FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIME PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ, 

Petitioner, No. 03-70244

v. Agency No.  A92-002-074 ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

March 23, 2006—San Francisco, California

Filed September 15, 2006

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, Stephen Reinhardt,

Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Sidney R. Thomas,

Barry G. Silverman, M. Margaret McKeown,

Kim McLane Wardlaw, Willam A. Fletcher,

Raymond C. Fisher, Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. Berzon,

Richard C. Tallman, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Jay S. Bybee,

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge William A. Fletcher;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Wardlaw;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Bybee;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

11389
COUNSEL

Raul R. Labrador, Nampa, Idaho, Robert H. Gibbs, Robert H.

Pauw, Gibbs Houston Pauw, Seattle, Washington, for the petitioner. 

Francis W. Fraser, Deborah N. Misir, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the respondent. 

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 

The question raised by this petition is whether the admissibility of an alien under the Special Agricultural Worker

(“SAW”) program is determined only as of the date of admission for lawful temporary residence under 8 U.S.C.

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11393
§ 1160(a)(1), or whether it is determined both as of that date

and as of the date of adjustment to lawful permanent residence under § 1160(a)(2). We hold that admissibility is determined as of the date of admission for lawful temporary

residence, and is not redetermined as of the date of adjustment

to lawful permanent residence. We therefore grant the petition

for review.

I. Factual Background

On about November 10, 1988, Jaime Perez-Enriquez, a citizen of Mexico, was admitted to lawful temporary resident status under the SAW provisions of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1). It is undisputed that at the time he was granted temporary resident status, Perez-Enriquez satisfied the requirements for

admissibility under § 1160(a)(1). On December 1, 1990,

Perez-Enriquez’s status was automatically adjusted to lawful

permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(2). 

On March 27, 1989, after his admission as a lawful temporary resident under § 1160(a)(1), but before his adjustment to

lawful permanent resident status under § 1160(a)(2), PerezEnriquez pled guilty to possession for sale of a controlled substance in violation of California Health and Safety Code

§ 11135. The court imposed a $100 fine and a suspended sentence of 180 days in county jail. In 2001, the Immigration and

Naturalization Service1 (“INS”) sought to remove PerezEnriquez as an inadmissible alien under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(A) on the ground that, due to his drug conviction, he was inadmissible at the time his status was adjusted

to that of lawful permanent resident. Perez-Enriquez contended that because he had been admitted under the SAW program, his admissibility had been determined at the time of his

1The Immigration and Naturalization Service has since been replaced by

the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002,

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 

11394 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
admission as a lawful temporary resident under § 1160(a)(1).

Therefore, according to Perez-Enriquez, the INS could not

seek removal on the ground that he was inadmissible. 

The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Perez-Enriquez

removed as an inadmissible alien under § 1227(a)(1)(A). The

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirmed

the IJ’s decision in a “streamlined” order. 

Perez-Enriquez timely petitioned for review in this court. A

three-judge panel denied the petition, holding that because

Perez-Enriquez had been convicted of his crime before his

adjustment to lawful permanent resident status under

§ 1160(a)(2), he never successfully adjusted to that status.

Thus, according to the panel, the INS could seek his removal

as an inadmissible alien under § 1227(a)(1)(A) rather than as

a lawful permanent resident. Perez-Enriquez v. Gonzales, 411

F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). We have vacated the decision of the three-judge panel and taken the case en banc to

consider Perez-Enriquez’s petition anew. Perez-Enriquez v.

Gonzales, 436 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Because this was a streamlined decision, we review the IJ’s

decision as the final agency action. See Falcon Carriche v.

Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended. We

review the legal questions presented de novo. De Martinez v.

Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended. We

give Chevron deference to established constructions by the

BIA of the statutes it is charged to administer. INS v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (citing Chevron U.S.A.,

Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842

(1984)); Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1995). 

II. Jurisdiction

[1] The government has argued that under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) we lack jurisdiction to review the petition

because Perez-Enriquez “is removable by reason of having

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11395
committed a criminal offense covered in [8 U.S.C. §]

1182(a)(2).” This argument was made prior to the enactment

of the REAL ID Act of 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.

