1

0 1

- 1 5 3 5

- c r ( L) ( 5 A) th In re T erro ri st B om bings o f U
. S
. E m ba ssi es (F i ft h A m en d m en t C ha l l en ge s) UN ITED STA

TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m, 200 7 (A rgue d: Dec emb er

10, 200 7 Dec id ed: No vem ber 24, 200 8) Do cket No s . 01 -1 535 -c r

(L ), 01- 155 0- cr

(c on ), 01- 155 3- cr

(c on ), 01-1571-cr (con), 05-6149-cr (con), 05-6704-cr (con) I n r e T ER RO RI S T B O M BI N G S O F U.S
. E MB A S S I ES I N E AST A FR I CA (F I F T H A M EN D M EN T C HAL L ENGES ), U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA ,

Appellee , v. M OHA MED S ADEE K O DEH , als o kno wn as Abu M oath, als o kno wn as No ur eldin e, al s o kno wn as Marwan, al so known as Hydar, M OHA MED R A S HE D D A OUD A L -’ O W HALI , als o kno wn as Kh ali d S ali m Sale h Bin Rashed, al so known as Moath, also known as Abdul Jabbar-Ali A bel-Latif, W ADI H E L H A GE also known as Abdus Sabbur,

Defenda nts-App ellants, K HA L F A N K

H AM I S M OHAMED , als o kno wn as Kh alf an K ham is , De fe ndant
. B ef or e: F EI NBERG , N EW M AN , and C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ges . Defendants appea l from judgments of conviction entered by the United States District Court fo r th e So uthern D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Le on ar d B . Sa nd , Judge

) following a jury trial in w hich they w ere found guilty of offens es arising fr om their involvement in a n international c onspiracy—led by Osama Bin Laden and organiz ed through the al Qae da terroris t network—to kill America n citize ns and destr oy Ame r icanfa cil it ies acr os s th e gl ob e. D ef

end ant s -a pp ell ant s Al- ’O whal i an d O dehcon te nd , int

er ali a , th at c er tai n i nculp ato ry s tat eme nt s s ho ul d h ave b eens up pr es s ed f r om th eir tr ial pr im ar ily bec aus e theyFor a det ai l ed des cr i pt i on o f t he f act ual ba ckg r ound and pr ocedur al hi s t or y of t hi s ca s e, s ee In re Terror is t 1 B om bing s of U
. S
. E m ba s s i e s

in E ast A f rica , _ _ F . 3 d
_ _ (2d C ir. 2 0 0 8 ).

2 wer e ob tai nedinvio lat

io n o f the F if

thAme nd men t. We s ee n o m er it inthis challen ge an d af

fi r m thei r convictions for the reasons stated in this opinion and in In re Te rror ist Bombings of U.S. Emb assies in East Africa , _ _ F .3d
__ (2 d Ci r . 20 08) filedto day.

D A V I D R

A S K I N and L ES L I E C. B R OW N , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney s (M

ich ael J . G ar cia, Unit ed S tat es At to r ney , on the bri ef , I r is La n, Dav

idO’ Neil, Kath er

in e P ol k F ailla, C el est e L . K oe le ve ld , A ssist a nt U ni te d S ta te s At tor ne ys, of counsel ), United States Attorney’s Off ice for the So uthern D is tr

ict of New Yor k, N ew Yo r k, N Y, for Appelle e U nit ed Stat es o f A mer ic a. J AM E S E. N EUM AN , N ew Yo r k, N Y, fo r D ef en dant -A ppella nt Mo hame d Sade ekOdeh. F REDE RI CK H. C OHN , N ew Yo r k, N Y, fo r D ef en dant -A ppella nt Mo hame d Ras

he d Dao ud Al

-’Owh ali
. J O S HUA L. D RAT EL and S A M A. S CH M I D T (Erik B. Levin, Renita K. Thukral, Meredith S. Heller, of counsel ), New Yor k, NY, for Defendant-Ap

pellan t Wa dih E l Hage. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : Def end ant s -a pp ell ant s M oh ame d Ras hedDao udAl- ’O whal i an d M oh ame d S adee k O deh chall enge the ir convictions in the United States District Court f or the Southern Dis trict of New York (L eon ar d B . Sa nd , Judge

) o n n um er ou s char

ges ar is in g f r om th eir invo lve men t i n the A ugu s t 7 , 19 98 bombings of the American Emba ss ies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Sala am, Tanza nia (the “A ugust 7 bombings”). In this opinion we c onsider their challenge s to the District Court’s rulings that denied,

1 fo r th e mo s t p ar t, th eir

r es pec ti ve m ot io ns to s up pr es s s tat eme nt s eachof th em m ade o ver s eas to U.S
. and non-U.S. official s. Other challenge s and those of their co-defendant, W adih E l-Hage, a reIn releva nt pa rt , t he F i ft h A m en d m en t pro vid es that “[n]o p erso n . . . shall be co m pe l l ed i n a ny crim i na l ca se 2 t o b e a wi t n e s s a g a i n s t h i ms e l f
. ” U. S
. Co n s t . a me n d
. V. 3 con s id er ed i n t

wo s epar ate op inio ns filedto day, In re Te rror ist Bombings of U.S. Emb assies in East Africa , __ F.3d __ (2d Cir. 2008), and In re T er ro ri st Bo mbing s o f U. S. Embas

si es in E ast Af ri ca ( Fo ur th A men dmen t Cha llenges) , __ F.3d __ (2d Cir. 2008). Al- ’O whal

i an d O dehcon te ndth at n either th e “Advic e of

Righ ts ” f or m ( “AO R”) th at they
r ecei vedno r th e s ub s equ ent

or al warni ngs of

an As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney (“ AUS A”) s ati s fi ed Mi ran da v . A ri zo na , 38 4 U. S. 4 36 ( 196 6) . I n ad di ti on , Al -’ Owh alias s er ts th at the c on di ti on s of hi s confinement made his s tatements involuntary and therefore inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. 2 He al s o co nt end s th at the D is tr ict Cou r t ab us ed i ts di s cr et

io n b y withd r awin g it s init ial gr ant of hi s
s up pr es s io n m ot

io n an d h ol di ng f

ur th er hear in gs pu r s uan t t o the g ov er nm ent ’s app lic ati on . F or hi s part, Odeh cla ims that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated w hen the District Court permitted him to withdraw his initial suppress ion motion and his attorneys failed to renew that motion promptly thereafter. As exp lai nedingr eat er

det ail bel ow, all of th es e claim s lack

mer it . T he A USA ’s or al warni ngs fulf ill ed, andth e AO R s ub s tan ti ally co mp lie d wi th , the g ov er nm ent ’s ob lig ati on s , in s of ar as it hadany,
un der Mi ran da , and the a dmiss ion of Al-’Owhali’ s and Odeh’s st atements did not otherwise run afoul of th e F if thAme nd men t. T he D is tr ict Cou r t’ s dec is io n t o co nd uct fu r th er hear in gs onAl- ’O whal

i’s suppr ession mot

ion was we ll within its discretion, as was its decision to gr ant, without prejudice to
r ene wal, Od eh’ s app lic ati onto withd r aw hi s init ial s up pr es s io n m ot

io n. Acco r di ngl

y, the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s r es ol ut

io n o f Al- ’O whal

i’s andOd eh’ s r es pec ti

ve m ot io ns di d n ot

vio lat e any

of th eir
co nsti tutio na l ri gh ts.4 I. BA CKGR OUND A. F act ual O ver

vi ew 1. Al- ’O whal

i Al- ’O whal

i was det ain ed o n Augus t 1 2, 1 998 by K eny an au th or it ies in“anar r es t [

th at] was val

id
un der Kenyan l aw.” United Sta tes v. B in Laden , 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2 001). Within one hour of his arrest, Al-’Owhali wa s tr ansported to Kenyan polic e hea dquarters in Nairobi and in te r r oga te d b y t

wo m emb er s of

th e J oi nt T er r or is t T as k F or ce— an F B I Sp ecial Ag ent anda Ne w Yor k Cit y po lic e de te ct

ive —o per ati ng o ut

of New Yor k Cit y andtw o o ff

icer s of Kenya’s nat

io nal po lic e. Id
. T he N ew Yo r k p ol

ice d et ect ive pr es ent ed Al- ’O whal

i wi than Ad

vic e of Righ ts fo r m o ft en used by U.S. law enforcement whe n operating overseas. The AOR, w ritten in English, read in its
en ti re ty a s fol lo ws: We ar e r epr es ent ati

ves of th e Unit ed S tat es Go ver nm ent . Un der ou r laws , yo u h ave c er tai n rig hts. Bef

ore we a sk y ou a ny

qu estio ns, we wa nt t o b e su re tha t y ou un de rsta nd tho se rig hts. You do not have to speak to us or answer any que stions . Eve n if you have already spoken to th e Ke nyanautho r

it ies , yo u d o n ot

hav e t o s peak

to us no w. I f y oudo s peak

with u s , an ythi ng that

you s ay m ay be us ed ag ain s t y ouina cou r t i n the U ni te d St ate s or els ewh er e. In t he Un it ed St a te s, y ou wo ul d h ave the rig ht t o ta lk to a lawy erto g eta dv

ic e b ef ore we a sk you any q ues ti on s andyou

couldhav e a law

yer with yo u d ur

ing qu es ti onin g. I n the U ni te d States, if you could not afford a lawyer, one w ould be appoi nted for you, if you wish, before any qu es ti onin g. B ecau s e we ar e no t i n the U ni te d S tat es , we c ann ot ens ur e that

you will h ave a l awyer

app oi nt ed fo r you bef or e any qu es ti onin g. If you decide to speak with us now, without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to s top ans wer in g qu es ti on s at a ny t

im e. Yous ho ul d al s o u nd er s tan d that if you dec id e no t t o s peak

with u s , that

fa ct cann ot be u s ed as evid en ce a ga in st y ou in a co urtin the Un it ed St a te s.A n FB I i nt er pr et er , who at t ended m any of t he r el eva nt i nt er r og at i ons , l at er t es t i f i ed t hat “ i n hi s opi ni on, 3 A l

- ’ O w hal i w ou l d l i kel y have ha d di ff i cu l t y un d ers t and i ng t he A O R i f i t w ere onl y read t o hi m al ou d i n E ngl i s h. ” B in L a d en , 132 F. Supp. 2d at 174. The i nt er vi ews l as t ed betw een t w o a nd f our hour s , wi t h t he e xce pt i on o f t he i nt er vi ews on Augus t 22 and 4 A u g u st 2 5 , w h ic h la ste d se v e n a n d n in e h o u r s r e sp e c tiv e ly
. S ee B in L a d en , 1 3 2 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 1 7 4 , 1 7 7 . 5 I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawy er at this time. I unders tand and know wha t I am doing. No promis es or thr eats have be en made to me and no pressur e or coe r cio n o f a ny k

in d h as bee n u s ed ag ain s t m e. Id
. at 173-74. Al -’Owhali told the A merican law enforcement a gents that he could not read E nglish and hada li mi te d u nd er s tan di ng o f s po kenEng lis h. Id
. at 174. A ccordingly , the police detective “read the AOR alo udinEng

lis h, goi ng s lo wly a ndche cki ng f or vis ual s ign s of com pr ehe ns io n. Al- ’O whal i app ear ed t o [

th e de te ct ive to ] u nd er s tan d, r epl

iedth at h e un der s to odwhe n as ked , an d s ign ed his ali as at th e bo tt om of

th e AO R inAr abi c wh en r equ es te d t o d o s o. ” Id
. A on e- ho ur

in te r r oga ti onens ued , in 3 whi ch Al- ’O whal

i r es po nd ed i n “b r ok en Engli s h. ” Id
. Finding their ability to communic ate wi th Al-’Owhali l imited by the e nd of that hour, the agents dec id ed t o co nt

in ue Al- ’O whal

i’s in te r r oga ti onwith the as s is tan ce o f a n i nt erpr et er . The special a gent beg an thi s in te r

vie w by r eadi ng the A OR i n En gli s h, whi ch the i nt erpr et er tr ans lat ed i nt o Ar abi c. Id
. Al-’Owhal i stated that he “understood that the warning wa s the s ame one as fromthe morning
s es s io n, ” “u nd er s to odhi s r igh ts as des cr

ib ed ther ein ,” an d “agr eedto ans wer qu es ti on s .” Id

. Al- ’O wh a li wa s the n i nte rvi ew ed for a bo ut t hre e h ou rs a nd , t he re a fte r, w a s qu estio ne d o n e ig ht o the r da ys: Aug us t 1 3, 1 4, 1 7, a nd21- 25. Id
. At th e s tar t o f e ach o f the i nt er vie ws onAug

us t 1 3, 1 4, 1 7 an d 2 1, 4 th e agen ts s ho wedAl- ’O whal i the s ign ed A OR, as kedwhe th er he r eme mb er ed his r

igh ts , an d wh ether he w ouldcon ti nu e t o an s wer th eir qu es ti on s . Id

. at 1 75. Al- ’O whal

i co ns ent ed o n eac h o ccas io n. Un til Augus t 2 1, h e de ni ed any in vo lve men t i n the e mb as s y bo mb in gs . Id
. Du r in g the A ugu s t 2 1 in te r

vie w, the U .S. agen ts des cr ib ed the i nculp ato ry evi den ce they had gather ed o n Al -’ Owh ali , an d “[ a]f te r ackn owl edg

in g that th e agen ts ‘kn ew ev erythi ng, ’ Al -’ Owh alis aid6

th at h e wo ul d t ell

th e t r uth ab ou t his invo lve men t i n the b om bi ng i f h e co ul d b e t r iedinth e Unit ed St ate s .” Id

. at 1 76. He e xp lai nedth at the r eas onhe w ant ed t o s tan d tr ial inth e Unit ed S tat es was “be caus e the U ni te d S tat es was hi s ene my, no t K eny a.” Id
. T he ag ent s th en t er mi nat ed the i nt er vie w inor der to det er mi ne whether

Al- ’O whal

i’s r equ es t c ouldbe m et . T he n ext day, Aug us t 2 2, a n AU SA, in the company

of the two U.S. ag ents and two Kenya n police office rs , provided Al-’Owha li with a do cum ent of un der s tan di ng ( “D OU ”) , ap pr ov ed b y the U .S. Dep ar tm ent of J us ti ce, s tat

in g: I . . . have be en fully a dvised of my rights , including my right to remain silent and my right not to ans wer qu es ti on s witho ut

a lawy er pr es ent . As I hav e be en p r evi ou s ly t ol d, I un der s tan d that a ny thi ng I sa y o r ha ve sa id ca n b e u sed a ga in st me in co urtin the Un it ed St a te s. I a lso understand that if I choose not to answer questions my refusal to answer questions cannot be hel d ag ain s t m e incou r t. I fu r th er un der s tan d that

if I cho os e t o an s wer

qu es ti on s , I can alway s ch a ng e m y m in d a nd de ci de no t to a nsw era ny furt he r qu estio ns. I unders tand that both Kenya n and Ame rican authorities are investigating the murder of the var io us Ame r

icanandKenyan v

ict im s inandar ou ndth e Unit ed S tat es [E] mb as s y inNai r ob i. I hav e a s tr on g pr ef

er enc e t o h ave m y cas e t r

iedinan U ni te d S tat es Cou r t b ecau s e Am er ica i s my e nem y andKenya is no t. I wouldlik e my pas t an d p r es ent

s tat eme nt s abo ut

what I hav e do ne an d wh y I hav e do ne i t t o b e air ed i n p ub lic inan Am er icancou r tr oo m. I un der s tan d that the America n authorities who are interviewi ng me wa nt to know who committed the bombing of the embassy and how it wa s carried out. I am willing to w aive my rights and answer the questions of America n authorities upon the condition that the undersigned law enforcement a uthorities m ake a ll best effor ts t o see that I am b r ought

to th e Unit ed S tat es to s tan d tr ial . I un der s tan d that

th e un der s ign ed p r os ecu to r is only empow ered to make rec ommendations to the Attorney General of the United Sta tes and other executive officials of the United States Government and I fur ther unders tand that the Unit ed S tat es Go ver nm ent on ly i nt end s to act

with the m utual

agr eem ent

of th e Ke nyan government. No other agreements or pr omises have been ma de other than as set for th in this document. Id
. at 1 76. After being shown this document, but before it was read to him, Al-’Owhali indica ted that “he might wis h t o h ave anatt or ney

r evi ew the D OU to mak e s ur e it was enf or ceab le. ” Id

. In res ponse, the AU SA , t hro ug h a tra nsl a tor , a dv ise d A l-’ Ow ha li of h is Mi

ran da rights, “r ecited e ntirely from [the7

AUS A’s ] m emo ry of

a do mes ti c Mi

ran da warning” a nd without “reference to the AOR utilized on the fi r s t d ay of

in te r r oga ti on .” Id

. Sp ecif ically, th e AUS A in fo r medAl- ’O whal i: that he had the right to remain silent; that he ha d the right “to have a n attorney present during this meeting;” that eve n if Al-’Owhali de cided to talkhe could a lway s change his mind late r; th at Al- ’O whal

i’s s tat eme nt s couldbe u s ed ag ain s t him incou r t, th ough the f act of hi s s ile nce could not. AUSA [redacted] a lso s aid that he w as an attorney for the U.S. gove rnment, not for Al-’Owhal i. It was repeatedly str essed to Al-’Owhali that he w as the “boss” at all times as to whether he wished to answer questions without a lawye r pres ent. Id
. at 1 76- 77 (

r edac ti ons ign al i n o r

igi nal ). T he A USAfu r th er

exp lai nedth at n o Am er

icanlawy er

was availab le at

th at t im e inKenya. Id

. at 177. A fter Al-’Owhali stated that he understood his r ights, the AUS A r ead the D OU to Al- ’O whal i, thr ough atr ans lat or , ve r if yin g af te r eachpar agr aphth at Al- ’O whal i u nd er s to odth e co nt ent s of th e do cum ent . Id

. Al- ’O whal

i didno t “ as s er t his r

igh ts ” or ob ject to any p r ov

is io n o f the D OU exce pt

fo r th e “u nce r tai nt

y as s oci ate d wi th[the p ar agr aphin di cat in g that U.S . o ff ici als wouldmak e] j us t a ‘ r eco mm end ati on ’ that he b e br ought

to th e Unit ed S tat es .” Id

. The AUSA a greed to investigate the poss ibility of ac commodating A l-’Owhali’s request, and before exiting th e r oo m t o co ns ul t w

ith his s up er

io r s at the D epar tm ent

of J us ti ce, v er

if ied(t wice ) that Al- ’O whal

i
was willing t o p r oce ed w

itho ut cou ns el. Id

. During the AUSA’s absence , Al-’Owha li withdrew his request, st ating that “he would be willing to talk eve n without a full gua rantee bec ause he trusted the U.S. officials to do the best they could to br in g hi m t o the U ni te d S tat es .” Id
. T he A USAth en r et ur nedto th e in te r vie w r oo m, ver

if iedagai n th at Al- ’O whal

i was willing t o p r oce ed w itho ut cou ns el an d, up onAl- ’O whal i’s r equ es t, han dedhi m th e DO U t o s ign
. Id

. Al- ’O whal

i s ign ed the s tat eme nt , af

te r exp lai ni ng that

th e do cum ent

wouldhav e to be am end ed t o i ncl ud e hi s true n ame andnat io nal it y. Id
. He w as th en i nt er r oga te d f or th e ne xt three-and-a-half hours; after that, he wa s interr ogated for three hours on August 23 and 24, a nd for ni ne h ou r s onAug

us t 2 5. Id
. During these interviews, Al-’Owhali admitted his participation in the bo mb in g of

th e Am er icanEmb as s y inNai r ob i. Id
.8

Du r in g the A ugu s t 2 5 in te r r oga ti on , Al -’ Owh aliclai medth at h e po s s es s ed “ ti me- s ens it ive in fo r mat io n r egar di ng a n i s s ue o f p ub lic s af et y” an d wo ul d dis clo s e thi s in fo r mat io n o nly if he w as gua r ant eeda tr

ial inth e Unit ed S tat es r ath er th an K eny a. Id

. Acc ordingly, the AU SA, a fter obtaining the nece ss ary approval s, prepared a second document of understanding (“second DOU”), whic h read: I . . . have be en fully a dvised of my rights , including my right to remain silent and my right not to ans wer qu es ti on s witho ut

a lawy er pr es ent . As I hav e be en p r evi ou s ly t ol d, I un der s tan d that a ny thi ng I sa y o r ha ve sa id ca n b e u sed a ga in st me in co urtin the Un it ed St a te s. I a lso understand that if I choose not to answer questions my refusal to answer questions cannot be hel d ag ain s t m e incou r t. I fu r th er un der s tan d that

if I cho os e t o an s wer

qu es ti on s , I can alway s ch a ng e m y m in d a nd de ci de no t to a nsw era ny furt he r qu estio ns. I have answe red a number of questions of the American a uthorities and have provided truthful in fo r mat io n af te r init ially p r ov idin g in cor r ect

in fo r mat io n. Ho weve r , I hav e als o i ndicat ed that th er e is addit

io nal in fo r mat io n that I hav e wh ichI s tat ed I woulds har e with the U ni te d S tat es autho r it ies up onmy a r r

ivi ng i n Am er

ica an d o bt ainin g anatt or ney . I hav e als o i ndicat ed that th e in fo r mat

io n co nce r ns a pu bl

ic s af et y is s ue. B ecau s e I wouldother wis e no t m ake thi s di scl osu re be fore a rrivin g i n th e U ni te d S ta te s a nd spe a ki ng to a n a tto rne y, bu t be ca use America n authorities do not wish t o take the risk that the dela y conc erning the information I in te ndto im par t l ate r

will cau s e lo s s of

lif e, i t i s her eby

agr eedth at I will t ell

th e Unit ed S tat es autho r it ies abo ut this in fo r mat

io n p r io r to r et urni ng t o Am er

ica. I n tur n, th e Am er

ican autho r it ies agr ee n ot

to us e the f

act th at I di s clo s ed thi s par ti cul ar in fo r mat io n ag ain s t m e as evidenc e in the Government’s case in c hief if I s hould demand a trial of the charges that will be filedagai ns t m e. I un der s tan d that th e Unit ed S tat es in te nd s to pu r s ue ap pr op r iat e in ves tigat ive leads based upon this information I am now a greeing to provide. I also understand that the Unit ed S tat es is fr ee t o u s e any evi den ce gai nedinfo llo win g up th e in ves tigat ive lead s bu t w

ill not advise any

jury that hears my case of the fact that I reveal ed this particular information to the United States gove rnment, unless : (1) I tes tify falsely (or otherwise elicit false or misleading evi den ce o r

te s ti mo ny) andr evealing thi s fa ct wil l s er ve t o co r r ect

fals e or mi s leadin g ev

id enc e; or (2) I request that the jury be advised of the fact that I disclosed this particular information andth e Cou r t o ver r ul es ob ject io n, if any, by the G ov er nm ent . T he G ov er nm ent her eby agr ees th at i f the D ef

end ant is con vic te d, th e Go ver nm ent

will dis clo s e the f

act th at I pr ov

id ed thi s information to the judge or jury determining or impos ing sentence i f requested to do s o by the def end ant . T her e is no pr om is e that pr ov iding s uchin fo r mat

io n will a ff

ect my s ent enc e. No other agreements or pr omises have been ma de other than as set for th in this document and th e pr io r agr eem ent

dat ed A ugu s t 2 2, 1 998 . I hav e de cid ed t o s ignthis do cum ent bec aus e I hav e be en ad

vis ed b y the u nd er s ign ed that I am now scheduled to be removed to the United States within the ne xt 24 hours, travel condi tions permitting, and the undersigned is awa re of no objections fr om either the United States or Kenya go ver nm ent s to s uchr emo val
.9

Id
. at 1 77- 78. T he A USAr ead the s eco ndDO U t o Al -’ Owh ali , thr ough atr ans lat or , an d thenAl- ’O whal i s ign ed i t. Id

. at 178. A fter the Kenyan polic e left the room, at Al-’Owha li’s request, he di s clo s ed the t

im e- s ens it ive in fo r mat

io n t o the U .S. agen ts . Id

. T he n ext

mo r ni ng, Al- ’O whal

i was flo wn from Ke ny a to t he Un it ed St a te s a nd , d uri ng the fli gh t, wa s a ga in a dv

ise d o f hi s Mi

ran da r igh ts . Al-’Owhal i “stated that he knewhis rights , signed the advi ce of rights form, and invoke d his right t o app oi nt ed c ou ns el. ” Id

. 2. Od eh On August 7, 1998, Pakistani immigration officia ls detained Odeh, following his arrival at the Kar achiairpo r t o n a f

lig ht fr om Kenya, o n the gr ou ndth at h e us ed a f als e pas s po r t. Uni

te d St ate s v . B in La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2d198 , 20 2 ( S.D .N .Y. 200 1) . O dehwas hel d i n P aki s tani cu s to dy u nt il A ugu s t 1 4, du r in g whichti me h e was in te r r oga te d b y P aki s tani o ff ici als
. Id
. OnAug us t 1 4, O dehwas tr ans po r te d to Nai r ob i, K eny a, an d tr ans fe r r ed f r om Pa kis tani cu s to dy t o K eny an cu s to dy. Id
. The next day, he
was in te r r oga te d b y t

wo s pec ial

agen ts of th e F B I , anAUS A, an d thr ee K eny an p ol ice o ff icer s . Id
. at 203 . O dehcom mu ni cat ed w ith his in te r r oga to r s , wi th ou t dif fi cul ty , en ti r ely i n En gli s h. Id
. T he U .S. officials explai ned to Odeh that whe ther or not he spoke with Pakistani a uthorities dur ing his detention inKar achihadno bear

in g onhi s dec is io n t o s peak to th em. Id

. “Thereafter, when Odeh raised the iss ue of his admiss ions to the Pakist ani a uthorities, he was told that the Americans did not know or care abo ut what hadtr ans pi r ed i n P aki s tan .” Id
. On e of th e F B I s pec ial

agen ts r ead O dehan AO R s im ila r inall mat er ial r es pec ts to th e on e r ead t o Al -’ Owh ali : We ar e r epr es ent ati

ves of th e Unit ed S tat es Go ver nm ent . Un der ou r laws , yo u h ave c er tai n rig hts. Bef

ore we a sk y ou a ny

qu estio ns, we wa nt t o b e su re tha t y ou un de rsta nd tho se rig hts. You do not have to speak to us or answer any que stions . Eve n if you have already spoken to th e P aki s tani au th or

it ies , yo u d o n ot

hav e t o s peak

to us no w. I f y oudo s peak

with u s , an ythi ng that

you s ay m ay be us ed ag ain s t y ouina cou r t i n the U ni te d St ate s or els ewh er e.10

In t he Un it ed St a te s, y ou wo ul d h ave the rig ht t o ta lk to a lawy erto g eta dv

ic e b ef ore we a sk you any q ues ti on s andyou

couldhav e a law

yer with yo u d ur

ing qu es ti onin g. I n the U ni te d States, if you could not afford a lawyer, one w ould be appoi nted for you, if you wish, before any qu es ti onin g. B ecau s e we ar e no t i n the U ni te d S tat es , we c ann ot ens ur e that

you will h ave a l awyer

app oi nt ed fo r you bef or e any qu es ti onin g. If you decide to speak with us now, without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to s top ans wer in g qu es ti on s at a ny t

im e. Yous ho ul d al s o u nd er s tan d that if you dec id e no t t o s peak

with u s , that

fa ct cann ot be u s ed as evid en ce a ga in st y ou in a co urtin the Un it ed St a te s. I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawy er at this time. I unders tand and know wha t I am doing. No promis es or thr eats have be en made to me and no pressur e or coe r cio n o f a ny k

in d h as bee n u s ed ag ain s t m e. Id
. As the FB I s pecia l age nt read the AOR , Odeh asked a bout the avai lability of a lawyer but did not
s pec if ically r equ es t o ne. Id

. After fur ther discus sion of the AOR and Odeh’s willi ngness to s peak to U.S . o ff ici als , the i nt er

vie w t emp or ar

ily ceas ed s o that

th e AUS A co ul d i nv es tigat e wh ether Kenyan
cou ns el wa s availab le t o O deh
. Id
. at 2 04. Believing tha t Odeh lack ed financi al resources, the AUSA inquired into the a vaila bility of app oi nt ed—bu t n ot

pr iva te ly r et ain ed— Kenyan c ou ns el. Id
. A “high -r ank

in g” K eny an l aw enf or cem ent of fi cer in fo r medth e AUS A that

un der Kenyan l aw, ap po in te d co un s el wa s no t p r ov id ed at the i nv es tigat

ive s tag e andit

was th eir “pr act ice t o co nt

in ue q ues ti onin g a p er s onwho r equ es ts an app oi nt ed at to r ney .” Id

. T he A USAin fo r medOd eh o f what he h ad l ear nedfr om th e Ke nyanpo lic e of fi cer , ve r if iedth at O dehhadno t al r eady r et ain ed anatt or ney , an d thenor ally in fo r medhi m o f his rights under Mi

ran da : Od eh w as to ldth at h e hadth e r igh t t o r emains ile nt

andth at i nv ocat

io n o f the r

igh t t o s ile nce couldno t b e us ed ag ain s t him incou r t. He w as als o t ol d that if he dids peak

to th e Am er

ican officials, statements that he made could be used a gainst him. With respect to the right to counsel, AUSA [redacted] told Odeh that he was entitled to hav e an a ttorney present and to hav e an a tt or ney

app oi nt ed i f h e co ul d n ot af fo r d o ne. Ho weve r , AU SA [ r edac te d] in fo r med11

Od eh that no Ame r icanatt or ney

was cur r ent

ly av ail abl e t o r epr es ent

hi m i n K eny a. AU SA [redacted] empha sized that Odeh wa s “the boss ” with respect to answering questions without an attorney present. Id
. (r edac ti ons ign als inor

igi nal ). T he A USAexp lai nedth at O dehcou ld(1 ) e xer cis e hi s r

igh t t o r emain silent; (2) invoke his right to have an a ttorney present, in which ca se the Americans would le ave the room and he could then de cide w hether or not to s peak with the Kenya n police; or (3) s peak to both th e Am er icanandKenyan a utho r

it ies witho ut

th e pr es enc e of

an at to r ney . Id

. Odeh suggested a fo ur thpo s s ib ili ty : “s peak

in g wi thth e Am er

icanof fi cial s ou ts id e the p r es enc e of th e Ke nyan s .” Id

. While the U .S. andKenyan a utho r it ies wer e in

ves tigat in g the v iab ili ty of Od eh’ s pr op os al, Od eh changedhi s mi ndanddec id ed t o s peak to bo thth e U. S. a ndKenyan o ff ici als
. Id
. Od eh thens ign ed th e AO R. Id

. Od eh n ever

s tat ed a d es ir e t o hir e an a tt or ney , an d “[ i] n f act , h e as kedth e of

fi cial s what
wouldhap penif

he s ub s equ ent

ly d ecid ed that

he didno t w ant

to s peak witho ut a lawy er pr es ent .” Id

. I n r es po ns e, the A USA

“in fo r medhi m that

he al ways hadth e r

igh t t o s to p t alk

in g wi thth e Am er

ican of fi cial s .” Id

. at 2 04- 05. Af te r s ignin g the A OR o n Augus t 1 5, O dehwas in te r vie wedfo r

abo ut s evenho ur s . Id

. During the interrogation the next day , the AUSA aga in informed Odeh that he had the right to the presence of an at to r ney

at the i nt er

vie w, ev en tho ughno Ame r icanatt or ney

was availab le, andth at i f O dehwant ed an at to r ney , the A mer

ican s wouldno t i nt er r oga te hi m. Id
. at 205. Odeh e xpress ed his willingne ss to answer questions and did not request an attorney, but he di d make inqui ries into the s tatus of pr operty
con fi s cat ed u po n his ar r es t. Id
. Odeh wa s interr ogated on a daily basis fr om approximately 9:00 a. m. to 6:0 0 p .m . u nt

il h e was tak en t o the U ni te d S tat es onAug us t 2 7, 1 998 . Id

. Du rin g t he se se ssio ns, “O dehadm it te d that

he w as a me mb er

of al Q aedabu t d eni ed any par ti cip ati onin(o r fo r ekn owl edg e of ) the e mb as s y bo mb in gs .” Id
. When Ode h was transfer red to American c ustody on August 27, he was give n the standard Mi ran da war ni ngs . Id

.O d eh al s o m oved t o s up pres s “evi d ence s ei zed d uri ng a s earch of hi s res i d ence i n W i t u, K enya, ” B in L a d en , 5 1 3 2 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 2 0 1 , b u t h e d o e s n o t p r e ss th a t iss u e o n a p p e a l.

A l-’O w h a li a lso so u g h t su p p r e ss io n o f a n o u t-o f- c o u r t w itn e ss id e n tific a tio n , B in L a d en , 132 F. Supp. 2d at 6 1 7 2 , w h ic h is n o t a t iss u e o n th is a p p e a l. 12 B. Al-’Owhali’s and Odeh’s P retrial Suppr ession Motions OnJ un e 20 , 20 00, Od eh f ile d a m ot io n t o s up pr es s , int

er ali a , s tat eme nt s th at h e ma de t o U .S. officials in Kenya and to Pakistani lawenforcement age nts in P akistan, on the grounds that the statements were made involunta rily and, with respect to the s tatements made to U.S. officia ls, purs uant to an i nad equ ate Mi

ran da war ni ng. See Bin La den , 132 F. Supp. 2d a t 201. In suppor t of this motion,

5 Od eh f ile d a s worn af

fi dav it
. Id
. Sh or tly ther eaf

te r , O dehexp r es s ed r es er

vat io ns abo ut

this mo ti onin let te r s to th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t an d the g ov er nm ent . Id
. at 2 01 & n. 3. I n r es po ns e, the D is tr ict Cou r t h eld a seale d and ex parte hear

in g onAug

us t 1 , 20 00 a t whi ch “ it

bec ame clea r

th at O dehwis hedto withd r aw hi s af fi dav it ongr ou nd s r elat

in g t o his r eligio us bel

ief s .” Id
. at 2 01. T he D is tr

ict Cou r t p er mi tt ed O deh to do so and “deem[ed] a s s imilarly withdrawn the motion to suppr ess its elf, but . . . granted [le ave] for Od eh’ s cou ns el t o r ene w the s up pr es s io n m ot io n i n a way that

di d n ot r ely o n O deh ’s ownaf

fi dav it .” Id
. Od eh ’s c ou nse l d id no t re ne w t he sup pre ssio n m oti on for o ve r five mo nth s. I n the i nt er

im , Al -’ Owh alimo vedto s up pr es s , int er ali a , s tat eme nt s th at h e ma de t o U .S. officials while he ld in the custody of Kenya n authorities, on the ground that the st atements were obtained in vi olation of the Fifth Amendment. See Bin La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2dat 1 71- 72. I n a s eale d 6 opinion dated Janua ry 9, 2001, the District Court granted Al-’Owhal i’s motion because of its determinations that the AOR presented to Al-’Owha li did not satisf y the requirements of Mi

ran da and,
un der th e cir cum s tan ces , Al -’ Owh ali ’s s tat eme nt s wer e no t m ade v ol un tar ily . T he n ext

day, J anu ary 10 , Odeh re-filed his previously withdrawn motion to suppr ess the statements that he made in Ke nya a nd,
onJ anu ary 18 , m ov ed t o s up pr es s th e s tat eme nt s th at h e ma de i n P aki s tan . Bin La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2dO d e h e x p la in e d th a t h is w illin g n e ss to file th e se a ff id a v its w a s b a se d o n th e su c c e ss o f A l-’O w h a li’s 7 su pp ressi on m oti on , w hich l eft hi m “c on vinc ed t ha t t he se l i m i t ed i ssue s can be rai sed w i t ho u t ru nn i ng afou l of [his ] d eepl y hel d rel i gi ou s bel i efs
. ” B in L a d en , 132 F. Supp. 2d at 201. T he se o pini on s— B in L a d en , 1 32 F. Su pp . 2 d 1 68 , a nd B in L a d en , 132 F. Supp. 2d 198— w er e i ni t i al l y f i l ed 8 under s eal , but t hen f

i l ed publ i cl y i n r edact ed f or m on Februa r y 16 , 2001 . The new evi dence p r es ent ed by t he g over nm ent i n s uppor t of i t s m ot i on f

or r econ s i dera t i on i ncl uded t he 9 t e s t i m o n y o f

b o t h t h e FBI S p e c i a l Ag e n t a n d t h e AUSA wh o i n t e r r o g a t e d Al

- ’ O wh a l i i n Ke n y a , t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e FBI Lan g ua g e Sp ec i a l i s t who p r ov i ded Ara bi c t r a ns l a t i on s er vi ce s dur i ng m os t o f Al

- ’ O wha l i ’ s i nt er r og a t i on , a nd nu m er ou s stip u la tio n s, d o c u m e n ts, a n d a ff id a v its. B in L a d

en , 132 F. Supp. 2d at 172. Bas ed on t hi s new evi dence, t he D i s t r i ct C o u r t m a d e th e fin d in g s o f f a c t d e sc r ib e d h e r e in
. 13 at 201. Both motions were suppor ted by sworn affidavits executed by Odeh. Id

. At th e s ame ti me, 7 th e go ver nm ent

mo vedfo r

(1 ) r eco ns id er ati onof

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s J anu ary 9 rul

in g gr ant in g Al

- ’O whal i’s mo ti onand(2) r eop eni ng o f the s up pr es s io n h ear in g onth at m ot

io n. Bin La den , 132 F. Supp. 2dat 1 72. T he D is tr

ict Cou r t gr ant ed the g ov er nm ent ’s mo ti on s andwithd r ew it s op inio n gr ant in g Al

- ’Owhali ’s motion because the “[g]ove rnment’s pr offer s ufficiently indic ated the ne ed to further develop th e f actual r eco r d. ” Id

. After conducting a he aring on the circumstance s of both Al-’Owhal i’s and Od eh’ s ov er s eas det ent

io n, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t r es ol

vedth e s up pr es s io n m ot

io ns intw o o pi ni on s is s ued
onFe br uar

y 13 , 20 01. 8 C. The District Cour t’s Rulings on th e Motions T he D is tr ict Cou r t gr ant ed i n p ar t an d d eni ed i n p ar t Al- ’O whal i’s mo ti onanddeniedinfull Odeh’s motions
. The Court held that the oral wa rning given to Al-’Owha li satisfied Mi ran da but the 9 AOR did not fully c omply with Mi ran da . B ecau s e Al- ’O whal i m ade s tat eme nt s pr

io r to r ecei vin g that oral warning, hi s motion was granted as to thos e un-warned statements but denied as to the statements mad e af te r th e or al warni ng. Od eh’ s mo ti onto s up pr es s s tat eme nt s mad e inPa kis tanwas deniedas
un ti mel y, an d his mo ti onto s up pr es s s tat eme nt s mad e af te r r ecei ving anor al Mi

ran da warning a nd
wa iv in g h is ri gh ts w a s de ni ed on the me rit s.14

1. Al- ’O whal

i Tur ning first

to Al-’Owhali’ s motion, the Dis trict Court found the following fa cts related to the
con du ct of Al- ’O whal

i’s in te r r oga to r s andth e co ndit io ns of hi s con fi nem ent : ( 1) Al- ’O whal i was hel d for f ourteen days by Keny an authorities in “incommunic ado detention” —that is, without communica tion with anyone outside the pris on; (2) his cell for the fir st t wo day s, which he shared with another detaine e, wa s ten-f eet-by-elev en-feet, with a tw o-foot- by-five-foot window and a concrete be d; (3) his cell for the other t

welve days wa s s ixty-four s quare feet, conta ining a thin ma t and at lea st one blanke t; (4) Al-’Owhali w as never handc uffed during the interviews; (5) the interviews were held in a “li br ary- lik e r oo m” ; ( 6) “f

r equ ent ” br eaks wer e all owe d f or pr ayer , eat

in g, an d u s in g the r es tr oo m; (7 ) the age nts pr ovided bottled wa ter upon request, as well as food; (8) U.S. officials made no threats or pr om is es ; an d ( 9) Al- ’O whal i r ecei vedmedical

car e as nee ded
. Bin La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2d at 1 78- 79. The District Court also obser ved that “A l-’Owhali ha [d] two yea rs of university education and
s ignif ican t m ili tar

y exp er ien ce” an d that

“[a]t th e t im e of th e in te r r oga ti on s , Al -’ Owh alihada bas ic
un der s tan di ng o f s po kenEng lis h [and ] wo ul d s om et

im es ans wer

th e s im pl er

qu es ti on s po s ed t o him bef or e the A r abi c in te r pr et er

hadevenfi ni s hedtr ans lat in g [ th em] .” Id

. at 1 79. Reco gni zin g that

Al- ’O whal

i’s mo ti onpr es ent ed a q

ues ti onof fi r s t i mp r es s io n, th e Di s tr ict Court held that both the Fifth Amendment privilege a gainst self-incrimination and a form of the Mi ran da r ul e app lie d t o the d et er mi nat io n o f “ th e admis s ib ili ty

of a def end ant ’s adm is s io ns at his criminal trial in the Uni ted States, where that de fendant is a non-resident alien and hi s s tatements were th e pr od uct

of an i nt er r oga ti oncon du ct ed ab r oadby U .S. law e nf or cem ent r epr es ent ati

ves .” Id
. at 1 81. With respect to the applic ability of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege a gainst self-incrimination, th e Di s tr ict Cou r t r ejec te d the g ov er nm ent ’s char act er izat io n o f the i s s ue as on e of

“ex tr ate r r it or ial applic ation,” e xplaining

that “any violation of the privileg e ag ainst self- incrimination occ urs , not at the15

moment law e nforcement officials coerce statements through cust odial interrogation, but whe n a def end ant ’s invo lu nt ary s tat eme nt s ar e actually u s ed ag ain s t him at a n Am er ican cr im in al p r oce edi ng. ” Id
. a t 1 81 -82 . Th e D ist ric t C ou rt e xp la in ed tha t, ba sed on the te xtof t he Am en dm en t, “t he se protections s eemingl y apply with equa l vigor to all defenda nts f acing criminal prosecution at the hands of th e Unit ed S tat es , an d wi th ou t ap par ent r egar d t o ci ti zen s hi p o r

com mu ni ty

con nec ti on .” Id

. T hi s reading w as confirmed, in the Distr ict Court’s view, by

“the Supreme C ourt’s own expli cit treatment of th e pr ivileg e agai ns t s elf

