United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight,

Committee on Ways and Means,

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10 a.m.

Thursday,

May 7, 1998

YEAR 2000 COMPUTING

CRISIS

Continuing Risks of

Disruption to Social

Security, Medicare, and

Treasury Programs

Statement of Joel C. Willemssen

Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems

Accounting and Information Management Division

GAO/T-AIMD-98-161

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the computing challenges that

the upcoming change of century poses to virtually all major organizations,

public and private, including government programs with a high degree of

interaction with the American public such as the Social Security

Administration (SSA) and Medicare. As the world’s most advanced and

most dependent user of information technology, the United States

possesses close to half of all computer capacity and 60 percent of Internet

assets.1

 As a result, the coming century change presents a particularly

sweeping and urgent challenge for entities in this country.2

For this reason, we have designated the Year 2000 computing problem as a

high-risk area3

 for the federal government, and have published guidance4

to help organizations successfully address the issue. Since early 1997 we

have issued over 35 products detailing specific findings and

recommendations related to the Year 2000 readiness of a wide range of

federal agencies.5

The common theme of these reports has been that serious vulnerabilities

remain in addressing the federal government’s Year 2000 readiness. Much

more action is needed to ensure that federal agencies satisfactorily

mitigate Year 2000 risks to avoid debilitating consequences. Vital

economic sectors of the nation are also vulnerable. These include state

and local governments; telecommunications; banking and finance; health,

safety, and emergency services; transportation; utilities; and

manufacturing and small business.

While actions by government and industry are underway throughout the

nation, the creation of the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion

represents an opportunity to orchestrate the leadership and public/private

1

Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures (President’s Commission on Critical

Infrastructure Protection, October 1997).

2

For the past several decades, automated information systems have typically represented the year

using two digits rather than four in order to conserve electronic data storage space and reduce

operating costs. In this format, however, 2000 is indistinguishable from 1900 because both are

represented only as 00. As a result, if not modified, computer systems or applications that use dates or

perform date- or time-sensitive calculations may generate incorrect results beyond 1999.

3

High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997).

4

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997) and Year

2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning (GAO/AIMD-10.1.19,

March 1998 [exposure draft]).

5

A listing of our publications is included as an attachment to this statement.

Page 1 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
partnerships essential to confronting the unprecedented challenges that

our nation faces. My testimony today will briefly outline our views on what

additional actions must be taken to reduce the nation’s Year 2000 risks,

and what our inquiries into Year 2000 readiness found at Social Security,

the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and Medicare, and at the

Department of the Treasury.

Risk of Year 2000

Disruptions Requires

Leadership

The public faces the risk that critical services could be severely disrupted

by the Year 2000 computing crisis. Financial transactions could be

delayed, airline flights grounded, and national defense affected. The many

interdependencies that exist among the levels of governments and within

key economic sectors of our nation could cause a single failure to have

wide-ranging repercussions. While managers in the government and the

private sector are acting to mitigate these risks, a significant amount of

work remains.

The federal government is extremely vulnerable to the Year 2000 issue due

to its widespread dependence on computer systems to process financial

transactions, deliver vital public services, and carry out its operations.

This challenge is made more difficult by the age and poor documentation

of many of the government’s existing systems and its lackluster track

record in modernizing systems to deliver expected improvements and

meet promised deadlines.

Year 2000-related problems have already occurred. For example, an

automated Defense Logistics Agency system erroneously deactivated

90,000 inventoried items as the result of an incorrect date calculation.

According to the agency, if the problem had not been corrected (which

took 400 work hours), the impact would have seriously hampered its

mission to deliver materiel in a timely manner.6

Our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven

progress, and our reports contain numerous recommendations, which the

agencies have almost universally agreed to implement. Among them are

the need to establish priorities, solidify data exchange agreements, and

develop contingency plans.

One of the largest, and largely unknown, risks relates to the global nature

of the problem. With the advent of electronic communication and

6

Defense Computers: Issues Confronting DLA in Addressing Year 2000 Problems (GAO/AIMD-97-106,

August 12, 1997).

Page 2 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
international commerce, the United States and the rest of the world have

become critically dependent on computers. However, with this electronic

dependence and massive exchanging of data comes increasing risk that

uncorrected Year 2000 problems in other countries will adversely affect

the United States. And there are indications of Year 2000 readiness

problems internationally. In September 1997, the Gartner Group, a private

research firm acknowledged for its expertise in Year 2000 computing

issues, surveyed 2,400 companies in 17 countries and concluded that

“[t]hirty percent of all companies have not started dealing with the year

2000 problem.”7

Additional Actions Must Be

Taken to Reduce Nation’s

Year 2000 Risks

As 2000 approaches, the scope of the risks that the century change could

bring has become more clear, and the federal government’s actions have

intensified. This past February, an executive order was issued establishing

the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion. The Council Chair is to

oversee federal agency Year 2000 efforts as well as be the spokesman in

national and international forums, coordinate with state and local

governments, promote appropriate federal roles with respect to

private-sector activities, and report to the President on a quarterly basis.

As we testified in March,8

 there are a number of actions we believe the

Council must take to avert this crisis. In a report issued just last week, we

detailed specific recommendations.9

 The following summarizes a few of

the key areas in which we recommend action:

• Because departments and agencies have taken longer than recommended

to assess the readiness of their systems, it is unlikely that they will be able

to renovate and fully test all mission-critical systems by January 1, 2000.

Consequently, setting priorities is essential, with the focus being on

systems most critical to our health and safety, financial well being,

national security, or the economy.

• Agencies must start business continuity and contingency planning now to

safeguard their ability to deliver a minimum acceptable level of services in

the event of Year 2000-induced failures. In March we issued an exposure

draft of a guide providing information on business continuity and

contingency planning issues common to most large enterprises; OMB

7

Year 2000-World Status (Gartner Group, Document #M-100-037, November 25, 1997).

8

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective Public/Private Cooperation Needed to

Avoid Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-98-101, March 18, 1998).

9

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential For Widespread Disruption Calls For Strong Leadership and

Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998).

Page 3 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
recently adopted this guide as a model for federal agencies.10 Agencies

developing such plans only for systems currently behind schedule,

however, are not addressing the need to ensure business continuity in the

event of unforeseen failures. Further, such plans should not be limited to

the risks posed by the Year 2000-induced failures of internal information

systems, but must include the potential Year 2000 failures of others,

including business partners and infrastructure service providers.

• The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) assessment of the current

status of federal Year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency

reports that have not been consistently verified or independently

reviewed. Without such independent reviews, OMB and the President’s

Council on Year 2000 Conversion have little assurance that they are

receiving accurate information. Accordingly, agencies must have

independent verification strategies involving inspectors general or other

independent organizations.

• As a nation, we do not know where we stand overall with regard to Year

2000 risks and readiness. No nationwide assessment—including the

private and public sectors—has been undertaken to gauge this. In

partnership with the private sector and state and local governments, the

President’s Council could orchestrate such an assessment.

Social Security

Administration

At this point I would like to address our findings at specific agencies,

beginning with the Social Security Administration. We see significant

progress at SSA, and it is essential that this progress continue. SSA has been

anticipating the change of century since 1989, initiating an early response

to the potential crisis. It made important early progress in assessing and

renovating mission-critical mainframe systems—those necessary to

prevent the disruption of benefits—and has been a leader among federal

agencies.

Three key risks remained, however, as discussed in our report of last

October and testimony of this past March.11 One major risk concerned

Year 2000 compliance of the 54 state Disability Determination Services

(DDS)12 that provide vital support to the agency in administering SSA’s

disability programs. The second major risk concerned data exchanges,

10GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, March 1998 [exposure draft].

11Social Security Administration: Significant Progress Made in Year 2000 Effort, But Key Risks Remain

(GAO/AIMD-98-6, October 22, 1997) and Social Security Administration: Information Technology

Challenges Facing the Commissioner (GAO/T-AIMD-98-109, March 12, 1998).

12One for each state plus the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. A federal

DDS serves as a backup and model office for testing new technologies and work processes.