231, 310 (2005). Section 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act amended

8 U.S.C. § 1252 to add a new subsection. That subsection provides: “Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other

provision of this chapter (other than this section) which limits

or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding

review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised

upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of

appeals in accordance with this section.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D). We are presented with a reviewable question

of law: whether Perez-Enriquez’s admissibility is determined

not only as of the date of his admission to lawful temporary

status under § 1160(a)(1), but also as of the date of his adjustment to lawful permanent status under § 1160(a)(2). The government contended, and the IJ concluded, that the statute

requires that admissibility be determined as of both dates. If

the IJ’s construction of the statute is wrong, Perez-Enriquez

is not removable on the ground charged by the government.

We have jurisdiction under § 1252 to review the IJ’s legal

conclusion.

III. Discussion

[2] The SAW program was established by Congress in

1986 as a two-step legalization program for certain alien agricultural workers. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1), the Attorney

General “shall adjust the status of an alien to that of an alien

lawfully admitted for temporary residence if the Attorney

General determines that” the individual has applied for such

adjustment within eighteen months of November 6, 1986; has

resided in the United States and performed agricultural work

for at least 90 man-days during the twelve-month period ending on May 1, 1986; and is otherwise admissible as an immigrant. After a statutorily prescribed time period, the Attorney

General then “shall adjust the status of any alien provided

lawful temporary resident status under paragraph (1) to that of

11396 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id.

§ 1160(a)(2). 

Under § 1160(a)(3)(A), the Attorney General “may terminate” an individual’s temporary resident status at any time

prior to adjustment of status to a lawful permanent resident.

Under § 1160(a)(3)(B), the Attorney General “may deny

adjustment to permanent status and provide for termination of

the temporary resident status” under § 1160(a)(1) if, inter alia,

“the alien . . . is convicted of a felony . . . committed in the

United States.” However, if the Attorney General does not act

affirmatively to terminate an alien’s temporary resident status

under § 1160(a)(3), that status is automatically adjusted to

permanent resident under § 1160(a)(2) after the passage of the

requisite time period. 

[3] The government, however, contends that 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(A) dictates a different timetable for determining

admissibility than just described. Section 1227(a)(1)(A) provides: 

Inadmissible aliens 

Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of

status was within one or more of the classes of aliens

inadmissible by the law existing at such time is

deportable. 

(Emphasis added.) The government contends that the admissibility of all aliens — even aliens already admitted to lawful

temporary resident status under the SAW program under

§ 1160(a)(1) — is determined, for purposes of any adjustment

of status, as of the date of that adjustment. By the government’s logic, Perez-Enriquez’s conviction rendered him inadmissible at the time of his adjustment from temporary to

permanent legal resident status. Therefore, according to the

government, Perez-Enriquez is removable as an inadmissible

alien under § 1227(a)(1)(A). 

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11397
The legal question is narrow, but the consequence is important. If the admissibility of an alien admitted under the SAW

program is determined at the time of his initial adjustment of

status to lawful temporary resident under § 1160(a)(1), and if

the alien’s status is thereafter automatically adjusted to lawful

permanent resident without further inquiry into admissibility,

the government may institute removal proceedings against the

alien. But the government must do so on the premise that the

alien is a lawful permanent resident alien rather than that the

alien is inadmissible. 

Lawful permanent resident aliens have important protections in removal proceedings that are not provided to inadmissible aliens. For example, depending on the circumstances, a

lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under

Section 212(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed

1996), and INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), or to seek

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). In PerezEnriquez’s case, the relevant protection is that provided by

Section 212(c) and St. Cyr because he pled guilty to his drug

offense in 1989, prior to the adoption of three statutes limiting

the availability of relief under Section 212(c). See St. Cyr, 533

U.S. at 297. 

[4] The BIA has authoritatively construed the statute in the

manner urged by Perez-Enriquez. In Matter of Jimenez-Lopez,

20 I. & N. Dec. 738 (BIA 1993), Jimenez-Lopez had been

admitted to lawful temporary resident status under the SAW

program. Jimenez-Lopez sought to return to the United States

from Mexico, but was excluded from reentry because marijuana was found in his car at the border. In discussing his

excludability under § 1225, the BIA carefully described the

operation of the SAW program and § 1160(a): 

[S]ection 210(a)(2) of the Act [8 U.S.C.

§ 1160(a)(2)] . . . adjusts the status of an alien

granted lawful temporary status under section

210(a)(1) [§ 1160(a)(1)] to that of a lawful perma11398 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
nent resident on the basis of a fixed schedule, without regard for the alien’s admissibility at that time.

