United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-10630

Summary Calendar

____________

John Anthony Castro, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

United States of America, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:22-CV-16

______________________________

Before Jones, Smith, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

John Anthony Castro appeals the district court’s entry of summary 

judgment in favor of the United States of America on his claim that an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) agent disclosed his confidential tax return information in violation of 26 U.S. § 6103(a)(3). Because the district court 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 21, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Government, we AFFIRM.

The standard of review on summary judgement is de novo. Davidson 

v. Fairchild Controls Corp. 882 F.3d 180, 184. (5th Cir. 2018). The court 

should grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 56(a). During an IRS criminal investigation into Castro, criminal 

investigative agent Tuan Ma (“Agent Ma”) contacted two potential witnesses to obtain information in furtherance of his investigation. The parties 

dispute whether Agent Ma disclosed to the two potential witnesses that Castro was under criminal investigation but that the investigation did not target 

the two potential witnesses. For the purpose of summary judgment, we assume that Agent Ma did in fact disclose such information to the two potential 

witnesses. McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012) (“In reviewing summary judgment, this court construes all facts and inferences in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The two potential witnesses submitted affidavits indicating that they spoke with Agent Ma after he reassured them that they were 

not under investigation.

Even accepting as true that Agent Ma made the alleged disclosures in 

violation of § 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, a safe harbor provision 

shields the Government from liability if the agent’s disclosure was based on 

“a good faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 

7431(b)(1) (“No liability shall arise under this section with respect to any inspection or disclosure . . . which results from a good faith, but erroneous, 

interpretation of section 6103[.]”). This circuit uses an objective standard to 

evaluate the applicability of this “good faith” exception to liability under the 

Internal Revenue Code. Payne v. United States, 289 F.3d 377, 384 (5th Cir. 

2002); see also Huckaby v. United States Dept. of Treasury, I.R.S., 794 F.2d 

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1041, 1048 (5th Cir.1986) (“A reasonable IRS agent can be expected to know 

statutory provisions governing disclosure, as interpreted and reflected in IRS 

regulations and manuals.”).

Here, Agent Ma reasonably and in good faith believed that—based on 

case law, statutory authority, regulations, and the IRS Manual (“IRM”)—

the disclosures were “necessary in obtaining information, which was not otherwise reasonably available[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(k)(6). Treasury Regulation 

§ 301.6103(k)(6)-1 defines “necessary” as “appropriate and helpful” and

clarifies that an agent is not required to first seek information from the taxpayer as an otherwise reasonably available source. TREAS. REG. § 

301.6103(k)(6)-1(c)(1) & (3). The IRM further instructs agents that they may 

identify themselves as members of the criminal investigation unit of the IRS 

and disclose the criminal nature of investigations when “necessary” because 

the witness is “disinclined to cooperate.” I.R.M. 9.4.5.11.3.1.4(1) (Note). 

Moreover, this circuit has stated that § 7431’s good faith exception protects 

an agent’s disclosure of “the nature of their official duties as a criminal tax 

investigation.” Gandy v. United States, 234 F.3d 281, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2000)

(reasonable agents “had a good faith belief that they could disclose the criminal nature of the investigation”). Castro did not present any evidence suggesting that Agent Ma’s interpretation of the relevant authorities was unreasonable under these circumstances. Agent Ma’s disclosure thus fell within § 

7431(b)(1)’s “good faith” exception to Government liability. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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