runs and much more careful tailoring of a tire to a vehicle will

be the case. That will reduce the base on which failure rates will

be calculated. Do you believe that that ought to be taken into account, where instead of talking about a million tire runs, we’re

talking about 25,000 tire runs?

Mr. NASSER. You’d have to ask a tire expert on that. I don’t think

so actually, when you look at some of the new manufacturing facilities—and we talked about Firestone’s Aiken plant. That’s a highvolume plant and it’s able to produce what seems to be at this

point at least very good tires.

82

Mr. SAWYER. In our last hearing—this is the final point, and

then I just have a request to make of you—you talked about Ford’s

commitment to doing early warning. What I was talking about a

moment ago is statistical early warning. It seemed to me that you

were talking about direct pressure measurement early warning

systems within the vehicle. It seems to me that some of your competitors are talking about using ABS-derived sensory information.

That’s secondary. I would hope that you could share information

with this committee about what direction we ought to urge NHTSA

to go.

Mr. NASSER. We will share that direction and specification. More

than that, we’re absolutely moving on it. We’re incorporating inflation gauges in our vehicles, almost as we speak, and we’ll lay out

the plans that we’ve got in terms of the other technology that’s

coming into vehicles across the board.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. SAWYER. Could I make one request?

Mr. GREENWOOD. Does the gentleman have a unanimous consent

request?

Mr. SAWYER. I would have a unanimous consent request. It—this

is almost personal. It is personal. I have been driving your Mustang for the last 15 years and I have really enjoyed your vehicles.

Could you get somebody in your company to tell me why, from my

last Mustang 2 years ago, asking for the same car, my lease price

went up 30 percent?

Thank you. Yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair notes that the—it will now recognize

the chairman of the full committee for a second round of questioning for this witness. Chair notes that under the rules of the

committee, each member is thus entitled to a second round of questioning. No member is obligated to take a second round of questioning. I recognize the chairman for 5 minutes.

Chairman TAUZIN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. Nasser, let me get back to the question of replacement tires

because it continues to plague us. Let me first put on the record

that our committee requested by letter information from other tire

manufacturers regarding claims data on their tires so that when

we might do a comparative analysis—and copies of that letter

was—those letters were sent to the minority. We also informed the

minority that data had been received and it’s available upon request. My information is it’s been shared with the minority since

that request. And so that information, the raw data we received,

is available. NHTSA hasn’t analyzed some of their claims data and

forwarded it to us, which is available publicly, and that indicated

there were some tires that were going to be used in the replacement program that had less than—a claims history that was less

favorable than some of the tires that are being replaced. That’s

part of the record as well.

Staff analyzed the raw data, and it’s the analysis of that raw

data that forms the difference of opinion as to whether it ought to

be made public until NHTSA has reviewed it. I have taken the

view that we ought to at least give NHTSA a chance to review that

analysis to make sure it is correct before we identify that that inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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formation is accurate to the American public, but we’ll continue our

discussions on that.

In that regard, Mr. Nasser, Ford did do some tests on the replacement tires as I understand, but again staff indicates to me

that while Ford ran vehicle handling tests with some of the replacement tires and rig tests on most of the replacement tires, that

the test parameters are very different from the test parameters

that were set for the earlier tests with all the Firestone tires. Is

that accurate?

Mr. NASSER. I don’t know whether that’s accurate or not.

Chairman TAUZIN. Well, we’re told that, for example, that the rig

test runs on the replacement tires were all conducted at 26 psi

with a load of 1,500, with no variation in the test for speeds— which speed was a very important variation—but load and pressure were not varied while speed was varied, my understanding is.

The bottom line is that our information is that the replacement tire

tests were conducted under different parameters than the Firestone tire tests, and if that is so, how could Ford be sure that the

tires you’re going to replace these Firestone tires with are in fact

better than the tires that you’re recalling?

Mr. NASSER. We will sit down and discuss the different test parameters, but in the end we always go back to the field data, and

that’s why I was so concerned with your comment; because if the

field data suggests that one of those tires doesn’t meet our standards, then we’ll act.

Chairman TAUZIN. Well then, the next question obviously is did

Ford request the claims data from the other companies who manufacture these replacement tires?

Mr. NASSER. We have the claims data and we—and we asked

NHTSA if they had any data that would suggest that any of these

tires were inappropriate.

Chairman TAUZIN. Did you actually request them from other

companies? You see, we did, and that is the raw data we’re discussing. It—did you discuss the same data.

Mr. NASSER. I don’t know what data you have, but we asked for

data as well.

Chairman TAUZIN. From the other companies?

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Chairman TAUZIN. All right. And then you also asked NHTSA,

as I understand it, for whatever claims data they had on these replacement tires. Is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. No. We asked them whether they had any safety defect review on any of the tires that we selected.

Chairman TAUZIN. Okay. In regards to the claims data that you

had on the replacement tires, can you share with us what your

analysis told you?

Mr. NASSER. I don’t have that with me, but we can share it with

you. I’ll file it after the meeting if you wish to see that.

Chairman TAUZIN. It would be very important if we could have

that on the record. Let me explain what is going on here so everyone can know. We just went through a recall of Firestone tires last

year. In many cases I was one of those Explorer owners who had

to go through recall. I got Goodyear tires, but a lot of other owners

got other Firestone tires. And now those Firestone tires are being

84

replaced in this new Ford recall or replacement program. And the

concern expressed is are these owners going to be putting on another tire that they have to replace later on, because we find out

later on that this new replacement tire turns out to have been

maybe even worse than the tire that they’re replacing. And so far

at least, NHTSA tells us that may be true with some of the replacement tires.

The raw data we received under our analysis tells us that also

may be true. That’s why I’d like to get this verified by NHTSA, and

if that’s true and we present that to Ford, I’m asking in advance

what will Ford’s obligation be with that information?

Mr. NASSER. Well, if the information is valid and it’s true, we

would obviously react very quickly. While you were out of the room,

I said we wouldn’t wait for 30 days; if the data is accurate, we

would revise the tires that we’re replacing. That’s a very serious

situation, in fact, that is the—if that is the case.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Chairman yields back. Chair recognizes the

gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. DINGELL. I would seek recognition at this time for purposes

of a colloquy with my friend, the chairman of the full committee.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DINGELL. I’ll be as brief as I possibly can. Mr. Chairman, I

understand your concerns about hurting some of the tire manufacturers, and I have no desire to do that, by untimely release of the

raw data. I am troubled about two items which appeared in the

paper this morning. And I’m referring—by error I said Yahoo—but

in point of fact it is AP-U.S.

It says as follows: Representative Billy Tauzin, our Louisiana

committee chairman, said congressional investigators have analyzed the failure rates of replacement tires Ford is using made by

Michelin, Continental, Goodyear, General, B.F. Goodrich, and

Uniroyal, and found that some fail more often than Firestone Wilderness AP tires Ford recalled last month.

It goes on to say: Ford is going to replace these recalled tires

with tires that have a worse claims history than some of the tires

that are coming off the Explorers, Tauzin said. For example, our

investigators have learned that one of the tires that is going to be

used in replacement has claims of 124 per million tires, well in excess of the 5 claims per million that Ford say is the benchmark in

this recall.

It goes on then to say as follows: Tauzin spokesman Ken Johnson

said the committee found two additional Firestone tire models used

on Ford vehicles. The Wilderness HT and FR-480 had higher rates

of claims for property damage than the Wilderness AT.

Then it goes on, skipping a paragraph, says—it says as follows:

Tauzin refused to make his data public yet, saying he wanted Federal safety officials to analyze the information first.

Now, Mr. Chairman, with great respect and affection for you, I

am not quite sure whether you are telling the committee here that

these tires have, on the basis of careful analysis by the committee

staff, a worse record of safety than those which—than the Firestone which they’re replacing, or that you are not sure as to whethVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
85

er this data has been properly analyzed and we have the information.

I am very much troubled about this. I am willing, if we are making charges about this, of this character, to have the whole business made public and let the necessary Federal agencies, the Ford

people, the Firestone people, or the manufacturers of the other

tires to make whatever comments, so that this committee and the

public at large may arrive at the necessary conclusions.

I think my major concern here, Mr. Chairman, is has there been

a good-hearted analysis by the committee staff which relates to the

comments that you have made earlier, or do we need further work

by the committee staff?

Mr. GREENWOOD. Does the chairman wish to respond?

Chairman TAUZIN. If the gentleman would yield, first of all, I

have no doubts about the numerical analysis done by the subcommittee staff. I think it’s accurate and the numbers cited in that

news story, although I didn’t write the news story, I think are

equally accurate.

If the gentleman would continue to yield, what we’re concerned

about is the significance of claims data as it relates to the safety

of the replacement tires. And it is the significance of that claims

data that I would very much appreciate a chance for NHTSA to

comment on before we—before we claim or make the claim that

this replacement tire is in fact a worse safety tire than the Firestone tire it will replace.

If I can continue for just a second?

Mr. DINGELL. I will be happy to continue yielding to my friend.

Chairman TAUZIN. The fact is that claims data is not the only

data, as I understand it, that Mr. Nasser has used in the Ford

analysis, and I don’t believe it’s the only data that NHTSA uses in

its analysis. And while it’s important data, its significance in relation to other data may be large or small, I don’t know. And it’s not

out of concern so much for the companies and their tires as it is

with putting out information that may or may not be significantly

valuable in terms of saying don’t put that tire on your car yet. And

the reason we have raised the issue with Mr. Nasser and the reason I’d like NHTSA to further evaluate our own staff’s analysis of

this raw data is that, if in fact these numbers are significant, that

NHTSA and our committee can properly advise the Ford Motor

Company, so as Mr. Nasser has said, he would take immediate

steps to make sure that in fact a tire that is in fact better is replacing a tire that’s worse, rather than the reverse.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, I would simply observe what my good friend

says is significant; if these data are insignificant, why are we making public statements? I would note here that the chairman of the

committee said this morning. He said, ‘‘and found some to fail more

often than the Firestone wilderness AT tires Ford recalled last

month,’’ referring to the analysis by committee investigators. And

what I’m trying to establish is, everybody who’s looking at a Ford

vehicle, thinking about buying them, they’re wondering whether this recall is in fact going to work. Ford is going to spend $3 billion

to recall, and yet here our investigators are saying that these tires

that are being replaced are less safe than those that are being

pulled off the tire.

86

Chairman TAUZIN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEARNS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time—time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DINGELL. I didn’t know I was limited. I thought I was having

a colloquy with my chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. Well, I’d like to—— Chairman TAUZIN. I would ask that the gentleman have an additional several minutes so we might finish.

Mr. DINGELL. With respect to my two very dear friends, the presiding officer of the committee, and my dear friend, the chairman

of the committee, I have got to decide what I am going to do about

the release of the documents which have been discussed by the

staff of the committee and by my dear friend, the chairman of the

committee.

Chairman TAUZIN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DINGELL. Yes.

Chairman TAUZIN. Let me try again. The Chair has not said and

cannot say whether these replacement tires are less safe or more

safe than the Firestone tires that were replaced. What the Chair

is concerned about is that Ford, in its evaluation of the Firestone

tires that are the subject of the recall, indicated to us that a 5

claims rate per million tires was the benchmark upon which a decision was made to consider replacing the Firestone tires. It was one

of the benchmark considerations.

What we have pointed out is that our information is that some

of the replacement tires far exceed this benchmark. NHTSA has

similarly pointed that out to this committee and the inquiry that

if there are tires with higher than 5 per million failure rate claims

records, is that a significant variation, so that in fact Ford may

wish to consider using a different replacement tire if other indications are that that tire may not be safe.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, you know—and to reclaim my time, and

again with great respect for you, Mr. Chairman, let me—let me

just read that—it’s remarkable what a fellow can learn by reading

in the newspapers.

I note here and it says—I’m quoting this—and I give credit to

AP-U.S., said—House Commerce Committee spokesman Ken Johnson said the congressional investigators will reveal the results of

their analysis into failure rates of several tire brands during a

hearing Tuesday. Johnson said the analysis would show that some

of the replacement tires Ford is using fail more often than some of

Firestone’s Wilderness AT tires.

It goes on to say, and I’m skipping a paragraph or two here: Ford

is working with Goodyear, Continental, and Michelin to get replacements. Johnson would not specify which of these tires had

higher failure rates than the Wilderness AT, but said that it would

be disclosed at the hearing.

And all I am trying to do is get disclosure and find this out. I

know the Ford folks want to know it, and I am sure all the other

replacement tire manufacturers want to know about it, too. And so

either we have a staff analysis that says this, that’s reliable; or we

have a staff analysis which doesn’t say this or is not reliable. I am

trying to find out do we have a staff analysis which is reliable, do

we have a staff analysis that tells the truth or do we not?

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Mr. STEARNS. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Chairman TAUZIN. Could the gentleman have an additional 2

minutes? I think we need to clarify this, if you don’t mind.

Mr. STEARNS. The Chair will give an additional 2 minutes to the

gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. DINGELL. I thank the Chair, but I didn’t know I was time

limited. Now I’ll be glad to yield to my friend, if he can clarify what

I just read out of the daily press.

Chairman TAUZIN. Well—well, first of all, let me inform the gentleman that the staff analysis is on the claims data only, and the

gentleman from Michigan can look at the raw data that has been

supplied to him.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, I have requested both the data and the analysis, and I’m trying to find out what the worth of the analysis is.

Chairman TAUZIN. Would the gentleman yield? The gentleman

has the raw data and can draw his own conclusions from it. Our

staff has drawn the conclusion that the raw data indicates that

some of these replacement tires have a claims history that is not

as good as the tires that are being replaced.

Now, what I’m suggesting to the gentleman, however, is that

that criteria alone may not mean that these are not good replacement tires. We don’t know. And until NHTSA has a chance to review this data and comment to us, it is my view that this analysis

by the staff identifying the particular tires would be premature,

and if the gentleman wants to do an analysis and release his own

analysis, he’s perfectly all right to do so. He can do so on his own,

without asking me to release data they would first like to have

NHTSA review.

Mr. DINGELL. Under the rules, Mr. Chairman, I would note, first

of all, every member of this committee is entitled to every paper

in possession of the committee. I will be happy to cite the rule if

the Chair wishes.

Chairman TAUZIN. If the gentleman would yield, we’ve satisfied

that rule. We have, I think, accorded you all the raw data that was

sent to the committee.

Mr. DINGELL. No, you’ve not satisfied that. I am asking for the

analysis which has been widely discussed here in at least two instances in the press, and I am not going to waive that right. So

I’m asking that the analysis be made available to us, and I hope

that anybody who is listening to this colloquy between my two dear

friends, the presiding officer of the subcommittee and my distinguished friend, the chairman of the full committee, will arrive at

the rather unfortunate conclusion that the staff here has been pulling a long bow, and that in point of fact the information doesn’t

show these things, or that the chairman of the committee doesn’t

have confidence in it because he won’t make it available to me and

others so we can know in fact what this says.

Now, I’m going to insist on my rights to have this information

made available to me, and I’m going to insist on my rights to have

it made available in an unexpurgated fashion. I will assure the

chairman of the committee that we will not release the data without appropriate notice to him and opportunity for him to discuss

with me. But in the meantime it appears that perhaps what the

chairman said should be read by the staff, so that the staff will unVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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derstand that this data is, if such exists, is of rather limited value

and doesn’t prove——

Mr. STEARNS. Time of the gentleman has expired. I would say to

the two distinguished gentlemen, we have talked about this earlier.

We’re talking about it again. What I suggest, the two gentlemen

get together, and I think we have an interpretation of what the

analysis has to—in other words, the analysis of the staff.

Chairman TAUZIN. Would the chairman recognize me briefly for

a half minute?

Mr. STEARNS. Let me just finish to say that our analysis that our

staff has done is the key of whether the chairman wants to, you

know, whether that extends—to what extent, I don’t know. And I

don’t know what the ruling is, but I would——

Chairman TAUZIN. Would the gentleman recognize me for 30 seconds?

Mr. STEARNS. Absolutely.

Chairman TAUZIN. I thank the chairman.

Mr. Dingell, with the understanding that you have just given me

that we will discuss and there will be no release of this data until

we’ve agreed, then I will be happy to share the analysis with the

gentleman.

Mr. DINGELL. I told my beloved friend, I want the record clear,

I told my beloved friend, the chairman of the committee, that I will

not release it until I have discussed it with the chairman of the

committee.

Chairman TAUZIN. That’s fair. I’ll accept that.

Mr. DINGELL. Very well. And I thank my good friend and I thank

the presiding officer of the committee for his kindness to me, too,

and I note that I’m not limited on time.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Nasser, what we have decided to do, so we are

going to continue on ahead here, I think we are going to take another round. The chairman has offered this. I’m going to ask a

short question. I ask members to keep it within 3 minutes.

Mr. Nasser has been very cordial and hospitable to stay here, so

we’re going to make a quick round here, and one question I have

deals with a field experience chart. In the field experience chart

that’s prepared by NHTSA, not our staff—this is nothing to do with

raw data, but NHTSA itself—the 1991-’94 model year Explorer is

compared to the 1995-1999 model year Explorer. So you have two

comparisons and two segmented years. It appears from this chart

that the 1991-’94 model year Explorer had 50 rollovers. The rollover number jumped to 87 for 1995 to 1999.

I guess an obvious question is—this is NHTSA’s information.

They’re saying that maybe there was a change of the suspension

and things like this. But could you explain why the rollover number jumped to 87 for the 1995 to 1999 model year Explorer?

Mr. NASSER. If you look at the total sport utility vehicle population, the trend for the two periods that you mentioned there does

show an increase in both periods. However, the Ford Explorer is

one of the best sport utility vehicles. It was clearly superior in the

earlier period than in the second period, and it became pretty much

average, and we think there are many different reasons there. One

of them is demographics. The number of younger people driving

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Explorers in that second period we think increased because of the

sports model and the two-door model.

Mr. STEARNS. NHTSA seems to indicate—well, their data shows

that. And is it possible that if you changed the suspension for the

1995 to 1999 year Explorer, would that have any impact?

Mr. NASSER. We did change the suspension.

Mr. STEARNS. You did.

Mr. NASSER. We went to a more modern suspension system.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay.

Mr. NASSER. One that is much more in line with today’s driving

conditions.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay.

Mr. NASSER. Both are good; one’s better. We don’t see any correlation between those changes and the data that’s represented

here.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. I am not going to go on with any more questions. I would just point out to you that the answer to the question

being demographics might not be all there is, and I suggest that

if you want to follow up with a written answer, I want to give you

every opportunity to do that; because I think all of us that looked

at this, including the staff, were trying to understand and extrapolate what that meant.

Mr. NASSER. We will do that.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. I’m going to complete my time, and the gentleman from New York, Mr. Towns, is recognized.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nasser, some, including Firestone, have said Ford shipped

more explorers with Firestone tires than with Goodyear tires to the

hot weather States of Arizona, Nevada, Louisiana, Mississippi,

Texas and Florida during moderate years 1995, 1996, and 1997.

Furthermore, they have claimed that this is an explanation for the

higher tread separation claim rates Firestone had than Goodyear

had during this period.

Can you tell us how many Firestone-equipped Explorers versus

how many Goodyear-equipped Explorers Ford shipped to these hot

weather States during the three model years?

Mr. NASSER. Okay. If you include Arizona, Florida, Louisiana,

Mississippi, Nevada and Texas, for the 1995 through 1997 model

year, there were 95,000 Explorers with Firestone tires and there

were 85,000 explorers with Goodyear tires. So, a fairly similar

number of explorers in that geographic area.

Mr. TOWNS. And for the Goodyear-equipped Explorers, there

were no tread separation claims at all involving injuries, deaths, or

lawsuits during this time; is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. That’s what we believe, yes.

Mr. TOWNS. But most of the tread separation claims have come

from hot weather States; is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. The majority, yes.

Mr. TOWNS. We know there were 1,183 Firestone tread separation claims during this period. So a large share of these claims

must have come from the hot weather States. What percentage of

these Firestone claims would you estimate to have come from the

hot weather States.

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Mr. NASSER. I don’t have that data with me, but we will provide

to it you.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to ask that the record stay

open until we can receive that information.

Mr. STEARNS. By unanimous consent, so ordered.

Mr. TOWNS. And before I yield back, Mr. Chairman, I’d also like

to request that we put a statement in the record from Congresswoman Eva Clayton from the State of North Carolina.

Mr. STEARNS. By unanimous consent.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Eva M. Clayton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EVA M. CLAYTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to share with

you and your Committee my views on the issues of this important investigation.

Ford and Firestone have suggested different causes of the high incidences of tread

separations and vehicle rollovers. These causes have ranged from allegations of defective tires, to defective steering mechanisms to negligent consumer practices.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible for the average consumer to ascertain

the actual facts.

In the complex interplay between competing, often powerful forces in our society,

disputes sometimes arise that require the mediating and ameliorating hand of the

government to sort out in an independent manner the conflicting contentions, to

evaluate inconsistent scientific supporting data, and to ascertain responsibility for

unsafe products. The public depends on the government to serve this role fairly,

fully and promptly. In the matter of the Ford-Firestone dispute, you have accepted

this task.

The outcome of your investigation, and the similar investigation being conducted

by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, will help to clarify

for the public the actual facts in this controversy. Also, your investigation very likely will have a significant impact on consumer confidence, individual and corporate

reputations and, most importantly, on consumer safety. Our citizens should be able

to use cars and tires without fear of losing their lives or suffering injuries on our

highways because these products are not made safely.

Firestone has a tire manufacturing plant in Wilson, NC, a small town in my district in eastern North Carolina. I have toured this plant and met some of the workers there. This plant employs more than 2,000 workers. These workers strive to

produce tires that are safe and without defects. Many of them are involved in civic

and community affairs in their communities. These workers, their families and several communities which depend upon their financial support, may be severely affected by the outcome of your investigation. Similarly, numerous other families and

communities of workers of both Ford and Firestone in other parts of the country

will anxiously await the outcome of your deliberations. We trust that your investigation will include a fair and comprehensive analysis of all relevant tire and vehicle

safety issues. This is an important task and I am confident that you and your Committee will render a valuable and honorable service to the nation. Thank you.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 3

minutes.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. Again I apologize for being a little bit

late for the hearing. I just have a couple of questions as we examine this issue on the newspaper reports today. Did you ask NHTSA

if other tires had a higher failure rate than the ones you were replacing with the Firestone?

Mr. NASSER. We asked NHTSA to review the proposed list of replacement tires to see if the Agency had any concerns in the past

or any potential concerns in the future. And the list we gave

NHTSA, they did not have any concerns.

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Mr. UPTON. So NHTSA has, at least as of this moment, has not

come back to you and said brand X has got a higher tire failure

rate than the ones you replaced; is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. That’s correct. The first we heard about it was in

the press this morning.

Mr. UPTON. And have any of the tire companies whose tires you

used to replace the bad Firestone—or the Firestone tires—have any

of those companies come, shared with you evidence that in fact

they have a higher failure rate than the ones that—Firestone tires

that you were replacing?

Mr. NASSER. Not that I am aware of, and we certainly wouldn’t

include those tires if that was the case.

Mr. UPTON. Right, right. So until this morning you had—these

newspaper reports came out—there was no evidence that the replacement tires that you were replacing on Ford customers’ cars

had a higher failure rate than the Firestone tires; is that right?

Mr. NASSER. That’s correct.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. Yield back.

Chairman TAUZIN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. UPTON. I’d be glad to yield.

Chairman TAUZIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I’d simply

like to put in the record something I received today Mr. Nasser,

which is my notice from the Ford Motor Company requesting information on my Explorer. And this, as I understand it, this is what

is being sent out to customers across America.

Mr. NASSER. That’s right.

Chairman TAUZIN. Which indicates not only the tires to be replaced but acceptable replacement tires; is that correct?

Mr. NASSER. Yes.

Chairman TAUZIN. And it’s a fairly long document, but I thought

it would be important to have it in the record.

Mr. STEARNS. By unanimous consent, so ordered a part of the

record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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94

95

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Mr. STEARNS. Gentleman yields back the balance of his time, and

at this point the gentleman, Mr. Strickland, is not here. Mr. Gordon from Tennessee is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Nasser, I want to salute your patience and

bladder. You’ve done a very good job of putting up with all of us

today. I had to be short with you because I wanted to get my two

questions in earlier. I just want to give you the opportunity, if you

want to clarify or follow up on anything they might have asked you

earlier.

Mr. NASSER. I’d just like to go back to the issue that was raised

earlier on the replacement program. We clearly are very concerned.

Our strategy isn’t to replace bad tires with bad tires. That doesn’t

make any sense at all, and we would appreciate that information

as quickly as possible. The worst thing that can happen here is

that our customers are confused and don’t know what to do.

And if we’re not helping that situation, then we are not doing our

jobs, and I take that responsibility very seriously. So we’d like to

clear that up as quickly as we can, as soon as this hearing is finished.

Mr. GORDON. I guess if I have another moment, I’ll just ask once

again, just to be sure; you’re saying that the tires on the Toyota

4-Runner and the Jeep Grand Cherokee are different ones than——

Mr. NASSER. They are different tires. We have had examples

where the same tires have been placed on Toyotas and other vehicles as replacement tires, where the customer replaces the original

equipment tire, once it’s been worn, with one of these Wilderness

tires. And the interesting thing is that the tread separation rate on

those competitive vehicles is about the same as we’re seeing on our

vehicles.

Mr. GORDON. But it is the same tire on the Ford Ranger?

Mr. NASSER. On the Ford Ranger 4x4 model, it is the same tire.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you. And again, thank you for your patience.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

The gentleman, Mr. Stupak, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Chairman. I don’t mean to belabor this

point more than we already have today, but I’ve sort of started. So

I’d like to ask the Chair of the full committee, if you could give us

some kind of inference of the statements that have been appeared

in the press. I take it one of three ways. The tires that Ford’s about

to replace, the Firestone tires, are either more dangerous or they’re

less dangerous, or the majority doesn’t have enough data to make

that judgment. Could you help us clarify that a little bit?

Chairman TAUZIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STUPAK. Yes.

Chairman TAUZIN. We know at least in one category, one parameter, the question of claims data against the tire, that some of the

replacement tires, according to NHTSA’s information, have higher

claims data rates than the tires that are being replaced. Do you.

Mr. STUPAK. Then is that claims data enough to make a judgment, or do you need more information?

Chairman TAUZIN. We need more information. Second—if the

gentleman would yield?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

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Chairman TAUZIN. According to the raw data we received from

other tire companies who are on this list that I just put into the

record, there are several tires that have claims data rates as high

as 124 per million, which is a rather significant number if 5 per

million is one of the benchmarks used in this replacement program.

And, therefore, finding out how significant that claims data is, is

fairly critical to the question you asked about safety.

Mr. STUPAK. So to answer the question, you need more information, because the claims data rate is not enough to make an analysis whether or not the tires being replaced are more dangerous or

less dangerous?

Chairman TAUZIN. That is my opinion, and that is why I have

asked NHTSA to immediately review this, to let us know that—and

to let Ford Motor Company know so that they might have the benefit of that analysis.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. But as I’m trying to clarify this here—because I agree with Mr. Nasser; I think we’re all pretty much confused on what to do now. For those of us, like yourself, who own

the Explorers or the Expedition, whatever it may be—again, I

mean, what message are we trying to communicate here to the general public, to the American people? That we need more information, or what?

Chairman TAUZIN. What I’m trying to do is to make sure that

since this is not a government recall—this is a corporate-sponsored

replacement program—that we don’t end up having a government

recall that follows it to replace the tires all over again—— Mr. STUPAK. I agree.

Chairman TAUZIN. [continuing] because we’ve used the wrong replacement tires. So the message I’m trying to say—and hopefully

NHTSA got it, and I think they did because we had some serious

conversations before this hearing today—is that we need NHTSA

immediately to assist both this committee and Mr. Nasser’s company with this analysis of—so they can announce publicly whether

any of the tires on the replacement list should be taken off the replacement list.

Mr. STUPAK. And if it’s not a recall and if Ford is doing this replacement program, then I think it’s only fair to give Ford, before

they even leave here today, all your data and your data analysis,

because this is not a recall, this is a replacement. They should have

it so they’re not back here doing another replacement.

Also, I guess if you’re asking NHTSA to do it, what other information does NHTSA need to make a sound, total judgment on this

incomplete information that’s being publicly released?

Chairman TAUZIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STUPAK. Yes.

Chairman TAUZIN. That’s the reason why I asked Mr. Nasser extensively, rather, what was requested by his own company and

what testing was done on these replacement tires. But if he does

not have the information, the raw data we have, we are more than

happy to share it with him. And you have copies of it. We have copies of it. We’ll make sure he has copies of it.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. So the information we’ve seen in the media

today, whether it’s the Detroit Free Press or the—— Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

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Mr. STUPAK. If I can just finish. The message—we want to clarify

or correct the information that these tires may not be more dangerous, that we need more information. So we should really correct

that information; correct, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman TAUZIN. I’m looking at the AP report. The only quote

contained in there that came from our committee spokesman was

that there are brands that have actually higher claims rates. That’s

all we know. There is no—if the AP story went on to draw the conclusions—that’s the AP writer. The only thing we know at this

point, the only thing that was reported and that has come out in

this hearing, is that there are tires that NHTSA has identified, and

now that our own staff have identified, that have higher claims

rate than 5 per million, and that obviously before those tires are

replaced, put on cars as replacement for other tires, somebody,

NHTSA, ought to give us some good information as to whether or

not that claims data is significant enough to make a difference.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Sawyer is

recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions, and they go to the question that—to the assertion that you

made earlier, Mr. Nasser, to the effect that you cannot go out and

test every tire on every vehicle. And I agree with that. That doesn’t

make any sense.

At the same time, in the letter that you’ve cited from Goodyear,

they suggest that there’s no desire, nor have manufacturers even

raised the question of tire manufacturers doing similar kinds of

testing of every tire on every vehicle. Should that be done? Or is

generic testing to different protocols by different tire manufacturers

sufficient to give you comfort into the future that the tires will perform as expected?

Mr. NASSER. I think it’s a combination of both, and there does

need to be much more communication, not only between the tire

manufacturer and the automotive manufacturer, but also information that comes from the field. And I think that’s what really drove

the TREAD Act of last year. We support it. We welcome it. And—

but whatever we do, it must be based on tires that have high quality levels and that have the technology that is appropriate for today’s driving conditions.

Mr. SAWYER. That brings me to my second question. You’ve hit

it squarely on the button. Earlier you had said that the exchange

of information with regard to the changing weight of the vehicle

and the suspension of the vehicle was not significant. It may have

been; it may not have been. I’m not going to argue that today. But

you also talked about the fact that a number of the tires that have

exactly the same designation may not be the same tire, and the

truth of the matter is that tires evolve over the life of a product

as well.

Should there be requirements, protocols under NHTSA, for the

exchange of information as products evolve in their design throughout their useful life?

Mr. NASSER. I strongly believe that if tire manufacturers change

the design of a tire, then they should inform the vehicle manufacturer. As a matter of fact, with our purchase order we make it very

99

clear that any changes to the design of a tire should be communicated to the vehicle manufacturer.

Mr. SAWYER. Should the same thing apply to you in the other direction?

Mr. NASSER. I think it does, but I certainly think it should be in

both ways. It should be a dialog, not one way.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. My colleagues, I believe we have expired all the

second round. So, Mr. Nasser, sincerely and on behalf of the full

committee—subcommittee—both myself and Mr. Greenwood, we

thank you sincerely for staying with us and your forthright answers. And now we’ll move to panel No. 2. Thank you.

Mr. NASSER. Thank you very much.

Mr. STEARNS. Panel No. 2 is Mr. John Lampe, President and

Chief Executive Officer, Bridgestone/Firestone. Mr. Lampe, you’re

welcome. Let me just say to my colleagues that—so we can continue to go on, I urge them to ask the questions. If perhaps you

have desire for colloquy, that we could perhaps move that member

to member, and we can continue on with the questions here so that

we can get through to our third panel, which is also patiently waiting.

And so with that, Mr. Lampe, at your convenience, we’ll welcome

your opening statement.

You are aware that the committee is holding an investigative

hearing, and in doing so has had the practice of taking testimony

under oath. Do you have any objections to testifying under oath?

Mr. LAMPE. No, sir.

Mr. STEARNS. The Chair then advises you that under the rules

of the House and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be

advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during

your testimony today?

Mr. LAMPE. No, sir.

