An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal autho rity. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

NO. COA13

- 1399 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 17 June 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Pasquotank County Nos. 10 CRS 001724

- 25 , 051007 ANTONIO EDWARD WEST, Defendant
.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 19 March 2013 by Judge Wayland J. Sermons in Pasquotank County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 May 2014
. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Danielle Marquis Elder, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State. John R. Mills, for defendant

- appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Defendant Antonio Edward West appeals from judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of first

- degree murder, attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and possession of a stolen firearm . We find no error in defendant’s trial.- 2

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On 12 June 2010, Dejuan 1 Brown was shot and killed after shots were fired into a crowd at a high school graduation party. Earlier that day, d efendant and his friends arrived at the party uninvited and were asked to leave. Defendant and his friends
left , but returned to the party later that evening. Around 11:00 p
. m . , a dispute arose outside the party. As the disput e escalated, a large crowd of people gathered. Shortly thereafter, shots were fired. Witnesses saw d efendant firing
shots into the crowd. Shamon Green testified that defendant poin ted his gun directly at him. Green then took off running
and was shot in the wrist. When Green looked back to where he had been previously standing, he saw Brown laying on the gr ound.
Brown died from a single gunshot wound to his head
. After fleeing from the scene , d efendant flagged down Brian Johnson and asked him for a ri de to the hospital because his friend had been shot and injured
. Johnson drove d efendant and his friend to the h ospit al and parked outside the emergency room
entrance . Security surveillance cameras outside the hospital recorded defendant helping h is frie nd into the hospital. Less than two minutes later, defendant returned to the car
. Johnson then drove around to the side of the hospital where he parked

1 The record variably refers to the victim as “Daquan” and “Dejuan.” For consistency with the transcript, we refer to the victim as “Dejuan” Brown.- 3

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and got out to urinat e by the side of the car. T here were no surveillance cameras located where Johnson parked the car, but he noticed defendant step out of the car and dispose of a
balled

- up shirt in a dumpster. Johnson later showed police where defendant had thrown away the shirt. Police searched a vat of used cooking oil o utside the hospital kitchen and located two weapons, a .380 caliber Cobra handgun and a .380 caliber Hi

- Point handgun, wrapped inside a shirt
. The guns and bullets found inside each were sent to the
S tate B ureau of I nvestigation (“S.B.I.”) for analysis. In addition, the .380 caliber bullet recovered from Brown’s head during autopsy as well as several shell casings, including shell casings from a .380 caliber weapon that were found near where Brown was shot, were also submitted to the S
. B . I . The State als o presented evidence tracing the purchase of the .380 caliber Cobra handgun to Emanuel Jinks. The parties stipulated that the gun was stolen from Jinks in 2009 by a man who was incarcerated at the time of the shooting. A pawn shop manager and firearms dealer testified that defendant placed a special order for a .380 caliber Cobra magazine on 7 June 2010 and the store’s records confirmed that defendant picked up the magazine on 10 June 2010.
S . B . I . Spec ial Agent Jessica Pappas was tendered as an- 4
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expert witness in forensic firearms identification. Prior to trial, d efendant moved in limine to exclude Agent Pappas’s expert testimony . T he trial court denied the motion but further ruled as follows:

The Court, however, is going to limit the opinion of the expert to not allow the expert to testify that a match may be done to the exclusion of all other guns in the universe. The expert may testify, as was stated by the expert on the stand during this voir dire, that a bullet came from a pa rticular gun to within a reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms examination field and any other language that describes what that field is, and what the reasonable degree of certainty is. I’m just not going to allow her to say that it is to the ex clusion of all other guns in the universe. And that wi ll be my ruling in this matter. Agent Pappas testified that she examined the .380 caliber Cobra and the .380 caliber Hi

- Point handguns retrieved from the oil vat outside the hospital, the bullet recovered from Brown’s head, and the shell casings collected f rom the scene of the shooting. Based on her analysis, Agent Pappas opined that the .380 caliber bullet re covered from Brown’s head as well as a .380 ca liber shell casing found near where Brown was shot were fired from the .380 caliber Cobra handgun
. At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charge of possession of a stolen firearm, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish defen dant knew- 5
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or had reason to know th at the firearm was stolen. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found defendant guilty of all charges. Defendant appeals.

_________________________ On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by: (I) admitting Agent Pappas’s expert testimony, and (II) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a stolen firearm because the evidence was insufficient to establish that defend ant knew or had reason to know that the gun was stolen
. I. Defendant first argues the trial court erred by admitting Agent Pappas’ s firearm toolmark identification testimony. Specifically, defendant claims Agent Pappas’s testimony, which violated the tri al court’s prior ruling, was unreliable and its admission violated defendant’s constitutional right to be tried based on reliable evidence
. We disagree. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, Agent Pappas’s testimony did not violate the trial court’s ruling limiting her testimony
. After voir dire examination of Agent Pappas , the court found the expert testimony reliable and denied defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony. The court’ s ruling only limited Agent Pappas from testifying that a bullet was fired- 6

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from a particular gun to the exclusion of all others
. Our review of the record reveals that Agent Pappas opined , based on her analysis , that the bullet recovered from Brown’s head and a shell casing retrieved from the scene of the shooti ng were fired
from the .380 caliber Cobra handgun
. Agent Pappas did not testify, as defendant contends, that “[defendant’s] gun was the only gun in the world that could have been the source of the bullet and casing
. ” Agent Pappas’s testimony , therefore, did not violate the trial court’s narrow limitation on the testimony. A trial court’s decision to allow expert testimony will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Morgan , 359 N.C. 131, 160, 604 S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004), cert. d enied , 546 U.S. 830, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79 (2005)
.

