Docket No. 101171. 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD 

DEVINE, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE TERRENCE SHARKEY, 

Respondent. 

Opinion filed June 22, 2006.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion. 

Justices McMorrow, Fitzgerald, and Kilbride concurred in 

the judgment and opinion. 

Justice Karmeier specially concurred, with opinion, joined 

by Chief Justice Thomas and Justice Garman. 

OPINION

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 381(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 

381(a)), the State=s Attorney of Cook County filed a motion with 

this court for leave to file a complaint seeking a writ of 

mandamus. We allowed the State to file the complaint. The 

State seeks an order compelling the Honorable Terrence 

Sharkey, judge of the circuit court of Cook County 

(respondent), to set for trial within 120 days a delinquency 

petition against L.J., a minor. The question before us is 

whether the State can utilize the speedy-trial provisions of the 

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5B601(1) (West 

2004)) to force a minor to go to trial within 120 days. 
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BACKGROUND 

In 2004 the State brought three felony delinquency petitions 

against L.J. (the minor), in the juvenile division of the circuit 

court of Cook County. The charges were aggravated unlawful 

use of a weapon, burglary, and attempted first degree murder. 

The State elected first to proceed on the charge of attempted 

murder. However, in February 2005, the circuit court granted 

the State=s petition for discretionary transfer (see 705 ILCS 

405/5B805(3) (West 2004)) of that charge to the criminal 

division, where it remains pending.1

 The juvenile court 

delinquency petition was subsequently nol-prossed. 

In April 2005, the State attempted to elect on the minor=s 

unlawful use of a weapon charge and force that case to 

proceed to trial. Respondent, the judge before whom this 

motion was brought, denied the motion, expressing concern 

regarding the fairness of requiring the minor to prepare for two 

cases at once. Respondent noted that the Code of Criminal 

Procedure provides that the court may Aupon the written motion 

of either party or upon the court=s own motion order a 

continuance *** if he finds that the interests of justice so 

require.@ 725 ILCS 5/114B4(d) (West 2004). Respondent found 

that a continuance was appropriate and in the interests of 

justice, and held that the State could not unilaterally invoke the 

 

 1The State=s petition for discretionary transfer and the circuit court=s 

ruling thereon are not contained in the record before us; it appears that this 

proceeding took place before a different judge. The facts concerning the 

transfer of the attempted murder charge are taken from on-the-record 

statements by the attorneys and the court during the hearing on the State=s 

speedy-trial motion. However, there does not appear to be any dispute as to 

the sequence of events. 
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speedy-trial provision of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 

405/5B601(1) (West 2004)), forcing the case to trial within 120 

days over the objection of the minor. 

As previously noted, the State instituted this original 

mandamus action to request that this court enter an order 

compelling respondent to set the case for trial within 120 days. 

See 155 Ill. 2d R. 381(a); Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, '4(a). 

Respondent has not filed a brief before this court, but the minor 

has filed a brief opposing the State=s mandamus request. 

ANALYSIS 

This court has discretionary original jurisdiction in 

mandamus actions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, '4(a). Mandamus

is A >an extraordinary remedy appropriate to enforce as a 

matter of public right the performance of official duties by a 

public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is 

involved.= @ People ex rel. Birkett v. Jorgensen, 216 Ill. 2d 358, 

362 (2005), quoting Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 

(1986). Mandamus will lie only when the movant shows A >a 

clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the [public 

officer] to act, and clear authority in the [public officer] to 

comply with the writ,= @ not when the act in question concerns 

an exercise of an official=s discretion. People v. Madej, 193 Ill. 

2d 395, 404 (2000), quoting Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 

198, 229 (1999). Further, A[w]here the writ would compel the 

performance of a judicial act by a lower court in pending 

litigation this court must necessarily consider not only whether 

the petitioner has shown a clear violation by the judge of a duty 

imposed by law but also whether issuance of the writ will be 

effective.@ People ex rel. Carey v. Scotillo, 84 Ill. 2d 170, 175 

(1981). 

The State argues that section 601 of the Juvenile Court Act 

clearly and unambiguously gives the State the right to 

unilaterally demand trial. The minor contends that this 

construction is erroneous and the State is improperly 

attempting to compel respondent to rule in the State=s favor in 

a scheduling matter, traditionally well within a judge=s 

discretion. 
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Because the instant case involves a matter of statutory 

construction, our review is de novo. See, e.g., People v. 

Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176, 179 (2005). Our aim is to ascertain 

and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, the best 

evidence of which is the language used in the statute itself. 

Where the plain language of the statute clearly reveals the 

legislature=s intent, that intent must prevail, and no resort to 

other interpretive aids is necessary. However, although 

statutory language ought to be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning, we construe statutes as a whole, with each provision 

construed in connection with every other section. People v. A 

Parcel of Property Commonly Known As 1945 North 31st 

Street, Decatur, Macon County, Illinois, 217 Ill. 2d 481, 499 

(2005), quoting Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). 

The State argues that this case is quite simple. Subsection 

(1) of section 5B601 of the Juvenile Court Act provides that Aa 

trial must be held within 120 days of a written demand for such 

hearing made by any party@ (705 ILCS 405/5B601(1) (West 

2004)); the State is a party; therefore a trial must be held within 

120 days of a written demand by the State. This argument is 

facially compelling. However, the minor provides a host of 

reasons for concluding that the answer is not nearly as clearcut as the State suggests, which we ultimately find persuasive. 

First, the minor argues that we must consider subsection 

(1) in context, looking to section 5B601 in its entirety, as well as 

the Juvenile Court Act generally. For instance, the minor points 

out that subsection (9) of section 5B601 provides that ANothing 

in this Section prevents the minor or the minor=s parents, 

guardian or legal custodian from exercising their respective 

rights to waive the time limits set forth in this Section.@ 705 

ILCS 405/5B601(9) (West 2004). How, the minor asks, can the 

State=s purported unilateral right to demand trial within 120 

days be reconciled with the clear provision that a minor cannot 

be prevented from exercising his right to waive the time limits? 

The State responds that the language of subsection (9) 

actually cuts in favor of the State, because it reveals that in the 

Juvenile Court Act the legislature specifies the particular 

parties who have a right when it chooses to do so, suggesting 

that the legislature truly meant Aany party,@ including the State, 
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when it used that term in subsection (1). This argument fails to 

come to grips with the heart of the conflict between subsection 

(9) and the State=s proffered construction of subsection (1), 

however. The problem is that subsection (9) gives the minor 

and his parents, guardians, or legal custodians an absolute 

and unqualified right to waive the time limits referred to in the 

article. This is impossible to reconcile with the State having a 

unilateral right to enforce the time limits. 

In a similar vein, subsection (8) of section 5B601 provides 

that A[t]he period in which a trial shall be held *** is tolled by: (i) 

delay occasioned by the minor ***. Any such delay shall 

temporarily suspend, for the time of the delay, the period within 

which a trial must be held ***.@ 705 ILCS 405/5B601(8) (West 

2004). Why would the legislature give the State a unilateral 

right to demand trial within 120 days but allow the minor to toll 

that clock through his unilateral delay? And if the minor=s delay 

did not toll the clock, we would run up against subsection (3) of 

section 5B601, which provides the remedy for failure to bring 

the minor to trial within the specified time limits: AWhen no such 

trial is held within the time required by subsections (1) and (2) 

of this Section, the court shall, upon motion by any party, 

dismiss the petition with prejudice.@ 705 ILCS 405/5B601(3) 

(West 2004). 

Moreover, subsection (2) of section 5B601 sets out the time 

limits for dealing with the situation when there are multiple 

delinquency petitions pending and the minor simultaneously 

demands trial on more than one of the chargesBbut there is no 

provision for what to do if the State were to demand trial on 

multiple charges. 705 ILCS 405/5B601(2) (West 2004). It would 

seem illogical for the legislature to have provided for one 

eventuality but not the other, if the legislature truly intended to 

grant the State an equal ability to demand trial. 

The minor also notes that in numerous other provisions of 

the Juvenile Court Act the terms Aparty,@ Aparties@ and Aany 

party@ are used without including the State. For instance, 

section 1B5 of the Juvenile Court Act is entitled ARights of 

parties to proceedings@ but the text of that statute refers 

primarily to parties opposing the State, i.e., Athe minor who is 

the subject of the proceeding and his parents, guardian, legal 
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custodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent.@

Moreover, that same statute also provides that the court Ashall 

appoint the Public Defender@ (or such other counsel as may be 

required) to represent Aany party financially unable to employ 

counsel.@ 705 ILCS 405/1B5(1) (West 2004). To accept the 

State=s argument in the instant caseBthat Aany party@ clearly 

and unambiguously always includes the StateBwould seem to 

compel the unreasonable conclusion that section 1B5 would 

entitle the State to representation by the public defender if it 

could prove itself indigent. The minor also directs our attention 

to subsection (3) of section 1B5, which requires the circuit court 

to advise Athe parties@ of their right to appeal in the event of an 

adjudication of wardship (705 ILCS 405/1B5(3) (West 2004))Ba 

situation in which only parties opposing the State would be 

interested in taking an appeal. See also 705 ILCS 

405/5B530(2)(c) (West 2004) (discussing notice requirements 

in the context of Amultiple parties@). 

Moreover, as the minor also points out, section 5B101 of the 

Juvenile Court Act provides that in delinquency proceedings 

minors Ashall have all the procedural rights of adults in criminal 

proceedings, unless specifically precluded by laws that 

enhance the protection of such minors.@ 705 ILCS 

405/5B101(3) (West 2004). But adults in criminal proceedings 

are not subject to the State utilizing the speedy-trial act to force 

them to trial over their protestsBonly a defendant can start the 

speedy-trial clock ticking by demanding trial in a criminal case. 

See 725 ILCS 5/103B5 (West 2002). Additionally, as 

respondent noted in ruling on the motion, criminal defendants 

have the right to continuances when Athe interests of justice so 

require@ (see 725 ILCS 5/114B4(d) (West 2004)). This right 

would seem to be overriddenBin contravention of section 

5B101(3) of the Juvenile Court ActBif the State had the 

unilateral right to force a delinquency petition to trial in 120 

days. 

Additionally, and finally, the minor observes that this case 

involves the circuit court=s control over its own docket, a 

context particularly unsuited to mandamus relief. See Will v. 

Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 655, 57 L. Ed. 2d 504, 98 

S. Ct. 2552 (1978) (denying request for mandamus when trial 
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court held a case in abeyance pending the outcome of another 

case and noting different standards for mandamus relief and 

simple appeals). 

The State argues that our appellate court has already held 

that A[a]s with the Code of Criminal Procedure,@ the Juvenile 

Court Act=s 120-day speedy-trial period Abegins to run when 

either party makes a formal demand for trial.@ In re A.F., 282 Ill. 

App. 3d 930, 931-32 (1996). We do not find this statement 

convincing. First, this was dictum, because in A.F. the court 

was evaluating the efficacy of a trial demand by the juvenile, 

not the State. Second, the court was proceeding from a faulty 

premise because, as previously noted, the Code of Criminal 

Procedure does not permit the State to start the speedy-trial 

clock ticking, only a defendant. See 725 ILCS 5/103B5 (West 

2002). We find this precedent of no assistance in evaluating 

the issues before us. 

The State also argues that the legislative history of the 

statute makes clear that the legislature=s intent in establishing 

the speedy-trial provision was to eliminate case backlogs, 

specifically in Cook County. We need not here recount the 

history on which the State relies, because even assuming 

arguendo that the State=s reading is correct, it says nothing 

about whether the State has the ability to force an individual 

case to trial. If there is a reason for one case not to go to trial, 

the State can focus its resources on preparing for trial in the 

numerous cases in which the minors do demand trial. 

This is not a case about the State=s ability to elect which 

case to proceed on first when there are multiple delinquency 

petitions pending against the same juvenile. All we are 

concerned with here is whether the speedy-trial provisions of 

the Juvenile Court Act give the State the ability to force a 

particular juvenile court proceeding to trial within a specific time 

against the minor=s wishes. More specifically, given that this is 

a mandamus action, the question is whether the State has 

shown A >a clear, affirmative right= @ (Madej, 193 Ill. 2d at 404, 

quoting Lewis E., 186 Ill. 2d at 229) to force a delinquency 

petition to trial against a minor=s wishes, because of a Aclear 

violation by the judge of a duty imposed by law@ (Scotillo, 84 Ill. 

