GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 1999 DEPOT 

MAINTENANCE

Workload Allocation 

Reporting Improved, 

but Lingering 

Problems Remain

GAO/NSIAD-99-154

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282668 Letter

July 13, 1999

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

On February 5, 1999, as required by 10 U.S.C. 2466 (e)(1), the Department 

of Defense (DOD) submitted a report to Congress on the distribution of 

depot maintenance workloads for fiscal year 1998. The statute provides 

that not more than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to 

a military department or defense agency for depot maintenance and repair 

can be used for performance by contractors. As required by 10 U.S.C. 2466 

(e)(2), we reviewed DOD’s report on the percentage of depot maintenance 

funding used by the public and private sector activities. This report (1) sets 

forth our view on DOD’s compliance with the percentage requirement in 

10 U.S.C. 2466; (2) compares the results of DOD’s recent report of fiscal 

year 1998 workload with prior years’ reports; (3) discusses continuing 

weaknesses in the accuracy, completeness, and consistency of reported 

data; and (4) discusses improvements in DOD’s guidance, data collection 

processes, oversight, and opportunities to further improve the quality of 

future reports. 

Results in Brief As submitted, DOD’s report covering fiscal year 1998 depot workloads 

would indicate that each of the covered military departments and the one 

reporting defense agency are in compliance with the 50-percent ceiling set 

by section 2466. However, because of errors and inconsistencies in 

reporting, we could not determine whether DOD’s departments and 

agencies were in compliance with the 50-percent ceiling for private sector 

performance. Further, consistent with DOD’s stated plans, the private 

Letr
B-282668

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

sector’s portion of such work is continuing to increase. DOD is collecting 

projected out-year obligation data that likely would have provided a more 

definitive outlook for future workload allocations, but has not yet 

completed its data collection and analysis of this data. 

Notwithstanding limitations in DOD’s data, its report covering fiscal year 

1998 depot workloads was more comprehensive than prior years’ reports 

because of improved guidance and, in the case of the Air Force, use of its 

audit agency to review its data. DOD reported obligating a total of 

$14.1 billion for depot maintenance in fiscal year 1998—about 37 percent 

more than was reported for fiscal year 1997. The percentage reported 

going to the private sector increased from 37 to 42 percent between fiscal 

year 1997 and 1998, with much of the increase resulting from contractor 

logistics support and interim contractor support. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Air Force, and the Army 

have provided improved guidance and oversight for this year’s report, and 

these actions resulted in more comprehensive reporting. However, 

reporting requirements are unclear in certain areas such as distinctions 

between depot and other levels of maintenance and repair activities. Also, 

problems occurred in this reporting cycle because guidance was not 

communicated to and understood by all organizational levels responsible 

for reporting. Further, data were not always reviewed for consistency and 

completeness within each service prior to submission to the OSD. Even 

once these issues are addressed, some subjectivity would likely continue 

because of difficulties in categorizing certain maintenance repair actions.

This report includes some recommendations for improving the quality of 

DOD’s public-private sector workload reporting.

Background DOD spent about 5 percent of its $272 billion fiscal year 1998 budget on 

depot maintenance activities. Depot-level maintenance involves the 

overhaul, repair, upgrade, and rebuilding of military systems, subsystems, 

parts, and assemblies and requires extensive shop facilities, specialized 

equipment, and highly skilled technical and engineering personnel. 

Traditionally, public sector maintenance activities have been performed at

Letr
B-282668

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

22 major government-owned and -operated depots1 and a number of 

othergovernment-owned facilities, including post-production software 

support activities, naval warfare centers, and Army arsenals. According to 

DOD officials, private sector maintenance and repair are conducted at 

about 1,100 contractor-operated facilities at various geographic locations. 

However, current DOD guidance calls for increasing reliance on the private 

sector to meet support needs to the extent authorized by law.

Legislative Requirements on 

Public and Private Sector 

Workload Distribution

Section 2466 of title 10 of the United States Code governs the allocation of 

depot maintenance workload between the public and private sectors. The 

statute provides that not more than 50 percent of funds made available in a 

fiscal year to a military department or defense agency for depot-level repair 

and maintenance can be used to contract for performance by nonfederal 

personnel. This percentage applies to each individual military department 

and defense agency. 

The statute also requires that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress 

a report concerning performance during the preceding fiscal year and that 

we report our views on whether DOD complied with the public-private 

sector percentage requirements. Congress has required DOD to report 

public and private sector distribution data in all years except one since 

1991, and the reporting requirement was made permanent by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) as codified at 

10 U.S.C. 2466. Results of our reviews of DOD’s public-private sector 

workload allocation reports for fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997 are 

discussed in appendix I.

The 1998 legislation further provided a new provision, 10 U.S.C. 2460, 

which defined depot-level maintenance and repair workloads. The 

provision specified that depot-level maintenance and repair includes 

(1) overhaul, upgrading, or rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or 

subassemblies; (2) testing and reclamation of equipment; (3) all aspects of 

software maintenance classified by DOD as depot maintenance as of July 1, 

1995; and (4) interim contractor support (ICS) and contractor logistics 

support (CLS) to the extent they involve depot-level maintenance services. 

The provision also specified that all depot-level maintenance and repair 

1

Major depots employ at least 400 personnel. Two major Air Force logistics centers (San Antonio and 

Sacramento) are in the process of closing and a naval warfare center (Keyport) is being downsized to 

less than 400 employees.
B-282668

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

workloads were to be included, regardless of funding source and location 

where the work was performed. It excluded from counting as depot-level 

maintenance workload the (1) nuclear refueling of aircraft carriers, 

(2) procurement of major modification or upgrades of weapon systems that 

are designed to improve program performance, and (3) procurement of 

parts for safety modifications but included the installation of parts for 

safety modifications.

Before 10 U.S.C. 2460 was enacted, depot-level maintenance and repair had 

not been defined in statute. Working definitions were provided in a variety 

of DOD directives, regulations and publications. The services applied these 

definitions using ad hoc procedures to prepare the prior-year reports. 

Uncertainty Exists 

Over Compliance With 

Ceiling on Private 

Sector Work, Even 

Though Reporting Is 

More Comprehensive 

Than Ever

DOD’s report, as presented, indicates that each of the covered military 

departments and the one reporting defense agency were in compliance 

with the statute; each reported that less than 50 percent of its depot 

workload was performed by contractors. However, as discussed later, 

because of errors and inconsistencies in reporting, we were unable to fully 

validate the data. Consequently, we could not determine whether DOD’s 

departments and agencies were in compliance with the 50-percent ceiling 

for private-sector performance. Notwithstanding limitations in DOD’s data, 

its March 1999 report was more comprehensive than previous ones. On the 

other hand, consistent with its stated policies and plans, DOD appears to be 

moving toward increased reliance on the private sector for depot 

maintenance support. DOD is working to develop future projections of its 

depot workload allocations, but it had not completed its efforts to obtain 

this information at the time we completed our report.

DOD’s Fiscal Year 1998 Report Is 

More Comprehensive Than 

Before

For fiscal year 1998, DOD reported total obligations of $14.1 billion for 

depot maintenance and repair. This is a 37-percent increase over the 

$10.3 billion reported for fiscal year 1997. Much of the increase resulted 

from reporting CLS and ICS. DOD has collected this information before 

for internal management purposes, but this was the first time it was 

included in the annual congressional report. In addition, more 

organizations and weapon system acquisition offices are now reporting 

depot maintenance workloads. For example, the number of Army major 

commands reporting increased from 4 to 11, the TRICARE Management 

Activity reported this year for the first time, and the U.S. Special 
B-282668

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Operations Command2 expanded its reporting to include reparable 

components funded through the service stock funds.

DOD submitted its workload report for fiscal year 1998 to Congress on 

February 5, 1999. The amounts and percentage distributions between the 

public and private sectors reported by DOD organizations are shown in 

table 1.

Table 1: Reported Fiscal Year 1998 DOD Depot Maintenance Workload Distributions

Source: DOD’s Feb. 5, 1999, report to Congress.

As discussed more fully later, we found numerous errors, omissions, and 

inconsistencies in the records supporting this report; consequently, we 

were unable to fully validate the data and determine whether or not DOD’s 

departments and agencies were complying with the 50-percent ceiling. The 

types of errors and omissions we identified indicated that in some 

instances DOD underreported the amount of funded depot maintenance 

work and understated the amount performed by the private sector. In 

other instances, the errors overstated the amount of funded depot 

maintenance. The errors and omissions were such that we sometimes 

2

 Because DOD does not consider them military departments or defense agencies, these two 

organizations are not subject to the 50-percent ceiling for private sector workloads. TRICARE 

Management Activity provides operational support for the military services in managing and 

administering portions of the defense health program. It funds maintenance on aeromedical evacuation 

aircraft. The U.S. Special Operations Command is a unified combatant command responsible for 

ensuring special forces are combat ready and mission capable. It receives its own funds for acquisition 

and support for special operations-peculiar equipment, while the military services are responsible for 

funding items that are not special operations-peculiar.

