GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 1999 DRUG CONTROL

Narcotics Threat From 

Colombia Continues 

to Grow

GAO/NSIAD-99-136

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280937 Letter

June 22, 1999

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International

 Narcotics Control

United States Senate

The Honorable John L. Mica

Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,

 Drug Policy, and Human Resources

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

In 1998, we reported on U.S. and Colombian efforts to address illegal 

narcotics activities in Colombia. We pointed out that both governments 

faced significant challenges in meeting the threat posed by drug traffickers 

and insurgent groups that support them.1

 As you requested, this report 

updates the narcotics situation in Colombia and highlights U.S. and 

Colombian efforts to address drug-trafficking activities in Colombia and 

the continuing challenges each government faces to combat these 

activities. Specifically, we examined (1) the nature of the drug threat from 

Colombia; (2) recent initiatives of the Colombian government to address 

the threat, and obstacles it faces; and (3) the status of U.S. efforts to assist 

the Colombian government in furthering its counternarcotics activities and 

reducing the flow of illegal narcotics to the United States. (A list of related 

GAO products on drug control issues in Colombia is at the end of the 

report.)

Results in Brief Despite the efforts of U.S. and Colombian authorities, the illegal narcotics 

threat from Colombia has grown since we reported last year. Today, 

Colombia remains the primary source country for cocaine products for the 

U.S. market.

• For the third year in a row, coca cultivation has increased so that 

Colombia is now the world’s leading cultivator of coca.

1

Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges

(GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).
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• More potent coca leaf is being grown within Colombia, which is likely to 

lead to an estimated 50-percent increase in cocaine production in the 

next 2 years.

• Colombia is now the major supplier of heroin to the eastern part of the 

United States.

• In the past year, the Colombian government has lost a number of battles 

to insurgent groups who, along with paramilitary groups, have increased 

their involvement in illicit narcotics activities and gained greater control 

over large portions of Colombia where drug-trafficking activities occur. 

The government of Colombia has undertaken a number of initiatives to 

address the narcotics threat. These include the initiation of peace talks 

with the insurgents; the development of a national drug control strategy; 

the establishment of a joint military-police task force to combat drug 

traffickers; the development of a new counternarcotics unit within the 

Colombian army that will be fully screened for human rights abuses; and 

the implementation of legislative reforms on extradition, money 

laundering, and asset forfeiture. In 1998, these efforts led to the seizure of 

record amounts of cocaine and arrests of drug traffickers. However, illegal 

drugs from Colombia remain readily available in the United States.

Despite these initiatives, the government of Colombia faces a formidable 

challenge in overcoming a number of significant obstacles in addressing 

the narcotics problem. The Colombian military has several institutional 

weaknesses that have limited its capability to support counternarcotics 

operations. In addition, government corruption, budgetary constraints, and 

a weak judicial system have hindered the Colombian government’s ability 

to reduce drug-trafficking activities. 

The United States has had limited success in achieving its primary 

objective of reducing the flow of illegal drugs from Colombia. Despite

2 years of extensive herbicide spraying, U.S. estimates show there has not 

been any net reduction in coca cultivation—net coca cultivation actually 

increased 50 percent. The United States has also had difficulties 

supporting some counternarcotics activities in Colombia due to U.S. 

cutbacks in drug detection and monitoring support. Furthermore, over the 

years the Colombian military has reportedly been involved in abusing 

human rights, such as arbitrary detention, and as a result, U. S. legislation 

has restricted the provision of U.S. assistance to Colombian police and 

military units if there is credible evidence of human rights violations. 

Finally, the growing involvement and strength of insurgent groups in the 

areas where coca and opium poppy are grown complicate U.S. support for 
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counternarcotics activities. For example, the sharing of intelligence 

information with the Colombian military creates an operational and policy 

dilemma for U.S. officials in drawing a distinction between support for 

counternarcotics versus counterinsurgency activities.