This mechanism is perhaps unique under the immigration laws, since an alien admitted for temporary

residence under section 210(a)(1) may apparently

adjust his or her status to that of a lawful permanent

resident even if physically outside of the United

States. . . . 

It is true that section 210(a)(3)(B) of the Act, 8

U.S.C. § 1160(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1992), permits the

Attorney General to deny a lawful temporary resident adjustment of status under section 210(a)(2) and

terminate temporary resident status upon, inter alia,

the alien’s commission of an act that renders him or

her inadmissible under section 212(a) of the Act

[§ 1182]. However, the language of this provision is

permissive in nature only; it does not mandate an

examination of a lawful temporary resident’s admissibility before adjustment to permanent status, such

as is the case with respect to adjustment under section 245 [§ 1227]. 

. . . 

[T]he record reflects that the Service clearly could

have proceeded to deny the applicant’s adjustment of

status under section 210(a)(2) of the Act and to terminate his lawful temporary resident status, but did

not. We do not find this omission, however, to constitute a new determination of the applicant’s admissibility to the United States, as the Service was not

obliged to make such a finding before the automatic

adjustment of the applicant’s status took place on

December 1, 1990. 

Id. at 742-43 (internal citation omitted). The BIA held that

Jimenez-Lopez was excludable from the United States

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11399
because of his attempt to smuggle marijuana into the United

States, but that he was excludable only as a lawful permanent

resident alien, not as a temporary resident. The BIA was

explicit on this point: “The necessary conclusion is that these

exclusion proceedings are still proper despite the applicant’s

adjustment of his status to that of lawful permanent resident

under section 210(a)(2) of the Act [§ 1160(a)(2)].” Id. at 743

(emphasis added). 

[5] We conclude that the BIA’s opinion in Jimenez-Lopez,

published in 1993, is alone dispositive of this case as a clear,

authoritative explication of the operation of § 1160(a). We

give Chevron deference to published decisions of the BIA

interpreting the immigration statutes it is charged to administer. As stated by the Supreme Court in INS v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999):

The Attorney General, while retaining ultimate

authority, has vested the BIA with power to exercise

the “discretionary power and authority conferred

upon the Attorney General by law” in the course of

“considering and determining cases before it.” 8

C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998). Based on this allocation of

authority, we recognized in Cardoza-Fonseca, [480

U.S. 421 (1987)], that the BIA should be accorded

Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory

terms “concrete meaning through a process of caseby-case adjudication”[.] 

Despite this statement in Aguirre-Aguirre, the dissent contends that we should not give Chevron deference to JimenezLopez. It gives three reasons. First, the dissent states that “the

applicable immigration statutes have changed considerably

since 1993.” Diss. op. at 11413. In a broad sense it is, of

course, true that the immigration statutes “have changed considerably since 1993.” But the narrower issue relevant to this

case is whether any of the “applicable” statutes has changed.

11400 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
The dissent fails to identify any statutory provision applicable

to this case that has changed since 1993. 

Second, the dissent states that “the Attorney General of the

United States[ ] does not share the panel’s reading of JimenezLopez. . . . It seems anomalous to give deference to an agency

determination that is contrary to the position taken by the

head of the agency.” This statement disregards that the Attorney General has vested his discretionary interpretive authority

to the BIA, see 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (2003), Aguirre-Aguirre,

526 U.S. at 425, and that the BIA has already interpreted the

statutory provisions at issue. The position of the government

in this case is a litigating position taken in opposition to a

published decision of the agency charged with administering

the statute. See Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,

488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988) (“We have never applied the

principle [of Chevron and other cases] to agency litigating

positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings,

or administrative practice.”); Smiley v. Citibank (South

Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (“Of course we deny

deference to ‘agency litigating positions that are wholly

unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.’ ” (citing Bowen)). 

Third, the dissent states that “if there is more than one possible construction of § 1160, then neither this court nor the

BIA is bound under Chevron to the majority’s interpretation

of Jimenez-Lopez.” Conceding arguendo the dissent’s premise

that there is more than one possible construction of § 1160,

the dissent’s conclusion does not follow from its premise.

