[Cite as State v. Webb, 2021-Ohio-3323.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

: 

: Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. 

Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

-vs- :

: Case No. 20CA64 

: 

JAMES D. WEBB JR. :

: 

: 

Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court 

of Common Pleas, Case No. 

2018CR1070 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: 

APPEARANCES: 

September 21, 2021 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: 

GARY BISHOP R. JOSHUA BROWN 

RICHLAND CO. PROSECUTOR 32 Lutz Ave. 

VICTORIA MUNSON Lexington, OH 44904 

38 South Park St., #2 

Mansfield, OH 44902 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 2 

Delaney, J.

{¶1} Appellant James D. Webb Jr. appeals from the October 24, 2019 

Sentencing Entry of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state 

of Ohio. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} This case arose on September 26, 2018, when appellant robbed W.N. after 

W.N. bought pills in appellant’s sister’s apartment. The following evidence is adduced 

from the record of appellant’s jury trial. 

W.N. is robbed after buying pills

{¶3} W.N. is an admitted oxycodone addict. As of September 2018, he was 

taking pills “at high levels” and often bought pills at the apartment of a woman named 

Bercha who lived in Apartment 4 in a complex on Kentucky Avenue. Bercha is now 

deceased. Customarily, “Detroit boys” would bring large amounts of pills to Bercha’s 

apartment and “set up” in her back bedroom. Buyers would come to the apartment at all 

hours to buy pills, often more than once a day. 

{¶4} On September 26, 2018, W.N. went to Bercha’s apartment several times. 

The first time was in the early afternoon, and in the apartment W.N. found Bercha, an 

unknown man in the kitchen, and the “Detroit boys” in the back bedroom. W.N. later 

learned the man in the kitchen was appellant, Bercha’s brother. As W.N. transacted the 

purchase of a “large amount” of pills, a neighbor, Jane Doe, came to the door of the 

apartment. Doe didn’t have a place to park and asked if someone could move their car. 

W.N. agreed to do so. He finished his transaction, left the apartment, and drove off in his 

car. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 3 

{¶5} Jane Doe was a witness for appellee at trial. She arrived home to the 

apartment complex shortly after 3:00 pm and no parking spots were available. When she 

asked the occupants of Apartment 4 to move a car, W.N. and appellant exited the 

apartment. Doe didn’t know W.N.’s name but described him as “the bigger guy.” Doe 

knew appellant to be Bercha’s brother. 

{¶6} W.N. returned after dark to buy more pills. Again, he parked in the small lot 

and walked down the sidewalk in the direction of Apartment 4. He noticed a man standing 

against the door, the same man he saw in Bercha’s kitchen earlier that day. The man 

asked, “Are you coming here?” and W.N. said yes. The man then “wielded a large knife,” 

according to W.N.’s testimony, and said, “Give me everything you got. I know why you’re 

here.” 

{¶7} The man—appellant—poked at W.N.’s stomach with the knife, and W.N. 

kept moving back from him. W.N. tripped and fell as he attempted to get away. He got 

up again to run. He dug in his pockets and realized his hand was bleeding profusely. 

W.N. ran to his car, but realized he didn’t have his keys. He went back toward the grassy 

area near the apartments to look for his keys, and noticed a neighbor, Jane Doe, standing 

at her door. W.N. asked Doe if she could help him find his keys and told her he was 

bleeding and needed help. Doe appeared to be holding a phone in her hand and went 

back inside her apartment. 

{¶8} Then appellant “came back out of the darkness,” according to W.N., and 

said, “Didn’t I tell you to get out of here?” W.N. took off running down Ashland Road, 

toward downtown Mansfield. He approached a Marco’s Pizza and saw a man and woman 

in the parking lot. He asked if they could give him a ride and they agreed. The couple 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 4 

insisted that W.N. needed to go to the hospital because he was bleeding profusely, but 

he wanted to go home to see his wife first. The couple dropped him off at a friend’s house 

who immediately took W.N. home and his wife brought him to the hospital. 

{¶9} Police met W.N. at the hospital and he described what happened. He had 

severe cuts to his hand and a stab wound in his back, near his spine. 

{¶10} In the meantime, Jane Doe had witnessed most of the incident between 

appellant and W.N. She was sitting on a couch near a window when she saw appellant 

walking on the sidewalk outside the apartments, along with the man she saw earlier— 

W.N. She didn’t know W.N.’s name but recognized him from the earlier encounter at 

Bercha’s apartment. Doe heard appellant say words to the effect of “Give me that” and 

the other man said “No.” Doe looked out the window and saw appellant with a large knife 

in his hand. Doe remained inside her apartment, terrified, and heard appellant stop 

outside her door before he kept walking in the direction of Bercha’s apartment. Doe later 

saw appellant running behind the building. 