Mr. STEARNS. In that case, if you’d please raise your right hand,

I’ll swear you in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. STEARNS. You are now under oath. You may now give a 5-

minute summary of your opening statement.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN LAMPE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC.

Mr. LAMPE. Chairman Stearns, Chairman Tauzin, and distinguished committee members, I am John Lampe, and I am the CEO

of Bridgestone/Firestone. First I’d like to thank you for holding this

hearing and inviting me to testify, and I appreciate the very hard

work on all these issues by the members of this committee, by the

other members, and by their staffs.

Mr. Chairman, it’s no secret that this year has been a struggle

for us. We’ve learned a lot since we were here the last time, and

some of it we’ve learned the hard way. But as a result, we’re more

responsive now to the American public, to our customers, to Congress, and to NHTSA. We’re doing what’s right. And our 45,000

employees are a great team. They’re fully committed to making

safe quality tires and to regaining the public’s trust. Yes, we’ve

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been hit hard, very hard, but I believe with all my heart we will

make it.

But let’s talk about our tires, and first let me assure you that

the Firestone tires that are on the road today are completely safe,

and our real world data proves that.

The 13 million tires that Ford is replacing have a claims rate of

.0009 percent. That’s 9 out of every 1 million tires. And most of

these claims are on the Ford Explorer. The identical tire on the

Ford—is on the Ford Ranger, and yet the tread separation claims

on the Ranger, exact tire, is 8 times less than that of the same tire

on the Explorer. And if that weren’t enough, Wilderness AT tires

on General Motor’s vehicles have only 2 tread separation claims on

3.1 million tires that we’ve supplied General Motors. And these 2

claims were minor, minor property damage claims, did not result

in accidents.

Also, several million of these tires that Ford is replacing under

their program have never, ever had a claim. And the bottom line,

replacing good tires with other tires, is a diversionary tactic and it

won’t increase or improve customer safety.

We’ve also conducted an extensive array of scientific tests comparing our tires to our competitor tires. And this testing supports

the data we see from the real world. We perform peal tests to

measure the amount of force it takes to tear apart the two steel

belts. We conducted Society of Automotive Engineer high-speed

tests, and we performed belt-edge temperature tests to see if the

internal temperature of the tires are the same as those other tires

in the marketplace. And these are just some of the tests we’ve performed. But in every test, the Wilderness AT tires performed within industry norms, oftentimes outperforming our rivals. Our testing

confirms what we’ve been saying all along: Our tires are safe, and

we have the tests. We have the real world data to prove it.

But now let’s compare our testing to Ford’s testing of the tires.

We use standard industry testing procedures. Ford, on the other

hand, did not; and what little they’ve shared with us reveals that

Ford’s testing of tires and our tires was, at best, unscientific; and,

at worst, misleading. Ford took new Goodyear tires and compared

them with old Firestone tires, some of which were 9 years old. But

when you take and compare the same age of tires—Firestone tires

versus the Goodyear tires from Ford’s own data—we are as good

as our competition, and in many cases better.

Ford talked about tire temperatures, and Ford ignored, though,

the internal temperature of a tire, the temperature that is very important when looking at such things as tread separations. Ford

chose to use surface temperatures. We don’t know why. It has no

correlation to internal temperature. And as the Wall Street Journal

reported, Ford did not use the same inflation pressure and loads

when testing Firestone tires against Goodyear tires. We heard two

or three times this morning about apples to apples. I think we need

an apples-to-apples comparison here as well.

And finally, Ford’s protections of future Firestone tire failures

are purely speculative. They’re not based on real world data. Yes,

with these hazard plots, you can make those lines go anywhere you

want, based on the assumptions you use.

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And next, Mr. Chairman, I must say—and this is not easy for me

to say as well—but there is something wrong with the Ford Explorer. The testing and accident data we have submitted prove it.

When I was here last year, I said to all of you that you could take

all our tires off the Ford Explorer and the Ford Explorer would

continue to roll over. And unfortunately, that’s exactly what’s happening.

But it didn’t have to be this way. We at Firestone asked Ford to

work with us so that we together could look at the tire—and we

looked at the tire a lot, but at the vehicle as well, and the tire vehicle interaction. But Ford refused, and we had no choice. We had

to go it alone. Ford left us no other option.

Mr. Chairman, these are the facts. The loss of a tread or air in

a tire shouldn’t cause a driver to lose control of his vehicle. The

driver should be able to pull over, not roll over. Even Ford’s own

export—expert car engineering agrees with that. Dr. Dennis Gunther is considered to be one of the most highly regarded, renowned

experts in vehicle dynamics, and he’s worked with NHTSA before,

and he’s worked for some of the automobile companies. And he

found that when a rear tire separates on some models of the Ford

Explorer, the vehicle goes from a slight understeer—and you talked

briefly about understeer, oversteer this morning—from a slight

understeer to an oversteer condition, where the rear tires can spin

out, just like you’ve experienced sometimes on ice. But the important thing, according to Dr. Gunther, it’s both the transition, transition from understeer to oversteer, and the oversteer itself that

often make it a dangerous situation for the average driver to be

able to maintain directional control on the Explorer at normal

highway speeds after a tire separation.

And the real world data supports Dr. Gunther’s finding. The

Florida traffic crash data base shows that for the 1994 through

2000 model year vehicles registered in Florida, the Explorer rolls

over twice as much as all other SUVs in single-vehicle, nontire-related accidents.

Mr. Chairman, last year this committee asked us why we didn’t

do more when we had reports of tread separations coming out of

Venezuela. Well, now there are new reports from the Venezuela

Consumer Protection Agency that the Explorer continues to roll

over with other brands of tires. In fact, since May of 2000, there

have been 43 judicially—judicially confirmed, certified Explorer

rollover crashes in Venezuela, and they’ve been on competitor tires.

In the last 10 days alone, there have been four people that have

been fatally injured in two separate Ford Explorer accidents in

Venezuela on different brands of tires, not ours.

Surely these warning signs can’t be ignored. As I’ve said before,

I said it last year, Ford can replace all the Wilderness AT tires on

our vehicle, but the Explorer will continue to roll over. We need to

understand why. And I know you want to understand why. We owe

it, I owe it, to the men and women who make our tires, to the

stores and dealers who sell our tires, and we all owe it to the people on the roads and the highways that drive on our tires. No one

cares more about safety than we do, and we’re doing our part.

We’re taking responsibility for our tires. We did a massive recall,

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and now we’re doing what’s right by asking the tough questions on

the Ford Explorer.

One of our Nation’s greatest industrial pioneers once said, don’t

find fault; find a remedy. Since the very beginning, Ford has only

wanted to find fault, blaming our tires. We, on the other hand,

have said that the vehicle tire interaction needs to be examined in

order to find a remedy. And, by the way, that great man that said

don’t find fault, find a remedy, was also Henry Ford.

I truly wish I could say with pride that Ford is still one of our

best customers, and I sincerely hope there comes a day when

Bridgestone/Firestone can do business with Ford again, but that

day won’t come until we answer the tough questions on the Explorer.

I would like to commend Chairman Tauzin for urging NHTSA to

examine the vehicle and the tire in a balanced way, because there

are very hard questions to be answered. Why is the Explorer so

much more likely to roll over in related crashes? If it’s just a tire

issue, why are Explorers continuing to roll over in Venezuela at

high numbers, even after Ford replaced all the Firestone tires?

Why is the Explorer harder to control than other SUVs after a

rear-tire separation? And why do our tires perform so well on other

vehicles?

Firestone will continue to work with the government to get the

answers the American public deserves to these and the other tough

questions. And I am glad to hear Mr. Nasser this morning and

Ford agree in the same spirit to support NHTSA’s investigation of

their vehicles.

Thank you again for inviting me here to testify, and Chairman

Stearns, using your words, I welcome the opportunity to answer

reasonable questions.

[The prepared statement of John Lampe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN LAMPE, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BRIDGESTONE/

FIRESTONE, INC.

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Stearns, Chairman Greenwood, Chairman Tauzin, and distinguished

Committee Members, I am John Lampe, CEO and President of Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. Since I appeared before this

Committee on September 21, 2000, much has happened. Our team at Bridgestone/

Firestone has been working vigorously to protect the safety and restore the trust

of our customers by assuring and enhancing the quality and performance of our

products. We have accomplished a great deal, and we have learned a great deal.

In my statement today, I would like to address the following four topics:

First, Firestone takes responsibility for the safety of its customers. We

have devoted all available resources and energy to the August 9, 2000 recall. We

conducted extensive research to determine the causes of tread separations and rollover crashes involving the Ford Explorer. We instituted targeted changes to improve

our products and we have enhanced our ability to monitor the performance of our

tires in the field.

Second, Firestone tires on the road today are safe. The recall of more of our

tires is not necessary and will not increase customer safety. I will present data that

prove our tires on the road today are every bit as safe as the comparable competitors’ tires on the roads today.

Third, to find the whole truth regarding Ford Explorer rollover crashes,

it is imperative that the Congress, the NHTSA, and the public examine the

vehicle issues as well as tire issues. I have said from the outset that no research, analysis or remedy for tire-related Explorer rollover crashes can be complete

without carefully addressing the contribution of vehicle characteristics. Today, I will

present claims data that show that the same tire on vehicles other than the ExVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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plorer performs quite well and that the tread separation rate, while still low, is elevated when that tire is on the Explorer. I will also present test data that precisely

identifies that characteristic of the Explorer which makes it extraordinarily prone

to rollover crashes in the event of a tread separation, an event that can happen with

any tire.

Finally, I want to take this public opportunity to make Firestone’s recommendations as to how drivers can help protect themselves against the possibility of serious

crashes like those that prompted the Committee to investigate this matter.

II. THE RECALL

Beginning on August 9, 2000, Firestone voluntarily recalled approximately 6.5

million P235/75R15 ATX and Decatur Wilderness AT tires fitted primarily on the

Ford Explorer family of vehicles. Our concern for the safety of our customers was

paramount, so we took this action before we knew what caused the increased rate

of tread separation claims. I am proud of the fact that our recall campaign was carried out very rapidly. From the date we announced the recall through January 2,

2001, we replaced 92 percent of the tires. As of today, more than 6.3 million tires

have been replaced, approximately 97 percent of the total number recalled. By any

measure, this is an outstanding performance, and one which reflects well on every

member of the Firestone team.

III. FIRESTONE TIRES ON THE ROAD TODAY ARE SAFE

On Monday, May 21, Firestone informed Ford Motor Company that it had no

choice but to terminate its almost 100-year relationship and stop supplying tires to

Ford. Firestone took this action because Ford simply refused to examine with Firestone what, if any, role the Ford Explorer had in the increased rate of tread separation claims and the subsequent rollovers that led to the catastrophic accidents. In

fact, in October 2000 I sent a letter to Mr. Nasser asking his cooperation into an

investigation of both the vehicle and the tire. Regrettably, Ford refused to jointly

investigate the vehicle.

On May 22, Ford announced it would unilaterally recall all Wilderness AT tires

fitted on Ford vehicles. We believe strongly that Ford’s action is motivated by a desire to divert attention from safety concerns of the Explorer. The data from both

testing and actual experience on the highways simply do not support Ford’s decision. Our tires on the road today are safe, and we do not intend to participate in

Ford’s unnecessary and deceptively motivated action.

Ford has claimed that Wilderness AT tires have higher rates of tread separation

than competitive tires. Ford would not share with us complete test data or actual

claims data on competitors’ tires. The data Ford did share with us shows that Ford

used grossly unscientific procedures in its testing. As a result, we have done our

own testing that I will summarize for you.

First, we tested ‘‘peel force,’’ the amount of force needed to tear the two steel belts

from a tire. We compared our tire with three major competitors’ tires that have also

been fitted to the Ford Explorer either as original equipment or a replacement tire.

As this chart (#1) shows, our tires out-performed two of the three competitors’ tires

in this test. The results were similar when we subjected the tires to high temperatures to simulate hot climate driving. (Chart #2)

Second, we conducted SAE high speed tests in which tires are intentionally run

to the point of failure on a machine that pushes tires beyond their limits. Once

again, the Wilderness AT outperformed several rivals and performed well within industry norms. (Chart #3)

Third, we performed vehicle tests where our tires were run on a test track mounted on a range of compact SUVs. With this test we measured the belt-edge temperature of each tire on each vehicle after identical test cycles. (Chart #4) This test

clearly shows that our tires were most heavily loaded on the Explorer. Additionally,

other tests were performed on the 1997 Ford Explorer with a variety of competitor

tires. The belt edge temperatures were measured and clearly show that damaging

temperature increases at lower inflation pressures were greatest on the Explorer

(Chart #5). These tests again revealed that the Wilderness AT is an excellent performer, better than many rival products, and well within industry norms. But these

tests also further suggest an Explorer issue.

In contrast, Ford’s ‘‘rig’’ testing is grossly unscientific and must be disregarded.

First, to test our tires, Ford used aged spare tires compared with new tires from

our competitors. Indeed, some of the Firestone tires tested were nine years old. It

is well known that tires naturally degrade over time, regardless of whether they are

used on vehicles. The rubber in tires begins to degrade as soon as it leaves the

plant. When you factor out the old Firestone tires that Ford tested, and just comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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pare our new tires with the competitors’ new tires, even Ford’s results show that

our tires are as good as the competition! Second, Ford used surface temperature

testing as opposed to internal temperature testing, the latter of which is needed to

detect thermal conditions related to belt separation. No respected organization

measures the surface temperature of tires to determine the likelihood of belt separation. Given these examples, it is no surprise that Ford refused to share all of its

data with Firestone.

Now let’s look at real world performance. A comparison of Wilderness AT performance tires fitted on the Explorer and other vehicles shows that tread separations

with our tire happen disproportionately on the Explorer. We sold the same tires to

Ford, designed and built to the identical specifications, for both the Explorer and

the Ranger pickup truck. Claims for tread separation on the Explorer were as much

as eight times greater in number than on the Ranger. (Chart #6)

These results are for the same tires on two different Ford vehicles. In fact, at the

time of shipment, we do not know which of our individual tires sent to Ford are

to be mounted on which vehicle. The fact that the very same tire performs so differently on these two vehicles is proof positive that there is something at work here

other than a tire issue. Again, it is no wonder why Ford refused to give us production data for the Ranger for nearly six months. As soon as we received the required

data from Ford this spring, the data convinced us that something about the Explorer

must account for the high number of tire failures and subsequent rollover accidents.

Real world claims data provide further evidence of the Explorer’s extraordinary

history of tread separation claims. For example, our ATX tires sold as original

equipment on the Explorer were also sold as replacement tires for a broad range

of similar vehicles from other manufacturers. Over seven years, there were six times

as many tread separation claims for the Ford Explorer, within the replacement tire

population that included other vehicles, than there were for other vehicles (claims

per 100,000 tires). (Chart #7) Again, the very same tire failed at a greatly higher

rate on the Explorer.

Ford also claims that its successful experience with Goodyear tires on the Explorer proves the need for its further recall of Wilderness tires. Once again, Ford

has misused data to produce a conclusion that supports its false statements. For example, it directly compares Firestone and Goodyear claims without mentioning that

a greater number of Firestone-equipped Explorers were shipped to hot weather

states where the tires were pushed to extremes and tread separation occurred.

(Chart #8) Ford states that there were only two claims for tread separation on Goodyear tires. News reports alone tell us there have been at least 13 incidents involving

tread separations of Goodyear and other manufacturers’ tires followed by Explorer

rollover crashes. But we don’t have to rely on news reports alone. Ford’s own internal document—identified as Document 54 in last fall’s hearing—states that Ford

knew of the possibility of at least 10 tread separations on Goodyear tires (Attachment 1) and physical evidence of these separations is readily available (Attachment

2). In fact, while Ford would have you believe that tread separations are proof of

defect, and that only Firestone tires experience tread separations, the reality is

quite different. (Attachments 3 and 3A) All tire manufacturers, including Goodyear,

acknowledge that tires are not indestructible, that tread separations are the most

common form of a tire disablement and that a tread separation is not evidence of

a defect.

Ford has also attempted to cloud the issue of the durability of our tires by making

unsubstantiated allegations regarding construction. But again, whether is the thickness of the wedge material at the belt edge (Chart #9) or claims about our materials, the data shows our tires are as good or better than the competition.

Ford’s comparison of Firestone to Goodyear is further flawed by the inclusion of

claims associated with the 6.5 million tires recalled by Firestone last year. Ford’s

use of claims on those tires to characterize tires on the road today is patently false

and misleading.

The rationale and data put forward by Ford to explain its current recall of Wilderness AT tires is unsupported by test data, by real world experience, and by Ford’s

own statements about the tires. Ford’s selective use of data, biased test procedures

and contradictory statements show that its recall is at best a poorly documented

public relations exercise designed to protect the image of a profitable product that

represents approximately 1⁄3 of every profit dollar—the Explorer. I am deeply concerned that this campaign at Ford is also an attempt to scapegoat our tires by falsely

alarming consumers about their safety. In the process, Ford may be hiding from consumers, regulators, and Congress some very real safety problems of their vehicle

which should be addressed honestly and seriously.

Mr. Chairman, the extensive testing data and the voluminous record of real world

performance of our tires shows that they are safe. There is no need for a recall of

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those tires. However, there is a need for industry and government to work together

honestly to continue to improve safety for the motoring public.

IV. THE VEHICLE

The tire and the vehicle must be regarded as a system. We have consistently

urged Congress, the NHTSA, and Ford to look at this phenomenon in a balanced

way—that is, to look at both the tire and the vehicle. Indeed, on October 23, 2000,

I wrote Mr. Nasser a letter asking his support for a joint investigation into both

the tire and the vehicle. However, Ford has refused to work with us to examine the

vehicle and tire as a system. They have steadfastly urged Congress, the NHTSA,

and the American public to consider this strictly a tire issue and not a vehicle issue.

We have had a growing and ultimately overwhelming conviction that tire design

and manufacturing issues alone simply cannot account for what has been happening

with the Explorer. There is no doubt that tire failures have become relatively rare

in the past few decades. Still, cars and trucks are equipped with spare tires, jacks

and lug wrenches precisely because when a tire fails, for whatever reason, auto

manufacturers contemplate you will be alive to change your tire when you need to.

We must ask ourselves why are tire failures on the Ford Explorer all too often not

a benign event, but often a catastrophic one? Why is it that, if a rear tire separates

on an Explorer, the driver often loses control and crashes? We couldn’t help but

think that this should not be happening; a driver should be able to pull over, not

roll over.

Since Ford was unwilling to participate in a joint analysis of its product, we were

forced to conduct our own research into the role of the vehicle. A survey of what

we have learned about the vehicle is found at Attachment 4 (Analysis of the Ford

Explorer). Our root cause analysis made clear that vehicle weight and low inflation

pressure are very significant factors that can lead to tread separations. The Explorer is a heavy vehicle and Ford recommended the bare minimum inflation pressure of 26 PSI. In short, Ford designed the Explorer with minimal reserve load.

As part of our root cause analysis, we learned that, in fact, in 1995, Ford increased the weight of some models of the Model Year 1996 Explorer by over 600

pounds from the initial weight when the Explorer was first introduced. (Charts #10

and #11) In this respect, it is no surprise that the 1996 Explorer is the vehicle that

appears most often in the claims and lawsuits alleging a tread separation. As everyone now knows, tires can lose as much as 1 psi per month. Ford’s recommendation

of a 26 PSI inflation pressure diminished the load reserve of the Explorer and its

tires to an unacceptable level (Chart #12). Our analysis shows that the tire inflation

safety factor for the Explorer is far below that of other popular SUVs we examined.

Given the combination of a heavy vehicle with minimal inflation pressure, it

stands to reason that the tire failure rate on the Explorer would be higher than

other SUVs. This is exactly what the data shows. As I stated above, the Wilderness

AT tires that Ford is replacing are performing well. The relatively few claims that

exist stem almost exclusively from tires fitted on Ford Explorers. Based on these

facts, it is apparent that there are vehicle issues at work here.

Moreover, when a tread does separate from a tire, the separation itself ordinarily

does not have a catastrophic effect on the vehicle. There is no explosion or impact

that radically upsets the attitude or direction of the vehicle. Engineers think of

tread separation in three phases, pre-separation, separation, and post-separation. In

pre-separation, the tire becomes out-of-round due to the tread beginning to detach.

The irregular shape of the tire creates a vibration in the vehicle, warning the driver

that a tire failure is occurring. This ordinarily signals a driver to reduce power and

beginning pulling off the road.

The separation event itself often creates a loud noise, as the tread flaps against

the vehicle’s bodywork before becoming entirely detached. Despite the noise, forces

imparted to the vehicle are minimal. The tire casing is normally intact and remains

inflated. The driver should be able to maintain control of the vehicle with very

slight steering inputs. Carr Engineering, who performed tread separation tests for

Ford, compared these steering inputs to those made to correct for wind gusts or

when encountering water puddles on the highway. The overwhelming scientific literature agrees with Carr Engineering on this point.

In the post-separation phase, the vehicle is continuing on the roadway with three

intact tires and one tire, which, while still inflated and supporting the vehicle’s

weight, lacks its tread. Normally, nothing catastrophic occurs here, and the driver

is easily able to maintain control.

The real world data shows that with the Explorer, the occupants are at much

greater risk than in comparable SUVs. An analysis of the Florida Traffic Crash

Database for Explorer Model Years 1994-2000 shows that in a single-vehicle, tireVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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related highway accident, the Explorer rolls over at nearly four times the rate of

other comparable SUVs. The rate of fatalities in single vehicle highway incidents

is nearly twice that of other comparable SUVs. (Charts #13 and #14) Still additional

analysis of the Florida data shows that the Explorer rolls over at nearly twice the

rate of all other mid-size SUVs in a single-vehicle, non-tire-related highway accidents (Chart #15). A summary of this information is contained in ‘‘Florida Crash,

Rollover, and Fatal Accident Rates Based on Vehicle Registrations’’ at Attachment

5. These analyses clearly suggest that there is a vehicle issue at work here.

Ford’s own engineering documents show that Ford was acutely aware, as early as

1981, of the critical handling requirements for sport utility vehicles such as the Explorer. Ford’s experience with the rollover-prone Bronco II, the Explorer’s predecessor, proved that special attention must be given to SUV handling to avoid rollovers. Ford recognized that keeping the vehicle axis parallel to the direction of travel is essential to reducing rollover accidents. Any design that allows an SUV to turn

sideways to the direction of travel would greatly increase the chance for a rollover.

This could be avoided by giving the driver safe handling qualities that maximize the

chances of maintaining directional control.

Automotive engineers, including Ford’s, intentionally incorporate a handling property called ‘‘understeer’’ in their vehicle design to help drivers maintain directional

control. Understeer is a forgiving, predictable, handling characteristic and its effect

is to provide predictable, progressive response to steering inputs. To turn the vehicle

harder, or at a higher rate of lateral acceleration, the driver need only turn the

wheel farther.

The opposite of understeer is oversteer. When engineers say a vehicle is oversteering they are talking about a circumstance where the rear wheels are not tracking the front wheels and the back end of the vehicle swings around. Engineers describe an oversteer vehicle as directionally unstable. Trying to steer a directionally

unstable vehicle characteristically causes it to spinout. That is a perilous position

for a vehicle with a rollover tendency.

We have studied internal Ford engineering analyses of Explorer handling made

throughout the vehicle’s design and development. (Attachment 6) Many compromises were made to give the truck-based Explorer a softer, car-like ride, and

these compromises may have also had the undesirable effect of reducing understeer

and increasing significantly the amount of oversteer in the Explorer after a tire

problem. The shift from understeer to a significant oversteer could cause drivers to

lose control of Explorers following tread separations. The analysis of Dr. Dennis

Guenther, a renowned vehicle dynamics engineer at Ohio State University who was

hired by Firestone’s defense counsel in October 2000, proves that this is often what

happens to Explorers.

In the course of Dr. Guenther’s work, it became clear that an analysis of the Explorer’s handling dynamics in tread separations would help us understand why all

of these accidents were occurring. In May 2001, at Firestone’s request, Dr. Guenther

began a series of tests of SUV handling at the Transportation Research Center

(TRC) in East Liberty, Ohio. The tests were designed to examine the controllability

of the Explorer and that of comparable SUVs, following a tread separation. The

tests conducted to date evaluated 1996 4x2, four-door Explorer handling compared

with that of the popular Jeep Cherokee and the Chevrolet Blazer. The tests that

were conducted are universally recognized, standard tests used by automobile manufacturers, including Ford. A detailed description of the tests and their results is

found at Attachment 7.

The results of these tests were both enlightening and deeply disturbing. Dr. Guenther determined that with a tread separation of a rear tire, the Explorer becomes

an oversteering vehicle in most situations, while the other tested SUV’s maintain

a safe reserve of understeer. The driver of an Explorer with four intact tires has

the benefit of a small margin of understeer to provide predictable handling. When

that same driver experiences an otherwise benign tread separation event, he must

maintain control of a vehicle whose handling characteristics have suddenly and profoundly changed. As noted previously, the rear end of the now-oversteering vehicle

has a tendency to swing toward the outside of a turn, and the driver may be completely unprepared to react appropriately. This chain-of-events typically results in

a spinout, which is a perilous position for a vehicle, like the Explorer, with a rollover tendency.

The other SUVs tested by Dr. Guenther never became oversteer vehicles. Tread

separation reduced the understeer of these vehicles somewhat, but there was still

a significant reserve to maintain predictable handling. The differences measured are

substantial. For example, the Cherokee with a separated rear tire still has more

understeer than an Explorer with four good tires. (Charts #16 and #17)

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As I explained, the findings of Dr. Guenther concerning the handling deficiencies

of the Explorer are supported by the real world data. If we need any further proof

that the Explorer’s handling should be evaluated, we need look no further than Venezuela. Plagued with reports of rollover crashes in that country, Ford engineers in

1999 questioned why only their vehicles ‘‘suffer accidents’’ while other Firestoneshod SUVs did not. Ford, in an effort to stem the accidents, offered to sell consumers suspension upgrades to improve stability, and later replaced all Firestone

tires with other brands. Even so, since May 2000, there have been 43 judicially confirmed Explorer rollover crashes in Venezuela—all of them on competitor’s tires.

(Chart #18) In the last 10 days alone, four people in Venezuela have died in Ford

Explorer rollover accidents. The two vehicles involved in these accidents were

equipped with competing tire brands. The Venezuelan Consumer protection agency

has contemplated having the Explorer banned from the country.

Last fall Firestone was roundly criticized by this Committee for not acting when

faced with data coming out of Venezuela and other countries. Indeed, at this Committee’s urging, Congress passed the TREAD Act largely in response to that very

situation. Shame on us now if, just a few months later, we ignore new data coming

out of Venezuela and do not adequately investigate the Explorer. Perhaps Ford will

be more responsive to requests from this Committee for accident and claims data

relating to the Venezuelan Explorer rollovers...they have steadfastly refused to

give that information to Bridgestone/Firestone.

As the Committee is aware, we took the initial findings of Dr. Guenther’s research

to the NHTSA as soon as the tests were complete. On May 31, 2001, I met with

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and Acting NHTSA Administrator Robert

Shelton to discuss these findings. I discussed with the NHTSA the need for a thorough investigation of the Ford Explorer. We did this, not because we are having a

feud with Ford Motor Company. We acted because of our overriding concern for

safety. We believe that to truly protect the public, safety investigations must identify and evaluate all of the factors that contribute to accidents.

V. CONCLUSION

To date, the Federal Government has focused almost solely on the tire, and we

accept that scrutiny of our products. But the data and Dr. Guenther’s report show

that the problem is not nearly so simple. There are critical aspects of vehicle handling that contribute powerfully to the risk of rollover crashes following tread separations.

For the Committee’s consideration in reviewing this matter, we have attached additional relevant data and information at Attachment 8.

We are not asking the NHTSA or Congress to make a conclusive judgement based

on our ongoing study. We are asking that the NHTSA view this study as proof that

there are vehicle issues at work here. These vehicle issues call out for scrutiny.

I want to again commend the Committee and staff for its hard work and persistence in investigating the causes of these rollover accidents. The public has a right

to a thorough analysis of this problem with the full cooperation of affected companies. We have an obligation to provide that cooperation even when, and especially

when, it might disclose problems with our products. Your oversight will help to assure that this occurs.

The timing of today’s hearing, at the beginning of the summer driving season, provides us with an important opportunity to educate the driving public about how

they can assure safe highway travel. Let me conclude by providing two recommendations from Firestone:

First, do think about your tires, whatever brand they are. Make sure they are always properly inflated. And ask your tire dealer to examine them for damage

if you have any doubts.

Second, avoid overloading your vehicle, as this can both upset its handling and exceed the capacity of its tires. Again, the vehicle manufacturer’s recommendations should be followed carefully.

Thank you again for inviting me to appear. I look forward to answering your questions.

ANALYSIS OF THE FORD EXPLORER

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this analysis is to address the myth with respect to the Ford Explorer that rollover crashes that occur following a tread separation are attributable

in any way to tire design or tire manufacturing. In fact, as the data presented in

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this analysis conclusively demonstrate, tire issues can not account for the high risk

and rate of Ford Explorer rollover crashes. This analysis concludes that, based on

the design and development of the Explorer, real world data on Explorer control

problems, an engineering analysis of the Explorer, and the substance of Ford’s own

presentation to NHTSA concerning Explorer vehicle dynamics, the rollover problem

is rooted in the Explorer, not tires.

A. Design and Development

For 20 years Ford engineers have known that so-called ‘‘understeer’’ is the primary vehicle design factor that prevents vehicle rollover and that an ‘‘oversteering’’

vehicle can and likely will result in loss of control that foreseeably could lead to a

rollover and other accidents. In fact, Ford engineers recommended to management

major changes to the suspension, engine height and track width of the Explorer to

increase understeer in all conditions and to increased Explorer rollover resistance.

Ford management ignored or rejected these recommendations.

Instead, Ford decided to create a public relations ‘‘image’’ for the Explorer as a

safe vehicle. The Company manipulated the rollout of the Explorer, including its design and testing, solely to get the new vehicle to ‘‘look’’ or ‘‘seem’’ like it was stable,

and regardless of the effect such manipulations might have on controllability. By

putting profits and public relations image in front of sound engineering principles,

Ford caused two catastrophic consequences. First, Ford reduced the margin of safety

for tires that it specified to Firestone, causing the rare but now highly publicized

phenomenon of tread separations on Explorers. Second, because of the vehicle’s design, the Explorer, following a tread separation, immediately transitions to an

oversteer truck that is likely to go out of control and roll over. Ford’s flawed decisions are confirmed by real world data.

B. Real World Data

As the following data suggest, the Explorer rollover problem is not a case of a

‘‘bad tire,’’ but of a vehicle control problem:

1) Wilderness AT 15’’ tires provided to General Motors and not recalled last year

have only 2 tread separation claims on 3.1 million tires.

2) The non-recalled Wilderness AT 15’’ tires have a tread separation claims rate

eight times higher on the Explorer than on the Ford Ranger. The tires on each

are exactly the same.

3) The total number of tread separation claims and lawsuits for the 13 million tires

Ford is replacing is 118, less than 10 parts per million or 0.0009%, which provides no rationale, other than a suspect one, for Ford’s $3 billion replacement

campaign.

4) Based on the Florida Traffic Crash Database, the odds of an Explorer rolling over

in a single-vehicle highway tire-related incident are 4.35 compared to 1.92 odds

for comparable SUVs. The odds ratio of a fatality occurring in such an accident

is nearly three times greater with the Explorer according to Florida data, and

four times greater according to Texas data.

This data proves that the Explorer, in single vehicle, tire related highway incidents simply does not perform as safely as its competitors, which is confirmed and

explained by the recent engineering analysis conducted by Dr. Dennis A. Guenther.

C. Engineering Analysis

According to a recent engineering analysis conducted by Dr. Dennis A. Guenther,

a Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Ohio State University, the Explorer is

often an oversteer vehicle after it experiences tread separation, which makes the

Explorer vehicle directionally unstable and subject to loss of control in the hands

of most drivers. Dr. Guenther’s analysis found that:

1) Explorer models he has tested, as designed, have a significantly lower amount

of understeer—less than half as much—than the other SUVs he evaluated.

2) The Explorer loses much of its small margin of understeer when it is loaded to

gross vehicle weight rating—the other SUVs do not.

3) The Explorer models tested, unlike other SUVs tested, lose all of their understeer

and become oversteer vehicles in most circumstances following tread separation

on a left rear tire, the predominant tire position in Explorer tread separation

crashes the other SUVs do not.