Dollars in millions

Total fiscal year

1998 obligations

Public

sector

total

Public

sector

percent

Private

sector

total

Private

sector

percent

Army $1,729.4 $941.2 54.4 $788.2 45.6

Navy (and Marine Corps) 6,430.9 3,748.2 58.3 2,682.7 41.7

Air Force 5,736.8 3,328.6 58.0 2,408.2 42.0

Defense Intelligence Agency 0.061 0.061 100.0 0 0

U.S. Special Operations Command 195.4 137.2 70.2 58.2 29.8

TRICARE Management Activity 30.7 0 0 30.7 100.0

Total DOD $14,122.4 $8,155.3 57.7 $5,968.0 42.3
B-282668

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

could not differentiate whether the amounts pertained to work performed 

by the public or private sectors. As a result, the net effect was unclear.

While Precise Data Are 

Lacking, Available 

Information Indicates 

Growth in Private Sector 

Workloads

We cannot be sure of the precise amounts of depot workloads being 

performed by government and private sector employees. However, DOD 

reports an increasing trend among the services in relying on the private 

sector for this work. For DOD in total, the percentage reported for the 

private sector was 42 percent for fiscal year 1998, up from 37 percent 

reported for fiscal year 1997. Figure 1 shows changes in reported 

percentages of DOD depot maintenance workloads performed by 

contractor personnel from fiscal years 1994 through 1998 for the military 

departments. The reporting baseline has changed over this period, 

consequently, the data are not directly comparable. The reports reflect 

changes in the data as reported under the guidelines in effect in each year.

Figure 1: Percentage of DOD Depot Maintenance Workloads Performed by 

Contractors (by dollar value)

Source: DOD data.

Note: While the data provide indication of a general trend toward increased contractor performance, it 

is subject to some imprecision due to periodic changes in reporting requirements.

Despite data limitations, the trend data indicate that the military 

departments continue to move toward the 50-percent ceiling on private 

sector workloads. DOD’s report for fiscal year 1998 indicated that, with the 

0

5

1 0

1 5

2 0

2 5

3 0

3 5

4 0

4 5

5 0

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

F isca l ye a r

Arm y Navy Air F o rc e
B-282668

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

exception of TRICARE, which reported all its maintenance in the private 

sector, no organization exceeded the ceiling on private sector workloads. 

This trend toward greater reliance on the private sector is consistent with 

DOD’s plans to move in this direction. 

Future Projections Although not required by 10 U.S.C. 2466, DOD is developing data to make 

future projections of depot maintenance workloads in the public and 

private sectors. However, at the time of our report, DOD was still 

developing the data. 

Data on the prior year’s workload percentages are important, but, by 

themselves provide only a retrospective, point-in-time measure. 

Projections of future years’ workloads and the percentage allocations 

between the two sectors provide a valuable perspective for internal 

management and congressional oversight. This data could highlight trends 

in the size and flow of workload and help judge the likely impact of current 

policies and acquisition program decisions on future allocations. 

Errors, 

Inconsistencies, and 

Uncertainties 

Continue, but the Net 

Effect Is Unclear

Our review this year, as in prior years, found numerous instances of 

inaccurate and inconsistent reporting of depot workloads and in 

designating whether it was performed by the public or private sector, 

making it unclear whether DOD departments and agencies were within the 

stated 50-percent ceiling. Of those problem areas where we could quantify 

or reasonably estimate, we found errors and inconsistencies amounting to 

about 10 percent of the total dollars of workload reported by DOD.3

 Many 

of these problems were specific to types of workloads and systems but also 

involved difficulties distinguishing between depot and nondepot workloads 

at some locations. Other problems were of a more miscellaneous nature. 

We could not determine the net effects of these problems on workload 

totals and percentages because of limitations in the data and because some 

were difficult to quantify. The major reporting problems are summarized 

below, and discussed more fully in appendix II.

3

 This figure, however, is based on our work primarily at headquarters locations and limited visits to 

field locations where data were obtained from the services. 
B-282668

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Key Problems Identified DOD’s report on fiscal year 1998 workloads contained varying degrees of 

underreporting, over-reporting, and inconsistent reporting of depot 

maintenance workloads. An example of inconsistent and possible 

underreporting involves installations of major upgrade and 

remanufacturing programs.4 The Army reported about $70 million for costs 

of disassembling systems at both public and private facilities. However, the 

Navy did not report any of its $10.4 million for disassembly workload. 

Neither service reported the installation costs incurred in the upgrade 

process in the private sector, considering these to be more production in 

nature rather than depot maintenance. Estimated installation costs for the 

Army were about $130 million and the Navy $30 million. OSD guidance 

specifies that installation and depot-level costs on major performance 

upgrades and other modifications should be reported. 

Another example of inconsistent and underreporting of workloads involves 

installation of other modifications by the Navy. The Naval Air Systems 

Command reported $217 million for installation of modifications by both 

the public and private sectors, but the Naval Sea Systems Command did not 

report $176 million for installation work. A Sea Systems Command official 

decided installation of modifications was not depot maintenance. 

However, one program within the Naval Sea Systems Command did report 

$62 million for public and private sector installations of modifications. 

This problem can affect both public and private workloads because 

installations are being done by both sectors. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, Navy officials said that funds spent 

for disassembly are paid for with Aircraft Procurement Navy dollars and 

are not required to be reported. OSD officials, however, agreed with us that 

it is not the source of funds but the nature of the work that would be the 

determining factor in whether work should be considered depot work. 

They also agreed that disassembly, reclamation, preparation, and recovery 

work are depot maintenance functions, regardless of where this work is 

performed or the source of funds paying for it. 

Underreporting was caused by the inability to distinguish whether work on 

depot maintenance workloads obtained through interservice agreements 

4

 A modification or upgrade is the alteration, conversion, or modernization of an end item of investment 

equipment which changes or improves the original purpose or operational capacity in relation to the 

effectiveness, efficiency, reliability or safety of that item. If the modification involves a remanufacture, 

the process typically results in a new model number and serial number of the modified system.
B-282668

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

was actually completed in the public or private sector. For example, the 

Army and the Naval Air Systems Command reported that all interservice 

workloads—$11 million and $116 million, respectively—were performed in 

the public sector, even though some workloads were actually performed by 

private contractors. The U.S. Special Operations Command, which reports 

separately from the services, did not determine where work was performed 

and reported its entire amount obligated for Air Force reparables—

$97 million—as public sector obligations, even though the Air Force, in 

total, contracts out more than one-third of its reparable workloads. This 

problem would understate contract workloads. 

The inability to distinguish depot workloads from other work performed by 

the services at below-depot level maintenance organizations resulted in 

inconsistent reporting. The Army performed depot maintenance tasks at 

field level activities that were not completely reported because these 

activities did not consider the work they did depot maintenance, even 

though some of this work meets the depot maintenance definition 

established in legislation. Several Army commands inconsistently 

collected and reported depot data. In addition, a recent internal study by 

the Army, as well as our ongoing review of Army maintenance, suggests 

that there is a proliferation of depot workloads performed in nondepot 

locations and the total amount, unknown at this time, is higher than 

reported. Further, the Navy maintains its Trident submarines at refit 

facilities but reported no depot maintenance. Navy officials have different 

opinions about whether some of the work done on the Trident is depot 

maintenance. The total maintenance expenditure in fiscal year 1998 was an 

estimated $158 million. The problem of identifying depot workload in 

nondepot activities could affect reported amounts for both public and 

private sectors.

Errors resulting from clerical and transcription errors and other problems, 

including differences in interpreting reporting guidance, also resulted in 

underreporting. The Navy, for example, inadvertently reversed its 

public-private data for the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and reported a 

$267,000 expenditure as $267 million; the net effect of both errors resulted 

in an underreporting of the public sector obligations. The Air Force added 

$24 million in estimated costs of government contract management to 

public sector obligations and subtracted the costs from private sector 

obligations. This latter area is not clearly dealt with in existing guidance.
B-282668

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Net Impact of Reporting 

Problems Is Unclear

The net effect of DOD’s reporting problems on depot workloads and the 

public-private percentages is not clear due to data limitations, limited time 

available for our review, and our inability to quantify or project some data. 

The total amount of errors and inconsistencies that was quantifiable 

represented about 10 percent of the total dollars DOD reported. Some 

errors involved underreporting, while others involved overreporting or 

resulted in adding to one sector while subtracting the same amount from 

the other sector. Further, although we could quantify or use officials’ 

estimates to quantify the majority of the problems, we found other 

problems were not easily quantified, and there are lingering uncertainties 

whether some types of workload should be reported. Some discrepancies 

were not readily distinguishable as to whether they affected the public or 

private sector. As a result, we could not accurately determine how much 

the reporting errors affected the overall percentages assigned to the public 

and private sectors. Thus, we could not definitively determine compliance 

with the 50 percent ceiling for the private sector.

At some locations, we found personnel responsible for providing 

information on depot workloads had not received the reporting guidelines 

necessary to provide accurate and complete information on depot 

workloads. Thus, although the services had issued guidance regarding 

what and how maintenance should be reported, in these instances this 

information never reached the personnel responsible for collecting it. Also, 

in some cases, reporting officials at locations where both depot and 

nondepot level maintenance work was being performed found they were 

making subjective determinations that could easily have been made 

differently by someone else. 

