alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: 

To: EAS (OSJ) 

Subject: ElDorado air service 

Date: Wednesday, June 05, 2013 8:05:58 AM 

Dear Sir/Madame, 

I travel on Seaport air ELD-MEM at least once a week and really appreciate this service. I live in 

Magnolia and am 2+ hours from any other airport. Though that may not sound like a long drive, rest 

assured that navigating 2 hours of deer infested, winding roads can make 2 hours feel like 6. 

Currently they use the Pilatus on my route with only the occasional Caravan. While we all prefer the 

Pilatus for its higher speeds, we are just happy to be lifted up and out of South AR on anything as 

opposed to driving. 

Seaport does a good job so please keep this service for the So AR area. 

Kindest regards, 

Marsha Cowling
§ 416.45 Condition for coverage—Medical staff. The medical staff of the ASC must be accountable to the governing body. ( a ) *Standard: Membership and clinical privileges.* Members of the medical staff must be legally and professionally qualified for the positions to which they are appointed and for the performance of privileges granted. The ASC grants privileges in accordance with recommendations from qualified medical personnel.
( b ) *Standard: Reappraisals.* Medical staff privileges must be periodically reappraised by the ASC. The scope of procedures performed in the ASC must be periodically reviewed and amended as appropriate.
( c ) *Standard: Other practitioners.* If the ASC assigns patient care responsibilities to practitioners other than physicians, it must have established policies and procedures, approved by the governing body, for overseeing and evaluating their clinical activities.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 185 (Friday, September 25, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 48851]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-22074]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 71

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0327; Airspace Docket 09-ASO-014]


Establishment of Class D Airspace, Modification of Class E 
Airspace; Bunnell, FL

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Direct final rule; confirmation of effective date.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action confirms the effective date of an airspace action, 
which was previously published as a direct final rule in the Federal 
Register, for the Flagler County Airport in Bunnell, FL.

DATES: Effective Date: 0901 UTC, September 25, 2009. The Director of 
the Federal Register approves this incorporation by reference action 
under title 1, Code of Federal Regulations, part 51, subject to the 
annual revision of FAA Order 7400.9 and publication of conforming 
amendments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melinda Giddens, Operations Support, 
Eastern Service Center, Federal Aviation Administration, P.O. Box 
20636, Atlanta, Georgia 30320; telephone (404) 305-5610.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Confirmation of Effective Date

    The FAA published this direct final rule with a request for 
comments in the Federal Register on May 27, 2009 (74 FR 25145), Docket 
No. FAA-2009-0327; Airspace Docket 09-ASO-14. The FAA uses the direct 
final rulemaking procedure for a non-controversial rule where the FAA 
believes that there will be no adverse public comment. This direct 
final rule advised the public that no adverse comments were 
anticipated, and that unless a written adverse comment, or a written 
notice of intent to submit such an adverse comment, were received 
within the comment period, the regulation would become effective on 
August 27, 2009. No adverse comments were received, and thus this 
notice confirms that effective date.
* * * * *

    Issued in College Park, Georgia, on September 2, 2009.
Barry A. Knight,
Manager, Operations Support Group, Eastern Service Center, Air Traffic 
Organization.
[FR Doc. E9-22074 Filed 9-24-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
§ 435.1015 FFP for premium assistance for plans in the individual market. ( a ) FFP is available for payment of the costs of insurance premiums on behalf of an eligible individual for a health plan offered in the individual market that provides the individual with benefits for which the individual is covered under the State plan, subject to the following conditions: ( 1 ) The insurer is obligated to pay primary to Medicaid for all health care items and services for which the insurer is legally and contractually responsible under the individual health plan, as required under part 433 subpart D of this chapter;
( 2 ) The agency furnishes all benefits for which the individual is covered under the State plan that are not available through the individual health plan;
( 3 ) The individual does not incur any cost sharing charges in excess of any amounts imposed by the agency under subpart A of part 447; and
( 4 ) The total cost of purchasing such coverage, including administrative expenditures, the costs of paying all cost sharing charges in excess of the amounts imposed by the agency under subpart A of part 447, and the costs of providing benefits as required by (a)(2) of this section, must be comparable to the cost of providing direct coverage under the State plan.
( b ) A State may not require an individual to receive benefits through premium assistance under this section, and a State must inform an individual that it is the individual's choice to receive either direct coverage under the Medicaid State plan or coverage through premium assistance for an individual health plan. A State must require that an individual who elects premium assistance obtain through the insurance coverage all benefits for which the insurer is responsible and must provide the individual with information on how to access any additional benefits and cost sharing assistance not provided by the insurer.
[78 FR 42303, July 15, 2013]
#### § 493.1227 Condition: Histocompatibility.

