### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 738 -CR

The St at e of Te xa s , A ppe lla nt

v . John T om ack Williams, Appellee

NO. 03-05-00739- CR

The St at e of Te xa s, App e lla nt

v . Ge orge Louise Williams, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF CALDWELL COUNTY , 421S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NOS . 04- 397 & 04-2 88 , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM C. KIRK ENDALL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
The State a

ppeals a n order granting the appe llees’ motions to suppress evidenc e sei z ed duringa sea

rch of their re sidence
. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 44.01(a )(5) (We st Su pp . 2 00 6) . T he se arc h w a s c on du c te d purs uan t to a wa rr ant, and the iss ue pr e se nte d is2

whether the supporting aff idavit stated probable cause . We c onclude that it did, and we reve rse the trial court’ s order
.

Th e su ff ic ie nc y of a pr ob a ble c a us e a ff ida vit is d e te rm ine d by c on sid e ri ng the tot a lity of the c ircumstance s set forth within the four c orner s of the docume nt. Illinois v. Gates , 4 62 U. S. 21 3, 23 4 ( 19 83 ); Sta te v . D av ila , 169 S.W .3d 735, 738 (Tex
. Ap p . — Au s tin 2005, no pet.). The fac ts submit ted to the mag istrate in the aff idavit must be sufficient to justify a conc lusion that the object of the sear ch wa s probably on the pre mises at the time the war rant wa s issued. Cassias v. Sta te , 71 9 S.W. 2d 58 5, 58 7 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1 986) ; Da v ila , 169 S.W .3d at 738. The issuing ma gi s trate’ s determination of pr obable c ause must be g iven g reat defe renc e and w ill be sustained if the mag istrate had a substantial basis for co n cludi ng that a sea rch w ould uncover evidenc e of w rong doing. Gates , 46 2 U.S. at 2 36; Swe ar inge n v . S tat e , 143 S.W .3d 808, 811 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); State v. Bradley , 966 S.W .2d 871, 873 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).

The warra nt at i ssue was signe d and ex ecute d shortly afte r midnight on F ebrua ry 25, 20 04 . T he c ri tic a l pa

ra g ra phof the pr ob a ble c a us e a ff ida vit state s:
O n T u e s d ay , F e b r

u ar y 2 4 , 2 0 0 4 a t a

p p r o xi m a t e l y 9 : 4 2 P
. M
. , t h e C a l dw e ll Co un ty Sheriff’ s Offic e and the Luling Police De partment we re dispatc hed to 5401 FM 2984, Lu l i n g, C al dwe l l C o u n t y , T e x a s fo r a m aj o r f i gh t/ as s au l ti np ro gre s s i n v o l v i n g a number of pe rsons. Whil e inside the residenc e, Caldwell County Sheriff’ s Serg eant L arr y Stanle y wh ile c on du c tin g the inv e sti g a tio n o f t he inc ide nt o bs e rv e d w ith in plain view a razor blade containing a white r esidue substanc e believe d to be coc aine in a tray in a bedroom belong ing to Geor g e W illiams. Serg eant St anley also observe d six (6) bottles of Prone th-Codeine without the pre scription labels of the bottle in the same room. Serg eant Stanley also observe d one small bottle without the prescr iption la be l c on ta ini ngse ve ra l w hit e pil ls b e lie ve d to be Altr a zola m ( Z ane x). It is a vio la tio n o f T e xas l aw t o p os se ss t he sa id con tr ol le d s ub sta nc e s w ith ou t a presc ription label attac hed to the bottle.3

This description of Stanley ’s observations while inside the appellees’ residence a fe w hours bef ore the war r an t i s s u e d

s u p p o rts th e ma g is tr a te ’ s f

in d in g o f p r o b a b le c a u s e to b e li e v e th a t c o n tr olled
su bs tanc e s wo uld be on the pr e mis e s. Th e tr ia l c ourt sa id a s mu c h at th e he ari ngon the mot ion

to suppress, but it never

theless g rante d the motion, r e asoningthat Stanley ’s entry into the residenc e wa s not justified by the fac ts state d in the aff idavit a nd was, there fore , presumptively unlawful. The trial court made the following written conc lusions of law:
1. The proba

ble cause aff

idavit f ails to e stablish pr obable cause beca use there is no justification for the initial entry of Serg eant Stanley