Page 4 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
ensuring that information obtained from these thousands of outside

sources—such as other federal agencies, state agencies, and private

businesses—was not “corrupted” by data being passed from systems not

Year 2000 compliant. Third, such risks were compounded by the lack of

contingency plans to ensure business continuity in the event of systems

failure.

We recommended several specific actions to mitigate these risks. These

included (1) strengthening monitoring and oversight of state DDS Year 2000

activities, (2) expeditiously completing the assessment of mission-critical

systems at DDS offices and using those results to establish specific plans of

action, (3) discussing the status of DDS Year 2000 activities in SSA’s

quarterly reports to OMB, (4) quickly completing SSA’s Year 2000

compliance coordination with all data exchange partners, and

(5) developing specific contingency plans that articulate clear strategies

for ensuring the continuity of core business functions.

At the request of this Committee’s Subcommittee on Social Security and

the Senate Special Committee on Aging, we are monitoring SSA’s

implementation of our recommendations. SSA has agreed with all of our

recommendations, and actions to implement them have either been taken

or are underway.

Regarding state DDSs, SSA has enhanced its monitoring and oversight by

establishing a full-time DDS project team, designating project managers and

coordinators, and requesting biweekly status reports. Further, almost all

states have now submitted initial Year 2000 plans; SSA now reports that 22

DDSs have had their systems renovated\ tested, and implemented. In

addition, beginning with its November 1997 report, SSA has included

information on DDSs in its quarterly reports to OMB.

SSA has also identified its external data exchanges and is in the process of

coordinating with its partners to make the exchanges Year 2000 compliant.

Further, SSA began working with the Department of the Treasury in March

of this year to test for the disbursement of benefit checks and other direct

deposit payments.

Finally, in accordance with our guidance, SSA has completed a high-level,

overall plan for business continuity. This plan represents a sound

framework from which SSA can build its specific contingency plans. These

specific plans—for each core business area—need to be developed to

ensure that operations continue uninterrupted.

Page 5 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
Medicare and the

Health Care Financing

Administration

As the nation’s largest health insurer, Medicare expects to process over a

billion claims and pay $288 billion in benefits annually by 2000. The

consequences, then, of its systems’ not being Year 2000 compliant could be

enormous. In a report issued last May,13 we discussed the critical

managerial and technical challenges facing the Health Care Financing

Administration (HCFA) in its efforts to ensure the viability of systems to

handle Medicare transactions into the next century.

We found that HCFA had not required systems contractors to submit Year

2000 plans for approval. Further, it did not have contracts or other specific

legal agreements with any contractors, other than one recently selected

contractor, stating how or when the Year 2000 problem would be

corrected, or whether contractors would certify that they would correct

the problem.

HCFA had also not identified critical areas of responsibility for Year 2000

activities. Although HCFA’s regional offices have a role in overseeing

contractor efforts, their specific Year 2000 responsibilities had not been

defined, nor had guidance been prepared on how to monitor or evaluate

contractor performance. While HCFA had been assessing the impact of the

century change on its internal systems, it had not completed a similar

review of Medicare contractors’ claims processing systems. Further, HCFA

had not required its contractors to prepare an assessment of the severity

of impact of potential Year 2000 problems.

Plans for independent validation of contractors’ strategies and test plans

were also lacking. Likewise, while HCFA had asked contractors to identify

their system interfaces, it had no plans for approving the contractors’

approaches for addressing interface and data exchange issues. Moreover,

HCFA had not developed contingency plans to address continuity of

business operations in the event of Year 2000-induced failures. HCFA

officials were again relying on the contractors themselves to identify and

complete the necessary work in time to avoid problems. Yet the

contractors had not developed contingency plans—and did not intend

to—because they considered this HCFA’s responsibility.

To address these deficiencies in HCFA’s approach, we made several

recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. These

included identifying responsibilities for managing and monitoring Year

2000 actions, preparing an assessment of the severity of impact and timing

13Medicare Transaction System: Success Depends Upon Correcting Critical Managerial and Technical

Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-97-78, May 16, 1997).