Background One of the goals of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy calls for a

15-percent reduction in the net flow of illegal drugs from source countries, 

including Colombia, by 2002. To achieve this goal, the United States has 

provided substantial assistance to Colombia in order to (1) disrupt and 

dismantle drug-trafficking organizations, (2) reduce the availability of 

drugs through eradication and enforcement efforts, and (3) strengthen 

Colombian institutions to enable them to support a full range of 

counternarcotics activities. This strategy recognizes the importance of the 

government of Colombia’s gaining control of the area where most

drug-trafficking activities occur and expanding counternarcotics support to 

the Colombian military to enable it to improve its counternarcotics 

capabilities.

Data provided by the Departments of State and Defense indicate that 

between fiscal year 1990 and 1998, about $625 million in U.S. 

counternarcotics assistance has been provided to the Colombian National 

Police (CNP) and the Colombian military for equipment, such as 

helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, weapons and ammunition, logistical 

support, and training. In October 1998, the Congress authorized another 

$2.6 billion over a 3-year period to enhance international eradication, 

interdiction, and crop substitution efforts.2

 Of this amount, the Congress 

appropriated $690 million for fiscal year 1999. According to the State 

Department, $173.2 million has been earmarked to support CNP and 

military counternarcotics initiatives. The funds will be used for procuring 

six Black Hawk helicopters, ammunition, and weapons for the CNP; 

upgrading the capabilities of CNP UH-1H helicopters; and enhancing the 

capabilities of the Colombian Air Force. According to the State 

Department, the CNP should begin receiving this assistance in mid-1999.

Last year we reported that Colombia was restricted from receiving some 

counternarcotics assistance as a result of the President’s decisions to 

decertify Colombia in 1996 and 1997 because it was not fully cooperating 

2

The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (Title VIII of Division C of P.L. 105-277).
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with the United States in reducing drug trafficking.3 This restriction was 

lifted in 1998 when the President decertified Colombia but granted a “vital 

national interests waiver” that allowed Colombia to continue receiving 

counternarcotics assistance. On February 26, 1999, the President certified 

that Colombia was fully cooperating with the United States in its 

counternarcotics efforts.

The Nature of the Drug 

Threat From Colombia

The drug-trafficking threat from Colombia has increased over the past 

several years—coca cultivation has increased by 50 percent since 1996, 

cocaine production is projected to rise by 50 percent, and Colombia has 

become the primary supplier of heroin to the eastern United States. The 

challenge of reducing drug-related activities has become more difficult as 

two insurgent groups, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) 

and the National Liberation Army (ELN), have expanded their involvement 

in drug trafficking while paramilitary groups have stepped up their illegal 

narcotics operations.

In August 1998, the U.S. embassy in Colombia reported that although the 

Colombian government continues to disrupt drug-trafficking activities of 

the major drug cartels, there has not been a net reduction in processing or 

exporting refined cocaine from Colombia or in cocaine availability within 

the United States. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA), several billion dollars flow into Colombia each year from the 

cocaine trade alone. This vast amount of drug money has made it possible 

for drug traffickers to gain unprecedented economic, political, and social 

power and influence in Colombia. Moreover, according to DEA, while two 

major groups (the Medellin and Cali cartels) dominated drug-trafficking 

activities during the late 1980s and early 1990s, today there are hundreds of 

smaller and more decentralized organizations. These groups are now 

capable of producing “black cocaine” that hinders detection and are

3

Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291j), requires the President 

to certify by March 1 of each year which major drug-producing and transit countries cooperated fully 

with the United States or took adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance during the 

previous year with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 United Nations Convention Against 

Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. If a country does not meet the statutory 

objectives, the President can either deny certification or grant a vital national interests certification, 

which recognizes that the requirement to use sanctions would threaten the vital national interests of the 

United States. 
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improving their transportation capabilities by manufacturing boats capable 

of carrying up to 2 tons of cocaine at high speeds.4

In March 1999, the State Department reported that Colombia remains the 

source country for over three-quarters of the world’s cocaine. Moreover, 

DEA has recently reported that, in the past 4 years, there has been a 

dramatic shift in the U.S. heroin market from Southeast Asian to 

Colombian heroin, especially in large East Coast cities such as New York, 

Boston, Newark, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. According to U.S. estimates, 

Colombia produces about 6 metric tons of heroin annually. 