into the residenc e. Although it re cites that he was there “while conducting the investig ation of” an incident that is nowhere de scribed in the a ffidavit, ther e is no g ener al “investig ation exception” to the re quirement of a sea rch w arr ant under

the Four th Amendment to the United States Co n s t itution. Mince y v. A rizona , 437 U.S. 496 (1973). 2. Th e re fo re Se rg e a

nt S tanle y ’s e ntr anc e int o th e re sid e nc e wa s p re su mpt ive ly unrea sonable. Pa

y ton v . Ne w York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 3. I f the a ffiant ha d established that Serg eant Stanley ’s pre sence in the residenc e was justified un d er t he var iously named e x ceptions to the sea rch w arr ant require ment, such as the “community car etaking ” exception, the “ex ige nt circ umstances” exception or the “e mergency ” exception, his observations could be the ba sis of a sea rch w arr ant. E.g ., Br im ag e v . S tat e , 918 S.W .2d 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
I n other wor ds, t h e co u rt conclude d that the af fidavit did not show that Stanley ’s information was law f u ll y o b ta in e d an d , th e r e f

o r e , th e in f

o r mati o nc o u ld

n o t b e c o n s id e r e d

in d e te r mi ning
w h e th e r th e a f

f id a v it s tate d p r o b a

b le c a u s e to s e a r c h. See Br own v . S

tat e , 605 S.W .2d 572, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (holding that unlawfully obtained information may not be used to procur e
sear ch wa rra nt and must be disreg arde d in determining sufficie ncy of af fidavit).4 Th e St a te c o mp la in s th a t t h e tr ia l c o u rt “ o v e r s te p p e d it s b o u n d s ” b y

o r d e r in g the evidenc e suppre ssed on a g round not alleg ed in the appellees’ moti on. I t is true that the appe llees did not alleg e or o ff

er evidenc e that Stanley

enter ed the a

ppellees’ residenc e unlawf ully , there by trig g eringth e ex cl u sionary rule a nd tainting the pr obable c ause a ffidavit. Cf. Ma rti n v . S tat e , 67 S.W .3d 340, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. re f’d) (in which de fenda nt asserte d that sear ch
war rant a ffidavit wa s tainted by unlawfully

obtained information). But that was not t he basis for the district court’s orde r. Instead, the c ourt sustained the a ppellees’ contention that the sea rch w arr ant aff idavit did not support a finding of probable cause by ruling that the af fidavit, on its face , failed to show that information cruc ial to a finding of probable cause was lawfully obtained. This ruling was within the scope of t he appellees’ motion to suppress. I t is important to stress t hat t he only issue pr e se nte d in

thi s a pp e a l is the pr op e r i nte rp re ta tio n o f t he pr ob a ble c a us e a ff ida vit
. The trial c ourt’s first conc lusion of law states that the i ncident under investigation when Stanley

enter ed the r esidenc e “is nowhe re de scribed in the a ffida v i t
. ” To the contra ry , the aff idavit describe s the incident as “ a major f ight/assa ult in prog ress involving a number of per sons.” A sea rch w arr ant af

fidavit must be rea d in a common sense a nd rea l istic manner. Cassias , 719 S.W .2d at 587. Reasonab l e i nfer ence s may be dra wn from the f

acts a nd circ umstances c ontained within the four corne rs of the affidavit. Id . at 58 7- 88 . T he a de qu a c y of the pr ob a ble c a us e a ff ida vit in this case turns on the infe renc es t he is suing mag istrate could rea sonably drawfrom the de scription of the incide nt that was the re ason for Stanley being at the appe llees’ r esidenc e in the first plac e. Police office rs may enter a home without a war rant to re nder e merg ency

assistance to an injured occupa

nt or to pr otect an occupa

nt f rom imminent injury
. Br igh am City v . S tua rt , 5475

U. S
. _ _ _ , _ _ _ , 1 6 4 L
. E d
. 2 d

6 5 0 , 6 5 8 (2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Mince y v. A rizona , 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)). I n Stu ar t , police off

icer s wer e dis patche d to a residence at 3: 00 a.m. in response to a re port of a loud party
. Id . at 164 L . Ed. 2d 656. Fr om outside the house, they could hear from within “some kind of a fig ht,” with loud “thumping a nd cra shing” and people shouting. Id . at 659
. B e c a us e the no ise
was c oming f

rom the re ar of

the house, the of

fice rs went to the ba ck y ard, wh er e they found two juveniles drinking beer
. Id . T hr ou g h a wind ow , th e y c ou ld s e e fo ur