-i ncr im in ati onas a ‘f

un dam ent al tr

ial r igh t o f c r im in al d ef end ant s ,’” id. at 1 84 (quo ti ng United Sta tes v. V

erdugo-Urquidez

, 494 U.S. 2 59, 264 (1990)), a nd beca use the animating purpos es of the privilege ag ainst self- incrimination— i.e. , fairness, r elia bility, prevention of abuses—“are
no les s r elev ant

whe n the c r

im in al d ef end ant at i s s ue i s an u nco nn ect ed, no n- r es id ent ali en, ” id. at 1 85. Acc ordingly, the District Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s pr ivileg e ag ainst self- incrimination applie d to Al-’Owhali notwithstanding his s tatus as a “non-res ident alie n[ ] whose only conne ctions to this cou ntry [a r e hi s ] alleg ed c r im es and
. . . do mes ti c pr os ecu ti onth er ef or .” Id
. Tur ning to the applic ability of Mi ran da , the Distr

ict Court held that, in prosecutions such as the one brought aga inst Al-’Owhali, “a principled, but reali stic applica tion of Mi ran da ’s fa milia r warning/w aive r fr amew ork, in the absence of a constitutionally-adequa te alternative , is both necessary andapp r op r

iat e un der th e F if thAme nd men t. ” Id

. at 1 85- 86. Ref

er enc in g the Mi

ran da Cou r t’ s ob s er vat io n that “co mp ul s io n [

was ] i nh er ent

incus to di al s et ti ngs ,” id. at 1 86 (qu ot in g Miranda

v. Ar izo na , 38 4 U. S. 4 36, 458 (1 966 )) , the D is tr ict Cou r t n ot ed that

“the i nh er ent

coe r civ ene s s of

th at po lic e t ech ni qu e [ i.e. , custodial interrogation] is clearly no l ess troubling when c arried out beyond our bo r der s andun der

th e aegi s of

a f or eig n s tat io nh ou s e,” id

. The Distr

ict Court also relied on a line of cases recognizi ng that Mi

ran da do es no t ap ply t o o ver s eas in te r r oga ti on s con du ct ed b y f or eign p ol ice
un les s U.S . o ff

ici als als o t ake p ar t i n the q ues ti onin g or

us e f or eign o ff ici als as th eir

agen ts . Id

. at 1 87.16

In the District Court’s view, the existence of this “joint venture exc eption” to the admissibility of overseas st atements taken in the a bsence of such warnings “is based on the assumption that Mi ran da
mu s t ap ply t o any po r ti onof an o ver s eas in te r r oga ti onth at i s , infa ct or fo r m, con du ct ed b y U. S. l aw enf or cem ent .” Id

. Hav in g de te r mi nedth at the Mi ran da framework applied to ove rs eas interrogations conducted by U.S. ag ents, the District Court set f orth the content of the warnings a foreign detainee must r ece ive. It fo un d “u nco ntr ov er s ial ” the r equ ir eme nt s th at as us pec t b e warnedth at “ he h as th e r igh t t o r emain
s ile nt . . . evenif

he h as alr eady

s po kento th e f

or eign au th or

it ies
. . . [an d] th at a nythi ng h e do es s ay may be u s ed ag ain s t him ina cou r t i n the U ni te d S tat es or els ewh er e.” Id

. at 1 87- 88. M or e di ff

icult were the w arnings related to the rights to pr esence a nd assis tance of counsel be cause a sus pect may not actually h ave tho s e r

igh ts un der

th e law inth e co un tr

y wh er e he is det ain ed an d “[ n] o co ns ti tu ti on al pu r po s e is s er

vedby c om pelling law

enf or cem ent per s on nel

to lie or mi s leads ub ject s of

in te r r oga ti on .” Id
. at 1 88. I n the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s ju dgm ent , the e xis te nce of th es e r igh ts tu r nedonfo r eign l aw bu t that depende ncy did not render these wa rnings inapplicabl e. It determined that “[t]o the maximum extent reasonably possible, efforts must be made to replicate w hat rights would be present if the interr ogation
wer e be in g co nd uct ed i n Am er ica. ” Id
. I n ef fe ct , the D is tr

ict Cou r t w ouldr equ

ir e that “U. S. l aw enforcement . . . do the be st they c an to give full effect to a suspect’s r ight to the presence and
as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el, while s till r es pec ti ng the ult im ate autho r

it y of th e f or eign s ov er eign. ” Id

. at 1 88- 89. With r es pec t t o thes e r igh ts , the D is tr

ict Cou r t p r op os ed the f

ollo win g war ni ng: Under U.S. law, you ha ve the right to talk to a lawye r to get advice before we a sk you any qu es ti on s andyou

can h ave a l awyer

with yo u d ur

in g qu es ti onin g. We r e we i n the U ni te d States, if you could not afford a lawyer, one w ould be appoi nted for you, if you wished, before any q ues ti onin g.17

B ecau s e yo u ar e no t i n o ur cus to dy an d we ar e no t i n the U ni te d S tat es , we c ann ot ens ur e that you will b e pe r mi tt ed ac ces s to a lawy er , o r hav e on e app oi nt ed f

or you , b ef or e or du r in g an y qu es ti onin g. Ho weve r , if

you want a lawy er , we w

ill as k the f or eign au th or

it ies to per mi t ac ces s to a lawy er or to appoint one for you. If the foreign authorities agree, then y ou can ta lk to that lawy er to get advi ce be fore we ask you a ny questions and you ca n have tha t lawy er with you during qu es ti onin g. If you want a lawye r, but the for eign a uthorities do not permit acce ss at this time to a lawy er or will not now a ppoint one for you, then you still have the right not to speak to us at any time without a lawye r pres ent. Id
. at 1 88 n .16
. The Di stri ctC ou rt th en a pp li ed thi s sta nd a rd o f a dm issi bi li ty to A l-’ Ow ha li ’s st a te me nts, holding that “the A OR is facia lly defic ient in its failure to apprise [d]efendants accurately and fully of their right, under Mi

ran da , t o the as s is tan ce an d p r es enc e of cou ns el i f q

ues ti on ed b y U. S. agen ts , ev en
con s id er in g the f act th at [d] ef end ant s wer e inth e cu s to dy o f f or eign au th or

it ies .” Id
. at 190. The AOR was misleading, in the Distr ict Court’s view, be cause it informed detaine es that, if they were in the Unit ed S tat es , they

wou ldhav e the r

igh ts to th e pr es enc e andas s is tan ce o f c ou ns el, bu t b ecau s e they
wer e abr oad , tho s e r

igh ts couldno t b e gu ar ant eed . T he A OR, th e Di s tr ict Cou r t c on clu ded , “wr on gly
con vey[ s ] t o a s us pec t that , d ue t o his cus to di al s itus ou ts id e the U ni te d S tat es , h e cu r r ent ly p os s es s es
no op po r tu ni ty

to avail h im s elf

of th e s er vic es of an at to r ney

bef or e or du r in g qu es ti onin g by

U.S
. of fi cial s ” an d, th er ef

or e, “ pr ema tu r ely f

or eclo s es th e s ignif

ican t p os s ib ili ty

th at the f or eign au th or

it ies themselves may, if asked, e ither supply counsel at public e xpense or permit r etaine d counsel inside the
s tat io nh ou s e.” Id

. I n the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s vie w, the A USA ’s or al r ecit ati onof a “t r adi ti on al” Mi

ran da
war ni ng a t the A ugu s t 2 2 in te r vie w accu r ate ly ap pr

is ed Al- ’O whal

i o f his r igh ts andthis war ni ng c ur ed the deficie ncies of the AOR a t the point it was administered. The District Court explaine d that the “AO R was fl awedinit s mes s age that th e r igh t t o co un s el d ur

in g anin te r r oga ti onby U .S. agen ts was ge og ra ph ic a ll y b a sed , . . . [b ut o n] Au gu st 2 2 . . . Al -’O wh a li wa s explicitly ap prised that he had the right to18

th e pr es enc e of

an at to r ney

fo r pu r po s es of

th e en s ui ng c onver s ati on s .” Id
. at 1 92 ( emp has is in ori gi na l) . A cc ord in gl y, the Di stri ctC ou rt c on cl ud ed tha t, ba sed on the AU SA ’s o ra l a dv ic e o f ri gh ts, “beginni ng on August 22, Al-’Owha li wa s appris ed of his rights in complia nce with the requirements of Mi ran da .” Id
. T he D is tr ict Cou r t al s o f

ou nd , b y a pr epo nd er ance of th e evi den ce, that

Al- ’O whal

i m ade a kn owin g, in te ll ig en t, a nd vo lu nta ry wa iv erof h is Mi

ran da r igh ts af te r hav in g be en s o warned
. Id

. at 1 93. The Court found that the “the conditions of confinement, although non-ideal , were far from op pr es s ive .” Id

. The District Court also obser ved that “A l-’Owhali’s beha vior during the interrogations
s ub s equ ent

to Aug us t 2 2 m ade i t c lear

th at h e was quit e awar e wh o was th e ‘b os s ’ as to whe th er
s tat eme nt s wouldor

wouldno t b e ma de w

itho ut a lawy er pr es ent .” Id

. In addition, the Distr

ict Court found that Al-’Owhali’s dec ision to s peak with U.S. officials “wa s not the product of any duress, thr eat, pr om is e, o r

coe r cio n b y hi s in te r r oga to r s ” an d that , b y co ntr as t, “ther e is evi den ce that Al- ’O whal

i
r egar dedhi s s es s io ns with [on e of th e s pec ial

agen ts ] as a cat -a nd -m ou s e gam e be tw eentr ain ed pr of es s io nal s .” Id

. The Di stri ctC ou rt a lso cl a rif ie d th e b a sis fo r it s ch a ng ed vi ewof t he vo lu nta rin ess of Al- ’O whal

i’s act io ns , ex pl ainin g that

init s init ial (an d s ub s equ ent

ly wi th dr awn) dec is io n o f J anu ary 9, 200 1, i t “ th ought

Al- ’O whal

i’s s tat eme nt s to be the p r od uct of a ‘H ob s on ’s cho ice’ th at s up po s edl y pi tt ed his con ti nu ed s ile nce inKenya agai ns t his acces s to an Am er icanatt or ney .” Id

. at 194. In light of th e addit io nal evi den ce p r es ent ed at

th e r eop ene d s up pr es s io n h ear in g, i ncl udin g the A USA ’s testimony, the Distr

ict Court conclude d: [W]hat truly motivated A l-’Owhali to inc ulpate himself wa s his own overriding desire that he be tr iedinth e Unit ed S tat es . As he d ecla r ed t o the U .S. agen ts in te r viewin g hi m, it

was th e Unit ed States which w as his enemy, not Kenya . Particularly significa nt is the fact that the suggestion th at h e be tr

iedinAme r

ica w as init

iat ed e nt ir ely b y Al- ’O whal

i. A ndwhe n Al -’ Owh aliwas di s s ati s fi ed b y the l es s -than -f ir m as s ur ance s of

fe r ed i n the f

ir s t D OU , h e de man dedth at A USA [redacted] do better. All of the above c onfirms [the Court’s] belief that Al-’Owhali ’s decision to waiv e hi s r

igh ts andcon fe s s to th e Am er ican s was a dec is io n b or ne o f his ownvo lit io n.19

Id
. (r edac ti ons ign al i n o r

igi nal ). For these reasons, the Dis trict Court granted Al-’Owhali’ s motion t o suppr ess the statements that he made to U.S. officials prior to August 22 but denied the motion with respect to s tatements made af te r th e or al warni ng a ndwaiv er of Aug us t 2 2. Id
. at 1 92, 194 . 2. Od eh With r es pec t t o the c on di ti on s of Od eh’ s ov er s eas con fi nem ent , the D is tr ict Cou r t f ou ndth at Odeh wa s held incommunica do in Kenya n custody for f ourteen days, the maxi mum length of detention autho r izedby K eny an l aw f

or in di vid ual s s us pec te d o f acapi tal of fe ns e. Bin La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2dat 205 . T he D is tr

ict Cou r t al s o f

ou ndth at “ th er e wer e no th r eat s or pr om is es mad e t o [d] ef

end ant Od eh inexch ang e f

or th e s tat eme nt s th at h e ma de. ” Id
. at 2 06. T he Co ur t al s o ackno wled gedth at “ [w] hile he wa s in Kenyan c ustody, [d]efendant Odeh’s wife and brother-in-law were a lso detained a nd in te r vie wedby the K eny an [

po lic e], ” an d that

Od eh w as no t allo wedto s peak with them
. Id

. at 2 06. As to th e pe r s on al ch ar act er is ti cs r elev ant

to this in quir

y, the Co ur t f

ou ndth at O dehhadth r ee yea rs of college -level e ducation, principa lly in a rchitecture and eng ineering, a nd that he had “ spent several ye ars in Afghanistan where he rec eived mil itary training and e xperience and whe re he served, for a ti me, as a me di c.” Id

. T ur ni ng t o O deh ’s Fi fth Am end men t c lai m, th e Di s tr ict Cou r t r es tat ed i ts ho ldin g wi thr es pec t to Al-’Owhali’ s s uppress ion motion: (1) the Fifth Amendment gove rned the admission of s tatements ob tai nedov er s eas ina U. S. tr ial ; ( 2) th e Mi ran da warni ng/ waiv er

fr ame wor k ap pl

iedto Od eh’ s ov er s eas interrogation by U.S. officia ls; and (3) the AOR “used in Ke nya a s part of the embassy bombing inves tigat io n was fa cially d ef

ici ent bec aus e it

pr ema tu r ely f

or eclo s ed the p os s ib ili ty

th at c ou ns el wo ul d i n fa ct be allo wedin s id e the f

or eig n s tat io nh ou s e.” Id

. at 2 11. As with Al -’ Owh ali , the A USA ’s or al
war ni ng c ur ed the d ef

ici ent AOR. Id
. The District Court explaine d:20

The detailed a nd patient expl anations give n by AUSA [redacted] a ffir matively communica ted the mes s age that , n o m att er

what , O dehpo s s es s ed the r igh t t o i ns is t o n the as s is tan ce an d p r es enc e of cou ns el f or pu r po s es of

qu es ti onin g by

U.S . la w en fo r cem ent . T her e was no in di cat io n that s ucha r igh t o nly exi s te d i f O dehwas actual ly i ns id e the U ni te d S tat es . Ad mi tt edly, O dehwas to ldth at n either

an Am er icanno r a Kenyan a pp oi nt ed l awyer was cur r ent

ly av ail abl e, b ut

th at in fo r mat io n was s im ply the tr uth. Mi ran da , af te r all , is no t s er

vedwhe n p ol

ice m ake mi s r epr es ent ati on s . M or eov er , wh at w as perhap s availab le— a pr iva te Kenyan a tt or ney

—was never limited in a ny wa y. And by asking Odeh if he ha d Kenya n counsel alrea dy retained, AUS A [r edac te d] cer tai nly ale r te d O dehas to th e exi s te nce of th at p os s ib ili ty . Id
. at 2 12 ( r edac ti ons ign als inor

igi nal ). Onth e bas is of

this or al warni ng, th e Di s tr ict Cou r t c on clu ded tha t Od eh ha d b ee n i nfo rme d o f hi s Mi ran da r igh ts “im mediat ely a ft er

th e adminis tr ati onof

th e wr it te n AOR a ndbef

or e any s ub s tan ti ve ques ti onin g ha d ye t t akenpl ace. ” Id
. T he D is tr ict Cou r t al s o f

ou nd“by a pr epo nd er ance of

th e evi den ce, that

Od eh m ade aval

id waiv er of hi s Mir and a r

igh ts .” Id
. T he w aiv er

was kn owi ng, inth e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s vie w, b ecau s e Od eh
un de rsto od hi s rig hts, in cl ud in g h is ri gh t to co un sel , a nd “f ul ly a pp re ci a te d th e f

a cttha t he wa s the ‘b oss’
as to whe th er

he w ouldacced e t o ques ti onin g by Ame r ican s .” Id
. a t 2 12 -13 . Itwa s vo lu nta ry be ca use Odeh “wa s dr

iven to talk in order to distance himself from the emba ss y bombing” a nd not because of any c om puls io n. Id

. at 2 13. I nd eed , the D is tr ict Cou r t n ot ed: “O dehmak es no clai m that he w as abused, mistreated, or thr eatene d by either the Keny ans or Americans. He raises no complaint with respect to the objective c onditions of his confinement [ e.g. , the s ize o f his cell or fr equ enc y of

meals ]. No r do es he alleg e that

hi s per s on al ch ar act er

is ti cs mad e hi m u nd uly vuln er abl e.” Id
. His allega tions of compulsion were instead ba sed on (1) his “incommunica do detention” a nd (2) his f ear of being le ft alo ne w ith the K eny ans if

he i nv ok ed his r

igh t t o co un s el. Id

. T he D is tr

ict Cou r t f ou ndnei th er
argum ent per s uas ive , ex pl ainin g ( 1) in com mu ni cado det ent io n “c ann ot

be s aidto hav e in du cedhi s statements s ince he bega n confessing fr om the very first day of questioning”; a nd (2) his being left alone with Kenya n authorities without being questioned by U.S. age nts “is precisely wha t Mi ran da re qu ire s: whe r e no cou ns el i s availab le, in te r r oga ti onmu s t c eas e.” Id
.21

In light of thes e determinations, the District Court denied Odeh’s motion to s uppress the
s tat eme nt s he m ade i n K eny a. Add r es s in g O deh ’s mo ti onto s up pr es s th e s tat eme nt s he m ade t o P aki s tani o ff ici als while det ain ed i n Kar achi , the D is tr ict Cou r t d eni ed i t as un ti mel y. Id
. While r eco gni zin g that

it had“ne ver imposed a hard dea dline by w hich Odeh w as required to renew his withdrawn June 20, 2000 suppression
mo ti on ,” the D is tr

ict Cou r t o bs er

vedth at, pu r s uan t t o Rule 1 2( b) (3 ) o f the F ede r al Rules of Cr im in al Pr oce du r e, s uchmo ti on s mu s t b e r ais ed “ pr io r to tr ial ” an d “the u ni qu e co nt ext of this cas e ne ces s it ate s th at the ‘ pr

io r to tr ial ’ . . . b e in te r pr et ed as ‘p r io r to ju ry s elec ti on .’” Id

. B y the t im e Od eh r ene wedthis po r ti onof hi s mo ti on , the D is tr

ict Cou r t h ad al r eady

s pen t nin e day s s elec ti ng aju ry f or th e t r ial
. Id
. Hadth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t h elda s up pr es s io n h ear in g onOd eh’ s mo ti on , “s uchact io n wo ul d ce r tai nly hav e resulted in great inconveni ence to the 65 potential jurors the [Dis trict] Court had already selected a nd th e 27 0 o th er s who hadyet to be s ub ject ed t o i ndivi du al v oi r di r e” b ecau s e thei r

liv es wouldbe h eldin “ab eyan ce” p endin g r es ol ut io n o f the s up pr es s io n m ot io n. Id
. at 2 13- 14. I t w ouldals o h ave r is ked causing the District Court to cancel j ury selection—the scope of whic h was the large st ever in the histor y of the Southern Distr

ict of New York—a nd to begin the compli cated proce ss aga in after the
con clu s io n o f the s up pr es s io n p r oce edi ngs . Id
. at 214. In addition, the District Court recognize d the pr eju di ce that

ho ldin g a s up pr es s io n h ear in g at th e ele ven thho ur

wouldcaus e the g ov er nm ent , in s of ar as “any ruling i n favor of s uppress ion would ha ve left the [g]overnment with insufficient time to alter its th eor y of th e cas e inthis s pr awli ng p r os ecu ti on .” Id
. Acco r di ngl

y, the D is tr

ict Cou r t d eem ed O deh ’s motion untimely, and be cause Odeh offered “no va lid reasons for his late submiss ion,” dec lined to di s r egar d the u nt

im eli nes s of

th e mo ti on . Id

. Onthis bas is , as r ein fo r cedby the g ov er nm ent ’s representation that it did not intend to us e in its case-in-chief any of Odeh’s s tatements obtained byA s O d e h re c o g n ize s, th e se sta te m e n ts m a d e to th e P a k ista n i a u th o r itie s w e r e n o t u se d in th e g o v e r n m e n t’s 10 ca se-i n-c hief. 22 Pakistani authorities, the Distr ict Court denied Ode h’s motion to s uppress the statements he made 10 while i n P aki s tani cu s to dy. Id
. at 2 15. II. DI SCUSSION A. Odeh’s and Al-’Owhali’s Challenges to t he DistrictCourt’s P rocedur al Decisions Od eh an d Al -’ Owh ali

chal len ge t wo p r oce du r al d ecis io ns of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t r elat

in g t o thei r sup pre ssio n m oti on s, sp ec ifi ca ll y t he Di stri ctC ou rt’ s de ci sio ns: (1 ) pe rmi tti ng Od eh to wit hd raw h is fi rst suppr ession mot

ion and (2) granting the gov ernment’s motion t o reopen Al-’Owha li’s suppr ession hear in g. We s ee n o er r or

inth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s r ul

in gs onth es e is s ues , n or

do we p er ceiv e any

mer it in Od eh ’s a rgu me nt t ha t he re ce iv ed in ef fe ctiv e a ssist a nc e o f c ou nse l w he n p re ssin g t he se m oti on s. 1. Od eh ’s Wit hd rawa l o f Hi s Fir st Mo ti on to S up pre ss Od eh f aul ts bo thth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or r ul in g that hi s fi r s t m ot

io n t o s up pr es s hadbee n withdrawn a nd his attorneys f or not r enewing the motion promptly thereafter. He cla ims that the dec is io ns of

