[Cite as State v. Bell, 2017-Ohio-8959.] 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 13, 2017 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Soumyajit Dutta, for Defendant-Appellant. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

JAMES BELL, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NO. C-160608 

 TRIAL NO. B-1401726 

 O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 2

MILLER, Judge.

{¶1} Following a jury trial, James Bell was convicted of aggravated 

burglary, aggravated robbery, two counts of felonious assault, and kidnapping—each 

with an accompanying firearm specification—and having a weapon while under a 

disability. The trial court imposed an aggregate term of 52 years of incarceration. 

We affirm. 

A Home Invasion and a Kidnapping 

{¶2} Returning home one evening, Cortaize Parker and Aunise Brown, 

along with their two children, parked near the backdoor of the family’s townhouse. 

Parker went inside, while Brown started to get the children out of their car seats. 

Parker heard screams, opened the backdoor, and saw an unidentified man holding 

Brown and the children at gunpoint. A second unidentified man entered Parker’s 

house, shot Parker in the leg, and let a third man in through the front door. Parker 

identified Bell as the third man. Parker suffered multiple gunshot wounds from Bell 

and the unknown assailant. While Parker lay bleeding, the two men ransacked 

Parker and Brown’s home, stole money, and left. 

{¶3} Parker called 9-1-1. He did not identify Bell by name during the call. 

Parker was transported to the hospital and, almost immediately upon his arrival, was 

questioned by police officer Adam Wood. Parker told Officer Wood that one of the 

men involved was “James,” who Parker knew as the brother of Brown’s best friend, 

Melanzie Williams. At the hospital, Parker also separately identified Bell to 

Detective Dustin Weekly. Parker did not speak with Brown before identifying Bell to 

police. 

{¶4} Meantime, the three perpetrators forced Brown to leave her children in 

the townhouse’s parking lot and abducted her. They drove her to the apartment of 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 3 

Brown’s cousin, Sharon Brown. The men force Brown to lie on a bed while they 

rummaged through a back room. 

{¶5} Once the men left, Brown immediately called her mother, Anita 

Brown, and asked Anita to get Brown’s children. Brown next called 9-1-1. She told 

the 9-1-1 operator that she could not identify any of the men involved. Police 

responded to Sharon’s apartment and immediately questioned Brown. She did not 

identify Bell. 

{¶6} At trial, Brown, who knew Bell, stated that Bell had a very distinctive 

voice, and that she recognized his voice during the car ride from her home to 

Sharon’s. Brown also testified that, as soon as the men had left Sharon’s apartment, 

she opened the front door of the apartment and saw Bell in the hallway. 

{¶7} The defense questioned Brown about her failure to name Bell at the 

scene or on the 9-1-1 call. Brown explained that she was too preoccupied with her 

children’s safety to initially identify Bell. However, she thought she had told police 

later on that night that one of the perpetrators was “James Williams,” Melanzie 

Williams’s brother. At the time, Brown didn’t know that James and Melanzie had 

different last names. The defense also cross-examined Brown concerning her 

connection to other possible suspects, including a man named Damon Kirkenhall 

whose fingerprints were found at the scene. She denied knowing Kirkenhall. 

{¶8} Two days after the home invasion, Parker picked Bell out of a 

photographic lineup. Within a month, Anita Brown received a handwritten, 

unsigned letter that included details referencing the home invasion and kidnapping. 

Anita Brown put the letter into a plastic bag, and 14 months later turned the letter 

over to police. Police tested the letter. Bell’s fingerprints were on it. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 4

{¶9} Bell testified in his own defense. He admitted that he wrote the letter 

but denied involvement in the home invasion and kidnapping. He testified that he 

had been at Sharon’s apartment complex selling drugs all day, and that he had seen 

Brown being dragged from a car and forced to go to an apartment. Bell claimed that 

he grabbed an AK-47, and went to Sharon Brown’s apartment to investigate and 

help. According to Bell, it was at this point that Brown saw him. 

{¶10} The court limited Bell in his cross-examination of Parker, Brown and 

Detective Weekly. According to a proffer Bell made to the court, Bell wanted to 

cross-examine these witnesses to present evidence that Brown and Parker had had a 

troubled relationship, including a specific incident where Brown had stabbed Parker, 

just two weeks prior to the home invasion, and to propose that Brown had 

orchestrated the home invasion and shooting as a way to “get back” at Parker. The 

defense wanted to suggest that it was Brown’s brother, Antonio Brown, along with 

Kirkenhall, who had shot Parker, and that Brown wanted to set up Bell to protect 

herself and the real assailants. 