4) An oversteer vehicle is extremely difficult for most drivers to control, particularly

at interstate highway speeds where it can become directionally unstable.

Dr. Guenther concludes that the oversteer problem in the Explorer should be reported as a safety defect within the meaning of the National Highway Traffic and

Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Ford Explorer rollover phenomenon is the result of a vehiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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1Ford Program Report 000000393-98, ‘‘Roll Over Stability,’’ February 3, 1981. 2 Id.

3Ford engineering document EXP3 1107, ‘‘Subject: UN46 Handling/Stability Status.’’ 4 Ford engineering document EXP4 1581-84, ‘‘Proposed UN-46 Chassis Design Modifications.’’ 5Ford document EXPI 0622, email from White to Houston, September 11, 1989.

6Ford engineering document EXP3 1108, ‘‘Subject: 1990 Explorer Handling Stability.’’

cle problem not a tire problem, and should be regarded as a safety defect within

the meaning of the National Highway Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

D. Misleading Ford Filing to NHTSA

Ford’s March 2001 filing with the NHTSA concerning the Explorer’s loss of control

following a tread separation contains inaccuracies and misinformation that reinforces Ford’s irresponsible reaction to the rollover problem, as the following component of that filing suggests.

Ford suggested in its filing to the NHTSA that tread separation is a ‘‘fundamental cause’’ of loss of vehicle control that ‘‘overwhelms differences in design among vehicle claims or within vehicle classes,’’ and that, in this setting, ‘‘Explorers perform

like all other vehicles.’’ Ford based that statement, however, on a so-called high lateral acceleration maneuver, where most drivers do not operate their vehicles. In fact,

the maneuver most often used to correct for the small event of drag following a

tread separation or in bringing a vehicle to the shoulder is a very small steer input

resulting in a so-called low lateral acceleration maneuver, even at highway speeds.

In such a normal driving maneuver, Explorers do not perform like other vehicles,

since they lack the necessary margin of understeer to remain directionally controllable in highway maneuvers involved in normal driving.

E. Conclusion

Taken together, these factors provide disturbing evidence that Ford, when given

the opportunity to act responsibly to ensure the safety and stability of the Explorer,

has acted instead to shift blame and obfuscate the facts concerning the safety of its

best selling vehicle. As the following analysis confirms, the rollover phenomenon is

a vehicle problem that requires forthright and responsible investigation.

II. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPLORER

A. Introduction

Ford engineers have known for over 20 years that the most important vehicle

characteristic in maintaining control and reducing SUV propensity for rollover is

understeer. The company’s engineering documents identify understeer as a ‘‘first

order effect’’ and the ‘‘primary factor influencing roll-over propensity.’’ 1 The problem

with an oversteering vehicle, in terms of rollover propensity, is that it can and likely

will result in the back end of the vehicle coming around—a loss of control—with the

vehicle ending up sideways to its path of travel. The resultant side forces (‘‘lateral

acceleration’’ in engineering terms) are what bring about rollover.2

Ford also recognized that the rollover stability of a vehicle is affected by its stability index, the relationship of center of gravity height and the track width of the

vehicle. In light of these vehicle control and stability principles, Ford engineers

adopted a ‘‘handling strategy’’ with respect to the Explorer to ‘‘increase understeer

in all conditions’’, 3 and they recommended to Ford management major changes to

the suspension, reduction in the engine height to lower center of gravity, and increase in the track width of the vehicle to make the Explorer more resistant to rollover than the Bronco II.4

Ford’s knowledge of the critical importance of understeer was not acted upon,

however, and Ford management rejected the center of gravity and track width recommendations of its engineers that would have made the Explorer more resistant

to rollover.

Rather than doing what good engineering required to make the Explorer safe,

with an acceptable margin of control Ford decided on a course of creating a public

relations ‘‘image’’ for the Explorer as a safe vehicle. It did this by making a vehicle

that could pass so-called ‘‘J-Turn’’ and ‘‘Consumer Union’’ lane change tests, even

though it knew and took the position internally that the maneuvers in those tests

were ‘‘not representative of what is happening in the real world.’’ 5 It also decided

to rely on the less aggressive driving habits of members of the family car market

into which it sold the Explorer to give the vehicle a statistics-based ‘‘image’’ of rollover safety in spite of the stability shortcomings of the vehicle.6

Unfortunately for Firestone’s reputation, Ford carried out the design tradeoffs and

manipulations required for the public relations image it sought primarily by letting

air out of the Explorer’s tires. In a 1989 Development Report on ‘‘Suspension DevelVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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7Ford engineering document EXPU 1458-60, ‘‘Development Report.’’ See also, Ford engineering document EXPT 1497-1503, ‘‘Development Report.’’ 8See, e.g., Ford engineering document EXP4 1273-74, ‘‘Subject: UN46 status.’’ 9See, e.g., Ford engineering document EXP4 0193, ‘‘UN46 Analysis.’’ See also Id. 10See, e.g., Ford media relations document EXP4 1280-84, ‘‘Explorer Q&A.’’

11See Ford document 000012766-67, memorandum from Snodgrass to Bacigalupi and Vought,

September 3, 1986. See also note 5. 12See Ford document 000012765, memorandum from Bacigalupi to Snodgrass, September 5,

1986. 13Ford document 000008940, memorandum from Bacigalupi to White, October 6, 1986. 14See note 6. 15 Id.

opment Status,’’ after noting that they had investigated variations in tire pressure

‘‘as means to achieving the UN46 [Explorer] ride and handling objective,’’ Ford engineers recommended use of ‘‘reductions in tire pressure to meet the program objectives’’ for both ride and handling.7

Similarly, in addressing rollover stability, Ford engineers adopted a ‘‘strategy’’ of

limiting cornering capacity of the large tires demanded by the Ford marketing department by, again, reducing air pressure.8

When it came to creating understeer, the Ford engineers again turned to lower

tire pressure.9

By putting profits and public relations image in front of sound engineering principles, Ford caused two catastrophic consequences. First, Ford reduced the margin

of safety for the tires that it specified to Firestone, contributing to the rare but now

highly publicized phenomenon of tread separations on Explorers. Second, because of

the vehicle’s design, the Explorer, following a rear tire tread separation, immediately transitions to an oversteer truck that is likely to go out of control and roll

over in the hands of the ordinary driver.

B. Development of the Explorer

1. Initial Design Flaws Based on Bronco II and Tire Manipulations—Ford’s internal documents describe the Explorer as a new and freshened Bronco II. Ford initially intended to continue using the Bronco II name, but decided to change the

name to Explorer when the Bronco II came under fire for rollover problems and

Ford sought to distance itself from criticisms of the Bronco II.10

As early as 1986, Ford engineers started playing with tire sizes to address rollover

stability, rather than making more fundamental changes in their vehicles. Ford engineers labeled the P195 tires as the ‘‘base tire’’ on the Bronco II to achieve a satisfactory ‘‘stability index’’ because the Bronco II with P215 tires, which it sold as an

option tire on the Bronco II, could not pass Ford’s rollover stability tests.11 One Ford

engineer questioned this approach: ‘‘Shouldn’t we be looking at more permanent

ways of improving the stability index of Bronco II other than small tires?’’ 12 Another

Ford engineering document explained that the company chose to play with tire size

rather than spend the time and money to create a truly safer vehicle:

Stability index requirements are always tied to base vehicle (this decision was

reached with help of OGC [Office of the General Counsel]). Since the P215

pushes the stability index below the accepted minimum of 2.1, the suspension

guys felt they need to retain a tire that has the minimum S.I. Better alternatives to tire size are for example

—lowering vehicle

—lowering CG by adding weight low in vehicle

Cost and timing implications of these kind of actions have always stalled them

in their tracks to White.13

In designing the Explorer, Ford stuck with the basic Bronco II frame and suspension, and utilized the same philosophy of playing with tires to address rollover stability concerns. As a result, the Explorer shared virtually the same track width,

high engine mount, obsolete suspension, and elevated center of gravity as its parent

vehicle, the Bronco II. ‘‘[G]iven the fundamental constraints imposed by the vehicle

package and suspension ‘type’ ’’ carried over from the Bronco II, Ford struggled to

reduce the Explorer’s rollover propensity; 14 most of Ford’s struggles involved specifying the tires rather than changing the vehicle.

2. Explorer Testing—Unrealistic Measure of Vehicle Safety—Ford required that

the Explorer pass ‘‘J-Turn tests,’’ an unrealistic maneuver invented by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety in the early 1980s, before being released for production.15 A ‘‘J-Turn test’’ is an extreme turn at a given rate speed (usually 45 or

60 mph), and an evaluation of whether the vehicle’s tires lift off the ground. In addition, while not a formal requirement, the Consumer Union’s lane-change rollover

111

16 Id. 17See note 1. 18Ford document EXPT 1047-49, memorandum from Figliomeni to Avouris, November 29,

1988. 19Ford document EXPU 1959, memorandum from Figliomeni to Avouris, February 3, 1989. 20Ford document EXP7 2273, memorandum from Figliomeni to Avouris [undated]. 21Ford document EXPU 9476-78, ‘‘Development Report.’’ 22See Ford document EXPT 1168, email from Avouris to Campbell, March 8, 1989. 23Ford document EXP4 1276, memorandum from Starr to Avouris and Campbell, May 10,

1989. 24See Ford document EXPT 0785-86, ‘‘UN46 Development Status.’’; see also Ford document

EXPT 0569, ‘‘Subject: 1990° UN-46 Chassis Revisions and Tire Availability,’’ July 6, 1989. 25See deposition of Thomas B. Baughman in Bailey v. Ford Motor Company, at 78-81. 26See Ford document EXPT 0570-71, email from Stornant to Campbell, June 23, 1989. 27See, e.g., Ford document EXP2 1578, ‘‘Inter-office Memorandum,’’ June 9, 1987. 28See, e.g., Ford document EXPN 0175, at 0180-81, ‘‘Dealer Launch and Resource Guide.’’;

Ford document 000057450-52, Ford press release. 29See, e.g.,note 24.

stability test ‘‘became an implicit requirement for the Explorer due to the potential

for adverse publicity’’ if it failed.16

Because of these image and litigation-driven requirements, the development of the

Explorer turned into a story of tweaking the vehicle and the tires in an attempt

to pass these tests, while at the same time providing a softer rider acceptable to

Ford’s target marketing group—families. Even though Ford’s internal documents

had identified understeer as the most important vehicle handling characteristic in

maintaining directional control and reducing rollover exposure, 17 the design tradeoffs made by Ford to pass J-Turn and Consumer Union tests did not address or seek

to increase understeer and the degradation they caused in the vehicles control

charicteristics.

In late 1988, more than a year before the Explorer’s spring 1990 introduction,

computer modeling showed that ‘‘the vehicle still has 2 wheel lift no matter what

tire is on it, 225/70, 215/75 or 205/75.’’ 18 In February 1989, the computer simulation

continued to show unacceptable rollover performance with certain P245 and P225

tires.19 The result remained poor in computer simulations after lowering the rear

of the vehicle by one-half inch with 26 psi in the tires.20

Undeterred by these results, Ford management concluded in late February 1989

that with 26 psi in the P235 and P245 tires, and tweaks to the suspension, stabilizer bar and a one-half inch reduction in rear ride height, the Explorer would

meet its handling objectives.21

Ford then tried every trick in the book to get the vehicle to pass the J-turn test,

including in one March 1989 simulation placing all four test dummies on the vehicle’s floor to lower the vehicle’s center of gravity. The Explorer still failed the test.22

Later in March 1989, the Explorer failed J-Turn tests with a variety of tire pressure

and suspension configurations.23 At one point, it was proposed that if the marketing

implications were not too great, the P225 tire be the largest tire allowed on the vehicle and that the maximum load allowed for the vehicle be reduced.24 Even in August 1989, the Explorer failed J-Turn tests at its Arizona proving grounds with 35

psi in the P235 tires.25

Concerned over the Explorer’s struggling performance in rollover stability tests,

in June 1989 Ford management actively considered releasing the 4-door Explorer

on P225 tires as a ‘‘strawman’’ because it would pass the Consumer Union test with

those tires, though not with P235 tires. Six months later, after the ‘‘strawman’’

passed the test, Ford could quietly release the 2-door and 4-door on P235 tires.26

Thus, Ford cynically manipulated not only the design of the Explorer, but also the

testing, solely to get the new Explorer to ‘‘look’’ or ‘‘seem’’ like it was stable, regardless of whether it really was or not and regardless of the effect such manipulations

might have the margin of safe controllability.

3. Manipulative Marketing—Ford not only manipulated the design of the Explorer

to make the vehicle seem like it was rollover resistant but also to make it seem to

the consumer something it was not—a passenger car.27 The Explorer is in fact a

‘‘Light Truck’’ derived from the Bronco II and Ranger trucks, not a passenger car.

Nevertheless, driven by its intense marketing determination to get suburban ‘‘soccer

moms’’ to buy and drive the vehicle, Ford imposed upon the vehicle design a passenger-car-like ride.28 Ford accomplished this by, among other things, softening the

suspension, using a P-metric (passenger car) tire, and taking air out of the tires.29

Knowing that this passenger-car-like vehicle would be just as likely to roll over as

the Bronco II, Ford intentionally designed excessive body roll into it to act as a deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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30See, e.g., note 3. 31Ford document EXP 0625, email from Stornant to White, September 11, 1989. 32Ford engineering document EXP3 1108, ‘‘Subject: 1990 Explorer Handling Stability.’’ 33 Id. 34See, e.g., Ford email EXPI 0619-20, email from Stornant to White, September 12, 1989. 35See note 4. 36Ford engineering document EXP3 1108, ‘‘Subject: 1990 Explorer Handling Stability.’’ 37See note 34. 38Ford document, ‘‘Firestone Tire Root Cause Update and Explorer Vehicle Dynamics Presentation,’’ March 28-29, 2001, at page TH-3 132. 39See Firestone Tire Failure Analysis, Dr. Sanjay Govindjee, January 30, 2001, at 35.

terrent to the driver against making sharp turns that might result in rollover.30

This change was made even though the relatively low damping of body roll adversely affects controllability of the Explorer. This change, coupled with Ford’s other

design tradeoffs intended to provide a vehicle more resistant to rollover allegations

rather than to improve safety, ultimately resulted in the sacrifice of the amount of

understeer and other contributions to a proper formation of controllability necessary

to provide reasonable consumer safety in foreseeable tire failure circumstances.

4. Flawed Tire Decisions—In the fall of 1989, an engineer warned that the Office

of the General Counsel of Ford was ‘‘arming themselves for one more attempt

to . . . restrict [the Explorer] to P225 tires.’’ 31 Obviously, the attempt by the lawyers

to address a safety issue failed. Ford sold the Explorer with optional P235 tires.

Ford engineering documents summarize the Explorer’s twisted development history by conceding failure:

The 1990 Explorer has been designed to achieve the best possible handling stability given the fundamental constraints imposed by the vehicle package and

suspension ‘‘type’’ . . . To achieve the stated [stability] values, the Explorer has

been lowered to the maximum extent possible. The relatively high engine position of the Explorer, unchanged from Bronco II, prevents further significant improvement in Stability Index without extensive suspension, frame and

sheetmetal revisions.32

Ford recognized that the Explorer, particularly the 2-door with P235 tires likely

would fail the Consumer Union test.33

With all of Ford’s design manipulations to achieve the appearance of rollover stability, the Explorer nevertheless remained an unstable vehicle when it was sold to

the public beginning in 1990. Both computer simulations and Ford’s actual testing

in 1989 showed that the 2-door Explorer with P235 tires was as unstable as the

highly criticized Bronco II, and the 4-door was only slightly better.34 When Ford engineers recommended major changes to the front suspension, steering system, and

rollover stability dimensions in order to make the vehicle as resistant to rollover as

they knew it needed to be, management rejected the proposals because they would

interfere with ‘‘Job 1.’’ Internally, ‘‘Job 1’’ at Ford meant meeting the March 1990

initial production date.35 Ford reasoned that even though it did not make needed

fundamental changes to the Explorer in development, it would still perform better

than the Bronco II in rollover statistics because of the longer wheelbase and increased understeer (largely from reduced tire pressure) and more conservative drivers. ‘‘With the high (80/20) mix of 4dr vehicles, we can expect a less aggressive driver profile with a corresponding reduction in all accident statistics.’’ 36 Ford internal

documents show that Ford management blithely ‘‘accepted [the] risk’’ that the Explorer would have a higher rollover risk with the larger P235 tire.37

Ford also blithely ‘‘accepted the risk’’ that the vehicle would become uncontrollable in foreseeable circumstances, such as tire failures. As Ford recently admitted

to NHTSA, 38 it simply chose not to test to determine how much tire tread/belt separation, which it admitted to be foreseeable, would reduce understeer and controllability and thus lead to unnecessary accidents. Ford failed to do such testing even

though it knew from tire testing it had done and decades of use of numerous tire

brands on the cars it manufactured that tire tread/belt separations could occur with

the tires to be used on the Explorer. Contrary to Ford’s assertions in the March

NHTSA presentation, there was nothing about the Explorer design that was intended to or did ensure vehicle controllability in the event of tread separation.

C. The Weight of the Explorer Further Stresses the Tires

That Ford took air out of the tires to increase the Explorer’s rollover stability cannot be reasonably disputed. Nor can it be disputed that weight—i.e., the load placed

on tires—is a factor in tire life. Dr. Sanjay Govindjee from the University of California at Berkeley established that vehicle loading is a very significant factor leading to tread belt separations.39 It also cannot be disputed that at 26 psi, Ford left

a very small leading margin for safety in the tires.

113

40See attached chart. 41See attached chart. 42See attached chart. 43See id. 44See attached chart.

The P235 tire at 26 psi on the Explorer has a margin for safety in terms of weight

of about 150 pounds. At 23 psi, that tire on several versions of the Explorer has

reached its maximum load at the GAWR of the vehicle.40 Below 23 psi, the tire

would be overloaded. In fact, through 1996, Ford continually added weight to the

Explorer. The 1990 4x4 4-door increased from about 5,000 pounds to nearly 5,400

pounds in 1993 to well over 5,600 pounds in 1996. It is no surprise that a significant

majority of the claims that Firestone has received is on the heavier Explorers.

In fact, the Explorer has an extremely low tire inflation safety factor relative to

other popular SUVs.41

The bottom line is that Ford placed too much on the tires. It set the specifications

for the tires and Firestone met those specifications. But Ford also reduced the tire

pressure to the minimum so the inherently unstable Explorer could pass, just barely, internal J-Turn tests, and so the light truck would ride more like a car to attract

family drivers. At the same time, Ford designed a heavy (and for that matter, top

heavy) vehicle, and then continued to make the vehicle heavier. No wonder that the

combination of low or in many cases under inflated tires with heavy loaded vehicles

in the hot summer lead to an increase in tread separations.

Not surprisingly, the real world data shows that this is more than just theory.

III. THE REAL WORLD DATA SHOW THE EXPLORER HAS A CONTROL PROBLEM

Not only do Ford’s internal documents show that the Explorer’s designers ignored

what they knew about the relationship of understeer and vehicle control, the real

world facts support the conclusion that this is not a case of a ‘‘bad tire,’’ as Ford’s

Chairman Nasser has asserted, but a vehicle with a control problem:

1. Of the 2.6 million Wilderness AT 15’’ tires not supplied last year and recalled

to General Motors, there are only 2 tread separation claims—less than 1 ppm!.

2. The non-recalled Wilderness AT 15’’ tires supplied to Ford have a tread separation claims rate 8 times higher on the Explorer than on the Ford Ranger. The

tires on each vehicle are exactly the same.

3. As of the end of 2000, the total number of tread separation claims and lawsuits

for the 13 million tires that Ford is replacing is 118. That is, less than 10 parts

per million or 0.0009%. This is incredibly low. Ford’s announcement to replace

these tires is itself suspect. No rational automobile company in the world would

spend $3 billion to address a ‘‘problem’’ that doesn’t exist.

4. Just a few weeks ago, there was a report of a Ford Explorer accident in Ft.

Myers, Fla. According to the report, a BF Goodrich tire on the left rear separated, the driver then lost control, and the vehicle ultimately rolled over, killing

the driver. In the newspaper report, the state trooper on the scene stated that

a tread separation does not ordinarily mean that you lose control of the vehicle.

5. In Venezuela, there are reports of 43 rollover accidents on Explorers between May

2000 and June of this year. All are Goodyear or other competitor tires. This rate

of rollovers has prompted the Venezuelan Consumer Protection Agency to consider that Explorers be banned from the country. In fact, in the last 10 days

alone, four people have died in 2 separate Ford Explorer rollovers; both of the

accidents were on competitor tires.

6. Finally, the crash data itself shows the stability problems in the Explorer. Based

on the Florida Traffic Crash Database, the odds of an Explorer rolling over in

a single vehicle highway tire-related incident are 4.35 while the odds of comparable SUVs rolling over in the same accidents are 1.92.42 The odds ratio of

a fatality occurring in such an accident is nearly three times greater with the

Explorer. The Explorer did not fair much better in Texas. In such incidents

based on the Texas database, the odds ratio of an Explorer rolling over is 1.58

times that of comparable SUVs.43 The odds ratio of being killed if an individual

is in such incident in Texas while in an Explorer is nearly four times that of

other comparable SUVs.44 This data proves that the Explorer in single vehicle,

tire related highway incidents simply does not perform up to par with its competitors. The testing performed by Dr. Dennis Guenther show why.

114

45Left rear tread separation is the most common finding in Explorer accidents involving tread

separation and is the condition examined to date. 46Linear range in this context refers to normal everyday driving by average drivers. 47See Gillespie, ‘‘Fundamentals of Vehicle Dynamics,’’ for a technical definition of ‘‘understeer’’

and ‘‘oversteer.’’ 48Dixon, ‘‘Limit Steady State Vehicle Handling,’’ at page 283, col. 1. 49Dickerson, et al., ‘‘Vehicle Handling with Tire Tread Separation,’’ at 2 (1999).

IV. DR. DENNIS A. GUENTHER’S ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF THE FORD EXPLORER

A. Summary

This analysis is focused on the loss of control experienced by the Explorer in normal highway driving following a rear tire tread/belt separation (hereinafter ‘‘tread

separation’’).

Loss of control in this circumstance often results in the Explorer leaving the highway and rolling over or spinning into an angle relative to its path of travel on the

roadway sufficient to cause rollover, with or without tripping, or other serious accidents. Because loss of control is a precursor to rollovers and other serious accidents,

the hypothesis is suggested by common Explorer accident scenarios that the Explorer has a control problem leading to rollover and other crashes in the event of

tread separation.

Dr. Guenther has tested that hypothesis and found that:

• the Explorer models he has tested, as designed, have a significantly lower amount

of understeer than the other SUVs he has evaluated, less than half as much

as the Jeep Cherokee and Chevrolet Blazer;

• the Explorer loses much of its small margin of understeer when it is loaded to

gross vehicle weight rating; the Cherokee and the Blazer do not;

• the Explorer models tested, unlike the Cherokee and the Blazer, lose all of their

understeer and become oversteer vehicles in most circumstances following tread

separation on a left rear tire, 45 the predominant tire position in Explorer tread

separation crashes; the only exception in Dr. Guenther’s investigation is a light

load configuration in a counter-clockwise turn, with the separated tire mounted

on the left rear, a circumstance where the vehicle retains a very small amount

of understeer;

• an oversteer vehicle is extremely difficult for most ordinary drivers to control, particularly at interstate highway speeds where it can become directionally unstable;

His conclusion based on these findings is that the Explorer is defectively designed

in that it has an inadequate margin of control in the foreseeable circumstance of

tread separation during normal highway driving in most load and turning circumstances.

B. Relevant Engineering / Accident Reconstruction Concepts

1. Understeer/Oversteer—The terms ‘‘understeer’’ and ‘‘oversteer’’, while not particularly descriptive in themselves, are engineering terms that are used to characterize what is one of the most significant control relationships in driving an automobile in the linear range 46—the amount of steering input necessary to produce an

amount of G’s of lateral acceleration, which produces the side force that accomplishes turning of an automobile. It is measured and expressed in degrees of steering wheel input per G of lateral acceleration.

The amount of understeer or oversteer in a vehicle is measured by driving the

vehicle in a constant radius circle at an increasing speed and recording the degrees

of steer input per G of lateral acceleration. In an understeer vehicle a test driver,

in terms of what he perceives and does in that circumstance, must steer toward the

center of the circle, with increasing steer input as he increases speed, in order to

stay on the path of the constant radius circle; that is the same thing the average

driver experiences as he drives around a curve—he must steer to the inside of the

curve in order to generate the side force necessary to turn the vehicle and stay on

the curving path, and the rear of the vehicle follows the front around the circle.

An oversteer vehicle behaves just the opposite. The test driver would have to steer

away from the center of the circle in order to stay on the constant radius circle as

his speed increases’ he would have to ‘‘take steer out’’ or ‘‘reverse steer’’ in order

to keep the car on the path of the circle as he increases speed.47 ‘‘Because of this

need for steering reversal, final oversteer is generally considered bad.’’ 48

Automobile manufacturers do not intentionally design an oversteer characteristic

into cars intended for ordinary drivers because ‘‘a vehicle that oversteers, by design

or circumstance, is highly undesirable.’’ 49 The vehicle dynamics literature is clear

that an oversteering vehicle is directionally unstable—generally speaking, ‘‘an

115

50 Bergman, ‘‘The Basic Nature of Vehicle Understeer-Oversteer’’ at page 11, col. 1 (1965). 51 Id. 52See ‘‘NHTSA: An Experimental Examination of Selected Maneuvers That May Induce OnRoad Untripped, Light Vehicle Rollover—Phase II of NHTSA’s 1997-1998 Vehicle Rollover Research Program’’ at page 29 (1999). 53 Allen, et al., ‘‘Characteristics Influencing Ground Vehicle Lateral/Directional Dynamic Stability’’ at page 27, col. 1 (1991). 54See, e.g., note 1. 55Kondo, et al., ‘‘Dynamical Behaviors Of A Car When One Tire Is Punctured Simulatively’’

at pages 2, 43 (1968). 56See note 49. 57 Bergman, ‘‘Considerations in Determining Vehicle Handling Requirements’’ at page 7, col.

1 (1969).

understeering vehicle is a directionally stable vehicle’’ and ‘‘an oversteering vehicle

is directionally an unstable vehicle.’’ 50 A vehicle is directionally unstable if steering

or disturbances, such as wind, generate forces that cause an ever-increasing vehicle

response until it spins out.51 Oversteer characteristically results in spinout.52

Generally, it is ‘‘desirable to have understeer to avoid directional instability.’’ 53

Ford, like any other automobile manufacturer, tries to build understeer into its

cars.54 They do this because understeer is essential to safely control an automobile.

Car designers can increase or decrease the amount of understeer in a vehicle by

many different means—by adjusting spring rates, suspension geometry, frame stiffness, roll damping, tire properties, tire pressure, weight distribution, and other vehicle and component characteristics. They adjust these and other elements which result in the amount and character of control available. Automobile designers, of

course, may adjust these elements for reasons other than achieving or influencing

controllability; they may, for example, make such adjustments to seek ride comfort,

to achieve a ‘‘flat’’ European cornering feel, to improve rollover resistance, or for

other reasons. Each of those trade-offs for such reasons, however, potentially affects

the amount of understeer and the amount of control safety margin, and the result

is exacerbated by the potentially greater understeer needs of SUVs.

Cars differ from each other in how much control margin, or understeer, they have.

How much understeer is necessary to provide a safe margin of control? The answer

from an engineering perspective is: The amount necessary to provide predictable vehicle control in foreseeable driving circumstances for the drivers intended for that

vehicle.

The foreseeable circumstances of driving include many things—the coefficient of

friction of the roadway surface, wind gusts, ice and snow, vehicle load, component

wear and failure, the effect of heat and use on the fit and flexibility of suspension

system components, and many others. One foreseeable circumstance, of course, is

tires wearing out and eventually failing, including tread separation, the most common mode of wearout failure for steel belted radial tires. All of these circumstances

can cause an increase in the need for understeer or directly decrease the amount

of understeer available in the vehicle. For example, tread separation will change tire

properties related to understeer, decreasing cornering stiffness and traction provided by belt and tread.

These are not new considerations for Ford automobile designers. For more than

30 years, the technical literature relating to tire influence on vehicle dynamics has

pointed out that in order to avoid oversteer following rear tire failure, ‘‘it is desirable to make the car strongly understeer in the original condition.’’ 55 Tests on the

predecessor to the Explorer, the Bronco II, demonstrated that following rear tire

tread separation that ‘‘vehicle exhibited dramatic oversteer characteristics and was

unstable.’’ 56

Not only is oversteer an unacceptable vehicle characteristic, but the transition

from understeer to oversteer that might occur in the event of loss of tread and tire

cornering properties, if sufficient understeer is not originally built into the car, is

particularly dangerous. The unexpected reversal of the handling characteristics of

the car in that circumstance is just the sort of unexpected event that leads to driving accidents; it is particularly unexpected because ‘‘none of the currently manufactured passenger cars show such behavior in ordinary driving.’’ 57 The ordinary driver

has not experienced and cannot anticipate the catastrophic results of this reversal

One of the car designer’s engineering obligations is to quantify the amount of

understeer and other vehicle control characteristics required to account and compensate for such varying and foreseeable events, the inevitable changes in driving

circumstances. By that quantification he determines the amount of understeer, the

margin of control, that must be designed into the car.

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58See, e.g. Robinette, et al., ‘‘Drag and Steering Effects of Under Inflated and Deflated Tires’’ (1997). 59Document BGC 0016305-311, memorandum from Tandy to Mickus, January 23, 1999, at

pages 2-3.. [Test vehicles included a 1993 Ford Explorer, 1986 Ford Bronco II, 1986 Ford Bronco

II XLT, 1994 Dodge Intrepid, 1987 Ford Club Wagon van, 1990 Ford Bronco, 1990 Ford Aerostar

van, 1987 Toyota van]. 60Klein, et al. ‘‘Anatomy of Accidents Following Tire Disablements,’’ at page 6 (1999). [Test

vehicles were 1989 Pathfinder and 1982 Chevrolet pickup]. 61Gardner, ‘‘The Role of Tread/Belt Detachment In Accident Causation,’’ at pages 7-8, 10

(1998). [Test vehicles were Ford Explorer, Camry Station Wagon, and Chevy Truck C2500]. 62Fay, et al., ‘‘Drag and Steering Effect from Tire Tread Belt Separation and Loss,’’ at page

13 (1999). [Test vehicle was 1993 Ford Taurus].

2. Tread Separation

Tread separation is a failure mode usual in steel belted radial tires.58 The majority of Firestone tires incurring a tread separation, without some causally related

damage to the tire, are high mileage tires with long use. The causes of this form

of failure are heat, loading, oxidation and cyclic stressing, all of which can weaken

and result in shearing of the rubber bond between the layers of steel belts, which

centrifugal force can then pull apart. This breakdown is an inevitable result of the

chemical and physical properties of rubber tires and how they are commonly used.

Those who are unfamiliar with tires or with accident reconstruction tend to describe tread separations or accidents associated with tread separations as if they are

explosive events in which the vehicle is thrown out of control by the force of the

separation. The scientific literature and testing commissioned by automobile manufacturers and others, however, has repeatedly demonstrated that this is not correct.

For example, Carr Engineering, vehicle dynamics experts regularly retained by

Ford to testify in automotive litigation, carried out testing on behalf of Ford relating

to, among other things, the forces involved in tread separation. Their findings in

those tests led them to conclude:

During the tread separation event, the tire did pull the vehicle slightly to one

side but the driver kept a straight line path with a small steering correction.

This amplitude of steer angle is small and on the order required to keep a vehicle in the lane on curved highways or in a straight path during other events

such as wind gusts or driving through water puddles at highway speeds.59

Other automotive researchers, including plaintiff experts pursuing forensic inquiries, academic researchers, and Firestone, have arrived at the same conclusion based

on numerous tests, including tests involving the Explorer and the Firestone tires

mounted on it as original equipment. For example:

• ‘‘[S]eparation by itself was not sufficient to cause loss of control.’’ ‘‘No induced

steering was felt as a result of tread separation.’’ ‘‘Test results by this author

corroborate work by Gardner who measured that steering wheel inputs during

tread separation are of the order of magnitude of lane change maneuvers during

high speed travel.’’ 60

• ‘‘Maintaining control of the vehicle after tread/belt separation requires a steering

torque similar to that required for a lane change maneuver.’’ ‘‘The results of the

testing show that the forces developed during a tread/belt detachment are well

within the range of a driver’s ability to control a vehicle.’’ 61

• ‘‘Little or no corrective steering action was needed to maintain control of the vehicle during the tread separation events.’’ 62

Descriptions of tread separation related accidents also sometimes fail to accurately capture the sequential nature of those accidents. Engineering analysis and

accident reconstruction require that tread separation and accidents associated with

them be broken down into their separate parts. For those purposes, the accident

events should be viewed as three separate and sequential elements:

a. Pre-separation—This is characterized by vibration felt generally in the vehicle,

(see notes 58 and 60) as the tire is deformed from a smooth circle to an irregular

‘‘circle’’ by movement of the tread and belt. This vibration is something most drivers

have experienced in connection with a failed tire, whether a puncture blowout or

a tread separation or some other mode of tire failure.

