J-A05012-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RICHARD A. LAPINSKI, GEORGE E. 

FITZGERALD AND MARY JO SIVY 

Appellants

v.

DAVID POLING, INDIVIDUALLY AND 

IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF 

THE ECONOMY BOROUGH 

DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE AND 

MICHAEL SISK, INDIVIDUALLY AND 

IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF 

THE BEAVER COUNTY DEMOCRATIC 

COMMITTEE

Appellees

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 250 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order January 20, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County 

Civil Division at No(s): 10754 of 2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and MOULTON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2017

Appellants, Richard A. Lapinski, George E. Fitzgerald, and Mary Jo 

Sivy, appeal from the order entered in the Beaver County Court of Common 

Pleas, which sustained the preliminary objections of Appellees, David Poling 

and Michael Sisk, and dismissed Appellants’ complaint. We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

Appellants are residents of Economy Borough in Beaver County, 

Pennsylvania, and were members of the Bipartisan Committee for a Better 

Economy Borough (“Committee”) until it disbanded in October 2013. The 
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Committee supported some candidates in the 2013 local municipal elections. 

During the 2013 elections, Mr. Fitzgerald was a candidate for mayor of 

Economy Borough, Ms. Sivy was a candidate for tax collector of Economy 

Borough, and Mr. Lapinski served as treasurer of the Committee. Appellees 

were also active in local politics. Mr. Poling was the mayor of Economy 

Borough and chairman of the Economy Borough Democratic Committee, and 

Mr. Sisk was the chairman of the Beaver County Democratic Committee. 

In September 2013, a dispute arose concerning the campaign finance 

reports of the Committee, Mr. Fitzgerald, and Ms. Sivy. Appellees sent 

letters dated September 9, 2013, and September 17, 2013 (“Letters”), to 

three Beaver County entities: the Bureau of Elections; the Board of 

Elections; and the District Attorney’s Office. Appellees sent the Letters on 

Economy Borough Democratic Committee letterhead and signed the Letters 

as chairpersons of their respective political committees. In the Letters, 

Appellees asked for an investigation into the Committee’s 30-day post 

primary campaign finance report, based on the Committee’s alleged failure 

to comply with reporting requirements. The Letters explained that Appellees 

had documentary proof of the Committee’s noncompliance.1 

In each letter, Appellees referred to several purported facts to support 

____________________________________________

1 The Letters reference several attachments and detail the content of each 

attachment, but the attachments are not in the certified record, and they 

were not appended to Appellants’ complaint. 
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their assertions. In the September 9th letter, Appellees explained Mr. 

Lapinski had prepared the 30-day post primary campaign finance report on 

behalf of the Committee. Appellees noted the report disclosed total 

expenditures in the amount of $978.27. Appellees then listed several 

observations to indicate the Committee had underreported their total 

expenditures. First, Appellees explained the Committee sent to voters 

approximately 11,000 mailers; Appellees estimated the cost of the postage 

was nearly $4,000.00. Second, Appellees stated the Committee posted at 

least 17 campaign signs throughout Economy Borough. Appellees 

represented each sign costs $150.00, based on the amount that appeared in 

a police report concerning damage to one of the Committee’s signs. 

Appellees concluded, in relevant part, as follows:

[The Committee] has yet to produce evidence of accuracy 

and transparency in their campaign finance reports. 

Clearly, the evidence provided in this complaint...will 

conclude that [the Committee’s] expenditures filed in the 

30-day post primary campaign finance report failed to 

disclose all monies spent in the 2013 primary election in 

Economy Borough, PA. [We are] urging the [B]oard of 

[E]lections and the [D]istrict [A]ttorney to take all 

necessary actions to ensure this [C]ommittee acts 

according to Pennsylvania election laws. The state 

provides detailed guidelines on its laws as well as fines and 

punishment that pertain to fraudulent campaign finance 

reporting. ... It’s apparent to [us] that th[e C]ommittee 

has not disclosed accurate expenditures, in kind 

contributions, or total contributions. 