a du lts a tte mpt ingto r e str a in another juvenile. Id
. at 656. This juvenile manag ed to bre ak fr ee a nd strike one of

the adults in the fa ce , s en d i n g the adult to the sink spitti ng blood. Id
. A t t h is p o in t, ano f

f ic e r o p e n e d th e k itchen door, announc ed his prese nce, a nd enter ed. Id
. The a dults were subse quently arr ested a

nd filed a motion to s uppress a l l ev i dence obtained af ter the of fice rs enter ed the house , arguing that the
war rantless entry violated the F ourth Amendment. Id
. The motion to suppress was g rante d by the trial court, a

nd its ruling wa s sustained by the state a

ppell at e co u rts. Id . a

t 65 6- 57 . T he Sup re me Court re ve rs e d, ho ldi ngthat un de r t he c ir c ums tanc e s, t

h e o f f i c e rs ha d a

n o bje c tiv e ly

re a so na ble ba sis fo r be lie vin g bo th that th e inj ur e d a du lt m ig ht n e e d h e lp a nd that th e vio le nc e in t

he kit c he n w a s ju st beg inning. Id . A s th e Court e xpla ine d, “ No thi ng in the F ourt h A me ndme nt r e qu ir e d th e m to wa it
u n t i l an o t h er

b l o w r en d er eds o m eo n e ‘ u n co n s ci o u s ’ o r ‘s em i -c o n s ci o u s ’ o r w o rs e b ef o re en t er i n g. The role of a pe ace office r includes pr eventingviolence a nd restoringorder , not simpl y rende ring first aid to ca sualties . . . .” Id
.

The a ffidavit at issue does not descr ibe t he incident at t he appe llees’ r esidenc e in the detail found in the Stu ar t rec ord. In the af

fidavit, howeve r, it was ave rre d that Stanle y an d other of fi c e rs we re dis patc he d to the a pp e lle e s’ re sid e nc e in r e sp on se to a re po rt of “ a ma jor fi g ht/ a ssa

ult6

i n p rogre ss involving a number of per sons.” The a ffiant a lso averr ed that Stanley enter ed the residenc e “w hile conductingthe investig ation” of this incide nt. The appellee s did not question the truth of these state ments. Se e Fran k s v . D e law ar e , 438 U.S. 154, 1 5 5 -5 6 (1978) ( permitting
c ha lle ng e to ve ra c ity of pr ob a ble c a us e a ff ida vit ). We be lie ve that the ma g istra te c ou ld r e a so na

bly infer that phy sical violence was or ha d been taking pla ce at the appellee s’ re sidence and that Stanley enter ed the r esidenc e eith er t o re s t ore or der or to determine if a

ny one inside re quired medic al assistance . I n short, the mag istrate could r easona bly infer f rom the fa cts stated in the af fidavit that Stanle y lawf ull y e nte re d th e a

pp e lle e s’ re sid e nc e . T he re fo re , it wa s p ro pe r f

or the ma g ist

rate to consider Stanley ’s observa tions while i nside the residence in decidingwhether the af fidavit stated probable cause to searc h.

A def ere ntial standard of

revie w is appropr iate to furthe r the F ourth Amendment’s strong pref

ere nce f or sea rche s conducte d pursuant to a wa rra nt. Da v is v . S

tat e , 202 S.W .3d 149, 157 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). A “ g ru dg ing or ne g a tiv e atti tud e by re vie wi ngc ourt s to wa

rd wa rr ants ” is inc on sis te nt b oth

wi th t he de sir e to en c oura g e us e of the wa rr ant pr oc e ss by

po lic e of fi c e rs and wi th the re cogni t i o n that once a war rant ha s been obta ined, intrusion upon interests protec ted by the F o u rth A me n d me n t is le s s s e v e r e th an o th e r w is e ma y b e th e c a s e . Id
. (q u o t i n g United States v. Ventresc a , 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965))
. Giving the mag istrate’s pr obable c ause f inding the de fer ence it is due and allowing for reasona ble available i nfer ence s, we hold that the af fidavit was suff

icient to warr ant a f

inding of probable cause to searc h the appe llees’ r esidenc e.7 The dist rict court’s order g ranting the appe llees’ motion to suppress is reve rsed, a nd the c a us e s are re mand e d f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.

_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Reverse d and Remande d Filed: F ebrua

ry 14, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh