Order 2010-7-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Issued by the Department of Transportation

on the 6th day of July, 2010

 

 Served: July 6, 2010

FINAL ORDER

SUMMARY

By this Order, we make final our tentative findings and conclusions set forth in Order 2010-5-7, 

and allocate four available slot pairs for daily scheduled combination services between the 

United States and Tokyo’s Haneda Airport, as follows: 1) one slot pair to Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 

(Hawaiian) for its proposed Honolulu-Haneda service;1 2) two slot pairs to Delta Air Lines, Inc. 

(Delta) for its proposed Los Angeles-Haneda and Detroit-Haneda services; and 3) one slot pair to 

American Airlines, Inc. (American) for its proposed New York (JFK)-Haneda service. We also 

make final our tentative decision not to award backup authority in this case. 

BACKGROUND

On December 11, 2009, the United States and Japan initialed the text of a Memorandum of 

Understanding (“2009 MOU”), providing for an Open-Skies regime between the two countries. 

The 2009 MOU permits U.S. and Japanese air carriers to provide scheduled combination 

services between the United States and Tokyo’s Haneda Airport when Haneda’s fourth runway 

becomes operational.2

 1 In this regard, we also make final our tentative decision to award Hawaiian exemption authority for its proposed 

services.

 Four daily slot pairs will be available to carriers from each country to 

provide these services. The scheduled operations will also be subject to the following 

conditions: 1) U.S. operations at Haneda will be permitted between 2200 and 0700 hours local 

time; 2) departures from Haneda to a point in the 48 contiguous U.S. states are not permitted 

prior to midnight; and 3) extra sections are not permitted.

2 Operational use of the fourth runway is currently scheduled to begin October 31, 2010. 

In the Matter of 

2010 U.S.-HANEDA COMBINATION 

SERVICES ALLOCATION PROCEEDING

 Docket DOT-OST-2010-0018
2

By Order 2010-1-17, issued January 26, 2010, the Department instituted the 2010 U.S.-Haneda 

Combination Services Allocation Proceeding, inviting interested U.S. carriers to apply for 

allocation of the four newly available pairs of slots for U.S.-Haneda scheduled combination 

services.3 The Order also set forth a procedural schedule and evidentiary requirements for the

establishment of a record for the Department to make a decision in this case. 

Six carriers – American, Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), Continental Micronesia, Inc. 

(Continental Micronesia), Delta, Hawaiian, and United Air Lines, Inc. (United) filed applications 

for the four available slot pairs to provide daily combination services in the U.S.-Tokyo 

(Haneda) market. Carriers that requested more than one slot pair were required to prioritize their 

requests. The requests, indicating the carrier-determined precedence, are outlined immediately 

below.

American requested two slot pairs for daily service from both New York (JFK) and Los Angeles 

using B777 aircraft. Joint applicants Continental and Continental Micronesia requested one slot 

pair for Continental for daily service from Newark using B777 aircraft and one slot pair for 

Continental Micronesia for daily service from Guam using B767 aircraft. Delta requested four 

slot pairs for daily services from Seattle, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Honolulu, and proposes to 

use B747 aircraft for all routes with the exception of Seattle, for which it proposes to use A330 

aircraft. Hawaiian requested two slot pairs and proposes to use both for daily services from 

Honolulu using B767 aircraft. United requested one slot pair for daily service from San 

Francisco using B777 aircraft. 

After examining the complete record of applications and responsive pleadings, by 

Order 2010-5-7, issued May 7, 2010, we tentatively decided to allocate the four available slot 

pairs for daily scheduled combination services between the United States and Tokyo’s Haneda 

Airport, as follows: 1) one slot pair to Hawaiian for its proposed Honolulu-Haneda service; 

2) two slot pairs to Delta for its proposed Los Angeles-Haneda and Detroit-Haneda services; and 

3) one slot pair to American for its proposed New York (JFK)-Haneda service. We tentatively 

decided not to award backup authority in this case. We also tentatively awarded Hawaiian 

underlying economic authority to engage in its proposed services. We allowed 10 calendar days 

for the filing of objections to our tentative decision and seven calendar days for responses to 

objections.

Delta filed comments to our tentative decision stating that it is pleased by the Department’s 

selection of its Los Angeles and Detroit proposals to provide service to Haneda and requests that 

the Department finalize its decision as quickly as possible. Continental/Continental Micronesia, 

Hawaiian, United, and the San Francisco International Airport (SFO) filed objections to our 

tentative decision.4

 Responses to objections were filed by American, Delta, Hawaiian, and the 

Delta Master Executive Council of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (Delta MEC). 