(See Letter dated 9/9/13, attached as Exhibit 1 to Appellants’ Complaint; 

R.R. at 16a.) 
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Appellees stated in the September 17th letter that Mr. Fitzgerald and 

Ms. Sivy failed to file 30-day post primary campaign reports. Appellees 

explained each candidate sent out to voters during the 2013 campaign over 

5,500 mailers. Appellees added that these mailers bore the same 

identification numbers which appeared on the Committee’s 2013 campaign 

materials. The September 17th letter concluded, in relevant part, as follows:

[We] strongly believe[] that...[Mr.] Fitzgerald[’s] and [Ms.] 

Sivy[’s] campaign materials were funded by the 

[Committee]. However, both candidates failed to report 

their campaign expenditures to the Beaver County Bureau 

of Elections.... ... The state’s election laws clearly caution 

candidates about failure to produce and report all 

campaign finances that exceed $250.00...which include 

fines, and criminal charges for fraudulent campaign 

financing. [We are] asking our elected county officials to 

order a[n] investigation into [Mr.] Fitzgerald and [Ms.] 

Sivy for failure to comply with the Pennsylvania election 

laws. These candidates clearly with the evidence 

provided...are in violation of the Pennsylvania Finance 

Reporting Laws section 1638. 

(See Letter dated 9/17/13, attached as Exhibit 2 to Appellants’ Complaint; 

R.R. at 17a.) 

The Bureau of Elections referred Appellees’ complaints to the District 

Attorney’s Office, which transferred the complaints to the Attorney General’s 

Office, due to a conflict. After it conducted an investigation, the Attorney 

General’s Office did not file criminal charges against Appellants and the 

Committee for violation of campaign finance laws. In their defamation/false 

light complaint, Appellants alleged the Attorney General’s Office issued a 

letter to the Beaver County District Attorney explaining why it declined to 
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prosecute Appellants for the alleged campaign finance violations set forth in 

the Letters. (Appellants’ Complaint, filed 9/10/14, at ¶¶ 39-40). The 

Attorney General’s Office letter does not appear in the certified record. 

During the 2013 election, John Paul Vranesevich reported Beaver County 

news on a website he maintained. In September and October 2013, Mr. 

Vranesevich wrote and published on the website three articles that discussed 

the allegations in the Letters. Mr. Vranesevich’s articles also summarized 

and quoted the Letters. 

On May 15, 2014, Appellants commenced this defamation/false light 

action against Appellees and Mr. Vranesevich by writ of summons. 

Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees and Mr. Vranesevich for 

defamation and false light on September 10, 2014. Appellants included the 

following averments in their complaint: 

11. [Appellants] are longtime residents of Economy 

Borough, Beaver County, who are active in the community 

and in local politics. 

* * *

13. Fitzgerald was a candidate for mayor of Economy 

Borough in the 2013 municipal elections. 

14. Sivy was a candidate for tax collector of Economy 

Borough in the 2013 municipal elections. 

15. [Appellants] were members of the [Committee] 

until it disbanded in or about October 2013. 

16. At all relevant times, Lapisnki served as treasurer 

of the Committee. 
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* * *

18. In or about September 2013, [Appellees] drafted, 

signed and circulated letters to the Beaver County Bureau 

of Elections, the Beaver County Board of Commissioners –

Board of Elections, the Beaver County District Attorney’s 

Office and perhaps other individuals....

19. In their [L]etters, [Appellees] called for the 

county to launch criminal investigations of [Appellants] and 

the Committee for not reporting certain campaign 

expenses in violation of campaign finance reporting laws 

set forth in the Pennsylvania Election Code, 25 P.S. § 

3241, et seq.....

* * *

23. For their [L]etters, [Appellees] used the official 

letterhead of the Beaver County Democratic Committee 

without the consent or authorization of the committee. 

24. [Appellees] identified [Appellants] by name in 

their [L]etters. 

25. [Appellees] falsely asserted in their September 9 

letter that a 30-Day Post-Primary campaign expenditure 

report, which was prepared by Lapinski and submitted to 

the Beaver County Bureau of Elections on June 20, 2013, 

violated the Pennsylvania campaign finance reporting laws. 