Page 6 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
of potential Year 2000 problems, and developing contingency plans. We

also recommended that HCFA require its contractors to submit for review

and approval (1) plans for identifying and correcting potential problems,

including certification that their changes would correct the problems,

(2) validation strategies and test plans for systems, and (3) plans for

addressing interface and data exchange issues.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has agreed to

implement our recommendations. For example, HCFA has established the

position of Chief Information Officer (CIO); this individual has made the

Year 2000 issue his top priority. HCFA has also established a Year 2000

organization, and the issue is included in HCFA’s information technology

investment process and annual performance plan goals. It is also

developing business continuity and contingency plans, with a draft plan

set for release this month. Further, the Medicare carriers’ manual has been

revised to require such contingency planning.

It should be noted, however, that since our report of last year,14 HHS’ and

OMB’s concerns about the Medicare contractors’ systems have become

more evident. For example, according to HHS’ February 1998 quarterly Year

2000 report, “HCFA’s Medicare contractor systems continue to be of great

concern to the Department.” In addition, in its summary of all agencies’

February 1998 reports, OMB concluded that HHS was making insufficient

progress on Year 2000 due in large part to HCFA’s delays.

There are also indications that the agency has not documented the severity

of impact of Year 2000-related failures—in other words, how its core

business functions would be affected if its automated information systems

failed because of Year 2000-related problems. For example, if Medicare

systems failed, the number of health services providers who would not be

paid, paid late, or in incorrect amounts is unknown. HCFA has recently

begun contingency planning that may address some of these issues. We are

currently evaluating the effectiveness of HCFA’s actions, at the request of

the Senate Special Committee on Aging.

Department of the

Treasury

With respect to the Department of the Treasury, we must first point out

that—unlike with Social Security and Medicare—we have not completed a

thorough assessment of the Department’s Year 2000 readiness. However,

we can describe some of what we have seen, and what Treasury officials

themselves report. In addition, we have undertaken detailed work at the

14GAO/AIMD-97-78, May 16, 1997.

Page 7 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which will be discussed in a separate

statement today.

Treasury’s role in delivering government services, such as Social Security

and Medicare payments, is vital. Treasury’s Financial Management Service

(FMS), for instance, as the government’s cash receipts and disbursements

agent and financial manager, represents the crossroads of financial activity

for the federal government. However, the Department’s progress in

making systems Year 2000 compliant has been mixed. Bureaus such as its

Office of Thrift Supervision are making good progress in converting their

systems and in overseeing the conversion activities of the financial

institutions that they regulate and inspect.15 In contrast, FMS is falling

seriously behind schedule in converting some of its systems.16 Treasury

Year 2000 program officials are aware of these and other related risks

facing the Department, and have established program management

structures and processes to address them, which we are presently

evaluating.

To perform their core business functions, Treasury and its bureaus rely on

a vast—and in many cases antiquated—collection of systems, thereby

complicating Year 2000 renovations. To integrate many of the bureaus’

systems and permit them to interact and exchange information with a

wide assortment of federal, state, and local government and private-sector

data exchange partners (over 6,800, according to the Department),

Treasury operates and maintains the largest non-Defense

telecommunications network in the federal government.

The responsibilities of Treasury’s Year 2000 program office are basically

twofold: guiding, monitoring, and reporting on the conversion activities of

its bureaus; and converting and reporting on Departmentwide

telecommunications systems that support its bureaus. To guide, monitor,

and report on bureau activities, Treasury has (1) established a

departmental program office and designated a program manager within

the CIO organization, (2) established Year 2000 working groups and

designated work group project managers to focus on major categories of

15Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Office of Thrift Supervision’s Efforts to Ensure Thrift Systems Are Year

2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-102, March 18, 1998).

16Treasury encompasses 14 separate bureaus or program offices. Two of these—the Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) and the U.S. Customs Service—account for almost 98 percent of federal revenues each

year. Two other major bureaus for which Year 2000 compliance implications are critical include FMS

and the Bureau of the Public Debt. Taken together, these four bureaus are instrumental in the efficient

collection and payment functions that support beneficiaries of programs such as Social Security and

Medicare.

Page 8 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
systems, (3) issued a departmental Year 2000 conversion strategy,

guidance, and standards, and (4) established monthly progress reporting

requirements. Additionally, it used its existing CIO Council as a forum for

Year 2000 information exchanges between the Department and bureau

CIOs, hired a contractor to validate the information being reported by its

bureaus, and developed draft guidance governing the process to be used in

certifying systems as compliant and for verification and validation of

certification determinations.

