United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Readiness, Committee on Armed

Services, House of Representatives

September 1993 ARMY TRAINING

Prioritizing and

Following Up on

Lessons Learned

Should Minimize

Recurring Weaknesses

GAO/NSIAD-93-231

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-253884 

September 15, 1993

The Honorable Earl Hutto

Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Army assesses the performance of units during their rotations at the

combat training centers, identifies the lessons learned from their

battlefield experience, and disseminates this information so that training

and doctrine can be modified to avoid repeating the same mistakes during

training exercises. As requested, we determined whether the Army has an

effective program for using these lessons learned to correct the problems

identified at the training centers.

Background The Army’s forces train at four combat training centers. Heavy forces

participate in exercises at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,

California, and its smaller counterpart, the Combat Maneuver Training

Center at Hohenfels, Germany, where mechanized infantry and armored

battalions can engage in free-play maneuvers against an opposing force. A

third training center, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee,

Arkansas, is used primarily by light forces. The fourth training center, the

Battle Command Training Program at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, is used to

provide command and control training to division and corps battle staffs.

The Army has come to rely increasingly on these training centers to train

its combat units and assess their capabilities. The training centers enable

units to train and maneuver in an environment that closely parallels that of

actual warfare. With their electronic instrumentation, they provide the

capability to objectively document units’ performance and provide

information on their strengths and weaknesses.

Under Army Regulation 11-33, the Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) has overall responsibility for the Army’s lessons learned program.

TRADOC has assigned responsibility for lessons learned at the training

centers to its Combined Arms Command, which carries out the program

through its Center for Army Lessons Learned.

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The Center for Army Lessons Learned is responsible for identifying

systemic training strengths and weaknesses of units that participate in

major operations and exercises, including exercises at the training centers.

To accomplish this task, the Center uses information from a variety of

sources, including “after action” reports, audio and video transmissions

that occur during the exercises, and evaluations from observers at the

training centers. After documenting the lessons learned, the Center

consolidates them and analyzes trends and deficiencies. It then publishes

the results of its analyses in bulletins and newsletters that are sent to

TRADOC’s schools and to other organizations throughout the Army.

TRADOC has 18 schools that serve as proponents for their own area and

develop training programs for Army personnel in their military specialty.

Included are the Infantry School, the Armor School, the Aviation School,

and the Engineer School. Ultimately, the schools are responsible for using

the lessons learned analyses to modify training and doctrine and to

validate and assess the adequacy of solutions to training problems.

Results in Brief Despite the lessons learned program, Army units repeat many of the same

mistakes during maneuver exercises at the combat training centers. Some

of these mistakes could have serious consequences on a real battlefield.

For instance, when hostilities erupted during the Persian Gulf War, Army

officials sought to resolve problems in Army training that could contribute

to fratricide incidents. The Center for Army Lessons Learned had

identified most of these same problems about 2 years earlier, but they had

not been corrected.

The Army is not achieving the full benefits of the lessons learned at the

training centers because TRADOC’s program lacks procedures for assigning

priorities to the lessons and for tracking the schools’ use of them. The

lessons are essentially provided to the schools as information to use as

they wish. Consequently, the schools lack guidance on which problems the

TRADOC leadership considers most serious. While the schools use the

lessons learned, neither TRADOC nor the schools keep track of the extent to

which the schools modify their training and doctrine to incorporate the

lessons. Further, the schools are not held accountable by TRADOC for

ensuring that problems identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned

are resolved.

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Units’ Performance at

Training Centers

Reveals Recurring

Deficiencies

Over the course of many years at the combat training centers, the Center

for Army Lessons Learned has identified a number of recurring problems

in units’ performance. These problems are in such areas as battlefield

planning; development and use of intelligence data, reconnaissance, and

communications; performance under chemical threats; and integration of

effective fire support into unit mission planning. In September 1992, for

instance, the Center identified the following recurring problems in units’

performance: battles were not tracked properly; direct fire was not

synchronized effectively; reconnaissance and surveillance plans were not

well coordinated, managed, or focused; communications with higher

headquarters were not properly planned and executed; many fire support

plans did not support the scheme of maneuver; and operations in a

chemical environment were not satisfactory.

Problems relating to fratricide have also been recurring at combat training

centers and firing ranges. For example, in August 1988, an M1 tank

participating in gunnery exercises on a firing range in Germany

inadvertently shot several rounds outside of its firing perimeter, hitting

two M2 infantry fighting vehicles and causing several casualties. This

accident prompted the TRADOC Commander to direct the Center for Army

Lessons Learned to conduct a follow-up study on fratricide at the National

Training Center. The Center found problems with fratricide—that is, units

firing weapons via an instrumented laser device were “destroying” tanks

and other weapon systems on their own side. On the basis of this analysis,

the Combined Arms Command issued a plan in February 1989 to correct

deficiencies in six areas: risk assessment, land navigation, target

assessment, target identification, fire planning, and fire control.

