THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Petitioner, 

v. 

Alex Robinson, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2014-001545 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Horry County 

 Edward B. Cottingham, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27617 

Heard October 21, 2015 – Filed March 30, 2016 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of 

Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Dayne C. Phillips, of Lexington, and Appellate Defender 

Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for Respondent. 
 

CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES: Respondent Robinson was convicted of one 

count of trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 100 and 200 grams. He was 

sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment and ordered to pay a $50,000 fine. 

The Court of Appeals reversed Robinson's conviction holding that the searchwarrant affidavit did not include any information to establish the reliability of the 

informant. State v. Robinson, 408 S.C. 268, 758 S.E.2d 725 (Ct. App. 2014). We 

granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari and now affirm the Court of 

Appeals' decision as modified. 

FACTS 

An officer of the Horry County Police Department (Officer) sought a search 

warrant for a residence alleged to be Robinson's home (the Home). The searchwarrant affidavit stated, in relevant part, that a confidential informant had 

purchased illegal drugs from the occupants of the Home on multiple occasions. 

Based solely on this affidavit, the Circuit Court1

 issued a search warrant for the 

Home. When the warrant was executed, officers found multiple people living in 

the Home. In one bedroom they found mail addressed to Robinson, and a bag 

containing 111 grams of cocaine located on top of a pile of men's clothing. In total, 

375.88 grams of cocaine were found in the Home. Robinson was not present when 

the warrant was executed although a car registered to him was parked outside the 

Home. 

At trial, Robinson challenged the veracity of the representations in the searchwarrant affidavit under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and sought to 

suppress the evidence obtained from the search. Robinson claimed that contrary to 

the assertions in the search-warrant affidavit, the purported confidential informant 

never personally made any drug purchases from the Home. The Trial Court 

conducted a Franks hearing where Officer testified that the confidential informant 

referenced in the affidavit never personally purchased drugs but that Oliver, a third 

party, made the purchases. The Trial Court found there were no false statements in 

the affidavit and denied Robinson's motion to suppress. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the Trial Court erred in denying Robinson's 

motion to suppress because the search-warrant affidavit did not include any 

information to establish the reliability of the informant. It therefore reversed and 

1 Officer testified that because there was a chance that this case would become a 

federal prosecution, he sought a search warrant from a circuit court judge instead 

of a magistrate. 
 

 

remanded for a new trial. See Robinson, 408 S.C. at 278, 758 S.E.2d at 730. We 

granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the 

Court of Appeals. 

ISSUES 

I.	 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the search warrant invalid 

because the search-warrant affidavit contained no information establishing 

informant reliability? 

II.	 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding there was intentionally 

false information in the search-warrant affidavit? 

III.	 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the search-warrant 

affidavit could support probable cause even with the false information 

omitted? 

IV.	 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Leon's2

 good-faith 

exception to suppression did not apply? 

ANALYSIS 

A. Informant reliability information in the search-warrant affidavit 

The State argues the Court of Appeals erred in finding there was no evidence to 

support the Trial Court's finding that the search-warrant affidavit contained 

information establishing informant reliability. Specifically, the State argues the 

information contained in the affidavit about the confidential informant's work with 

law enforcement and successful purchases of illegal drugs from the Home, was 

sufficient to support the Trial Court's determination. We agree. 

The veracity and the basis of knowledge of persons supplying the information in a 

search-warrant affidavit are considerations in the determination of whether there is 

probable cause to issue a search warrant. State v. Johnson, 302 S.C. 243, 395 

S.E.2d 167 (1990) (internal citation omitted). An appellate court gives great 

deference to the issuing judge's probable cause determination. State v. Dupree, 354 

S.C. 676, 583 S.E.2d 437 (Ct. App. 2003). An affidavit based solely on 

information provided by a confidential informant must contain information 

supporting the credibility of the informant and the basis of his knowledge. See 

State v. Martin, 347 S.C. 522, 527, 556 S.E.2d 706, 709 (2001) (citing State v. 192 

2 468 U.S. 807 (1978). 
 

Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 192, 525 S.E.2d 872, 881 

(2000)). 

The pertinent parts of this search-warrant affidavit include: 

REASON FOR AFFIANT'S BELIEF THAT THE PROPERTY 

SOUGHT IS ON THE SUBJECT PREMISES . . . 

A confidential and reliable informant working for the Horry County 

Police Department purchased a quantity of off white powder 

substance represented as being cocaine and field-testing positive for 

cocaine attributes from the occupants of the house identified as [the 

Home]. That the informant has been able to make recent continuous 

purchases of illegal drugs from this residence leads to the affiant's 

belief that there is the possibility there may be more illegal drugs 

located at this residence. 

The contents of the affidavit were sufficient to provide the Circuit Court a 

substantial basis to believe that the: (1) Horry County Police Department; (2) had a 

confidential informant; (3) who bought a substance that tested positive for 

cocaine; (4) from the Home; and (5) the informant had made other recent 

purchases of illegal drugs from the Home. However, as explained below excepting 

that the confidential informant worked for the Horry County Police Department, 

none of these assertions were true. Looking at the four corners of the affidavit, 

there is information from which the Circuit Court could conclude the confidential 

informant was reliable. See Dupree, 354 S.C. at 685, 583 S.E.2d at 442. We agree 

with the State that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the affidavit, on its face, 

lacked sufficient information to establish the reliability of the confidential 

informant. Nevertheless, we affirm the result of the Court of Appeals as explained 

below. 

B. Intentionally false statements in the search-warrant affidavit 

Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a 

defendant has the right to challenge false statements in a search-warrant affidavit. 

See State v. Jones, 342 S.C. 121, 126, 536 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2000) (citing Franks v. 

Delaware, 438 U.S 154 (1978)). In order to obtain relief, the defendant must prove 

the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, 

included false statements in the search-warrant affidavit. The burden is on the 
defendant to establish the falsity by a preponderance of the evidence. See Franks, 

438 U.S. at 156. 

At the Franks hearing, Officer testified that the Home became the target of his 

investigation when a confidential informant said she knew someone who could 

purchase drugs from within the Home. According to Officer's testimony, three 

purchases were made prior to the execution of the search-warrant affidavit. All 

three purchases happened in substantially the same way. The confidential 

informant picked up a third party, Oliver, and drove to a location close to the 

Home. Oliver was then dropped off a short distance away from the Home in order 

to avoid suspicion. The confidential informant stayed in the car and watched as 

Oliver walked into the Home. Oliver then returned to the car with drugs. The drugs 

were later tested and confirmed to be cocaine. The confidential informant was 

debriefed after the buys during which she informed Officer of what Oliver told her. 

When seeking the search warrant, Officer relied solely on his affidavit; he did not 

orally supplement the affidavit before the Circuit Court. 

When Officer wrote the affidavit, he was aware that the confidential informant had 

not personally made the alleged drug purchases. After each of the three alleged 

transactions, Officer was informed that Oliver was the actual purchaser. Officer 

acknowledged, at the Frank's hearing, he knew of Oliver's role, but offered no 

explanation why he did not include this information in the affidavit. 

The State argues the Court of Appeals erred in holding clearly erroneous the Trial 

Court's finding that no false statements were contained in the search-warrant 

affidavit. Because the confidential informant drove Oliver close to the Home, gave 

Oliver "buy money," watched him enter the Home, and watched him exit the 

Home, the State argues that the confidential informant actually "purchased and 

obtained the drugs from [the Home]" herself. We disagree. 

Applying a common-sense reading to the search-warrant affidavit, it states that this 

confidential informant personally made drug purchases out of the Home. There is 

nothing that reasonably suggests an alternative interpretation. See State v. Thomas, 

275 S.C. 274, 276, 269 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1980) (stating that affidavits are to be 

given a "common-sense reading") overruled in part on other grounds, State v. 