To determine if proffered expert testimony is admissible under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702, a trial court must conduct a three

- step inquiry to ascertain whether: (1) the expert’s method of proof is rel iable; (2) the witness presenting the evidence qualifies as an expert; and (3) the evidence is relevant. State v. Britt , 217 N.C. App. 309, 313

– 14, 718 S.E.2d 725, 729 (2011)
. Here, defendant only challenges the reliability of Agent Pappas’s testimony. A trial court should first look to precedent for guidance- 7
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in determining whether the method of proof underlying an expert’s opinion is reliable
. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd. , 358 N.C. 440, 459, 597 S.E.2d 674, 687 (2004). Once the trial court determines the expert’s method of proof is reliable, “any lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the expert’s conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.” Id. at 461, 597 S.E.2d at 688
. It is well settled that firearm toolmark identification is recognized as a reliable method of proof as “[c]ourts in North Carolina have upheld the admission of expert testimony on firearm toolmark identification for decades.” Britt , 217 N.C. App. at 314, 718 S.E.2d at 729
. Defendant concedes th e reliability of firearm toolmark identification. N onetheless , defendant claim s Agent Pappas’s testimony was unreliable because firearm toolmark identification does not support her “conclusion that only [ defendant’s ] gun coul d have fired the bullet recovered from [ Brown’s ] brain .” We are unpersuaded by this contention . A s we previously stated, Agent Pappas did not testify that only defendant’s gun could have fired the lethal bullet. Because precedent recognizes the reliability of firearm toolmark identification, defendant’s argument as to Agent Pappas’s conclusions go es to the weight of the testimony and not its admissibility. We therefore conclude- 8

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that the trial court properly followed precedent and did not abuse i ts discretion in admitting the expert testimo ny. This disposition renders our consideration of defendant’s remaining argument regarding the admission of the expert testimony
unnecessary . II. Defendant next contends the evidence presented was insufficient to support a conviction for possession of a stolen firearm because defendant pu rchased the gun from a firearm s dealer shortly before the shooting and his disposal of the gun immediately after the shooting wa s insufficient evidence to establish that he knew or had reason to know that the gun was stolen . The State points out that the evidence showed that defendant purchased a magazine, not the gun, days before the shooting and asserts that defendant’s argument is foreclosed by
well

- established precedent
. In response, d efendant concedes his factual error and further concedes that under the authority of State v. Wilson , 203 N.C. App. 547, 691 S.E.2d 734 (2010 ) , the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant ’ s guilty knowledge
. We agree. To convict a defendant of possession of a stolen firearm ,

“ the State must present substantial evidence that (1) the defendant was in possession of a firearm; (2) which had been- 9

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stolen; (3) the defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the property was stolen; and (4) the defendant possessed the pistol wi th a dishonest purpose.” State v. Brown , 182 N.C. App. 277, 281, 641 S.E.2d 850, 853 (2007). “‘Other cases upholding convictions when knowledge was at issue have contained some evidence of incriminating behavior on the part of the accused.’” Wilson , 203 N.C. at 554, 691 S.E.2d at 739 (quoting State v. Allen , 79 N.C. App. 280, 285, 339 S.E.2d 76, 79, aff'd per curiam , 317 N.C. 329, 344 S.E.2d 789 (1986)). “[G]uilty knowledge can be inferred from defendant’s throwing away [of] the stolen weapon, despite a n intervening crime committed by defendant with the weapon.” Id. at 554, 691 S.E.2d at 740. Here, the State’s evidence showed that defendant fled from the scene of the shooting and disposed of the gun by wrapping it in the shirt he was wearing during the shooting and throwing it in a n oil vat outside the hospital. This evidence is sufficiently incriminating to permit a reasonable inference that
defendant knew or had reason to know that the gun was sto len.
See State v. Taylor , 64 N.C. App. 165, 169, 307 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1983) ( conclu ding that evidence that the defendant removed a firearm from his coat and threw it into nearby bushes was “sufficiently incriminating to permit a reasonable inference
that defendant knew or must have k nown that the firearm was- 10

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stolen , and thus sufficient to support a finding to that effect by the jury ”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds , 311 N.C. 380, 317 S.E.2d 369 (1984). We therefore find no error in defendant’s conviction for possession of a stolen firearm.
No Error . Judges STEELMAN and DILLON concur . Report per Rule 30(e).