 3 We instituted this proceeding in advance of the effective date of the 2009 MOU to provide U.S. carriers the 

opportunity to fully utilize the new rights when they become available. 

4 In its objection, SFO moved for leave to file one day late. In the interest of a complete record in this proceeding, 

we will grant the request.
3

RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

Objections of Continental/Continental Micronesia, Hawaiian, and United5

Continental and Continental Micronesia (joint applicants) do not contest the tentative awards

but do object to the Department’s tentative decision not to award them backup authority.6

Hawaiian states that it is pleased with the Department’s tentative decision to award it one slot 

pair for Honolulu-Haneda service but objects that it was not awarded a second Honolulu-Haneda 

slot pair. Hawaiian asserts that it is entering a market that is overwhelmingly dominated by U.S. 

and Japanese alliance carriers and argues that an award of two slot pairs would enhance its 

competitive position against entrenched incumbents in the U.S.-Tokyo market.7 Hawaiian 

makes note of Honolulu-Tokyo service reductions announced by Japan Airlines International 

Co., Ltd. (JAL) and asserts that an award to Hawaiian of a second slot pair would address the job 

and revenue losses in Hawaii that it claims would result from JAL’s service reductions.

8

 It 

maintains that the public benefits associated with the selection of its second daily HonoluluHaneda flight would exceed those offered by the Department’s other tentative selections and 

contends that the Department should alter its tentative decision and grant Hawaiian a second slot 

pair for Honolulu-Haneda service. 

United contends that its San Francisco-Haneda proposal offers the strongest combination of 

local and connecting service at both ends of the route and would benefit more U.S.-originating 

passengers than would any of the other proposals at issue. It urges the Department to reconsider 

its tentative decision and award United a single slot pair in preference either to Hawaiian’s 

Honolulu service or Delta’s Detroit or Los Angeles service.9 

United is critical of the Department’s tentative selection of Hawaiian. United contends that

(1) Hawaiian will be able to initiate Honolulu-Narita service once the U.S.-Japan Open-Skies 

Agreement takes effect, and (2) there is no evidence that Hawaiian, as a new entrant, can or will 

institute Honolulu-Tokyo service only if it can serve Haneda. United also maintains that, if a 

separate Haneda market does exist, all of the applicants in the proceeding would be new entrants 

at Haneda and Hawaiian is not entitled to favored treatment as a new entrant carrier in the 

U.S.-Haneda market. It asserts that, although an award to Hawaiian would add another 

competitor on an already well-served and competitive nonstop route, it will generate no 

competitive or service benefits for U.S. mainland passengers. United states that 

 5 SFO also filed an objection requesting that the Department reconsider its tentative decision and award one slot pair 

to United for San Francisco-Haneda service. 6 Specifically, the joint applicants state that Continental’s Newark-Haneda proposal should be selected for backup 

authority to Delta’s Detroit-Haneda and American’s New York (JFK) awards, and Continental Micronesia’s 

Guam-Haneda proposal should be selected for backup authority to Hawaiian’s Honolulu-Haneda award. 7 Hawaiian Objection, at 2. 8 Hawaiian Objection, at 3-4. 9 United notes that although it does not challenge the Department’s tentative decision to award one of the four 

available slot pairs to American for Haneda service from New York, it takes issue with the Department’s tentative 

finding that an award to American should enhance alliance competition by improving the competitive posture of the 

oneworld alliance in the U.S.-Asia market as compared to the Star and Skyteam alliances. 
4

Honolulu-Haneda traffic is overwhelmingly Japanese-originating leisure traffic and Hawaiian’s 

service would therefore provide little benefit to U.S.-originating passengers. Finally, United 

contends that Hawaiian’s service will not materially benefit the Hawaiian tourist economy unless 

the service draws Japanese leisure passengers who otherwise would not visit Hawaii, and it states 

that the record does not indicate that to be the case.

10

In addressing the tentative awards to Delta, United asserts that Delta already dominates 

U.S.-Tokyo services, and maintains that the Department should not have awarded multiple slot 

pairs to Delta over an award of a single slot pair to United. United also questions the capacity 

benefits associated with Delta’s proposed use of B747 aircraft.