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t an d his att or ney s vio lat ed his Fi fth an d S ixth Am end men t r igh ts . O deh ’s po s it io n l acks mer

it . O deh ’s ownact

io ns —i n p ar ti cul ar , h is r equ es t, onr eligio us gr ou nd s , t o wi th dr aw hi s af fi dav it ins up po r t o f the s up pr es s io n m ot io n an d his in s is te nce , againonr eligio us gr ou nd s , that hi s lawy ers not r e-file the motion—fully expla in why his first suppr ession mot

ion was dee med withdrawn by the Distr ict Court and not immedia tely renew ed by his attorneys. Acc ordingly, he ha s no basis to complain nowthat his constitutional rights were violate d. As des cr ib ed ab ov e, O deh ’s att or ney s fileda mo ti onto s up pr es s onJ un e 20 , 20 00 that was
s up po r te d b y an a ff

id avi t e xecu te d b y Od eh. See Pa r t I .B , ante . Shortly thereafter, Odeh contac ted the Di s tr ict Cou r t an d the g ov er nm ent to exp r es s hi s r es er

vat io ns abo ut

th e mo ti on . Id

. Od eh ’s d ef

en se te am al s o wr ot e t o the D is tr ict Cou r t, r equ es ti ng that

Od eh b e all owe d t o wi th dr aw hi s af fi dav it andth at23

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t h ol d a h ear

in g t o d et er mi ne whether

Od eh’ s con s ti tu ti on al r

igh ts wer e ade qu ate ly pr ot ect ed. I n l

igh t o f thes e let te r s , the D is tr ict Cou r t h elda s eale d, ex parte hearing (in the a bsence of
r epr es ent ati

ves of th e go ver nm ent

) o n Augus t 1 , 20 00, at whi ch O deh , thr ough the as s is tan ce o f a n in te r pr et er , s tat ed that , b ecau s e of r eligio us law, he w

is hedto withd r aw hi s af

fi dav it anddi d n ot

want hi s attorneys to continue to press the suppres sion motion on the basis of his t estimony. The District Court in quir ed whether

Od eh w ouldper mi t his att or ney s to r es ub mi t the m ot io n b as ed o n ev

id enc e other

th an hi s te s ti mo ny. After consulting with Odeh, defense counsel intimate d that Odeh might be wi lling to permit the filing of such a motion but expected his lawyers to fir st obt ain his permiss ion before making any s uchfiling. Acc ordingly, the District Court accede d to Odeh’s desir e to withdraw his affidavit a nd, bec aus e the af

fi dav it fo r medth e bas is fo r

th e s up pr es s io n m ot

io n, dee medth e mo ti onwithd r awn. On e me mb er

of Od eh’ s def

ens e t eam ob ject ed t o the D is tr ict Cou r t’ s r ul

in g, an d the D is tr

ict Cou r t r es po nd ed that

it s dec is io n was witho ut

pr eju di ce t o r e- filing the m ot io n b as ed o n o th er

evi den ce. T he dis s ent

in g de fe ns e at to r ney

per s is te d i n h er

ob ject io n, argui ng that

th e de cis io n wh ether

to s ub mi t
or withd r aw O deh ’s af

fi dav it was s ub ject

on ly t o d ef

ens e co un s el’ s s tr ate gic ju dgm ent . N ot in g that this assert ion was contrary to defense counsel’s letter and made for the first time nearly a n hour and thirty minutes into the hearing, the District Court did not alter its ruling but permitted counsel to brief the is s ue f or th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s fu r th er

con s id er ati on . T hr ee m on th s pas s ed w itho ut any f ur th er submis sion fr om defense counsel. On Septembe r 28, 2000, the District Court r aised the issue in the course of a proceeding on the withdrawal a pplica tion of one of Odeh’s counsel, explaining that it “ha[d] not r ul ed that no mo ti onto s up pr es s may be m ade a bs ent

M r . O deh ’s app r ov al o r

af fi dav it bu t r ath er

. . . exp lic it ly d ef er r ed r es ol ut

io n o f that

mat te r , awai ti ng afu r th er s ub mi s s io n which[o ne o f O deh ’s attorneys] . . . advises the Court apparently will not be forthcoming.” Appe llants’ App. 2775. The24

s up pr es s io n ap pl

icat io n was ul ti mat ely r ene wedby t wo m ot io ns filedonJ anu ary 10 andJ anu ary 18 , 2001, both supported by an affidavit of Odeh. Od eh c on te nd s th at the D is tr ict Cou r t v io lat ed his Six thAme nd men t r igh t t o the e ff

ect ive assis tance of counsel by

honoring his—that is , Odeh’s—request to withdr aw his affidavit a nd suppr ession mot

ion despite his counsel’s objection. This contention is entir ely without merit. T he Su pr eme Cou r t h as exp lai nedth at acou r t “ vio lat es [a d ef end ant ’s ] r

igh t t o ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce wh en i t interferes in certain ways with the a bility of counsel to make i ndepende nt decisions about how to
con du ct th e de fe ns e.” Strickland

v. Washin gton , 466 U.S. 6 68, 686 (1984). The record shows no evidenc e—and Ode h has pointed to none—that the District Court inter fered with the indepe ndent decisions of Odeh’s defens e team with respect to this motion. Ins tead, the rec ord s hows that on the independe nt applica tions of both Odeh and Odeh’s attorneys, the Distr ict Court permitted the withd r awal o f O deh ’s af

fi dav it bec aus e it s s ub mi s s io n alleg edly co nf lic te d wi thOd eh’ s r eligio us bel ief s . The District Court also held an ex parte hearing, a t the request of

Odeh’s attorneys, to evaluate the cir cum s tan ces un der

lyi ng O deh ’s dec is io n. At

this hear in g, the D is tr

ict Cou r t h eldth at b ecau s e Od eh wished to withdraw his affidavit and the suppr ession mot ion was depe ndent upon that affidavit, the
mo ti onwouldals o b e de eme d wi th dr awn. As th e Di s tr ict Cou r t e xp lai ned , O dehcouldno t “ hav e it bo thways ”—b y withd r awin g the af fi dav it bu t c on ti nuin g t o p r es s a mo ti onr ais in g cl aim s s up po r te d alm os t e nt

ir ely b y that

af fi dav it . Ap pellan ts ’ Ap p. 275 8. T he D is tr ict Cou r t n ever th eles s per mi tt ed def ens e co un s el t o f

ile “a n ew m ot

io n wi th ou t anaf

fi dav it fr om th e de fe nd ant ,” s tat in g that th e Di s tr ict Cou r t “ woulddef

er dec is io n o n the ad equ acy o f s ucha mo ti onun til af te r th e [g ]o ver nm ent

hadan op po r tu ni ty

to r es po nd .” Id

. at 2 774 . When one member of Odeh’s defense team chall enged the ruling on the ground that the decision to withdraw a n affidavit should be made by counsel and not theB ut see D ean v. C l inton C orrectiona l

F a cil it y , 9 3 F . 3 d 5 8 , 6 1 (2d C ir. 1 9 9 6 ) ( “ It cle a rly i s p re fe ra b le fo r c o u n se l to 11 l eav e t he deci s i on whet her or not t o r ej ect a l eg al def ens e t o t he c l i ent . ‘ T he l awyer s houl d al w ays r em em ber t hat t he deci s i on whet her t o f

or eg o l eg al l y a vai l abl e ob j ect i ves or m et hods bec aus e of non - l eg al f

act or s i s ul t i m at el y f

or t he c l i ent a n d n o t fo r h im se lf. ’ ” (q u o ti n g M o d e l C o d e o f P ro fe ssion a l R e sp o n sibili ty E C 7 -8 (19 8 3 )))
. 25 def end ant , th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t i ns truct ed h er

to br ief th e is s ue. Sh e de cli nedto do s o. T hes e r ul in gs 11 cannot constitute “interfere[nce] . . . with the ability of counsel to mak e indepe ndent decisions about ho w t o co nd uct

th e de fe ns e,” St

ri ck land , 46 6 U. S. a t 6 86. No r di d the D is tr

ict Cou r t i nt er fe r e inany w ay wi thth e in dep end enc e of Od eh’ s def

ens e t eam by n ot in g init s Aug

us t 1 , 20 00 O r der

th at o ne o f the d ef

ens e at to r ney s hadas s ur ed “ Od eh w ith r es pec t to t hi s sub je ctma tte r [th a t] n oth in g wil l b e su bm it te d to the C ou rt th a t do es n ot h ave hi s ex pre ss app r ov al. ” Ap pellan t’ s App . 27 64. Ano th er mem ber of th e de fe ns e t eam con s truedthis lan guage as “in s truct in g de fe ns e co un s el n ot

to file any mo ti on s witho ut M r . O deh ’s exp r es s app r ov al. ” Id
. at 2 769
. The District Court corrected this mis apprehension promptly, expla ining: “the C ourt has not iss ued a broad pronouncement that a c lient’s wishes as to all matters m ust pr evai l . . . [and] that no motion to
s up pr es s may

be m ade a bs ent

M r . O deh ’s app r ov al. ” Id
. at 2 775 . Acc or di ngl

y, the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s Aug us t 1 Or der

cann ot be r ead t o i nt er fe r e with d ef ens e co un s el’ s in dep end ent ju dgm ent . In ess ence , the requests m ade by Odeh and his defense team required the District Court to mediat e be tw eenOd eh’ s “r igh t t o co ntr ol

th e pr es ent ati onof

hi s def ens e,” Lainf

ie st a v. A rt uz , 25 3 F .3d 151 , 15 4 ( 2dCir . 20 01) , an d his r

igh t t o the e ff

ect ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el. Cf. Fa rett a v. Cal ifo rn ia , 42 2 U.S . 80 6, 8 20 ( 197 5) (“ T he l ang uag e ands pi r

it of th e Si xth Am end men t c on te mp lat e that cou ns el, lik e th e other def ens e t oo ls gua r ant eedby the A men dm ent , s hall b e an aidto a willing de fe nd ant —n ot an or ganof th e St ate in te r po s ed b et

weenan u nwilli ng d ef

end ant andhi s r igh t t o d ef

endhi ms elf per s on ally.” ). Reco gni zin g O deh ’s abs ol ut e co ntr ol ov er th e de cis io n t o t es ti fy , se e B ro wn v . A rt uz , 12 4 F.3 d 7 3, 78 (2 d C ir. 19 97 ), a nd de fe nse co un sel ’s b el ie f th a t a sup pre ssio n m oti on wa s ne ve rth el ess warranted, we find no fault with the Distr ict Court’s decision to (1) deem withdrawn the suppress ion26

mo ti onth at w as bas ed p r

in cip ally onOd eh’ s af

fi dav it and(2) p er mi t the m ot

io n’ s r ene wal i f s up po r te d by e vid enc e other

th an O deh ’s af

fi dav it . I n s o d oi ng, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t ad mi r ably bal ance d O deh ’s
r igh t t o co ntr ol

hi s def ens e andhi s r

igh t t o the e ff

ect ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el. As s er ti ng that

“ther e is amp le b lam e t o b e s har ed, ” O dehB r . 63 , O dehno w als o f aul ts hi s defense team a t trial for

(1) improperly deferr

ing to his wishes to withdr aw his affidavit in support of the motion to s uppress , (2) failing to respond to the Dis trict Court’s invitation for additional briefing on the withdrawa l of the motion to s uppress , and (3) negle cting, until the e ve of trial, to re-file the suppr ession motion based on evidenc e other than his affidavit. Odeh’s firs t two arguments are foreclosed by our determination in United Sta tes v. Wellington that “to the extent that defenda nt instructed his counsel to purs ue a c ours e of action that de fendant now compla ins of, ther e wa s no abridgement—constructive or other wis e—o f d ef

end ant ’s Six thAme nd men t r igh t t o ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el. ” 41 7 F .3d284 , 289 (2d Cir. 2005 ). Deferring to the wishes of a cli ent does not constitut e ineffective assis tance of counsel. Wi th respect to Odeh’s third argument, defense counsel’s delay in re-filing the suppr ession motion was not prejudicial be cause the gov ernment represented that no s tatement from the interrogation conducted in Pakistan would be used at trial—a nd none of his s tatements was so us ed by the government. Beca use Odeh was not prejudiced by the dela yed filing of the suppress ion motion, he
ca nn ot d em on stra te in ef

fe ctiv e a ssist a nc e o f c ou nse l o n th a t ba sis. 2. The District Court’s Reopening of Al-’Owha li’s Suppress ion Hearing Al- ’O whal

i ar gue s th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t ab us ed i ts di s cr et

io n wh en, af

te r gr ant in g hi s suppr ession mot

ion, it then permitted the government to reopen the record in support of its mot ion for
r eco ns id er ati on . Relyin g onpr eced ent s fr om other cir cui ts , Al -’ Owh alifa ul ts th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s dec is io n t o r eop en the s up pr es s io n h ear in g wi th ou t r equ

ir in g the g ov er nm ent

to of fe r a r eas on abl e ju s ti fi cat io n f or no t h avi ng p r es ent ed thi s evi den ce at th e ear lie r pr oce edi ng. See, e.g. , United Sta tes v.W e no t e t hat , unl i ke O deh’ s r enewed m ot i on t o s uppr es s ( w hi ch was al s o f

i l ed af t er j ury s el ect i on h ad beg un, 12 but f i ve m ont hs af

t er t he i ni t i al m ot i on was deem ed w i t hdra w n) , t he g over nm ent ’ s m ot i on f or r econ s i dera t i on was p r o m p tly file d o n e w e e k a ft e r th e D istr ic t C o u r t’s r u lin g . 27 Kithcart , 21 8 F .3d213 , 22 0 ( 3dCir . 20 00) (“ I n o r der to pr op erly ex er cis e it s di s cr et io n [ to r eop en
s up pr es s io n h ear

in gs ] the dis tr

ict cou r t m us t e val uat e [the g ov er nm ent ’s ] ex pl anat io n an d d et er mi ne i f i t is bo thr eas on abl e, an d ad equ ate to exp lai n wh y the g ov er nm ent init ially f ail ed t o i ntr od uce evi den ce that may ha ve bee n essential to meeting its burden of pr oof.”). By reopening the suppress ion hearing and permitting the gove rnment to pr esent additional e vidence , the Distr ict Court afforded the gov er nm ent , inAl- ’O whal i’s vie w, “ th e pr ov er bi al s eco ndbi te of th e app le. ” 12 Because of the subs tantial “de ference properly ac corded a district court’s decisions regarding evi den ti ary ma tt er s andth e gen er al co nd uct of tr ial s ,” w e r evi ew a dis tr

ict cou r t’ s dec is io n t o r eco ns id er
an ev id ent iar y r ul in g f or abu s e of di s cr et io n. United Sta tes v. B ayless , 201 F.3d 116, 13 1 (2d Cir. 2000). In Bayless , we ne ither endorsed nor

rejected the position urged by A l-’Owhali—tha t when the gove rnment seeks to intr oduce ne w evide nce in reope ned suppress ion proceeding s, the government must offer a
r eas on abl e ju s ti fi cat

io n f or it s failu r e t o p r es ent

th e evi den ce ear

lie r . See id. We ob s er

ved , h owe ver , that “[o]ther courts , citing a policy i n favor of intr oduction of lawfully obtained e vidence , have decline d to im po s e s ucha ju s ti fi cat

io n r equ ir eme nt .” Id

. In addition, we reiterate d our view that “va gue notions of
un fair nes s , that

th e go ver nm ent

s ho ul d n ot

hav e ‘t wo b it es ’ o ff

th e s ame app le, ought

no t [ to ] co ntr ol .” Id
. at 1 32 (qu ot

in g United Sta tes v. T

ucker , 380 F.2d 206, 21 4 (2d Cir. 1967)). As presaged by our earlier ca ses, we now hold that, on a motion to reopen a suppres sion hear in g, ther e is no br

igh t- lin e r ul e that

nec es s ar ily andinvar iab ly r equ ir es th e go vernm ent

to pr ov id e a
r eas on abl e ju s ti fi cat

io n f or it s failu r e t o o ff

er r elev ant evi den ce at

an ea rlie r s up pr es s io n p r oce edi ng. Whether or no t the g ov er nm ent

can j us ti fy

it s del ay is s im ply on e f

act or , am on g other s , that

a di s tr ict
cou r t m ay co ns id er

whe n d ecid

in g wh ether

to r eop en a s up pr es s io n h ear in g. We agr ee wi thth e other28

cir cui ts th at h ave r each ed thi s con clu s io n. A “d ef end ant is ent it ledto hav e evi den ce s up pr es s ed o nly if it was obtained unc onstitut ionally . If matters appea ring later indica te that no constitutional violation occurred, society’s interest in admitting all relev ant evide nce milita tes s trongly in favor of permitt ing
r eco ns id er ati on .” Uni

te d St ate s v . Re gi lio , 66 9 F .2d116 9, 1 177 (7 thCir . 19 81) . As th e Ni nth Ci r cui t h as
r eco gni zed , “[a] c r

im in al d ef end ant acqu ir es no per s on al r

igh t o f r edr es s ins up pr es s ed e vid enc e” beca use the rationale for suppr essing unlawfully obtai ned evide nce is to deter official misconduct, not to
com pen s ate cr

im in al d ef end ant s fo r

th e vi ol ati on . Uni

te d St ate s v . Rabb , 752 F.2d 1320, 1 323 (9th Cir. 1984). If the government poss esses evidenc e showing that, in fac t, no official misconduct occurred, the interests of just

ice mili tate strongly in favor of considering this evidenc e eve n if it is belatedly brought to the distr ict court’s attention. In the last analysis, a distr ict court should be permitted, in the exercise of its dis cretion and in lig ht of the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether its s uppress ion ruling should s tand. Whi le it may often be useful for

the government to expla in its r easons for not introducing evidenc e ea rlier, a district court may c onsider the evidence without firs t finding good cause for the gov er nm ent ’s om is s io n o r del ay. The case now be fore us illustrates the wisdom of consigning the dec ision to r eopen e videntiary hearings to the sound dis cretion of the distr ict court, unencumbered by bright-line rules. Here, the Distr ict Court recogniz ed that its decision to grant Al-’Owhali’ s s uppress ion motion was based on “cer tai n f actual as s um pt io ns whi ch [ s ub s equ ent

ly] app ear [ed

] t o b e in accu r ate ” inlig

ht of th e evi den ce
s ub mi tt ed i n s up po r t o f the g ov er nm ent ’s mo ti onto r eop en the s up pr es s io n h ear in g. S up pl eme nt al App. 1119. In addition, the lega l question—namely, the applic ation of the Fifth Amendment and Mi ran da to st atements taken ove rs eas—wa s one “of fir st impr ession not only in this circuit but nat io nally. ” Id

. T hat th e Di s tr ict Cou r t c ho s e t o r eop en the r eco r d i n l igh t o f the g ov er nm ent ’s addit io nal evi den ce an d the s ignif

ican ce o f the l egal

qu es ti onat i s s ue s tr

ike s us as an emin ent

lyIn d e e d , A l-’O w h a li’s c r itic ism o f th e g o v e r n m e n t fo r o ffe r in g a d iffe r e n t b a sis fo r a d m ittin g h is st a te m e n ts in 13 r es po ns e t o t he D i s t r i ct Cour t ’ s r ul i ng o nl y r ei nf or ce s t he n ov el t y of

t he l eg a l que s t i on s r a i s ed by h i s m ot i on a nd, p e rh a p s u n w it ti n g ly, u n d e rsc o re s the ad v isab il it y o f a ffo rd ing the D ist ric t C o u rt w id e l a ti tu d e to e n su re tha t i ts deci s i on— ann ounci ng f or t he f i r s t t i m e a f

r am ework f

or r es ol vi ng s uppr es s i on m ot i ons i nvol vi ng ove r s eas i nt er r og at i on by U . S
. age nts— t oo k a cc ou nt of all t he releva nt facts.