26. Among other things, [Appellees] falsely claimed in 

their September 9 letter that:

a. The expenditures reported by Lapinski in the 

Report are false and that Lapinski “failed to disclose 

all monies spent in the 2013 primary election in 

Economy Borough, PA.” 

b. The Committee “has yet to produce evidence 

of accuracy and transparency in their campaign 

finance reports.” 

c. Lapinski and the Committee engaged in 

“fraudulent campaign finance reporting.” 
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d. “Th[e C]ommittee has not disclosed accurate 

expenditures, in kind contributions, or total 

contributions.” 

27. [Appellees] also erroneously reported the number 

of campaign flyers that the Committee mailed to voters 

and the number of campaign signs that the Committee 

purchased. 

28. In addition to their campaign against Lapinski and 

the Committee, [Appellees] attacked Fitzgerald and Sivy in 

their September 9 letter and in their September 17 letter. 

29. [Appellees] erroneously claimed that Fitzgerald 

and Sivy broke the law by failing to file 30-Day PostPrimary campaign expenditure reports with the Beaver 

County Bureau of Elections. 

30. [Appellees] wrote that “both candidates failed to 

report their campaign expenditures to the Beaver County 

Bureau of Elections which would have listed all in kind 

contributions that were labor donated to both campaigns,” 

and [Appellees] called on “elected county officials to order 

an investigation into candidates George E. Fitzgerald and 

Mary Jo Sivy for failure to comply with the Pennsylvania 

election laws.” 

31. Upon information and belief, [Appellees] 

slandered and smeared [Appellants] by making similar 

accusations concerning alleged campaign finance reporting 

violations to others in Economy Borough and Beaver 

County. 

* * *

42. Lapinski and the Committee submitted all 

required reports during the 2013 election cycle and did so 

in a timely manner. 

43. Likewise, Sivy properly submitted the required 

30-Day Post-Primary report for 2013, and Fitzgerald was 

not required to file said report because his personal 

expenses did not exceed $250.00. 
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* * *

COUNT I – DEFAMATION

* * *

57. Each of the statements made by [Appellees] was 

false. 

58. [Appellees] knew that such statements were 

false, and/or acted in reckless disregard of their truth or 

falsity. 

59. [Appellees] had no privilege to make such 

statements.

(Appellants’ Complaint, filed 9/10/14, at ¶¶ 11, 13-16, 18-19, 23-31, 42-43, 

57-59; R.R. at 5a-12a) (internal citations to exhibits omitted). Appellants 

appended to their complaint as exhibits copies of the Letters at issue, 

without the attachments to the Letters. 

On September 30, 2014, Mr. Vranesevich filed preliminary objections 

in the nature of a demurrer.2 Mr. Poling filed preliminary objections in the 

nature of a demurrer to Appellants’ complaint on October 27, 2014. On 

October 31, 2014, Mr. Sisk also filed preliminary objections in the nature of 

a demurrer. In their preliminary objections, Appellees asked the court to 

dismiss the complaint because, inter alia, Appellants are public figures and 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court sustained Mr. Vranesevich’s preliminary objections and 

dismissed Appellants’ complaint against him on April 1, 2015. Appellants did 

not challenge the court’s April 1, 2015 order, and Mr. Vranesevich is not a 

party to this appeal. 
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they failed to plead that Appellees had made the allegedly defamatory 

statements with actual malice. For the same reason, Mr. Sisk also asked the 

court to dismiss Appellants’ false light claim. 

On September 24, 2015, Mr. Poling filed a brief in support of his 

preliminary objections. In his brief, Mr. Poling posited the Letters are 

incapable of a defamatory meaning. The court conducted a hearing on 

Appellees’ preliminary objections on September 28, 2015. At the hearing, 

Ms. Sivy joined Mr. Poling’s position on lack of defamatory meaning. The 

court sustained Appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissed Appellants’ 

complaint on January 20, 2016. Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal on 

February 16, 2016. On February 23, 2016, the court ordered Appellants to 

file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b); Appellants timely complied on March 15, 2016. 

Appellants raise three issues for our review:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING 

APPELLEES’ PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS IN THE NATURE 

OF A DEMURRER AND CONCLUDING THAT LETTERS 

PREPARED AND CIRCULATED BY [APPELLEES] ARE NOT 

CAPABLE OF DEFAMATORY MEANING AND ARE NOT 

HIGHLY OFFENSIVE TO A REASONABLE PERSON[?]