The plan established specific actions to be taken and assigned

responsibilities for these actions to various TRADOC organizations,

including the proponent schools. However, the responsible organizations

either did not carry out the actions in the plan or did not document what

actions they did take. During 1990, the Center for Army Lessons Learned

continued to identify fratricide-related problems at the National Training

Center.

The issue began to receive renewed interest because of Operation Desert

Storm. Army officials raised concerns about the possibility of fratricide,

and the Combined Arms Command issued a new plan in December 1990

for correcting fratricide-related deficiencies in unit training. This plan

addressed the same six areas as the 1989 plan, plus two others. We found

that the Army has more aggressively implemented the 1990 plan, and

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B-253884 

recent data shows improvements in fratricide-related problems since that

time.

Other examples of recurring deficiencies involve battlefield supply

procedures and the construction of fortifications. The Combined Arms

Command reported in 1988 that combat units at the combat training

centers were bogged down waiting for engineering construction support

materials to reach them and had weaknesses in their basic fortification

skills. The Combined Arms Command, believing that these problems

increased the risk that units could not conduct successful defensive

operations, issued a corrective action plan in 1988. In spite of the plan,

these problems were not completely resolved. Training center data

reported in October 1992—4 years later—showed that similar deficiencies

remained. According to Combined Arms Command officials, the lack of

progress in resolving these deficiencies was caused by the tasks’

complexity and competing demands that limited training at home stations.

We believe that another contributing factor may have been the Combined

Arms Command’s failure to adequately monitor the plan’s implementation.

TRADOC officials told us that even though the Center for Army Lessons

Learned had continued to identify recurring deficiencies in exercises

conducted at the training centers, the deficiencies were not as severe as

they were in the past. Furthermore, officials said that some deficiencies

will never be eliminated entirely because (1) the Army is continuously

training new soldiers and it is reasonable to expect them to make mistakes

as they learn their profession and (2) some tasks are particularly complex

and difficult to master. These officials may be correct in their view that

recurring problems are less severe, as indicated in fratricide data.

However, as discussed below, we believe an effective assessment in such

critical areas—as well as whether more can or should be done to modify

training and doctrine—requires a more disciplined process.

TRADOC’S Lessons

Learned Program Has

Weaknesses

TRADOC’s lessons learned program has two primary weaknesses that

hamper its effectiveness. First, TRADOC does not systematically rank the

lessons identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned on the basis of

their significance. The schools thus choose the problems they will address,

with no direction from TRADOC leadership on which ones merit greatest

attention. Second, TRADOC lacks formal follow-up procedures for tracking

the use of lessons learned and holding the schools accountable for

correcting deficiencies. Absent such procedures, TRADOC has limited

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B-253884 

knowledge as to whether and to what extent the lessons are being used to

resolve the problems identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

Lessons Learned Are Not

Ranked on the Basis of

Their Priority

When the Center for Army Lessons Learned publishes the results of its

analyses in bulletins and newsletters, it does not list the deficiencies

according to their significance. This judgment is left instead to the

individual proponent schools. Thus, the schools are not systematically

provided guidance on which problems the TRADOC leadership considers

most serious. Senior school officials also do not prioritize the lessons

learned. Rather, they rely on their school staff—instructors, doctrine

writers, and department heads—to incorporate the lessons as they see fit

in their training and doctrinal modifications.

In 1988, TRADOC attempted to take a more systematic approach to

correcting the problems identified at the combat training centers. It

developed a “priority issue list” to rank the importance of each of

28 problems that had been identified collectively by the senior leadership

of TRADOC, the Combined Arms Command, and the schools. TRADOC

officials intended to prepare plans detailing the specific actions required

to resolve the most important problems on the list within a 6-month to

2-year period. The Commander of the Combined Arms Command had

previously endorsed the concept of a priority issue list. He stated that such

a list would enable the TRADOC leadership to establish clear priorities for

those problems it deems most serious, to identify the participants involved

and establish accountability, and to estimate the resources required to

resolve problems.

The TRADOC Commander approved the priority issue list in April 1988,

stating that the list would be used to focus training exercises during 1989.

However, the plan was never implemented, and many issues identified on

the list were left unresolved. TRADOC officials could not provide an

explanation for this. All of the individuals involved had left TRADOC, and

records were not kept to document the plan’s status.

The former Director of the Center for Army Lessons Learned told us he

believed the priority issue list concept still had merit, and he planned to

develop another priority issue list. The Center planned to select about five

top issues of recurring deficiency, determine the reasons for these

problems, and obtain suggestions on how to solve them. The plan would

require the approval of the Combined Arms Command and TRADOC

headquarters. The Deputy Commanding General for Training at the

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B-253884 

Combined Arms Command also told us he plans to reestablish a priority

issue system.

TRADOC Lacks Follow-Up

Procedures for Tracking

Use and Impact of Lessons

Learned

Regulation 11-33 requires TRADOC to track the actions taken to resolve

training deficiencies. TRADOC assigned this responsibility to its Combined

Arms Command in May 1989. However, the Combined Arms Command has

not established formal tracking procedures. Consequently, TRADOC does

not know to what extent the lessons identified by the Center for Army

Lessons Learned are incorporated in the schools’ revisions to training and

doctrine.