{¶11} Doe opened her apartment door and W.N. came up the sidewalk covered 

in blood, stating the he couldn’t find his keys. Doe said nothing and slammed her 

apartment door shut. She called 911 and a recording of her call was played during her 

testimony. Doe spoke very quietly because she was afraid appellant might still be close 

by. She described two people “fighting around,” and explained she meant appellant tried 

to take something from W.N., then everything went quiet. At trial, Doe identified appellant 

as the man with the knife. 

{¶12} Deputies from the Richland County Sheriff’s Department were dispatched 

to the apartment building and upon arrival found a trail of blood near the sidewalk. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 5 

Following the blood trail to Marco’s Pizza, one deputy learned that the stabbing victim 

obtained a ride from a couple picking up a pizza. The deputy obtained their contact 

information and spoke to the couple about the man they gave a ride to. He observed a 

bloodstain and a blood-soaked blanket in the couple’s car. Deputies spoke to W.N. at the 

hospital and to Jane Doe at the apartment building. They learned the suspect in the 

stabbing was appellant, Bercha’s brother. They knocked on Bercha’s door that night, but 

no one answered. 

{¶13} Deputies collected evidence from the scene that night and the next day in 

daylight. They found a bloodstained Avia athletic shoe and packaging and a sheath for 

a Good Cook brand knife. They found the knife itself stuck into the ground approximately 

10 feet from Bercha’s apartment, with the handle sticking out of the ground. The evidence 

was photographed, collected, and submitted to BCI for DNA analysis. A forensic scientist 

testified that DNA on the knife handle matched appellant’s profile, and the bloodstain on 

the outside of the Avia shoe matched W.N.’s profile. DNA from the collar of the shoe 

matched appellant. Deputies showed W.N. a photo lineup and he identified appellant as 

the person who stabbed him. 

{¶14} Appellant was eventually arrested on September 29, 2018, and 

investigators obtained a taped statement from him at the Richland County Jail. Appellant 

told them W.N. came to his sister’s apartment to buy pills from “the Detroit boys.” He 

admitted he was wearing Avia athletic shoes on the night of the incident. He admitted 

stealing the knife from Kroger. Appellant also told deputies he smoked crack cocaine on 

the day of the stabbing and that he gets violent when he doesn’t take his medicine. He 

denied attacking W.N. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 6 

{¶15} A loss-prevention officer from Kroger testified that appellant stole a large 

knife from the Mansfield store and identified the stolen knife as the knife found by deputies 

stuck in the ground. During her testimony, appellee presented a video of appellant 

stealing the knife. 

Appellant’s testimony

{¶16} Appellant was the only defense witness at trial. He readily admitted he is a 

convicted felon and crack cocaine addict. Appellant testified the “Detroit boys” frequently 

“set up” at Bercha’s apartment to sell drugs, and she was scared and wanted it to stop. 

Appellant therefore went to the apartment in an attempt to protect his sister. He admitted 

he stole the knife from Kroger and concealed it in a flower bed outside the apartment “for 

protection.” 

{¶17} On the day in question, appellant had been out with friends and returned to 

the apartment building after dark. He observed a man hunched over in the grass, looking 

for something. Appellant helped the man find his hat, keys, cell phone, and wallet. 

Appellant testified the man said, “I’m leaking,” which appellant understood to mean he 

was bleeding. Appellant entered Bercha’s apartment intending to call an ambulance, but 

when he came back outside, the man was gone. 

{¶18} Appellant denied stabbing W.N. He admitted he and Bercha didn’t open 

the door when deputies knocked, but said it was because “the Detroit boys” were around. 

Upon cross-examination, appellant acknowledged W.N. came to the apartment earlier 

that day and then returned to “re-up,” or get more pills. Appellant acknowledged he knew 

W.N. would therefore have money in his pockets. Appellant denied that the bloodstained 

Avia shoe was his despite the discovery of his DNA on the collar of the shoe. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 7 

Indictment, trial, conviction, and sentence

{¶19} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of aggravated robbery 

pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree [Count I] and one count of 

aggravated robbery pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), also a felony of the first degree 

[Count II]. Appellant entered pleas of not guilty and the matter proceeded to trial by jury. 

Appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to a prison term of 11 years upon 

Count I. The trial court found that Count II merged with Count I. 

{¶20} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entry of his conviction and 

sentence. 

{¶21} Appellant raises one assignment of error: 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶22} “THE VERDICTS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WERE AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” 

ANALYSIS

{¶23} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues his convictions upon two 

counts of aggravated robbery are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We 

disagree. 

{¶24} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the 

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility 

of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must 

be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 8 

Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering 

a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction.” Id.