Whenever a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, Chevron deference is owed to an interpretation provided

by the agency charged with administering the statute. In this

case, that agency is the BIA. Contrary to the dissent’s statement, the BIA is not bound under Chevron to follow any particular interpretation of an ambiguous provision of our

immigration statutes. Rather, it is this court that is bound

under Chevron. Also contrary to the dissent’s statement, we

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11401
are not providing an “interpretation of Jimenez-Lopez” in this

case. Rather, we are following the interpretation of § 1160

provided by the BIA in Jimenez-Lopez, as required by Chevron. 

[6] We note for good measure that prior to the three-judge

panel decision in this case, the BIA consistently followed

Jimenez-Lopez in an unbroken string of unpublished opinions.

Such unpublished decisions are not entitled to Chevron deference, see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40

(1944), but they serve to underline the correctness of our

reading of the BIA’s decision in Jimenez-Lopez. 

For example, In re Herrera-Mendez, 2004 WL 1167348

(BIA Jan. 27, 2004), is factually indistinguishable from this

case. Like Perez-Enriquez, Herrera-Mendez was an agricultural worker admitted under the SAW program. Also like

Perez-Enriquez, he was convicted of a drug offense between

the time of his admission to temporary resident status and his

adjustment to permanent resident status. Citing JimenezLopez, the BIA held that Herrera-Mendez had successfully

adjusted to permanent resident status despite the drug conviction. It wrote: 

[R]espondent became a lawful temporary resident

of the United States on June 16, 1988, as a special

agricultural worker (SAW) pursuant to section 210

of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1160] . . . . The respondent’s

drug conviction was entered August 17, 1990, after

she had already filed her SAW application. On

December 1, 1990, her status was adjusted to lawful

permanent resident pursuant to section 210 of the

Act. 

The rules and procedures for adjustment to permanent status under section 210(a)(2) of the Act

[§ 1160(a)(2)] differ from those relating to adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act [§ 1227].

11402 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
Whereas adjustment pursuant to section 245 of the

Act requires that an alien be admissible to the United

States at the time of his adjustment to lawful permanent residence, adjustment pursuant to section

210(a)(2) of the Act has no such requirement.

Instead, pursuant to section 210(a)(1)(C) of the Act,

an alien’s admissibility to the United States is determined as of the time of his adjustment to that of lawful temporary resident. After the alien has been

granted lawful temporary resident status under section 210(a)(1) of the Act, section 210(a)(2) mandates

that his status be adjusted to that of lawful permanent resident based on a fixed schedule and without

further reference to his admissibility. . . . See Matter

of Juarez, 20 I&N Dec. 340, 345 (BIA 1991); see

also Matter of Jimenez-Lopez, 20 I&N Dec. 738, 742

(BIA 1993). 

Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted). The BIA “therefore disagree[d] with the DHS that [Herrera-Mendez] was

inadmissible [to] the United States when she adjusted her status to lawful permanent resident, and ineligible for section

212(c) consideration.” Id.

To the same effect are In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2004

WL 1739154 (BIA June 29, 2004) (“[P]ursuant to section

210(a)(1)(C) of the Act, an alien’s admissibility to the United

States is determined as of the time of his adjustment to that

of lawful temporary resident. . . . After the alien has been

granted lawful temporary resident status under section

210(a)(1) of the Act, section 210(a)(2) mandates that his status be adjusted to that of lawful permanent resident alien

based on a fixed schedule and without further reference to his

admissibility. See . . . Matter of Jimenez-Lopez[.]”); In re

Acuna Martinez, 2004 WL 1167124 (BIA Feb. 12, 2004)

(“[U]nlike section 245 of the Act, which requires both a discretionary determination and consideration of statutory

requirements such as the alien’s continuing admissibility, proPEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11403
visions set forth at section 210 do not mandate an examination

of a lawful temporary resident’s admissibility, but rather provide for an ‘automatic’ adjustment after 2 years of status as

a temporary resident. See Matter of Jimenez-Lopez[.].”); and

In re Tellez Gomez, 2004 WL 1059693 (BIA Jan. 2, 2004)

(“After the alien has been granted lawful temporary resident

status under section 210(a)(1) of the Act, section 210(a)(2)

mandates that his status be adjusted to that of lawful permanent resident based on a fixed schedule and without further

reference to his admissibility. See . . . Matter of JimenezLopez[.]”).