Argument and Analysis 

{¶11} Bell was denied his right to cross-examination, but the 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In his first assignment 

of error, Bell contends that the trial court violated his right to due process of law and 

his right to confront the witnesses against him when it refused to let him present his 

defense. More specifically, Bell challenges the trial court’s rulings precluding him 

from cross-examining Parker about Brown allegedly stabbing him; cross-examining 

Brown about familial connections between herself and Kirkenhall that would tend to 

show that Brown knew Kirkenhall well; and cross-examining Detective Weekly, who 

had interviewed Parker at the hospital, about whether he thought that Parker was 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 5

dishonest. Bell also contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to 

question one of his own witnesses, investigating officer Justin Hussell, concerning 

text messages found on Brown’s cell phone. 

{¶12} The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution gives the accused the right to confront the witnesses against him; 

however, it “guarantees only ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not 

cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 

defense might wish.’ ” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 

N.E.2d 596, ¶ 83, quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 

L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). Accordingly, the court has “ ‘wide latitude * * * to impose 

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other 

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or 

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’ ” (Emphasis deleted.) 

State v. Warmus, 197 Ohio App.3d 383, 2011-Ohio-5827, 967 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 64 (8th 

Dist.), quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). “To establish a Confrontation Clause violation, the defendant 

must show that he was ‘prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate crossexamination’ and ‘[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different 

impression of [the witness’s] credibility had [the defendant’s] counsel been 

permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.’ ” Id., quoting Van 

Arsdall at 680. 

{¶13} Bell was permitted to draw some inferences regarding Brown’s alleged 

set-up of him. Specifically, the defense asked Brown about her failure to initially 

identify Bell to investigating officers or in the 9-1-1 call, and about her alleged 

connection to Kirkenhall, whose fingerprints were found at the scene. However, the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 6

trial court should have permitted Bell to continue with this line of questioning when 

cross-examining Brown, and should also have allowed Bell to ask Parker and Brown 

about their allegedly acrimonious relationship. According to Bell’s proffer, Brown 

knew Kirkenhall through family connections, and would have tried to protect him. 

Further, Brown allegedly had a motive to hurt Parker—namely, her troubled 

relationship with him that had supposedly lead to Brown stabbing Parker just two 

weeks before the home invasion. Allowing Bell to question Brown and Parker about 

these matters raise none of the concerns cited in Van Arsdall. This line of 

questioning was key to Bell’s defense. 

{¶14} While we find that the trial court erred in limiting Bell’s crossexamination of Brown and Parker, we hold that the error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In Van Arsdall, the United States Supreme Court held that a 

Confrontation Clause error is subject to a harmless-constitutional-error analysis. The 

correct inquiry, is “assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination 

were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Van Arsdall at 684. Whether the error is 

harmless depends on a number of factors, including: the importance of the witness’s 

testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 

presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the 

witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and 

the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Id. 

{¶15} Here, there is no doubt that Brown’s testimony was important. Only 

she and Parker identified Bell. But Parker identified Bell, who he knew through 

Melanzie Williams, to two officers shortly following the shooting. And Parker 

testified that he had not spoken to Brown before being questioned by police. This 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 7

evidence strongly discredits the defense’s proposed theory. Even if the defense had 

been allowed to argue that Brown had set up Bell, Bell would be hard-pressed to 

establish that Brown was able to convince Parker during his ambulance ride to the 

hospital to frame Bell. Further, Bell sent a handwritten letter to Brown’s mother that 

referenced the crimes at issue. Given Parker’s eyewitness identification and the 

letter, combined with the overall strength of the state’s case and the crossexamination that the court did permit, we hold that the damaging potential of Bell’s 

proffer was negligible, at best. Accordingly, the error by the trial court was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶16} In regard to Detective Weekly’s testimony, we hold that the trial court 

properly excluded the detective’s testimony concerning Parker’s truthfulness. See 

State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 128, 545 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), overruled in part 

on other grounds, State v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St.3d 5, 2007-Ohio-5267, 875 N.E.2d 

944 (holding that it is error to allow a witness to comment on the credibility of 

another witness). 

{¶17} Finally, Bell takes issue with what he characterizes as the trial court’s 

ruling that precluded him, on direct examination, from asking one of the 

investigating officers about text messages found on Brown’s phone that allegedly 

referenced a “JB”—James Bell. However, the trial court did not deny Bell the 

opportunity to ask this. Instead, the court sustained a proper objection that 

counsel’s question was leading. Upon rephrasing the question, the detective 

responded that he did not have anything written in his notes or recall anything about 

the text messages. 