11

With regard to Delta’s tentative award for Detroit-Haneda service, United maintains that the 

small size of the Detroit-Tokyo local Origin & Destination (O&D) market alone should have 

disqualified Delta from receiving an award for Detroit, and argues that the San Francisco-Tokyo 

market is four times larger than Detroit-Tokyo.

12 While United concedes that Delta offers 

extensive connections from its Detroit hub, United claims that many of those passengers that 

would connect at Detroit have better options for Tokyo travel. United also contends that, given 

the Department’s tentative selection of American at New York (JFK), Delta’s Detroit service is 

less attractive because a disproportionately high percentage of Detroit’s potential connecting 

passengers would be from the New York/New Jersey area.

United agrees with the Department’s finding of a need for Haneda service from a west coast 

gateway, but argues that its San Francisco proposal is preferable to Delta’s proposed service at 

Los Angeles, because it would benefit both local and connecting passengers. United 

acknowledges that the Los Angeles-Tokyo local O&D market is larger than

San Francisco-Tokyo, but states that Delta would offer almost no connections via Los Angeles, 

and no connections that United itself would not offer from San Francisco. United claims that 

despite the relative local market sizes, its San Francisco-Tokyo service would be of benefit to 

almost twice as many passengers as Delta’s Los Angeles proposal when local plus connecting 

passengers are combined.13

 

 

Answers of American, Delta, and Hawaiian14

American states that the Department correctly concluded that the second largest mainland 

U.S.-Tokyo market should receive new Haneda service and requests that the Department make 

final without delay its proposed award of one slot pair to American for service from New York 

(JFK). With respect to the alliance competition comments made by United in its objection, 

American states that the Department’s analysis correctly reflected that an award to American 

should enhance U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Asia alliance competition. American notes that under 

JAL’s reorganization plan, that airline proposes to retire all of its B747-400 aircraft by the end of 

2011, reduce its (New York) JFK-Tokyo service, and terminate service at Kona. American 

 10 United Objection, at 7-8. 11 United Objection, at 11. 12 United Objection, at 9. 13 United Objection, at 10-11. 14 The Delta MEC also filed an answer in support for the Department’s tentative selection of Delta to provide 

Haneda service from Detroit and Los Angeles
5

states that, as a result of JAL’s reorganization, oneworld’s comparative ranking with Star and 

Skyteam will diminish.15 With respect to Hawaiian, American states that the Department 

appropriately declined to award half of the available slots to a single route, particularly 

Honolulu, that is dominated by Japan-originating leisure traffic and which Hawaiian could serve 

from Narita.16 In response to Continental’s request that the Department grant it backup authority 

at Newark for American’s New York (JFK)-Haneda award, American asserts that the 

Department clearly articulated its rationale for not selecting backup awards in its tentative 

decision. However, American states that, should the Department accept Continental’s position, 

American has no objection to an award of backup authority to Continental because it has no 

intention of leaving the JFK-Haneda route unserved. 

Delta asserts that there is nothing in the objections of United, Continental/Continental 

Micronesia, or Hawaiian that would justify changes to the Department’s tentative decision. 

Delta states that the Department carefully considered Hawaiian’s request for a second slot pair 

for Honolulu-Haneda service, but found that Honolulu did not merit a second award at the 

expense of important mainland gateways including Los Angeles, Detroit, and New York. With 

respect to the request of Continental and Continental Micronesia for backup authority, Delta 

states that the Department correctly declined to award backup authority in the unique 

circumstances of this case. Specifically, Delta states that the selected carriers are well-positioned 

to begin new Haneda services. Delta further states that should the pending application of 

United/Continental/ANA (Star) for antitrust immunity be approved, Continental’s Star alliance 

will be the largest player in the U.S.-Japan market, a consideration that the Department would 

clearly want to evaluate on the basis of a fresh record in the unlikely event it needs to select a 

backup carrier. Delta disagrees with United’s claim that Delta would offer no Haneda 

connections from Los Angeles other than from Las Vegas. Delta notes that it has a 

comprehensive domestic marketing alliance with Alaska/Horizon that will enhance connecting 

opportunities for Delta passengers at Los Angeles.17 With regard to United’s objections to 

Delta’s award for service from Detroit, Delta asserts that the strength of its Detroit hub will 

enable service that will ensure maximum U.S.-Haneda convenience and connectivity from the 

greatest number of U.S. cities. 

Hawaiian states that the Department correctly recognized in its tentative decision that Hawaiian 

is a true new entrant in the U.S.-Tokyo market. It further states that its proposal will benefit the 

state of Hawaii, its citizens, the Hawaiian economy, and travelers in the Hawaii-Tokyo market. 