Mcknight, 287 S.C. 167, 337 S.E.2d 208 (1985). Not only did this confidential 

informant not make the purchases, she did not witness Oliver's alleged purchases. 

At best, the informant could reliably state that: (1) Oliver left the car with the 

stated intention to buy drugs; (2) Oliver walked into the Home; and (3) Oliver 
returned to the car with drugs he claimed he had purchased from the occupants of 

the Home. The confidential informant could not provide any first-hand information 

about drug purchases from the Home. 

We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the Trial Court erred in holding 

there were no false statements in the search-warrant affidavit. Officer's testimony 

makes clear that he knowingly and intentionally made false statements in the 

search-warrant affidavit. As a result, Robinson has met his initial burden under 

Franks. We hold that the false statements in the search-warrant affidavit were 

made knowingly and intentionally in violation of Franks. We next decide whether 

the search-warrant affidavit supported probable cause absent the false statements. 

C. Probable cause absent false statements 

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded because it found that the searchwarrant affidavit did not include any information establishing informant reliability. 

It also held that despite the Franks violation, the affidavit could support probable 

cause even if the false information were omitted. The State argues that the Court of 

Appeals correctly held that suppression was not required on this basis because 

even with Oliver's involvement included in the affidavit, probable cause would 

have still existed. We disagree. 

Once it is established that the affiant has knowingly and intentionally or with 

reckless disregard for the truth made false statements, the search-warrant affidavit's 

remaining content must be reviewed to determine if probable cause exists. See 

Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-156. The remaining content must allow a reviewing judge 

to make a common sense decision whether, under the totality of the circumstances, 

including veracity and basis of knowledge of person(s) supplying information, 

there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in 

the particular place to be searched. If the remaining content cannot support this 

determination, then the trial judge should suppress the evidence. Id. 

With the false statements excised from this search-warrant affidavit, there no 

longer exists a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause. Contrary to the 

holding of the Court of Appeals and the argument of the State, the search-warrant 

affidavit supports probable cause only if Oliver, not the confidential informant, 

were telling the truth. Since the confidential informant stayed in the car, down the 

road from the Home, her knowledge hinges on the reliability of Oliver, whose 
 

 

credibility has not been established.3 With the false information removed, nothing 

remains in the search-warrant affidavit to establish a substantial basis for a finding 

of probable cause. 

D. Leon's good faith exception to suppression 

Finally, the State argues the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the good faith 

exception to an otherwise invalid search warrant did not apply. We disagree. In 

U.S. v. Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence should not be 

suppressed which resulted from a search where law enforcement reasonably relied 

on a search warrant, which was ultimately found to be invalid . See 468 U.S. 807, 

920 (1978). The Court, however, held suppression remains the appropriate remedy 

when a reviewing judge is intentionally misled by information in an affidavit that 

the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless 

disregard of the truth. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 

The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the good-faith 

exception to suppression does not apply because the affidavit is "so lacking in 

indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable." Robinson, 408 S.C. at 277, 758 S.E.2d at 730. We agree with the 

Court of Appeals that Leon does not apply. We hold that the good faith exception 

is not available, where, as here, the warrant issued is based on a search-warrant 

affidavit of the officer which contained representations known to be false. See 

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 

CONCLUSION 

As explained in subsection A, supra, we hold that because the search-warrant 

affidavit, on its face, supports a finding of probable cause, an objective law 

enforcement officer's belief in it could be reasonable. Thus, the Court of Appeals 

erred in holding otherwise. However, because the information in the searchwarrant affidavit concerning the informant/purported purchaser's reliability was 

intentionally false, see subsections B and C, supra, the credibility of the entire 

affidavit is compromised. 

Moreover, as Oliver was never searched prior to entering the Home, nothing in 

the record establishes that he did not possess the drugs prior to the alleged 

transactions. 

3 
For the reasons given above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 

BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice Jean H. Toal, 

concur.