The State Department also reported that total coca cultivation in the 

Andean region has substantially declined in Peru and Bolivia since 1996. 

However, figure 1 shows that Colombia has now become the primary 

source for coca cultivation, as drug traffickers have increased their coca 

cultivation in the areas that are not under governmental control.

4

“Black cocaine” is created by a new chemical process used by drug traffickers to evade detection by 

drug-sniffing dogs and chemical tests. The traffickers add charcoal and other chemicals to cocaine, 

which transforms it into a black substance that has no smell and does not react when subjected to the 

usual chemical tests.
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Figure 1: Trends in Andean Region Coca Cultivation, 1996-98

Source: Department of State.

In just 3 years, Colombia has surpassed Peru and Bolivia as the world’s 

leader in coca cultivation. Gross coca cultivation estimates in Colombia 

increased from 67,200 hectares in 1996 to 101,800 hectares in 1998, a rise of 

about 50 percent. Most of this increase occurred in two areas—Caqueta 

and Putumayo. In addition to the expansion of cultivation in known cocagrowing areas in southern Colombia, the United States has identified two 

new growing areas in northern Colombia—Norte de Santander and San 

Lucas. The new growing areas are, for the most part, controlled by the 

insurgents.

Colombia

Bolivia

Peru

32%

23%

1996 1997

1998

45%

41%

24%

35%

53%

20%

27%
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Increased Coca Yields May 

Expand Cocaine Production

In February 1999, a U.S. interagency report on Colombia concluded that 

new fields of coca leaf, similar to the type typically found in Bolivia and 

Peru, are now being grown in Colombia. The new coca is believed to be 

more potent, as it has a substantially higher cocaine alkaloid content than 

the type of coca most commonly found in Colombia. The study noted that 

this new coca, coupled with existing fields of coca, could increase potential 

Colombian cocaine production estimates from 1998 levels of 165 metric 

tons to between 195 and 250 metric tons, or as much as 50 percent, over the 

next 2 years. According to DEA, the production figure could be even 

greater if the cocaine-producing laboratories are more efficient at 

producing cocaine from the new coca leaf than their counterparts in Peru 

and Bolivia. 

Greater Insurgent and 

Paramilitary Involvement in 

Drug-trafficking Activities

According to Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department 

officials, insurgent and paramilitary organizations are increasingly 

becoming involved in drug-trafficking-related activities and are controlling 

more territory. Active insurgent groups and their growing involvement in 

drug-trafficking activities over the past several years are complicating 

Colombia’s ability to reduce drug trafficking. The most active insurgent 

groups are the FARC and the ELN. These two groups are estimated to have 

as many as 20,000 personnel. Additionally, the number of municipalities in 

the rural areas of Colombia in which the FARC has a presence has been 

increasing: the insurgents currently can exercise some degree of control 

over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory, an area equal in size to Texas, east 

and south of the Andes (see fig. 2).
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Figure 2: Areas of Colombian Insurgent, Paramilitary, and Drug-trafficking Activities

Source: U.S. agencies.

According to U.S. estimates, two-thirds of FARC units and one-third of ELN 

units are involved in some form of drug-trafficking activity. Some of the 

insurgents have assisted the drug traffickers in providing security for 

cocaine-processing laboratories and other drug-trafficking-related 

Caribbean Sea

Paramilitary activities

Insurgents activities

Opium poppy growing areas 



Cocaine coca growing areas







































Ecuador

Peru

Brazil

Venezuela

Colombia

Bogota
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activities and in storing and transporting cocaine within Colombia; they 

also appear to be engaged in localized opiate trafficking within Colombia. 