IV. No Remand under INS v. Ventura

The government contends that the BIA’s unpublished decisions just described did not answer the question now before

us — whether § 1227(a)(1) requires that the admissibility of

SAW workers must be determined at the time of readjustment

of status to permanent resident alien under § 1160(a)(2). It

argues that therefore, at a minimum, we should remand this

case to the BIA under INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002), for

an answer to that question. For two reasons, we disagree with

the government’s contention that a Ventura remand is

required. 

First, contrary to the government’s contention, the BIA’s

unpublished decisions did answer the question now before us.

For example, Herrera-Mendez is, as noted above, factually

indistinguishable from this case. The BIA concluded that

Herrera-Mendez had successfully adjusted her status and was

therefore eligible for relief under Section 212(c). The necessary premise underlying that conclusion is that HerreraMendez, and SAW aliens in her position, were not “inadmissible” at the time of their adjustment to permanent resident

status under § 1162(a)(2). The BIA’s conclusion thus

addressed precisely the question now before us, for the key

phrase in § 1227(a)(1)(A) is “[i]nadmissible . . . at the time of

. . . adjustment of status.” 

11404 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
[7] Second, until the three-judge panel’s decision in this

case, the BIA consistently followed the construction of

§ 1160(a) articulated in Jimenez-Lopez and reflected in the

unpublished decisions described above. As a result of the

three-judge panel’s decision in the case now before us, the

BIA felt compelled to change its construction. In 2004, the

BIA initially decided In re Flores-Munoz, 2004 WL 2418626

(BIA Aug. 27, 2004), in accordance with Jimenez-Lopez. In

the course of its unpublished decision, the BIA wrote what

had, by 2004, become a virtual boilerplate: 

The rules and procedures for adjustment to permanent status under section 210(a)(2) of the Act [8

U.S.C. § 1160(a)(2)] differ from those relating to

adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act [8

U.S.C. § 1227]. Whereas adjustment pursuant to section 245 of the Act requires that an alien be admissible to the United States at the time of his adjustment

to lawful permanent residence, adjustment pursuant

to section 210(a)(2) of the Act has no such requirement. Instead, pursuant to section 210(a)(1)(C) of

the Act, an alien’s admissibility to the United States

is determined as of the time of his adjustment to that

of lawful temporary resident. . . . After the alien has

been granted lawful temporary resident status under

section 210(a)(1) of the Act, section 210(a)(2) mandates that his status be adjusted to that of lawful permanent resident based on a fixed schedule and

without further reference to his admissibility. See . . .

Matter of Jimenez-Lopez, 20 I&N Dec. 738, 742

(BIA 1993)[.] 

After the decision of the three-judge panel in this case, the

government moved to reopen in Flores-Munoz. In an unpublished decision granting the motion, the BIA wrote: 

Initially, we note that in our August 27, 2004,

decision, we determined that pursuant to section

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11405
210(a)(1)(C) of the Act, an alien’s admissibility is

determined at the time of adjustment to lawful temporary status and is not revisited as subsequent

adjustment to lawful permanent status is based upon

a fixed schedule without further reference to admissibility. However, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently held that

adjustment of status occurs on the date of the automatic adjustment to lawful permanent status under

[the SAW program], rather than on the earlier date

when the alien received lawful temporary status. See

Perez Enriquez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.

2004). Accordingly, the DHS motion is granted[.] 

In re Flores-Munoz, 2005 WL 1104190 (BIA Mar. 25, 2005).

[8] In its second decision in Flores-Munoz, the BIA gave

no other reason than the decision of the three-judge panel for

reversing its long and consistent line of decisions based on

Jimenez-Lopez. We have no doubt that, left to its own

devices, the BIA would have continued to adhere to its decision in Jimenez-Lopez and later cases, for the BIA made clear

that its second decision in Flores-Munoz was compelled by

the decision of the three-judge panel of this court. We now

hold, on en banc consideration, that this decision of the threejudge panel was incorrect. In this circumstance, we have no

reason to remand this case to the BIA under Ventura. 

Conclusion

[9] Based on the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a), the BIA’s decision in Jimenez-Lopez construing that text, and the BIA’s consistent application of Jimenez-Lopez in later decisions, we

hold that admissibility for an agricultural worker under the

SAW program is determined as of the date of adjustment of

status to lawful temporary resident under § 1160(a)(1).