Moreover, TRADOC does not hold the schools accountable for resolving the

problems identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. A key reason

for this is that no feedback mechanisms exist to provide information on

the impact of the schools’ training and doctrinal revisions—that is,

whether they succeeded or failed in correcting the identified deficiencies.

Like TRADOC, the schools we visited also did not track their use of lessons

learned. Officials at the Engineer School, Chemical School, and Armor

School told us that the staff who make critical decisions concerning

changes to training and doctrine are experienced in their work and rely on

the Center for Army Lessons Learned as just one source of information.

For instance, the staff have frequent telephone conversations with

observers at training events, and many have served as observers

themselves. These staff also review much of the same raw data used by the

Center for Army Lessons Learned in its analyses, including after action

reports and audio transmissions from the training exercises.

The Deputy Commanding General for Training at the Combined Arms

Command acknowledged the lack of formal and systematic follow-up

procedures. However, he was satisfied that the schools were aware of the

problems identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned and that they

took the appropriate steps to address them. He also said TRADOC’s

leadership and other senior Army officials, including the Chief of Staff,

Army, were aware of the recurring deficiencies in unit training because the

deficiencies are discussed at Army conferences, seminars, and meetings.

He believes that the current or informal approach works well.

We disagree that the informal approach has been effective. The recurring

deficiencies at the combat training centers indicate that the problems

identified by the Center for Army Lessons Learned are not systematically

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-93-231 Army Training
B-253884 

resolved. Even when the Combined Arms Command has issued a plan to

correct specific problems—such as the 1989 plan to correct

fratricide-related problems—the Command has no assurances that the

plan has been implemented. According to officials at the Center for Army

Lessons Learned, it took the Gulf War to prompt the Army into developing

and implementing a revised fratricide action plan.

Moreover, the reliance on an informal approach to correct training and

doctrine deficiencies is not compatible with the Army’s practice of

periodically rotating military personnel assigned to TRADOC. As a result of

personnel turnover, we found that there was little institutional knowledge

among TRADOC officials on either the use made of lessons learned

information or the progress made to minimize recurring deficiencies. For

example, Engineer School officials had little knowledge about specific

actions taken to address deficiencies involving battlefield supply

procedures and the construction of fortifications. Moreover, it took these

officials several days to locate a copy of the original action plan.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander,

TRADOC, to establish a system for placing priorities on the problems

identified at the combat training centers. A starting point for this effort

may be the new priority issue list being formulated by the Center for Army

Lessons Learned.

We further recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the

Commander, TRADOC, to establish procedures for tracking the schools’ use

of lessons learned and for holding the schools accountable for resolving

the identified problems.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The Department of Defense agreed with our findings and

recommendations. It said that while the lessons learned program had

provided important information to the Army, improvements could be

made. In response to our recommendations, the Department said that

Army headquarters will provide guidance to TRADOC regarding the

interpretation of and compliance with Army Regulation 11-33. More

specifically, it said that the guidance would direct TRADOC to establish (1) a

system to assign priorities to the problems identified at the combat

training centers and (2) procedures for tracking lessons learned and

assigning accountability for problem resolution. We believe that effective

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B-253884 

implementation of these initiatives should significantly improve the

lessons learned program.

Scope and

Methodology

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed Army regulations related to

the lessons learned program, as well as directives from the TRADOC

headquarters. We also reviewed information on recurring deficiencies

developed by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, priority issue lists of

problem areas, plans for addressing deficiencies, and other pertinent

documents.

We interviewed Army officials responsible for the management of the

lessons learned program at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the

Combined Arms Command, and TRADOC. We also obtained the views of

Army officials who have oversight of the program. We interviewed officials

at several TRADOC schools and centers to obtain their views on how lessons

learned at the training centers are identified and used to correct training

and doctrinal deficiencies. We also interviewed battalion, brigade, and

division leadership in two active Army divisions to determine how they

use lessons learned information to correct deficiencies identified during

rotations through the National Training Center.

We performed our work at the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the

Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; TRADOC

headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Office of the Deputy Chief of

Staff for Operations and Plans at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; the

National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Army Research

Institute at the Presidio of Monterey, California; the Armor School at Fort

Knox, Kentucky; the Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; the

Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama; the lst Infantry Division

(Mechanized) at Fort Riley, Kansas; and the lst Cavalry Division at Fort

Hood, Texas.

We conducted our review from April 1992 to April 1993 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, Senate and House

Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations; the Director,

Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the

Acting Secretary of the Army. We will also make copies available to others

upon request.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-93-231 Army Training
B-253884 

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix I.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations

 and Capabilities Issues

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-93-231 Army Training
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Norman J. Rabkin, Associate Director

Charles J. Bonanno, Assistant Director

Thomas W. Gosling, Reports Analyst

Kansas City Regional

Office

James S. Moores, Evaluator-in-Charge

George N. Lundy, Jr., Site Senior

(393509) Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-93-231 Army Training
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