Although DOD has reported that the insurgents probably earn between 

$500 million and $600 million annually from these activities, State 

Department officials stated that this estimate has not been confirmed. U.S. 

embassy officials said that monies from the units involved in drugtrafficking activities support insurgent activities throughout Colombia. 

According to U.S. officials, the current alliance between the insurgents and 

the drug traffickers poses a clear challenge to Colombia’s ability to conduct 

effective counterdrug operations. The Colombian government has little or 

no control over most of the areas where drug-trafficking activities are 

occurring. DEA reported that the presence of FARC units in Colombia’s 

eastern lowlands and southeastern jungle areas was especially 

troublesome. According to DEA, these areas include most of the coca and 

opium poppy cultivation and most of the major drug-trafficking production 

facilities.

Paramilitary groups emerged during the 1980s as self-defense forces in 

response to insurgent violence. Current U.S. estimates indicate that these 

groups have between 4,000 and 6,000 personnel. In 1998, DEA reported 

that certain leaders of some groups have become major drug traffickers. 

U.S. officials do not have estimates on the amount of income that these 

groups derive from illegal drug activities. 

U.S. officials stated that the paramilitary groups operate with relative 

impunity in parts of northern Colombia. According to the U.S. embassy, 

paramilitary groups also appear to have established a permanent base in a 

major coca-growing area in southern Colombia where there is a heavy 

concentration of insurgents.

Colombia’s 

Counternarcotics 

Efforts, and Obstacles 

Faced

The Colombian government has taken a number of steps to improve its 

counternarcotics efforts. It has entered into peace negotiations with 

insurgent groups; issued a counternarcotics strategy; developed a joint 

military and CNP task force and proposed the creation of a military 

counternarcotics battalion; achieved record cocaine seizures and 

continued to arrest drug kingpins; and pursued efforts to implement 

legislative reforms in extradition, money laundering, and asset forfeiture.

Despite these activities, the Colombian government faces obstacles in 

attempting to reduce drug-trafficking operations. These obstacles include 
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budgetary constraints, corruption, a military with limited capability, and a 

weak judicial system.

Peace Negotiations After his 1998 election, in an effort to end over 40 years of violence, 

Colombian President Pastrana initiated peace negotiations with the FARC 

and the ELN on November 7, 1998. To bring the insurgents into the peace 

negotiations, the Colombian president established a demilitarized zone for 

the FARC, covering about 42,000 square kilometers. The initial proposal 

placed the zone off limits to CNP and Colombian military actions for a 90-

day period, which was supposed to end on February 7, 1999.

However, in January 1999, the FARC broke off negotiations until April 1999 

because paramilitary groups allegedly killed 130 inhabitants in a village 

while negotiations were occurring. According to the State Department, the 

FARC demanded that the Colombian government take more aggressive 

action against these paramilitary groups before further peace talks can 

occur. In February 1999, the ELN also broke off negotiations until a 

demilitarized zone in its primary area of control was established. This zone 

would include the two new coca-growing areas in northern Colombia. 

State Department officials stated that the government of Colombia has not 

taken any action on the ELN’s request. Peace negotiations with the FARC 

resumed in April 1999 and have resulted in an agreed-upon, 12-point 

agenda. Moreover, the Colombian president extended the time frame for 

the demilitarized zone.