Hawaiian maintains that those important benefits far exceed any alleged benefits arising from 

United’s duplicative California-Tokyo service, and states that the arguments raised by United in

its objection have already been considered and rejected by the Department.

DECISION

We have decided to make final our tentative decision to allocate four available slot pairs for daily 

scheduled combination services between the United States and Tokyo’s Haneda Airport, as 

follows: 1) one slot pair to Hawaiian for its proposed Honolulu-Haneda service; 2) two slot pairs 

 15 American Answer, at 3-4. 16 American Answer, at 5. 17 Delta Answer, at 2.
6

to Delta for its proposed Los Angeles-Haneda and Detroit-Haneda services; and 3) one slot pair 

to American for its proposed New York (JFK)-Haneda service. We also make final our tentative 

decision not to award backup authority in this case. Further, we make final our tentative decision 

to award Hawaiian underlying economic authority to engage in its proposed services.18

As we noted in our tentative decision, Haneda services have been limited to primarily domestic 

operations and the airport has been unavailable to U.S. carriers for scheduled international 

operations since 1978. U.S. carriers have been limited to operating U.S.-Tokyo scheduled 

services at Tokyo’s Narita airport. The 2009 MOU presents us with a unique opportunity to 

facilitate the return of more convenient U.S.-Tokyo access for the traveling public. We further 

noted that, in past cases where we have had an opportunity to introduce or re-introduce service to 

an area that has long been unavailable to U.S. carriers, the Department has typically attempted, 

where possible, to satisfy diverse public interest objectives and needs in selecting carrier 

proposals for award of the available rights.19 Similarly, in this proceeding, the ability to allocate 

slot pairs to enable four daily U.S.-Haneda services allows us to reintroduce convenient 

U.S.-Tokyo access while addressing a variety of important public interest objectives. We 

tentatively determined that such an approach would best serve the public interest and we affirm 

that position here. 

Against that background, we tentatively concluded that the proposals of Hawaiian at Honolulu, 

Delta at Los Angeles and Detroit, and American at New York (JFK), would provide the most 

effective access to Haneda and result in the greatest degree of overall public interest benefits.

The award of one slot pair to Hawaiian for service from Honolulu would not only bring a new 

entrant to the Tokyo market, but also would achieve the important objective of enhancing 

competition in the largest overall U.S.-Tokyo market and provide important benefits to the

Hawaiian economy. The selection of Delta for Haneda service from Los Angeles would provide 

Haneda access to what is, by far, the largest mainland U.S.-Tokyo market and would inject 

significant capacity into the U.S.-Tokyo market by Delta’s use of B747 aircraft. An award to 

Delta for Haneda service from Detroit would provide a large central and eastern U.S. catchment 

area with convenient Haneda service through a proven U.S.-Asia hub and again provide 

significant capacity. American’s proposed service from New York (JFK) would provide Haneda 

access to the second largest mainland U.S.-Tokyo market and enhance alliance competition in 

the U.S.-Asia and U.S.-Japan markets. 

Taking into consideration the full range of benefits provided by the tentatively selected 

proposals, and having reviewed the objections and answers filed by the parties to our tentative 

decision, we have determined that no party has brought to our attention any new argument that 

warrants a different conclusion. We address the arguments of the objecting carriers below.

With respect to Hawaiian’s assertion that we did not adequately consider its request for a second 

slot pair, we are cognizant that an award of a second Honolulu-Haneda slot pair to Hawaiian 

would enhance its competitive presence in the Honolulu-Tokyo market and may also result in 

 18 As we stated in our tentative decision, our findings here are made on each application’s merits, and have not been 

considered in conjunction with, nor have we pre-judged the outcome of, the oneworld (American/JAL) and Star 

(Continental/United/ANA) applications for antitrust immunity pending before the Department. 19 Order 2010-5-7, at 8.
7

further economic benefit to the state of Hawaii. However, in reaching our tentative decision, we 

determined that any additional benefits that may result from an award of a second slot pair to 

Hawaiian for Honolulu-Haneda service would not outweigh the competitive and service benefits 

that would likely result from our other tentative selections of Delta’s Los Angeles and Detroit 

proposals and American’s New York (JFK) proposal. Specifically, selection of Delta’s Los 

Angeles proposal and American’s New York (JFK) proposal would provide Haneda service to 

the two largest mainland U.S.-Tokyo markets, and selection of Delta’s Detroit proposal would 

provide Haneda service to the largest behind-gateway catchment area in the proceeding through 

a proven hub. These selections fulfill important and diverse public interest objectives. Hawaiian

has not presented any new arguments that persuade us that the overall public interest would be 

furthered by the award of a second slot pair for its Honolulu-Haneda service, which would 

require us to forgo the significant and diverse benefits provided by our selections. Thus, we 

affirm our tentative decision to award Hawaiian one slot pair for Honolulu-Haneda service.