Th e D i s t r i ct Cour t a g r ee d wi t h t he g ov er nm en t o n t hi s p oi nt : “ The l a t en es s o f Al

- ’ O wha l i ’ s m ot i on was due 14 t o va r i ous ci r cum s t anc es t hat i ncl uded a cha ng e of couns el f

or A l

- ’ O w hal i an d hi s am bi val ence as t o whet her t he m ot i on s hou l d even be m ad e. ” B in L a d en , 1 3 2 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 1 7 2 ; see also U nite d

S tates v. B in L a d

en , N o . 9 8 C r . 1 0 2 3 , 2 0 0 1 WL 11606 04, at * 9 ( S. D . N . Y. O ct . 2, 2001 ) ( “I t m us t al s o be em pha s i z ed t hat t he t i m e pr es s ure s whi ch wer e pr es ent t hr ough out t he s uppr es s i on p r ocee di ng s ( w hi ch t ook pl ace duri ng an i nt er r upt i on i n j ury s el ect i on) were ent i r el y t he re su lt o f A l-’ O w h a li ’ s e x ten d e d p ro c ra sti n a ti o n w it h re sp e c t t o the fil ing o f th e m o ti o n . It h a rd ly b e h o o v e s h im to c o m p lain ab o u t t im ing
. ” ). 29 reasonable c ours e of action. In addition, the courts that have imposed a rule requiring the government to show good cause to reopen evide ntiary hea rings appear to have done so because “from the beginning [o f th e p roc ee di ng s] th e g ov er nm en t w a s ful ly awa re of w ha t i t ha d to est a blish to su cc essf ul ly op po se [the d ef end ant ’s ] s up pr es s io n m ot io n. ” Kithcart

, 218 F.3d at 220. The suppr ession mot ion before the Distr ict Court in the instant case—involvi ng the appli cabil ity of the Fifth Amendment and Mi ran da to overseas investigations—was, as noted, “of firs t impress ion” and, a ccordingly , the government ca nnot be s aidto hav e be en aw ar e “f r om th e be gin ni ng . . . o f what it hadto es tab lis h. ” 13 Even i f we we re to impose a “justification” requirement, the gove rnment s urely met it here. In it s mo ti on , the g ov er nm ent of fe r ed at leas t t wo j us ti fi cat

io ns fo r no t h avi ng i ntr od uce d ce r tai n ev id enc e at the initial suppr ession hearing. Firs t, the government pointed to the shortened time frame for the
s up pr es s io n h ear

in g as s oci ate d wi thAl- ’O whal i’s del ay in

filing hi s mo ti on whi ch “ nec es s it ate d an 14 exp edi te d h ear

in g du r in g the m id s t o f j ur

y s elec ti onandfi nal

tr ial pr epar ati on s ,” Al- ’O whal i Ap p. 120 7. T he r es ul t o f thi s s che dule, acco r di ng t o the g ov er nm ent , was th at i t “ mi s per ceiv ed the dis pu te d i s s ues that most troubled the [Distr ict] Court” and, therefore, did not initial ly present evidenc e most r eleva nt to th e Cou r t’ s con cer ns . Id
. Seco nd , the g ov er nm ent di d n ot s ub mi t c er tai n ev

id enc e at th e init ial suppr ession hearing out of concern, raised by Al-’Owha li’s own counsel, that new s accounts of the hear in g m igh t t ain t the j ur

y po ol
. Id
. at 1211. It planne d to offer those s tatements under seal in the30

r eop ene d s up pr es s io n h ear in g. Ei th er

of th es e exp lan ati on s wouldhav e be en s uf fi cien t j us ti fi cat

io n, in
ou r vi ew , t o w a rra nt r eo pe ni ng the sup pre ssio n h ea rin gs. Acc ordingly, we reject Al-’Owha li’s challe nge to the District Court’s decision to reopen the
s up pr es s io n h ear

in g. B. Al- ’O wh al i’ s an d O de h’ s Ch alle ng es t o t he De ni al of th ei r Mot io ns to Supp r ess Inculpatory St atement s 1. St and ar d o f Re vie w Whena def

end ant challen ges th e de ni al o f as up pr es s io n m ot io n, we r evi ew the dis tr

ict cou r t’ s fa ct ual fi ndin gs fo r

clea r er r or , vi ewing the e vid enc e inth e light mo s t f avo r abl e t o the g ov er nm ent . See, e.g. , United Sta tes v. Yousef

, 32 7 F .3d56, 124(2 d Ci r . 20 03) . O ur r evi ew o f the dis tr

ict cou r t’ s leg al
co nc lu sio ns i s de novo
. Id

. 2. The Applica bility of the Fifth Amendment and Mi ran da to the Admission at T rial of Inculpatory Statements Made in Foreign Custody to U.S. A gents Li ke the D is tr

ict Cou r t, we co ncl ud e that

th e admis s ib ili ty

at tr ial of s tat eme nt s mad e t o U .S. age nts by for eign na tionals held in foreign custody is governed by the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the gov er nm ent

do es no t ar

gue other wis e. Al th ough w e ne ed n ot dec id e wh ether

we agr ee wi thth e Di s tr

ict Court as to all aspects of its ruling on the Fifth Amendment and Mi ran da , it s uf fi ces to ho ld , as des cr

ib ed in gre a te r de ta il be lo w, tha t i nso fa r a s Mi ran da might app ly t o i nt er r oga ti on s con du ct ed o ver s eas , that dec is io n i s s ati s fi ed whena U. S. agen t i nf or ms a f or eign d et ain ee o f his r

igh ts un der

th e U. S. C on sti tutio n w he n q ue sti on ed ov er sea s. We note that U.S. ag ents acting overseas need not bec ome expe rts in foreign criminal procedure in order to comply with Mi ran da ; nor need they a dvocate for the appointment of loca l counsel on a foreign sus pect’s behalf. W hile doing so may provide additiona l grounds f or finding that any statements obtained in the c ours e of interrogations were made volunta rily, it is not r equired by e ither the Fifth31

Amendment or Mi

ran da . If the s uspect chooses to make a knowi ng and volunta ry waive r of his rights af te r a war ni ng a dap te d t o the c ir cum s tan ces of qu es ti onin g ov er s eas andcho os es to s peak with a U .S. age nt, then neither the Fifth Amendment nor Mi ran da will b ar th e admis s io n o f his s tat eme nt at tr ial
. a . The Fif

th A me nd me nt R

ig ht A ga in st S el f-In crim in a ti on in Do me sti c Tria ls We no te at the o ut s et

th at o ur analys is of

th e app lic abilit

y of th e F if thAme nd men t t o thi s pr os ecu ti ondi ff

er s fr om ou r

analys is of

th e F ou r thAme nd men t’ s app lic abilit y. See In re Te rror

ist Bombings of U.S. Emb assies in East Africa (Fourth Am endm ent Ch allenges) , __ F.3d __ (2d Cir. 2008). W hile a violation of the Four th Amendment’s prohibition of unr easonable searches and seizures occurs at the time of the search or seizure, regardless of whether unlaw fully obtained e vidence is ever offered at tr ial, a violation of th e F if thAme nd men t’ s r

igh t ag ain s t s elf

-i ncr im in ati onocc ur s on ly wh en a c om pelleds tat eme nt is offered at trial agai nst the defenda nt. In United Sta tes v. V erdugo-Urquidez

, the S up r eme Cou r t e xp lai ned th at “ [t ]h e pr ivileg e agai ns t s elf

-i ncr im in ati ongua r ant eedby the Fif thAme nd men t i s a f

un dam ent al tr

ial
r igh t o f c r im in al d ef end ant s . Al th ough c on du ct by l aw en fo r cem ent

of fi cial s pr io r to tr ial may ul ti mat ely im pai r th at r igh t, a con s ti tu ti on al v

io lat io n o ccu r s on ly at

tr ial .” 4 94 U .S. at 2 64 ( cit

in g Ma llo y v. H o ga n , 378 U.S . 1 ( 196 4) ; Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 4 41, 453 (1972)). The Fourth Amendment “f un ct io ns di ff er ent ly” ; it is vio lat ed “ at the t

im e of an u nr eas on abl e go ver nm ent al i ntr us io n. ” Id
. (citing United Sta tes v. Calan dra , 41 4 U. S. 3 38, 354(1 974 ); United Sta tes v. Leon , 46 8 U. S. 8 97, 906 (1 984 ))
. Acc ordingly, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searche s and seizures r egula tes the
a ctiv itie s of t he go ve rnm en t w he n i nv estig a ti ng crim es, wh il e t he Fif

th A me nd me nt’ s pri vi le ge a ga in st
s elf -i ncr im in ati onr egulat es th e admis s ib ili ty of a def end ant ’s s tat eme nt s at tr

ial
. Because a puta tive viola tion of the Four th Amendment is “fully ac complished” at the pla ce a nd ti me o f the alleg ed i ntr us io n, id. , a cl aimed vi olation occ urring overs eas entail s an analy sis of the extraterritor

ial a pplica tion of the Four th Amendment. No such ana lysis is nece ss ary with respect to theThi s m ay be s o be caus e, as her e, t he g over nm ent ha s pr evi ous l y t ake n t he p os i t i on t hat i t does not di s put e t he 15 a p p lic a b ility o f th e se lf- in c r im in a tio n c la u se to n o n -U .S . c itize n s. S e e , e .g. , Un it

e d S t a t e s v . Ro mmy , 506 F. 3d 108, 131 ( 2d C i r . 2007 ) ( “[

W ] e ob s er ve t hat nei t her i n t he di s t r i ct cour t nor on t hi s ap pea l do t he p ar t i es di s put e t he a ppl i cab i l i t y of Fi f t h a nd Si xt h Am endm ent pr ot ect i ons t o t he c us t odi al i nt er r og at i on o f a f or ei gn na t i ona l out s i de t he U ni t ed St at es by a g e n ts of this c o u n try e n g a g e d i n a c rim ina l inv e sti g a ti o n . ” ). T he Su pre m e C ou rt ha s he l d t ha t resi d en t al i en s are p rotec t ed by t he F i ft h A m en d m en t ’ s pri vil eg e a ga i nst 16 se lf- in c r im in a tio n . S ee U nite d S tat e s v. B al s ys , 524 U . S. 666, 671 ( 1998) ( “Res i dent al i ens . . . ar e co ns i dere d ‘ per s ons ’ f or pur pos es of

t he Fi f t h Am endm ent an d ar e en t i t l ed t o t he s am e pr ot ect i ons under t he [ Sel f

- I ncr i m i nat i on] C l aus e a s c it ize n s.”). 32 Fifth Amendment’s pr

ivileg e ag ainst self- incrimination bec ause that provision governs the admissibility of evidence at U.S. trials, not the conduct of U.S. a gents investigating criminal activity . For this reason, it naturally follows that, rega rdless of the origin— i.e. , domestic or for eign—of a statement, it ca nnot be adm it te d at

tr ial inth e Unit ed S tat es if

th e s tat eme nt

was “co mp ell ed. ” U. S. Co ns t. ame nd . V. Simila rly, it does not matter whether the defendant is a U.S. c itizen or a foreign na tional: “no pe rs on” tried in the civ ili an co ur ts of

th e Unit ed S tat es can b e co mp ell ed “ to be a w itnes s agai ns t him s elf

.” Id
. While the S up r eme Cou r t h as no t b eencall ed u po n t o s tat e thi s lat te r pr in cip le ex pl

ici tly, it has 15 hel d that th e F if thAme nd men t’ s r

igh t t o d ue p r oce s s of

law ap pl ies equ ally t o U .S. cit

izen s andfo r eign nat io nal s pr es ent

inth e Unit ed S tat es , ev en tho s e he r e unlawf ully. See Ma thews

v. Di az , 42 6 U. S. 6 7, 7 7 16 (1 97 6) (“ The Fif

th A me nd me nt, a s we ll a s the Fou rte en th A me nd me nt, pro te ct s ev er y o ne of t he se pe rson s [ i.e. , n on -c it

izen s ] f r om dep r iva ti onof lif e, l ib er ty , o r pr op er ty witho ut du e pr oce s s of

law. Evenon e wh os e pr es enc e inthis cou ntry is un lawf ul , in vo lu nt ary, o r

tr ans it or y is ent it ledto th at
con s ti tu ti on al p r ot ect

io n. ” ( in te r nal cit ati on s om it te d) ). We s ee n o b as is to con s ignth e “f un dam ent al tr ial r igh t” of a def end ant to be f r ee o f c om pelleds elf

-i ncr im in ati on , Verdugo-Urquidez , 49 4 U. S. a t 2 64, to les s er s tatus . I nd eed , the p r

in cip les ani mat

in g the p r ivileg e agai ns t s elf

-i ncr im in ati onapp ly wi thequ al fo r ce t o b oth ci ti zen s andfo r eig ner s who ar e hal ed i nt o o ur cou r ts to ans wer

cr im in al ch arges . As described by the Supreme C ourt:33

“[ The pri vi le ge a ga in st se lf- in crim in a ti on ] re fle ct s ma ny

of o ur fu nd a me nta l v a lu es a nd mo st noble aspirations: our unwillingness to s ubject those sus pected of crime to the cruel trilemma of s elf -a ccu s ati on , p er ju ry or

con te mp t; ou r

pr ef er enc e f or an ac cus ato r

ial r ath er th an an in quis it or ial s ys te m o f c r

im in al j us ti ce; o ur

fe ar th at s elf -i ncr im in ati ng s tat eme nt s will b e eli cit ed by i nh um ane tr eat men t an d ab us es ; o ur s ens e of fair pl ay whichdi ct ate s a f

air s tat e- in di vid ual bala nce by

requiring the government to leav e the individua l alone until good ca use is s hown for distur bing him and by

requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the ent ir e lo ad; ou r

r es pec t f or th e in vio lab ili ty of th e hu manper s on ali ty

andof th e r igh t o f e ach individual to a private enc lave where he ma y lea d a private li fe[;] our dis trus t of s elf-deprecatory s tat eme nt s ; an d o ur

r eali zat io n that th e pr ivileg e, while s om et

im es a s hel te r

to th e guilt

y, i s of te n a pr ot ect io n t o the i nn oce nt .” United Sta tes v. B alsys

, 52 4 U. S. 6 66, 690 (1 998 ) (qu ot in g Murphy v. Waterfront Comm ’n of N.Y. Ha rbor , 37 8 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). For these reasons, we have previously required that, in order to be admitted in our
cou r ts , in culpat or

y s tat eme nt s ob tai nedov er s eas by f or eign o ff ici als mu s t h ave b eenmad e vo lu nt ar ily
. See Yousef , 327 F.3d at 145 (“[S]ta tements taken by foreign polic e in the a bsence of Mi ran da warnings are admissible if voluntary.”). We do not rea d the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. Eisentrager , 33 9 U. S. 7 63 ( 195 0) , as evidenc e to the contrary. In Eisentrager , twenty-one Germans convic ted of war crimes by a U.S. military court located in C hina petitione d the U.S. District Court for the Distr ict of Columbia for a writ of hab eas corpu s bec aus e, int er ali a , their trials entailed the use of testimony allege dly compe lled in viol ation of th e F if thAme nd men t. At

th e ou ts et , the Co ur t e mp has izedth e “i nh er ent di s ti nct io ns r eco gni zed throughout the civilize d world betwee n . . . resident enemy a liens who have submitt ed themselves to our laws and nonresident ene my alie ns who at all times have remained with, and adhe red to, enemy gov er nm ent s .” Id

. at 769. With respect to extending constitutional protections to aliens within the borders of the United States, the Court expla ined “the a lien’s presence within its territor ial jurisdiction

. . . gave th e J udici ary po wer to act .” Id

. at 771. The petitioners in Eisentrager , h owe ver , wer e no t w

ithi n th e t er r it or ial ju r is di ct io n o f the U ni te d S tat es ; they wer e cap tu r ed an d tr

iedinChi na an d i mp r

is on ed i n Germany. T he Co ur t e xp lai nedth at “ th e no nr es id ent ene my alie n, es pec ially o ne who has r emain ed i nO n th e a v a ila b ility o f th e w r it o f h a b e a s c o r p u s to n o n -r e sid e n t e n e m y a lie n s, th e C o u r t re a so n e d : 17 T he wr i t , s i nce i t i s hel d t o be a m at t er of r i gh t , woul d be equal l y a vai l abl e t o en em i es duri ng ac t i ve h os t i l i t i es as i n t he p r es ent t w i l i gh t betw een w ar an d peac e. Such t r i al s woul d ham per t he war ef f or t an d br i ng ai d and c o m fo rt to th e e n e m y . T h e y w o u ld d im inish the p re sti g e o f o u r c o m m a n d e rs, no t on ly w it h e n e m ies b u t w it h w ave r i ng neut r al s . I t woul d be di ff i cul t t o devi s e m or e ef

f ect i ve f et t er i ng of

a f i el d com m ander t han t o a l l ow t he ve ry e ne m i es h e is ord ere d t o re d u ce t o su bm i ssi on t o c all him t o a cc ou nt i n h i s ow n c i vil co u rt s and d i ve rt h is e ffo r ts a n d a tte n tio n fr o m th e m ilita r y o ffe n siv e a b r o a d to th e le g a l d e fe n siv e a t h o m e . N o r is it u n lik e ly th a t th e re su lt o f s u c h e n e m y litigio u sn e ss w o u ld b e a c o n flic t b e tw e e n ju d ic ia l a n d m ilita r y o p in io n h ig h ly co m forti ng t o e ne m i es o f t he U nit ed States. Id
. at 779. 34 the service of the enemy , does not have ev en th[e] qualifie d acc ess [of a resident enemy a lien] to our courts, f or he neither has comparable clai ms upon our institut ions nor could his us e of them fail to be helpf ul to th e en emy .” Id

. at 776. Most s ignifica ntly, the C ourt viewed the a vaila bility of habea s corpus to no n- r es id ent

ene my alie ns as a me chanis m f or un der mi ni ng A mer

icanmilit ary ef

fo r ts . Id
. at 7 79. 17 Part and parcel of wa ging wa r, the Court obser ved, is “[t]he jurisdiction of military authorities, dur ing or fo llo win g ho s tilit

ies , t o p unis h tho s e guilt

y of of fe ns es agai ns t the l aws of

war .” Id
. a t 7 86 . Fo r th ese reasons, the Court’s rejection of the Fifth Amendment cla im in Eisentrager cannot be unmoored from the salient facts of the case: an ove rs eas convic tion of “nonresident enemy alie ns,” following the ce ss ation of ho s tilit ies , b y a duly- con s ti tu te d m ili tar y co ur t. Cf. Boumed

iene v. Bush , 55 3 U. S. _

_, 128 S. Ct . 22 29, 226 1 ( 200 8) (e xp lai ni ng that

“at th e t im e Eisentrager

was dec id ed, th e Cou r t w as r igh t t o b e co nce r ned about judicia l interference with the mili tary’s effor ts t o contain e nemy el ements, guerilla fighters, and ‘wer e- wol ves ’” i n l igh t o f the “ hi s to r

ical con te xt andnatur e of

th e milit ary’s mi s s io n i n p os t- War Germany” (

in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ). T he Eisentrager holding is inapposite, therefore, to the facts before us : a domestic prosecution of nonres ident alie ns br ought to this countr y specifica lly to be pr os ecu te d b y ou r

civ ili an cr im in al co ur ts . Acc ordingly, we hold that foreign nationals interrogated overseas but tried in the civilia n courts of th e Unit ed S tat es ar e pr ot ect ed b y the F if thAme nd men t’ s s elf

-i ncr im in ati onclau s e.35 b. The Applica tion of Mi ran da to U.S . I nt er r oga ti on s Con du ct ed O ver s eas Having de termined that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination governs the admissibility at trial of st atements made ove rs eas, we turn to the related que stion of Mi ran da ’s applic ability to ove rs eas interrogations conducted by U.S . age nts. T he Supreme C ourt has not ruled on this par ti cul ar

qu es ti on , b ut

it has hel d that

th e f r ame wor k es tab lis hedby “Mi ran da . . . gove rn[s ] the adm is s ib ili ty

of s tat eme nt s mad e du r

in g cu s to di al i nt er r oga ti oninbo ths tat e andfe der al co ur ts .” Dickerso n v. United Sta tes