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

APPELLEES HAD PROPERLY AND TIMELY ARGUED THAT 

APPELLANTS HAD NOT SHOWN THAT THE STATEMENTS IN 

QUESTION ARE CAPABLE OF DEFAMATORY MEANING 

WHEN, IN FACT, APPELLEES FAILED TO RAISE SUCH 

ARGUMENTS IN THEIR PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS[?]

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING 

APPELLEES’ PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS IN THE NATURE 
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OF A DEMURRER AND CONCLUDING THAT APPELLEES 

PREPARED AND SUBMITTED THEIR LETTERS IN THEIR 

CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMEN OF TWO DEMOCRATIC

COMMITTEES, NOTWITHSTANDING APPELLANTS’ 

AVERMENTS THAT APPELLEES ACTED INDIVIDUALLY IN 

PART AND USED OFFICIAL LETTERHEAD WITHOUT 

CONSENT OR AUTHORIZATION[?]

(Appellants’ Brief at 3-4). 

In their first issue, Appellants argue Appellees accused Appellants in 

the Letters of criminal acts in violation of Pennsylvania campaign finance 

laws. Appellants assert these criminal allegations are capable of a 

defamatory meaning as libel per se and are highly offensive to a reasonable 

person. Appellants also claim the Letters baldly stated Appellants violated 

political campaign advertising laws and implied the existence of undisclosed 

defamatory facts. Appellants maintain the Letters did not reference the 

nature of the alleged violations or include citations to specific provisions of 

the Pennsylvania Election Code. Appellants note the record does not include 

the attachments to Appellees’ Letters. Appellants posit they should be 

allowed to conduct discovery to determine whether: (1) the proposed 

attachments support Appellees’ claims; and (2) the Beaver County officials 

who received the Letters would have considered Appellants disparaged after 

reading the Letters. 

In their second issue, Appellants argue Appellees waived their position 

that the statements in the Letters are incapable of a defamatory meaning, 

because Appellees failed to raise that contention in their preliminary 
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objections. Appellants aver Mr. Poling first challenged the defamatory 

meaning of the Letters in his brief in support of his preliminary objections 

and again during the hearing on the preliminary objections. Appellants 

represent Mr. Sisk joined Mr. Poling’s argument at the hearing but did not 

otherwise argue the Letters are incapable of a defamatory meaning. 

In their third issue, Appellants argue Appellees did not author the 

Letters in their respective capacities as chairpersons of political committees. 

Appellants claim Appellees had no authorization to write the Letters on the 

official letterhead of the Beaver County Democratic Committee. Appellants 

conclude this Court should vacate the trial court’s order that sustained 

Appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissed Appellants’ complaint. We 

disagree. 

The relevant scope and standard of review in examining a challenge to 

an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are as 

follows:

Our review of a trial court’s sustaining of preliminary 

objections in the nature of a demurrer is plenary. 

Such preliminary objections should be sustained only 

if, assuming the averments of the complaint to be 

true, the plaintiff has failed to assert a legally 

cognizable cause of action. We will reverse a trial 

court’s decision to sustain preliminary objections 

only if the trial court has committed an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion.

All material facts set forth in the complaint as well as 

all inferences reasonably [deducible] therefrom are 

admitted as true for the purpose of this review. The 

question presented by the demurrer is whether, on 
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the facts averred, the law says with certainty that 

no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to 

whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt 

should be resolved in favor of overruling it.

Regarding a demurrer, this Court has held:

A demurrer is an assertion that a complaint does not 

set forth a cause of action or a claim on which relief 

can be granted. A demurrer by a defendant admits 

all relevant facts sufficiently pleaded in the complaint 

and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, but not 

conclusions of law or unjustified inferences. In ruling 

on a demurrer, the court may consider only such 

matters as arise out of the complaint itself; it cannot 

supply a fact missing in the complaint.

Where the complaint fails to set forth a valid cause of 

action, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer 

is properly sustained. 

Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis in 

original) (internal citations omitted). Also, when analyzing a demurrer, the 

court “need not consider the pleader’s conclusions of law, unwarranted 

inferences from facts, opinions, or argumentative allegations.” Wiernik v. 