{¶18} Bell’s first assignment of error is overruled. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 8 

{¶19} The letter was properly authenticated. In his second 

assignment of error, Bell argues that the letter he wrote should not have been 

admitted into evidence because the state failed to establish a chain of custody and 

also failed to adequately link Bell to the letter. 

{¶20} “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 

precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that 

the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Evid.R. 901(A); Great Seneca 

Fin. v. Felty, 170 Ohio App.3d 737, 2006-Ohio-6618, 869 N.E.2d 30, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). 

We review the trial court’s judgment for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sage, 31 

Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶21} Establishing a chain of custody is part of Evid.R. 901(A)’s 

authentication requirement. It is well-established that the state is not required to 

prove a perfect chain of custody. State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 57, quoting State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 662, 693 

N.E.2d 246 (1993). Here, Anita Brown testified that she received the letter within a 

month of the crimes at issue. She put the letter in a plastic bag and gave it to police 

approximately 14 months later. This established the chain of custody. Bell contends 

that the state was required to prove who had access to the letter before and after 

Anita Brown received it. It did not. Bell’s argument goes to the weight of the 

evidence, instead. 

{¶22} Next Bell argues that the state didn’t establish that Bell had written the 

letter. Evid.R. 901(B) provides examples of authentication or identification 

conforming with the requirements of Evid.R. 901(A). Evid.R. 901(B)(4) is 

instructive. That subsection, entitled “Distinctive Characteristics and the Like,”

provides that “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 9

distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances” can be used to 

authenticate evidence. In this case, Anita Brown testified that she received the letter 

within a few weeks after the events in question. Detective Weekly testified that the 

letter appeared to reference events relating to the case. Detective Weekly ran the 

letter for fingerprints and discovered one of Bell’s on the letter. Based on the timing 

of the letter, the references in it relating to the case, and the presence of Bell’s 

fingerprint, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 

state had laid a proper foundation for the admission of the letter. 

{¶23} Bell’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶24} Matters outside the record will not be reviewed on direct 

appeal. In his third assignment of error, Bell argues that he was denied the 

effective assistance of trial counsel. Bell claims that counsel was ineffective for (1) 

failing to offer into evidence the notes of one of the investigating officers; (2) failing 

to offer into evidence an audio recording of the interview between Parker and 

Detective Weekley at the hospital; (3) misplacing notes from an investigating officer, 

Detective Meyer, that may have included exculpatory statements from Brown; and 

(4) failing to subpoena Detective Meyer to testify. 

{¶25} The state is correct that all of these assertions reference matters 

outside of the record, and therefore that this argument is not proper on direct appeal. 

See Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 13; 

State v. Wyche, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160678, 2017-Ohio-7041, ¶ 4. Bell’s third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶26} No evidence of judicial bias. In his fourth assignment of error, 

Bell contends that his due-process rights were violated because the court exhibited 

judicial bias. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 10

{¶27} Judicial bias is demonstrated by “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or 

undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the 

formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as 

contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law 

and the facts.” State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 132 N.E.2d 191 

(1956), paragraph four of the syllabus; see State v. Loudermilk, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-160487, 2017-Ohio-7378 (applying Weygandt). 

{¶28} The trial judge here was short with defense counsel at times, especially 

during counsel’s proffer of Bell’s proposed defense. However, the record contains no 

evidence that the trial judge reached any decision based on bias against Bell. Bell 

points to his severe sentence as evidence of bias. However, given the nature of these 

crimes—a home invasion and shooting, a kidnapping, and the ransacking of two 

homes—the sentence was justified. Further, Bell does not contest his sentence on 

appeal. Bell’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶29} Bell’s convictions are not against the weight of the 

evidence. In his fifth and final assignment of error, Bell contends that his 

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. They were not. While 

Bell presented a version of events that, if believed, would have exonerated him, there 

is no indication that in weighing the evidence presented the jury “so lost its way” as 

to create a manifest miscarriage of justice warranting a new trial. See State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The fifth assignment of 

error is overruled. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 11

Conclusion

{¶30} Bell’s convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, two 

counts of felonious assault, kidnapping, and having a weapon while under a 

disability, and the accompanying firearm specifications, are affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

ZAYAS, P.J., and DETERS, J., concur.

Please note: 

The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.