According to the State Department, the United States supports a process to 

achieve peace and break the linkage between the insurgents and drug 

traffickers. This, according to the State Department, should enable the 

CNP and the military to carry out their counternarcotics programs more 

effectively in the long term. However, U.S. officials have expressed 

concerns about the peace process and its potential impact on 

counternarcotics operations. According to U.S. officials, the government 

of Colombia lacks a clearly defined negotiating strategy. In addition, U.S. 

officials are concerned that U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics efforts 

could be limited by an indefinite extension of the 90-day cease-fire zone or 

by expanding the area of the demilitarized zone to include other drugtrafficking areas under insurgent control. State Department and DOD 

officials informed us that to fulfill promises the Colombian government 

made to the FARC, the governments of Colombia and the United States 

have agreed not to allow certain types of overflights, such as surveying 

coca-growing areas, through the demilitarized zone.
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Counternarcotics Strategy In September 1998, the State Department reported that an important factor 

in U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics cooperation would be the 

development of an integrated national counternarcotics strategy. The 

Colombian government issued an initial strategy, entitled “An Integrated 

Policy on Drugs for Peace,” in October 1998. The strategy addresses the 

implementation of alternative crop development, eradication and 

interdiction efforts needed to reduce illegal drug production, legislation 

and institutional reforms to combat drug-trafficking organizations, 

demand-reduction programs to control Colombian consumption of illicit 

drugs, environment actions, and efforts to strengthen international 

cooperation in dealing with illegal drug-trafficking activities.

According to the State Department, the strategy provides a good 

framework because it closely parallels elements of the U.S. 

counternarcotics strategy, lays out a solid foundation for cooperation 

between various donors and the Colombian government, clearly describes 

Colombia’s legal framework for attacking illegal drug-trafficking activities, 

and recognizes the social and economic costs of the drug trade in 

Colombia. While the State Department acknowledged that the strategy 

contained many positive elements, it also contained a number of 

weaknesses. For example,

• the strategy’s emphasis on alternative crop development programs in 

the coca-growing areas of Colombia is based on the assumption that 

independent peasant farmers grow the majority of coca in small plots, 

rather than large-scale drug traffickers using hired labor; 

• the strategy does not establish specific time lines or measures of 

effectiveness to evaluate the progress made in implementing alternative 

development programs and reducing the supply of illegal drugs;

• the strategy does not precisely define the military’s role in reducing 

drug-trafficking activities; 

• the strategy does not clearly identify how the supply reduction activities 

will be funded or what the funding requirements are for these activities; 

and

• the strategy does not develop a concept of coordination between law 

enforcement and alternative development efforts.

Moreover, DEA officials stated that the strategy did not address the 

extradition of Colombian nationals; improvements to prison security; 

mechanisms for protecting judges, prosecutors, and witnesses; and 

improvements to legislation covering asset forfeiture and money 

laundering. According to the State Department, the Colombian 
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government is aware of these concerns and is in the process of addressing 

them.

Colombian Military’s 

Counternarcotics Initiatives 

The U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics strategies recognize that the 

Colombian military needs to become more involved in counternarcotics 

operations, particularly in areas not under government control, if the flow 

of illegal drugs from Colombia is to be reduced. In response to military

defeats in southern Colombia, the Colombian government created a Joint 

Task Force in March 1998 consisting of military and CNP units in the 

southwestern area of Colombia to retake control of the territory from the 

drug traffickers and insurgents. According to U.S. officials, the task force 

has supported CNP counternarcotics operations such as seizing cocaine 

laboratories.

Moreover, according to DOD, the Colombian government is in the process 

of establishing a counternarcotics battalion with an estimated strength of 

about 950 personnel. The battalion will be dedicated to conducting its own 

counternarcotics operations and supporting CNP operations. Currently, 

one company of the battalion is operational and has been fully screened by 

the State Department to ensure that there is no credible evidence of human 

rights abuses. According to the State Department, the battalion should be 

fully operational by January 2000. The U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM) estimates that the battalion would require in excess of $70 

million worth of equipment and training to become fully operational. Of 

this amount, approximately $60 million would be to provide helicopters. 

DOD recently designated $3.5 million to provide counternarcotics 

equipment to the battalion, but it indicated that no decision had been made 

on the total level of U.S. support that will be provided. 