Admissibility is not redetermined as of the date of automatic

adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under

11406 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
§ 1160(a)(2). We therefore grant Perez-Enriquez’s petition for

review, vacate the order of removal, and remand to the BIA

for appropriate further proceedings. 

PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED. 

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part: 

I, too, agree with most of the majority’s opinion. However,

I also agree with Judges Bybee and Silverman that a remand

under INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002), is in order. 

Although the BIA’s ruling in Matter of Jimenez-Lopez, 20

I. & N. Dec. 738 (BIA 1993), implicitly controls this decision,

the agency must be given an opportunity to make an explicit

holding that the relevant admissibility date for a special agricultural worker (“SAW”) applicant is the date of admission as

a lawful temporary resident. I am persuaded that this is the

correct reading of the SAW provisions. As the BIA stated in

Jimenez-Lopez, adjustment of status under the SAW provisions “involves a different procedure” whereby the applicant’s status is adjusted to “that of a lawful permanent

resident on the basis of a fixed schedule, without regard for

the alien’s admissibility at that time.” Id. at 742.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, with whom SILVERMAN, Circuit

Judge, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

I agree with much of the majority’s opinion. I write separately because I believe that the majority has overstepped the

bounds of INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002). 

The majority finds that BIA has previously construed 8

U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1) to mean that Perez-Enriquez’s admissibilPEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11407
ity is determined only as of the date of admission to lawful

temporary status. See Matter of Jimenez-Lopez, 20 I. & N.

Dec. 738 (BIA 1993). It agrees with BIA and affords these

decisions Chevron deference. Maj. Op. at 11400. It then contrasts BIA’s prior position with its position this case, which

BIA evidently felt compelled to take because of the panel’s

original decision. Finding BIA’s position in this case inconsistent with its prior position, the majority concludes that

BIA’s decision in this case must be erroneous and vacates the

order of removal. 

I am with the majority until that final step. I am not so confident that we can reach that conclusion for BIA, even though

we may have invited the error. An agency has a duty of consistent dealing. It also has the duty, in the first instance, to

construe the statutes it enforces. Having determined that BIA

has treated Perez-Enriquez in a manner inconsistent with

BIA’s prior rulings, I would grant the petition and remand to

BIA for an explanation. It seems to me that BIA has three

options. First, it can determine that its ruling in PerezEnriquez’s case is, indeed, inconsistent with its prior rulings

and can grant him the same relief. Based on BIA’s observations in In re Flores-Munoz, 2004 WL 2418626 (BIA Aug.

27, 2004), on the panel’s now-withdrawn opinion in this case,

see Maj. Op. at 11403-04, I would be surprised if BIA did not

acknowledge that it made a mistake in Perez-Enriquez’s case

and correct it. Second, BIA can explain why Perez-Enriquez’s

situation is factually different from Matter of Jimenez-Lopez

and the cases following it. Or, third, BIA can explain that it

has changed its view on how Section 1160(a)(1) should be

construed. 

It is the possibility that BIA will pursue this last option that

raises the greatest concerns. The Supreme Court has “rejected

the argument that an agency’s interpretation ‘is not entitled to

deference because it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations’ of the statute in question.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500

U.S. 173, 186 (1991) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

11408 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984)). “An initial

agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone,”

because the agency “must consider varying interpretations

and the wisdom of its policy on continuing basis.” Chevron,

467 U.S. at 863-64. Thus, “[t]he [BIA] is not estopped from

changing a view [it] believes to have been grounded upon a

mistaken legal interpretation.” Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993). I do not read the majority’s

decision to conclude that there is only one possible construction of Section 1160, so that any other construction would be

unreasonable as a matter of law. See Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that

BIA departed from its prior practice and that its “interpretation is unreasonable, [and] we need not defer to it”). Were

BIA to change its view, we might afford its new position

something less than full Chevron deference, see Good Samaritan Hosp., 508 U.S. at 417; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480

U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987), but I don’t see that we preclude

BIA from offering a “reasonable rationale supporting its

departure from prior practice.” Seldovia Native Ass’n v.

Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990).

Because I don’t think that we can prejudge how BIA should

treat this case, I respectfully dissent as to Part IV of the opinion. “Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a

case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place

primarily in agency hands.” Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16. I would

grant Perez-Enriquez’s petition and remand to BIA to figure

it out. 