2d at 175) A >where no exercise of discretion on his part is 
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involved= @ (Jorgensen, 216 Ill. 2d at 362, quoting Madden, 114 

Ill. 2d at 514). The answer must be in the negative, given the 

wealth of reasons outlined above for concluding that the Aany 

party@ language in section 5B601(1) is not intended to include 

the State. To adopt the State=s construction would conflict with 

other subsections of section 5B601 as well as other portions of 

the Juvenile Court Act. Indeed, the facial conflict with 

subsection (9) of section 5B601 (ANothing in this Section 

prevents the minor or the minor=s parents, guardian or legal 

custodian from exercising their respective rights to waive the 

time limits set forth in this Section@ (705 ILCS 405/5B601(9) 

(West 2004))) might well alone suffice to derail the State=s 

mamdamus petition. We are not required to turn a blind eye to 

a statute or a statutory scheme and construe a single 

subsection in isolation. When section 5B601(1) is viewed in 

context, it is clear that the term Aany party@ was not intended to 

include the State. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons above stated, we conclude that the State=s 

request for a writ of mandamus must be denied. This case 

involves a circuit court=s control over its own docket, a matter 

traditionally considered to be well within its discretionary 

control, and the State has not shown clear entitlement to the 

relief it requests. 

Writ denied.

JUSTICE KARMEIER, specially concurring: 

I agree that mandamus will not lie in this case. I write 

separately because I would reach that conclusion for a reason 

different from the one expressed by the majority. 

Unlike my colleagues, I believe that subsection (1) of 

section 5B601 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 

405/5B601(1) (West 2004)) does confer upon the state the right 

to make a speedy-trial demand. Here, as in all cases of 

statutory construction, our objective is to ascertain and give 

effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of 
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legislative intent is the language of the statute. In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 

471, 480 (1997). Subsection (1) of section 5B601 expressly 

provides: 

AWhen a petition has been filed alleging that the 

minor is a delinquent, a trial must be held within 120 

days of a written demand for such hearing made by any 

party, except that when the State, without success, has 

exercised due diligence to obtain evidence material to 

the case and there are reasonable grounds to believe 

that the evidence may be obtained at a later date, the 

court may, upon motion by the State, continue the trial 

for not more than 30 additional days.@ (Emphasis 

added.) 705 ILCS 405/5B601(1) (West 2004). 

Although the word Aany@ has a diversity of meanings 

depending on the context in which it is used, its primary 

definition is Aone indifferently out of more than two@ or Aone or 

more indiscriminately from all those of a kind.@ Webster=s Third 

New International Dictionary 97 (1976). Consistent with this 

definition, it is synonymous with Aeither,@ Aevery@ or Aall.@

Black=s Law Dictionary 94 (6th ed. 1990). 

In proceedings such as this to adjudicate whether a minor is 

delinquent, the State is the petitioner. 705 ILCS 405/5B520 

(West 2004). As such, it is unquestionably a Aparty.@ Because 

the clear and unambiguous language of section 5B601(1) of the 

Juvenile Court Act expressly permits Aany party@ to file a 

speedy-trial demand, and because Aany@ means Aone 

indifferently out of more than two@or Aone or more 

indiscriminately from all those of a kind@ and is synonymous 

with Aeither,@ Aevery,@ or Aall,@ it necessarily follows that the 

State is among those parties entitled to file a written trial 

demand under the law. 

The majority rejects this conclusion, holding that Aany party@

actually means Aany party except the State.@ Such a 

construction is untenable. Where, as here, a legislative 

enactment is clear and unambiguous, a court is not at liberty to 

depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by 

reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the 

legislature did not express. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 

189 (1990). 
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Where the General Assembly intended to distinguish 

different categories of parties or differentiate the State from 

other parties to a proceeding governed by the Juvenile Court 

Act, it did so. For example, in contrast to section 5B601(1), 

section 1B15 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1B15 (West 2004)), 

dealing with waiver of objections to venue, is addressed not to 

Aany party,@ but to Aa party respondent.@ Section 1B5 of the Act 

(705 ILCS 405/1B5 (West 2004)), governing rights of parties to 

proceedings, refers to Athe minor who is the subject of the 

proceeding and his parents, guardian, legal custodian or 

responsible relative who are parties respondent.@ Section 

5B601(2) (705 ILCS 405/5B601(2) (West 2004)) speaks of the 

Aminor respondent@; while section 5B705(3) (705 ILCS 

405/5B705(3) (West 2004)), pertaining to motions for 

continuances in connection with sentencing, lists Athe State=s 

Attorney, a parent, guardian, legal custodian, or counsel.@ 

Other instances of differentiation between types of parties are 

common. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/2B22(2), 3B26(7) (West 

2004). 