 Seizures and Arrests The Colombian government has continued to make progress in seizing 

drugs and arresting key leaders of drug-trafficking organizations. In March 

1999, the State Department reported that Colombia had seized a record 

amount of coca products in 1998--almost 57 metric tons—and had also 

destroyed 185 cocaine laboratories. Before that, the U.S. embassy 

reported, in August 1998, that the CNP had captured the heads of a number 

of key Colombian drug-trafficking organizations, including major figures of 

a key cocaine-processing organization. The State Department also 

reported in March 1999 that the CNP special investigative units, which 

conduct long-term investigations of drug-trafficking organizations, were 

credited with 63 arrests.
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Legislative Initiatives Over the past several years, the Colombian government has enacted several 

major pieces of legislation designed to reduce drug-trafficking activities. 

These include extradition, anti-money laundering, and asset forfeiture 

legislation. While Colombia’s legislative actions represent positive steps, 

their implementation has been slow.

 Extradition Legislation In December 1997, the Colombian congress passed a bill to repeal the 1991 

constitutional ban on the extradition of Colombian nationals but did not 

make it retroactive, thus blocking extradition for offenses committed 

before December 17, 1997. The United States wanted the law to be 

retroactive because it hoped to extradite to the United States drug kingpins 

from the Medellin and Cali cartels that were in prison on drug-related 

charges when the bill was passed. In response to this concern, the prior 

Colombian president filed a suit to remove this clause from the bill, but the 

Colombian constitutional court voted to uphold the nonretroactivity 

clause.

The United States made its first extradition request for a Colombian 

national in December 1998; however, to date the individual still has not 

been surrendered to the United States because he is awaiting a court 

hearing. Furthermore, the United States has requested the provisional 

arrest for extradition of four more Colombian national drug traffickers. 

According to the State Department, three of these individuals have been 

arrested and are awaiting a judicial decision by Colombia’s Supreme Court, 

but the fourth remains at large.

Anti-money laundering 

Legislation

Money laundering has been a criminal offense in Colombia since 1995. In 

February 1997, the Colombian government enacted legislation that 

increased penalties for money laundering connected with drug trafficking. 

The statute includes penalties of up to $50,000 for individuals and

$2 million for institutions, and possible jail sentences of 6 to 15 years. As a 

result of this legislation, the Colombian banking system strengthened 

“know your customer” rules to monitor large or suspicious transactions. 

Banks are now required to maintain records and to regularly report 

currency transactions exceeding $7,000 as well as any “suspicious” 

transactions. For example, if multiple deposit transactions are made below 

the reporting requirement over a short period of time, they should be 

reported as “suspicious.”

According to the State Department, more than 20 Colombian banks were 

under investigation for money-laundering activities in 1998; however, there 
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has been only one money-laundering arrest and no convictions. The State 

Department also noted that the Colombian bank inspectors are evaluating 

compliance with the reporting requirements. The United States is 

providing courses on investigating and prosecuting money-laundering 

crimes to the various Colombian officials responsible for implementing the 

anti-money laundering legislation and regulations.

Asset Forfeiture Legislation In 1996, Colombia passed an asset forfeiture law designed to seize assets 

from individuals involved in illegal activities, including drug trafficking. In 

March 1999, the State Department reported that multimillion-dollar 

seizures had occurred against current and former major drug traffickers 

and their relatives from the Medellin and Cali cartels. Furthermore, over 40 

forfeiture cases were pending against high-ranking drug traffickers. 

However, there has been only one case in which seized assets were actually 

forfeited.

According to the State Department, this dismal performance can be 

attributed to several factors, including the lack of political will on the part 

of the prior Samper administration; the corrupting influence of the drug 

kingpins trying to protect their assets; and Colombian government efforts 

to define and refine the administrative, bureaucratic, and legal procedures 

for the final forfeiture and disposition of assets. At least five major and 

several lesser government entities are involved in the process, and 

coordination among them is inadequate. According to the State 

Department, the current president has acknowledged the need to reform 

the process.