{¶25} Appellant was found guilty upon one count each of aggravated robbery 

pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (3). Those sections state: 

No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as 

defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing 

immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: 

(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person 

or under the offender's control and either display the weapon, 

brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it; 

* * * *. 

(3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on 

another. 

{¶26} Appellant argues his aggravated-robbery convictions are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence because appellee’s witnesses failed to identify him as 

the perpetrator and there is no evidence of a theft offense. Upon our review of the record, 

we disagree. 

{¶27} Appellant asserts W.N. was unable to identify appellant as the man who 

stabbed him until he was “prompted” by the prosecutor. First, we note W.N. unequivocally 

identified appellant during his testimony as the man he first saw in the kitchen of Bercha’s 

apartment and who approached him upon his later return to the apartment. T. 196, 208, 

212. W.N. also identified appellant in a photo lineup during the investigation. T. 319-320. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 9 

Moreover, we disagree with appellant’s erroneous characterization of W.N.’s testimony 

and the alleged “prompting” by the prosecutor which appellant cites at page 4 of his brief. 

The cited testimony, in context, is below: 

* * * *. 

[PROSECUTOR]: Is [appellant] the person that was outside 

that Apartment 4 that night that confronted you with the knife and 

then ultimately stabbed you? Do you see him in court today? 

[W.N.]: He appears a little different, but yes, I do. 

[PROSECUTOR]: And can you indicate where he is seated 

and what he is wearing? 

[W.N.]: He is wearing a blue-and-white striped shirt with a tie, 

gray hair, and glasses. 

[PROSECUTOR]: You say he looks a little different. Do you 

mean he seems to be in deteriorated health? 

[W.N.]: Uhm, he seems to be a little lighter and actually looks

a little more healthy. 

[PROSECUTOR]: But he is in fact the person who demanded 

money and then ultimately stabbed you that night? 

[W.N.]: Yes, he is. 

[PROSECUTOR]: That’s all I have. 

THE COURT: The record will reflect the witness did identify 

the defendant at this time. 

* * * *. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 10 

T. 208. 

{¶28} Appellant also argues Jane Doe was unable to identify appellant as the 

person who stabbed W.N. While it is true Jane Doe did not observe the actual stabbing, 

she observed appellant with the knife and with W.N. on the sidewalk. She heard 

appellant demand something from W.N. and W.N. refused. T. 224-228, 236. She 

identified appellant at trial as the man she saw with the knife. T. 238. 

{¶29} Appellant cites State v. Anderson, 191 Ohio App.3d 110, 2010-Ohio-6234, 

944 N.E.2d 1224 (1st Dist.), for the proposition that a conviction was reversed as against 

the manifest weight of the evidence after a witness had to be recalled to identify the 

defendant. Upon our review of the case, the appellate court reversed and remanded for 

a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the witness to be 

recalled to identify the defendant. Id., ¶ 19. The appellate court explicitly did not reach 

the issue of manifest weight of the evidence because of its resolution of the witnesstestimony issue. Id., ¶ 21. Anderson’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion 

is premised upon unique facts that bear no resemblance to the instant case. Nor does 

Anderson involve a manifest-weight claim resting upon identification of the defendant. 

{¶30} The jury was free to accept or reject the testimony of W.N. and Jane Doe, 

just as the jury was free to reject appellant’s self-serving testimony. Ultimately, the weight 

of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are determined by the trier of fact. 

State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 231, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 79. In 

the instant case, W.N. and Doe unequivocally identified appellant as the man with a knife 

who stabbed W.N. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 11 

{¶31} Appellant further argues his conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence because there is no evidence a theft occurred. We disagree. The jury was 

instructed that a “theft offense” is to knowingly obtain or exert control over property owned 

by another, without the person’s consent or by threat or by intimidation, and with the 

purpose to deprive another of his or her property. T. 382. The jury was also instructed 

that a “criminal attempt” occurs when one purposely does anything that is an act 

constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his 

commission of the offense. T. 382. 

{¶32} Appellee could thus establish aggravated robbery premised upon an 

attempted theft offense. R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (3), the aggravated robbery, require 

appellee to prove appellant “attempt[ed] or commit[ed]” a theft offense. The jury could 

reasonably find appellant attempted to commit a theft offense based upon W.N.’s 

testimony that appellant said “Give me everything you got” while brandishing the knife, 

and from Doe’s testimony that appellant said words to the effect of “give me that.” 

{¶33} We cannot find the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest 

miscarriage of justice in convicting appellant of two counts of aggravated robbery. 

Appellant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and the sole 

assignment of error is therefore overruled. 
Richland County, Case No. 20CA64 12 

CONCLUSION

{¶34} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the 

Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By: Delaney, J., 

Wise, John, P.J. and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur.