* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances

set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 96-11083

Summary Calendar

_______________

ROBYN J FOLLOWWELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

G E CAPITAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

VERSUS

DAN FOLLOWWELL,

Defendant.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:96-CV-2087-H)

_________________________

February 5, 1997

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*

Robyn Followwell appeals the dismissal of her claims against
 

1 According to G E Capital, this federal action arises out of the

institution, by G E Capital Mortgage Services, as authorized servicing agent for

the Federal National Mortgage Association, of a forcible detainer action against

Followwell. G E Capital Mortgage Services acquired title to Followwell’s

property at a foreclosure sale. 

2

G E Capital pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Finding no error,

we dismiss the appeal as frivolous.

I.

Followwell alleged in this pro se action that G E Capital had

committed “severe violations of the federal housing contract laws”

by “working over time to try to develop and utilized [sic] unsavory

means to illegally take her home away from her.” Followwell sought

$5 million in damages for mental and physical stress and a “federal

injunction and or a cease and desist order . . . and or to force

the defendant to come to the table and work out a compromise.”1

The district court noted originally that the complaint failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and invited

Followwell to file an amended complaint remedying this deficiency.

Ten days later, Followwell filed essentially the same conclusionary

allegations, without any citations to the relevant “federal housing

contract laws” that she alleged G E Capital had violated. The

district court dismissed the complaint.

II.

We review de novo a dismissal on the pleadings. See Guidry v.

Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d at 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). Although we

accept as true all of the factual allegations of the well-pleaded
3

complaint, a plaintiff, in order to avoid dismissal for failure to

state a claim, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusionary

allegations. See id. The pleadings must both provide notice of

the circumstances that give rise to the claim and set forth

sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim or to

permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. See

Walker v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir.

1990) (per curiam). A district court is not permitted to dismiss

a complaint simply because it is questionable whether the plaintiff

will ultimately prevail. See Mahone v. Addicks Utility Dist., 836

F.2d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 1988).

Cognizant of the liberal pleading requirements, see Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), we nevertheless agree with the

district court that Followwell has failed to state a claim. Her

allegations of G E Capital’s “severe violations of the federal

housing contract laws,” which violations are being done

“illregardless [sic] of the plaintiff’s equity in the systematic

process,” and of G E Capital’s “use of callous actions . . . to

take the plaintiff’s home from her without regard for the federated

process,” are merely conclusionary. 

Followwell cites no specific statutes or causes of action

under which her claim may be cognizable, nor does she plead any

specific facts that would render G E Capital's “tactics” unlawful.

Furthermore, Followwell was given an opportunity to amend her

pleadings to address the district court’s concerns regarding their

sufficiency, but she failed to do so. We disagree with her
4

assertion that “this cannot be accomplished with a mere amended

complaint” and that she “must be provided with an opportunity to

present all of her items to the court.”

Followwell's brief contains but a scant 21⁄2 pages of

meaningless “argument.” The appeal is frivolous and is DISMISSED

pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.