That the legislature distinguished between parties when it 

intended to is nowhere more evident than in section 5B601(1) 

itself. As the text quoted above shows, after conferring on Aany 

party@ the right to make a speedy-trial demand, it immediately 

establishes an exception to the hearing deadline which may be 

invoked only by the State. Given the structure of that passage, 

a generic reference to parties followed by a specific exclusion 

for the State, it is clear that term Aany party@ was intended to 

embrace the State, as well as the minor, and the minor=s 

parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who 

are parties respondent. 

The formulation employed by the General Assembly Act in 

section 5B601(1) is identical to that used in section 

3B16(b)(1)(A) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/3B16(b)(1)(A) (West 

2004)), governing adjudicatory hearings for minors requiring 

authoritative intervention, and section 4B13(b)(1)(A) of the Act 

(705 ILCS 405/4B13(b)(1)(A) (West 2004)), pertaining to 

adjudicatory hearings for minors alleged to be addicts. Under 

those provisions, which took effect January 1, 1988, Aany 

party@ has the right to make a speedy-trial demand, just as 
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Aany party@ has a right to make a speedy-trial demand under 

section 5B601(1) of the Act governing trials for minors alleged 

to be delinquent. 

In construing the language of these provisions, it is 

important to note that prior to January 1, 1988, sections 3B16 

and 4B13 of the Act were phrased differently. Under the earlier 

version of those laws, the speedy-trial period began 

automatically upon the filing of petitions alleging that a minor 

required authoritative intervention or was an addict. See 705 

ILCS 405/3B16(a)(1), 4B13(b)(1)(A) (West 2004). Because the 

act of filing was the triggering event, whoever was the 

petitioner could determine, through the timing of its filing, when 

the hearings would be held. Under that law, the petitioner could 

be any of a variety of persons and entities, including the State. 

See 705 ILCS 405/3B15, 4B12 (West 2004). Accordingly, any 

of those persons and entities, including the State, could, by 

filing the petition, start the clock running on the speedy-trial 

period. 

When the legislature amended sections 13B16 and 14B13 

of the Juvenile Court Act effective January 1, 1988, it did not 

restrict the category of persons or entities who could cause the 

speedy-trial period to begin. The new system simply alters how 

the speedy-trial period is triggered. Instead of relying on the 

mere act of filing, the law now requires that a separate written 

demand be made. 

The same is true of section 5B601(1) of the Act. Until the 

statute was amended in the mid-1980s, the statutory hearing 

deadline automatically commenced when the delinquency 

petition was filed, regardless of who filed it. No written speedytrial demand was necessary. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, 

par. 704B2. The new version of the law simply requires that a 

speedy-trial demand be made before the hearing clock begins 

to run. As with the new versions of sections 13B16 and 14B13, 

it in no way restricts the class of persons or entities who may 

cause the speedy-trial period to begin. The State could start 

the clock before by filing the petition. It can still start the clock. 

The only difference is that, now, a written demand is 

necessary. 
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In justifying its refusal to follow the plain and unambiguous 

language of section 5B601(1), the majority asserts that 

permitting the State to demand a speedy trial would conflict 

with section 5B601(9) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5B601(9), which 

states that A[n]othing in this Section prevents the minor or the 

minor=s parents, guardian or legal custodian from exercising 

their respective rights to waive the time limits set forth in this 

Section.@ The majority=s argument is premised on the 

assumption that the option of not demanding trial within 120 

days is the same as having absolute authority to prevent the 

commencement of trial until more than 120 days have elapsed. 

In other words, they read section 5B601(9) of the Act to mean 

Aif I don=t ask for it, you can=t have it.@ The linguistic and logical 

steps necessary to reach this construction are not explained, 

and, frankly, I do not understand them. An abstention is not a 

veto. 

In my view, there is no conflict between sections 5B601(1) 

and 5B601(9). That one party has authority to waive a statutory 

right does not mean that the right may not be asserted by any 

of the other parties in the case. Waiver is merely the intentional 

abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. People v. 

Blair, 215 Ill.2d 427, 444 n.2 (2005). It does not entail, and has 

never been understood to entail, the power to insist that the 

right not be exercised by others who have an equal entitlement 

to invoke it. 

It is clear from their opinion that what really concerns my 

colleagues is the prospect that a minor will be forced to trial 

before he or she is prepared to proceed. What the majority fails 

to recognize, however, is that even if Aany party@ is construed 

to mean Aany party except the State,@ this potential remains. 