As a result of this program office oversight, Treasury has a good

appreciation of where its attention must be focused. Program officials

recognize that progress among the bureaus has been uneven, as has

progress within individual agencies for certain categories of systems. For

example, they stated that FMS is Treasury’s highest priority because of its

slow progress to date and the criticality of its role in managing the

government’s finances. As a result, according to the Department’s Year

2000 program manager, FMS progress and activities are tracked on a daily

basis and, consequently, FMS Year 2000 management effectiveness has

improved.

Department Year 2000 officials further report that telecommunications

systems and non-information technology (IT) areas, such as systems

embedded in facilities and equipment, are not as far along as other IT

areas, such as financial and management information systems, because

work in these areas started late. To address this risk, Treasury has

established working groups and project managers for both

telecommunications and non-IT systems, along with formal processes for

guiding, monitoring, and reporting on these areas.

To address the conversion of its telecommunications systems, the program

office has established a telecommunications working group and

designated a project manager. A risk management plan has also been

established, as has a test facility to permit all telecommunications systems

components to be tested before being placed in operation. In addition, a

contractor has been hired to perform independent verification and

validation of telecommunications conversion activities.

Despite these actions, Treasury and its bureaus face other major risks that

must be managed effectively if key systems are to be ready in time. For

example, the assessment phase—during which the compliance of

mission-critical systems is determined—has not been completed. This is

worrisome because it reduces the amount of time left for critical

Page 9 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
renovation, validation, and implementation activities. Treasury’s milestone

for assessing all mission-critical systems was July 1997. However, as of the

end of March 1998, FMS still had not completed assessing the compliance

of five of its mission-critical systems. For example, according to Treasury’s

latest status report, FMS is awaiting a contractor proposal for renovating a

system called GOALS I—for Government On-Line Accounting Link System

I. This system plays a critical role in processing interagency payments and

collections. Of particular note is that the need to assess GOALS I for

renovation arose only recently, when it became apparent that GOALS II,

intended to replace GOALS I, will not be ready in time.

For non-IT systems, Treasury’s components are farther behind. As of

mid-March, systems in 3 of Treasury’s 14 bureaus had still not been

inventoried. Of the systems in the 11 inventoried bureaus, many remain to

be assessed.

A final risk area is that contingency plans for ensuring continuity of

business operations have not yet been developed. As our guidance points

out,17 business area priorities and system dependencies must be examined

in light of possible Year 2000-induced failures; contingency planning to

help ensure continuity of business operations must then be developed and

tested.

Although Treasury’s Year 2000 program office recognizes the importance

of business continuity planning and has issued guidance in this area,

bureaus have not yet completed such plans, and are at risk of being unable

to complete them in time. For example, IRS plans to develop contingency

plans only for those business areas relying on systems whose conversions

are behind schedule. With this approach, IRS will have no ready response

to unexpected Year 2000-induced problems. Further exacerbating this

problem is that devising and activating manual or contract processes to

ensure continuity of operations could be a daunting task. According to a

Treasury contractor, it may be difficult for some Treasury components,

such as FMS, to formulate an approach to operating in a nonautomated

environment.

In conclusion, the change of century will present many difficult challenges

in information technology and in ensuring the continuity of business

operations, and has the potential to cause serious disruption to the nation

and to government entities on which the public depends, including SSA,

17GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, March 1998 [exposure draft].

Page 10 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
Medicare, and Treasury. These risks can be mitigated and disruptions

minimized with proper attention and management. While these agencies

and programs have been working to mitigate their Year 2000 risks, further

action must be taken to ensure continuity of mission-critical business

operations. Continued congressional oversight through hearings such as

this can help ensure that such attention is sustained and that appropriate

actions are taken to address this crisis.

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee

may have at this time.

Page 11 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
GAO Reports and Testimony Addressing the

Year 2000 Crisis

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential For Widespread Disruption Calls

For Strong Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998).

Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD

Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, April 30, 1998).