The vibration serves as notice that something is wrong with a tire, a message that

most drivers understand as requiring them to take their foot off the gas, check the

traffic around them, and begin to move to the shoulder of the highway to change

the tire.

b. Separation—Testing, (see notes 58,59,60 & 61) establishes that the actual tread

separation is a benign event in terms of the amount and duration of forces exerted

on the automobile laterally, longitudinally and vertically.

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63See note 52.

64See attached exhibit 5.

c. Post-separation—In the period immediately following tread separation on a rear

tire any SUV will lose some understeer because the tire properties contributing to

control of the vehicle—cornering stiffness, traction, etc.—will have been reduced because of removal of the tread and one of the steel belts. It is the controllability of

the Explorer in this circumstance that Dr. Guenther is investigating.

C. Engineering Evaluation Of Explorer Directional Control

Dr. Guenther was retained by counsel to assist them in the preparation of Firestone’s defense in the personal injury litigation arising out of Explorer crash and

rollover accidents. While he made measurements of and inspected various Explorers

and engaged in some accident reconstruction at the direction of counsel, he did not

undertake the dynamics testing and data analysis underlying his conclusions concerning the controllability of the Explorer until last month.

Firestone had expected that Ford, as part of a root cause analysis, would focus

on the vehicle and provide Firestone, NHTSA and the Congress information about

the vehicle’s handling in a tread separation event. Ford has 15 years of experience

in the design and development of and litigation about the Explorer. They have that

information. Firestone requested Ford participation in investigation of the vehicle

in October of last year. In spite of repeated follow up requests, Ford made no response to Firestone. It became clear that Dr. Guenther’s engineering evaluation of

the Explorer would be important not only in defense of the litigation but in addressing congressional, regulatory and public concerns about automotive safety relating

to loss of control and rollover of the Explorer when it experienced tread separation.

1. Testing Conducted—a. Site—The tests were carried out at the Transportation

Research Center, Inc. (TRC) test facility near East Liberty, Ohio. The facility is used

on a contract basis by numerous automobile manufacturers, component suppliers,

and state and national regulatory authorities to conduct automotive safety testing.

It was used by NHTSA, for example, in 1997-98 to conduct extensive tests of maneuvers that may induce on-road untripped rollover in various vehicles, including

the Ford Explorer.63 Ford used TRC in development testing of the UN-105, the

version of the Explorer offered in 1995 and subsequent years.

b. Study Objectives—The purpose of the testing program, which is ongoing, is

to examine the margin of control in the Explorer as designed and, comparatively,

in peer SUVs in the circumstance following rear tire tread separation. Due to the

complexities and non-linearity of vehicles and the nature of the Explorer accidents,

Dr. Guenther chose to explore the linear range as a preliminary investigation. In

the linear range, a principal parameter of control is the understeer/oversteer gradient (other parameters such as steering response time and gain, and steering frequency response are also being examined as they may relate to loss of control in

the event of tire tread separation).

c. Test Vehicles—The vehicles evaluated are the following:

1996 ....................................................................................................... Ford Explorer .................................. 4 dr 4 x 2

1996 ....................................................................................................... Chevy Blazer .................................. 4 dr 4 x 2

2001 ....................................................................................................... Jeep Cherokee ................................ 4 dr 4 x 2

2000 ....................................................................................................... Ford Explorer .................................. 4 dr 4 x 2

Each vehicle was tested with its original equipment (OE) tires at OEM recommended tire pressure. The 1996 Explorer was tested with both OE Firestone tires

and OE Goodyear tires recommended by Ford.

d. Vehicle Instrumentation and Measurement—The data acquired for purposes of this analysis was the following: 64

Vehicle Input

Steering Wheel Angle

Vehicle Speed

Vehicle Response

Lateral Acceleration

Yaw Rate

Body Roll Angle

e. Test Maneuvers—The tests conducted are universally recognized standard

tests used by automobile manufacturers, including Ford, and other researchers in

vehicle dynamics for establishing the values investigated. The tests are as follows:

Step Steer—The vehicle is driven on the test pad area in a straight line at a constant speed. The driver then rapidly turns the steering wheel until it hits a mechanical stop. Steering wheel stops are set to attain a desired lateral acceleration at the

test speeds. This steer angle is held until steady-state response is established.

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65See note 42.

Tests were run in both directions (right turn/left turn) and at two speeds (60 mph

and 40 mph). The test was run both with four good tires and with the left rear tire

detreaded by cutting between the steel belts; test runs with the detreaded tire were

done only at the slower 40 mph speed. Test runs were done at both light load (curb

plus driver and instrumentation) and heavy load (gross vehicle weight rating).

The test is used to measure vehicle response times as related to lateral acceleration and yaw velocity response, and to measure the gain of these responses in relation to steering wheel input (output divided by input).

Constant Radius Circle—The vehicle is driven around a 200 foot constant radius

circle with increasing speed. The driver adjusts the steering angle (by turning the

steering wheel) as necessary to keep the vehicle on the path of the circle.

Test runs were done in both directions, clockwise and counter-clockwise, with four

good tires and with the left rear tire detreaded. Test runs were done at light load

(curb plus driver and instrumentation) and heavy load (gross vehicle weight rating).

The test is used to measure understeer and oversteer (degrees of road wheel steer

per Gs of lateral acceleration).

Frequency Response—Sinusoidal sweep steering tests are frequently used to determine the linear response of vehicles. The vehicles in these tests were driven on a

long straightaway with the driver steering with slowly increasing frequency up to

approximately 3 to 4 hz followed by decreasing frequency. The test was run at a

nominal speed of 66 mph.

The test measures lateral acceleration gain, yaw velocity gain, and phase angles

at the frequencies tested (up to 3 to 4 hz).

f. Results of Directional Control Tests—The results of the constant radius circle tests are set forth in data sheets and charts attached hereto as Exhibit 6. Data

reduction and analysis continues with respect to the step steer and frequency response tests.

In summary, the findings in the tests are as follows:

Constant Radius Circle—This standard method of measuring understeer/oversteer

gradient establishes that the Explorer, with four good tires, has a relatively small

amount of understeer compared to other SUVs tested—less than half the amount

found in the Blazer and the Cherokee. In fact, the Cherokee has about the same

understeer with a detreaded tire as the Explorer with four good tires. These findings are consistent with NHTSA vehicle characterization tests that found that the

Explorer had the lowest amount of understeer of the 12 vehicles on which it conducted rollover-inducing maneuver tests.65

The test results show that, unlike the other SUVs tested, the Explorer loses its

small margin of understeer when it experiences a tread separation and becomes an

oversteer vehicle.

This is true whether the Explorer is operated on Goodyear OE tires recommended

by Ford or on Firestone OE tires.

The Explorer’s oversteer characteristic is worse in the loaded condition. The only

circumstance in which it does not become oversteer with a detreaded tire is when

it is lightly loaded (curb plus driver and instrumentation) and the detreaded tire

is on the inside rear position (left rear in a counter-clockwise turn); in test runs in

that configuration the Explorer is almost neutral steer with respect to the

understeer/oversteer gradient.

An oversteer vehicle is not safe at highway speeds in the hands of an average

driver. Sometimes a driver may achieve directional control, sometimes he may not.

In addition to his dynamic testing, Dr. Guenther has carried out several accident

reconstructions involving Explorer crashes and reviewed numerous police accident

reports concerning such accidents. Explorer rollover accidents, as reflected in those

reconstructions and police accident reports, frequently occur

• on interstate or similar high-quality, high-speed roadways, without environmental

interference;

• in straight line travel;

• at highway speed

• with no driver impairment

• with no risky behavior

• with rear tire tread separation

• with some apparent effort at driver steering control reflected in change(s) of vehicle heading and path of travel.

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66See, e.g., Klein, et al., ‘‘Anatomy of Accidents Following Tire Disablements’’ (1999).

2. Conclusion

The Explorer is an oversteer vehicle in most circumstances after it experiences

tread separation. Oversteer can make a vehicle directionally unstable and subject

to loss of control in the hands of most drivers. This is a vehicle problem, not a tire

problem. The vehicle performs the same following tread separation on the Goodyear

tire as it does the Firestone tire. This must be regarded as a highway safety defect

within the meaning of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

V. THE FORD ‘‘EXPLORER VEHICLE DYNAMICS PRESENTATION’’ TO NHTSA OF MARCH 28- 29, 2001 CONCERNING EXPLORER LOSS OF CONTROL FOLLOWING TREAD SEPARATION

IS MISLEADING AND IRRELEVANT

The following statements and charts are examples of the many inaccuracies and

irrelevancies contained in the Ford vehicle dynamics presentation to NHTSA: • Statement at page TH-3 18. Exhibit 7—The statement about tread separation, ‘‘This fundamental cause [of loss of control, i.e., decreased tire traction] overwhelms

differences in design among vehicle classes or within vehicle classes. Explorers perform like all other vehicles’’, is true only with respect to limit maneuvers, that is,

at high lateral acceleration where most of us never operate a vehicle, even in most

emergency maneuvers. The statement is not relevant or accurate in the linear range

of maneuvering, that is, at low lateral accelerations experienced in normal driving

(e.g., 0.3 Gs or less). The maneuver involved in correcting for the small amount of

drag following a belt separation (similar to a normal lane change steer, according

to SAE test literature),66 or the maneuver involved in bringing the car to the shoulder so that you can change the tire is just such a low lateral acceleration maneuver,

even at highway speeds.

In normal everyday driving maneuvers following a tread separation the Explorer

does not perform like all other vehicles. In this circumstance, it has a higher likelihood of loss of control because it lacks the necessary margin of understeer to remain

directionally controllable in highway maneuvers involved in normal driving. Peer

SUVs, such as the Cherokee and Blazer, remain understeer and more controllable

in a wider range of maneuvers following tread separation than the Explorer. • Statement at page TH-3 76. Exhibit 7—This chart purports to show results of

various SUV vehicles in a constant radius circle test following a tread separation.

It shows all vehicles including the Explorer maneuvering at more than 0.5 G lateral

acceleration with a separated tire on the outside rear. That is a physical impossibility in normal highway travel; these vehicles in general and the Explorer in particular cannot generate that much lateral acceleration with a detreaded tire in the

outside rear position in normal highway travel. The Explorer will spin out of control

before it reaches 0.5 G lateral acceleration in this circumstance. Ford can do it only

as a trick on a low speed 100 foot radius circle. It indicates the irrelevant nature

of the information presented to NHTSA in its vehicle dynamics presentation.

The suggestion accompanying the chart that ‘‘Explorers and peer vehicles

oversteer above approximately 0.4G, with tread off of outside rear tire’’ is not accurate or relevant. The Explorer with a detreaded tire is oversteer in that circumstance at all lower lateral acceleration levels while the Blazer and Cherokee are

not. Moreover, it is not relevant to an analysis of highway safety in normal driving

because motorists generally do not operate their vehicles at the higher level of lateral acceleration examined by Ford. The assertion is made that ‘‘tread separation

on O/S rear tire narrows differences among all vehicles (overwhelms design differences)’’ is, again, not accurate in the linear range; it only applies to limit maneuvers. Following tread separation, the Blazer and Cherokee maintain understeer in

the linear range while the Explorer has none and changes completely to oversteer;

the Cherokee, in fact, has about as much understeer with a detreaded outside rear

tire as the Explorer does with four good tires. Similarly, the statement that ‘‘Explorer performance is typical of peer vehicles’’ is not accurate for linear range operations for the same reason. The Explorer is oversteer in the linear range of lateral

acceleration following outside rear tread separation (about 0.3G or less); other SUVs

remain understeer in the linear range.

• Statement at page TH-3 87. Exhibit 7—This simulation chart depicts all vehicles as having the same maneuvering limits following a tread separation. Dr. Guenther’s testing at TRC demonstrates the contrary in the linear range and the computer-generated simulation has no basis in fact.

• Statement at page TH-3 132. Exhibit 7—The first and fourth statements on this

page are presented without any supporting data of any sort. The Explorer does not

‘‘perform similar to others in its class in the event of a tire tread separation’’, rather,

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it becomes oversteer, an unpredictable, unfamiliar, unsafe handling condition. For

that reason, the Explorer does not ‘‘have a margin of safety ‘as designed’ to accommodate, to a reasonable level, component failures including tread separations.’’

• Statement at page TH-3 134. Exhibit 7—The fourth statement on this page is

false. The designers of the Blazer and the Cherokee have in fact provided a margin

of control safety following tread separation in the design of those vehicles. They did

it more than a decade ago, when the Blazer and the Cherokee were the primary

SUV examples available to Ford engineers for comparative analysis when they designed and developed the Explorer.

VI. CONCLUSION

Ford has had over twenty years to adjust the design of the Ford Explorer and to

work cooperatively and responsibly with its tire suppliers to ensure the safety and

stability of its vehicle. To date, it has failed to do so. The design of the Explorer

is an oversteer vehicle in the event of a tread separation. A tread separation is normally a benign event that a driver can control by pulling to the shoulder of any

roadway. The flawed design of the Explorer, however, renders the vehicle in a tread

separation event susceptible to rollover and therefore potentially lethal. While real

world data and an engineering analysis of the vehicle confirm this phenomenon,

Ford refuses to accept the facts and take responsibility. The purpose of this analysis

is to ensure that these facts are publicly known, and, in the best case, to compel

Ford to take responsibility for its flawed attempts to protect its defective product.

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Mr. STEARNS. Okay. Hospitable questions.

Mr. Lampe, you know, you have a disadvantage that you have

to sit here for 4 hours before you become the second panel; but you

have the advantage, because you’ve heard Mr. Nasser, and now he

is not in a position to answer, but you’ve made a pretty strong

statement here in your opening statement about the Ford vehicle,

the SUV.

Just a rather quick observation. We had two hearings with your

corporation last year, and yet the allegation or the statement

against the Ford SUV was not as strong back then. Is the information that you’ve received subsequent to those—to your hearings, is

why you’re making your claims so much stronger?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, Chairman Stearns. We, as you remember last

year, did say you can take our tires off and the Ford Explorer is

going to continue to roll over. We’ve said many times this is a tire/

vehicle issue. We have to look at the tire and the vehicle. But since

that time, I think you’re aware of Dr. Gunther’s study on the Ford

Explorer as compared to the Jeep Cherokee, the Blazer. And it’s

very compelling, the evidence that was found in the study, that the

understeer to oversteer transition and the oversteer itself in the

Ford Explorer makes it a very difficult drive for the normal driver

to control.

Mr. STEARNS. Well, you know, he did that study in May, as I understand, recently, didn’t he?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, he did.

Mr. STEARNS. So you didn’t have that information back there,

and when you talked about the Ford SUV, I think you were talking

in terms of vehicle application. It wasn’t such a strong statement

as you’re making this morning—this afternoon. Well, how do you

explain the high rates of tread separation on these Wilderness AT

tires? I mean, shouldn’t consumers be concerned about it? Are you

just saying it’s all Ford’s fault? And some of these rates are high,

and so I think you have to say that there’s some culpability on your

part.

Mr. LAMPE. And, Chairman Stearns, we did a recall—safety recall last August. It wasn’t mandated. NHTSA had not finished

their investigation. I think they will tell you they were months and

months away from completing any investigation. We announced

that recall on a voluntary basis because we felt there were issues,

and we wanted to get some of those tires off the road. But our tires

are safe. Our tires are safe that are on the road today.

Mr. STEARNS. You probably heard when I talked to Mr. Nasser

about this B rating versus a C rating, and I understand the Firestone tires on the Ford Explorer have a temperature resistant rating of a C, and that these tires meet the minimum performance required by Federal safety standards as well as Ford’s own specification.

Can you tell me, like Goodyear has a B, I mean, can you tell me

what that C rating means and—versus a B rating? After all, I

know that Firestone supplies General Motors with tires as original

equipment and that General Motors will not allow any tire with

less than a B rating on their SUVs. So why is there inconsistency

between what General Motors does and what you do for them and

what you did for Ford Motor Company?

284

Mr. LAMPE. First, Mr. Chairman, we supplied Ford with the tire

they asked for, designed to their specifications. C—there are millions and millions of tires with a C temperature range that operate

in all parts of the country. C temperature is not an indication of

area—works in one area better than another area. It’s one of the

three ranges that is established by the Uniform Tire Quality Grading System. It’s a high-speed test, and you must remember that the

UTQG test that determines not only speed rating but temperature

is a high-speed test.

Mr. STEARNS. So when Ford specifies a C and you——

Mr. LAMPE. I’ll correct that, Congressman.

Mr. STEARNS. General Motors, you provide a B; and C you provided to Ford, and you decided that?

Mr. LAMPE. Chairman Stearns. And the one kind of

misstatement was Ford did not specify——

Mr. STEARNS. I understand that.

Mr. LAMPE. [continuing] a C. They did not specify——

Mr. STEARNS. So you decided that?

Mr. LAMPE. That’s the tire we gave them that met the C requirements. I’ll point out from our standpoint that we try to make sure

that an entire line of tires has the same grade to make it less confusing for the consumer. Many, many of those sizes and types in

the Wilderness line actually met the B temperature grade requirement. But to be consistent and to avoid confusion, we mark them

all at the minimum.

Mr. STEARNS. But if you’re—are you saying that we should

have—the consumer should have no concern about a C versus a B?

It just is something the consumer shouldn’t be concerned about?

Are you saying your C-rated tires would perform just as well as a

B-rated tire for General Motors?

Mr. LAMPE. I’m saying, sir, that the C-rated tires are perfectly

acceptable for any geographic region for any application in the

United States. There’s literally tens of—15, 20 million C-rated

tires, more than that operating today.

Mr. STEARNS. Well, the obvious question is, why do we have a

B-rated tire on General Motors and a C-rated on Ford?

Mr. LAMPE. I was not—I was not aware of the General Motors,

but I will obviously assume that’s correct. And if they ask for a

specification and a specified B rating, that’s certainly what we

would strive to provide for them.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. In the Ford testimony today, was there anything that he said that you object to very strongly in terms of his

understanding of your product that you would like to go on record,

other than saying his vehicle is bad? To use the words of don’t

feel—don’t find fault, but find a remedy. I mean, are there things

that he said, instead of attacking Ford, that you feel about your

product that you would like to defend?

Mr. LAMPE. Sir, I don’t mean to be perceived as attacking Ford.

I think there are some issues that need to get out and need to be

answered. Yes, testing of the tires; we did testing of tires. We did

testing against a number of tires, but the tests we did were significantly more scientific and more fair, just basically fair. I mentioned

that Goodyear, on their rig testing, took our tires, and some of

285

which were 9 years old, and compared them and tested them to the

Goodyear tires, which were less than a year old.

When you take their data and you take out our 9-year-old tires

and you take apples to apples, our new tires compared to the Goodyear new tires were equal.

The same thing on this temperature test. I’ll tell you a statement

that was made by one Ford engineer when we asked, why didn’t

you use internal temperature rather than surface temperature?

You know. You’re an engineer. It’s much more reflective of internal

tire heat buildup. He said, we didn’t use internal temperature because there wasn’t much difference between all the brands.

Those are the things that really bother me, the nonapples to apples comparison. There were a number of other, obviously, areas in

Mr. Nasser’s testimony that I don’t agree to, but you asked me to

stick—focus on the tires, and that’s what I’ll do.

Mr. STEARNS. Thank you. My time has expired.

The gentleman who is the ranking member of the Commerce,

Trade, and Consumer Protection Subcommittee, Mr. Towns.

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lampe, I would like to understand a little more about Firestone’s criticism of the Explorer. I see in your material a lot of discussion about concepts like oversteer and understeer. Am I correct?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, sir.

Mr. TOWNS. At the end of the day, aren’t we really talking about

steering responsiveness?

Mr. LAMPE. Sir, it’s, again, my understanding that Dr. Gunther’s

concern is more the ability—the ability to the—of the driver to

maintain correctional—directional control at normal highway

speeds if that vehicle goes from an understeer to an oversteer. If

the driver is not able to maintain control, the back end starts to

roll out on him, and then the car is going sideways to its intended

direction of travel and starts to roll over. But it’s the driver’s inability to maintain control, is my understanding.

Mr. TOWNS. Aren’t the manufacturers generally moving in the direction of designing their vehicles to have more responsive steering? Is that correct?

Mr. LAMPE. All automobile manufacturers strive to design into

their vehicle a certain amount of understeer, because we can all

deal with understeer. You and I, the normal driving public, can

deal with understeer, and that’s preferable. What we don’t want to

experience and what the automobile manufacturers don’t want to

put their customers into that situation, is that oversteer position.

Mr. TOWNS. Let me sort of get one thing clear. Could you sort

of give me quickly the difference in terms of your testing and the

difference between Ford’s testing of the tires? What’s the difference? I mean, just briefly.

Mr. LAMPE. Okay. Very briefly, first of all, we tested—when we

tested temperature of the tire, we stick a pyrometer down inside

the tire into the belt edge to measure the heat buildup at the belt

edge where separations start. We don’t measure the surface at the

tire. When we measured—we make a test called high-speed SAE

test, run-to-fail. You purposely run the tires at a higher speed, and

then you step up the speed and you step up the speed until the

tires fail. That’s what it’s designed to do, to make the tire fail.

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We did 2 of our tires, 10 of our competitor tires, gentlemen; the

most common failure, most common—and especially Goodyear has

said many times, the most common failure of a tire is tread separation, and when we ran those tests, sure enough, 8 out of the 10

tires that we ran on the high-speed test experienced belt-leavingbelt separation. We tested them to fail. Don’t—I’m not saying they

were bad tires. We ran them till they failed, but the failure mode

is belt leaving belt. That’s very common.

Goodyear has said it a number of tires. For anybody to say that

a separation is not a foreseeable event or not an event that a car

manufacturer should make sure that he gives his consumer adequate control over is wrong.

Mr. TOWNS. Let me just run back to the Dr. Gunther test again.

Dr.—it’s indicated Dr. Gunther really tested access to steering responsiveness. You didn’t tell him to test any of those new design

vehicles with more responsive steering, did you?

Mr. LAMPE. No, Congressman Towns. We—we left it up completely to Dr. Gunther. He’s the expert. Again, he’s an expert in vehicle dynamics. He performed standard routine tests, and they’re

very reputable. You can repeat them and repeat them, standard

recognized tests on the three best-selling SUVs in the marketplace:

The Explorer, the Jeep Cherokee, and the Blazer.

Mr. TOWNS. Well, you know, that’s the thing. They’re saying that

he did it on a 1996 Chevy Blazer and a Jeep Cherokee, right, both

of which had older designs with less responsive steering. And of

course, for example, you did not ask him to test the new BMW-X5

or the Mercedes ML 320, both of which have more responsive steering than all of those that you mentioned. Am I correct?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, sir. And I understand both of those vehicles that

you mentioned also have a traction control—a very sophisticated

traction control device to help that vehicle not go into an oversteer

position. But, no, we did not test them. The Jeep Cherokee was the

year 2000. The Explorer was the 1996, and the Blazer was a 1996.

And we also tested another Explorer with Goodyear tires.

Mr. TOWNS. At this time I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you

very much.

Mr. LAMPE. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from

Pennsylvania, the chairman of the Oversight and Investigations

Committee, Mr. Greenwood.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr.

Lampe.

Mr. LAMPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. GREENWOOD. I want to go back to a question I think Mr.

Stearns started to focus on, and try to get a little bit more clarification. We’ve got three of your plants with very, very different rates

of tire tread separation: Wilson, 19; Joliette at 2.8; and Aiken at

zero. Are those numbers correct?

Mr. LAMPE. I believe so, yes, sir.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Now, it’s a simple question. I assume that if

the Ford Explorers that were put on are a random selection of Ford

Explorers, and they’re not—you can’t say that the Wilson plant

went on a certain kind of Explorer or a certain run of Explorers,

and then the Joliette plant tires went on a different run of ExplorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00292 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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ers. It seems the common denominator is the Explorer, and the

variable is the plant. And so the question is: How can you attribute

the significant variation in the tire tread separation rates, when

the only thing that seems to be at variance here is the plant and

not the vehicle?

Mr. LAMPE. First of all, a number of our plants make sizes for

the Explorer. Some are the same sizes, some are different. The

other thing you have to remember, Congressman, is that Wilson

tire plant has hundreds of lines of tires, hundreds, that have never

had a claim. And if you take the Explorer-produced claims or the

Explorer-responsible claims out of our data base, our claims statistics fall dramatically. And certainly the number of injuries and fatalities falls dramatically. Our Wilson plant is a fairly new plant.

I think it’s about 25 years old. The Aiken plant is brand new. It’s

only 4 or 5 years old. They use similar manufacturing techniques

in a lot of cases. There are some differences in equipment, but the

performance rate and the claims rate in Wilson on their overall

production is excellent and very good.

Mr. GREENWOOD. What do you think is the cause of that very

statistically significant, I assume, range in claims rates based on

tire tread separation for these plants?

Mr. LAMPE. Again, Congressman, it can be the application of vehicle that goes on. One of the variables, too; take the Ford Explorer. Wilson tires going into their assembly plants, their manufacturing plants, St. Louis and Louisville, versus Joliette tires, the

distribution of the Wilson-made production might end up going a

lot more further south to the warmer States and the hotter States,

when the Joliette production stays more up in the north and Canada.

Mr. GREENWOOD. You’re saying ‘‘might,’’ or the data indicates

that?

Mr. LAMPE. It might. I’d have to see the distribution data from

Ford. They had that information. I’d have to see that, but it very

well could influence the rate.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Have you asked Ford for that data? I would

think that would be fairly significant information for your company

to have.

Mr. LAMPE. We asked for that data. We asked for—from Ford,

the Ranger distribution data, because we wanted to see that comparison between the Explorer and the Ranger. Sir, we asked for it.

We asked for it and we asked for it. And it wasn’t until May 11,

after I refused to hand over some information to Ford, until they

handed over the information to me, so I could—— Mr. GREENWOOD. Have you had a chance to analyze it so we

know whether, in fact, these different claims rates reflect geography as opposed to something in a tire?

Mr. LAMPE. I do not—I cannot say that with all certainty. Congressman, I would—one other thing I would like to point out. We

talk a lot about claims. Claims is a word, is a classification, that

didn’t even exist 8 months ago. There is no standard definition of

claims in the industry. What Goodyear says a claim is, could be

completely different than what we said it is. There is no standard

established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

as to what a claim is, or what an acceptable rate is. But the imporVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00293 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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tant thing is that what happens after the separation, after the separation. Again, a driver should not lose control of his vehicle. It’s

a rare event, but it is a foreseeable event, and it is one that happens.

Mr. GREENWOOD. I agree with you. This whole business of claims

rate is not good science. This is about how many calls are made to

NHTSA, and as we all know, those calls can be inspired by what

happens in the news, they can be inspired by what’s happening in

the courtrooms. And there’s nothing final about this information

that we learn from claims rates. Let me—— Mr. LAMPE. And the Congressman is really referring to even another measure that is different from claims rate, the Vehicle Owner’s Questionnaire reports that NHTSA gets. You get the VOQs,

you get claims, you get adjustments. It is a confusing subject.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Let me go to another subject. You rely to a

great extent on the research of Dr. Gunther who ran experiments

detailing the amount of understeer and oversteer of the Ford Explorer. Dr. Gunther compared the 1996 and the 2000 Ford Explorer

to the 1996 Blazer and the 2001 Jeep Cherokee. Dr. Carr, hired by

Ford, argues that these vehicles are not comparable to the Explorer, and that neither have similar steering mechanisms, which

creates a situation where the Explorer will necessarily look far

worse. How do you respond to that comment?

Mr. LAMPE. Dr. Gunther is an expert, sir. He’s a full professor

at the Ohio State University. He has done a tremendous amount

of work for NHTSA. He’s done work for the automobile companies.

He is the expert. He selected the vehicles to get the best comparison, the best comparative test that he could do. The tests that he

ran are standard, repetitive-type tests, recognized in the industry.

Mr. GREENWOOD. But you do acknowledge that there are different configurations in these vehicles in terms of their steering

mechanisms.

Mr. LAMPE. I do not know that for a fact. No, I cannot say that.

Mr. GREENWOOD. My time has expired.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The chairman

of the full committee, Mr. Dingell, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lampe.

Mr. LAMPE. Morning, Congressman.

Mr. DINGELL. I have a series of questions. But first, it was 1992

when Bridgestone/Firestone began its turnaround. I’m reading now

from the Akron Beacon Journal. It opted to move its headquarters

from Akron, Ohio to Nashville, Tennessee to get a new lease on its

corporate life. ‘‘Ono,’’ Bridgestone/Firestone CEO at the time said, ‘‘last year’s results,’’ that is, 1997, ‘‘showed the improvement of

cost-cutting and increased sales in the 5-year period.’’ Did Bridgestone/Firestone launch some sort of cost-cutting effort

in the early and mid-1990’s to deal with its profit and loss and debt

situation?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman Dingell, I’m not—could you be a little

bit more specific? We’re always—certainly we’re always trying to

improve our productivity and keep our expenses under control.

Mr. DINGELL. The journal quotes Mr. Ono, who is a man I gather

of some importance in the company, who said that last year’s results show the improvement of cost-cutting in the 5-year period.

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My question: Was there a cost-cutting program which went on at

Firestone or not?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman Dingell, there are always measures in

our company to keep our expenses under control.

Mr. DINGELL. Was there a name for this cost-cutting program?

Mr. LAMPE. I’m not sure what the Congressman is referring to.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, all I know is that you had a cost-cutting program going on according to Mr. Ono. Have you ever talked to him

about this?

Mr. LAMPE. Mr. Ono has returned to Japan, sir. Again, if you

could be more specific, I’ll certainly try to address it.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, he actually said that it was a company-wide

program.

Mr. LAMPE. Again, sir, we had many programs that we put in

place to improve our productivity, to make us a better company, to

improve our expense to sales ratios. That’s a continuous practice.

Mr. DINGELL. As a result of this cost-cutting program, did Firestone change the Explorer tires that it was selling to Ford in any

way?

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t know that any change was made to the Ford

Explorer tire because of any cost-cutting program, Congressman

Dingell.

Mr. DINGELL. Are you telling me that there were no changes in

the tires that Firestone was selling to Ford for Explorers?

Mr. LAMPE. We make continuous changes in the tires. I did not

say that, Congressman. We make continuous changes in our tires,

to improve our tires.

Mr. DINGELL. Were any of these changes made for cost-cutting

reasons?

Mr. LAMPE. Not that I know of, Congressman. I don’t know of

any—again, we make a number of changes. We try to improve our

tires. We try to make our tires better all the time. I was not in

manufacturing at the time, so I know of—I know of none——

Mr. DINGELL. Does any of these result in the use of less expensive materials and compounds and production processes?

Mr. LAMPE. Again, Congressman, I cannot—I cannot state to

that. I will tell you that we’re always looking to be able to use better materials at a better price if we can improve the quality of our

tires.

Mr. DINGELL. Would you please submit to this committee a list

of all changes in materials, compounds, in production processes,

and in structure of the tires made during this period?

Mr. LAMPE. Of course we will, Congressman.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, did Firestone tell Ford of any of the changes

that they were making in the tires during this period of time and

the reasons why these changes were being made?

Mr. LAMPE. We have a lot of dialog back and forth with the Ford

Motor Company, as Mr. Nasser stated. He stated that he’s—Ford

Motor Company shares information when they change the vehicles.

We share a lot of information back with our OEM customers when

we change the tires, especially if it affects the performance—performance parameters of what they’ve asked for.

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Mr. DINGELL. Did Firestone monitor the field performance of the

tires that were modified during this period of time as a part of the

cost-cutting program of that company?