Improvements Made in 

Guidance and 

Reporting for 1998, but 

Additional 

Improvements Are 

Needed

Compared to prior years, DOD improved its reporting on the distribution of 

depot maintenance funds between the public and private sectors for fiscal 

year 1998. This most recent report shows that the services are reporting 

more dollars, on more types of maintenance, and from more activities. Two 

services improved their respective processes for collecting data. Yet, based 

on data deficiencies identified, additional improvements are needed. 

However, to what extent additional efforts can eliminate all reporting 

problems is questionable, given the sheer size and extent of data collection 

efforts and the reporting uncertainties that persist. 
B-282668

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Improved Guidance and 

Data Collection 

Workload reporting guidance and implementation strategies for collecting 

and reporting the fiscal year 1998 workload data were generally better, 

more systematic, and more comprehensive than in prior years. OSD 

provided increased top-level guidance and taskings to the appropriate 

organizations. The Air Force and the Army took several steps to improve 

their data collection and reporting processes, but we found little indication 

that the Navy had.

The OSD Maintenance Policy, Programs, and Resources Office assembles 

DOD’s report to Congress from the data aggregated by the military 

departments and the defense agencies. Responding to a recommendation 

in our July 1998 report, OSD issued guidance stating that the military 

departments and defense agencies should establish and document internal 

operating procedures for collecting data and reporting public and private 

sector depot-level workloads. It also stipulated that the procedures should 

clearly (1) identify the specific commands and activities responsible for 

submitting data and (2) describe the records and systems from which 

documentation would be pulled and the minimum documentation to be 

retained. It defined depot maintenance consistently with 10 U.S.C. 2460, 

added new reporting requirements for ICS, CLS, and similar contracts, and 

included some narrative to help clarify new reporting requirements and 

approaches. 

OSD tasked the military departments and the defense agencies to report 

and required a response in the negative from those agencies having no 

depot maintenance. Seven defense agencies submitted negative responses. 

The Defense Intelligence Agency was the only agency to report some depot 

maintenance, and that amount was minimal. Although not defense 

agencies, the U.S. Special Operations Command and TRICARE 

Management Activity also reported some depot maintenance workloads. 

OSD does not consider these two organizations to be military departments 

or defense agencies as defined in 10 U.S.C. 101 and, consequently, it does 

not believe these organizations are subject to the 50-percent limitation. We 

found no basis to disagree with that view. However, OSD rightly included 

these organizations in the report to ensure more complete reporting of the 

source of repair of DOD depot maintenance work. These organizations do 

manage depot maintenance funds and own equipment items that are 

maintained in DOD depots and by contractors.
B-282668

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Air Force Air Force officials initiated the following key actions that substantially 

improved its reporting process and results from prior years. 

• Issued additional instructions to supplement the OSD guidance, 

expanding on the directions for reporting ICS, CLS, and other 

maintenance reporting categories that had proven troublesome in the 

past or which required some interpretation.

• Held a widely attended kick-off meeting to explain and revise the 

guidance and to discuss reporting issues with representatives of the air 

logistics centers, acquisition program offices, and Headquarters, Air 

Force Materiel Command (AFMC).

• Provided electronic templates to help ensure comprehensive and 

standardized reporting.

• Designated focal points that worked with reporting entities to answer 

questions and summarize data.

• Used the Air Force Audit Agency to verify data and validate the 

collection process. Auditors, along with officials from AFMC 

headquarters and the Air Staff, reviewed major portions of the workload 

estimates initially submitted by logistics centers and acquisition offices 

and made substantial revisions to improve the accuracy and 

comprehensiveness of the data reported to the Congress. 

Army The Army also issued supplemental instructions to expand upon the OSD 

guidance, provide more details, and accommodate Army-unique programs. 

Officials based the instructions on the findings and recommendations 

resulting from last year’s evaluation by the Army Audit Agency and our 

work. The instructions were disseminated to 11 major commands, and 

each command headquarters distributed the guidance to lower 

organizational levels and generally tasked appropriate offices for reporting. 

Every command subsequently reported depot maintenance obligations for 

fiscal year 1998 while only four commands reported last year. Officials, 

however, did not always ensure that all reporting offices had received and 

understood the guidance, which led to some reporting errors and 

inconsistencies discussed later in this report. Responding to the problems 

we identified in last year’s report,5

 the Army Audit Agency reviewed the 

results of the Army’s 1997 data collection and reporting, and made 

recommendations for improving Army procedures. An official said the 

5

 Defense Depot Maintenance: Public and Private Sector Workload Distribution Reporting Can Be

Further Improved (GAO/NSIAD-98-175, July 23, 1998).
B-282668

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

auditors may be called in again to review the 1998 results, depending on the 

kinds and extent of problems we identified in this year’s report.

Navy Navy officials did not (1) issue additional instructions, (2) ensure that the 

OSD guidance was distributed to all appropriate offices, and, (3) in general, 

exercise the degree of management oversight of the data collection 

process, as did the other services. The Navy basically distributed the data 

call to nine commands and relied on their responses with little internal or 

external review. The Naval Audit Service was not tasked to verify data and 

validate the process. The Navy’s approach resulted in differing 

interpretations of OSD guidance and questionable data gathering practices 

at two of the three commands we visited. For example, one command 

reported obligations for installing modifications as stated in the OSD 

guidance while another one did not, based on an official’s determination 

that such expenses were not maintenance and were therefore not 

reportable. Neither the Naval Air Systems Command nor Naval Sea 

Systems Command sent the OSD guidance and taskings to all weapon 

systems program officials who were in the best position to determine 

applicability of reporting requirements to their programs. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, Navy officials said they had (1) obtained copies of 

newly drafted 50-50 data collection and implementation guidance from 

both the Army and the Air Force to take advantage of their “lessons 

learned” and (2) initiated plans to use the Naval Audit Service to help 

improve the Navy’s 50-50 data gathering and reporting. 

Further Improvements Can 

Be Made 

In the current environment, where the distinction between depot and other 

types of maintenance is becoming more blurred due to the various factors 

noted, identifying and reporting all obligations for depot maintenance is an 

increasingly complex process. Some situations will likely continue to 

require some subjective judgments regarding whether and how much to 

report. However, some of the errors we found were administrative and 

clerical and could be eliminated through reviews of data before they are 

forwarded to higher levels, improving DOD guidance, and providing more 

management oversight. Also, we identified some opportunities for process 

improvements that could help to improve the quality of DOD’s 

public-private sector workload reporting. 
B-282668

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Distinctions Between Depot and 

Other Types of Workload Are 

Increasing Reporting Challenges 

and Will Likely Require 

Additional Guidance

Since the early 1990s, the distinction between depot-level maintenance and 

other levels of maintenance and manufacturing work has become 

increasingly vague as the services move depot workloads to operating 

locations, redefine required levels of maintenance, and consolidate 

maintenance organizations. This vagueness could require additional 

guidance on how to distinguish between depot and other workloads when 

depot and other maintenance levels have been consolidated. 

While depot-level maintenance workloads continue to be performed at 

traditional depot activities, they are also performed by civilian and 

active-duty military personnel in military units and by contractors at 

various field locations. Funds for depot-level maintenance activities come 

principally from operations and maintenance appropriations but also 

procurement and research, development, testing, and evaluation 

appropriations. The public depots are primarily financed with working 

capital funds, whereas other facilities providing maintenance are financed 

through direct appropriation.6

Each of the military services is consolidating and streamlining some 

maintenance activities, which can present future reporting challenges. 

Thus, each of the military service headquarters may need to add guidance 

specific to its initiative, but some subjective judgments and differences in 

interpretation are likely when depot work is consolidated with other 

maintenance activities.

An Army initiative—the Sustainment Maintenance program—will collapse 

the current four-level maintenance system into a two-level system. Still in 

the early policy formulation stage, the two-level system will combine field 

and sustainment levels of maintenance at the same location. The current 

depot and general support levels will be combined and relabeled as 

sustainment maintenance workload—tasks that involve repairing, 

overhauling, rebuilding, and testing items. Sustainment maintenance will 

be accomplished both at the established Army depots and at local repair 

and maintenance activities. The Army plans to issue a new national 

maintenance policy later this year to consolidate the maintenance levels, 

and it will then begin revising field level instructions and technical orders 

in preparation for implementing the sustainment maintenance program.

6

A working capital fund is a revolving fund in which depots earn revenues through sales of maintenance 

services to customers, who reimburse the fund with appropriated monies. Nonworking capital funded 

maintenance facilities are financed through direct appropriations and their customers are not charged 

on a per item basis as they are for operations funded through the working capital fund. 
B-282668

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

The Navy’s regionalization of maintenance plans is consolidating 

depot-level and below-depot levels of maintenance on a geographic basis. 