Obstacles Facing the 

Colombian Government

The Colombian government faces a number of obstacles in reducing drugtrafficking activities, including handling budgetary constraints, overcoming 

corruption, addressing military weaknesses, and strengthening its judicial 

system.

Budgetary Constraints Severe budgetary constraints could limit the Colombian government’s 

ability to support counternarcotics initiatives. In March 1999, the State 

Department reported that the Colombian government was unable to 

increase its counternarcotics commitment because its national budget was 

facing its worst crisis in decades, with annual deficits ballooning to

5 percent of gross domestic product. The report concluded that the 

Colombian government will have a difficult time funding counternarcotics 

operations and controlling the areas where illicit crops grow in 1999.
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Corruption Widespread corruption within all sectors of the Colombian government is a 

major factor affecting counternarcotics operations. In 1998, DEA reported 

that drug-related corruption existed in all branches of the government, 

within the prison system, and in the military. In March 1999, the State 

Department reported that drug-related corruption in all branches of the 

government continued to undermine Colombia’s counternarcotics 

effectiveness. The report noted, for example, that in November 1998, U.S. 

Customs and DEA personnel searched a Colombian Air Force aircraft in 

Florida and found 415 kilograms of cocaine and 6 kilograms of heroin. 

Several Air Force officers and enlisted personnel were arrested in 

connection with the incident. Also, in March 1999, the State Department 

reported that President Pastrana had made eliminating corruption a major 

initiative of his government.

Military Capability The Colombian military is hard pressed to provide security for key facilities 

throughout the country and simultaneously engage insurgents, drug 

traffickers, and paramilitary groups in rural areas. According to DOD, the 

Colombian military lacks a long-term strategy and effective leadership; 

suffers from poor morale; and has inadequate equipment, logistics, and 

training. In the past year, the Colombian military has suffered major 

defeats from the insurgents, and insurgent groups are moving into more of 

the territory where drug-trafficking activities are primarily occurring. 

Additionally, in October 1998, DOD officials at the U.S. embassy reported 

that a Colombian Army unit responsible for performing counternarcotics 

missions in southern Colombia did not control land communication and 

had conceded the use of the road network to the insurgents and drug 

traffickers. According to the Director of the U.S. Office of National Drug 

Control Policy, the recent offensives by the insurgents and the resulting 

military defeats suggest that Colombian security forces will be unable to 

conduct effective antidrug operations in regions where guerrilla forces 

dominate and control the area. 

Weak Judicial System According to the State Department, Colombia’s weak judicial system 

continues to adversely affect its counternarcotics efforts. U.S. embassy 

personnel stated that less than 3 percent of all cases, including drug-related 

ones, are prosecuted in Colombia. These officials attributed Colombia’s 

dismal prosecution rate to various inefficiencies in the investigative 

process and court backlogs. As a result, any crime, including drug 

trafficking, has a significant chance of going unpunished.
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Challenges Facing U.S. 

Counternarcotics 

Efforts 

A major goal of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Colombia is to 

reduce the availability of drugs. To do this, the United States concentrates 

its efforts on supporting eradication and interdiction activities of the CNP 

and the military. The United States faces several challenges in trying to 

achieve its objectives, including eradicating enough coca and opium poppy 

to reduce Colombia’s net cultivation, providing adequate resources for 

detection and monitoring support, assuring that counternarcotics aid is not 

provided to Colombian military and CNP units where there is credible 

evidence that human rights abuses have not been addressed, and 

determining when it is appropriate to share information with the 

Colombian military on insurgent activities for planning counternarcotics 

operations.

Eradication Efforts U.S. and Colombian efforts to eradicate enough coca and opium poppy to 

reduce the net cultivation of these crops have not succeeded to date. 