PHH U.S. Mortg. Corp., 736 A.2d 616, 619 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal 

denied, 561 Pa. 700, 751 A.2d 193 (2000) (internal citations omitted). To 

determine if the trial court properly sustained preliminary objections, this 

Court examines the averments in the complaint and the documents attached 

to the complaint to evaluate the adequacy of the facts averred and to assess 

the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Clemleddy Constr., Inc. v. 

Yorston, 810 A.2d 693, 696 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 682, 

823 A.2d 143 (2003). 
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The Uniform Single Publication Act outlines the basics of a defamation 

action. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8341-8345. Section 8343 provides:

§ 8343. Burden of Proof

(a) Burden of plaintiff.—In an action for defamation, 

the plaintiff has the burden of proving, when the issue is 

properly raised:

(1) The defamatory character of the communication.

(2) Its publication by the defendant.

(3) Its application to the plaintiff.

(4) The understanding by the recipient of its 

defamatory meaning.

(5) The understanding by the recipient of it as intended 

to be applied to the plaintiff.

(6) Special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its 

publication.

(7) Abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343(a). A communication is defamatory if it “tends...to 

harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 

community or to deter third parties from associating or dealing with him.” 

Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News, 577 Pa. 598, 615, 848 A.2d 113, 124 

(2004). “It is not enough that the victim...be embarrassed or annoyed, he 

must have suffered the kind of harm which has grievously fractured his 

standing in the community of respectable society.” Id. 

“Libel is the malicious publication of printed or written matter which 

tends to blacken a person’s reputation and expose him to public hatred, 
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contempt or ridicule.” Id. See also Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 483 

A.2d 456, 469 (Pa.Super. 1984) (defining libel as “a method of defamation 

expressed by print, writing, pictures, or signs”). A publication is also 

defamatory if it tends to injure the subject of the publication in his business 

or profession. Id. at 461. Statements which impute the commission of a 

crime are capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.3 Marcone 

v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1078 (3d Cir. 

1985), certiorari denied, 474 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 182, 88 L.Ed.2d 477 

(1985) (citing Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166 

(1971) and Agriss, supra). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 571 

provides: “One who publishes a slander that imputes to another conduct 

constituting a criminal offense is subject to liability to the other without 

proof of special harm if the offense imputed is of a type which, if committed 

in the place of publication, would be (a) punishable by imprisonment in a 

state or federal institution....” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 571. See 

also Agriss, supra at 473 (noting Pennsylvania generally tends to adopt 

Restatement rule in defamation). 

It is not necessary th[at] the charge be made in technical 

language. It is enough that the language used impute to 

____________________________________________

3 The Pennsylvania Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2600, et seq. (“Election Code”), 

sets forth political campaign finance reporting and advertising requirements. 

25 P.S. §§ 3246, 3258. A violation of the Election Code is a misdemeanor, 

the sentence for which is either a fine or imprisonment, at the court’s 

discretion. 25 P.S. §§ 3545, 3550. 
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the other the criminal offense. ... It is not necessary that 

the defamer charge any particular criminal offense by 

name or description, if the words used imply some crime.... 

Neither is it necessary that the defamer directly charge the 

other with the criminal offense or that the charge be made 

as of the speaker’s own knowledge or belief.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 571, Comment C. 

Importantly, public-figure plaintiffs must plead additional elements to 

state a cause of action for defamation. Coleman v. Ogden Newspapers, 

Inc., 142 A.3d 898, 905 (Pa.Super. 2016). Individuals who are “intimately 

involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their 

fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large” are public 

figures. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 

111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 

337, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3005, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)) (internal quotations 

omitted). Generally, candidates for office are public figures. Id. at 344, 94 

S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at ___ (stating: “An individual who decides to seek 

governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 

involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than 

might otherwise be the case”). 

All public figures must establish the alleged defamatory statement was 

false and the defendant made the statement with actual malice. American 

Future Systems, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Eastern 

Pennsylvania, 592 Pa. 66, 91-92, 923 A.2d 389, 404 (2007), certiorari 

denied, 552 U.S. 1076, 128 S.Ct. 806, 169 L.Ed.2d 606 (2007); Tucker, 
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supra, at 624-25, 848 A.2d at 129-30. Actual malice exists where a 

defendant makes a defamatory statement “with knowledge that it was false 

or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 624, 848 

A.2d at 129 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 

84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). “The requirement that the 

plaintiff be able to show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence is 

initially a matter of law.” Tucker, supra at 626, 848 A.2d at 130 (citing 

Milkovich, supra). 