, 53 0 U. S. 4 28, 432 (2 000). Pr oce edi ng o n the as s um pt io n that th e Mi ran da fr ame wor k ge ner ally go ver ns th e admis s ib ili ty of s tat eme nt s ob tai nedov er s eas by U .S. agen ts , we
con clu de that

th e app lic ati onof

th at f r ame wor k t o o ver s eas in te r r oga ti on s may di ff er fr om it s do mes ti c app lic ati on , d epe ndin g onlo cal c ir cum s tan ces , inkeep in g wi thth e co nt ext -s pec if ic n atu r e of

th e Mi ran da
r ul e. In Dickerso n , the S up r eme Cou r t e xp lai nedth at the Mi ran da “w a rni ng /w a iv er ” f

ra me wo rk a rose from the risk “that the coercion inhe rent in custodial interrogation blurs the line be tween vol untary and invo lu nt ary s tat eme nt s , an d thu s height ens th e r is k that an i ndivi du al will n ot

be ‘ acco r dedhi s pr

ivileg e under the Fifth Amendment . . . not to be compelle d to incriminate himself.’” 530 U. S. at 435 (quoting Mi ran da , 38 4 U. S. a t 4 39) (al te r ati on s inor igi nal ). I n r es po ns e, the Co ur t s et fo r th“co ns ti tu ti on al gui del in es ” co ndit

io ni ng the ad mi s s ib ili ty

of s tat eme nt s ob tai nedincus to di al i nt er r oga ti on s onwhe th er
a s us pec t h ad b eenwar nedth at h e: “ha s th e r igh t t o r emains ile nt , that

anythi ng h e s ays can b e us ed ag ain s t him ina cou r t o f l aw, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, a nd that if he cannot a ffor d an attorney one will b e app oi nt ed f

or hi m p r io r to any q ues ti onin g if

he s o d es ir es .” Id
. (quo ti ng Mi

ran da , 3 84 U. S. a t 4 79 ). Un de rgi rdi ng the se g ui de li ne s a re tw o o bj ec tive s: “t r us tw or thin es s anddet er r enc e.” Or eg o n v. El st ad , 470 U.S. 2 98, 308 (1985). By “a dequatel y and ef fe ctiv el y a pp ris[

in g] [a susp ec t] o f hi s rig hts” a nd re a ssuri ng the susp ec t th a t “ the ex er ci se o f th ose36

r igh ts mu s t b e f

ully h on or ed, ” the Mi

ran da war ni ngs “co mb at the[

] p r es s ur es ” in her ent

incus to di al in te r r oga ti on s . Mi

ran da , 384 U.S. a t 467. In so doing, they enhanc e the trust worthiness of any
s tat eme nt s th at m ay be eli cit ed d ur in g anin te r r oga ti on . With r es pec t t o d et er r enc e, the Co ur t h as exp lai nedth at, “[

b] y r ef us in g t o ad mi t e vid enc e gai nedas a r es ul t o f [ willf ul or neg lig ent ] co nd uct [depriving the defenda nt of a right], the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or inth eir fu tu r e co un te r par ts , a gr eat er degr ee o f c ar e t owar d the r igh ts of an ac cus ed. ” Michigan v. Tucker , 41 7 U .S . 4 33 , 4 47 (1 97 4) . Th us, co urt s sup pre ss un -w a rne d sta te me nts, ev en tho se t ha t ma y o the rw ise be vo lu nta ry

a nd tru stw ort hy , i n o rde r to de te r fut ure mi sco nd uc t by law e nfo rc em en t a ge nts. Rec ognizing

that the threat of suppr ession in U.S. courts for f ailure to comply

with Mi ran da ho ld s lit tl e s way o ver

fo r eig n au th or it ies , we h ave d ecli nedto s up pr es s un -w ar neds tat eme nt s ob tai ned overseas by foreign officials. In United Sta tes v. Welch , we rec ognize d, in line with the approach of the Ni nth Ci r cui t, th at “ th e Mi ran da r equ ir eme nt s wer e pr

im ar ily des ign ed t o p r even t U ni te d S tat es po lic e of fi cer s fr om r elyi ng upo n i mp r op er in te r r oga ti onte chniques andas th e r equ ir eme nt s hav e li tt

le, if any, det er r ent ef fe ct up onfo r eig

n p ol ice o ff icer s , the Mi

ran da war ni ngs s ho ul d n ot

s er ve as th e sine qua

non of adm is s ib ili ty .” 4 55 F .2d211 , 21 3 ( 2dCir . 19 72) (c it

in g Uni te d St ate s v . Chav arr ia , 443 F.2d 904, 90 5 (9th Cir . 19 71) ); se e al

so Uni te d St ate s v . M art indal e , 790 F.2d 1129, 1 131 (4th Cir. 1986) (“There wa s no requirement on the part of the B ritis h officers of complianc e with the rule e ither in [ Mi ran da ], or in Massiah v. United

States, 37 7 U. S. 2 01 ( 196 4) .”) ; Uni te d St ate s v . N o lan , 55 1 F .2d266 , 27 3 ( 10th Ci r . 19 77) (ad op ti ng s im ila r

r eas onin g) ; Kilday v. United Sta tes , 48 1 F .2d655 , 65 6 ( 5th Ci r . 19 73) (“ [T ]h e Unit ed States Constitution cannot compel such specific, a ffir mative a ction [ i.e. , p r ov idin g Mi ran da warnings] by foreign sovereigns, s o the policy of deterring s o-calle d ‘third degree’ polic e tactic s, which underlies the Mi ran da excl us io nar

y r ul e, i s in app os it e t o thi s cas e.” ); Chav arr ia , 443 F.2d at 905 (“W hen the in te r r oga ti onis by the au th or it ies of a f or eign j ur is di ct io n, th e exc lu s io nar

y r ul e has lit tl e or

no ef fe ctThe ot her ex cept i on n ot ed by t he Y ou sef C our t per t ai ns t o “ s t at em ent s obt ai ned under ci r cum s t anc es t hat 18
‘ s hock t he j udi ci al con s ci ence . ’ ” 327 F. 3d at 146. 37 up onth e co nd uct

of fo r eig n p ol ice. ”) . I ns te ad o f a pp lyi ng Mi ran da ins uchcas es , we h ave r equ ir ed that “[ w]h ene ver

a cou r t i s as kedto r ul e up onth e admis s ib ili ty of a s tat eme nt

mad e t o a f

or eign p ol ice officer, the court mus t consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the statement was voluntary. If the court finds the statement involuntary, it must exclude this beca use of its inherent
un r eli abilit

y.” Welch , 45 5 F .2dat 2 13. When U .S. lawenforcement age nts or officials are involve d in overseas interrogation, however, the deterrence rationa le retains its for ce. In such circumstances, the twin goa ls of ens uring trus tworthiness and deterring misconduct might compel the applic ation of Mi ran da . We s ugg es te d as much in Yousef

, 327 F.3d at 56. In Yousef , we observed that “statements taken by foreign police in the absence of Mi

ran da war ni ngs ar e admis s ib le i f v ol un tar y,” s ub ject

to tw o ex cep ti on s . Id

. at 145. One of these exce ptions—the s o-calle d “joint venture doctrine”—a ppears to have bee n “implicitly adopted” by
ou r Cou r t, eventh ough w e hav e “f ail ed t o d ef

in e it s pr ecis e co nt ou r s .” Id
. at 1 46. Pu r s uan t t o thi s

18
exce ption, “statements elicited during overseas interrogation by foreign police in the absence of Mi ran da
war ni ngs mu s t b e s up pr es s ed when ever Unit ed S tat es law e nf

or cem ent agen ts act

ive ly p ar ti cip ate in qu es ti onin g co nd uct ed b y f or eig n au th or it ies .” Id
. at 145. Other circuits have e xplicitly recognize d the applic ability of Mi

ran da to cus to di al s tat eme nt s eli cit ed o ver s eas th r ough the ac ti ve p ar ti cip ati onof

U.S
. agen ts . See United States v. Heller , 62 5 F .2d594 , 59 9 ( 5th Ci r . 19 80) (“ [I]f Ame r icanof fi cial s par ti cip ate d inth e f or eign s ear ch o r

in te r r oga ti on , o r

if th e f or eign au th or

it ies wer e act

in g as agen ts fo r

th eir Ame r icancou nt erpar ts , the e xcl us io nar y r ul e s ho ul d b e in

vo ked .”) ; Pf

ei fe r v . U. S. Bu reau o

f Pri so ns , 61 5 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Ci r. 1980) (“Under the joint venture doctrine, evide nce obtai ned through activitie s of foreign officials, in which fede ral age nts s ubstantially pa rticipated and w hich viola ted the ac cused’s Fifth Amendment or Mi

ran da rights, mus t be suppres sed in a subsequent tr ial in the U nited States.”). In lightO u r re c o g n it ion tha t M i r an da m i gh t ap pl y t o f

or ei gn det ai nees hel d over s eas s houl d i n no way i m pai r t he 19 a b ility o f th e U .S . go v e r n m e n t to g a th e r fo r e ig n in te llig e n c e . F irs t, M i r an da ’s “ p u b lic sa fe ty ” e x c e p tio n , see N e w Y o r k v. Q ua rl es , 467 U . S. 649 ( 1984) , woul d l i kel y a ppl y ov er s eas wi t h no l es s f or ce t han i t does dom es t i cal l y. W hen exi ge nt c irc u m sta n c e s c o m p e l a n u n -w a r n e d in te r r o g a tio n in o r d e r to p r o te c t th e p u b lic , M i r an da woul d not i m pai r t he go ver nm ent ’ s ab i l i t y t o ob t ai n t hat i nf or m at i on. Sec ond, we em pha s i z e t hat t he M i r an da f r am ework go ver ns onl y t he adm i s s i on o f

cus t odi al s t at em ent s at U . S. t r i al s . I ns of ar as U . S. ag ent s do not s eek t o i nt r oduce s t at em ent s obt ai ned th r o u g h o v e r se a s c u sto d ia l in te r r o g a tio n s a t U .S . tria ls, M i r an da ’ s s t r i ct ure s woul d not ap pl y. 38 of th es e pr eced ent s , we p r oce ed o n the as s um pt io n that th e Mi ran da “wa rning/waive r” fr amew ork gen er ally go ver ns th e admis s ib ili ty inou r do mes ti c co ur ts of

cus to di al s tat eme nt s ob tai nedby U .S. off ic ia ls fr om in divi du a ls d uri ng the ir d et en ti on un de r th e a uth ori ty of f ore ig n g ov er nm en ts. 19 Even i f we we re to conclude, rathe r than assum e, that Mi ran da applie s to overs eas interrogations involving U. S. age nts, that would not mean that U.S. a gents must recite verbatim the famil iar Mi ran da warnings to those detained in foreign la nds. As the Supreme Court explaine d in Duc kwo rt h v. Eag an , the

“Mi ran da war ni ngs [n eedno t] be g

ive n i n the e xact

fo r m d es cr

ib ed i n that

dec is io n. ” 49 2 U. S. 1 95, 202 (1 98 9) . In fa ct , t he Su pre me C ou rt d ec rie d a re vi ewin g c ou rt’ s “ri gi di ty . . . [ in re qu iri ng

a ] p re ci se formulation of the wa rnings given a crimina l defendant” i n Ca lifornia v. Pryso ck , holding that “no tal is manic i ncan tat

io n [ i] s r equ ir ed t o s ati s fy

[ Mi ran da ’s ] s tr ictur es .” 453 U.S . 35 5, 3 59 ( 198 1) ; see also Dickerso n , 53 0 U. S. a t 4 40 n .6 ( “[ T ]h e Con s ti tu ti ondo es no t r equ ir e po lic e t o ad mi ni s te r

th e par ti cul ar Mi ran da war ni ngs .”) . I nd eed , the Mi ran da C ou rt i tse lf st a te d th a t i ts “ de ci sio n i n n o w a y c re a te s a
con s ti tu ti on al s tr ait jack et ” an d that “other pr oce du r es whi ch ar e at

leas t as ef

fe ct ive inapp r

is in g accu s ed pe rson s of t he ir ri gh t of

sil en ce a nd in a ssuri ng

a co nti nu ou s op po rtu ni ty to e xe rc ise it ” c ou ld pa ss
con s ti tu ti on al m us te r . Mi

ran da , 38 4 U. S. a t 4 67. T he Dic ke rso n Cou r t o bs er

vedth at “ no con s ti tu ti on al
r ul e is im mu tab le, ” 53 0 U. S. a t 4 41, cit in g ex cep ti on s to th e Mi

ran da r ul e—s uchas th e “p ub lic s af et y”
exce pt io n, see New York v

. Qua rles , 467 U.S. 6 49, 657 (1984) (conc luding that “the ne ed for answers t o qu es ti on s ina s ituat

io n p os in g a thr eat

to th e pu bl

ic s af et y ou tw eig hs th e ne ed f

or th e [ Mi ran da ] rul e protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege ag ainst self- incrimination”), a nd the exce ption for pr ior in con s is te nt

s tat eme nt s , see Harris v. New York , 40 1 U. S. 2 22, 226 (1 971 ) ( ho ldin g that

“[ t] he s hi eld39

pr ov id ed b y Mi

ran da cannot be pe rverted into a license to use perjury by wa y of a defense, free from the
r is k o f c on fr on tat

io n wi thpr

io r in con s is te nt

ut te r ance s ”) . T he Co ur t e xp lai ned : “N o co ur t l ayin g do wn a ge neral rule ca n poss ibly foresee the various circumstances in which c ounsel will seek to a pply it, and th e s or t o f m odif

icat io ns r epr es ent ed b y thes e cas es ar e as mu ch a n or mal par t o f c on s ti tu ti on al l aw as th e or igi nal dec is io n. ” Dickerso n , 53 0 U. S. a t 4 41. T he f ede r al ap pellat e de cis io ns app lyi ng Mi ran da ’s “war ni ng/ waiv er ” f r ame wor k t o o ver s eas interrogations demons trate the flexibility a nd adapta bility of the rule. In Cran ford v. Rodriguez

, 51 2 F .2d 860 (10th Cir. 1975), the Tenth C ircuit considered a cha llenge to a wa iver form br ought by a de fendant init ially d et ain ed i n M exi co b y M exi can a utho r it ies ands ub s equ ent

ly ques ti on ed ther e by

U.S . age nt s . After rejecting the a rgument that Mi ran da di d n ot app ly o ut s id e the U ni te d S tat es , id. at 863, the Tenth Circuit considered the sufficiency of a standard waive r for m modified to omit “the line respecting app oi ntmen t o f alawy er

andin s er ti ng i ns te ad that

if [the s us pec t] wis hedto con s ul t the A mer ican Consulate the la tter would be advised of his detention and ‘[the suspect] will be given the opportunity to tal k t o a Co ns ul ate r epr es ent ati ve, ’” id. at 862. The Tenth Circuit considered this “variation” of the standard Mi

ran da warnings to be “unav oidable [due to the lac k of avail ability of a U.S. lawye r in Mexico] andno t p r eju di cial .” Id

. at 8 63. I t s tat ed that

“[ t] he p et it io ner was adm onis hedth at h e ne ed n ot s peak ; that he wa s [informed that he wa s] entitled to talk to a Consulate officia l; that any thing he said could be
us ed ag ain s t him incou r t; andth at i f h e de cid ed t o an s wer qu es ti on s witho ut

a lawy er he c oulds to p at any t im e.” Id
. The Tenth Circuit held that this “good faith effort ” to inform a sus pect of his rights
com pl iedwith the Mi

ran da fr ame wor k. Id

. The Fifth Circuit reac hed a similar conc lusion in Uni te d St ate s v . Do pf , a ca se considering the admissibility of s tatements obtained in a custodial interview he ld in Mexico by a U.S. a gent in light of a
war ni ng that

om it te d r ef

er enc e t o the ap po in tm ent of cou ns el. 434F. 2d205 (5 thCir . 19 70)
.B ec au se w e c on clud e tha t , assum i ng t he y a pp l y, t he st ri ctu res of M i r an da w e r e sa tisf

ie d in th is c a se , see

P art 20 I I . B . 3, post

, we l eav e f

or an ot her day t he ques t i on o f whet her t he M i r

an da “ w ar ni ng /w ai ver ” f r am ework go ver ns t he ad m i ssi bil i t y o f s t atem en t s ob t aine d i n the co u rse of c u st od i al i nterro ga t i on s co nd u cted ov erse as. 40 Sp ecif ically, th e U. S. agen t w ar nedth e s us pec ts th at “ anythi ng they s aidcouldbe u s ed ag ain s t them whe n an d i f they

wer e r et ur nedto th e Unit ed S tat es ; that he c ouldno t f

ur ni s h them with a l awyer

in M exi co b ut

of fe r ed t o co nt act

th e Am er icanCon s ul

onth eir beh alf .” Id
. at 207. E ven though the a gent had neithe r infor med the suspects of their right to appointed counsel nor obtained written wa ivers fr om them, the Fifth Circuit conclude d: [The agent] did eve rything that he reasonably could hav e done to protect the rights of appellants by advi sing them of their r ight to remain silent, of the poss ible use ag ainst them of incriminatory statements, of

the reason why they

could not be furnished counsel by the U.S. Gove rnment while they wer e inM exi co an d o f the av ail abilit y of th e Am er icanCon s ul

fo r th eir as s is tan ce. Id
. As th es e de cis io ns dem on s tr ate , wh er e Mi ran da has been a pplied to overseas interrogations by U.S . age nt s , it

has bee n s o ap pl

iedina f lex ib le f as hi onto acco mm od ate th e exigen cies of lo cal conditions. This context-specific approac h is wholly consistent with our r eading of the Supreme Court dec is io ns con s trui ng the Mi ran da fr ame wor k, a ndwe n ow ap ply that app r oachto th e f

act s of this cas e. 20 3. Applica tion of the Fifth Amendment a nd Mi ran da to Defendants’ Statements
a. The AOR Tur ning first

to the AOR, w e observe that it provided five notices to Al-’Owha li and Odeh. It
war nedth em that

un der U.S . la w: ( 1) th ey h ad the r

igh t t o r emains ile nt ; (

2) if th ey ch os e t o s peak , anything the y said could be used agai nst them in court; (3) in the United States, they w ould have had the
r igh t t o co ns ul t w

ith a l awyer

andto hav e a law

yer pr es ent du r in g qu es ti onin g; (4) inth e Unit ed S tat es , a lawy er would have been a ppointed for them if they c ould not afford one; and (5) if they chose not to
s peak , that

fa ct couldno t b e us ed ag ain s t them ina U. S. c ou r t. See Pa r t I .A, ante . I t f

ur th er adv is ed th em that “[ b] ecau s e we ar e no t i n the U ni te d S tat es , we c ann ot ens ur e that

you will h ave a l awyerT he releva nt l an gu ag e in t he A O R fol l ow s: 21 I n t he U ni t ed St at es , you woul d have t he r i gh t t o t al k t o a l awyer t o g et advi ce b ef or e we as k yo u any ques t i ons an d yo u co u l d ha ve a l aw ye r w i t h y ou d u ri ng q u esti on i ng . In t he U nit ed States, i f yo u co u l d no t afford a l aw ye r, one w ou l d be appoi nt ed f or you, i f you w i s h, before any qu est i oni ng. B ec au se w e a re n ot i n the U nit ed States, w e c an no t en su re that yo u w i l l ha ve a l aw ye r ap po i nted for yo u be fore any q ue s t i oni ng. 41 app oi nt ed f

or you bef or e any qu es ti onin g.” Id

. The District Court held that the AOR ran afoul of Mi ran da beca use it suggested that defendants lacked the right to the presence a nd appointment of
cou ns el b ecau s e they

wer e he ldou ts id e of

th e Unit ed S tat es . We d o n ot bel iev e that th e AO R was as def ici ent as th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t b eli evedit

to be, bu t, as exp lai nedbel ow, we al s o thi nk th at the ad

vic e as to the right to counsel could have be en made clea rer. In any event, we need not rule definitive ly on the adeq uacy of th e AO R bec aus e we agr ee f ully wi thth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t that

th e s ub s equ ent

or al advic e f

ully complied with whateve r Mi ran da r equ ir eme nt s wer e app lic abl e. T he A OR p r es ent ed d ef

end ant s with a f

actually ac cur ate s tat eme nt of th eir r igh ts un der

th e U. S. Constitution and how those rights might be limited by the governing non-U.S. c riminal procedures. In addition, it advised defendants of a right normally not contained i n Mi ran da warnings—that the defendants’ silence c ould not be used aga inst them at an America n trial. This additional warning amplified the A OR’s cautiona ry mess age and thus reinfor ces the wa rning’s adequac y under Mi ran da
. Li ke the D is tr

ict Cou r t, we co ns id er

th e f ir s t t wo w ar ni ngs inth e AO R—the r igh t t o r emain silent and the introduction at trial of any statements made therea fter—to be entirely consistent with the text and tea ching of Mi

ran da
. With respect to the rights t o presence and a ppointment of counsel, howeve r, we disagree with th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s con clu s io n that

th e AO R “wr ongly

con vey[ed] to a s us pec t that , d ue t o his cus to di al situs outside the United States, he currently possess e[d] no opportunity to avail himself of the services of an at to r ney

bef or e or du r in g qu es ti onin g by

U.S . o ff ici als .” Bin La den , 132 F. Supp. 2d a t 190. The

21B in L a d en , 1 3 2 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 1 7 3 ; B in L a d en , 132 F. Supp. 2d at 203.