Mr. LAMPE. Again, Congressman Dingell, you’re referring to

changes made in tires versus cost-cutting, and I don’t think that’s

a fair characterization at all. We always monitor. We always monitor the performance of our tires in the field. We do tests. We do

run tire analysis. We do many tests to make sure our tires perform

well.

Mr. DINGELL. Are you telling me that none of these changes in

tire structures were cost cutting?

Mr. LAMPE. I’ve said I can’t say that, sir, but I don’t—I don’t believe you’re in a position to be able to say that either. I don’t think

any one of us know.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Lampe, you’re the witness, not I.

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, at some point, did Firestone decide to reverse

some of the cost-cutting actions it had taken with regard to Explorer tires, because field performance data indicated problems?

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t know that to be the case, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Would you submit a list of materials, structure,

and changes in manufacturing processes, please, to this committee

that occurred during that period of time?

Mr. LAMPE. I said I would, sir, yes, sir.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired, and the—Mr.

Lampe, just answer his request, if you would.

Mr. Tauzin, the chairman of the full committee.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you very much. Mr. Lampe, welcome

again.

Mr. LAMPE. Thank you, Chairman Tauzin.

Chairman TAUZIN. Let me put something on the record. Claims

data, as we understand it, is data that refers to a tire failure that

leads to injury or property damage. Is that correct?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, sir. Let me explain. Again, this didn’t even come

up in vocabulary until August of last year. A claims is made up—

the way we define it—and, again, the real problem is there is no

industry definition. We define a claim. Every time you see information we give you, it’s defined as a minor property damage claim,

and it could be so much as replacing a wheel on somebody’s car.

No——

Chairman TAUZIN. Nevertheless, we have property damage and/

or injury——

Mr. LAMPE. No, no.

Chairman TAUZIN. [continuing] connected to the tire failure.

Mr. LAMPE. Property damage, as much as less—as little as $5.

Chairman TAUZIN. I understand.

Mr. LAMPE. It includes personal injuries and it includes lawsuits,

three different things.

Chairman TAUZIN. I just wanted that on the record. Second, you

mention that Firestone did a voluntary recall of tires last year, but

to set the record straight again, it was the story done by KHOU

in Houston, Texas, that really started this ball rolling and got the

NHTSA to do an investigation, because KHOU actually used data

at NHTSA to describe a situation where too many Ford Explorers

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were rolling over with tire separations on their tires, on the Firestone tires, and that prompted the whole business, did it not?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman Tauzin, my understanding is I believe

the KHOU television program you’re referring to was sometime

back in February——

Chairman TAUZIN. That was months before the recall.

Mr. LAMPE. February of 2000. I believe NHTSA opened up a preliminary evaluation in May of 2000. We announced our safety recall in August. My point being only that the preliminary evaluation

of our tires was still underway, and it was still——

Chairman TAUZIN. Well, I want to talk to you about that, though.

You just talked to Mr. Dingell about changes that are made in

Firestone tires. I asked—you were in the room when I asked Mr.

Nasser about the decision by Ford to purchase Goodyear tires in

1996, and then to return exclusively to Firestone tires again in

1998. Now, Ford and Firestone had an amazingly close relationship

for all those years, and it has intrigued me for a long time—I have

not yet gotten a good answer to it—why did Ford decide to start

buying Goodyear tires in 1996?

Mr. LAMPE. Sir, that’s very explainable. During the—and I believe it was actually in 1995 that they started using some Goodyear

tires. They used them in 1996 and a little bit in 1997, I believe,

and then that’s when they went back to 100 percent Firestone. At

that same time period, we were having a labor disruption, labor

problems in our union plants. Our production had been reduced,

and I believe Ford switched some of the business back—over to

Goodyear in order to take off some of the pressure on us, to assure

supply. And then once our labor problems were concluded, they

went back to us 100 percent. That’s my understanding.

Chairman TAUZIN. What’s intriguing about all that, is that in

1995, I think it was, you ran some tests on the tires indicator and

had an amazing, I think, 4 out of 10 failure rate. And—it was some

amazing results we had at the last hearing. Is that correct?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman, you and I got into this in the last

hearing about this testing and the results, and I think—I believe

that we agreed that a lot of this testing that you were referring to

was testing that we were doing on prototype tires and testing

where we actually—what we call test to failure, where you——

Chairman TAUZIN. But you found it wrong. You found an unevenness in the sidewalls, and you changed that to an even sidewall treatment, and you found also in 1998, I believe it was, that

you needed to strengthen or add amendments to the wedge. Is that

correct?

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t believe it was a matter, Congressman, of finding something that made us do something. We always try to——

Chairman TAUZIN. How do you——

Mr. LAMPE. We always try to improve our products. The wedge

change you’re referring to that we did in 1998, we talked about at

the last hearing, and it covered over a 104 different sizes. It wasn’t

a change we made to the Explorer tire. It was over 104 different

sizes.

Chairman TAUZIN. It was many different——

Mr. LAMPE. As an improvement.

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Chairman TAUZIN. You and Ford now conducted the very same

tests on the Ford Explorer, the radius circle test, and you did it in

conformity with the Society of Automotive Engineers’ guidelines.

Now you used different peer vehicles than Ford did, apparently.

You used a different size track, I think. I don’t know if that makes

a difference. But your results are exactly the opposite of Ford’s.

You found an oversteering problem, and they found none, using the

same apparent engineers’ guidelines. You came out with totally different results. Now, who are we to believe, and how are we to know

what’s correct in these results?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman Tauzin, that’s why from the very start

we asked Ford to work with us, do this together with us, be a part

of this. It goes back to, Congressman—— Chairman TAUZIN. But that hasn’t happened. You’ve done separate tests.

Mr. LAMPE. No. It’s not—— Chairman TAUZIN. We’re stuck with the fact that each of you did

a separate test, using the same guidelines, and you got an expert

that says one thing, and they’ve got an expert that says another.

You’ve got one result, and they’ve got another result. Who’s going

to settle this for us?

Mr. LAMPE. That’s a very—and I’m glad you pointed out that it

was a—it was Dr. Gunther that did the tests. We did not do them

ourselves. This test is a very standard, recognizable test in the industry, and it’s very repeatable. It’s not something you do once and

you can never replicate. You can. I’m suggesting we are not the vehicle experts. We shouldn’t have had to do this in the first place,

Congressman. We should not have had to do it. But it can be replicated, and I would—— Chairman TAUZIN. I’m told that Ford did it on both the 100- and

the 200-meter track and again came up with opposite results from

you. So what you’re saying is somebody who doesn’t work for Ford,

who is not hired by Ford, somebody who doesn’t work for Firestone,

is not hired by Firestone, somebody ought to replicate this test?

Mr. LAMPE. I think it would be a very, very good idea. I will

point out one difference in Ford’s test, to my understanding, is they

tested vehicles at what they call .5 lateral G’s, which is an extremely, extremely violent kind of acceleration that nobody ever

gets to in normal driving. Dr. Gunther’s was done between .1 and

.3, which is under the normal driving conditions. But I’d be more

than willing to—— Chairman TAUZIN. But they were both done under the same engineering guidelines.

Mr. LAMPE. That would be great.

Chairman TAUZIN. You’re telling me they weren’t.

Mr. LAMPE. No, they were not.

Chairman TAUZIN. So we really need someone, some independent

analyst to tell us who’s right and who’s wrong here. Right?

Mr. LAMPE. I think that would be a great idea. We have—we’ve

done something that we shouldn’t have had to do in the first place,

and if NHTSA or a third party wanted to do this, we would be most

willing to cooperate, yes, 100 percent.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LAMPE. Thank you, Congressman.

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Mr. STEARNS. I thank the chairman.

Mr. Gordon is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GORDON. Welcome, Mr. Lampe. A quick lead to—at the request of the committee staff and to complete our record, you had

mentioned in your testimony that there were 4 deaths in the last

10 days in Venezuela based on tread separation on nonFirestone

tires. We have no record of that. If you could provide us with some

documentation.

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, sir. I did not—I was not aware that you don’t.

We have—we will provide you—we have 43 individually documented judicial cases, which means they’re either certified or registered by a judge or——

Mr. GORDON. If you could just provide that——

Mr. LAMPE. We’ll do that.

Mr. GORDON. [continuing] to the committee.

I’d like to get on to the two questions I had asked Mr. Nasser

earlier. To my understanding, the same Firestone tires used on the

Ford Explorer are also used as original equipment on the Ford

rangers. These same tires are evidently used on two other popular

SUVs, the Toyota 4-Runner and the Jeep Grand Cherokee. Claims

data shows that owners of vehicles other than the Explorer have

virtually no problems with tread separation leading to rollovers.

What does this suggest about the Explorer’s design or handling

characteristics and their contribution to the problems?

Mr. LAMPE. You’re exactly right, Congressman, and I heard the

question when you asked it of Mr. Nasser. The exact——

Mr. GORDON. That’s an addendum, and a quick addendum. There

appears to be a major difference between—or Mr. Nasser just clearly said that the Toyota and the Jeep Cherokee were not the same

tires. If you can correct that, too, or give us your view?

Mr. LAMPE. Very brief, the exact same tire that we supply the

Ford Explorer is the exact same tire that goes on the Ford Ranger,

and already we’ve said that the Ford Explorer has 8 times as more

claims than the Ranger does. We supplied 3.1 million tires, of our

Wilderness tires, to General Motors, and we had 2 claims. We supplied over 1.2 million Wilderness tires to the Toyota 4-Runner, and

we had zero claims.

And the question that calls into being is why do we supply tires,

Wilderness AT to Ford, that appear on vehicles that have accidents

and rollovers, and why do we supply tires to others that it doesn’t?

Mr. Nasser said the tires were not the same tires, and I’ll agree

to that. They have slight differences, as established by the OEM,

for such things as fuel economy or road noise or something; but the

basic Wilderness AT tire, 85 percent, 90 percent, of that tire is the

same whether it goes to Ford, whether it goes to General Motors,

or whether it goes to Toyota. There are some tweaks for the OEMs.

Mr. GORDON. My second question was, 1 year ago, Ford initiated

an almost identical replacement program in Venezuela to replace

Firestone tires with other brands. Even though Explorers are now

using other brands of tires in Venezuela, it’s my understanding

that the Explorer rollovers have continued at a high enough rate

to cause the head of the country’s consumer protection agency to

suggest banning sales of Explorers.

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Why has replacement of Firestone tires in Venezuela not brought

an end to the problem, and will the replacement of Firestone tires

on the Explorer end the problem in the United States?

Mr. LAMPE. And that’s our big dilemma, Congressman. We’ve

seen what happened in Venezuela. Ford has said it was a tire

issue. They replaced the tires. We didn’t replace them. They did.

But the problems continue. The rollovers continue. You’re right.

The head of the Consumer Protection Agency came out and requested the Attorney General to ban the sale of Ford Explorers,

and just this morning, there was an article in a Venezuela newspaper that quoted the president of the Explorer Owners Association, stating that this is a vehicle problem, this is not a tire problem. We don’t have tires left on Ford Explorers. And I’m not saying

the tires that are on the Explorers today in Venezuela are failing.

They’re not. Unfortunately, the vehicle continues to roll over.

Mr. GORDON. Could you also provide us documentation of

that——

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, I will.

Mr. GORDON. [continuing] news article?

Mr. LAMPE. I certainly will. Thank you.

Mr. GORDON. I guess if there is any time left, I will offer this to

you to clear up any kind of differences of opinion from the earlier

witness.

Mr. LAMPE. No, I’m not going to use my time to do that. I’m just

going to reaffirm one thing that Mr. Nasser said. The decision that

I had to make and my company had to make a couple weeks ago

to terminate our relationship with the Ford Motor Company was

the most difficult, most painful decision I’ve ever made. Ninety-six

years of heritage. Harvey Firestone, Henry Ford were great friends.

We did not take that decision lightly. As I said, it’s a very difficult

decision, but it was the only decision that we could take. It was the

right decision to take at the time.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. The

Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Deal, for 5 minutes.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here.

Mr. LAMPE. Thank you.

Mr. DEAL. You have stated that the important thing is what happens after the tire separation. I would submit to you that we are

basically talking about two events, both of which may be calamitous here. The first is the tire separation. The second is possibly

a rollover following a tire separation. You’ve indicated that you

think it is a combination vehicle/tire problem that we’re addressing.

So my first question to you, then, is based on the fact that you’re

saying that relatively the same tire does not have the same potential problems 8 times, I believe you said, less with a Ranger versus

an Explorer. Are you contending that there is something in the design of the Ranger that causes the tire separation?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman Deal, my comment was—and I’m sorry

if I confused this. The——

Mr. DEAL. I understand your comment. I’m simply asking——

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Mr. LAMPE. No. No. But I’ve got to clarify one thing you said real

fast. The incident of claims for tread separations on the Ranger is

8 times less than the Ford Explorer.

Mr. DEAL. But, now, is that a claim that is followed by a rollover

that precipitates the definition of claim?

Mr. LAMPE. The rollover event on a Ford Ranger is practically

nonexistent. It’s practically nonexistent.

Mr. DEAL. The separation is 8 times less on the Ranger?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DEAL. Are you then contending that there is something

about the design of the Explorer that causes the tire separation?

Mr. LAMPE. We keep looking at that. We talked about that last

fall. We talked about why so many rear-tire failures, why so many

left-rear-tire failures. We have not had any scientific findings that

would suggest that, to date, that would suggest that there is something on the Ford Explorer, other than the inflation pressure and

the weight, which is extremely important, but nothing mechanical

on the Explorer causing a tread separation.

But we still believe when we go back to the Ford chart on the

weight of the Explorer, that one of the Congressman brought up,

that that inflation pressure is extremely important. And Congressman—or, Chairman Tauzin, you’ll remember last year we talked

about 26 pounds, and we asked Ford to let us move our tire to 30.

They agreed on a range from 26 to 30. We then went back and

said, please, Ford, we want you to recognize 30 pounds for our tire.

They did that, and 2 weeks ago I was meeting with Ford, and their

top engineer for passenger cars and SUVs told me they have now

gone to 30 pounds for all manufacturers.

Mr. DEAL. So the only thing—— Mr. LAMPE. So they probably recognized that 26 was not sufficient as well.

Mr. DEAL. So the only thing you can account for in that regard

may be the tire pressure might attribute to that fact?

Mr. LAMPE. Air pressure and load; yes, sir.

Mr. DEAL. Now, the second thing you indicated was that in the

tests that you had performed, your tire compared favorably with all

of its competitors, and I assume these were tests on your tire that

has now been recalled?

Mr. LAMPE. No, sir, this is just the latest testing that we’ve done,

testing that we’ve done within the last 90 days, 120 days on our

tires, which would not include the recalled tires. They’re already,

for the most part, off the road.

Mr. DEAL. Are you contending that your initial recall was not

necessary?

Mr. LAMPE. The additional action taken by Ford?

Mr. DEAL. The initial recall that you made.

Mr. LAMPE. No, I never suggested that, sir. You asked me if we

did testing, if this testing reflects tires that we recall; and I’m saying, no, it does not.

Mr. DEAL. All right.

Mr. LAMPE. Those tires are off the road. This is current production tires.

Mr. DEAL. All right. So you’re not insisting that the tires that

were initially recalled by your action didn’t have problems?

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Mr. LAMPE. No, sir, I am not.

Mr. DEAL. All right.

Now, you were generally asked a question about the difference

in performance of your tires based on their location of manufacture,

and I believe you indicated that it may have something to do with

which vehicles the tires go on; and I think we are talking here exclusively about all explorers and that it may have some something

do with some going to Southern States.

I couldn’t help being a little paranoid, as a Southerner, recognizing that all the tires made in the South seem to perform pretty

good, everybody; it’s only the tires made in the North and sent to

the South that have problems. That gives me a little bit of pause

here.

Mr. LAMPE. You said that. I didn’t.

Mr. DEAL. Is there any other explanation that you can offer with

regard to the differentiation between point of manufacture and performance?

Mr. LAMPE. It is also the type of tire that is produced. You might

have a commercial light truck tire being produced in one plant,

versus an over-the-road passenger tire in another. You would expect to see a higher separation rate, claim rate, if you will, on the

commercial light truck tire because of its application.

So application has a lot to do with it as well, Mr. Deal.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LAMPE. Thank you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutsch, for 5 minutes.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lampe, there have been allegations that Ford basically

pushed Firestone with its demands to improve the Explorer’s stability and gas mileage, and that Firestone ended up going along

with those demands, but didn’t tell Ford that the tire would not be

as robust if that were to occur.

Looking back on that sort of period, first of all, if you can talk

about the veracity of those allegations; but also, knowing what you

know now, would you be doing things differently in terms of

changes that you made.

Mr. LAMPE. I am not aware of any changes that were done for

the reasons you stated, Congressman. Yes, frankly, looking back— you’ve asked me that; I have been asked that before. Looking back,

the air pressure of 26 pounds was a bigger factor than we originally thought.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Okay. Did Ford specifically ask you to lighten the

tire at any point?

Mr. LAMPE. We did lighten the tire. I have also seen that information. We lightened the tire, and I can’t remember which model

year it was. I don’t know if this was the result of an innovation,

an improvement that we could make on our tires, or if it was at

Ford’s request; but I will get that information for the record.

I do not know if that was at Ford’s request.

Mr. DEUTSCH. I appreciate if you can provide that.

We have placed into the record a June 16 article from the St. Petersburg Times reporting that a Fort Myers man died in March

after a Cooper tire tore apart and his Explorer flipped over.

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Another person was killed in Florida on May 16 of this year

when an unidentified non-Firestone rear tire fell apart.

An April 30 article from the Peoria General Star reported on the

death of an Illinois man who had replaced his Firestone tires with

Cooper tires.

Now, Cooper tires were not approved replacements for the Firestone tires. Do you have any evidence of Explorers rolling over on

non-Firestone, but approved, replacement tires after last year’s recalls.

Mr. LAMPE. Sir, I have got reports that have been sent to me

from media reports that—of a number of cases of Explorer rollovers

on competitor tires other than—in addition to those that you have

mentioned. There were two or three in California; there was one

in Georgia. There have been a number, but I do not—I do not have

an adjudication, I do not have a certification, of these. They have

just been reported on competitor tires.

Mr. DEUTSCH. I think that’s an issue again where whatever information you have, if you can provide the committee and committee staff with that obviously very helpful information.

Mr. LAMPE. I believe we’ve provided that, but I’ll double-check

and make sure you get that.

Mr. DEUTSCH. We have the performance specifications that Ford

provided to both Firestone and Goodyear for the Explorer tires.

What changes need to be made in these specifications to avoid another disaster? Or is it possible? I mean, do you have any suggestions about that?

Mr. LAMPE. I think we need to continue to improve our ability

to exchange information with the automobile manufacturer.

Congressman, last fall I said that we’ve got to know a lot more

about the vehicle, that we’ve got to know a lot more about our

tires, and we’ve got to talk a lot more about what, if they increase

the weight from 5,000 pounds to 5,600 pounds, we need to know.

If we change something in our tire that is going to affect the performance of that vehicle, they need to know. And I said back then

that I am firmly convinced, that is the best thing we can do is,

share more information, be open with each other and make sure we

understand how the tire and the vehicle interact.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Now, you have just emphasized the importance of

vehicle weight to tire performance. When did you first learn that

Ford had increased the Explorer’s weight by 600 pounds in the

model year 1996?

Mr. LAMPE. And I can’t speak for the 45,000 people in my company. That would be kind of an unfair statement. We did not become aware at the management level until we got into this whole

issue about weight and inflation, which was last year. That is the

first time we became aware that Ford had increased the weight

from 1990 to 1996, and then they decreased it, back down.

And what’s interesting about that is our highest rate of claims

on the Ford Explorer are those 2 years where the weight was the

highest. Our claims were less before, and they’ve come down since

the weight came down. Whether that is a strong correlation or not,

I would suggest it is.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Were you surprised that Firestone was not informed of the change in the weight?

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Mr. LAMPE. I am surprised, in looking back at it. I wasn’t involved in the Ford-Firestone relationship back in 1996. I would

have had no reason to be involved, but I am surprised that we

weren’t informed.

Mr. DEUTSCH. And as you’ve testified at this point, then how important is the vehicle’s weight to tire performance?

Mr. LAMPE. It is very important. It’s very important. Weight and

inflation are the two most important things to tire performance. If

a tire becomes underinflated, or if it becomes overloaded, that tire

is going to run the risk of being damaged.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Let me just ask one last question.

I asked Mr. Nasser about testimony that Ford experts have given

at trial regarding the ability to drive, or the average driver to

drive, in a situation where the treads basically come apart. What

would your position be in terms of the ability of a driver to drive

in that situation?

Mr. LAMPE. As Goodyear stated on four different occasions, tread

separation is not an unusual tire failure. All tires will fail, all tires

can fail if they’re not taken care of, if they’re abused. But probably

the most compelling thing is a presentation that Goodyear made to

NHTSA back in—I believe in March; and I am sure NHTSA can

provide you a copy. And there are two things I’d like to read from

their presentation. I mean, I—it is here—this is Ford’s presentation

to NHTSA back in March, Ford’s presentation:

‘‘Like other SUVs, Explorer’s handling capacity, even with a separated tire, is sufficient to allow a safe stop.’’ that’s one statement

by Ford.

The other one:

‘‘Explorers have a margin of safety, as designed, to accommodate

a reasonable level of component failures, including tread separations.’’ they said this in March.

Dr. Guenther comes out in May and says, there’s a problem because it is a foreseeable event; and now Ford is saying, well, they

don’t design their cars for that after all—very important.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. The

Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you.

I’d like to welcome and thank you for your patience also. Let me

ask you some questions, some of which may be answered briefly,

maybe even yes or no; but I have got about five questions I’d like

to cover with you.

Referring back to last year, how long did it take Firestone to

complete the original tire recall which was ordered by NHTSA last

summer, and how many tires were recalled and were they all replaced?

Mr. LAMPE. We virtually completed the recall in about 5 months,

41⁄2 months. We replaced about—it is a little over 6 million tires.

We have continued to replace those tires; we’ve got up to about 6.3

million; we estimated there were about 6.5.

I am not sure, but if you ask NHTSA, I think they would probably tell you this is the highest percentage of reclaimed product on

a replacement program like this that’s ever been. They’re virtually

all off the road, Congressman.

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Mr. BRYANT. Given your successful completion of this tire recall

last year, is the current tire recall being conducted by Ford necessary?

Mr. LAMPE. No, sir, it’s not. The tires they’re replacing are perfectly safe tires.

Mr. BRYANT. What, if any, quality control measures has Firestone undertaken to prevent situations like the tire recall last summer from occurring again?

Mr. LAMPE. We’ve done a number of things, Congressman. We,

first of all, instituted an improved early warning system to make

sure that we can catch an issue when it’s an issue and before it

becomes a problem, and that is working. We have done some manufacturing changes in our product, in our plants, not only to—as

matter of continuous improvement.

But we understand that there will be tougher standards out

there in the future and tougher testing requirements by the

TREAD Act, and we want to make sure we are in full compliance

and ahead of the program on that.

We’ve also done some standardization in our plants, but we’ve

done a number of things as a result of lessons learned.

Mr. BRYANT. You mentioned the TREAD Act. Of course, Mr.

Upton’s here as the sponsor of that bill last year; and in response

to that bill, what changes, if any, has Firestone undertaken, anticipating the new defect reporting obligations under this act?

Mr. LAMPE. First of all, Congressman Upton, we’re fully supportive of your bill. RMA, the Rubber Manufacturers Association,

which includes all the major tire manufacturers, including Goodyear, Michelin, Cooper, we have been very supportive. And we will

continue to support NHTSA and work for a successful implementation of that act.

One of things we’ve changed, Congressman Bryant, is the reporting system on our quality control procedures. We have a quality

control committee that reports directly to me and is accountable directly to me. They bring any issues that have come up through our

early warning system, identifying when there are still issues.

It’s my decision, my responsibility to make the decision to either

go out and get those tires, or some other recourse, but we have

changed completely our reporting requirements.

Mr. BRYANT. I have got one final question.

I was in and out, visiting with constituents, and I don’t know if

you have been asked this question. But concerning the Wall Street

Journal article that talked about different ratings or classifications,

if you will, A, B, C of tires; and there’s been testimony that Mr.

Nasser addressed about perhaps their requirement that they use a

C-rated tire on the Explorer, and also that maybe they’ve gone to

a B-rated.

Could you distinguish in layman’s terms for us those ratings and

in terms of heat resistance and usage on an Explorer-type vehicle?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes. There are three ratings, basically A, B and C.

Ford did not—and I’d like to correct the Congressman’s statement a little bit. Ford did not specify a temperature grade, and

that I believe was Mr. Nasser’s testimony as well—just confirming

that. The C temperature grade is a perfectly acceptable temperature grade on passenger and light truck vehicles in the United

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States. It is not a reflection of geographic suitability. It’s a grade

that’s assigned during a high-speed, high-speed SAE test; and

again there are many vehicles—as Mr. Nasser said, there are millions of vehicles in the United States and all locations in all parts

of the country that have temperature grade C tires, temperature

grade B and a lesser population of temperature grade A.

Mr. BRYANT. So I think he mentioned that you did not necessarily make that distinction on the tires that you provided to

Ford, the Explorer vehicle, initially.

Mr. LAMPE. That is up until 1999. I believe it was 1999. As we

interpreted the regulations, we were not required to mark light

truck tires or tires that were used on light trucks, like SUVs, with

a UTQG designation. There were other manufacturers that didn’t

do it either, that interpreted the regulation the same way. NHTSA

had asked us in 1999 to begin marking those tires, and we did at

that time.

Mr. BRYANT. Very quickly, the last question on this, how in

terms of performance would a C-rated tire compare to a B-rated

tire.

Mr. LAMPE. Again, there are many, many factors of performance,

handling, maneuverability and so forth. Again, this is more of a

speed—it’s a speed-rated, high-speed test to see what tires can resist heat at high speeds; it is about 80 resistance, which is the top

B or a C.

The only performance—in my opinion, Congressman Bryant, the

only performance distinction would be the temperature generation

and resistance at high speeds.

Mr. BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

A few weeks ago Firestone gave the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration a preliminary report regarding handling and

oversteer problems in the Ford Explorer. Yet Firestone had known

from litigation in the mid-1990’s about the handling issues with the

Explorer.

Why didn’t Firestone approach NHTSA back in the mid-90’s or

late 1990’s about this issue, so that it could have been dealt with

as the safety issue which had already been identified in that earlier

time period before additional death and injury was caused by the

vehicle?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman Markey, it’s very difficult for me to answer that. I was not—as you know, I think, I just took over to be

CEO last October, and I was not in our technical or manufacturing

area. I don’t know that people at Firestone felt that there was a

vehicle problem, or not, back in the early 1990’s. Certainly there

were a few lawsuits that existed at that time on the Ford Explorer

that would suggest—that existed for rollovers, but I can’t tell you

if anybody in our company approached NHTSA or not.

I don’t believe they did.

Mr. MARKEY. No, I don’t think they did. The question is, why

didn’t they?

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What we’re all interested in here is clearly the dysfunctional relationship that exists not only between Ford and NHTSA, but between Firestone and NHTSA. And I think we’re concluding pretty

much between both industries and NHTSA in terms of the responsibility, which each company feels that it has to bring information

to NHTSA, that could help provide additional safety for the American family?

Mr. LAMPE. I agree with you completely. I don’t consider our relationship with NHTSA dysfunctional. We have a tremendous

amount of cooperation, but—— Mr. MARKEY. I don’t mean now. I know it’s improved a lot.

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman, I can only assume and I can only say

that I guess if there was an issue we felt we would, Ford would

bring it to the forefront. They’re the experts. They know the stability of their vehicles; and other than that, it’s really hard for me

to comment because I wasn’t in the position back then.

Mr. MARKEY. No, I appreciate your passing the buck there over

to Ford; and you, as well—because of the litigation, you as well

knew there was a huge issue here—again, not you sir, you weren’t

in the position at that point in time. But it’s a real issue.

Let me ask you a question. I would just like to get your view on

it. The roof crush standard is 30 years old. Would you support a

new roof crush standard to be developed to reflect a rise of SUVs

on our roadways and the higher probability of rollovers in these vehicles?

Mr. LAMPE. I support Congressman Upton’s TREAD Act that will

increase the testing on tires.

Mr. MARKEY. I’m not talking testing. I am talking about an actual roof crush standard, so that families aren’t, as the vehicle rolls

over, crushed to death inside of the vehicle.

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman Markey, I am not the vehicle expert,

but I would support anything that would improve public safety as

long as there was a risk/benefit analysis associated with it to see

the practicability of it.

Mr. MARKEY. Well, obviously, from your own testimony, Ford has

increased from 5,000 to 5,600 pounds the weight of the vehicle; and

this pretty much becomes a weight issue, how much weight do you

want to now build into this roof protection so that the consumer

is—the American driver or passenger is not crushed.

Mr. LAMPE. And I’m certainly not trying to be flippant at all in

a subject like this, but yes, you could design a people—you could

put people in tanks, and they wouldn’t be hurt on rollovers. The

only matter is, is that practical; and I am not qualified to say that.

But I am for anything that improves public safety.

Mr. MARKEY. How about the use of advanced window glazing inside of the window to prevent glass from falling out in crashes? Do

you think that makes sense?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman, you’re asking me to comment on something that’s way out of my realm of expertise. Excuse me.

Mr. MARKEY. Okay. Okay.

I would like it if you could to give us, for the record, any information that Firestone has, any memos that deal with what you knew

about the handling and oversteer problems back in the mid- and

late-90’s from these lawsuits, and what you knew about what Ford

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knew on these issues at that time, so that we can get a handle on

how long ago it was that it was clear that there was a big issue

here.

Would you provide for the committee memos, any memos that

Firestone has developed or has access to that came from other companies relating to that, those issues during that time period?

Mr. LAMPE. If that information has not already been provided,

certainly we will provide that, Congressman.

Mr. MARKEY. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Shimkus.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask, on the information you provided us, Mr. Lampe, the chart here, it says Florida Single Vehicle Highway Fatal Incident Crash Rates by Model

Year. I think it’s in section one, the third or fourth chart. The

charts were Florida and Texas accident data limited to a single vehicle highway accident where a tire was a contributing factor of the

accident. The question, again, is trying to clear up data and data

supplied to us.

Why didn’t you include the Mercury Mountaineer in your definition of a Ford Explorer? You did include the Mazda Navajo, correct?

Mr. LAMPE. I asked that same question, Congressman, because

I was mystified as to why. It’s the same tire, we supply the same

tire to the Mountaineer. It is my understanding that the Mountaineer has a different suspension than the Explorer and the Navajo do. That’s my understanding.

I am sure somebody from Ford could answer that, but that’s why

they were not included, because they were not an apples-to-apples

comparison.

Mr. SHIMKUS. I am sure we’ll be able to get a response from

Ford. We’ll follow up on that and we’ve got staff shaking their

heads yes.

Let me go to another issue that I raised in other questions, and

it deals with this whole standards requirement; and again I will go

back to an issue—again, you were not CEO at the time we worked

through the TREAD Act. I did raise the nylon cap issue then and

I just raise it now, really as a point of discussion.

In a Time magazine article of September 2000 they—their basic

premise of the article stated that with the advent of increased

highway speeds, it may now be time to revisit nylon caps as vehicles get heavier, as heat and aspects—what is your position on the

nylon cap, and is it or is it not needed. And why—do you produce

tires with a nylon cap and why do you produce some for one type

of vehicle and not for other types of vehicles?

Mr. LAMPE. Again, at the risk that I’m not a tire expert or engineer; but I’ve worked with the company for 27 years, so let me try

to answer that to the best of my ability.

We do make some tires with nylon caps. Nylon cap ply strips are

used for high-speed applications. They were originally, to my understanding, developed in Europe for the autobahn. We have done

a lot of tests, and they do improve the high-speed capability of

tires. And the higher speed that you go, the higher speed rating

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you go on a tire, the more likely you are to find cap strips and cap

plies.

We have also done tests that would indicate that cap strips and

cap plies have no noticeable effect on a tire, with a tire separation,

getting a separation or having a separation occur. They’re more to

hold the tread in place at very, very high speeds.

I think there are millions and millions and millions of tires on

the American road today, hundreds of millions that don’t have

nylon strips, nylon cap plies, and they function and operate just

fine. If we were ever to go to a system, perhaps, God forbid, like

in Germany with no speed limit, then certainly they would be required much, much more than today.

Mr. SHIMKUS. In a follow-up to comments and questions with Mr.