Department of the Interior: Year 2000 Computing Crisis Presents Risk of

Disruption to Key Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-98-149, April 22, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency

Planning (GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, Exposure Draft, March 1998).

Tax Administration: IRS’ Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request and Fiscal Year

1998 Filing Season (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-114, March 31, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Needed to Avoid

Disruption of Essential Services (GAO/T-AIMD-98-117, March 24, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Office of Thrift Supervision’s Efforts to

Ensure Thrift Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-102,

March 18, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective

Public/Private Cooperation Needed to Avoid Major Disruptions

(GAO/T-AIMD-98-101, March 18, 1998).

Post-Hearing Questions on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s

Year 2000 (Y2K). Preparedness (AIMD-98-108R, March 18, 1998).

SEC Year 2000 Report: Future Reports Could Provide More Detailed

Information (GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-51, March 6, 1998).

Year 2000 Readiness: NRC’s Proposed Approach Regarding Nuclear

Powerplants (GAO/AIMD-98-90R, March 6, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s

Efforts to Ensure Bank Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-73,

February 10, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: FAA Must Act Quickly to Prevent Systems

Failures (GAO/T-AIMD-98-63, February 4, 1998).

Page 12 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
GAO Reports and Testimony Addressing the

Year 2000 Crisis

FAA Computer Systems: Limited Progress on Year 2000 Issue Increases

Risk Dramatically (GAO/AIMD-98-45, January 30, 1998).

Defense Computers: Air Force Needs to Strengthen Year 2000 Oversight

(GAO/AIMD-98-35, January 16, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Needed to Address Credit Union

Systems’ Year 2000 Problem (GAO/AIMD-98-48, January 7, 1998).

Veterans Health Administration Facility Systems: Some Progress Made In

Ensuring Year 2000 Compliance, But Challenges Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-31R,

November 7, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: National Credit Union Administration’s

Efforts to Ensure Credit Union Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant

(GAO/T-AIMD-98-20, October 22, 1997).

Social Security Administration: Significant Progress Made in Year 2000

Effort, But Key Risks Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-6, October 22, 1997).

Defense Computers: Technical Support Is Key to Naval Supply Year 2000

Success (GAO/AIMD-98-7R, October 21, 1997).

Defense Computers: LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year 2000 Issues

(GAO/AIMD-97-149, September 26, 1997).

Veterans Affairs Computer Systems: Action Underway Yet Much Work

Remains To Resolve Year 2000 Crisis (GAO/T-AIMD-97-174, September 25,

1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Success Depends Upon Strong Management

and Structured Approach (GAO/T-AIMD-97-173, September 25, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14,

September 1997).

Defense Computers: SSG Needs to Sustain Year 2000 Progress

(GAO/AIMD-97-120R, August 19, 1997).

Defense Computers: Improvements to DOD Systems Inventory Needed for

Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, August 13, 1997).

Page 13 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
GAO Reports and Testimony Addressing the

Year 2000 Crisis

Defense Computers: Issues Confronting DLA in Addressing Year 2000

Problems (GAO/AIMD-97-106, August 12, 1997).

Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000

Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117, August 11, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Time Is Running Out for Federal Agencies to

Prepare for the New Millennium (GAO/T-AIMD-97-129, July 10, 1997).

Veterans Benefits Computer Systems: Uninterrupted Delivery of Benefits

Depends on Timely Correction of Year-2000 Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-97-114,

June 26, 1997).

Veterans Benefits Computers Systems: Risks of VBA’s Year-2000 Efforts

(GAO/AIMD-97-79, May 30, 1997).

Medicare Transaction System: Success Depends Upon Correcting Critical

Managerial and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-97-78, May 16, 1997).

Medicare Transaction System: Serious Managerial and Technical

Weaknesses Threaten Modernization (GAO/T-AIMD-97-91, May 16, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Risk of Serious Disruption to Essential

Government Functions Calls for Agency Action Now (GAO/T-AIMD-97-52,

February 27, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Today Needed To Prevent

Future Disruption of Government Services (GAO/T-AIMD-97-51, February 24,

1997).

High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9,

February 1997).

(511248) Page 14 GAO/T-AIMD-98-161
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