For example, the Navy has implemented a pilot project consolidating the 

operations and management of its Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and its 

nearby intermediate maintenance facility. This pilot project is testing the 

regional maintenance concept that integrating intermediate and depot 

maintenance activities would result in greater efficiency and lower overall 

costs than maintaining maintenance facilities within a single, geographic 

area. The Navy decided the consolidated activity at Pearl Harbor would 

use a single financial system and use mission funding rather than the Navy 

Working Capital Fund. Fiscal year 1999 is the first year operating under the 

new organization. The impact on the 50-50 reporting of merging both the 

operational and financial aspects of the two levels of maintenance 

reporting is uncertain, but an official told us the combined activity could 

have difficulty determining what work should be included in the Navy’s 

2466 report to Congress next year.

Similarly, the Air Force’s recent transition from three to two levels of 

maintenance and changes in the location of work present some difficulties 

in reporting depot-level maintenance. Under two levels of maintenance, 

some workloads that had been accomplished at intermediate facilities 

transitioned to depots, while some devolved to base maintenance activities. 

Those workloads that went to depots should be included in the report to 

Congress, consistent with the OSD guidance that all workloads performed 

at depots should be counted as public sector workloads. The Air Force’s 

experience in reporting C-5 engine maintenance suggests that additional 

guidance may be needed in this area because the same or similar tasks may 

not be consistently reported and could change from year to year depending 

on the location where work is performed. The Air Force initially pushed 

intermediate-level C-5 engine workloads to the San Antonio Air Logistics 

Center, where they were reported as public depot workloads. The Air 

Force later decided to move these same workloads to operating bases, 

where they were not included in this year’s depot workload report.

Continue to Improve Other 

Guidance and Ensure It Is 

Adequately Communicated to 

Key Reporting Levels 

The errors, inconsistencies, and uncertainties we found indicated that 

implementing guidance could be improved with further clarifications of 

reporting requirements in problem areas discussed in this report and with 

greater emphasis on ensuring that reporting guidance is disseminated to 

and understood by those charged with reporting. The experiences in the 

Air Force and the Army demonstrate that continuing to hone guidance and 

tailor it to service specific issues and programs pays off. Once improved, 

management must then direct and coordinate its release and provide the 
B-282668

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

oversight necessary to ensure comprehensive and consistent results. On 

this point, the Army fell somewhat short in ensuring instructions were 

distributed and understood, especially in those commands that had not 

previously been tasked to report depot maintenance. Also, as discussed 

earlier, the Navy did not exercise much central direction and oversight of 

data collection to ensure all appropriate offices received guidance and had 

a common understanding of reporting requirements. 

Responding to a recommendation in our July 1998 report, OSD stated in its 

guidance that the military services and defense agencies were to establish 

and document internal operating procedures for collecting data and 

reporting public and private sector depot-level workloads. The procedures 

are to clearly identify the specific commands and activities responsible for 

submitting data and describe the records and systems from which 

documentation will be pulled and the minimum documentation to be 

retained. The OSD guidance clearly specified reporting conventions and 

organizational responsibilities, while Army and Air Force supplemental 

instructions provided more specific details tailored to service issues and 

programs. For example, the Air Force guidance for CLS and ICS programs 

included a helpful list of tasks to assist program officials in determining 

which program costs should be counted as depot and which should not be. 

Each year, DOD can build upon lessons learned to further improve 

guidance for the following year and to include new issues that emerge—for 

example, reporting maintenance warranty costs and the challenges posed 

by the services’ consolidations and changes in maintenance levels.

Align Internal Definitions With 

Statutory Requirements

Because of the new statutory definition of depot maintenance in 10 U.S.C. 

2460, the services need to ensure that their own regulations and internal 

operating processes are consistent with the statute. This appears to be 

more of a problem in the Army than the other services. The Army’s primary 

regulation on maintenance—Army Regulation 750-1—establishes policies 

and procedures for determining the appropriate level and subsequent 

classification of maintenance. The statutory definition encompasses a 

substantial portion of general support-level maintenance that is currently 

not recognized by the Army regulation as depot maintenance. As a result, 

field maintenance and program officials used definitions and maintenance 

classifications established pursuant to the regulation in determining 

whether and how much depot maintenance should be reported and did not 

report some workloads that appear to meet the definition in the statute. 

Army officials are revising this regulation to be more consistent with the 

statute. The Army, however, will also have to revise other operating 

instructions at the field and depot levels. Next year, the Army will need to 
B-282668

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

ensure that, when completed, the revised regulation is understood and 

used in the field to report depot maintenance workload. 

Maintain Auditable Records OSD guidance requires that the military services and the defense agencies 

maintain the detailed supporting data used to develop the submission for 

use by us. For CLS, ICS, and similar contractor support, the guidance 

specifies that records are to be maintained on the amounts included in 

workload totals and that estimating techniques and rationales are to be 

explained and documented. Our review, however, showed that complete 

records, accessible and understandable to a third party, were not always 

maintained. Army units in Korea, for example, maintained rather poor 

documentation and some records had been disposed of. The Navy did not 

maintain comprehensive central records to show how obligations had been 

accumulated. Air Force programs did not always have documentation to 

show how CLS costs were computed and what assumptions and estimating 

methodologies were used. Good records, documentation of processes 

followed, and identification of data sources used are important not only for 

audits and management oversight but also for use as a historical record 

that can be followed by newly assigned staff to assist in data collection and 

by new weapon system programs.

In commenting on a draft of this report, Navy officials said that the Defense 

Contract Management Command (DCMC) maintains information about 

depot maintenance contracts, including a complete history of obligations. 

While this may be true, DCMC does not provide a separate accounting of 

contract maintenance data. Additionally, our comment regarding the Navy 

not maintaining comprehensive records was intended to refer to all types 

of Navy depot-level maintenance, including that provided by Navy depots, 

other service depots, as well as the private sector. In later discussions with 

Navy officials, they agreed with our observations regarding the need to 

maintain better records in the future. 

Consider Expanded Use of 

Auditors to Verify Data and 

Validate Processes

The Air Force has demonstrated the value of employing its audit agency as 

a third party, “honest broker,” to verify data and validate the data collection 

and reporting processes. The Army made limited use of its auditors last 

year to identify problems and to prepare instructions to supplement the 

OSD guidance. The Navy did not employ its audit agency to assist in this 

process. Additional use of service audit agencies could improve the quality 

and consistency of reported workload data.

The Air Force called on the Air Force Audit Agency for both the 1998 and 

1997 report cycles. Numerous reporting officials cited the Air Force Audit 
B-282668

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Agency’s work as extremely valuable in improving report accuracy and 

consistency. Auditors reviewed about $4.8 billion (85 percent) of the fiscal 

year 1998 workloads reported by the air logistics centers and acquisition 

program offices and identified an error rate of 3 percent, or $198 million 

(absolute value). These errors were corrected before the Air Force 

finalized its data and submitted the Air Force report to OSD. As a result, 

we found fewer reporting problems in the Air Force than in the other 

services.

The Army used its audit agency to review data after the 1997 report had 

already gone to Congress, but its findings and recommendations were 

useful to improving the Army’s process and issuing supplemental 

instructions. If the Army had used its auditors to verify data before 

submitting its report to OSD, fewer problems would likely have gone 

undetected in the report that went to Congress. And, given the magnitude 

of errors identified in the Navy’s report, use of its audit service could have 

been very beneficial. Use of statistical sampling techniques could also be 

helpful in this regard.

Report Out-year Data and 

Project Future Allocations

As noted, while not required by law, this year’s data call from OSD 

continued the prior practice of having components report projected 

workloads and percentage distributions for future years, in addition to 

current year reporting. OSD tasked the services to project workload data 

for fiscal years 1999 through 2005. The fiscal year 1999 and 2000 workloads 

were to use data submitted in the 2000 President’s budget and the funded 

workloads for the remaining years were to reflect the most recent Program 

Operating Memorandum submission. DOD had not completed its efforts to 

obtain this information at the time we completed our report. Having this 

information, along with reporting on the results of the preceding year, 

would be beneficial.

Conclusions DOD improved the results and the processes used to generate the report 

for fiscal year 1998. The report indicates that the military departments and 

defense agencies complied with the legislative requirement on depot 

maintenance funding allocation. However, we could not fully validate the 

data and determine whether the military departments and defense agencies 

were complying with the 50-percent ceiling for private sector performance 

under 10 U.S.C. 2466. Many of the reporting problems relate to 

uncertainties regarding what is and is not reportable and inconsistent 

interpretation of requirements between and among the services. Problems 
B-282668

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

also resulted from personnel not receiving or being fully aware of reporting 

requirements. Further, some problems were exacerbated by the lack of 

retention of documentation pertaining to workload allocations, or 

insufficient management oversight to ensure accuracy and completeness of 

the data.

Despite data limitations, available information indicates that DOD, 

consistent with its policies and plans, is moving toward greater reliance on 

private-sector repair capabilities. DOD’s report presents data for the most 

recent reporting year. DOD is in the process of developing projections of 

future year workload allocations. Such information is necessary to make a 

complete analysis of funding trends. 