If the laboratory provides services in the specialty of Histocompatibility, the laboratory must meet the requirements specified in §§ 493.1230 through 493.1256, § 493.1278, and §§ 493.1281 through 493.1299.
Non-Employee Director 2009 Compensation Summary



 Exhibit (10)(hhhh) 
 NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION SUMMARY 
  

					
	 Annual Retainer
	  	$	48,600	1
		
	 Equity Compensation2
	  	$	55,400	3 in RSUs
		
	 Fee for Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings
	  	$	2,000	4
		
	 Audit Committee Chair – Annual Retainer
	  	$	25,000	1
		
	 Compensation Committee Chair – Annual Retainer
	  	$	10,000	1
		
	 Governance Committee Chair – Annual Retainer
	  	$	10,000	1
		
	 Lead Director – Annual Retainer
	  	$	10,000	1

  

	 1
	 Paid in cash at the final Board of Directors meeting in calendar year 2009. Paid pro rata for retiring directors at time
of retirement. 



	 2
	 On February 28, 2007, the Board of Directors established stock ownership guidelines pursuant to which Directors are
expected to own stock with a value equal to five times their annual retainer (or $243,000). Directors have until February 28, 2012, to meet the guideline. Restricted stock and restricted stock units are included for the purpose of meeting the
guideline and unexercised stock options are not included. 



	 3
	 Vesting over three years, accelerating on retirement, and priced on the second business day following the filing of the
Company’s 10-K. Not paid to directors retiring before grant date. Grant evidenced by current form of notice and award agreement. 



	 4
	 Paid in cash in connection with each meeting.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from National
Property Investors 6 1996 Year-End 10-KSB and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such 10-KSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000708870
<NAME> NATIONAL PROPERTY INVESTORS 6
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          15,450
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          78,329
<DEPRECIATION>                                  47,338
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  50,079
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                         34,536
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,568
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    50,079
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                14,036
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,378
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,526
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  (355)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       303
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.74<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Docket Number FAA - 2012 - 0639

**Contacts. With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed?**
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the quarterly report of National Home Health Care
Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2004, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Robert P. Heller, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Date: June 14, 2004.
                                            /s/ Robert P. Heller
                                            -----------------------------------
                                            Robert P. Heller
                                            Principal Financial Officer
#### Girard Trust v. Dennis

*F. Dougherty,*for plaintiff.

*Erisman & Klein,*for defendant.

June 27, 1955.

Flood, J.,

Plaintiff in its exceptions claims that the chancellor did not properly dispose of his contention that he holds one half of the party wall by adverse possession. Plaintiff and its predecessors in title have been in exclusive possession of the building for over 21 years during which defendant made no use of it and claims that, as a result, the half of the party wall on defendant’s property is plain*760tiff’s by adverse possession. He cites Baxter v. Girard Trust Co., 288 Pa. 256 (1927), a case which involves the question of adverse possession by the encroachment of a building. However, in our opinion, the line of cases covering adverse possession by a wall built upon another’s land does not govern the case before us.

Here the wall was already built on the ground by a common predecessor in title of the parties. Thereafter, the owner of the land divided it by mortgaging part of it by an instrument which divided the building in such a way that one half of the wall went to defendant’s predecessors in title and the other half to plaintiff’s, making the wall a party wall, as this court held in an earlier adjudication.

From the time of the division, plaintiff and its predecessors have done nothing which could be called an adverse taking of possession, since admittedly the use of the windows for light and air is not sufficient for this purpose.

The exceptions are dismissed and the decree nisi is, therefore, made final.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AS OF, AND THE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED, MARCH 31, 1999
INCLUDED IN REGISTRANT'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED
MARCH 31, 1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH BALANCE
SHEET AND STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND THE NOTES THERETO.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                             258
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   34,096
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     39,400
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                76,251
<PP&E>                                           3,991
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  89,702
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,058
<BONDS>                                         33,504
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              190
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        18,285
<OTHER-SE>                                      14,584
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    89,702
<SALES>                                         41,129
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                41,129
<CGS>                                           33,999
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,717
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 623
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    777
<INCOME-TAX>                                       437
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                340
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       340
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .07
        

</TABLE>
#### Leroy SMITH, Alias Leroy Smith, Jr., Alias Leroy J. Smith, Jr. v. STATE.