Nasser—and I am sure we’ll get better information after

everybody’s sorted through the transcript—it was our understanding that Ford did move to push nylon caps for Venezuela and

Saudi Arabia, on their tires being sold in those locations. We didn’t

get a definitive answer from Ford whether that was true.

Do you have any information on that?

Mr. LAMPE. I believe, sir, that today the competitive tire they’re

using in Venezuela does have a nylon cap ply or a nylon cap strip.

It is also my understanding that the speeds in Saudi Arabia and

Venezuela, both, are extremely high. People routinely drive 100

miles an hour. So those two areas might very well justify cap plies

or cap strips.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Stupak.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lampe, at the September 5th hearing, I asked Mr. Ono, who

was then representing Firestone, whether they would join us in

calling for and cooperating in a blue ribbon, independent panel to

perform review on all the AT, ATX Wilderness tires, and determine

the cause, and propose solutions.

Is Firestone still committed to a blue ribbon, independent committee?

Mr. LAMPE. We were committed then, Congressman. As long as

it looks at both the vehicle and the tire interaction with the vehicle, we would certainly join with that committee.

Mr. STUPAK. I think that’s a problem. Shouldn’t we let the committee decide what it should look at if it’s truly going to be independent?

Mr. LAMPE. Mr. Stupak, we strongly believe that you’ve got to

look at the tire-vehicle interaction, because one doesn’t make sense

of the study itself.

Mr. STUPAK. But then we get results like you have with the

Guenther report, where you have completely the same results

based on scientific study, but we get two different organizations

here advocating two different results of the same scientific study.

So shouldn’t you really let an independent panel determine what

it should look at and what it should not look at?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman, I would agree that an independent

panel certainly gives a he-said/she-said, removed type of report; but

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again, I would strongly encourage that panel, if they want to understand what is happening in the field today, to look at the tire

and the vehicle and the interaction between those two.

Mr. STUPAK. In the earlier testimony, they talked about—I guess

they called it the field data tests that Ford did about the—they put

the hundred, I am sorry, 1,083 separations with the Firestone and

two separations with Goodyear tires on their vehicles. Roughly 3

million Goodyear tires were tested and 3 million Firestone tires

were tested.

Do you remember that testimony?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, I do.

Mr. STUPAK. And you got a copy of that report?

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t know if we did or not, Congressman.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. According to Mr. Nasser, you received it, the

committee received it, and NHTSA received it.

Mr. LAMPE. That’s fine.

Mr. STUPAK. How do you explain that, when you do 3 million

Goodyear and 3 million Firestones?

Mr. LAMPE. It’s very interesting. You say that this same committee back last year got a document, you refer to it as Document

54.

Mr. STUPAK. No, no, let’s stick with this document.

Mr. LAMPE. What I am trying to explain is, Document 54 showed

that Ford had received 10 complaints about Goodyear

separation——

Mr. STUPAK. See, that’s not my question.

Mr. LAMPE. [continuing] and now they’re saying two.

Mr. STUPAK. I want to ask the questions.

Mr. LAMPE. I am sorry. I misunderstood.

Mr. STUPAK. You are only going to interpret what you want to

interpret.

I’m asking specifically about this one, not Document 54, but this

study here about the 3 million Goodyear tires and 3 million Firestone; any idea how you get the differences? If you don’t, you don’t.

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t know how Goodyear classifies claims, Congressman, and I can’t explain the number ‘‘2’’ that is shown for

Goodyear, when we talked about 10 already last year.

No, I cannot explain it.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. But you would agree with me would you

not, that without tire separation, we don’t have to worry about

understeering and oversteering on the vehicle?

Mr. LAMPE. No. I would not agree with you, Congressman, on

that.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Well, what else? Do you have to worry about

understeering and oversteering without losing control?

Mr. LAMPE. It’s my understanding that any type of ride disturbance, such as a tread separation, could possibly induce the same

characteristic and same need for understeer versus oversteer in a

vehicle.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay, other than tread separation, what else do you

get in an oversteer or understeer situation?

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t know, Congressman. I would think there are

a number of things that could happen to the rear of the vehicle

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that would induce the same sort of situation, but again, I am not

a vehicle dynamics expert.

Mr. STUPAK. In this whole situation here on some of the charts

that have been up here, I think there was a yellow chart your assistant there has been putting up there. I think it is Attachment

No. 3 in your testimony.

You talk about tread separations as sort of a common occurrence

with vehicles; is that correct?

Mr. LAMPE. No, I wouldn’t characterize it, and I think I previously said I would not characterize it as a common occurrence.

Tread separation is a very rare event considering the millions and

millions and millions of tires that are made.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Very rare event?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. We have more blowouts than we do of tire separations?

Mr. LAMPE. No. Again, in my opinion, Congressman, and Goodyear backs that up, tire separations are the most common-type tire

failure.

Mr. STUPAK. How many tire separations do we have each year

in this country; do you have any idea?

Mr. LAMPE. No idea, Congressman.

Mr. STUPAK. Of all these rollovers, do you know how many are

not tire separations?

Mr. LAMPE. All I can tell the Congressman is that the FARS

data, Federal Fatal Accident Reporting Systems data, from 1990 to

1999 on the Ford Explorer single vehicle rollover accidents, 6 percent of those accidents alleged a tire involvement. There were 94

percent of those rollover accidents that did not have any tire-related factor to them.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. The Explorer—and you have a chart up there

about the gross vehicle weight and the changes by year and tire

pressure and load, you said, are—well, weight are very critical.

When you have a tire separation, your vehicle weight will shift,

will it not; the critical mass of a vehicle will then change?

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t know that to be a fact, sir. And I did not see

that in Dr. Guenther’s report. I can’t say that it does or doesn’t.

I am sorry. I can find out for you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LAMPE. Would you like for me to find out about that, Congressman Stupak.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. I’d appreciate it. Thank you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton, for 5 minutes.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Lampe, I appreciate your remarks in support of the

TREAD Act, which was signed by the President last year. Again,

I was sorry that I was late coming back; and I was not here for

Mr. Nasser’s testimony.

But in reading it, he said this and I quote from page 2:

‘‘our tire team worked closely with NHTSA every step of the way.

We also shared our data and analysis with Firestone—Dr. Sanjay

Govindjee, who conducted an independent investigation at Firestone’s request.’’

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He goes on to say, ‘‘And we did detailed engineering analysis of

failed tires to give us an understanding of real-world failure mechanisms. Our findings prove consistent with the findings of Dr.

Govindjee,’’ and goes on to say, ‘‘Firestone’s Wilderness reached the

following conclusions, Firestone Wilderness AT tires experience

higher rates of tread separations than other tires, including the

Goodyear tires used on the Explorer.’’ Now what is interesting to me as I read that testimony is then

to look at today’s Wall Street Journal when it says ‘‘Sanjay

Govindjee,’’ the same individual, ‘‘an expert hired by Bridgestone/

Firestone,’’ then it goes on here to say, ‘‘a unit of Japan’s

Bridgestone/Firestone Corp. last year to report on the root cause of

more than 2,100 tread tires used on previous-generation Ford Explorers, said yesterday that the tire company officials didn’t provide

him with certain data that he requested during his inquiry. Dr.

Govindjee, a professor of civil engineering at University of California, Berkeley, said he wasn’t shown criteria information last

year about changes made to a critical component of Wilderness AT

and ATX tires.’’ Further, it goes on to say, ‘‘I am a little perplexed as to why I

wasn’t shown certain data about the wedge change. Clearly, the

wedge is important in tread separations. The thing that’s unanswered is how important is that change that they made.’’ Comment.

Mr. LAMPE. Not exactly sure what information Dr. Govindjee’s

referring to. We gave him tons of information. We talked about the

wedge change here.

Mr. UPTON. He was your guy, right?

Mr. LAMPE. We hired him as an independent third party investigator, Congressman, to be exactly that, completely independent.

We gave him tons of data. If there is something we didn’t give him?

Mr. UPTON. Because Ford says, Nasser said in his statement,

their conclusion was with him, the guy you hired.

Mr. LAMPE. And Dr. Govindjee’s conclusion was consistent with

ours, our root cause analysis. We have no difference with—differences with Dr. Govindjee; his findings confirmed our root cause

analysis on the recalled population of tires. That’s what his mission

was.

But if there is anything that Dr. Govindjee didn’t get that he

feels he needs, we’ll be sure he gets that.

Mr. UPTON. One of the frustrations I think Chairman Tauzin

mentioned in his question, is, we do want to get to the bottom of

this. We want an independent party who can tell us who’s right

and who’s wrong, and get the bad tires off if, in fact, they are.

I’ll bet you have seen this Ford document they think they provided to all of their dealers of the tire replacement program. In it,

it says, ‘‘Once the Wilderness AT tires reach 3 years old, the failure

rate increases considerably’’—the tires they brought up on the dias

a little bit earlier were 3 years old, by the way—laboratory and vehicle testing by Ford shows that tire design variations and physical

characteristics of the Wilderness AT tires makes them less durable

than comparable tires from other manufacturers. Information

shared by NHTSA shows that failure rates for actual road performance for many of the Wilderness AT tires were measurably worse

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than comparable tires from other manufacturers, and data recently

received from Firestone shows that failure tests had increased significantly for some of the Wilderness AT tires. Because Ford does

not have sufficient confidence in the future performance of these

tires as they age, we’re acting now.’’ That’s their document that they have provided to all their dealers.

Now, one of the arguments in support of the TREAD Act, which

passed without dissent last year, was the provision that we included involving criminal sanctions, and the whole idea was to say

that when a manufacturer or someone involved in the sale of automotive product was aware that that product was going to lead to

serious injury or death that they would come forward to NHTSA

and act before those deaths and injuries happen.

Tires that I have here I think perhaps would have led to serious

death or injury a little bit earlier and it shows that the sanctions

we put in there work, the idea worked. Rather than going back

after the fact, after the accident, we had it before. And based on

the evidence that Ford is showing us with this and the comments

made earlier, I think that they knew that, in fact, those tires were

going be unsafe, they were going to lead to serious injury; and to

make sure that they were not only protecting their customers, but

they knew that they would probably be subject to criminal prosecution, they decided to submit that data and make that decision before NHTSA came up with their final conclusion.

Mr. LAMPE. And I don’t agree with their conclusion at all.

Our tires are safe. Our tires are performing well on the roads.

Mr. UPTON. I don’t know all that many people personally that

have an Explorer. The ones that I do have had trouble with their

tires, all of them, 100 percent.

Mr. LAMPE. I would very much like to have our engineers look

at the tires that you brought in today, Congressman. I’d like to see

what is—— Mr. UPTON. And three—by the way, three of the four tires that

that individual had had that same type of early tread separation.

Mr. LAMPE. I’d certainly like to have those tires examined and

if you would work with us on that, I’ll get you the findings back.

Mr. UPTON. Last—I know my time is expiring—if we can get as

part of the record, I don’t know or not, Dr. Sanjay’s report to you

all, in terms of what he submitted, we’d appreciate that for the

record.

Mr. LAMPE. I believe that Dr. Govindjee’s report has been provided to the committee. If not, Congressman Upton, we’ll certainly

do that.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The staff informs me that we have that document, and we will make it available to the gentleman from Michigan.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.

Doyle.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one question,

and it’s really a follow-up to something Mr. Stupak was talking to,

too, because it’s very, very frustrating, the issue of trying to sort

through all the claims and counterclaims.

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But as I was reading through Ford testimony, they point to this

one example of what they claim is the only apples-to-apples comparison, and I think you alluded to it earlier, Mr. Lampe, in your

testimony when you said, in the period 1995 to 1997, because of

some labor unrest or something, that Ford had taken some of the

pressure off of Firestone by introducing some Goodyear tires into

their line; but that it was sort of a way of taking the pressure off

of supply. So that during those 3 years, 1995 to 1997, ‘‘we were

equipping the Ford Explorer with Goodyear and Firestone tires.’’ And their claim is that roughly 3 million Firestone tires were

equipped on about 500,000 Explorers; and that your own claims

data base shows that there were 1,183 claims of tread separation

and that there were also about 3 million Goodyear tires on another

500,000 Explorers that traveled more than 25 billion miles and

that their data base shows only two minor claims of tread separation. And I guess the question, or the point they’re making, is that

if the car was the issue, if the Explorer was the cause of the tread

separation, or at least a contributing factor to it, wouldn’t there be

more of—you know, wouldn’t these two be more in the same ball

park.

The Firestone AT tires on the Explorers had 600 times more

tread separation claims than the Goodyear, and you would think,

if the car was the culprit, that they’d be a little bit more in the ball

park, the Goodyear and the Firestone tires; and I’m just wondering

how you square that, because it seems to me to be the only applesto-apples data we have here.

Mr. LAMPE. And just two comments, Congressman. Once again,

that information is based on claims data, and I really don’t—I don’t

have access to the Goodyear data and I don’t know how they identify, how they, what their definition of ‘‘claims’’ is, if it’s the same

definition that we’ve got. Because nobody ever used ‘‘claims’’ up

until 8 months ago. So I don’t know that it is an apples-to-apples

comparison.

But if you look at our tire, that tire you were talking about that

had those separations—which, by the way, the vast majority of

those separations you’re talking to are tires that we’ve replaced,

that we’ve recalled.

But if you look at that exact same tire we make today and put

it on the Ranger, you have 800 percent less amount of claims than

you do on the Explorer.

Mr. DOYLE. So what you’re saying is that Goodyear doesn’t report

tire separations the same way you do, or there’s no standard way

of reporting?

Mr. LAMPE. I’m saying I don’t know how they report. Claims—

we have never used claims as a performance indicator up until August of last year, July and August. We always used adjustments,

warning adjustments. So this claim is a whole new classification,

if you will, of tires. We had to define the classification for us in

order to give the information to NHTSA.

I do not know if Goodyear has the same definition of ‘‘claims.’’ I don’t know, maybe they say anything over $500 is a ‘‘claim,’’ anything less is just an ‘‘adjustment.’’ So I don’t know that we can compare those unless I can see exactly the Goodyear information.

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Mr. DOYLE. So you’re saying that it’s conceivable that there could

have been 1,000 tread separations with Goodyear tires, and if the

damage was under $500, they may not have reported it?

Mr. LAMPE. I think that’s kind of stretching it. I’m not trying to

get you to believe that. I am just saying that I don’t know what

an accurate number would be for Goodyear unless I knew for sure

that it was defined exactly the same, Congressman.

Mr. DOYLE. Let me ask you one final question. If the car was the

culprit, would you expect that the tire separation rates would be

roughly equal between the two tires?

Mr. LAMPE. If the Explorer inflation and load factors were the

same, I would—I would think that the—the effect would be the

same on the tires.

Mr. DOYLE. It would be interesting to see how Goodyear does

their claims. Thank you.

Mr. DINGELL. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOYLE. Yes, I would.

Mr. DINGELL. When Ford orders, or rather commences, negotiation with you about purchasing tires to be put on its Explorer, it

gives you essentially a series of performance specifications; does it

not?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, I believe that’s a term I used.

Mr. DINGELL. It says the tires are supposed to do these things

and these are the characteristics of the vehicle; isn’t that right?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. And this is how the vehicle will be used. So Ford

has given you then performance specifications on both the Explorer

and on the Ranger; is that right?

Mr. LAMPE. That’s not entirely true, sir. They specify—they specified exactly the same tire to be used on the Explorer and the

Ranger; the exact, exact same tire is put on the Ranger. We ship

them to Ford they put some on Ranger, some on Explorer.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DINGELL. Could I ask unanimous consent, because I think it

is a very important point.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Does the gentleman ask unanimous consent

that the gentleman from Pennsylvania be given an additional 1

minute?

Mr. DOYLE. Yes.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objection.

Mr. DOYLE. And I yield to my chairman.

Mr. DINGELL. Doesn’t Ford give you specification for both the

Ranger and the Explorer, and you then manufacture a tire to suit

those?

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman Dingell, it’s my understanding that

Ford gave us one specification.

Mr. DINGELL. For the two?

Mr. LAMPE. To be used for the Ranger and the Ford Explorer; it’s

exactly the same tire.

Mr. DINGELL. Don’t the specifications design the weight, speed,

the carrying capacity, turning torque?

Mr. LAMPE. Ford designs the specifications. They gave us one

specification for the same tire to be used on the Ranger as is used

on the Explorer. They—in fact, that tire, when we ship it to Ford,

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it doesn’t know what vehicle it is going to go on. It arrives at Ford

and they put some on Rangers and some on the Explorers—doesn’t

make any difference.

Mr. DINGELL. Why are they failing then on Explorers and not

failing on Rangers?

Mr. LAMPE. Thank you, Congressman. That was my point exactly.

Mr. DINGELL. But why?

Mr. LAMPE. I think you have to look at the vehicle. The difference is the vehicle. The tire’s exactly the same; the difference is

the vehicle.

Mr. DINGELL. Well, are you telling me you’re not making a tire

that suits the Ford Explorer and does suit the Ranger.

Mr. LAMPE. I am telling you I—we’re making the tire that was

requested by Ford, that was specified by Ford.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DINGELL. The Ranger’s a pick-up truck; is it not?

Mr. LAMPE. The Ranger is a pick-up truck.

Mr. DINGELL. And the Explorer is an SUV?

Mr. LAMPE. Ford Explorer is an SUV, yes.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis,

for 5 minutes.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to apologize to

you and the committee; I have a great big, bad Superfund site not

only in my District, but in my hometown; and we had public meetings last night and this morning, and I had to be down there for

those because they were planned long in advance of this hearing.

Mr. Lampe, even before I heard some of the questions that were

asked of you—and I obviously did not hear your opening testimony—I felt that before we could ever get to the bottom, if we ever

will, of what has happened here, that certainly the interaction of

the tire and the vehicle has to be considered. And I think that

we’re just barking up the wrong tree if we don’t do that.

This is not to insinuate anything at all, but it’s just that we’ve

got to look at both of those, I think.

I did note in your testimony—pretty profound statement, your

written statement—and you said the odds of having a fatal accident in a Ford Explorer are three times greater than in any other

midsize SUVs.

Mr. LAMPE. And I believe you referring to Florida, we looked at

two different data bases Congressman. We looked at the Florida

test crash or the Florida crash data base and the Texas crash data

base and that statement came from one of those data bases yes, sir.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, now, how did you come to the belief that the

odds are three times greater?

Mr. LAMPE. The data base will show you single vehicle accidents,

single vehicle rollovers of the Explorer, and then it will show you

all the other SUVs and it will show you if it was tire-related or not

tire-related. That all comes from Florida’s data base, and we simply

then had statistical methods applied to that data base to determine

the odds of one versus the other.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, you say it would tell you whether it was

tire-related or not. In other words, I mean, is the fact that there

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are three times more fatal accidents in a Ford Explorer than in

other midsize SUV—is that a fact regardless of whether it involves

tires, regardless of whether it involves seatbelts, regardless of any

other factor? Is that right; is that what your testimony is?

Mr. LAMPE. In the written, that comes directly from the Florida

data base, yes.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. So that’s a black and white figure?

Mr. LAMPE. Straight from the data, sir, it’s my understanding.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Straight from the data.

Well, a general question, sir. It seems that there’s, there were a

large number of claims in this country, problems overseas, with

these tires, your tires, dating back to 1997. And this is certainly

a question that I think has to be asked of the next panel, Mr. Jackson, but I would ask you, why is it that something more was not

done prior to, let’s say, last summer, July, the middle of last year

in terms of examining relevant data base bases?

What I’m trying to get to here is, you know, after the fact, which

is what we’re doing here, after the fact, I realize there might still

be some accidents—isolated accidents taking place after out there.

But after the fact, I mean, does it—maybe you get to the problem,

you try to solve the problem, but in the meantime, an awful lot of

terrible things have happened.

So could you, could Ford, could or should the government have

gotten more involved in trying to prevent all of these things that

took place after—once—you know, it’s been a year-and-a-half now

that we have known the problems were developing, claims have

been—were being filed.

Mr. LAMPE. And you’re referring, Congressman, to the events

leading up to last August recall announcement?

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I’m referring to—I’m referring to claims regarding

these tires that went back to 1997.

Mr. LAMPE. Leading up to August?

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yeah, leading up to it exactly.

Mr. LAMPE. And we did an awful lot of work, and we did a lot

together with Ford. Ford alerted us of a situation in Saudi Arabia.

We went over there with a team of engineers and, together with

Ford, went out and examined a lot of tires.

The conditions in Saudi Arabia are very extreme, Congressman.

We covered those last year when we talked. Already very, very flat

loads, very high speeds. In many cases they will go off the highways onto the sand, deflate their tires because it gives them more

flotation. Then they come back on the highways and there isn’t any

place to reinflate their tires so they travel long distances with very

severely underloaded tires.

We looked at the tire. There was not a tire problem. Ford agreed

with us it wasn’t a tire problem. And the same situation happened

in Venezuela.

We have talked a lot about claims today. And it wasn’t until we

actually started looking at the claims data that we had never

looked at before as an performance indicator, and NHTSA and

other tire companies had not looked at it, that we saw an overrepresentation of tires that were produced in one design called the

ATX, and in one size; and then another one size in the Wilderness

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tire that was produced in Decatur. And then that drove us to take

our action.

But we took very, very prompt action. When we had this claims

data and could see this overrepresentation, we didn’t mess around

at all. We—it was within a week that we were up here and announced a voluntary recall.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Sawyer, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a couple of observations with the questions. ‘‘oversteer’’ and

‘‘understeer’’ are measures of vehicle dynamics, and they represent

the loss of adhesion at the front or the rear of the car, and they

occur all the time. It occurs in the rain, it occurs on ice, and it really represents simply a loss of the full measure of adhesion.

The point is that the whole question of testing protocols, it seems

to me, needs to be revisited. It’s the sort of thing I want to ask

NHTSA, but Dr. Guenther’s dynamic vehicle testing, if there was

as much of a difference in the G forces that were applied to the tire

between the tests that were done by Ford and the ones that were

done by Firestone, that’s not a consistent testing. That’s not scientifically consistent. That’s huge difference. Would you agree?

Mr. LAMPE. Again, Dr. Guenther’s testing, Congressman Sawyer,

was done at what he calls the linear range, which is at the speeds

that we drive at. His analysis of the Ford testing was done at a

range that nobody ever achieves. You can’t achieve it; therefore, nobody’s going to do well at that range.

I think they need to be consistent, yes.

Mr. SAWYER. Who needs to put those kinds of testing protocols

in place? Is SAE an appropriate body to turn to?

Mr. LAMPE. I don’t know if it’s SAE or NHTSA. It’s certainly a—

I agree with you, it should be a third party, an independent third

party, Congressman.

You have brought up an excellent point, the oversteer—

understeer to oversteer that’s caused by tread separation. Even

Ford’s own expert said that at normal highway speeds, the effect

of a tread separation on the vehicle is nothing more than a gust

of wind or running through a puddle of water. So we are not talking about a catastrophic loss of adhesion.

Mr. SAWYER. That’s my point exactly. You spoke of a product, of

the lasting effect of overheating as being damage to a tire, so that

the internal temperature of a tire didn’t cause a risk of separation.

You used the term ‘‘damage.’’ is that damage abiding; even once the

tire temperature is returned to normal, has damage been done that

lives on in the life of that tire for the rest of its life?

Mr. LAMPE. Any type of high generation of heat, such as underinflation, overload, tremendously high speeds, anything that creates excessive heat can do lasting damage to a tire.

Mr. SAWYER. In that sense, when we talk about warning systems

on pressure that we’ve been talking about for a year now, how critical is the margin of error? That is to say, if, in fact, 26 pounds

per square inch were specified and there was a 20 percent margin

for error, you’re actually talking about potentially being down

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below 21 pounds. How critical does that become in terms of the

overall life of the tire and the risk of separation at a later date?

Mr. LAMPE. Twenty percent underinflation is very, very critical,

and it’s not something that you can—you can’t run a tire 20 percent underinflated for 2 months and air it back up and think that

you have corrected the problem, because the damage exists and it’s

going to stay there.

Mr. SAWYER. Let me ask you then about a second point of early

warning. We’re beginning to talk about claims data. My understanding is that you have recently returned to a standard for what

is—what are claims data grounded in virtually any loss above the

cost of the tire itself.

Am I correct about that?

Mr. LAMPE. I am not sure. I did hear that just the other day. I

don’t know if that’s something new to meet the requirements of the

TREAD Act, but I can’t disagree with that.

Mr. SAWYER. My understanding is that Goodyear does essentially

the same thing.

Mr. LAMPE. Okay.

Mr. SAWYER. How critical is that kind of comparability and

should we ask NHTSA to build that kind of comparability into the

standards that we ask them to promulgate?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, any time we are going to be in the future using

comparisons and this type of data, we should have comparability

in how we classify adjustments, how we classify and claims. It

should be consistent.

Mr. SAWYER. You mentioned earlier, but I would just like to reemphasize that you talked about continuous improvement and the

effect that reporting protocols back and forth among companies

ought to have. That 400 to 600 pounds is significant from your

point of view, that a suspension change can be significant. Would

you agree that tire design could be equally as significant?

Mr. LAMPE. Yes, a significant change in tire design that could affect the performance of the tire, I would consider that significant.

Mr. SAWYER. One final question. Should we ask NHTSA to be the

clearinghouse for that exchange of information, or should we simply require the companies to share that back and forth?

Mr. LAMPE. No, I believe we should require the companies to

share it back and forth because I think it is in our own best mutual

interest.

Mr. SAWYER. Should NHTSA have a role in that?

Mr. LAMPE. I wouldn’t be against NHTSA having a role, Congressman Sawyer, but I don’t know that that role would be necessary, but I certainly wouldn’t be against it. If it would help the

situation, then yes, I am all for it. Anything that makes it better.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Mr. Lampe,

I think all of the members of the panel have queried you, which

means you are excused. We thank you very much for your patience

and for your testimony for being with us this afternoon.

Mr. LAMPE. Thank you very much for the questions and the very

courteous treatment that I received today.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, may we be allowed to follow up with

written questions?

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Mr. GREENWOOD. Certainly.

Mr. STUPAK. I thought we were going to go a second round.

Mr. GREENWOOD. If the gentleman has questions that he would

like the committee to officially pose in writing, we can do that.

Mr. LAMPE. Congressman, could I make one change? I believe

Congressman Bilirakis was talking about some test data, and

maybe I misspoke, and I want to just get the record correct.

I believe he was looking at the Florida tire-related data base. If

I misspoke and said Texas, I would like to change that to Florida.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman for clarification and again for his testimony—— Mr. LAMPE. Thank you very much.

Mr. GREENWOOD. [continuing] and calls forward our third and

final panel consisting of the Honorable Michael Jackson, Deputy

Secretary, accompanied by Mr. Robert Shelton, Executive Director

and Mr. Kenneth Weinstein associate administrator for safety assurance for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

Department of Transportation.

Gentlemen, thank you for waiting so patiently to be with us You

are aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing,

and when doing so, we’ve had the practice in the past of taking testimony under oath. Do any of you have any objections to giving testimony under oath?

The Chair then advises you that under the rules of the House

and rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony

today?

In that case, if you will raise your right hand, I will give you the

oath. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the

truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth? So saying, you

are under oath. And please be seated.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. GREENWOOD. Mr. Jackson, you are going to present the opening statement, are you?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, I am, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Welcome again and please proceed.

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT SHELTON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AND

KENNETH WEINSTEIN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR

SAFETY ASSURANCE, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY

ADMINISTRATION

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, and members of the

subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you this afternoon

and wish to thank the subcommittee. Thank you, Chairman

Stearns and Greenwood, subcommittee ranking members Towns

and Deutsch, full committee Chairman Tauzin and Ranking Member Dingell.

With me I have NHTSA’s executive director Robert Shelton on

my left and Associate Administrator for Safety Assurance, Ken

Weinstein on my right.

Mr. Chairman, this hearing addresses a series of safety issues

that are of the very highest concern. Everyone who has spoken

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today has underscored that, but I would be remiss by not observing

the same point and telling you how seriously we take this inquiry

and this responsibility NHTSA has.

The Department of Transportation’s investigation of Firestone

tires was set in motion by tragic events, and loss of life. All the

parties appearing before you here today honor the memory of those

individuals by doing our best to take responsible action.

On behalf of Secretary Mineta and myself, and the Department,

I want to assure you that DOT is pursuing these matters systematically, objectively, and thoroughly.

Like you, we are also animated by a focused sense of urgency

and a vigorous resolve to protect the public interest, to protect the

consumers’s rights. We have heard today about the consumers

being trapped in the middle, and, Mr. Chairman, we wish to be

bound right to that interest—right in the middle—to provide you

objective, impartial assessments. That is what this committee

needs, that is what the American public needs, and that is what

this agency was commissioned to do.

We worked closely with both Ford and Firestone to share information to gather facts about these complex matters. We have also

consulted with experts throughout the field. We have in our testing

commissioned independent scientific labs to do work for us, which

I will describe later. So we have brought into our own analysis a

substantial amount of the type of blue ribbon expertise that you

could find in the country to examine these issues.

As we gain additional information and are able to draw firm conclusions from our ongoing research, we are going to follow this

where the facts lead us. We are going to let all the chips fall where

they may.

We want to thank the committee, particularly, for your strong

support and counsel as we progress. In particular, I want to express our gratitude for the tools, the assistance, and the resources

that you have given us in the TREAD Act. Frankly, this is a significant enhancement of the tools that we have to work in this

arena, and we are very grateful for the improvements you have

given us to work in this area.

After my confirmation by the Senate last month, I read the

TREAD Act in its entirety. I have studied it. We have had good

conversations to try to get this new Deputy Secretary up to speed

on it. But I confess, I often have been impatient at the Department

of Transportation about the pace of our regulatory work. We move

too slowly too often. But I am pleased to report to you today that

we are moving in an area where we have some very tough deadlines for TREAD Act regulatory work. We are on deadline. We are

doing the job that we had set out before us and I am pleased to

report that things are moving just as planned by the Congress.

And we will keep you advised about our progress in a detailed

way as we move forward. This includes regulations regarding tire

performance standards, tire pressure warning, early warning reporting requirements, rollover testing and child restraint improvements. We will continue to monitor this carefully and, as I said, I

will keep you advised about our progress.

I am pleased to also tell you that yesterday, President Bush announced his intention to nominate an outstanding physician, Dr.

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Jeff Runge, to head this agency. While Secretary Mineta and myself will continue to be actively involved, Dr. Runge, if confirmed

by the Senate, will have primary responsibility for running the

agency. I want to tell you that, in the absence of a new administrator, we have a tremendous amount of confidence in the NHTSA

professional team, two of whom are represented here with me

today, to move this forward.

We have not been sitting on our hands at this department waiting for a new administrator. We have been moving fast.

The remainder of my testimony will address two topics. First,

NHTSA’s ongoing investigation into certain Firestone tires; and

second, the question of whether and to what extent NHTSA should

review tire-vehicle interface issues, including the data commissioned by Firestone regarding understeer and oversteer characteristics of the Ford Explorer.

Sir, if I may, the first topic will be our investigation of Firestone

tires. As this committee is aware, NHTSA opened its formal defect

investigation of over 50 million Firestone ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness tires in May 2000, after the receipt of a series of complaints

concerning those tires.

With implementation of the TREAD Act, we have a far better

early warning system to identify these defects. NHTSA now anticipates that we will complete the current testing program for these

tires at the end of next week. And by roughly this time next month,

we will be able to report publicly on our conclusions about this important assessment.

Since NHTSA’s investigation was launched, there have been two

separate actions which will lead to replacement of more than half

of the tires we have discussed here today, the original recall last

summer and the May announcement by Ford of its tire replacement program.

I want to say that the Department applauds Ford for its strong

commitment to safety and its efforts to retain the confidence of its

customers. But I want to be clear too that NHTSA has not yet completed its investigation, nor have we made formal recommendations

or a determination of the necessity for further recall.

Ford’s decision does not, in other words, render our ongoing investigation moot. NHTSA’s role under the Vehicle Safety Act is to

decide whether any of the tires under investigation contain a defect

that relates to motor vehicle safety. Some of the tires were installed as original equipment on non-Ford vehicles and are beyond

the scope of Ford’s replacement program. Other tires have been

used as a replacement tire on non-Ford vehicles. It is thus important that NHTSA complete its review, its investigation.

NHTSA’s Firestone investigation is unprecedented in its scope

and in the tools that we are using in the conduct of this analysis.