Recommendations To improve the data collection and reporting processes, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the secretaries of the 

military departments and commanders of the defense agencies and 

activities, (1) provide additional clarifying guidance in areas of 

uncertainties such as those involving warranties that include the 

performance of maintenance, remanufacturing, and consolidation of depot 

and nondepot work at individual locations; (2) increase management 

emphasis and oversight to ensure reporting requirements are adequately 

communicated to all organizational levels responsible for providing 

workload reporting data; (3) consider greater involvement of service audit 

agencies and statistical methods, as appropriate, to verify workload 

reporting data before the data is submitted to OSD; (4) ensure retention of 

necessary documentation to verify workload allocations; and (5) provide 

future years’ projections along with the prior-year data, or as otherwise 

required by Congress.7

Agency Comments DOD officials provided oral comments on a draft of this report. They 

concurred with the first four recommendations and agreed to take actions 

such as issuing additional guidance in areas of uncertainty, including 

remanufacturing and consolidation of depot and nondepot work, and 

increasing the use of service audit agencies to review reported depot 

maintenance workload data. While concurring with the intent of our fifth 

recommendation, the officials said it is not practicable to submit future 

7

H.R. 1401, section 334.
B-282668

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

years’ projections of depot workloads at the same time as prior-year data. 

These officials said that if DOD is to submit out-year projections, the 

budget update scheduled at the end of March would provide a better 

baseline than out-year projections estimated using data developed in 

September of the previous year. Thus, because of the timing of the update, 

they said that May 1 is the earliest the future-year data can be submitted. 

We agree that the later information should be more current. However, 

using projections determined by the end of March or later as the basis for 

developing a report to Congress may not accommodate congressional 

review during the defense authorization process. Noting that Congress 

isconsidering requiring that out-year data be provided based on a different 

schedule than the prior data, we revised our recommendation to reflect 

this.8

As discussed below, officials also commented on various findings related to 

DOD’s reporting on depot workloads. 

DOD officials agreed that the Department’s fiscal year 1998 depot workload 

report had significant errors and inconsistencies, but they noted that none 

were of sufficient magnitude to cast reasonable doubt that the military 

departments and the defense agencies were in compliance with the 

50-percent limitation. As our report points out, given the numbers and 

types of errors and inconsistencies identified, we could not determine 

whether the required reporting activities were or were not in compliance 

for fiscal year 1998. 

Army and Navy officials stated that the Army and the Navy were correct in 

not reporting certain costs associated with remanufactucturing programs 

because these costs involve production, not depot maintenance. We noted 

that the Army did include the costs associated with disassembly and 

preparation, which are a part of the remanufacturing process, while the 

Navy did not. DOD officials agreed that reporting guidance relative to 

remanufacturing and major upgrade programs should be clarified. The 

statutory definition of depot maintenance includes certain aspects of 

weapon system and component upgrade and rebuild. We acknowledge that 

this is a difficult area to report on. However, we believe our 

recommendation is still merited and additional guidance and attention is 

warranted to ensure reporting is done consistently and in accordance with 

congressional guidelines.

8

 H.R. 1401, section 334.
B-282668

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Navy officials disagreed with our statements that the Navy should have 

reported funds associated with depot-like work performed at the Trident 

Refit Facilities. They said that these facilities are not considered 

depot-level facilities; no depot maintenance work is performed there; and 

to accommodate the Trident’s unique operational schedule, depots are used 

only for extended refit periods and extended refueling overhauls. These 

facilities, however, were developed with extensive industrial capability, 

generally not authorized at intermediate repair facilities, to accommodate 

depot repair of the submarines’ critical components to support the 

Trident’s operational schedule. Further, in accordance with congressional 

and OSD guidelines, it is not the location of the work but the content that 

should determine whether it is depot-level work. Also, as previously noted, 

DOD guidance provides that depot maintenance includes overhaul, 

upgrading, or rebuilding of parts regardless of the source of funds for the 

work. We continue to believe it is not reasonable to conclude that these 

extraordinary industrial facilities perform no depot maintenance work in 

light of the capabilities of the industrial equipment located at the facilities 

and the content, complexity, and cost of the repair work performed there. 

Our 1998 report recommended that the secretaries of the military 

departments develop methodologies for aggregating and reporting 

depot-level work accomplished at nonworking capital funded repair sites—

including the Trident repair facilities. We continue to believe that 

additional efforts in this area are needed to ensure that depot work is 

reported, regardless of location or funding source.

While our report states the Air Force may have underreported maintenance 

warranty costs, Air Force officials commented that all warranty costs 

related to depot-level maintenance were included in the report to Congress. 

However, Air Force Audit Agency officials initially raised the issue that 

warranty costs appeared to be underreported and, in their report 

comments, Air Force officials said that operating procedures would be 

expanded for warranty costs. Our report did not state that amounts were 

incorrectly reported but that a warranty is another reporting category that 

could be clarified in future guidance. Consequently, we left this example in 

the final report. Because warranties are widely employed and encouraged 

by DOD reform initiatives, it will be more important for OSD and the 

military departments to expand and clarify reporting guidance in this area. 

Therefore we have revised our recommendation to specifically reflect this 

category.

Agency officials also provided technical comments which we incorporated 

where appropriate.
B-282668

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Scope and 

Methodology

To validate DOD’s reported amounts and percentage allocations to the 

public and private sectors, we reviewed DOD’s fiscal year 1998 report and 

the supporting details (summary records, accounting reports, budget 

submissions, and contract documents) at the departmental headquarters, 

major commands, and selected maintenance activities. We discussed with 

officials the processes used to request, collect, aggregate, and report depot 

data and the management controls to oversee and validate results. We 

compared the processes against title 10 provisions on reporting 

requirements and definitions and the internal guidance used to guide this 

year’s report. We selected certain programs and maintenance activities for 

more detailed review based on several factors, including relative size, 

OSD’s areas of interest, and our past experience as to problem reporting 

areas. We evaluated procedures used and the results to ensure accurate 

and complete data and to identify errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in 

the reported area. We discussed audit findings and reconciliations made by 

the Air Force Audit Agency in its review of Air Force data and reviewed 

Army Audit Agency findings from last year.

To compare this year’s report to prior years, we used information that we 

had developed in past years, supplemented by newer data, to compare and 

contrast total amounts reported, workload compositions by maintenance 

categories, and individual reporting organizations. We did this to identify 

major changes in the amounts and composition as well as commonalties 

between this and previous reporting periods. However, a complete 

comparison is not possible because of changes in reporting guidance. We 

developed trend data to show the annual percentage allocations between 

the public and private sectors for the military departments and for DOD as 

a whole, from 1994 to 1998.

Based on the supporting details backing up each organization’s report, 

discussions with officials, and our analysis of selected programs, we 

identified specific examples where the reported information was not 

accurate, was incomplete, and/or was inconsistently reported within and 

between organizations. We used OSD and service supplemental guidance 

as criteria to evaluate and determine problem reporting areas and areas 

where there are differences in interpreting and applying the guidance. We 

obtained officials’ views to determine the rationale they used deciding 

whether and how much to report and their perspectives on subjective and 

challenging areas of reporting.
B-282668

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Building on what we had learned about both the positive actions taken by 

DOD this year, as well as continuing problem areas, we identified process 

improvements that could lead to improved future years’ reports. We also 

identified where DOD had already taken action to improve this year’s 

guidance, data collection processes, and oversight. We received comments 

and perspectives from officials at OSD, department headquarters, major 

commands, and maintenance activities regarding lessons learned and 

lingering areas of concern.

We interviewed officials and examined documents at OSD, Army, Navy, and 

Air Force headquarters, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and TRICARE 

Management Activity, all in Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Special Operations 

Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; Army Materiel Command in 

Alexandria, Virginia; Air Force Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio; Naval Sea 

Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia; Naval Air Systems Command, 

Patuxent River, Maryland; Air Force Audit Agency, Dayton, Ohio; Army 

Tank Automotive Command and the Program Executive Office for Ground 

Combat and Support Systems, Warren, Michigan; Army Aviation Missile 

Command and the Program Executive Office for Aviation, Huntsville, 

Alabama; Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, 

Oklahoma; Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins, Georgia; and 

several field locations of the Eighth U.S. Army, Korea.

We conducted our review from February to May 1999 in accordance with 

generally accepted government audit standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable F.W. Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air 

Force; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable 

Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional 

committees and members. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request.
B-282668

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Points of contact concerning this report and other 

key contributors are listed in appendix III.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issue
B-282668

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

GAO Reports 

Concerning Public and 

Private Sector 

Workload Distribution 

Reporting

28

Appendix II

Problems Found in 

DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot 

Workloads

30

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

41

GAO Related Products 43

Tables Table 1: Reported Fiscal Year 1998 DOD Depot Maintenance 

Workload Distributions 5

Figures Figure 1: Percentage of DOD Depot Maintenance Workloads 

Performed by Contractors (by dollar value) 6
Contents

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Abbreviations

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

CLS contractor logistics support

DCMC Defense Contract Management Command

DOD Department of Defense

ICS interim contractor support

NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command

O&M operations and maintenance

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Appendix I

GAO Reports Concerning Public and Private 

Sector Workload Distribution Reporting ApenxIdi

In May 1996, we reported1 that the Department of Defense’s (DOD) report 

of public and private sector depot maintenance workload allocations did 

not provide a complete, consistent, and accurate picture of depot 

maintenance workloads. DOD’s report did not include funding for interim 

contractor support (ICS), contractor logistics support (CLS), labor for 

installation of modification and upgrade kits and software maintenance. In 

that report, we suggested that Congress might wish to consider requiring 

that these workload categories be included in future workload reports, 

regardless of funding source.