We fully considered United’s assertion that its San Francisco-Haneda proposal offers the 

strongest combination of local and connecting service at both ends of the route and would benefit 

more U.S.-originating passengers than would any of the other proposals at issue. In formulating 

our tentative decision, however, we determined that Delta’s Los Angeles proposal represented 

the most compelling west coast gateway option. It would maximize public benefits by providing 

service in the largest west coast and mainland U.S.-Tokyo market, and would do so while 

providing more capacity than would the other west coast proposals, and while offering

connecting opportunities to Tokyo traffic from the western United States.20 Selection of a 

second west coast service would undermine our ability to address the diversity of objectives we 

had identified, namely: the introduction of new competition in the U.S.-Tokyo market; the need 

for U.S.-Haneda service in the largest mainland U.S.-Tokyo O&D markets; the need to provide a 

large central and eastern U.S. catchment area with convenient Haneda service through a proven 

U.S.-Asia hub; and, the benefit of enhancing alliance competition in the U.S.-Tokyo and 

U.S.-Asia markets. We tentatively concluded that the four selected gateways for U.S.-Haneda 

services, and the carriers selected at each such gateway to provide those services, would make 

effective use of the limited U.S.-Haneda opportunities available to U.S. carriers and widen 

U.S.-Haneda access, consistent with our goal of addressing the various public interest 

objectives.21

We have carefully considered the arguments of United and SFO and are not persuaded to reach a 

different approach or outcome. We appreciate, as we said in the show-cause Order, that United’s 

service would generate benefits. However, given the limited number of slot opportunities 

available and the public benefits to be realized from geographically diverse Haneda access, we 

believe that the diverse combination of benefits achieved by finalizing our tentative selections, as 

outlined above, outweighs the benefits associated with a second west coast service at San 

Francisco.

Having considered the relative merits of the various proposals, arguments, and objections 

presented in this proceeding, we have decided to make final our tentative decision to allocate

four available slot pairs for daily scheduled combination services between the United States and 

 20 Order 2010-5-7, at 9-10. 21 Order 2010-5-7, at 11.
8

Tokyo’s Haneda Airport, as follows: 1) one slot pair to Hawaiian for its proposed 

Honolulu-Haneda service; 2) two slot pairs to Delta for its proposed Los Angeles-Haneda and 

Detroit-Haneda services; and 3) one slot pair to American for its proposed New York (JFK)-

Haneda service. We find that the four selected proposals will offer public benefits that, on 

balance, outweigh the benefits of the proposals we were not able to select. 

BACKUP AWARD

As a final matter, in our tentative decision, we outlined our rationale for electing not to award 

backup authority in this case.22 We have considered the arguments of Continental and 

Continental Micronesia with respect to backup authority and are not persuaded to alter our

tentative decision. The record in this proceeding indicates that the selected carriers are 

committed to inaugurating their U.S.-Haneda services in a timely manner. Furthermore, as we 

also stated in our tentative decision, should any of the selected carriers not begin its proposed 

services, the public interest would be best served by allowing us to award any unused rights on 

the basis of a fresh record. Accordingly, we have decided to make final our tentative decision 

not to award backup authority. 

ECONOMIC AUTHORITY

We find that the selected carriers are fit to provide the authorized services. Each of the selected 

carriers has been found to be a citizen of the United States, and fit, and willing, and able to 

provide scheduled foreign air transportation of persons, property, and mail as a certificated air 

carrier under section 41102 of Title 49 U.S.C.23 24 We will grant Hawaiian exemption authority, 

subject to the attached conditions, for a period of two years, subject to renewal, effective 

immediately upon issuance of a final order in this proceeding.25 We note that Delta and 

American already hold certificate authority to provide their proposed services.26 

We will impose a startup condition for each award. We will require the carriers to institute their 

proposed services within 90 days of October 31, 2010, the date on which the IATA 2010 winter

traffic season begins.27

 22 Order 2010-5-7, at 12.

 In addition, we propose that the slot pairs allocated in this proceeding be 

subject to a 90-day dormancy condition, wherein any slots not utilized for a period of 90 days 

(once inaugurated) would be deemed dormant and revert to the Department.