The agency has examined literally hundreds of tires from the field

and is employing numerous state-of-the-art techniques to analyze

them. I have outlined in my formal presentation the types and

techniques and tools that we are using: Shearography, sectioning,

adhesion testing, rig testing on drums, chemical analysis and other

internal testing. And to do this we have recruited the best experts

we can find and are using some of the Nation’s most complex laboratory assets to do this work.

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NHTSA has requested and received information in addition from

six other tire companies to allow the agency to perform peer comparisons. Throughout the investigation, NHTSA has continued to

receive extensive information from both Ford and Firestone, and

we have periodically provided both companies with summaries of

data collected in our testing effort. We are grateful that both parties have cooperated so closely with this investigation. However, I

want to emphasize that NHTSA has not provided either Ford or

Firestone with conclusions or recommendations about whether a

further recall will be necessary. When we have boxed that all up,

we will provide it all at once and announce it publicly.

Finally, I know that some members of this committee may be

concerned that the NHTSA Firestone tire investigation may not yet

have gone far enough. It is true that NHTSA’s testing is focused

primarily on a subset of the tires that are covered by Ford’s recent

replacement program. However, this is because NHTSA’s analysis

of field data has demonstrated that those tires have been associated with the greatest number of claims, crashes, injuries and fatalities compared to other tires not covered by Firestone’s 2000 recall. This touchstone about what is happening in the real work that

Mr. Nasser refers to is our touchstone in launching an investigation of this sort.

To put this in context, and based on NHTSA’s June 18th, 2001,

update of this data, the 14.4 million ATX and Wilderness AT tires

recalled last year have been associated with 285 crashes and 123

fatalities. The 13 million tires in Ford’s recently announced replacement program have been associated with 37 crashes and 10

fatalities. The tires covered by NHTSA’s September 1, 2001 consumer advisory have been associated with 15 crashes and 5 fatalities, and the approximately 23 million remaining tires within this

universe of tires has been associated, to date, with 8 crashes and

12 fatalities. So this gives you some sense of the universe of this

data that we are looking at from the real world.

Ford has now also provided data to NHTSA and to this committee about tires that are not currently being subjected to extensive testing by NHTSA. Again, NHTSA expects to conclude its testing next week. If after assessing all available data, NHTSA concludes that an expanded testing program is recommended for other

Wilderness tires, it will expand the investigation of other tires and

focus more scrutiny on those tires that such results might point toward.

If I may, just at this juncture, say a word too about the data that

has been discussed this morning about claims and of the replacement tires that Ford is using in its program. Mr. Chairman, I

would commit to you that while we may not be able to act as expeditiously as Mr. Nasser, we too expect to be nimble here.

If upon receiving this data this evening, we could look at it tonight and look at it a little bit in the morning, we will come back

to you with a preliminary assessment of what we think we are

looking at, what data we might need. If we need to have some conversation with other manufacturers, we will try to start that first

thing in the morning and tell you how long we think it’s going to

take, and we will give you a quick take on that data and what we

think it looks like.

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We would like to involve Ford and Firestone in that quick look

as well. But we promise to be responsive to you tomorrow and let

you know what we think the need is and how long it’s going to take

us to fill it. So we will work with you very quickly on that.

Last, I would like to address the question of Firestone’s assertions regarding the handling of Ford Explorers. In Chairman

Tauzin’s letter of June 6th to NHTSA, he urged us to consider

whether the safety problem being investigated is solely a tire issue

or whether it is a tire-vehicle application issue. I would like to offer

two sets of observations about this very important question.

First, NHTSA’s inquiry is focused on tires because it’s the tires

that have been failing. As the committee is aware, by law, tires are

treated differently from other items of original equipment. Defects

in tires are to be remedied by the tire manufacturer rather than

the vehicle manufacturer. If tires were treated statutorily as part

of the vehicle itself, as are headlights or seat belts for example, the

proper course of action would be to launch an investigation of one

or more vehicle models and any tires that might be used as replacements.

Moreover, and to be more specific, NHTSA has, to date, had no

credible evidence that the Ford Explorer’s design is in any way responsible for causing tread separation or other such catastrophic

tire failure. Firestone has not, as I understood it, asserted this

causal relationship either, and Mr. Lampe’s testimony addressed

that issue as well.

So NHTSA has to date, therefore, conducted our investigation as,

first and foremost, a tire investigation. If it appears that the safety

problem is limited primarily to crashes involving vehicles equipped

with certain Firestone tires, then the most immediate and the most

effective remedy is to recall those tires.

Second, I would like to talk just for a moment about NHTSA’s

examination of the handling characteristics of the Ford Explorer.

As the committee is aware, Firestone commissioned a study to look

at the handling characteristics and rollover propensity of Ford Explorers, and that has been discussed today. Firestone recently informed the Department of this and released the initial results from

that study. Like other SUVs, the Ford Explorer experiences a higher rollover rate than other passenger cars.

In asking NHTSA to investigate the safety of the Explorer, Firestone specifically said that they had not intended to launch a formal investigation—a formal defect petition at NHTSA. However,

because the content of it has been structured in this way—as a petition—we have, at the Department, Secretary Mineta and myself,

asked NHTSA to treat the Firestone petition as a formal petition

and we are behaving as law and regulation require us to behave

upon receipt of a petition asking us to launch a defect investigation. That is where we are right now.

Consequently, at this stage, NHTSA is conducting an analysis to

determine if a formal investigation is merited. The Department and

NHTSA are giving this matter full consideration. Again, a sense of

the urgency that I was trying to speak to you about earlier today

certainly pervades our approach to this issue. NHTSA is reviewing

the Firestone information. Already, we have met both with Firestone and Ford. Moreover, we met last week with the individual

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who conducted this research on behalf of Firestone and have had

useful conversations with all of those parties.

Firestone’s consultant recently advised NHTSA that he would

not be finished with the full testing regime that he is conducting

for Firestone until the end of July. Even before receiving Firestone’s request, the Agency had been reviewing field data from a

variety of sources, including NHTSA’s own data collection systems

for the purposes of evaluating the likelihood of rollover given a tire

failure for both the Explorer and for peer vehicles.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Mr. Jackson, we turned the clock off 10 minutes ago. If you would wrap up.

Mr. JACKSON. I’m in my last page, sir. Our goal is to complete

this analysis of the data as quickly as possible this summer. We

realize it is an area of enormous importance to all the parties involved. So I have provided now, in sum, an overview of what we

are doing on the tire investigation as well as on this petition that

we have received on the vehicle. Portions of what I said have, I

know, disappointed probably both Firestone and Ford. We are very

comfortable being in exactly the position that we are. We are going

to do this professionally, systematically, but with urgency. And

when we finish, and it won’t be long, we will be back here to tell

you exactly what we found. I’m now happy to answer any questions

that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Michael P. Jackson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF

TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittees: I am pleased to appear before

you today and wish to thank Subcommittee Chairmen Stearns and Greenwood, Subcommittee Ranking Members Towns and Deutsch, Full Committee Chairman Tauzin and Ranking Member Dingell for the invitation to appear at this hearing.

With me are NHTSA’s Executive Director, L. Robert Shelton, and Associate Administrator for Safety Assurance, Kenneth N. Weinstein.

1. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, this hearing addresses a series of safety issues that are of the very

highest importance. The Department of Transportation’s investigation of Firestone

tires was set in motion by tragic events and loss of life. All of the parties appearing

before you today must honor the memory of those individuals by our responsible actions.

On behalf of Secretary Mineta, I want to assure you that the Department of

Transportation is pursuing these matters systematically, objectively, and thoroughly. Like you, we are animated by a focused urgency, and a vigorous resolve to

protect the public. We have worked closely with Ford and Firestone to share information and gather facts about these complex technical matters. Our work on these

matters continues to evolve. As we gain additional information and are able to draw

firm conclusions from our ongoing research, NHTSA will follow these matters wherever the facts lead.

I want to thank the Committee on Energy and Commerce for your strong support

and your counsel as we progress. In particular, I want to express our gratitude for

the tools and resources that this Committee helped make available to the Department with last November’s enactment of the TREAD Act. After my confirmation by

the Senate last month, I studied the Act in its entirety. In the TREAD Act, Congress set aggressive deadlines for completing the required rulemakings. While I confess to having often been impatient with the pace of regulatory work at the Department, Secretary Mineta and I are pleased to inform the Subcommittees that NHTSA

is on schedule to implement the Act’s landmark safety enhancements. This includes

the regulations regarding tire performance standards, tire pressure warning, early

warning reporting requirements, rollover testing and child restraint improvements.

We will continue to monitor implementation carefully. I personally pledge that the

Department will work closely and candidly with these Subcommittees to keep you

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apprised of our progress both on TREAD Act implementation, and on the Firestone

Tire and Ford Explorer matters.

The remainder of my testimony will address two topics: first, NHTSA’s ongoing

investigation into certain Firestone tires; and second, the question of whether and

to what extent NHTSA should review tire-vehicle interface issues, including data

commissioned by Firestone regarding understeer/oversteer characteristics of the

Ford Explorer.

2. NHTSA’S INVESTIGATION INTO FIRESTONE TIRES

As the Committee is aware, NHTSA opened its formal defect investigation of over

50 million Firestone ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness tires in May 2000, after the number of complaints concerning these tires increased significantly that year. With implementation of the TREAD Act, we will have a far better early warning system to

identify potential tire defects.

NHTSA now anticipates its current testing of tires will be completed by the end

of next week. By roughly this time next month, NHTSA expects to finish its analysis

and announce the results.

Since NHTSA’s investigation was launched, there have been two separate actions

that will lead to replacement of more than half of the tires covered by the investigation:

• On August 9, 2000, Firestone recalled all of its ATX and ATX II tires of the P235/

75R15 size manufactured since 1991. It also recalled Wilderness AT tires of that

size made at its Decatur plant, for a total of 14.4 million tires. • On May 22, 2001, Ford announced a tire replacement program that includes all

other Firestone Wilderness tires on certain Ford, Mercury and Mazda SUVs and

light trucks. This replacement action totals approximately 13 million tires.

The Department applauds Ford for its strong commitment to safety and its efforts

to retain the confidence of its customers. It is necessary to reiterate that NHTSA

has not yet completed its investigation nor has NHTSA made a formal determination about the necessity of a further recall. Ford’s decision does not render NHTSA’s investigation moot.

NHTSA’s role under the Vehicle Safety Act is to decide whether any of the tires

under investigation contain a defect that relates to motor vehicle safety. Some of

these tires were installed as original equipment on non-Ford vehicles and are beyond the scope of Ford’s replacement program. Other tires have been used as replacement tires on non-Ford vehicles. It is thus important that NHTSA complete its

investigation and reach a decision consistent with its statutory and regulatory mandate.

NHTSA’s Firestone investigation is unprecedented in its technical complexity. The

investigation includes both a review of field experience and an extensive series of

laboratory analyses. The agency has examined hundreds of tires from the field and

is employing numerous state-of-the-art techniques to analyze the performance and

characteristics of these tires. These techniques include:

• shearography—a non-destructive technique that can detect separations within a

tire;

• sectioning—cutting a tire to measure the dimensions of interior features, including cracks;

• adhesion testing—measuring the resistance of the belts to being peeled apart;

• rig testing on drums—to assess durability;

• chemical analyses—evaluating the effects of oxidation and other chemical processes that can degrade a tire; and

• other internal physical measurements.

NHTSA has requested and received information from six other tire companies to

allow the agency to perform peer comparisons. Throughout the investigation,

NHTSA has continued to receive extensive information from both Ford and Firestone, and we have periodically provided both companies with summaries of data

collected in our testing effort. We are grateful for the cooperation of both parties.

However, I want to emphasize that NHTSA has not yet provided either Firestone

or Ford with its conclusions or recommendations about whether a further recall is

necessary.

Finally, I know that some members of the Committee may be concerned that the

NHTSA Firestone investigation may not yet have gone far enough. It is true that

NHTSA’s testing is focused primarily on a subset of the tires that are covered by

Ford’s recent replacement program. However, this is because NHTSA’s analysis of

field data has demonstrated that those tires have been associated with the greatest

number of claims, crashes, injuries and fatalities compared to other tires not covered by Firestone’s August 2000 recall. To put this in context, based on NHTSA’s

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1The eight crashes represent eight different tire models. In addition, NHTSA has data on an

additional 53 total fatalities where the vehicle involved was an Explorer and/or there is enough

tire information known to assume the tire involved is among those under investigation. Because

the crashes are old or the tire was not saved, additional information is not available to categorize them properly.

June 18, 2001 update of the database of reports to the agency, the 14.4 million ATX

and Wilderness AT tires recalled last year have been associated with some 285

crashes and 123 fatalities. The 13 million tires in Ford’s recently announced replacement program have been associated with 37 crashes and 10 fatalities. The tires covered by NHTSA’s September 1, 2001 Consumer Advisory have been associated with

a reported 15 crashes and five fatalities. The approximately 23 million remaining

tires within the universe of tires covered by this investigation have, to date, been

associated with eight crashes and 12 fatalities.1

Ford has now also provided data to NHTSA and to this Committee about tires

that are not currently being subjected to extensive testing by NHTSA. Again,

NHTSA expects to conclude its ongoing tire testing for this investigation next week.

If, after assessing all available data, NHTSA concludes that an expanded testing

program for other Wilderness tires is indicated, it will expand its investigative work

to focus more scrutiny on those tires.

3. FIRESTONE’S ASSERTIONS REGARDING HANDLING OF FORD EXPLORERS

In Chairman Tauzin’s June 6 letter to NHTSA, he urged NHTSA to consider

whether the safety problem now being investigated is ‘‘solely a tire issue, or whether

it is a tire-vehicle application issue.’’ I would like to offer two sets of observations

about this important question.

First, NHTSA’s inquiry has focused on tires because it is the tires that have been

failing. As the Committee is aware, by law tires are treated differently from all

other items of original equipment on vehicles. Defects in tires are to be remedied

by the tire manufacturer rather than the vehicle manufacturer.

If tires were treated statutorily as part of the vehicle itself—as are headlights or

seat belts, for example—the proper course of action would have been to launch an

investigation of one or more vehicle models and any tires used as replacements.

Moreover, and to be specific, NHTSA has had no credible evidence that the Ford

Explorer’s design is in any way responsible for causing tread separation or other

such catastrophic tire failure. Firestone has not, as I understand it, asserted this

causal relationship.

NHTSA has to date therefore conducted this investigation as first and foremost

a tire investigation. If it appears that the safety problem is limited primarily to

crashes involving vehicles equipped with certain Firestone tires, then the most immediate and effective remedy under the law is to recall the tires.

Second, I would now like to turn to NHTSA’s examination of the handling characteristics of the Ford Explorer. As the Committee is aware, Firestone commissioned

a study to look at the handling characteristics and rollover propensity of Ford Explorers after tire tread separation. Firestone recently informed the Department that

it is conducting a study and simultaneously made public the results of the first set

of its handling tests. Firestone has asked the Department to investigate its claims

that the Ford Explorer is deficient in its handling under this situation.

Like other SUVs, the Ford Explorer experiences a higher overall rollover rate

than passenger cars. In asking NHTSA to investigate the safety of the Explorer,

Firestone has alleged that Explorers are more likely than other SUVs to experience

an oversteer condition following a tread separation on a left rear tire and that an

oversteer condition is likely to make a vehicle less stable.

Although Firestone has verbally stated to the Department that it did not intend

to take the formal legal step of petitioning NHTSA to conduct an investigation, their

written communication to NHTSA virtually constitutes such a request. Secretary

Mineta and I therefore asked NHTSA to treat the Firestone request as if it were

a formal petition. Consequently, at this stage NHTSA is conducting an analysis to

determine if a formal investigation is merited.

The Department and NHTSA are giving this matter full consideration. NHTSA

is reviewing Firestone’s information and has met with both Firestone and Ford to

discuss in detail Firestone’s allegations. Last week, the agency met with the consultant hired by Firestone to conduct its tests. Firestone’s consultant recently advised

NHTSA that he does not expect to complete his testing until the end of July.

Even before receiving Firestone’s request, the agency already had been reviewing

field data from a variety of sources, including NHTSA’s own data collection systems,

for the purpose of evaluating the likelihood of a rollover, given a tire failure, for

both the Explorer and for peer vehicles. NHTSA has recently collected and is curVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00327 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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rently evaluating accident data regarding various model years of the Explorer.

NHTSA has not yet formed a view as to the validity of Firestone’s claims about the

performance of the Explorer. NHTSA will assess the additional test data promised

by Firestone in conjunction with other relevant available data. The agency’s goal is

to complete its initial analysis of this data as quickly as possible this Summer. It

will then decide whether to open a formal investigation.

We realize that this is an issue of great interest to the Subcommittees, to the

manufacturers and the public. We will keep these Subcommittees informed as

NHTSA brings this review to closure.

Mr. Chairman, I have now provided an overview of our ongoing Firestone investigation, the Explorer vehicle handling analysis, and the principles animating each.

Portions of my testimony today may alternatively leave both Ford and Firestone disappointed that we do not have immediate closure on important issues. I know that

we can, in both cases, count on their continued cooperation with NHTSA. As we continue to do our job in assessing these difficult issues, I hope we will earn the Committee’s confidence and that of the public who rely on the Department’s vital safety

work.

Speaking for Secretary Mineta, you have our pledge that we will continue to conduct this work in a fair, impartial and thoroughly professional manner, always

mindful of the urgency and importance of this effort. This concludes my statement.

My colleagues and I will be glad to answer any questions.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Mr. Jackson, I know it is a heck of a thing to

have you sit around for 61⁄2 hours and ask you to wrap it up after

10 minutes.

Mr. JACKSON. I learned a lot.

Mr. GREENWOOD. But that’s the way it works.

Last year, NHTSA recommended a recall on several Firestone

tires based on an overall claims rate of 12.6 claims per million tires

produced. Some of the suggested tires had less than 3 claims, but

the low production universe elevated the claims rate. This year,

Ford is removing Firestone Wilderness AT tires from all of its vehicles based partially on identifying tires with a claims rate of more

than five claims per million produced, a figure they say is an industry standard.

Do you agree that there is any such industry standards, and if

so, is it 5 or 12.6 or some other number?

Mr. JACKSON. I don’t believe that we have exactly reached an understanding of a number, a single number that would be appropriate to use as an indicator of when to trigger a defect investigation. It is a variable, an important variable. But a single one such

as that is not definitively established as sufficient for this purpose.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Mr. Jackson, you said that in your opening

statement that NHTSA was considering whether to look into the

combination of this tire on this particular vehicle. Last year in a

Senate hearing, Senator Snowe asked Dr. Bailey, quote: ‘‘have you

decided that it is a tire problem or a Ford Explorer problem or

both?’’ and Dr. Bailey responded: ‘‘At this time, I think we are dealing with a tire problem, but as part of our investigation, we will

also explore the possibility of a combination.’’ Has that study not been conducted by NHTSA?

Mr. JACKSON. NHTSA has gathered some preliminary evidence

on this, and the Firestone data is a part of that—a part of that

work.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The companies are making use of their respective understeer and oversteer experiments. The question is, is there

a baseline amount understeer that a car or SUV should have?

Mr. JACKSON. No, sir, we have not established as a recommendation of NHTSA such a standard.

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Mr. GREENWOOD. I’m sorry, I was interrupted there. You have

not yet decided whether there should be such a standard?

Mr. JACKSON. That’s correct.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Are you working on—where do you stand on

that? Are you probing that question?

Mr. JACKSON. That question is embedded in the question of

whether we should launch a formal investigation in the case of the

Explorer, and will be part of the preliminary conversation that

takes place as we do our review. We are not conducting an investigation now. We are conducting a review. And part of that review

would address this question inside the Department.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Well, understand, my question is not does the

Explorer have an understeer or oversteer problem. My question is

should there be a national standard set for steering?

Mr. JACKSON. We would like to be able to answer that question

more straightforwardly as a result of concluding our preliminary

review and report back to your our thoughts on that matter. It is

definitely a new step that we believe Firestone is asking us to take,

to regulate an area or to look at and evaluate an area where we

have not historically had a role.

Mr. GREENWOOD. How much would the steering mechanism of

the vehicle play a role in the vehicle’s understeer or oversteer?

Mr. JACKSON. I would like to defer to one of my expert colleagues

to answer that question.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Well, I am not an expert vehicle dynamicist, a

dynamics expert, but I would say it is possible that it could have

an effect under various different circumstances. Whether it be in

a tread separation, I don’t know. And we will be working and looking at the data and seeing what Dr. Guenther comes up with and

see whether or not steering inputs have any effect.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Much has been made throughout the hearing

about this issue of claims rates. And I think most of us have come

to the conclusion that claims rate is an only somewhat reliable

piece of information. As I understand it, the claims rate is simply

a function of how many people call NHTSA and supply information

with regard to property and/or personal damage that result in a

motor vehicle accident, and that rate could be affected by what

happens in the media today. I wouldn’t be surprised if our hearing

results in additional claims.

Could you describe how NHTSA handles these claims and what

you make of the information gathered from it?

Mr. JACKSON. Let me take a first cut at that. The claims rate

definition is something that we are addressing in the TREAD Act

regulatory work that we are doing right now. But the differences

in the definitions, which really are those of the manufacturers, the

tire manufacturers—and this data, by the way, is reported not to

us initially, but to the manufacturers. They share data with us.

This data has coalesced around a common understanding at least

in the data that we are sharing with tire manufacturers that it is

essentially a claim that we are looking at here for more than the

value of the tire itself.

So in the Goodyear and Firestone data, there is, we believe, comparability at this juncture. We will address that more systematically in our regulatory work.

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Mr. GREENWOOD. My time has expired. The gentleman—the

Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman. I thank you. Gentlemen, is tread

separation a common form of tire failure?

Mr. JACKSON. No, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. It is not. Is it regarded as catastrophic?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Can it be reasonably anticipated that if it’s an

SUV, it will roll over after tread separation?

Mr. JACKSON. No, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. In other words, you would assume that after tread

separation, the vehicle is not going to roll?

Mr. JACKSON. The data that Mr. Nasser discussed this morning

says that approximately 10 percent result in a rollover in the event

of a——

Mr. DINGELL. Do you agree with that?

Mr. SHELTON. Mr. Dingell, our data say that it is 10 percent I

believe at the highest. In many cases it is less than that.

Mr. DINGELL. There was a period of three model years, 1995

through 1997, when virtual equal numbers of Goodyear and Firestone tires were put on the Explorer. I understand there has been

1,183 tread separation claims for Firestone tires used in those

model years, and only two tread separation claims for Goodyear

tires were used in those same 2 years. Is that so?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, that’s correct.

Mr. DINGELL. That conforms with your records. Did either of the

two claims on Goodyear tires involve loss of life?

Mr. SHELTON. No, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Is there greater likelihood that tread separations

will occur at low or high speeds?

Mr. SHELTON. High speeds, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. It is uncommon for them to occur below 35 miles

an hour?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, it is typically a high speed phenomenon.

Mr. DINGELL. So if somebody tested a tire at 35 miles an hour,

they wouldn’t get a good result, would they, if they showed up with

a lot of tread separation?

Mr. SHELTON. It is unlikely they would find tread separation at

35 miles an hour.

Mr. DINGELL. You’d look kind of fishy-eyed at that particular

kind of test, would you not?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Now, is there threshold level for tread separations

that NHTSA recognizes as standard for judging when to recommend a recall?

Mr. SHELTON. No, sir, we do not have such a threshold.

Mr. DINGELL. The Wilderness AT tires recalled last year were all

from Firestone’s plant in Decatur, Illinois; is that correct?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. The Wilderness AT tires were also made at Firestone plants at Wilson, North Carolina; is that also true?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. I understand that the latest reports reveal that

tread separation claims for the Wilderness AT tires produced in

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Wilson, North Carolina, in 1996 have been extremely high, 100

parts per million. Is that information correct?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. I wouldn’t say that it is necessarily 100 parts

per million. We have looked at trends in the Wilson plant and——

Mr. DINGELL. Well, it’s either true or not true or you don’t know.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. I’ll check it out——

Mr. DINGELL. Please give us the answer. I also understand that

16-inch Wilderness AT tires made at Wilson has a tread separation

claims rate of 450 parts per million when used on the vehicle up

to 5 years; is that correct?

Mr. SHELTON. We will have to check.

Mr. JACKSON. We will have to get those numbers.

Mr. DINGELL. That is correct?

Mr. SHELTON. We are checking that.

Mr. DINGELL. Okay. You will check that out. NHTSA also asked

Firestone to recall its 16-inch Wilderness AT tire made at Wilson

last year, did it not?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. 16-inch tire?

Mr. DINGELL. Yes, you asked them to recall the 16-inch tire.

Mr. SHELTON. No, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. You did not? Are you now prepared to say that

NHTSA does not believe that the Wilderness AT tires produced at

Wilson pose any safety risks for drivers and passengers who have

these tires on their vehicles?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. We are in the process of completing our investigation and will be able to address that by this time next month.

Mr. DINGELL. All right. The rate of 100 parts per million is higher than the average rate for tires that have been recalled in the

past year, is that not so?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, sir. As I understand the rates of the tires that

have been recalled are higher than that.

Mr. STEARNS. [Presiding] Excuse me, Mr. Dingell. There’s two

mikes. If you could spread the mikes and when you speak, make

sure you speak into them.

Mr. DINGELL. Tread separations tend to occur in hot climate regions in warm weather periods of the year; isn’t that so?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. When will NHTSA have the work done to make a

decision about recalling tires produced at Wilson?

Mr. SHELTON. We plan to complete our analysis for the entire investigation approximately 1 month from today.

Mr. DINGELL. Is that delay related to the fact that NHTSA does

not have an administrator, acting or permanent, at this time?

Mr. SHELTON. No, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. It is not?

Mr. SHELTON. No, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. Currently NHTSA rates vehicles on the basis of

their static stability; is that correct?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. And no SUV that NHTSA has tested received higher than a 3- out of a possible 5-star rating; is that correct?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, sir, that is correct.

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Mr. DINGELL. It is my understanding that the 2002 model year

Explorer will receive a 3-star rating from NHTSA. That is as high

as any other SUV; is that correct?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. DINGELL. In prior model years, NHTSA gave the Explorer a

2-star rating; is that correct?

Mr. SHELTON. The earlier model Explorer was tested and got a

2-star rating, yes. Not prior model years, because we just started

the program a few month ago.

Mr. DINGELL. Would you call a 2-star rating during those year

good or bad?

Mr. SHELTON. It would be typical for an SUV. They range from

1 to 3.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, could I clarify one of my prior answers? I misunderstood because of the way the prior conversation

had been going with respect to tires on Explorers and Rangers, et

cetera, when you asked me about had we recommended recalling

a 16-inch tire from Wilson, I was focusing on that. On our consumer advisory list, the one that we issued last September 1st, we

did include a 16-inch Wilderness AT tire that is used on a relatively small number of Ford 150 vehicles. It is a different size and

different tire from the one that is used on Explorers. I apologize for

that confusion.

Mr. DINGELL. What about the Explorer tire to which I was referring? Did you suggest that it should be recalled or not?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. We did not, and that’s certainly a part of our

current investigation. The ones—the 16-inch tires used on Explorers made at Wilson or any place else were not included.

Mr. DINGELL. Could that investigation now ongoing result in a

recall of that tire?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. It could lead to a request for that.

Mr. STEARNS. Let me offer my questions here. Just as a general,

do we have enough resources at NHTSA to analyze and provide, in

a timely fashion, information on this area and others?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, I think we do. And if we find that as these

examinations increase that we don’t, I will come back and tell you.

Mr. STEARNS. So right now we have all the resources at NHTSA

to do the job in your opinion?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEARNS. And that is the opinion of your boss?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, I have not asked that question of him directly, but we have no conversations on the table about that issue

right now.

Mr. STEARNS. Have you heard the discussion that we have had

on this raw data that we’ve had here?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. STEARNS. If we give you this raw data, can you come back

within 30 days and give us your analysis, or 2 weeks or 1 week or

1 day?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, in my prepared remarks, I volunteered that we could come back tomorrow and give you our prelimiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00332 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
327

nary analysis of that data and what we think it might take to give

you a definitive answer to the questions that you are asking us.

Mr. STEARNS. In terms of the TREAD Act, do you think we

should do anything more than that at this time?

Mr. JACKSON. No, sir, I do not have a recommendation for more

right now. We have a pretty steep regulatory agenda ahead of us.

We have many new and complex issues to work through with the

industry. We will be keeping you and the members of this committee apprised, but I do not think anything more is needed at this

point.

Mr. STEARNS. Were you here when Mr. Stupak was talking about

claims versus safety and the nuance that once you talk about

claims, it does not imply safety? Were you here?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. STEARNS. Do you think we need to have in Congress a better

understanding, either legislatively, in your office, what claims

mean in terms relative to safety or are they totally diverse, separated?

Mr. JACKSON. I think that we obviously have a little confusion

here in the room and it seems natural that we should clarify this

a little bit more. As part of our regulation, we are specifying a definition that would provide common data to us from the tire manufacturers. And so that is exactly what we are doing.

In the meantime, frankly, we have had these conversations with

the tire manufacturers that we have been talking with as part of

this investigation. And we believe we have a pretty common sense

agreement about what that definition of claims would be.

Mr. STEARNS. Not only a definition, but once you give a claims

quantitative answer, don’t you have to list the contingencies that

make up that claim?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, you are exactly right to understand

that claims alone is not a single metric answer to the question of

whether we have a problem. There are a multiplicity of factors that

we have to look at to be able to dig into the question of whether

a possible defect exists.

Mr. STEARNS. In the field experience chart prepared by NHTSA,

by you folks—this is not our raw data, but which you prepared— you compare the Explorer model years 1991 to 1994 to the model

years 1995 to 1999. Can you see it okay? Do you need a copy?

Mr. JACKSON. I am familiar with that chart, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. It would appear from this chart—and you heard

me ask Ford Motor company—that the 1991-94 model had 50 rollovers. The following number jumped to 87 for the 1995-1999 model

year Explorer. Is this important statistics? You probably heard Mr.

Nasser indicate it was just demographics. He didn’t give an answer

to it.

I guess the No. 1 question is, are you investigating this and what

leads to this increase rollover number?

Mr. JACKSON. We are reviewing this data more thoroughly. And

it is a statistically significant difference between those two numbers. And we are discussing this with Ford and among our own experts, to assess this data more carefully.

We generated this data, we looked at it and discovered that it

is an issue that we want to dig into more.

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Mr. STEARNS. How long have you known about it?

Mr. JACKSON. Since April.

Mr. STEARNS. Are you aware that Ford has changed the suspension on different model years?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, we are.

Mr. STEARNS. Tell me briefly what that means.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. In fact, Mr. Chairman, that is why we separated

out those. We knew that they had made a change. In model year

1995, they switched from what is called a twin I-beam suspension

to what Mr. Nasser characterized a more modern type of suspension, an A-arm suspension. And they made other changes to the vehicle as well for model year 1995. So it is a somewhat different vehicle.

I am not here to tell you that an A-arm suspension automatically

leads to more rollovers. I am not saying that at all. But that is why

we broke out the two models.

Mr. STEARNS. But didn’t the suspension occur at the same time

as this chart? I mean, wouldn’t it fall into those years, the 1995

to 1999 model year Explorer?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. That’s correct. We did the data runs for the two

separate categories. That is why we split the total Explorer population into those two groups, just to see whether or not there was

any difference in consequence. What these are, by the way, sir, is

the rollovers that occurred following a tread separation. So we

wanted to see what the consequences of a tread separation would

be on Explorers, on pickup trucks, on other SUVs, and that was

why this chart was developed. And that is why we used different

groups of Explorers as well.

Mr. STEARNS. You know, fellows, the taxpayers are hiring you to

make some difficult decisions. And this is not a case where you are

going to give an oblique or ambiguous answer. You are going to

have to come up and risk and give some answers here so that the

American consumer is safe. Do you think, based upon this chart,

that it is worthwhile to investigate beyond tires, perhaps look at

the role of other vehicles in rollover incidences?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Not specific—— Mr. STEARNS. Does that warrant, in your opinion, that kind of investigation?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman not just from this chart but both

the information in this chart, the information that Dr. Guenther

has prepared, and all the information that is available to us. We

will look at all of that and make that decision later this summer.

Mr. STEARNS. Okay. My time has expired. Mr. Stupak is recognized.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s your testimony that

this vehicle field experience, that relates to tread separations;

right?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. It’s what occurs after a claim—claims of tread

separation provided by Firestone to us.