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, with whom O’SCANNLAIN,

TALLMAN, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting: 

As noted by the majority, this case concerns a narrow legal

issue: whether, in removal proceedings where the alien is

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11409
charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) with being inadmissible at the time of adjustment of status, the adjustment of status

date is the date the alien’s status was adjusted to legal temporary resident or the date on which it was adjusted to legal permanent resident. Section 1227(a)(1)(A) provides that any

“alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was

within one or more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the

law existing at such time is deportable.” (Emphasis added.)

We must therefore consider whether “adjustment of status”

refers to November 10, 1988, when Perez-Enriquez presented

himself to the government and claimed that he resided in the

United States and had performed seasonal agricultural services for at least 90 days, see 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1), or

December 1, 1990, when his status was automatically

adjusted to lawful permanent resident, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1160(a)(2). Lacking any clear instruction in the statute, we

are forced to look beyond the plain language of the statute to

determine which date the government must use. 

The majority believes that Matter of Jimenez-Lopez, 20 I.

& N. Dec. 738 (BIA 1993), is dispositive. I cannot agree. The

issues decided in Jimenez-Lopez were different from the issue

presented in this case. Furthermore, the majority seeks to

impose its interpretation of Jimenez-Lopez against the government. I continue to think that the sounder perspective is that

§ 1227(a)(1)(A) allows the respondent to use the later date as

the adjustment of status date. Accordingly, I dissent from the

majority’s contrary conclusion.1

I

Jimenez-Lopez presented a distinct factual setting and

resolved distinct legal issues. Jimenez-Lopez applied for lawful temporary residence under the special agricultural worker

(“SAW”) provisions on June 2, 1988. 20 I. & N. Dec. at 738-

1

I concur in the majority’s determination that we have jurisdiction to

review the petition. 

11410 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
39. On April 8, 1990, Jimenez-Lopez was returning from a

trip to Mexico. Because the car in which he was traveling was

found to contain marijuana, Jimenez-Lopez was arrested and

“charged with excludability as an alien who the immigration

officer had reason to believe was a drug trafficker,” and

paroled into the United States. Id. at 739. On October 1, 1990,

he was convicted of importation of a controlled substance and

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.

Id. On December 1, 1990, Jimenez-Lopez’s status was

adjusted to lawful permanent resident pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1160(a)(2). Id. 

The government brought exclusion proceedings against

Jimenez-Lopez. The IJ terminated the proceedings, holding

that Jimenez-Lopez’s physical entry into the United States

and the later automatic adjustment of his status to legal permanent resident constituted admittance into the United States,

and he therefore was no longer excludable. Id.

The BIA vacated the IJ’s termination of the exclusion proceedings. Id. at 743. It held that neither Jimenez-Lopez’s

parole into the United States on the drug charges nor the automatic adjustment of his status to lawful permanent resident

constituted “entry” into the United States.2Id. at 742. In

reaching this determination, the BIA noted that JimenezLopez’s adjustment of status to legal permanent resident after

he was paroled into the United States was automatic, and did

not include an admissibility determination. Id. at 742-43.

Accordingly, he was properly in exclusion proceedings

because he had not effected an “entry” into the United States.

Id. at 743. This determination appears to be of little assistance

to our task of determining which of two adjustments of status

dates is invoked under § 1227(a)(1)(A). 

2

Indeed, the BIA noted that the SAW provisions appeared to allow an

alien to “adjust his or her status to that of lawful permanent resident even

if physically outside the United States.” 20 I. & N. Dec. at 742. 

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11411
As noted by the majority, Jimenez-Lopez states that the

automatic adjustment to permanent legal resident under

§ 1160(a)(2) does not constitute a new determination of the

applicant’s admissibility to the United States. I do not, however, find in Jimenez-Lopez any direct support for the majority’s implicit conclusion that the critical “adjustment of status”

date for purposes of § 1227(a)(1)(A) must be one for which

there was a contemporaneous determination of admissibility.

There is nothing in Jimenez-Lopez preventing an IJ, in a subsequent removal proceeding charging an alien with inadmissability under § 1227(a)(1)(A), from determining an alien’s

admissibility as of the date his status was adjusted to legal

permanent resident, notwithstanding the fact that the adjustment had been automatic. 