23 See Orders 2007-7-3 (Hawaiian), 2009-1-8 (Delta), and 2007-4-2 (American). 24 We find that our awards in this proceeding will result in a near term increase of annual fuel consumption in excess 

of ten million gallons. As a result, our action constitutes a “major regulatory action” under the Energy Policy and 

Conservation Act of 1975, as defined by section 313.4(a)(1) of the Department’s regulations. We find, however, that 

the service provided under the authority granted and resulting public benefits outweigh any adverse effects that may 

be caused by the increased fuel consumption. 25 We note that once the U.S.-Japan Open-Skies Agreement is entered into force, Hawaiian’s exemption authority

would be subsumed by its blanket open-skies certificate (see Order 2007-7-3). 26 See Order 2009-1-8 (Delta) and Order 98-5-16 (American). 27 We are aware that the timing of the Haneda runway completion and the date on which the 2009 MOU is signed 

are factors that could have an impact on startup of Haneda services. We will entertain requests for modified startup 

dates in the event that those factors delay the ability of a carrier to institute its proposed services in the time period 

provided. 
9

ACCORDINGLY,

1. We make final our tentative findings, conclusions, and decision set forth in Order 2010-5-7;

2. We grant Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. exemption authority, subject to the attached conditions, to 

engage in scheduled foreign air transportation of persons, property, and mail between Honolulu, 

Hawaii, and Tokyo, Japan, and allocate to it one slot pair to provide its proposed HonoluluHaneda services;

3. We allocate Delta Air Lines, Inc. two slot pairs for its proposed Los Angeles-Haneda and 

Detroit-Haneda services, respectively; 

4. We allocate American Airlines, Inc. one slot pair for its proposed New York (JFK)-Haneda 

service; 

5. The slot pairs allocated in ordering paragraphs two through four above will remain in effect 

indefinitely, provided that the holder continues to hold the necessary underlying authority to 

serve the markets authorized; and provided further that the slot pairs will become dormant and 

will revert automatically to the Department if they are not used for a period of 90 days (once 

inaugurated); 

6. We grant the request of the San Francisco International Airport for leave to file;

7. To the extent not granted, we deny the remaining applications in this proceeding;

8. We will not entertain petitions for reconsideration of this order; and 

9. We will serve this order on the parties to the captioned docket of the order, the Japanese

Ambassador to the United States in Washington, DC, the Federal Aviation Administration, and 

the U.S. Department of State (Office of Aviation Negotiations).

By:

Susan L. Kurland

Assistant Secretary for Aviation

and International Affairs

(SEAL)

An electronic version of this document is available on the World Wide Web at:

http://www.regulations.gov
Attachment

U.S. Carrier Exemption Conditions

In the conduct of the operations authorized, the U.S. carrier applicant(s) shall:

(1) Hold at all times effective operating authority from the government of each country served;

(2) Comply with applicable requirements concerning oversales contained in 14 CFR 250 (for 

scheduled operations, if authorized);

(3) Comply with the requirements for reporting data contained in 14 CFR 241;

(4) Comply with requirements for minimum insurance coverage, and for certifying that coverage 

to the Department, contained in 14 CFR 205;

(5) Except as specifically exempted or otherwise provided for in a Department Order, comply 

with the requirements of 14 CFR 203, concerning waiver of Warsaw Convention liability limits 

and defenses;

(6) Comply with all applicable requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration, the 

Transportation Security Administration, and with all applicable U.S. Government requirements 

concerning security, including, but not limited to, 49 CFR Part 1544. To assure compliance with 

all applicable U.S. Government requirements concerning security, the holder shall, before 

commencing any new service (including charter flights) to or from a foreign airport, contact its 

Principal Security Inspector (PSI) to advise the PSI of its plans and to find out whether the 

Transportation Security Administration has determined that security is adequate to allow such 

airport(s) to be served;

(7) Comply with such other reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations required by the public 

interest as may be prescribed by the Department of Transportation, with all applicable orders and 

regulations of other U.S. agencies and courts, and with all applicable laws of the United States.

The authority granted shall be effective only during the period when the holder is in compliance 

with the conditions imposed above.

 

1/2008