The meaning of terms such as actual malice—and, more 

particularly, reckless disregard—...is not readily captured in 

one infallible definition. Rather, only through the course of 

case-by-case adjudication can we give content to those 

otherwise elusive constitutional standards. ... Most 

fundamentally, ...“[j]udges as expositors of the 

Constitution,” have a duty to “independently decide 

whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to 

cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry 

of any judgment that is not supported by clear and 

convicting proof of ‘actual malice.’”

Tucker, supra at 626, 848 A.2d at 131 (quoting Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 

Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2695, 105 

L.Ed.2d 562 (1989)) (emphasis in original). 

To survive preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, a 

plaintiff must plead sufficient allegations of actual malice. Tucker, supra at 

635, 848 A.2d at 136. The plaintiff must plead the defendant had 

unequivocal notice that the statement was false. Id. at 630-32, 848 A.2d at 

133-36. Additionally, the plaintiff must also plead the defendant knew the 
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statement was false or made the statement with reckless disregard to its 

falsity. Id. at 624, 848 A.2d at 129. “A showing of a reckless disregard for 

the truth...requires more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct. 

Failure to check sources, or negligence alone, is simply insufficient to 

maintain a cause of action for defamation.” Id. at 634, 848 A.2d at 135 

(quoting Harte-Hanks, supra at 688, 109 S.Ct. at 2696, 105 L.Ed.2d at 

___) (internal quotations omitted). 

The [United States] Supreme Court has emphasized that 

the question of whether a statement has been published 

with reckless disregard of falsity is not measured by 

whether a reasonably prudent [person] would have 

[published], or would have investigated before publishing. 

Rather, [t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the 

conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious 

doubts as to the truth of the publication. Thus, while 

recklessness may be found where there are obvious 

reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the 

accuracy of his reports, it simply cannot be concluded that 

a defendant entertained the requisite doubt as to the 

veracity of the challenged publication where the 

publication was based on information a defendant could 

reasonably believe to be accurate. 

Tucker, supra at 634, 848 A.2d at 135-36 (quoting Curran v. 

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 179-80, 439 A.2d 652, 660 

(1981)). 

Under Pennsylvania law, invasion of privacy includes several torts, one 

of which is publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before 

the public, or simply, false light. Burger v. Blair Medical Associates, 

Inc., 600 Pa. 194, 964 A.2d 374 (2009) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
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Torts §§ 652B-E). The Restatement sets forth the elements of false light as 

follows: 

§ 652E. Publicity Placing Person In False Light

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another 

that places the other before the public in a false light is 

subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if

(a) the false light in which the other was placed would 

be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 

(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 

disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter 

and the false light in which the other would be 

placed. 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E. Under this section, “publicity” 

means “the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at 

large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as 

substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” Id. at § 652E, 

Comment A; Burger, supra at 204-204, 964 A.2d at 379-80 (noting 

publicity element requires that matter is made public to so many people that 

matter is substantially certain to become one of public knowledge). “Thus, it 

is not an invasion of the right of privacy...to communicate a fact concerning 

the plaintiff’s private life to a single person or even to a small group of 

persons.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, Comment A. The plaintiff 

must also establish the publicity given to him is such that a reasonable 

person would feel seriously aggrieved by it. Id. at § 652E, Comment C. 

Furthermore, under Section 652E, the publication must be false. Id. at § 
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652E, Comment A. The publication must also be a major misrepresentation 

of a person’s character, history, activities, or beliefs which could cause a 

reasonable person to take serious offense. Id. at § 652E, Comment C. 