Mr. STUPAK. So Ford should have more crashes because it has

the Firestone tires, which is alleged to separate, and that is what

this chart reflects.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Well, what we were attempting to do was to say

if there is a tread separation, what is the likelihood of a cataVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00334 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\73739 pfrm11 PsN: 73739
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strophic event, of a crash or a rollover. Only when you have a lot

of tread separations do you have enough data to have statistically

significant results.

Mr. STUPAK. These other vehicles, other compact SUVs and other

compact SUVs without Bronco II, did they have the Firestone Wilderness tires?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Yes, these are—everything on that chart reflects

tires that are the subject of our investigation.

Mr. STUPAK. Very good. In—before Ford came out with their recall or replacement notice, did NHTSA have a chance to look at the

tires that they were going to use as replacement tires? By that I

mean you saw the list.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. They gave us the list after they advised us that

they were going to do what they did. But we subsequently had the

opportunity to look at the list.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you have an opportunity to discuss it with

them? Did you voice any concerns about any of these vehicles—excuse me, replacement tires?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. They asked us whether we were investigating

any of those tires. They subsequently asked us how many consumer complaints we had gotten about these tires. And I’m distinguishing from claims. This is like to our hotline. And we gave them

that data. And then they went forward and did what they did.

Mr. STUPAK. Does NHTSA have any concerns about these replacement tires? That they may have a worse safety record than

the ones that are being replaced?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Well, sir, we will keep looking at that. At the

moment, we don’t have any such concern. We are not investigating

them. But if we see anything—and we look forward to seeing the

data that the committee was discussing before—we will certainly

promptly advise the committee as well as Ford.

Mr. STUPAK. So the data that you may receive from the committee, you don’t have any idea if these tires are more dangerous,

less dangerous, or insufficient information to make a judgment

call?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. At this point, we have no evidence that would

indicate that they are dangerous.

Mr. JACKSON. Congressman, I would like to give a gloss on that

point. Mr. Nasser earlier said that he made the full portfolio of customer service actions, in effect, covering a wide variety of performance data for the tires that are in that customer service action.

Necessarily, some of those tires, as he admitted, were not tires that

indicated substantial failure.

So if we find that some in that pool of Ford actions are comparable to other tires out there in the replacement, it’s not prima

facie a surprise to us because of the nature of the way they made

their decision and the data that was available to them on some of

the newer tires.

Mr. STUPAK. Did they—did Ford give you the data that they had

on these replacement tires or they just asked you about——

Mr. JACKSON. I don’t believe we exchanged that data. They just

asked us for some of the information we have described to you, sir.

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Mr. STUPAK. So it’s your testimony today that there are no other

tires that you are looking at for tread separations other than the

Firestone tires.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. No other tires that are on that list. We do have

two pending investigations about tires called light truck tires, a

Firestone tire and a Goodyear tire.

Mr. STUPAK. So no other on that list, then.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Right. Right.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. In answer to some questions by somebody,

tread separation or a tread failure, very seldom does that happen;

right?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Would a blowout occur more often on tires than

tread separations? If you know?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Mr. Lampe says no, and we don’t dispute that.

We don’t keep track of that. We couldn’t tell you how many blowouts there are.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Lampe also said that tread separations are

common occurrence. And he cited some quotes from Goodyear.

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, Congressman, consumers normally wouldn’t

report a blowout to NHTSA. All of us have had flat tires in our

lives and I don’t call NHTSA when I have a flat tire.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. SHELTON. I suspect you wouldn’t either.

Mr. STUPAK. Correct. Thank you.

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Shimkus is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have defined or

used the terminology, ‘‘parts per million,’’ which I think refers to

claims per million, connected with last year’s original recall where

we also asked how come insurance data wasn’t getting to NHTSA.

Part of the Tire Act was to get information. And I think that is

what we are kind of wrestling with too is new fountains of information, some coming from the insurance industry, some coming from

individual testing, either by you all or by the industry.

I was intrigued with the debate or the discussion on the tires on

the SUVs and the Ranger pickups with Mr. Dingell with Mr.

Lampe. And the basic premise was: same tire. It goes into the debate of standards and specifications.

Do we want to micromanage tire standards through Federal regulation?

Mr. JACKSON. We, as part of the TREAD Act, we were asked to

look at the tire standard that we have out there, and we believe

that we should look at that and that it can benefit from another

look. We are not trying to design tires—to provide a ‘‘performance

spec’’ for a tire to be made for a given vehicle.

So there is a degree of appropriate work that we have to do here,

but we are not in the business of designing tires nor of specifying

the requirements for a given tire-vehicle combination.

Mr. SHIMKUS. So what do we expect to receive from your evaluation? Or what do you think you might present to us? If you are the

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, an element of the

Department of Transportation, we have independent corporations

send us—establishing specifications to tire industry individuals

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who establish the exact standards for a multitude of different vehicles. What do you think you are going to accomplish?

Mr. JACKSON. We currently have a tire standard, and perhaps I

could ask my colleague to give you an overview of that standard

and exactly what we are looking at for changes in it.

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, Congressman, as part of the TREAD Act, we

are going to upgrade our tire standard. As it was discussed in this

committee’s hearing last year, the existing NHTSA tire standard

has been essentially unchanged since 1968. And as one of the provisions of the TREAD Act we are upgrading that standard. And we

will issue a proposal this summer, I think late this summer to actually upgrade that tire standard, because under TREAD, we have

to get that rulemaking completed by next June.

So that right now, under the NHTSA tire standard, there are

high-speed tests, there are endurance tests, there is a debeading

test. There is another test that is escaping me right now. But all

of those tests will be upgraded as part of our proposal this summer.

Mr. SHIMKUS. But that will be a floor, in essence.

Mr. SHELTON. Yes that, will be a floor, sir.

Mr. SHIMKUS. So if the automobile industry wants more bells and

whistles on their tires, they at least have to meet the floor of the

basic standards for all their tires.

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, sir, for all the their tires.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you. You know, this is the whole chickenand-the-egg debate on the tread separation and then steering problems, oversteering problems, maybe crashes, deaths, injuries, at

least. So we are talking tires, but we are also talking, you know,

the Ford Explorer and some of the engineering there.

Both companies conducted the same tests, which is the radius

circle test in conformance with the Society of Automotive Engineers

guidelines. However looking at the charts presented by both companies, they reached opposite results. How can we discern—how can

we, as Members of Congress, discern which is correct? And then

the follow-up question: Will you be able to discern which is correct?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Well, I don’t think it is a question of which is

correct. We will look at all of that information and maybe all of it

is persuasive to some degree or less degree than the other. Plus

there will be a lot of other additional information and we plan to

doing that expeditiously and having an answer as to whether we

should open an investigation. We are not going to simply be choosing between two different tests used by Ford or Dr. Guenther.

Mr. SHIMKUS. And that is why we are having a hearing to help

us clear the smoke. And I thought the whole hearing today would

do that. For a while it got a little smokier. Maybe we are clearing

it up at the end of the day, but we appreciate your work and look

forward to your report.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman

from Florida, Mr. Deutsch.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The other two panels,

I asked this question. I want to ask it to you as well. What should

the experience of a driver be in a situation of tread separation? I

mean, should the driver be able to handle the vehicle to get to the

shoulder of the road or what should the experience of a driver be?

332

Mr. WEINSTEIN. I don’t know that you can say what it should be.

The data seems to indicate that in most occasions, the driver is

able to get to the side of the road without a catastrophic crash. Unfortunately that is not always the case. It probably depends what

the driver does. It might depend on the speed. It might depend if

he is in a curve at the time. It might depend on the other traffic.

There are a lot of factors that go into it. But it does not automatically lead to a rollover in any vehicle, the Explorer or anything

else.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Do we have information—I mean, you mentioned

a bunch of factors. Do we have empirical data to support that?

Have we looked at ones that are not catastrophic versus the ones

that are catastrophic and how does the driver reaction differ?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Well, we don’t have—I can’t quantitatively discuss that. We are going to be doing some analysis in our simulator

as to how a driver reacts under certain circumstances, including a

tread separation. That work is supposed to start, I believe, later

this month or next month. We have expedited that and put it at

the head of the line.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Shelton, did you want to add something to

that?

Mr. SHELTON. Yes, I think this chart that the committee put up

illustrates that. When you look at claims per rollover, that is how

many claims it takes to generate a rollover. So higher is better.

That is, you are less likely to have a rollover given a claim. But

even for some of the lower numbers, claims per rollover, 11.9. That

means 11.9—it takes 11.9 incidents before you have a rollover.

That, I think, alludes back to Mr. Nasser’s testimony where he said

less than 1 out of 10 results in the vehicle actually rolling over.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. If I could just expand on that, those are only

claims. There are probably a number of tread separations that

don’t result in a claim as we defined it before. So the numbers are

probably even somewhat smaller.

Mr. DEUTSCH. One of the things that seems clear is that there

are other countries that we could have gained information from

their data. Is there any attempt at all in a formalized mechanism

to coordinate with other countries their claims data?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, that is one of the improvements of the

TREAD Act, to be able to get us relevant data from tire manufacturers and from vehicle manufacturers as soon as they, themselves,

have such relevant data.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Now, at this point, again, have we gotten any

overseas claims data since the TREAD Act went into effect?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Yes—not claims data. We have gotten recalls

and service actions that occurred in foreign countries. That is in effect right now, and manufacturers have been notifying us if they

do a recall, say, in Europe that affects vehicles that are for sale in

the U.S.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Would it make any sense at all—again, so we are

putting the onus on the manufacturer as opposed to you folks from

a country-to-country basis. Is there any reason to do it on a country-by-country basis, or is it not practical or not necessary?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Well, it would be helpful, and we have made

some inquiries in that regard. However, most other countries do

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not have the same kind of defect system that we do and the same

governmental oversight over their manufacturers in terms of directing them to do recalls. They have different types of systems.

And the data just isn’t necessarily collected by governmental agencies.

Mr. DEUTSCH. As we are sort of ending this hearing—and I appreciate you sitting through the many hours that we have been

here today—part of the hearing is, as the chairman mentioned, at

the start of this hearing is to try to inform the American people.

Is there any parting words that you would want to give consumers

at this point in time in terms of safety issues on existing Ford cars,

or for that matter, existing Firestone tires?

Mr. JACKSON. We appreciate very much, Congressman, the focus

that this committee has on the consumer. That is our focus. We are

working for you as well to give the consumers clear, concise, responsible scientific data. We can’t rush to judgment, but we are

close to judgment and we will speak comprehensively, and I believe

authoritatively, soon.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Let me add one final question. I see my time is

running out. In January, NHTSA issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking establishing a preliminary plan for gathering information on deaths, injuries, crashes, lawsuits, consumer complaints, et cetera, by make and model of vehicle and by potential

defects. This is a critically important rule for the consumer. What

is the status of that rule at this point?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Congressman, we have received comments. We

have a 60-day comment period. We have analyzed the comments

and summarized them. We are preparing now to put out a notice

of proposed rulemaking, now that we have a little more focus on

the issues. That should be later this fall.

Mr. DEUTSCH. All right. So the final rule should be this fall?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. No, that would be the notice of proposed rulemaking. Under the TREAD Act, the final rule must be out by the

end of June of 2002, and we will make that deadline, hopefully earlier. But it is a very complex issue as the summary that you just

read indicates.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman

from Michigan, Mr. Upton, is recognized.

Mr. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all for the

kinds words about the TREAD Act. And as you go back and in particular, in your responsible job now, one of the actions that was responsible for us moving on this action was the history of the recall

of Firestone 500 tire back in the 1970’s. This committee held hearings back then, and yet nothing was done in terms of legislation.

There has been reference made to the 68 tire standard. I was trying to think where I was in 1968, I didn’t even worry about having

a draft number back then as I was still in junior high school. And

the tire standards, obviously tires have changed quite a bit from

1968 to where they are today. And our focus last year was to identify whether we did have a problem. We did. And now new data,

more than 200 deaths because of the Firestone tire, and to implement legislation to correct the problem so that it would not happen

again.

334

And I think every member on this panel, Republican and Democrat worked so hard to pass that in a very strong bipartisan way

in both the House and the Senate without dissent at all. As we look

back, look at the situation today, we know that it’s working.

It was important to give you all the resources so that you could

develop the new standards that have to be met. And I know as we

think about some of the questions today, I wanted to clarify one of

the answers that you gave earlier, I think it was to Mr. Dingell

that in the years 1995 to 1997, were there 1,183 Firestone tire separations—tread separations versus two by Goodyear?

Mr. JACKSON. Claims.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Claims.

Mr. UPTON. Claims, I’m sorry. The report that was in some of today’s papers—and you all have indicated that you are going to be

starting to work on that tomorrow and give us answers as soon as

you can with regard to information on the tires that Ford is replacing, the Firestone tires. Have any of you ever heard of—have you

heard of any of those questions before today, before opening the

paper at your doorstep this morning? I mean, I woke up in Denver

at 5:30 and saw it in USA Today.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. I think last night, I heard that there was a question about it. But, I mean, I am talking about 6 at night, a reporter

called and said it was going to be in the paper. But so I guess that

is before this morning.

Mr. UPTON. Did you all comment on this story at all? Again——

Mr. JACKSON. No.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. No, we don’t have enough information.

Mr. UPTON. Well, I certainly look forward to getting your response to the information that may be shared with you, the evidence and take us where the facts take it because it is important

that you have the resources so that every American knows that

whether it is a Ford or a Chrysler or a GM or Honda, that, in fact,

the tires that they have are safe and they are not going to have

to fear for their lives or their family’s lives when they go to a soccer

game or little league game or to and from work.

I appreciate your work. I look forward to working with Chairman

Stearns as a member of this subcommittee as we continue to oversee the actions of the TREAD Act. I believe that NHTSA has to be

reauthorized this year, so we will look at pros and cons of where

we have to go and make sure that the bottom line is that you have

the resources to give the American public the confidence that they

must have in your jobs as overseers of this important agency. I

yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

I would also point out that he was one of the authors of the

TREAD Act. We in Congress appreciate all his efforts and are glad

to see that it is working.

In the procedure of the House, this committee, members who

serve on the subcommittee go before the ones who don’t. So in this

case, Mr. Bilirakis would go and then Mr. Sawyer, if he would be

patient, he will finish up. Mr. Bilirakis from Florida.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, in

the process of your continuing analysis, your study of this problem,

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are you intending to look at the vehicle as well as the tire, the

interaction, in other words, of the two?

Mr. JACKSON. Congressman, as part of our ongoing Firestone investigation, the vehicle is not, per se, part of that investigation. We

are going to complete the tire investigation and announce that in

approximately 1 month.

The other issue, about understeer/oversteer in the Explorer vehicle, is at a much more preliminary stage. We have received, in effect, a petition from Firestone asking us to look into this question,

so we are in a preliminary review stage to decide whether an investigation is merited or not. So in that regard and in a less formal

mode at this juncture, we are looking at those issues.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. But it seems I—and, again, first of all, I probably—I chair the Health Committee, and I have got my plate full

and then some with so many other areas, prescription drugs and

managed care reform, et cetera, et cetera, so I haven’t spent the

time on this issue that so many other members of this committee

have, and I am the first one to admit that. But it just seems to me

that logically, where there is a chance that there is some sort of— that maybe there might be a design flaw of some sort in the vehicle, and the interaction with the tire causes this would basically almost follow that you would, in the process here, take a look at that

also.

Mr. JACKSON. Prior to this point, Congressman—— Mr. BILIRAKIS. I don’t represent either one of these companies in

my district.

Mr. JACKSON. No, sir, neither do we. We are with you. We have

the same intention. And honestly, I believe both parties have the

intention of protecting the safety of the public. I do think that is

important.

We have not to this point thought that there is evidence that directs us toward a vehicle defect investigation. We are now looking

carefully, responsibly, quickly, at a series of data that has been

presented to us, and also some data that we have reviewed ourselves as has been shown on your display. And if we believe that

a defect investigation is called for, we will launch that formally and

expeditiously. But there has not been a conviction at NHTSA up

to this point that such an action was appropriate.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, there are people out there who feel that that

ought to be done. And I am not just referring to Firestone necessarily. I have had—I have had tire retailers who are not in the

business now, so they have no axe to grind, but who have sold all

of these tires at one time or another over a period of time who basically said to me, hey, there may be a problem with the vehicle.

So I would suggest that. Well, very quickly, take a look at that

chart, and I see the claims 1201 and then 1031 for those two different periods of time. Is that an unusual number of claims?

Mr. WEINSTEIN. It’s a very high number of claims.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Very high number of claims. Well, you know, I

raise the question with all due respect. You know, it’s National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and then, you know, there

are State Farms referrals in July 1998. We’ve had the history going

back for a few years, all the way back to that period of time at

least. It seems to me that—my two sons—I have two sons—both

336

bought Explorers a few years ago at the same time thinking they

could probably get a deal with a Ford dealer and they didn’t get

a deal at all, it turned out, but they have had a lot of problems

with that car—those cars.

And when I think of my four grandchildren riding in those vehicles and something like this potentially happening, so I guess, you

know, I often times ask myself what is the role of government or

what should be the role of government? I’m certainly against too

much government and that sort of thing, but it seems to me with

this kind of history, that we as a Federal Government have a role

here to get involved a heck of a lot earlier, and to at least communicate to the public. I know that you use the term, Mr. Jackson,

we can’t rush to judgment. And you’re right. But I’m disappointed,

frankly, that maybe we didn’t take an earlier role in this regard.

I think that really calls for it——

Mr. WEINSTEIN. We, of course——

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

We recognize the full Chairman of the committee, Mr. Tauzin,

the gentleman from Louisiana.

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Jackson, welcome sir. And, again, I was not here for your statement. I apologize. I had to go out to a leadership meeting this afternoon, but I

do want to thank you, first of all, for private comments you made

to me about your appreciation of the TREAD Act and the new authorities and the new, not only responsibilities, but dollars and all

of those efforts we’ve tried to make to give your agency the power

and the authority to take charge of some of these issues.

You’ve sat here and you’ve heard how frustrated we are with the

fact that these two mighty companies that are trading information

that sometimes differs, and it is sometimes based upon supposedly

the same testing criteria. And I think you understand how deeply

we will depend upon your agency to settle some of these questions

for us and the American public. We deserve to know the information we’re getting in these kind of recalls and replacements is, indeed, totally valid information, unfettered by any kind of personal

disputes that may be going on between these two very large companies.

In that regard, I also wanted to clarify with you your comments

regarding the information our staff has developed on replacement

tires. We obviously are deeply interested in getting your take on

the information we’ve developed from the raw data we received,

and my understanding is that you’ve committed to this committee

to begin immediately reviewing it, analyzing it.

Mr. JACKSON. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. We will start tonight.

We’ll look at the data we take home with us, and we’ll meet first

thing in the morning and whack away at it.

Mr. STEARNS. Would the gentleman yield? They indicated they

might have something for us tomorrow.

Chairman TAUZIN. That would be excellent. Obviously, it’s not—

it’s our intent, obviously, to get this information out as rapidly as

we can, but we wanted to be real and meaningful, and you can,

again, help us make sure we’re not a party to confusing Americans

about some of this data, which has been my big concern.

337

I also want to point out, however, that—in a question you may

have answered to Mr. Upton as to when you all found out about

this, that NHTSA itself supplied us with data indicating some of

these concerns. For example, you supplied us with data on the

Goodyear Wrangler HT that is used on the F-150, Expedition, and

Bronco. That has a 13.7 per million claims ratio, which is in excess

of a five claims per million that Ford used as a benchmark.

You also submitted to us information that the General Grabber

APXL manufactured in Charlotte, admittedly a small run of only

a half million tires, but nevertheless, a nearly 11 per million claims

rate, indicating that yours—and both of these are replacement

tires. So information we have—that has troubled us has come, in

part, from you. I don’t want you to think that we just pulled it out

of the air. This is data you submitted to our staffers indicating that

at least two of these replacement tires have claims ratios in excess

of the five per million used as a benchmark by the Ford Motor

Company in its recall decision. Are you aware of that?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir. We acknowledge that some of the data

that’s been discussed here as part of this conversation is data that

NHTSA has also obtained and has shared with you and your staff.

To go to the larger question we need an architecture of how to pull

together the relevant variables that will help us assess this data

in a coherent and clear way, and that’s what we propose to try to

give you a summary of in the morning or in the afternoon tomorrow.

Chairman TAUZIN. You should also know that our staff’s evaluation went beyond the years 1993 to 1998 in which you had information on one of those tires on the years 1995 to 2000 as you had on

another tire. We supplemented that with some of the raw data that

we’ve obtained, and we’ve, again, analyzed different numbers over

the stretch, but numbers again that we would like you to look

at——

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Chairman TAUZIN. [continuing] and to come back to us on. Again,

it’s critical—I want to make sure everybody understands this. It’s

critical that you help us resolve what these numbers mean. If a replacement tire is in fact safe, despite these numbers, if, for example, the claims data is all about minor property damage rather

than injuries and deaths, that makes a difference.

If, on the other hand, this claims data is accompanied by personal injury and death claims, it may have a much larger significance, and you have a lot of that information, and we obviously are

counting on you to wrap that around the information we’ll give you

so that we can get a clear picture of this.

One final thought, and I’d like your response on this. We have

obviously focused in the TREAD Act on the notion that the more

your agency does in the kinds of testing that Ford says it did, extensive pressure heat, psi speed testing to take these tires to the

limit, so that the American public knows in advance that a tire is

either safe or potentially not safe, so that we’re not relying upon

post mortems in making decisions on recall, is a vital part of the

reforms we initiated. I simply want your response on that. Is the

agency properly gearing up to do what Ford Motor Company apparently felt a need to do on its own? And the answer I hope you give

338

me in a second is more important because of what we’ve seen in

this Ford recall, because if we’re going to count on the companies

to do it, we’ll never know how accurate and how comparable and

how fair and how unbiased some of these tests and reports are

when companies are running tests out of their own labs and challenging one another as to accuracy. We have to depend upon your

agency, and so I’m asking you, are you gearing up, will you be in

good position to begin doing this instead of us having to rely upon

Ford tests and Firestone tests to make our decisions here?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, absolutely we are committed to

this, and absolutely we have launched this type of work. The work

that we’re doing now on the Firestone tire investigation is the most

comprehensive, complex and sophisticated analysis that NHTSA

has ever undertaken on a tire-related issue. So we’re working it

now, and I want to take this chance to say to you in person and

public how much we have appreciated the resources and the tools

that you’ve given to us in the TREAD Act, and we are committed

to implement those tools on time and to work—you have my personal commitment and that of Secretary Mineta that this is a priority of the Department of a significant order, and I’ll be watching

it, and he will too.

Chairman TAUZIN. Well, for a guy named Michael Jackson,

you’re singing a good tune.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman

from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Your agency

needs a lot more money, doesn’t it, Mr. Jackson, a lot more people

to meet, all these deadlines, and to do a lot more things that come

to your attention, what this committee might not know about?

Mr. JACKSON. Congressman Markey, we have a very important

set of responsibilities at this agency, and some of those we have not

pursued as quickly as I would like to see us do, and where we need

some more resources, this administration is not going to be bashful

about coming to the Congress and telling you exactly where we

need them and what we have to do with them, but I do hope to

accelerate the pace of our regulatory work, which is absolutely indispensable to the country.

Mr. MARKEY. The problem that I think many of the committee

members have is that while you, speaking for the administration,

say that you won’t be bashful, on the other hand, there hasn’t been

an administrator named for the first 5 months. So you can imagine

the confidence coefficient that our committee has looking at this

agency in administration at this point is at an historic low point,

because obviously we would want this agency to have had a gold

star put over its forehead, given what had just transpired in the

preceding year and all of these rulemakings, which have to be finished over the next couple of years. For example, it’s my provision

that calls for a dynamic test to be done.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARKEY. Now, there’s a 2-year window that you have to get

it done, but obviously if you can get it done in 1 year, then that

many more people’s lives would be saved, injuries avoided.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir. This is—if I may say, this is my second

tour of duty at the Department of Transportation, and I have a

339

sense, honestly, of the depth on the bench that we have among the

career people who are doing this type of analytical work. I want to

assure you that from the very beginning of his tenure, Secretary

Mineta has had to focus on these issues. In fact, one of the reasons

that we have not had an administrator in place yet is that we

launched a very extensive, nationwide search in cooperation with

the White House to find an extraordinary candidate for this job,

and the President announced his intention to nominate such a man

yesterday. But in the interim, there has been no slacking off or

resting on our laurels or sitting around on the core questions, and

particularly the question that you——

Mr. MARKEY. When will the dynamic testing——

Mr. JACKSON. We will meet or beat the statutory requirement for

implementing that rule.

Mr. MARKEY. So 2 years is not your goal? It’s a shorter time period than that?

Mr. JACKSON. I will tell you that I’m an impatient man. I want

to beat every single one of them that we have on the books, and

that that is the approach that we’re taking in our conversations to

get this done quickly. These are urgent and important things to do.

Mr. MARKEY. A lot of members of this committee side, on the Republican side especially, want to put real deadlines on the Federal

Communications Commission. They have to approve or disapprove

every merger within 60 days. Every rulemaking has to be completed within a very brief period of time. I would like to see—then

there nobody dies, you know, if a cable service is delayed an extra

30 days, you know. Here I think there’s a real urgency——

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARKEY. [continuing] that attaches to the work that you do.

Mr. JACKSON. Absolutely.

Mr. MARKEY. And I would hope that you would ensure that it

happens faster than 2 years.

Mr. JACKSON. I have a 6-year-old daughter at home that rides

around in the type of vehicles that we’ve been talking about today

here, sir, and I believe in my bones that this is an absolutely indispensable and urgent focus for us to take on in this safety mandate

that we have and——

Mr. MARKEY. Well, here’s a question that I’m sure every American who owns one of these vehicles and is now driving around in

it, having purchased it with the notion that they could strap their

children into the back seat and it would be safer than in some

small vehicle. When it turns out ironically that the children are

more vulnerable, because of this rollover propensity and the fact

that there are no roof crush regulations that are on the books.

Why doesn’t NHTSA begin a proceeding to put tough roof crush

standards so the roof just doesn’t collapse in on these family members? It’s a 30-year-old standard that we’re all living with and

dying with now in the United States. It was before the advent of

the SUV, and so now we have this vehicle that’s out there. Now

one in four vehicles coming out in the road or more are SUVs, and

so all of these families are putting their children into vehicles without any roof crush or rollover or crash worthiness standards that

are on the books.

340

Mr. JACKSON. Congressman, I asked this same question, and

we——

Mr. MARKEY. Who did you ask?

Mr. JACKSON. One of my colleagues at NHTSA when I got to the

department, and we have been working on this for some time, and

I’m jumping the gun a little bit, but happy to tell you that this

summer we will be publishing a notice in the Federal Register that

summarizes the data, the information that we’ve gathered about

the roof crush issue and solicits in a formal way input that could

lead to a formal review of those standards and issues.

Mr. STEARNS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. MARKEY. May I, Mr. Chairman, just have 30 additional seconds?

Mr. STEARNS. Absolutely.

Mr. MARKEY. I think he has just made big news here today, Mr.

Chairman, if I may, in terms of an advance that I don’t think anyone anticipated coming into today’s hearing room. So do you anticipate that that will lead toward the promulgation of a rule dealing

with—— Mr. JACKSON. We’re going to get that data in, and we will assess

it, and I would not like to forecast or speculate about the choices

or options that we would make, but it will certainly create a public

record that helps us evaluate, in a reasonable amount of time, this

issue.

Mr. MARKEY. And, again, knowing that there hasn’t been an upgrade of this standard in 30 years, is it fair to say that you believe

it’s time for us to review that standard and to update it?

Mr. JACKSON. I think it’s time to do exactly what we’re going to

do, get this conversation going in the public arena with the information that we have on the table suggesting to us that we need

to take a very, very careful look at it.

Mr. MARKEY. He’s made less news than I thought he was making, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. Sounds like a——

Mr. MARKEY. I will listen more carefully the second time and—— Mr. JACKSON. I’m not trying to—market.

Mr. MARKEY. And I’ll say this. I think it’s a mistake that you’re

not doing it. I think you could do it on your own. We now know

that thousands of lives could be saved if you put this standard on

the books and the industry had to meet it, and we know that if

they could increase the weight in these vehicles from 5,000 to 5,600

pounds over a 5-year period. It’s not that they’re afraid to add

extra weight to the vehicles, because we know they’re not concerned about fuel economy standards. They’re the least fuel-efficient vehicles on the road. They’re just packing it with all this additional weight. But all we need is a bar over the head of these

families, so that when the vehicle rolls over because of its propensity, that their lives aren’t going to be unnecessarily lost. So I think

you should do it. I think you’re making a big mistake if you don’t

and you’re going to be held accountable.

And second, if it’s a cost issue, if you don’t have the money, you

should ask us for the money. We’ll give you the money to put something this important on the books. I appreciate the fact that you’re

commencing. I can see from your testimony today the sincerity of

341

your interest on the subject. I hope that we can help you to be successful inside your administration and——

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, and we’ll seek that help.

Mr. Chairman, if I just may, on this issue I am not trying to

equivocate or be cute. I am trying to be responsible and tell you

that this really is an important issue to look at and to reserve judgment about exactly how to proceed once we launch this conversation publicly.

Mr. MARKEY. Then I take that, Mr. Jackson, as a good faith, you

know, promise to the committee, and I thank you for volunteering

that information.

Mr. JACKSON. And I know of your interest in it. If you would like

me to keep you personally involved and informed about what we’re

doing, then I would be happy to do that.

Mr. MARKEY. I would appreciate that. Thank you, sir. Appreciate

it.

Mr. STEARNS. All right. The gentleman, Mr. Sawyer, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman, some day I hope to be able to

stretch 5 minutes as well as my colleague from Massachusetts.

Let me just say, first of all, thank you very much for your testimony here today and for all of the work that you have been doing.

I have to confess that I am both troubled and comforted by what

you’ve said here today. I am comforted by your willingness to go

beyond what you have been requested to do to look at the questions

of vehicle interaction with tires, and I think that’s important for

you to do. I’m troubled, in that you seem to operate from the presumption that it is the tire that fails and therefore causes the difficulty with the vehicle. I think that may well be true. But it is also

true that the behavior of the vehicle affects the performance of the

tire and may, in fact, be a causal factor in the failure.

It is—it is true that the tire standards have not changed since

1968, and the change in technology has been enormous. Simply

going from bias to radial technology has been enormous. It seems

to me that the testing protocols that go with that change in technology need to change as well and that the kind of in-depth analysis that you’ve listed in your testimony, the shearography, the sectioning, the adhesion testing, the rig testing on drums, important

dynamic testing in its own right, but not vehicular dynamics.

Chemical analyses and other physical measurements are all important, but we simply need to get to an understanding of the way

each of the products affect the performance of the other.

If I could only suggest—you talked about the importance of the

relevant variables. If you simply look at the difference in weight

distribution between the Explorer and the Ranger, it seems to me

that there may well be a reason to understand the difference in

rear tire performance because of the polar moment of inertia that

comes at the loss of adhesion. It’s critically important.

Let me just turn in conclusion to—and then if you want to comment on any of this, please feel free to. If—when you were asked

about any advice that you might give to the American people, I

hope that the next time you’re asked that, you will reply, inflate

your tires; check them regularly; it has a profound affect on their

342

life and their performance, and it may have a profound affect on

your life as well. Any comments?

Mr. JACKSON. I couldn’t agree more with that.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEARNS. I thank my colleagues. We are now at the end of

this hearing that has lasted almost 71⁄2 straight hours. I want to

thank the staffs on both sides for an excellent job of preparation.

I want to thank you, Mr. Jackson, and your colleagues for waiting

through this period. I think we’ve had a very thoughtful hearing.

You’ve indicated you have the resources so that you can go ahead

and accomplish what needs to be done. I also believe we’ve posed

important questions for the American public by hearing both sides

of these issues.

And in the end, you are the impartial body. You are responsible

to make sure that the real answers come forward and not us on

either side. So we’re relying on you, because ultimately, the vehicles and the tires are going to be safe because of your work. So it’s

a very serious project you have before you. So I want to again

thank you. I also want to thank my chairman, Jim Greenwood from

Pennsylvania for his cochairmanship. And with that, the—— Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. STEARNS. Yes.

Mr. SAWYER. I just wanted to thank you very much for the opportunity to participate. Because it has been so long, I’m even more

grateful for the chance to—— Mr. STEARNS. Well, we particularly appreciate your staying

through the whole 71⁄2 hours.

With that, the two subcommittees are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]

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