NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM J. NORDHOLM,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. TIM BARKELL; et al. ,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 19

- 35357

D.C. No. 2:17

- cv
- 00011

- JCL

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Jeremiah C. Lynch, Magistrate Judge, Presiding * *

Submitted August 5, 2020 * * *

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Former Montana state prisoner William J. Nordholm appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
process violations while he was a pretrial detainee and retaliation while he was a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 35357

prisoner . We have jurisdict ion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo cross

motions for summary judgment. Hamby v. Hammond , 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2016) . We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on Nordholm’s due process claim because Nordholm failed to raise a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether defendants were required to provide him with a pre

deprivation hearing prior to charging him with booking and bonding fees. See

Mathews v. El dridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ( b alancing factors to determine
whether government has provided sufficient due process ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nordholm’s
conspiracy claim because Nordholm failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights

. See Crowe v. County of San Diego , 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010) (a
conspiracy claim requires the existe nce of an agreement or meeting of the minds to
violate constitutional rights).
However, summary judgment was improper on Nordholm’s retaliation

claim

. The record reflects that, following Nordholm’s attempt to have a complaint

served on d efendant Barkell, d efendants Barkell, Sather, Durkin, and Staley

refused to provide additional grievance forms to Nordholm and refused to process certain grievances he had submitted. Taking this evidence in the light most3 19

- 35357

favorable to Nordholm, a genuine dispute of materia l fact exists as to whether

these defendants retaliated against Nordholm

. See Brodheim v. Cry , 584 F.3d
1262, 1269

- 7 2 (9th Cir. 2009) ( setting forth elements of retaliation claim and
concluding that a reasonable person “ may have been chille d” by a written warning
about a prisoner’s grievances )

. We note that the district court expressly stated it
did not reach any issues concerning exhaustion. W e reverse and remand for
further proceedings on this claim as to d efendants Barkell, Sather, Durkin, and
Staley only

. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nordholm’s motion
for class certification because, as a pro se litigant, Nordholm has no authority to
represent anyone other than himself. See Hawkins v. Comparet

- Cassani , 251 F.3d

12 30, 1237 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United

States , 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) ( a pro se litigant has no authority to
appear as an attorney for others ).
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part , REVERSED in part, and REMANDED

.