7 Div. 772.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Oct. 28, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1981.

Stephen E. Harrison, for Burns, Shumaker & Davis, Gadsden, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., Cynthia D. Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOWEN, Judge.

The defendant was indicted and convicted for robbery in the second degree. Sentence was life imprisonment under Alabama’s new habitual felony statute.

The crime for which the defendant was convicted occurred in May of 1980. Alabama’s habitual felony offender statute became effective on July 30, 1979. See comments to Alabama Code Section 13A-5-9. The defendant contends that Section 13A-5-9(c) is an ex post facto law as applied to him because his three prior felony convictions (burglary and grand larceny, assault with intent to murder, and grand larceny) were all committed before the effective date of the habitual offender statute. This argument is without merit for the reasons stated in *Wilson v. State,*371 So.2d 932, 940 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), affirmed, 371 So.2d 943 (Ala.1979).

Additionally, we note that this question is presented for the first time on appeal and is therefore not preserved for review. *Steele v. State,*289 Ala. 186, 266 So.2d 746 (1972); *Grace*v. *State,*369 So.2d 318 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).

*1274The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

All Judges concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         136,467
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,350,345
<ALLOWANCES>                                   242,000
<INVENTORY>                                     15,196
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,391,102
<PP&E>                                      15,361,758
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,456,981
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              24,028,678
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,357,199
<BONDS>                                     13,645,713
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        82,808
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,485,324
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                24,028,678
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,757,294
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                7,448,578
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (234,009)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             699,976
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,157,251)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (393,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (764,251)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                    (234,087)
<NET-INCOME>                                 (998,338)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.17)


</TABLE>
#### David L. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 81-208, 81-209.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Oct. 21, 1981.

Jerry Hill, Public Defender, Bartow, and Robert F. Moeller, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

RYDER, Judge.

Williams appeals his convictions for burglary, grand theft and dealing in *1166stolen property. We reverse the conviction for grand theft since it was based on the same course of conduct that provided the foundation for the dealing in stolen property conviction. *See Kelly v. State,*397 So.2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm the convictions for burglary and dealing in stolen property but vacate the sentences and remand for a hearing to determine if appellant had a prior felony conviction. If not, the court must order a presentence investigation prior to resentencing. *See Lopes v. State,*309 So.2d 591 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.710.

SCHEB, C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur.
#### Alvin SPIGNER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. V-464.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 12, 1974.

*497Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and James O. Brecher, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

DREW (Ret.), Associate Judge.

Appellant was charged with and convicted of murder in the second degree. At the conference on charges, request was made to the trial court to charge the jury “on attempt and assault with intent to commit” the crime charged. The trial judge’s denial of that request is assigned as error here and argued as one of the three points on appeal.

The pertinent statute 1 has been replaced by Rule 3.S10, F.R.Cr.P., which provides:

> “Upon an indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried for any offense, the jurors may convict the defendant of an attempt to commit such offense if such attempt is an offense, . . . The court shall charge the jury in this regard.”

The record here shows that the trial judge charged the jury on: 1) murder in the second degree; 2) murder in the third degree; and 3) manslaughter, and defined these offenses to the jury with the admonition: “If you return a verdict of guilty, it should be for the highest offense which has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” The conviction of appellant by this jury of the offense of murder in the second degree brings the failure of the trial judge to charge on attempt squarely within the scope of the harmless error statute,2 and the holding of the Supreme Court in DeLaine v. State.3 This Court should not reverse a judgment of conviction unless the error committed “injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant”.4 The statute contemplates the commission of error by the trial judge, and we think it was error not to charge the jury as requested. The result reached by the jury, however, in finding the appellant guilty of murder in the second degree when it was empowered to find him guilty of two lesser offenses, presents the exact situation meant to be covered by the statute. The error clearly did not injuriously affect the substantial rights of appellant.

The other points on appeal have been carefully considered and are found by us to be without merit.

Affirmed.

SPECTOR and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.

1

. Florida Statute 919.16.

2

. Florida Statute 924.33.

3

. DeLaine v. State, 262 So.2d 655 (Fla.1972).

4

.This is'the exact language of the harmless error statute, supra.