42 AOR, inth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s vie w, “ pr ema tu r ely f or eclo s e[d ] the s ignif

ican t p os s ib ili ty

th at the f or eign autho r it ies th ems elv es may , if

as ked , ei th er

s up ply co un s el at

pu bl ic ex pen s e or

per mi t r et ain ed c ou ns el in s id e the s tat

io nh ou s e.” Id

. at 1 90. T he D is tr

ict Cou r t h eldth at U .S. agen ts par ti cip ati ng i n o ver s eas inves tigat io ns mu s t “ [t

]o th e ma xim um ext ent

r eas on ably po s s ib le, [m ake] ef fo r ts . . . to r epl

icat e wh at
r igh ts wouldbe p r es ent

if th e in te r r oga ti onwer e be in g co nd uct ed i n Am er ica. ” Id
. a t 1 88 . Th ey

mu st also “be cl ear and c andid a s to both the existence of the right to counsel and the possible impedime nts to it s exer cis e.” Id

. T o ex pl ainandill us tr ate it s ho ldin g, the D is tr ict Cou r t s ugg es te d that

an ac cep tab le Mi ran da warning w ould include the offer to “ask the for eign a uthorities t o permit acce ss to a lawyer or to app oi nt on e f or [the s us pec t] .” Id

. at 189 n.16 . Because the AOR read to Al-’Owha li and Odeh di d not in clu de s uchan o ff

er , an d b ecau s e it

s ugg es te d that

“[ t] he r igh t t o co un s el . . . d epe nd [ed ] o n ge ogr aph y, wh en in ste a d i t a ct ua ll y h in ge d o n fo re ig n l aw, ” t he Di stri ctC ou rt h el d th a t th e “ AO R , o n i ts fa ce , [ wa s] inadequa te under Mi

ran da andit s pr oge ny. ” Id

. at 1 91- 92. In our view, the AOR

presented defendants with a factua lly a ccurate statement of their right to
cou ns el u nd er

th e U. S. Co ns ti tu ti on ; it

als o ex pl ain ed that

th e ef fe ct uat io n o f that

r igh t m igh t b e li mi te d by the s tr ictur es of cr im in al p r oce du r e ina f

or eign l and . We d o n ot

agr ee wi thth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s vie w that the releva nt section of the AOR amounts to a suggestion that counsel is not availabl e. The AOR informed defendants that “in the United States” they w ould be entitled to the presence and appoi ntment of def ens e co un s el, bu t b ecau s e they wer e no t i n the U ni te d S tat es , U. S. agen ts couldno t e ns ur e that counsel would, in fa ct, be a ppointed. This is so because the law of Kenya , as the detaining authority—and not U.S. law—gove rned whether defenda nts were entitled to (a) the appointment of publicly financed c ounsel and (b) the presence of counsel during interrogations. In that sense, the right to cou ns el didin dee d “d epe ndongeo gr aph y.” I n cas es whe r e a s us pec t h as no ent it lem ent to cou ns el43

un der th e law of th e f or eig n l and , it wouldbe m is leadin g t o i nf or m him fals ely that

he w as gua r ant eed the presence or appointment of an attorney—a nd Mi ran da do es n ot r eq ui re the pro vi sio n o f fa lse
as s ur ance s . The warning at issue here wa s candid: It explaine d the rights pr ovided by the U.S. C onstitut ion, while rec ognizing

that, beca use defendants were detai ned outside the United States, U.S. l aw did not govern the terms of

their detention or interr ogation. R ather than indica ting that defendants had no right to appointed counsel, the A OR stated that defenda nts may have to look to loc al law for the effectuation of th os e r igh ts . I nd eed , the f

act s pr es ent ed b y Od eh’ s cas e be ar this ou t. Up onhear

in g the A OR’ s war ni ngs , O dehdi d n ot

as s um e that

cou ns el wa s un availab le; in s te ad, he i nqui r ed whether cou ns el wa s availab le u nd er

Kenyan l aw. See

Pa r t I .A. 2, ante . For thes e reasons, we do not equate the langua ge of th e AO R with a s tat eme nt th at c ou ns el wa s un availab le. I ns te ad, we r ead that lan guage as a can di d acknowledgment of the possible disparity between rights established by the U.S. C onstitut ion, on the one hand, a nd the ava ilabili ty of counsel and entitleme nt to the ass istance of counsel under the lawof the detaining

authority, on the other. The District Court compensated for this potential disparity betwe en U.S. c onstitut ional rights andth e r igh ts th at o bt ainov er s eas by r equ ir in g U. S. agen ts to s tu dy l ocal cr im in al p r oce du r e andur

ge lo cal o ff ici als to pr ov

id e s us pec ts with co un s el, if r equ es te d, s o as to “r epl

icat e” the r

igh ts th at they would hav e in the United S tates. We do not a gree that Mi ran da r equ ir es s uchef

fo r ts . As the Supreme Court set for th in Duckworth , “Mi ran da does not require that attor neys be pr od uci bl e oncall , b ut

on ly that th e s us pec t b e inf

o rme d . . . that he ha s the right t o an attorney be fore anddu r in g qu es ti onin g, an d that

an at to r ney

wouldbe ap po in te d f

or hi m i f h e co ul d n ot

af fo r d o ne. ” 492 U.S. a t 204 (emphasis added). The defendant in Duckworth r ecei vedth e f ollo win g war ni ng: Youhav e the r

igh t t o r emains ile nt . Anythi ng y ous ay canbe u s ed ag ain s t y ouincou r t. You ha ve a ri gh t t o tal k t o a law y er fo r ad v ic e be fo re we asky o u any

que st io ns , and t o hav e h im w

it h y o u dur ing44

que st io ning . You ha ve this right to the advi ce a nd presence of a lawye r even if you ca nnot afford to hi r e on e. We ha ve no way o f giving yo u a la wyer

, but one will b e app ointed for yo u, if you wish, if a nd wh en you go to co urt . If you wish to answer quest ions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to st op answering questions at any time. Y ou also have the right to s top answering at any time until you’ve ta lked to a lawye r. Id . at 198 (e mp has is inor

igi nal ). T hi s war ni ng w as challen gedonth e gr ou nd s th at i t f ail ed t o p r ov

id e a “cle ar and unequiv ocal w arning of the right to appointed counsel before any interrogation” and “li nk[ed] an i ndige nt ’s r

igh t t o co un s el b ef

or e in te r r oga ti onwith a f

utur e eve nt .” Id

. at 200. The Supreme C ourt rejected the c halle nge, refusing to endorse a “rigid” appli cation of Mi ran da . Th e C ou rt h el d, in a ca se arising in a purely dome stic sett ing, that gove rnment off

icia ls are permitted to “accuratel y describe[ ] the pr oce du r e f

or th e app oi ntmen t o f c ou ns el” un der app lic abl e law
. Id

. at 2 04. If, un de r th ose pro ce du re s, “the p ol ice c ann ot pr ov id e app oi nt ed c ou ns el, Mi ran da requires only that the police not question a
s us pec t u nl es s he w aiv es hi s r igh t t o co un s el. ” Id

. I n o th er wor ds , Mi

ran da requires government agents to be the conduits of information to det ain ed s us pec ts —b oth as to (1 ) thei r r igh ts un der

th e U. S. Constitution to the pr esence a nd appointment of counsel at custodial interrogations and (2) the procedures thr ough whic h they might be a ble to vindica te those rights under local l aw. It does not
co mp el the po li ce to se rve a s advocates for detainees before local a uthorities, endeavoring to expa nd the
r igh ts andpr

ivileg es availab le u nd er

lo cal l aw. T hi s is no t t o s ay that if , af te r bei ng i nf or medof hi s Mi ran da r igh ts , a d et ain ee in s is ts onth e im mediat e app oi ntmen t o f c ou ns el as a con di ti onof mak in g a statement, the U.S. officials are ba rred fr om attempting to expedite the provision of couns el. Quite the contrary; doing so is perf

ectly c onsis tent with Mi

ran da , but it is not r equired. Because complia nce with Mi ran da does not require law enforcement to advoc ate on beha lf of
s us pec ts det ain ed i n the U ni te d S tat es , we s ee n o b as is fo r ado pt in g a dif fe r ent r ul e f or det ain ees hel d overseas by foreign powers. It is true that the rights of f

oreign detaine es to the pres ence and app oi ntmen t o f c ou ns el will d epe ndonfo r eign l aw, b ut , as no te d ab ov e, Mi ran da does not require theA s w e d isc u ss in P a r t II.B .3 .c .ii, p ost , w e a r e sa tisf

ie d th a t th e sta te m e n ts a t iss u e h e r e w e r e g iv e n v o lu n ta r ily
. 22 45 provision of

lega l services. It r equires only that, until leg al services are ei ther provided or waived, no interrogation take pla ce. A t the request of foreign detainee s or

on their own initiative , U.S. a gents are fr ee t o d es cr

ib e the p r oce du r es by whi ch at to r ney s ar e ma de av ail abl e info r eign co un tr ies , s o l on g as they make an honest, good faith effort to pr ovide a ccurate information. Foreign detai nees may, of course, insis t that they receiv e loca l counsel or U.S. counsel a s a condition of making a statement. In
r es po ns e, U .S. agen ts may , inth eir di s cr et io n, app eal t o l ocal

autho r it ies to app oi nt

cou ns el o r

even obtain U.S. c ounsel for them. Alternative ly, foreign deta inees may de termine that, in light of the di ff icult y of ob tai ni ng o r

un availab ili ty

of cou ns el u nd er

lo cal l aw, i t i s inth eir

bes t i nt er es ts to waiv e their right to couns el and ma ke a statement to U.S. a gents. We see nothing contrary to the spir

it or letter of Mi

ran da , particularly a s construed in Duckworth , ineither of th es e r es ul ts . We a re awa re that, as defendants urge, foreign detaine es may run the risk of refus ing to speak to U.S. officials only to find themselves forced to speak to their for eign ja ilors. T his would be so, howeve r, even if U.S. age nts made effort s to s ecure counsel on thei r behalf and those efforts proved fruitles s. T he risk of being forced to speak to their foreign jailor would a lso exist, mor eover, if U.S. a gents were not involved a t all. Of course, statements obt ained unde r these circumst ance s could not be admitted in a U.S . t r ial if th e s ituat io n i ndicat ed that

th e s tat eme nt s wer e ma de i nv ol un tar ily
. Yousef , 32 7 F .3d145 . 22 Ou r dec is io n n ot

to im po s e addit

io nal du ti es onU.S . age nt s op er ati ng o ver s eas is ani mat ed, in part, by our recognition that it is only through the cooperation of local authorities that U.S. age nts obtain ac cess to f

oreign detaine es. We ha ve no desire to str ain that spirit of cooperation by compelli ng U.S . age nt s to pr es s fo r eig n go ver nm ent s fo r

th e pr ov is io n o f l egal

r igh ts no t r eco gni zedby thei r criminal justice systems. “For better or f

or wors e, we live in a world of nation-st ates in which our Government must

be able to ‘function effectively i n the company of sovereign nations.’ Some who46

vio lat e ou r

laws may liv e ou ts id e ou r

bo r der s un der

a r egi me q

ui te di ff er ent fr om th at whi ch o bt ain s in this cou ntry.” Verdugo-Urquidez , 49 4 U. S. a t 2 75 (qu ot

in g Pe re z v. B ro wnell

, 356 U.S. 4 4, 57 (1958)). The rule of Mi ran da do es no t r equ

ir e co ns cr ip ti ng o ur agen ts to be l egal

adv ocat es fo r

fo r eign d et ain ees thereby disrupting the delica te relations betwee n our government and a foreign powe r. Altho ughwe d o n ot

fi ndth e adv

ice o f r igh ts con cer ni ng c ou ns el as def ici ent as di d the D is tr

ict Cou r t, we thi nk

th e wo r di ng that

was us ed c r eat ed a n eedles s r is k o f mis un der s tan di ng b y s tat in g, al bei t
accu r ate ly, what

th e r igh t t o co un s el wo ul d h ave b eenhadth e in te r r oga ti onocc ur r ed i n the U ni te d St ate s . Anadv

ice o f r igh ts s ho ul d s tat e only wh at r igh ts ar e availab le, no t what r igh ts wouldbe av ail abl e if circumstances were different. This does not mean that U.S. a gents need to determine wha t rights are infa ct availab le u nd er

lo cal l aw. All they

nee d t o s ay is th at c ou ns el r igh ts dep endonlo cal l aw, an d that th e U. S. agen ts will af

fo r d the ac cus ed what ever r igh ts ar e availab le u nd er

lo cal l aw. T hu s , anAOR u s ed her eaf te r might us ef ully advis e as to cou ns el r

igh ts inth e f

ollo win g language: Whether you can r et aina lawy er , o r

hav e a law

yer app oi nt ed f

or you , an d wh ether

you can consult with a lawyer and ha ve a l awy er present dur ing questioning are ma tters that depend on lo cal l aw, an d we cann ot

adv is e yo u o n s uchmat te r s . I f l ocal autho r it ies per mi t y outo ob tai n counsel (retained or appointed) a nd to consult with a lawyer at this time, you may attempt to ob tai n an d co ns ul t w

ith anatt or ney

bef or e s peak in g wi thus . Si milar

ly, if lo cal au th or

it ies per mi t you to have a lawye r pres ent during questioning by loca l authorities, your lawye r may attend a ny qu es ti onin g by

us . For these reasons, we conclude that the AOR substantially c omplied with w hateve r Mi ran da requirements were applica ble, but we need not rule definitive ly on the matter bec ause of the adequa cy of the subs equent oral wa rning, and bec ause the error, if any, in exc luding the statements obtained prior to the ora l w a rni ng

be ne fit te d d ef

en da nts a nd wa s the re fore ha rml ess.H e co nt ends t hat t he Court s houl d not ha ve c r edi t ed t he AU SA ’ s t es t i m ony at t he r eope ned s uppr es s i on 23 h e a rin g b e c a u se the go v e rn m e n t ha d u rg e d thr o u g h o u t t h e p rio r p ro c e e d ing s tha t M i r an da di d not ap pl y ov er s eas an d t he A U SA ’ s t es t i m ony w as i ncon s i s t ent wi t h t hat pos i t i on. I n s uppor t of t hi s ar gum ent , A l

- ’ O w hal i poi nt s t o t he g ov er nm en t ’ s “ l on g s t a ndi ng p os i t i on ” b ef or e t he D i s t r i ct Cour t t ha t “ i t di d n ot p r ov i de a s t a nda r d M i r an da warn i ng b e c a u se n o n e w a s r e q u ire d , a n d su c h a w a r n in g w o u ld h a v e , i n a n y e v e n t, se r io u sly m isr e p r e se n te d K e n y a n la w .” A l- ’O w h a li B r . 9 1 . A l-’O w h a li u r g e s th a t, b e c a u se th e g o v e r n m e n t w a s la b o r in g u n d e r th e b e lie f th a t a c o n v e n tio n a l M i r an da w a rn ing w a s u n n e c e ssa ry , i t w o u ld h a v e b e e n i n c o n sisten t fo r o n e o f th e ag e n ts of the go v e rn m e n t— th e A U S A

— to pr ovi de s uch a warn i ng . I n a dd i t i on, A l

- ’ O w hal i poi nt s out t hat t he AU SA ’ s t es t i m ony w as not cor r obor at ed by t he t ran sl ator o r on e o f t he spe cial age nts. 47

b. The Oral Warning Provided by the A USA Al so Satisf ied Mi ran da With r es pec t t o the o r al warni ngs pr ov id ed b y the A USA , we s ee n o b as is to di s tu r b the D is tr ict Court’s r ulings that the AUSA a dministered the warnings and that these warnings were sufficient to apprise defendants of their Mi ran da r igh ts . Al-’Owhal i argues that the Distr ict Court erroneously found that the AUSA admini stered the
or al warni ngs bas ed o n the t es ti mo ny o f the A USA . H e co nt end s th at the A USAs im ply f abr icat ed his testimony and tailored it to conform with the lega l standard announced by the Distr ict Court. 23 Acco r di ngl

y, h e main tai ns th at the r eco r d m akes “cl ear th at the A OR wa r ni ngs wer e the o nly wa rni ng s” that he recei ved. Al -’Owhali Br. 91 (emphasis in original). As no te d ab ov e, we r evi ew a D is tr ict Cou r t’ s fa ct ual

fi ndin gs fo r

clea r er r or , vi ewing the f

act s in th e light mo s t f avo r abl e t o the g ov er nm ent . See Pa r t I I .B .1, ante . We have e mphasized that “‘c redibility det er mi nat

io ns ar e the p r ov

in ce o f the tr

ial ju dge , an d s ho ul d n ot

be o ver r ul ed o n ap peal

un les s clea rly
er r on eou s .’” Yousef

, 32 7 F .3dat 1 24 (qu ot

in g United Sta tes v. Rosa , 11 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 1993)). The Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s cr edi bilit

y de te r mi nat

io n wi thr es pec t t o the A USA ’s te s ti mo ny i s un amb igu ou s : The sugge sti on tha t A ssist a nt U ni te d S ta te s At tor ne y [ ] i mp rop er ly

a lt er ed hi s te sti mo ny

a s a con s equ enc e of

th e r eop eni ng t o m eet

th e Cou r t’ s ob ject

io ns is bel iedby the f

act th at his affidavit, whic h discuss ed the advice of rights given Al-’Owha li, wa s s ubmitted before the Court granted the motion to reopen. To the extent that any of Al-’Owhali’s arguments in favor of s up pr es s io n ar e pr edi cat ed o n ch all eng es to th e cr edi bilit y of th e [g ]o ver nm ent ’s witnes s es , they ar e un availing.48

United Sta tes v. B in Laden , No. 98 Cr. 1023 , 2001 WL 1160604, a t *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oc t. 2, 2001). In addition, the District Court found no cause for sus picion in the g overnment’s s ole relia nce on the A OR at the initial suppr ession hearing, expla ining that it wa s “entirely understandable that the [g]ove rnment initially relied on the Advice of R ights for m which ha d been used abroad e xtensively by [Assis tant Unit ed S tat es At to r ney s ] i n the f iel d wi th ou t c hallen ge. ” Id
. It f ound “no bas[i]s whatsoever to s upport th e claim th at ther e was s om e ma ni pulat io n o f the s up pr es s io n h ear in g pr oce s s to ob tai n a t act ical adv ant age. ” Id

. We see nothing erroneous—much less clea rly erroneous—in either of these findings. The Distr ict Court conclude d, based on its direct observation of the AUSA ’s demeanor and in lig ht of the te s ti mo ny o ff

er ed, th at the A USA ’s te s ti mo ny w as cr edi bl e. T he D is tr ict Cou r t f ur th er det er mi nedth at th e “l ate ” in tr od uct

io n o f the e vid enc e of

th e or al Mi

ran da warnings was the product of the government’s misapprehension of the val idity of the AOR. As the Distr ict Court expla ined, the government had no rea son to doubt that its AOR, whic h had bee n “used abroad exte nsively . . . without chal len ge, ” id. , would pa ss muster under Mi ran da , and it therefore would hav e bee n reasonable for the government to decline to call the A USA—pa rticularly in light of his status as one of the lead prosecutors
onth e cas e—t o t es ti fy

at the i ni ti al s up pr es s io n h ear in g. A cco r di ngl

y, i t w as r eas on abl e t o co ncl ud e that the government offered the AUSA’ s tes timony at the reopene d suppr ession hearings and not at the initial he aring bec ause the nee d to offer that evidenc e bec ame a pparent to the government only a fter the Distr ict Court found the AOR ina dequate unde r Mi ran da . Al -’ Owh alidi s agr ees andhas s et fo r that length his alternative interpretation of the facts, as des cribed above in the margin. But this dis agreeme nt do es no t d emo ns tr ate th at the D is tr ict Cou r t’ s cr edi bilit

y de te r mi nat

io ns wer e cle arly err on eou s . Acc ordingly, we see no basis to dis turb the Dis trict Court’s finding that the AUSA also orally provided a
con ven ti on al, andent

ir ely a dequat e, Mi

ran da war ni ng t o Al -’ Owh ali
.49

In addition, both Al-’Owhali and Odeh que stion whether the AUSA’s oral wa rnings were suff icient to apprise them of their Mi ran da rights. T hey c ontend that the wa rnings were inadequa te bec aus e the A USAdi d n ot app r is e them of

whe th er th ey co ul d o bt ainleg al r epr es ent ati onun der Kenyan l aw. T her e is no mer it to this con te nt

io n. As exp lai nedabo ve, Mi ran da do es no t r equ

ir e U. S. age nts t o become e xperts on f oreign criminal proce dure. For the same reasons that the AOR nee d not have de lved into the rights of criminal defendants under Kenyan l aw, the AUSA’ s or al wa rning need not have e xplaine d (1) whether and how loc al defense c ounsel could be obtai ned and (2) whe ther and how lo cal d ef ens e co un s el, on ce o bt ain ed, couldth en p ar ti cip ate ina cus to di al i nt er r oga ti oncon du ct ed u nd er Kenyan a us pi ces . Al- ’O whal

i al s o u rges th at the o r al warni ng b y the A USAwas in capa bl e of cur in g the f lawe d
war ni ngs con tai nedinth e AO R. I n his vie w, the “ con tr adi ct io ns ” be tw eenth e AO R andth e or al
war ni ng w er e s o j ar r

in g that he “ couldno t h ave c om pr ehe nd ed the w ar ni ngs ,” an d the s tat eme nt s th at he m ade p r

io r to r ecei ving the o r al warni ng “ tai nt ed” all th at f ollo wed . Al -’ Owh aliB r . 10 0, 1 27. Because, as expla ined abov e, we see no serious flaw in the A OR and, therefore, nothing that needed to be “ cur ed” by the o r al warni ng, we r ejec t thi s challen ge. I n ad di ti on , we s ee n o co ntr adi ct io n b et ween th e AO R andth e or al warni ngs in s of ar as bo thof

th em a ccu r ate ly d es cr

ib ed Al- ’O whal

i’s r igh ts un der the U. S. C on sti tutio n a nd the ne ed to l oo k t o l oc a l l aw f or t he ef fe ct ua ti on of o ne of t ho se rig hts.
c. Defendants’ Wa iver of their Mi ran da Rights and their Subsequent Stateme nts Al-’Owhal i and Odeh c ontend that the conditions of their confinement made their Mi ran da
wa iv er s a nd sub seq ue nt st a te me nts i nv ol un ta ry . A l-’ Ow ha li urg es t ha t hi s “se cr eta nd re le ntl ess interrogation . . . over a ten da y period of incommunica do and solitary confinement in a Kenya n prison”
re nd er s a ll of t he sta te me nts h e m a de du rin g h is i nc a rc er a ti on , i nc lu di ng hi s Mi ran da waiv er , in vo lu nt ary. Al-’Owhal i Br. 111, 125. Acc ording to Al-’Owhali, hi s “only chanc e to escape this pr olonged isolation50

andin te r r oga ti on , an d t o h ave anatt or ney to con s ul t, was to con fe s s hi s invo lve men t i n the b om bi ng, whi ch w ouldenab le him to go t o Am er ica, whe r e he wouldhav e an a tt or ney .” Id
. at 1 13. Simila rly, Odeh argues that his “choice was not really be tween rema ining silent or talking, but betwe en talking to th e Ke nyan s alo ne o r

tal king t o them andth e Am er ican s .” O dehB r . 88 . T he c ir cum s tan ces inwhi ch he m ade thi s cho ice w er e “dis tu r bi ng, ” inhi s vie w, b ecau s e he agr eedto mak e a s tat eme nt on ly af te r having be en left alone with Kenya n police office rs , whom he a ccuses of having a “ reputation . . . for to r tu r e.” Id