In sum, Jimenez-Lopez’s holdings that the automatic adjustment to legal permanent resident did not constitute an entry

and was not an admissibility determination is not dispositive

because it does not answer the question of whether under

§ 1227(a)(1)(A) the critical “adjustment of status” for purposes of the unique SAW provisions is the initial adjustment

to legal temporary resident or the subsequent adjustment to

legal permanent resident.3

II

Assuming that the applicability of Jimenez-Lopez to this

case were established, I would still disagree with the majority’s position that Jimenez-Lopez is entitled to Chevron deference. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999);

see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Jimenez-Lopez was

3Support for the use of the later date may be gleaned from the BIA’s

observation in Jimenez-Lopez that the provision allowing the Attorney

General to terminate legal temporary resident status was “permissive in

nature only,” and its suggestion that a failure to do so should not weigh

against the government. 20 I. & N. Dec. at 742. 

11412 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
decided thirteen years ago and it appears that reasonable

minds may differ as to its meaning.4 Moreover, the applicable

immigration statutes have changed considerably since 1993,

and the respondent in this case, the Attorney General of the

United States, does not share the panel’s reading of JimenezLopez. In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Supreme Court gave Chevron

deference to a position advanced by both the BIA and the

Attorney General. 526 U.S. at 424. It seems anomalous to

give deference to an agency determination that is contrary to

the position taken by the head of the agency.5

Moreover, if there is more than one possible construction

of Section 1160, then neither this court nor the BIA is bound

under Chevron to the majority’s interpretation of JimenezLopez. As noted in Judge Bybee’s concurring and dissenting

opinion, the Supreme Court has recognized that an agency

can, and should be allowed to, change its mind. The Supreme

Court has “rejected the argument that an agency’s interpretation ‘is not entitled to deference because it represents a sharp

break with prior interpretations’ of the statute in question.”

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) (quoting Chevron,

467 U.S. at 862). “An initial agency interpretation is not

instantly carved in stone,” because the agency “must consider

varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64. Thus, “[t]he

[Attorney General] is not estopped from changing a view [he]

believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken legal interpretation.” Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402,

4The Immigration Judge in this case thought that Jimenez-Lopez was

instructive and that Perez-Enriquez’s “adjustment by operation of law

does not in some way constitute a waiver or estoppel of the Service’s ability to pursue the instant charge.” 

5Of course, a party might argue that an agency should be estopped from

changing its position, or that it relied on a prior agency position to its detriment. Such contentions, however, are very different from holding that

deference to a difficult-to-comprehend BIA opinion requires that this

court’s interpretation of that opinion trumps a contrary position advocated

by the Attorney General of the United States. 

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11413
417 (1993). If the Attorney General is not estopped from

changing his view, how can he be bound under Chevron to an

interpretation of a BIA decision with which he does not

agree? 

In this case, the court is called upon to interpret JimenezLopez and Section 1160. The majority’s statement, however,

that its interpretation is compelled by Chevron deference is,

I submit, wrong, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and at

odds with our usual criteria for deferring to agency interpretations. See Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 750, 754-

59 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing Chevron deference in immigration cases and noting the importance of the role played by the

Attorney General).

III

I remain of the opinion that the government’s perspective

is reasonable and legal. The SAW provisions applied to

numerous aliens who were in the United States illegally, and

set forth a two-step process for adjustment to permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1160. The first step allowed these

aliens to alert the government to their presence without penalty: they were granted temporary resident status. At the time

of the application, the government presumably had no knowledge of the individual alien, other than what he or she set

forth in the application. The time between the adjustment to

temporary resident and the automatic adjustment to permanent resident gave the government some time to investigate

the applicant. Accordingly, to the extent that an adjustment of

status determination gives an alien some additional procedural

or substantive rights against any effort by the government to

deport him or her, it makes sense to use the date of adjustment

to permanent resident, even though the adjustment is automatic. 

Furthermore, using the date of adjustment to lawful permanent resident is consistent with the fact that the benefits

11414 PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES
accorded a lawful permanent resident are far broader than

those accorded a temporary resident. The IJ determined that

in line with the benefits accruing from lawful permanent residence, “adjustment of status,” as used in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(A), should refer to the date of adjustment of status to permanent resident. 

Even if I did not find this approach persuasive, I would

affirm because Perez-Enriquez has not shown that the respondent’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. For these

reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary

conclusion.

PEREZ-ENRIQUEZ v. GONZALES 11415