### The HONORABLE CHARLES B. KORNMANN, United States * 

### District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. The HONORABLE H. DAVID YOUNG, United States Magistrate 1 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ___________ No. 96-1264

___________ David Barber, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Eastern * District of Arkansas. Shirley S. Chater, * Commissioner, Social Security * [UNPUBLISHED] Administration, * * Defendant-Appellee. *

__________________________ Submitted: June 13, 1996 Filed: August 6, 1996

__________________________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge , and KORNMANN, District Judge. *

PER CURIAM.

Da vid Barber appeals the judgment of the district court affirmin g 1 the Social Security Administration's denial of disability insuranc e benefits. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

David Barber, a thirty-eight year old man with a ninth-grad e edu cation and past relevant work experience as an assembly line worker , maintenance worker, and car detailer, first applied for disability benefit s
on Au gust 30, 1988, claiming permanent disability due to neck and bac k injuries suffered when a transmission fell on him. Following the Social Security Administration's denial of benefits and a convoluted procedural history which we will not recount here, a second supplemental hearing was hel d on November 8, 1993, at which Barber, his wife, and a vocationa l expert each testified. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Barber disability benefits based on his finding that Barber was capable o f performing past relevant work as a car detailer.

The ALJ f ollowed the sequential five-step analysis set forth in the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f) (1993). The ALJ found that Barber had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 5, 1986. He also found that Barber suffered from a mild cervical dis c degeneration and spondylosis at C4-5, borderline intellectual functioning,
a dysthymic disorder, and a series of psychological disorders affecting hi s physi cal condition, including a mixed personality disorder NOS wit h passive/aggressive an d schizotypal characteristics, a panic disorder with agoraphobia, and a somatoform pain disorder. Th e ALJ found, however, that these impairments were not severe enough to meet, or in combination, t o equal a listed impairment. The key determination in this case is ste p four, in which the ALJ determines whether the claimant's impairmen t precludes him from performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)

. The ALJ discredited B arber's subjective complaints of pain and found that Barber retained the residual functional capacity to perform work-related acti vities that did not involve heavy manual labor or work requirin g overhead activities, or heavy repetitive pushing or

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pulling. The ALJ also found that Barber's mental impairments woul d preclude him from performing only tasks involving unusual stress, highly compl ex tasks, or a high level of judgment. As a result, the ALJ foun d that B arber's impairments did not preclude him from performing pas t relevant work as a car detailer. Following the Appeals Council's denial of his request for review, Barber sought review in the district court. On Januar y 3, 1996, the magistrate granted the Commissioner's motion fo r summary judgment and dismissed Barber's complaint. Barber appeals.

II. DISCUSSION
We review the denial of social security benefits to determine w hether the ALJ's decision i s supported by substantial evidence on the record as
a whole. Novotny v. Chater , 72 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantia l evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequ ate to support a conclusion." Id. (quotations omitted). We mus t affirm the decision of the ALJ so long as substantial evidence supports hi s position, regardless of whether substantial evidence supports an alterativ e conclusion. Jones v. Chater , 86 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1996).
Barber first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his subj ective complaints of pain. He points out that he has b een diagnosed as suffering from a somatoform disorder, a psychiatric malady causing the victim to hav e
an e xaggerated perception of his physical ailments. The ALJ may no t
summar ily dismiss a claimant's subjective claims such as a somatofor m disorder without expressly determining that the claimant's testimony is no t credible. Metz v. Shalala , 49 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995). Instead, th e ALJ must consider the claimant's prior work history, as well as an y obs ervations by third parties regarding: (1) the claimant's dail y act ivities; (2) the duration, intensity, and frequency of the pain; (3 ) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (4) precipitating and aggravating factors; and (5) functional

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restrictions. Robinson v. Sullivan , 956 F.2d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1992).

The ALJ properly applied this framework by noting several tellin g inconsistencies that undermined Barber's complai nts of pain, specifically: (1) a consistent absence of objective medical ev idence supporting Barber's claime d level of pain; (2) repeated observations by treating physician s th at Barber was deliberately exaggerating his symptoms; (3) Barber' s relatively unrestricted range of daily activities; (4) Barber's sporadic and conservative treatment history coupled with the low dosage of his pain medication; and (5) Barber's poor work history. "The ALJ may discount the claimant's allegation s of pain when he explicitly finds them inconsistent with daily activities , lack of treatment, demeanor, and objective medical evidence. " Jones , 86 F.3d at 826. Moreover, the ALJ made a specifi c finding that Barber's subjective complaints of disabling pain were simply not credible. "If an ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant's testimony and gives a good reason for doing so, we will normally defer to that judgment. " Dixon v. S ullivan , 905 F.2d 237, 238 (8th Cir. 1990). Each of thes e inconsistencies is well-supported by the record, and the mere fact that th e record does contain some support for Barber's claim that he is suffering from some degree of somatoform disorder does not require reversal in light of the ALJ's express credibility determination. See Metz , 49 F.3d at 377. We con clude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation o f Barber's subjective complaints of pain, includin g his somatoform disorder.
Barber next contends that his mental impairme nts preclude his return to past relevant work as a car detailer. The ALJ's finding that Barber' s mental impairments would preclude him from perfo rming only tasks involving unusual stress, highly complex tasks, or a high level of judgment, however , is also supported by substantial evidence. Dr. William Wilkins rate d Barber' s capacity to return to work as fair to good. Dr. Joseph Crupi e found Barber "oriented to

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time, plac e, and person" with a "low average IQ," "no gross cognitiv e deficit," and an adequate ability to concentrate . Dr. B. Eliot Cole found Barber to be "alert, pleasant, and cooperative" with no evidence o f hallucinations or delusions and rated Barber's ability to return to work
as fair . Dr. Ken Dowless found Barber to be "fully oriented and alert " although suffering from situational depression. A second consultation wit h Dr. Cole characterize d Barber as alert and logical with "no problems with attention, but some difficulty with concentration."
This evidence supports the ALJ's determination that, despite Ba rber's depres sion and anxiety, he is still capable of communicating, behavin g properly, exercising basic judgment, and carryin g out simple instructions. While Dr. W. Gerald Fowler opined that Barber's mental impairments rendere d him inca pable of performing even a low stress job involving simpl e inst ructions, that diagnosis is at odds with the clear weight of th e psychiatric record as a whole. Accordingly, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Fo wler's opinion in favor of the conflicting substantial evidence

. Piepgras v. Chater , 76 F.3d 233, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1996).

III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.