. at 9 0. Wi thr es pec t t o wh ether th e wai ver was kn owi ng u nd er

th e Mi ran da fr ame wor k, Odeh argues that it was not beca use he did not “underst[and] that he had the option of delay ing the interrogation for even a day or two in order t o obtain counsel” a nd “wa s not pr ovided wi th the option of s peak in g wi thth e J or daniancon s ul ate , o r th e ch ance to con s ul t w

ith his wif e.” Id
. at 8 9- 90. We “will a ff

ir m a dis tr ict cou r t’ s con clu s io n that

a def end ant kn owi ngl y andvo lu nt ar

ily waiv ed hi s con s ti tu ti on al r

igh ts if any r eas on abl e vi ew o f the e vid enc e s up po r ts it .” Uni te d St ate s v . B ur ro us , 14 7 F.3d 111, 116 (2d C ir. 1998) (citation and inte rnal quotation marks omitted). Our inquiry into the kn owi ng a ndvo lu nt ar

in es s of a waiv er is “di r ect ed t o a d ef

end ant ’s s tat e of

mi nd , whichcan b e in fe r r ed fr om hi s act

io ns ands tat eme nt s .” United Sta tes v. Spencer, 995 F. 2d10, 11 ( 2dCir . 19 93) . T he e xis te nce of a knowing a nd voluntary wa iver does not, however, gua rantee that al l subs equent statements were
vo lu nt ar ily mad e. Ac cor di ngl

y, we cann ot

“di s pen s e with the v ol un tar in es s in quir

y” s im ply be caus e we det er mi ne that

a def end ant ’s waiv er

was val id
. Dickerso n , 530 U.S. a t 444. Neverthele ss , as the Supreme Court has observed, “cases in which a defendant ca n make a colorable a rgument that a self-incriminating
s tat eme nt was ‘co mp ell ed’ des pi te th e f act th at the l aw en fo r cem ent

autho r it ies adh er ed t o the dict ate s of Mi ran da ar e r ar e.” Id

. (citation and inte rnal quotation marks omitted).51 i. T he Mi

ran da Wa ivers We ob s er ve at th e ou ts et

th at Al- ’O whal

i was pr es ent ed w

ith the A OR, whi ch h e s ign ed, withi n
on e ho ur of hi s ar r es t i n K eny a. See

Pa r t I .A. 1, ante . I ni ti ally r ead t o him inEng lis h, th e f or m wa s tr ans lat ed o r ally in to Ar abi c inth e af te r no onof

th e s ame day, whi ch w as th e f ir s t d ay of hi s det ent

io n. Acco r di ngl

y, h e exe cut ed a Mi

ran da waiv er withi n h ou r s of

hi s ar r es t, andth er ef

or e, his con te nt

io n that his will wa s overbor ne by a n extended pe riod of detention runs counter to the facts. Similarly, on the
s eco ndday o f his det ent

io n, Od eh r ecei

vedth e AO R, as well

as an o r al Mi

ran da warning from the AUSA, and he signed the waiv er the same day. The District Court found that Odeh’s waiver was “not [the r es ul t] of

any c oer civ e co nd uct

onth e par t o f U .S. per s on nel ” an d “that he w as dr ive n t o t alk

in
or der to di s tan ce h im s elf

fr om th e em bas s y bo mb in g.” Bin La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2dat 2 13. Od eh’ s vagu e, u ns ub s tan ti ate d i nt im ati on s onapp eal that

Kenyan p er s on nel

pl ayeds om e ne fa r

io us r ol e in eli cit in g thi s waiv er , see

Odeh Br. 90 (noting “the reputation of the Kenyans for tor ture”), are not suppor ted by the record, we re not raised before the Dis trict Court, and are not suff icient, in a ny eve nt, to di s tu r b the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s fa ct ual

fi ndin gs . We ther ef

or e co ncl ud e that

th e Mi ran da waiv er s of

Al- ’O whal i an d O dehwer e exe cut ed v ol un tar ily
. T ur ni ng t o the ques ti onof whe th er th e wai ver s wer e exe cut ed kno win gly , we o bs er ve that on ly Odeh cha llenge s the Dis trict Court’s ruling on this s core. The Distr ict Court found: Od eh tol d th e A me ric a ns th a t he wa s co mfo rta bl e sp ea ki ng E ng li sh a nd tha t he wo ul d a sk clarifying que stions if he did not understand his r ights or anything else the ag ents s aid. A t no ti me didOd eh i ndicat e that he w as exp er

ien cin g co mp r ehe ns io n p r ob lem s du r in g the i nt er

vie w sess ions. Fur thermore, AUSA [redac ted] expla ined to Odeh his Miranda rights with a tr eme nd ou s degr ee o f c on s cien ti ou s nes s , p r ecis io n, anddet ail . O dehhi ms elf as kedAUS A [re da ct ed ] a nu mb erof f

ol lo w- up qu estio ns c on ce rni ng hi s rig hts, the re by

re ve a li ng Od eh ’s g ra sp of the salient iss ues. Because Odeh fully a ppreciated the fact that he wa s the “boss ” as to whether he w ould acc ede to questioning by A mericans, we find Odeh’ s waiver to be knowi ng and intelli gent. Bin La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2dat 2 12- 13 ( r edac ti ons ign als inor

igi nal ).52

Od eh c on te nd s th at his waiv er was no t kno win g be caus e he di d n ot kn ow that

he c oulddel ay interrogation in order to obt ain counsel a nd he wa s not of fered the opportunity to contact his consulate or his wife. Thes e assertions , even i f tr ue, hav e no bea ring on whether Odeh’s waiv er was made kn owi ngl y. Mi ran da do es no t r equ

ir e that a s us pec t b e in fo r medth at h e may de lay ques ti onin g, o bt ain
as s is tan ce f

r om hi s con s ul ate , o r

con tac t his wif

e, an d wh er e a de fe nd ant ’s “vo lu nt ary de cis io n t o s peak was made with full awa reness and comprehension of all the information Mi ran da requires the police to
con vey, th e wai

ver [ ] [i s ] v ali d. ” Mo ran

v. B ur bine, 47 5 U. S. 4 12, 424(1 986 ); see also Fa re v. M ic hael C. , 44 2 U.S . 70 7, 7 22 ( 197 9) (dis ti ngu is hi ng “ th e r equ es t f

or cou ns el f r om th e r equ es t f

or a pr ob ati onof

fi cer , a clergyma n, or a close friend. . . . [bec ause the latter] simply is not necessary, in the way an attorney is, for th e pr ot ect

io n o f the l egal

r igh ts of th e accu s ed. ”) . As a r es ul t, we r ejec t O deh ’s con te nt io n that hi s waiv er was no t m ade kno win gly
. We ther ef or e co ncl ud e that

bo thAl- ’O whal

i an d O dehkn owi ngl

y andvo lu nt ar

ily exec ut ed v ali d Mi ran da wa iv er s. ii. The Voluntariness of the Statements We no w co ns id er

th e qu es ti onof

whe th er th e cir cum s tan ces of

Al- ’O whal

i an d O deh ’s confinement rendered their statements involuntary. In order t o do so, “we must examine the total ity of the circumstances. Spec ifically , these circumstances include 1 ) the acc used’s characteristics, 2) the
con di ti on s of

th e in te r r oga ti on , an d 3 ) the c on du ct of th e po lic e.” Parsad v. Greiner , 33 7 F .3d175 , 18 3 (2 d Ci r . 20 03) (c it

in g Tankleff v. Senkowski

, 13 5 F .3d235 , 24 5 (

2dCir . 19 98) ); see also Dickerso n , 53 0 U. S. a t 434(d es cr ib in g the i nqui ry in to “wh ether a def end ant ’s will was ov er bo r ne b y the c ir cum s tan ces sur rounding the giving of a c onfess ion. . . . [as taking ] into consideration the totality of all the
sur rounding circumstances—both the characte rist ics of the accused a nd the details of the interrogation” (internal citation a nd quotation marks omitted))
.53

As described above, the Distr ict Court found that Al-’Owhali ha d a basic unde rs tanding of spoken English, recei ved two ye ars of univers ity-level e ducation, a nd was familia r with political a nd
wor ldeven ts . Bin La den , 132 F. Supp. 2d a t 179. With respect to the conditions of his confinement, the Di stri ctC ou rt fo un d th a t A l-’ Ow ha li wa s he ld in “i nc om mu ni ca do de te nti on ” f or fo urt ee n d a ys, a t fi rst ina te n- by- elev en f

oo t c ell andth en i n aneig

ht -b y- eig ht fo ot cell , an d d ur

in g thi s ti me, he r ecei

ved medical att ent io n “a s nee ded .” Id

. T he D is tr

ict Cou r t n ot ed “ [a] ph ot ogr aphof Al- ’O whal

i inhi s cell , tak en at s om e po in t d ur

in g hi s U.S . in te r r oga ti oninKenya, s ho w[i ng] hi m s miling an d s tr iki ng a tr iu mp han t p os e.” Id

. at 193. The District Court descr ibed the interrogation sessions , which w ere “in te r mi tt ent

andr eas on abl e indu r ati on ,” id. , a s fol lo ws: Al-’Owhal i was neve r in handcuffs dur ing any of his inter

views in Keny a. Al l interviews were held in a library-like room fitted with tables and cha irs. F requent breaks were take n to allow Al- ’O whal

i t o u s e the r es tr oo m, pr ay, an d eat . P r ayer br eaks las te d f

or abo ut 15 min ut es . Bott led wa ter was provided upon request; food was oft en provided by the a gents. No threats wer e ma de b y the U .S. agen ts , n or wer e any pr om is es mad e. Id
. at 1 78- 79 (

nu mb er in g omit te d) . T he D is tr

ict Cou r t al s o t oo k n ot e of

th e “ev id enc e that

Al- ’O whal

i
r egar dedhi s s es s io ns with [an F B I agen t] as a cat -a nd -m ou s e gam e be tw eentr ain ed p r of es s io nal s .” Id

. We hav e no r eas onto do ub t the D is tr ict Cou r t’ s con clu s io n that

Al- ’O whal

i was “a well -e du cat ed an d i nt ell

ige nt in di vid ual
. . . [wh os e] d eme ano r

bef or e the A mer

ican s was on e in di cat

ive of con fi den ce, n ot

of in ti mi dat io n. ” Id
. at 193. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record suggesting tha t th e c on du ctof A l-’ Ow ha li ’s i nte rrog a tor s wa s op pre ssiv e; qu it e t he co ntr a ry : t he y p er mi tte d b re a ks, pr ov id ed f oo d an d wat er , li mi te d the d ur ati onof th e s es s io ns , an d n ever

pl acedhi m i n r es tr ain ts . I nd eed , Al -’ Owh alido es no t ap pear to argue other

wis e, as hi s challen ge t o the v ol un tar in es s of hi s statements centers primarily on the circumstances of his incommunicado dete ntion in Kenya . The Di s tr ict Cou r t f ou ndth e co ndit

io ns of hi s con fi nem ent , “al th ough n on -i deal
. . . fa r fr om op pr es s ive .”A s n o te d e a r lie r , i n c o m m u n ic a d o d e te n tio n d e sc r ib e s d e te n tio n w ith o u t c o n ta c t w ith th e o u tsid e w o r ld a n d is 24 n o t t o b e c o n fu se d w it h so li tar y c o n fin e m e n t. 54 Id
. Al- ’O whal

i ar gue s , h owe ver , that

th e length o f t

im e he was hel d i n d et ent

io n i mp os ed “ te r r

ib le ps ych ol ogi cal an d co er civ e pr es s ur es ” onhi m. Al- ’O whal i B r . 11 6. Without minimizing

in any w ay the pote ntially c oercive e ffects of incommunica do detention las ti ng f or fo ur te en d ays , we m us t c on s id er this fa ct as on ly o ne d atapo in t— alb eit a s ignif ican t o ne—

in
ou r to ta li ty -of

-th e- ci rc um sta nc es a na ly sis. Cf. Un ited States v. Kiendra , 66 3 F .2d349 , 35 1 ( 1s t Ci r . 19 81) 24 (“[S]olitary confinement [for thirt y day s] . . . cannot be presumed to have w eake ned [a suspect’s] will to
s uchan ex te nt

th at h e was in com pet ent

to exer cis e hi s r

igh ts .”) . Weighi ng again s t the p ot ent ially
coe r civ e cir cum s tan ces of

Al- ’O whal

i’s con fi nem ent

ar e the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s car ef

ul fi ndin gs of

fa ct regarding Al-’Owha li’s personal characteristics (his educa tion, his knowledge of English and current
ev en ts, a nd hi s de me a no r) a nd the re stra in ed co nd uc t of hi s in te rrog a tor s (w ho ne ve r re sort ed to t hre a ts, promis es, or coercion to obtain information fr om him, and who informed him of his rights from the
ver y be gin ni ng) . I n ad di ti on , we m us t c on s id er th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s con clu s io n that what truly motivated A l-’Owhali to inc ulpate himself wa s his own overriding desire that he be tr iedinth e Unit ed S tat es . As he d ecla r ed t o the U .S. agen ts in te r viewin g hi m, it

was th e Unit ed States which w as his enemy, not Kenya . Particularly significa nt is the fact that the suggestion th at h e be tr

iedinAme r

ica w as init

iat ed e nt ir ely b y Al- ’O whal

i. A ndwhe n Al -’ Owh aliwas di s s ati s fi ed b y the l es s -than -f ir m as s ur ance s of

fe r ed i n the f

ir s t D OU , h e de man dedth at A USA [r edac te d] do bet te r . Bin La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2dat 1 94. T aki ng i nt o acc ou nt th e t ot ali ty

of th e cir cum s tan ces , as we m us t, we cannot conc lude that, bec ause Al-’Owha li wa s detained incommunic ado for four teen day s, the sta te me nts h e m a de a fte r w a iv in g h is Mi ran da rights were involuntary. The Distr ict Court’s clear finding th at the c on di ti on s of

Al- ’O whal

i’s det ent io n we r e no t c oer civ e is bu ttr es s ed b y s tr on g ev id enc e of Al- ’O wh a li ’s p er son a l i nte ll ig en ce a nd re sil ie nc e; the hu ma ne tre a tme nt h e r ec ei ve d fro m h is i nte rrog a tor s; and his own ac knowledg ment that a desire to come to the United Sta tes to air his grievanc es, and notBef or e t he D i s t r i ct C our t , O deh ar gued i n s uppor t of hi s i ni t i al m ot i on t o s uppr es s t hat hi s t r eat m ent at t he 25 han ds of t he Paki s t ani aut hor i t i es “ w as s o he i nous t hat a l eg i t i m at e ques t i on a r os e a s t o whet her D ef endant ’ s s ubs equent sta te m e n ts in K e n y a w e r e th e ‘fr u it o f th e p o iso n o u s tr e e .’ ” O d e h B r . 6 2 . H e h a s n o t re n e w e d th a t a r g u m e n t o n a p p e a l.

A s not ed abo ve, O deh m ake s va gue and uns ubs t ant i at ed acc us at i ons ab out t he r eput at i ons of t he Kenyan 26 p o l i c e b u t d o e s n o t c l a i m t h a t h e w a s a c t u a l l y mi s t r e a t e d b y t h e m. 55 coercion, c aused him to speak with U.S. age nts. All of this evidenc e militates powe rfully agai nst the potentially

coercive effects of his detention and in support of the findings of the District Court. For th es e r eas on s , we a ff

ir m the d ecis io n o f the D is tr ict Cou r t t hat th e s tat eme nt s mad e by

Al- ’O whal

i while inKenyan d et ent

io n we r e vo lu nt ary. Od eh d oes no t ar

gue exp lic it

ly that hi s po s t- war ni ng s tat eme nt s wer e ma de i nv ol un tar ily
. 25 Ne ve rth el ess, hi s a rgu me nts d ire ct ed ge ne ra ll y a ga in st th e v ol un ta rin ess o f hi s Mi ran da waiv er apply with equ al l ack o f f

or ce t o the s tat eme nt s he m ade ther eaf te r . T he o nly qu es ti onth at c on cer ns us inthis
r egar d i s whe th er , u nl

ike Al- ’O whal

i, O deh ’s fo ur te en- day i nco mm unicad o d et ent io n r end er ed invo lu nt ary hi s po s t- war ni ng s tat eme nt s . We co nclud e that it di d n ot . Li ke Al -’ Owh ali , O dehwas edu cat ed at th e unive r s it

y lev el. Bin La den , 13 2 F . Su pp . 2dat 2 06. I n ad di ti on , h e s peak s Eng lis h an d Ar abi c, an d r ecei

vedmilit ary t r ainin g an d ex per ien ce “f or s ever al year s ” inAf

gha ni s tan . Id

. Od eh w as hel d “i nco mm unicad o, ” li ke Al -’ Owh ali , f or fo ur te en d ays in Kenyan c us to dy. Id

. at 2 05. Du r

in g thi s ti me, th er e “we r e no th r eat s or pr om is es mad e,” andOd eh does not allege that he wa s mis treated. Id
. As the Distr

ict Court remarked, Odeh’s detention “c annot 26 be s aidto hav e in du cedhi s s tat eme nt s s in ce h e be gancon fe s s in g f r om th e ver

y f ir s t d ay of qu es ti onin g.” Id
. at 213. W e ag ree. Odeh beg an speaking with U.S. a gents the day a fter he arrived in Kenya from Pa kis tan . Id

. at 203. W e nee d not speculate on his reasons f or doing so, but that deci sion cannot be attr ib ut ed t o the c oer civ e ef

fe ct s of a f ou r te en- day d et ent

io n that was yet to com e. Ac cor di ngl

y, we conclude that, in light of the Distr ict Court’s findings r ega rding Odeh’s pers onal cha racteristics, the abs enc e of

op pr es s ive in te r r oga ti onmetho ds , an d his dec is io n t o s peak with U .S. of

fi cial s im mediat elyW h ile w e d o n o t fo r e c lo se th e p o ss ib ility th a t, a ft e r v o lu n ta r ily c h o o sin g to m a k e a sta te m e n t, a su sp e c t’s 27 s ubs equent i ncom m uni cado det ent i on m ay over power hi s ab i l i t y t o deci de t o di s cont i nue s pea ki ng , we s ee n o ev i dence i n t he r ecor d of

t hat her e. 56 upon encountering them, Ode h’s pos t-warning statements cannot be attributed to the coercive effects of his incommunicado de tention. 27 Acco r di ngl

y, we con clu de that

th e mo ti on s of

Al- ’O whal

i an d O dehto s up pr es s th eir in culpat or y s tat eme nt s wer e pr op erly d eni ed b y the D is tr ict Cou r t. III . CONCLUSI ON To s ummarize, w e hold: (1 ) T he i nculp ato ry s tat eme nt s of Al- ’O whal

i an d O dehth at w er e ob tai nedov er s eas by U .S. age nts were properly admitted at trial beca use (a) the oral warnings of the federal prosecutor s atisfied, andth e “Advic e of

Righ ts ” f or m s ign ed b y de fe nd ant s s ub s tan ti ally co mp lie d wi th , the g ov er nm ent ’s obligations, insofar as it had any, unde r Mi ran da v. A ri

zo na , 384 U.S. 4 36 (1966), and (b) the statements
wer e no t o bt ain ed i nv ol un tar ily fr om def end ant s invio lat

io n o f the F if

thAme nd men t; (2) The Dis trict Court did not violate Odeh’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by pe rmitting him to withdraw his initial suppress ion motion on religious grounds ; and (3) On a motion to reopen a suppres sion hearing, there is no bright-line rule that necessarily and invariably requires the government to pr ovide a reasonable justification for its f ailure to offer relevant evidenc e at a n earlier suppress ion proceeding . Acc ordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by reopening a suppr ession hearing at the gove rnment’s r equest, notwithstanding the gov er nm ent ’s failu r e t o p r ov id e a r eas on abl e ju s ti fi cat

io n f or no t o ff er in g the e vid enc e at

an ea rlie r pro ce ed in g b ec a use no suc h j usti fic a ti on is re qu ire d i n a ll ca ses.57

For these reasons, and for those set f orth in In re Te rror

ist Bombings of U.S. Emb assies in East Africa ,

__ F. 3d
__ (2 d Ci r . 20 08) , the j ud gm ent s of con vic ti onent er ed b y the D is tr ict Cou r t ag ain s t Al- ’O whal

i andOd eh ar e AFFIRMED in a ll re spe ct s.