Instantly, Appellants’ defamation and false light claims stem from two 

letters Appellees sent to the Beaver County Board of Elections, Bureau of 

Elections, and District Attorney’s Office. Appellants attached the Letters to 

their complaint as exhibits. In the September 9th letter, Appellees alleged 

the Committee failed to comply with statutory campaign contribution 

reporting requirements and requested an investigation into the Committee’s 

2013 campaign financing. In the September 17th letter, Appellees explained 

Mr. Fitzgerald and Ms. Sivy were candidates for office during the 2013 

municipal election. Appellees stated the candidates’ campaign materials had 

the same identification numbers as those the Committee deployed. 

Appellees indicated Mr. Fitzgerald and Ms. Sivy did not file campaign finance 

reports. In the letter, Appellees concluded the candidates violated statutory 

campaign finance reporting requirements. 

As to whether the Letters are incapable of a defamatory meaning, the 

trial court reasoned as follows:

[Appellees] only sent letters including the statements in 

question to the [Beaver County] Board of Elections, the 

Beaver County Bureau of Elections, and the Beaver County 

District Attorney. The [L]etters served as formal 

complaints expressing concern that [Appellants] had 

potentially failed to disclose necessary campaign finance 

expenditures. 
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* * *

[Appellees]...expressed their concerns to the proper body 

for investigating such concerns. ... [Appellees] did not 

publish these statements widely, but, instead, sent them 

to the officials charged with investigating these types of 

claims. The audience hearing the remarks was apprised of 

possible election code violations, and urged to look into the 

allegations. 

Moreover, the statements were not bold assertions of 

[Appellants] breaking the law, but arguments that could 

lead to such a conclusion. For example, [Appellants] 

allege that [Appellees] stated [Appellants] “failed to 

disclose all monies spent in the 2013 primary election in 

Economy Borough.” The full sentence of the letter actually 

states, “Clearly, the evidence provided in this 

complaint...will conclude [the Committee’s] expenditures 

filed in the 30-day post primary campaign finance report 

failed to disclose all monies spent in the 2013 primary 

election in Economy Borough, PA.” Read in full, the 

statement is not an accusation, but a conclusion to be

reached in light of the supporting evidence provided. 

Also, [Appellees] filed the [Letters] in their capacities as 

[c]hairmen of two Democratic [c]ommittees, stating they 

believed it was apparent to them that [the] Committee 

“has not disclosed accurate expenditures, in kind 

contributions or total contributions.” This was their 

opinion. 

Finally, with respect to the allegation that [Mr. Fitzgerald 

and Ms. Sivy] “broke the law,” it is true that if they failed 

to file campaign finance reports, then they would be in 

violation of campaign finance reporting laws. With respect 

to this allegation, [Appellees]...ask[ed] the appropriate 

officials to investigate the matter. This complaint is 

separate from allegations against the [Committee]. 

When the statements [Appellants] complain about are 

considered in their full context, [the court] believe[s] the 

statements are not capable of a defamatory meaning. As 

a matter of law, the [c]ourt will sustain [Appellees’] 

preliminary objections and dismiss [Appellants’] 
J-A05012-17

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defamation claim against them. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed January 20, 2016, at 4-7) (internal citations 

omitted). Regarding Appellants’ false light claim, the trial court said:

To determine the offensive nature of the statement in 

question in the instant case, we must again consider the 

context in which they were made. The statements were 

made in [letters] to the individuals responsible for 

investigating such complaints. When read in their entirety, 

the statements contained the opinions of [Appellees] and 

the [L]etters included documentation and evidence to 

support those opinions. Accordingly, considering their 

entire context, we find that these statements are not 

highly offensive to a reasonable person. 

(Id. at 8). We respectfully disagree with the court’s conclusion here. 

In the Letters, Appellees requested that authorities investigate 

Appellants’ purported failure to comply with the Election Code, the violation 

of which is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. See 25 P.S. 

§§ 3545, 3550, supra. Appellees imputed criminal activity to Appellants. 

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 571, Comment C, supra. To the 

extent Appellees implied or expressed that Appellants engaged in criminal 

activity, Appellees’ statements are capable of a defamatory meaning.4 See

Marcone, supra (stating statements which impute commission of crime are 

capable of defamatory meaning as matter of law). Accordingly, the trial 

____________________________________________

4 Our decision that the statements in the Letters are capable of a defamatory 

meaning renders moot Appellants’ second issue concerning the preservation 

of Appellees’ position that their statements are incapable of a defamatory 

meaning. 
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court erred when it determined the Letters are not capable of a defamatory 

meaning, as a matter of law. 

