Filed 7/7/14 Thomson v. Bacchus CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MISTY THOMSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HAROUN BACCHUS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B244144

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SS022421)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

James K. Hahn, Judge. Dismissed as moot.

Haroun Bacchus, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Defendant and appellant Haroun Bacchus (Bacchus), in propria persona, appeals 

a July 24, 2012 order granting a request by plaintiff and respondent Misty Roberts 

Thomson (Thomson) for a restraining order.1 2

The restraining order, by its terms, expired on July 24, 2013. Because this court 

cannot provide effective relief from the expired restraining order, the appeal is dismissed 

as moot.3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 2, 2012, Thomson filed a request for a civil harassment restraining order 

against Bacchus.

Thomson alleged, inter alia: She and her husband shared a Santa Monica 

apartment with Bacchus. In June 2011, she obtained a 100-yard restraining order against 

Bacchus. The order expired “a couple of months ago and he no longer lives with us but 

he continues to pay rent and is still on the lease. He stops in for a few minutes once a 

week and is hostile every time.” Thomson stated she was fearful for her safety in that 

Bacchus acted aggressively and physically obstructed her with his body.

On July 2, 2012, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order, to remain in 

effect until the court hearing, scheduled for July 24, 2012.

Bacchus filed a written response, denying he had been hostile and asserting he had 

given Thomson and her husband a lot of space by staying with relatives. Bacchus also 

indicated the subject apartment was rent-controlled, he had lived there a long time and it 

was his only residence.

On July 24, 2012, the matter came on for hearing. The trial court issued a oneyear restraining order directing Bacchus to stay at least 20 feet away from the apartment, 

 

1 An order granting a restraining order is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, 

subd. (a)(6).)

2 Thomson declined to file a brief.

3 We requested Bacchus to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for 

mootness.
3

from Thomson, and from her husband. The order stated it would expire at midnight on 

July 24, 2013.

On August 23, 2012, Bacchus filed a motion to dissolve the July 24, 2012 

restraining order, on the ground, inter alia, Thomson’s testimony was not credible.

On September 25, 2012, the motion to dissolve the July 24, 2012 restraining order 

was transferred to another department, was heard, and was denied.

On September 18, 2012, Bacchus filed notice of appeal from the July 24, 2012 

restraining order.

CONTENTIONS

Bacchus contends: the ex parte proceeding on July 2, 2012 was not valid because 

no harm or immediate danger existed at the time for granting a temporary restraining 

order; Thomson’s declarations and testimony showed the incident was a fabrication and 

no substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision; judicial responsibilities 

include understanding the law and properly applying it; and both judges erred in their 

decision making and failed to recognize prior filings with the court.

DISCUSSION

1. Mootness.

 a. General principles.

Events occurring after a notice of appeal is filed can render the appeal moot 

and subject to dismissal on the court’s own motion. (City of Hollister v. Monterey 

Insurance Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 479-480). An appeal is moot when the 

occurrence of an event makes it impossible for the appellate court to grant effective 

relief. (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 

536, 541 (Eye Dog); Mercury Interactive Corporation v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 

60, 77-78; Santa Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1538, 

1547.) Where the relief granted by the trial court is temporal and expires by the time the 

appeal can be heard, as here, the appeal may be rendered moot and subject to dismissal. 

(Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School District

(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.)
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The policy behind the mootness doctrine is that courts decide actual controversies 

and normally will not render opinions that are merely advisory. (Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. 

Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1179.) But there are three discretionary 

exceptions to this rule under which a reviewing court may exercise discretion to decide 

an appeal on the merits despite events mooting it. (Epstein v. Superior Court (2011) 

193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1411.) These are: when a case poses an issue of broad public 

interest and is likely to recur (Edelstein v. City & County of San Francisco (2002) 

29 Cal.4th 164, 172); when the same controversy is likely to recur between the 

parties (City of Hollister v. Monterey Insurance Co., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 480; 

In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498); and when a material question remains 

between the parties despite mooting events (Eye Dog, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 541; 

County of Fresno v. Shelton (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 996, 1006).

 b. Exceptions to mootness doctrine are inapplicable.

The various exceptions to the mootness doctrine, set forth ante, do not apply.

The issues in this appeal, which are necessarily dependent on the facts in this 

particular case, do not rise to the level of broad public interest or importance.

In the event of any subsequent dispute between Bacchus and Thompson, that 

would be a new matter which would be governed by the facts and legal principles 

applicable thereto.

Further, it does not appear that material questions remain between the parties at 

this juncture, with respect to the July 24, 2012 restraining order, despite said restraining 

order having expired.

Bacchus’s supplemental letter brief contends the appeal is not moot because the 

trial court, on August 7, 2013, issued an order renewing the restraining order for one 

year, through August 7, 2014. Said order was issued on August 7, 2013 following a live 

hearing at which both the protected person and the restrained person were present. On 

September 20, 2013, Bacchus filed a new notice of appeal, specifying the August 7, 2013 

restraining order. (No. B251514.) 
5

However, we cannot, in the instant appeal (No. B244144) provide effective relief 

from the restraining order which expired on July 24, 2013. The subsequent restraining 

order, issued August 7, 2013 with an expiration date of August 7, 2014, is beyond the 

scope of this appeal.

In sum, the July 24, 2012 civil restraining order against Bacchus, which order is 

the subject of this appeal, expired on July 24, 2013. Given the expiration of the operative 

restraining order, this court cannot provide effective relief from said order. Neither an 

affirmance nor a reversal of the July 24, 2012 order would affect the substantive rights of 

the parties. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed as moot.

DISPOSTION

The appeal from the July 24, 2012 restraining order is dismissed as moot. 

No costs are awarded.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KLEIN, P. J.

We concur:

KITCHING, J.

ALDRICH, J.