Similarly, in January 1998, we reported2

 that DOD's approach for collecting 

information on public and private sector depot maintenance workload 

allocations did not provide complete and consistent reporting for the same 

workload categories. We noted that DOD's guidance to the military 

departments was imprecise, leaving room for varying interpretations on 

data to be reported. To improve upon the accuracy of future workload 

distribution reports, we recommended that DOD develop a standardized 

methodology for annually collecting depot maintenance funding data for 

the public and private sectors, including specific definitions of the types of 

workloads and defense activities that should be reported. Responding to 

an earlier draft of our January 1998 report, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) issued guidance in December 1997 that addressed many of 

our concerns regarding how the workload distribution data should be 

collected and aggregated to provide more complete and consistent 

reporting. 

In July 1998, we reported3

 that the military departments had not 

developed complete and consistent workload distribution information in 

their February 1998 reports on the fiscal year 1997 workload. This resulted 

in underreporting about $300 million for public sector workloads and 

$1.6 billion for private sector workloads. We identified several reasons for 

this underreporting. First, OSD guidance continued to leave room for 

varying interpretation of reporting requirements. Second, the military 

1

Defense Depot Maintenance: More Comprehensive and Consistent Workload Data Needed for

Decisionmakers (GAO/NSIAD 96-166, May 21, 1996).

2

Defense Depot Maintenance: Information on Public and Private Sector Workload Allocations

(GAO/NSIAD-98-41, Jan. 20, 1998).

3

Defense Depot Maintenance: Public and Private Sector Workload Distribution Reporting Can Be 

Further Improved (GAO/NSIAD-98-175, July 23, 1998).
Appendix I

GAO Reports Concerning Public and Private 

Sector Workload Distribution Reporting

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

departments had not developed internal procedures and systems for 

accurate and timely reporting. Third, the military departments had not 

resolved questions on the inclusion of some depot-level workloads. We 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct that the secretaries of 

the military departments (1) establish and document internal operating 

procedures for collecting data and reporting public and private sector 

depot-level workload distribution and (2) develop methodologies for 

aggregating and reporting the amount of funding for depot-level work at 

nonworking capital funded repair sites. We also recommended that the 

Secretary establish milestones for issuing clarifying instructions and for 

resolving questions on responsibilities for reporting depot-level 

maintenance for selected maintenance.
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads ApenxIdi

As in prior years, our review of selected data continued to find inaccurate 

and inconsistent reporting. Some errors are attributable to simple 

transcription and clerical mistakes, but many result from failure to follow 

guidance, unclear instructions, inadequate management oversight, lack of 

visibility of the data, and use of prospective and budgetary data rather than 

actual recorded obligations. Major upgrades, installation of modifications, 

interservice work (work performed by one service but funded by another), 

CLS, and maintenance performed at nondepot locations are more likely 

than others to experience reporting problems. There are also questions 

and uncertainties about reporting certain workloads and other areas that 

require judgment. In addition, the line separating depot-level maintenance 

from lower levels of maintenance is becoming increasingly blurred as the 

services move depot and depot-type workloads to operating locations, 

redefine required levels of maintenance, and consolidate maintenance 

organizations.

Major Upgrades and 

Remanufactured 

Systems

We determined that the Army and the Navy did not consistently report 

workload data in the 2466 report and may have underreported the use of 

funds for installation and related workloads on several major upgrade and 

remanufacture programs. Service officials said these programs were to 

improve performance and were production in nature and not reportable as 

depot maintenance. OSD guidance, however, includes overhaul, upgrading, 

and rebuilding in its definition of depot maintenance and specifically 

directs that the installation of performance upgrades and other 

modifications be reported, regardless of the source of funds and location of 

the work. The Army’s supplementary instructions also state that the 

installation of major modifications or upgrades of weapon systems that are 

designed to improve performance are reportable and that, if rebuild or 

overhaul is performed in conjunction with the modification, the full cost of 

the rebuild or overhaul is reportable as well as the cost to install the 

modification kit. The Army instructions cite one upgrade program in 

question as an example of reportable costs. Because of the differences in 

opinion and inconsistent application of guidance, this area is one where 

DOD needs to clarify reporting requirements.

The Army did not report obligations for depot-level installation workloads 

for the Abrams Tank, the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, and the 

Longbow Apache Helicopter upgrade programs funded by the procurement 

appropriation. More than $1.3 billion in procurement funds were available 

to these programs during fiscal year 1998. A DOD official estimated that 

about 10 percent, or $130 million, was for installation. Army officials 
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

believed that these kinds of performance upgrades and remanufacturing 

actions were not reportable as depot maintenance. They consider these 

actions more like new production because the upgraded systems receive 

new model numbers and serial numbers. However, the Army did report the 

depot-level obligations for the disassembly of components and 

premodification work performed at Army depots and contractor facilities 

on these weapon systems. For example, the Army reported obligations 

totaling $38.5 million for the operations and maintenance (O&M) funded 

disassembly of the Longbow Apache. Of this total, $30.2 million was for 

contract obligations and $8.3 million was for work performed at an Army 

depot. For the Abrams and Bradley disassembly and premodification 

work, the Army reported procurement funded obligations totaling 

$32.2 million ($24.5 million for workload at Army depots and $7.7 million 

for contractor workloads). 

The Navy’s AV-8B (Harrier) remanufacture program modifies selected day 

attack Harriers to a radar/night attack capability. Aircraft are disassembled 

at the Cherry Point Naval Aviation Depot in North Carolina, with specific 

parts being shipped to the contractor facility to be used in the new 

configuration. Navy officials did not report any funds for installing the new 

configured parts at the contractor facility, nor did they report $10.4 million 

in obligations for disassembly work at Cherry Point. The total program cost 

in fiscal year 1998 was $327 million; using the estimate that installation 

costs account for about 10 percent of program costs would indicate that 

about $32.7 million was not reported. Program officials said that they did 

not believe these kinds of costs were reportable under the depot 

maintenance workload requirement because the remanufactured aircraft 

will be a totally new system and that the Navy lacks the capability to do the 

remanufacture. Program officials had not received OSD’s reporting 

guidance this year and had not been tasked to report by Navy headquarters. 

The OSD guidance specifies that all work performed at a DOD depot should 

be reported.

Other Modification 

Work

On other modification work, two naval commands did not report 

installations consistently and one underreported its work. The Naval Air 

Systems Command (NAVAIR) reported $217.4 million for aircraft 

modification installations, but the Naval Sea Systems Command did not 

report about $176 million for installations. The Sea Systems official 

responsible for data collection decided that installation of modifications 

should not be reported because it was not “maintenance” and verbally 

instructed her staff accordingly. However, that instruction apparently was 
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

not passed to program officials in the nuclear area because they reported 

$62 million for installation of nuclear equipment modifications. As 

discussed previously, the OSD guidance states that installations on both 

performance upgrades and other modifications should be reported as 

depot maintenance.

Interservice Workloads The Army and NAVAIR reported fiscal year 1998 interservice depot 

workloads of $11 million and $116.4 million, respectively.1 Both assumed 

that DOD employees would accomplish all this work, and they did not 

attempt to determine whether the work was actually accomplished by a 

contractor. Available data indicate that some of this interservice work was 

performed in-house and some was contracted out. DOD reported that, in 

fiscal year 1997, 21 percent of interservice workloads were accomplished 

by contractors. 

The Air Force, in contrast to the other services, queried its program 

managers and officials responsible for managing interservice workloads to 

determine the ultimate source of repair for the workloads it interservices to 

the Army and the Navy. Its report to Congress included $170.7 million in 

workload accomplished at Army and Navy depots by government 

employees and $14 million accomplished by contractors (7.6 percent of the 

total interservice). There are, however, conflicting data on the interservice 

workload. The above amounts included a total of $174.9 million that was 

financed through the revolving depot fund; the remaining amounts were 

directly funded. The 1998 annual financial statement of the Air Force 

revolving fund reported only $121.5 million for interservice workloads. Air 

Force Materiel Command financial and depot maintenance staff could not 

reconcile the two numbers. In commenting on a draft of this report, Air 

Force officials said financial records do not provide sufficient detail to 

report the ultimate source of repair for all interserviced workloads. Thus, 

Air Force officials said they obtained source-of-repair data for 

interserviced workloads from the individual centers. However, they 

provided no data to reconcile the two data sources. 

1

Depot workloads funded by one service but performed either at another service’s depot or by the other 

service’s contractor are called interservice workloads. OSD guidance requires that the military 

department or defense agency that manages the funding, or which owns the equipment being repaired, 

should report the workload for the purposes of this report. OSD guidance also requires that depot work 

will be reported according to who does the actual work, regardless of the location of the work. Air 

Force supplemental guidance elaborates that the program manager or production specialist responsible 

for the interservice workload will report whether the other service is repairing the asset organically or 

by contract.
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is not required to report 

under 10 U.S.C. 2466. It does not have its own depots and, similar to 

interservice arrangements, obtains depot maintenance from the services on 

a reimbursable basis. For the fiscal year 1998 report, USSOCOM officials 

allocated depot-level workloads on reparable parts to the public and 

private sources for work sent to the Army and the Navy but were not able 

to do so for the Air Force. An official said that he lacked visibility into the 

Air Force’s stock fund to determine who performed the work. 

Consequently, USSOCOM reported all $97 million in its Air Force reparable 

workload as public sector workload. USSOCOM and Air Force officials 

could not determine for us the ultimate sources of repair for this diverse 

workload, but it appears that this assumption may have significantly 

understated the private sector workload and overstated the public work by 

the same amount. The Air Force’s fiscal year 1998 financial statement 

shows that about 35 percent of depot-level reparable funds in total went to 

private contractors. For another point of comparison, we obtained data 

from the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center directorate that manages 

special operating force programs. This data suggest an even more 

pronounced private sector involvement. The center directorate 

determined that $24.4 million of its fiscal year 1998 reparable workload was 

accomplished by contractors and only $2 million by the government. This 

workload consisted of maintenance on both USSOCOM and Air Force 

owned equipment. 

CLS and ICS In reviewing contract and financial records and through discussions with 

officials, we identified several instances where program officials 

overstated contract obligations because they did not separate depot-related 

costs from the costs of other nondepot services provided by contractors. 

We also identified a few programs that incorrectly reported obligations 

through misinterpreting guidance or reporting outdated data.

Although DOD had collected information on CLS and ICS2

 for weapon 

systems in prior years, its report on fiscal year 1998 depot maintenance was 

the first year it had reported to Congress in the current format. Efforts to 

2

CLS is designed to be a lifetime support concept in which the contractor may provide some or all 

logistics support for an operational weapon system or major component. In addition to depot 

maintenance, support may include intermediate and base level maintenance, supply operations, 

engineering services, and program management. ICS is an interim arrangement, part of the acquisition 

strategy for new systems and subsystems, in which a contractor provides depot maintenance and, 

sometimes, other support services. 
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

obtain and report data on CLS and ICS depot workloads can be somewhat 

more difficult than for other types of maintenance because these often 

require subjective judgments on the part of reporting officials to isolate 

depot-related cost items from nondepot-related items. For ICS programs, 

OSD guidance requires the services only to report depot maintenance on 

weapon systems that have passed their initial operating capability dates.3

The ease and exactness in isolating appropriate depot costs partly depend 

upon how a contract is structured and how easy it is to clearly identify 

depot tasks within the contract line items. If it is not practical to determine 

the amount to be reported based on specific contract line items or other 

direct means, the guidance permits the use of algorithms or estimation 

formulas to determine the portion to be reported. When other than actual 

obligations are reported, the military department or defense agency is 

required to maintain records on the amount of CLS and ICS reported and to 

describe and explain any algorithm or estimation formula used in making 

the projections.

Although DOD does not consider TRICARE to be a defense agency subject 

to the 50-50 limitation, DOD wanted to include this activity’s depot 

maintenance data in the 2466 data call for completeness. The TRICARE 

Management Activity overreported CLS depot maintenance work by about 

$7 million by including some tasks that are not considered to be depot 

maintenance. OSD guidance tasked the TRICARE Management Activity to 

report depot maintenance and repair for the C-9A medical evacuation 

aircraft funded by the Defense Health Program. The TRICARE reporting 

official used records available to him and reported $30.7 million in depot 

maintenance obligations for fiscal year 1998. This amount represented the 

total annual program obligations for CLS contracts. We reviewed contract 

records and budgetary data and determined that $23.7 million should have 

been reported for depot maintenance during fiscal year 1998. In addition to 

valid depot workload for programmed depot maintenance, engine 

overhauls, and other depot-level tasks, the total amount included base 

supply activities, engineering support, contractor management costs, and 

other nondepot-related items. The Air Force flies and maintains the 

C-9 fleet for the Defense Health Program. We understand that DOD plans 

to transfer reporting responsibility to the Air Force starting with the fiscal 

year 2001 workload.

3

Initial operating capability refers to the date when the service determines that a new system has been 

fielded in sufficient numbers at its first operating base.
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

USSOCOM reported the entire amount—$106.8 million—obligated on its 

numerous CLS and ICS contracts. It did not identify only the depot 

maintenance portions. Reporting officials did not readily have information 

to identify the reportable depot portions but, to the extent those contracts 

also funded nondepot tasks, depot maintenance obligations would be 

overstated. 

The Army National Guard overreported depot-level maintenance 

obligations on CLS contracts for fixed winged aircraft by about 

$40.3 million. An official reported total obligations on contracts for fiscal 

year 1998 rather than only the depot-related obligations because he had not 

received the Army’s 1998 instructions and reported total obligations as was 

done for the 1997 report. We determined that the total obligations reported 

included $40.3 million for base operations, flying hours, and other 

nondepot related costs. By excluding those items, we identified the 

$40.3 million overreporting. An Army program official said that it is 

difficult to distinguish between depot-level and nondepot activities for 

these fixed winged aircraft. The contracts for logistics support did not 

separately identify the depot maintenance portion of the workload. The 

program office had received training and guidance on making these 

judgments, but the Guard had not received the guidance nor the training. 

We found several instances of misreported and questionable amounts in the 

Air Force data. For example, two programs had reported outdated 

budgetary estimates rather than actual obligations, which were higher by 

about $5 million in total. Officials in one of those programs also 

misinterpreted the instructions for reporting software maintenance, which 

resulted in further underreporting CLS obligations by $500,000. A third 

program overstated obligations by $1 million by including some nondepot 

maintenance items. A fourth CLS program, which serves many DOD 

customers at hundreds of worldwide sites, primarily relied on the 

contractor’s estimate of depot costs. This program reported only 5 percent 

of its total program as depot related, which was very low compared to 

other CLS programs. 

Lert
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Difficulties in 

Distinguishing Depot 

Work From Other 

Maintenance 

Performed at 

Nondepot Locations

The distinction between depot-level maintenance and other categories of 

maintenance is becoming increasingly blurred as the services move depot 

workloads to operating locations, redefine required levels of maintenance, 

and consolidate maintenance organizations. Traditionally, DOD has not 

considered these field activities and activities funded by direct 

appropriation, rather than through the working capital fund, as depot 

maintenance providers. OSD guidance now requires the services to report 

maintenance work funded by all funding sources, regardless of the location 

where work is performed. Based on problems we identified at the limited 

locations contacted, we believe that the services may have underreported 

significant amounts of work at facilities that do both depot level and other 

levels of maintenance work.

Army For the fiscal year 1998 workload report, the Army reported $112 million in 

depot-level work completed by local repair and maintenance organizations 

operating at various field locations. However, the approach and 

methodology that the field activities used for collecting and accumulating 

workload data were inconsistent. Officials at some field-level maintenance 

and repair activities owned, managed, and funded by the Army’s major 

operational commands, said they did not know that they had to report 

maintenance activities as depot maintenance since they were not 

performed at a depot. Although the Army’s reporting guidelines follow the 

definitions in 10 U.S.C. 2460 and OSD guidance for identifying depot 

maintenance workloads, personnel who were assigned to the operating 

commands and who were responsible for accumulating data for inclusion 

in the report did not fully understand the requirements. Consequently, 

several major operating commands applied different data collection 

methodologies that led to inaccurate and inconsistent reporting. For 

example, the Training and Doctrine Command reported labor and materials 

obligations for only the depot-level tasks associated with items for which 

the command had obtained a special repair authority4

 from Army 

headquarters, while the European Command reported all depot level and 

general support tasks. Reporting officials at the Eighth Army in Korea 

were new to the reporting requirements and had some difficulties 

interpreting and applying the guidance.

4

A special repair authority is a one-time or continued authority granted by Army headquarters that 

allows a field location to perform specified depot-level maintenance.
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Total Amount of Depot 

Maintenance Conducted at 

Army Field Locations 

Cannot Be Determined

As directed by the House Committee on National Security, the Army 

recently completed a study of the proliferation of depot-maintenance type 

activities.5 The Army’s April 1999 report concluded that it currently lacks 

information to accurately determine the total amount of depot 

maintenance and similar work being conducted at field activities. The 

Army’s maintenance manuals and policy statements have not been updated 

to reflect the depot maintenance definitions enacted by Congress and 

codified under 10 U.S.C. 2460. Maintenance manuals and policy statements 

currently reflect a four-level system consisting of unit level, direct support, 

general support, and depot level.6

 In discussing the Army’s study, Army 

headquarters officials told us they plan to revise their maintenance 

manuals and policy statements to redefine levels of maintenance. The 

current depot and general support levels will be combined and relabeled as 

sustainment maintenance workload--–tasks that involve overhauling and 

rebuilding items—and should be reported as depot level in future workload 

reports. Army officials believe these changes will enable commands to 

develop more complete and consistent workload data for future reporting 

cycles.

The Army’s depot proliferation report states that the total amount of 

depot-level maintenance work conducted at field locations is unknown. It 

stated that field level activities completed 40 staff years of depot-level work 

at a reported cost of $17.6 million under special repair authorities granted 

by Army command headquarters. The report also provided information 

indicating that unknown resources were expended overhauling and 

rebuilding various Army equipment—work that the Army’s maintenance 

classification and reporting procedures did not recognize and categorize as 

depot-level workload, but which could be considered as depot 

maintenance under the 10 U.S.C. 2460 definition. The report also stated 

that the workload allocation reporting process did not accurately reflect 

the total dollar value of the depot workload performed in field locations. 

The workload was overreported in some cases and underreported in 

others. The report concluded that reporting problems were largely 

attributed to (1) differing interpretations of the OSD guidance and 10 U.S.C. 

2460 and OSD definitions of depot-level maintenance, especially with 

5

Directed by H.R. 105-532 on the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, the completed “Study 

of the Proliferation of Depot Maintenance-Type Activities” was submitted to Congress on April 14, 1999.

6

Unit and direct support maintenance is generally conducted by deployable military units. General 

support and depot maintenance generally is conducted by personnel working in fixed industrial-like 

facilities.
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

respect to rebuilding, remanufacturing, and specialized repair type work, 

and (2) reporting officials lacking effective systems to facilitate timely and 

accurate reporting. We are currently completing a separate review on this 

issue.

Navy The Navy did not report any of the $158 million it expended on 

maintenance support at the Trident Refit Facilities in Bangor, Washington, 

and Kings Bay, Georgia. While some officials labeled them as 

intermediate-level maintenance and repair facilities, the activities were 

specifically designed to provide incremental depot overhaul and repair of 

the Trident submarine fleet and depot-level repair of Trident equipment. 

The facilities also provide routine services and perform emergency and 

emergent voyage repairs to other submarine units. Navy documents cite 

extensive facility capabilities, dry-dock, and equipment that indicate a 

depot capability. The refit facilities performed depot overhauls on some 

smaller surface vessels to better utilize their facilities. However, in their 

official comments to our July 1998 report, the Navy stated that no 

depot-level maintenance is performed at the refit facilities. Other Navy 

officials told us that the refit facilities are the only locations where any 

Trident maintenance is done. This raises a question how submarines that 

have been in service for at least 15 years can have no depot maintenance 

performed on them.

Additional 

Miscellaneous Errors 

and Omissions

Our review of financial records, summary spreadsheets, and other 

materials supporting DOD’s workload report, and discussions with officials 

identified a wide variety of other errors and reporting uncertainties.

Navy In the workload numbers reported to Congress (table 1), the Navy reversed 

its public-private workload figures for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and 

misreported $267,000 as $267 million. The net effect of these two errors 

decreased the Navy’s total workload and its private sector workload, 

increased the public sector workload, and changed the public-private 

sector allocation percentages from the reported 58/42 to 65/35.
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Based on work we reported7 in February 1999, we believe that the public 

workload numbers reported by the Atlantic Fleet included some amount 

that was contracted to the private sector. In general, for the workload that 

is sent to the public shipyards, government employees do most of the major 

overhaul work while the ship is in drydock. Private sector employees, 

either on the shipyard or at private facilities, however, accomplish some 

work. Fleet officials reported the entire workload as accomplished in the 

public sector. We reported that about $30 million of the $538 million of 

work sent to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in fiscal year 1998 was contracted 

to private firms. It is likely that some funds also flow through the other 

public shipyards to contractors but we did not make an effort to identify 

comparable situations.

The Navy made two additional errors that resulted in overstating contract 

obligations by $41.5 million. Obligations for nonequipment ship alterations 

were double-counted, and estimated costs for installations had been 

reported based on a budget figure, which turned out to be greater than 

actual obligations for the year.

Air Force The Air Force adjusted its workload figures to transfer $24 million from 

private sector obligations to the public sector. Officials subtracted 

1.5 percent of its total contracted workload that is funded through the 

depot maintenance revolving fund and added that amount to the public 

sector amount. The 1.5-percent figure is based on an element in the pricing 

structure for contracted items that estimate the salaries for government 

personnel charged with contract management. The Air Force maintains 

that this should be reported as a public sector government workload to be 

consistent with 10 U.S.C. 2466 that specifies the reporting of government 

employee costs as public sector obligations. This area is not clearly dealt 

with in existing guidance.

The Air Force may have underreported maintenance warranty costs by an 

undetermined amount. Officials did report warranty costs of $3.4 million 

for four programs, but Materiel Command officials and the auditors believe 

that more programs could have reportable warranty costs. For example, 

one product center reported $1.2 million, the fiscal year 1998 portion of a 

10-year extended warranty for the AGM-130. Other programs at the 

7

Navy Ship Maintenance: Allocation of Ship Maintenance Work in Norfolk, Virginia, Area

(GAO/NSIAD-99-54, Feb. 24, 1999).
Appendix II

Problems Found in DOD’s Report on Fiscal 

Year 1998 Depot Workloads

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

product center, including Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Advanced Medium 

Range Air to Air Missile, and sensor fused weapon, have similar warranties 

but no depot costs were reported for these programs. Warranties may be 

another reporting category that could be clarified in future guidance. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, Air Force officials said that costs 

occurring prior to initial operating capability would not meet the 10 U.S.C. 

2460 definition of depot-level maintenance and would not be included in 

the Air Force submission. However, both they and other officials agreed 

that additional guidance will be provided in the future regarding the 

applicability of warranty costs to 2466 reporting.

Army At the Army’s Aviation and Missile Command, program officials did not 

coordinate data collection actions with officials at the integrated 

maintenance center. This resulted in double counting some items, which 

overstated obligations by $1.8 million. Also, two program offices reported 

their budgeted programs rather than actual obligations, overstating 

reported workload by $600,000.

U.S. Special Operations 

Command

An error in the computation formula used by the Special Operations 

Command to report its depot workload resulted in a $69-million 

understatement in both the total amount and the private sector amount. 

Correcting this changes the public-private sector percentages from the 

reported 70/30 to 58/42.
Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApenxIdi

GAO Contacts Barry Holman (202) 512-5581

Julia Denman (202) 512-4290

Acknowledgements In addition to those named above, Bruce Fairbairn, Raymond Cooksey, 

Andrew Marek, Glenn Knoepfle, Frederick Naas, Terry Wyatt, Jean Orland, 

and Kate Monahan made key contributions to this report.
Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance
Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

GAO Related Products

Army Logistics: Uncertainties Surrounding Proposed Support Plan for

Apache Helicopter (GAO/NSIAD-99-140, May 25, 1999).

Navy Ship Maintenance: Allocation of Ship Maintenance Work in the

Norfolk, Virginia, Area (GAO/NSIAD-99-54, Feb. 24, 1999).

Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce Requirements and Related Issues

Affecting Depots and Arsenals (GAO/NSIAD-99-31, Nov. 30, 1999).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Public and Private Sector Workload

Distribution Reporting Can Be Further Improved (GAO/NSIAD-98-175, 

July 23, 1998)

Defense Depot Maintenance: Use of Public-Private Partnership

Arrangements (GAO/NSIAD-98-91, May 7, 1998). 

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New

Weapon Systems to the Private Sector (GAO/NSIAD-98-8, Mar. 31, 1998).

DOD Depot Maintenance: Information on Public and Private Sector

Workload Allocations (GAO/NSIAD-98-41, Jan. 20, 1998).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Challenges Facing DOD in Managing

Working Capital Funds (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-152, May 7, 1997).

Depot Maintenance: Uncertainties and Challenges DOD Faces in

Restructuring Its Depot Maintenance Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-111, 

Mar. 18, 1997, and GAO/T-NSIAD-112, Apr. 10, 1997). 

Navy Ordnance: Analysis of Business Area Price Increases and Financial

Losses (GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-97-74, Mar. 14, 1997).

Defense Outsourcing: Challenges Facing DOD as It Attempts to Save 

Billions in Infrastructure Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110, Mar. 12, 1997).

High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997).

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD's Policy Report Leaves Future Role of

Depot System Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-96-165, May 21, 1996).

Letr
GAO Related Products

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-154 Depot Maintenance

Defense Depot Maintenance: More Comprehensive and Consistent

Workload Data Needed for Decisionmakers (GAO/NSIAD-96-166, May 21, 

1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the

Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr. 16, 1996, and 

GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148, Apr. 17, 1996).

Closing Maintenance Depots: Savings, Personnel, and Workload

Redistribution Issues (GAO/NSIAD-96-29, Mar. 4, 1996).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public

and Private Sectors (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161, Apr. 12, 1994).

Depot Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-93-292R, Sept. 30, 1993).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Management and Restructuring to Support

a Downsized Military (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-13, May 6, 1993).

Air Logistics Center Indicators (GAO/NSIAD-93-146R, Feb. 25, 1993).

(709392) Letr
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the 

following address, accompanied by a check or money order made 

out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary, VISA and 

MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are 

discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000

or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and 

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list 

from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone 

phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain 

these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET, 

send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at: 

http://www.gao.gov
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00