Delinquency cases, after all, are not simply bilateral 

proceedings involving a minor and the State. Parents, 

guardians and legal custodians are also involved, and they 

possess the same status as parties under the statute as the 

affected minors. That means they also have the same speedytrial rights as minors do under section 5B601(1) of the Juvenile 

Court Act. 

Needless to say, a parent=s interests with respect to the 

conduct and outcome of delinquency proceedings are separate 
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and distinct from those of the minor. It is entirely possible that a 

parent may wish prompt resolution of a delinquency 

proceeding where the child does not. Under section 5B601(1), 

such a parent, as a party, would have every right to demand a 

speedy trial even if the child were perfectly content to waive his 

or her own speedy-trial rights and defer the proceedings until 

later. 

The only way to prevent that from happening would be to 

say that the definition of Aany party@ in section 5B601(1) is 

limited to the minor and the minor alone. In other words, it 

would require this court to hold that when the legislature said 

that all of the parties could demand a speedy trial, it actually 

meant just the opposite, namely, that only one of the 

partiesBthe minorBcould make a speedy-trial demand. Such a 

result would be indefensible under any recognized principles of 

statutory construction. 

The majority suggests that treating the State as a Aparty@

would yield some absurd and unreasonable results. The 

examples it gives pertain to the right to appointment of counsel 

and the obligation to advise parties of their right to appeal from 

an adjudication of wardship. Without addressing the particulars 

of those arguments, I would note simply that to the extent that 

the references to Aparties@ may be broader than necessary in 

these examples, the overbreadth is completely 

inconsequential. As a practical matter, it does no harm. It has 

no effect. Accordingly, it provides no justification for ignoring 

the plain and unambiguous language of section 5B601(1). 

Under the prior version of the law, when the speedy-trial 

period commenced automatically upon filing of the petition, the 

rigidity of the speedy-trial deadlines was ameliorated by a 

judicial construction of the statute which read the time period 

as directory rather than mandatory. See In re Armour, 59 Ill. 

2d 102 (1974) (construing Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 

704B2). Under more recent precedent (In re S.G., 175 Ill.2d 

at 481-82) and in light of subsequent revisions to the statute, such a 

construction of the law is no longer valid. That does not mean, 

however, that once the State or any other party files a written 

speedy-trial demand, the minor is at the mercy of a fixed and 

unyielding trial date. As the majority correctly points out, minors 
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in delinquency proceedings are, at a minimum, entitled to all 

the procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings (see 705 

ILCS 405/5B101(3) (West 2004)), including the right to 

continuances when the interests of justice so require (see 725 

ILCS 5/114B4(d) (West 2004)). Where the minor involved in 

such a proceeding seeks and obtains a continuance, thereby 

delaying the trial, and the delay is deemed to be attributable to 

the minor, the speedy-trial period, if commenced by a written 

demand, will be tolled. Section 5B601(8) of the Juvenile Court 

Act (705 ILCS 405/5B601(8) (West 2004)) expressly so states. 

That is so regardless of which party filed the speedy-trial 

demand. Under the clear language of section 5B601(8), the 

statutory trial period is tolled whenever there is delay 

occasioned by the minor. Who initially triggered the speedytrial period is irrelevant. 

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court in this case 

erred when it opined that the State was not among the parties 

entitled to make a speedy-trial demand under section 5B601(1) 

of the Juvenile Court Act. The State did have the right to 

demand a speedy trial. That right, however, was not 

unconditional. Where the request for a speedy trial is opposed 

by the minor, as it was in this case, the court has the discretion 

to delay the proceedings and continue the case when the 

interests of justice require. 

The record before us shows that the circuit court believed 

that it would be unduly burdensome on the minor to force him 

to trial on the delinquency petition while his prosecution on 

adult charges was underway. Whether one agrees with the 

circuit court=s assessment or not is of no consequence. For 

purposes of the matter before us today, the salient point is that 

this was a determination which the court had the discretion to 

make. Under Illinois law, the exercise of discretion is not 

subject to review by a writ of mandamus. International 

Harvester Co. v. Goldenhersh, 86 Ill.2d 366, 369 (1981). It is 

for this reason that the State=s request for a writ of mandamus

should be denied. 

CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE GARMAN join in 

this special concurrence.