Nevertheless, Appellants’ pleadings expressly demonstrate they are 

public figures. Appellants alleged they were active in their community and 

local politics and were members of the Committee until October 2013. (See

Appellants’ Complaint at ¶¶ 11, 15.) Appellants also pled that during the 

2013 municipal elections, Mr. Fitzgerald was a candidate for mayor of 

Economy Borough, Ms. Sivy was a candidate for tax collector of Economy 

Borough, and Mr. Lapinski served as treasurer of the Committee. (See id.

at ¶¶ 13, 14, 16.) Through their activity in the community and participation 

in politics, Appellants were public figures. See Milkovich, supra; Gertz, 

supra. As public figures, Appellants were required to establish in their 

complaint facts which demonstrate Appellees’ statements were false and 

made with actual malice. See Tucker, supra. 

In their complaint, Appellants baldly averred Appellees’ statements 

were false. (See Appellants’ Complaint at ¶ 57.) Appellants similarly 

concluded Appellees made the statements knowing they were false or with 

reckless disregard to their falsity. (See id. at ¶ 58.) Appellants, however, 

failed to plead any facts to support either assertion. Appellants also failed to 

plead and attach relevant documents to show Appellees unequivocally were 

on notice that their statements were false or made with reckless disregard 

for their falsity. See Tucker, supra. Therefore, Appellants failed to plead 
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the elements of falsity and actual malice. See id.; Lerner, supra; 

Clemleddy, supra. Likewise, Appellants were required to plead adequate 

facts concerning Appellees’ alleged abuse of a conditional privilege. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 8343(a)(7), supra. Appellants’ single conclusory averment that 

Appellees did not have privilege to make their statements is inadequate. 

(See Appellants’ Complaint at ¶ 59.) See also Lerner, supra. Accordingly, 

Appellants’ defamation claim was legally insufficient. 

Regarding Appellants’ false light claim, Appellants alleged in their 

complaint that Appellees sent the Letters to three Beaver County entities: 

the Board of Elections; Bureau of Elections; and District Attorney’s Office. 

Appellants averred Appellees told other unnamed individuals in Economy 

Borough and Beaver County about Appellees’ accusations. Appellants also 

alleged Mr. Vranesevich published on his website several articles about 

Appellees’ letters. Appellants, however, failed to plead Appellees were 

responsible for the Internet commentary on Appellees’ letters. Appellants’ 

allegation that Appellees told “others” does not make out the widespread 

publicity necessary to support a false light claim. (See Appellants’ 

Complaint at ¶¶ 18, 31.) Appellants failed to plead that Appellees 

disseminated their statements to the public at large to make the statements 

a matter of general knowledge. See Burger, supra; Restatement (Second) 

of Torts § 652E, Comment A, supra. Thus, Appellants’ claim for false light 

against Appellees was legally insufficient as well. 
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Regarding Appellants’ third issue on Appellees’ use of official 

letterhead of the Beaver County Democratic Committee, the trial court 

reasoned as follows:

The letters in question were sent on official letterhead and 

signed by [Appellees] in their capacity as chairmen of 

these respective committees. Although it was alleged that 

the letters were sent without consent or 

authorization...[Appellants] never alleged that [Appellees] 

needed consent or authorization from [the Beaver County 

Democratic Committee] before sending letters. ... 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed May 11, 2016, at 4) (internal citation to record 

omitted). The record supports the trial court’s rationale. Appellants failed to 

plead in their complaint or argue on appeal that consent or authorization 

was required by law. Moreover, even if Appellees sent the Letters in an 

official or individual capacity, the outcome of this case remains unchanged. 

Therefore, Appellants’ third issue merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court’s order sustaining Appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissing 

Appellants’ defamation/false light complaint with prejudice. See Divine v. 

Hutt, 863 A.2d 1160, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2004) (stating where trial court has 

reached correct result, this Court may affirm its decision on alternative

basis). 

Order affirmed. 

President Judge Emeritus Bender joins the memorandum.

Judge Moulton concurs in the result.
J-A05012-17

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2017