Figure 3 shows that, despite significant increases in spraying, only about 30 

percent, or 35,400 hectares, of coca crop were eradicated out of 123,400 

sprayed between 1996 and 1998.
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Figure 3: Trends in Colombian Coca Cultivation and the Effectiveness of Aerial 

Eradication Efforts, 1996-98

Source: U.S. government data.

Figure 4 shows that opium poppy cultivation in Colombia has remained 

relatively stable.

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

1996 1997 1998

Net Cultiv ation Reporte d S pray A c tiv ity Coc a K illed

67,200

16,053

2,500

79,500

41,451

19,265

101,800

65,930

13,650

Hectares
B-280937

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

Figure 4: Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Eradication, 1996-98

Source: U.S. government data.

Beginning in October 1996, the State Department decided to significantly 

increase the U.S. level of support and participation in aerial eradication 

operations against coca and opium poppy. According to the State 

Department, the estimated costs of supporting aerial spraying operations 

for fiscal year 1999 could be as high as $68 million, an increase of about 350 

percent over the $19.6 million actually spent in 1996. A significant portion 

of U.S. assistance to this effort is carried out by a U.S. contractor. Between 

80 and 90 contractor personnel are stationed in Colombia on either a 

temporary or permanent basis. As a result of this effort, State Department 

data shows that 107,381 hectares of coca were sprayed during 1997-98, 

exceeding its goal of 50,000 hectares for this period. 

Since 1996, nearly all spray activities have been conducted in two of the 

three primary coca-growing areas in Colombia. U.S. embassy officials 

stated that they would like to expand eradication operations during 1999 

into the third primary coca-growing area, where U.S. estimates indicate 

that coca cultivation increased from 19,000 hectares in 1997 to 30,100 

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

1996 1997 1998

Total Cultiv ation A v ailable f or Harv es t Eradic ated

12,328

6,300 6,028

8,996

13,572

6,600

6,100

2,896

Hectares

6,972
B-280937

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

hectares in 1998. However, the Colombian government has not granted 

approval to begin spraying operations in this area. According to U.S. 

embassy officials, the Colombian government is hesitant to start a massive 

aerial eradication program without having alternative crop development 

projects in the area due to the potential economic impact that the loss of 

the coca crop would have on the farmers. These officials stated that 

eradication efforts could increase popular support for the FARC, which 

already controls most of the territory. According to the State Department, 

the United States will not support alternative development programs in 

areas until they are under government control.

The U.S. embassy began a concentrated effort to spray opium poppy in 

November 1998. The effort is designed to sustain spraying operations over 

time so that growers will find it uneconomical to continue cultivating 

opium poppy.

Reductions in Support for 

Detection and Monitoring 

A second challenge facing the United States is providing sufficient 

detection and monitoring resources to support Colombian and U.S. 

counternarcotics operations in southern Colombia. The U.S. 

counternarcotics plan for Colombia includes efforts to increase detection 

and monitoring support from SOUTHCOM and the U.S. Customs Service. 

The support generally consists of providing aircraft and radar.

SOUTHCOM data, however, shows that DOD and U.S. Customs have not 

supplied the resources required to meet SOUTHCOM’s detection and 

monitoring plans for the source zone countries, including Colombia, 

primarily because of competing demands to support higher priority 

missions, such as support to Bosnia and Kosovo. According to 

SOUTHCOM, the total hours devoted to drug detection and monitoring 

declined by about 16 percent between 1997 and 1998. Also, in 1998, U.S. 

Customs, for security reasons, withdrew two aircraft that had been 

stationed in Colombia over the past several years to track suspected drugtrafficking aircraft. U.S. embassy officials stated that, as a result of these 

shortfalls and reductions, it is now more difficult to follow suspect drugtrafficking aircraft after they are detected.

Moreover, SOUTHCOM officials stated that their ability to continue 

providing existing levels of detection and monitoring support could be 

further eroded with the closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama City, 

Panama, on May 1, 1999. To compensate for this, the Secretary of Defense, 

on April 16, 1999, approved a plan to open forward operating locations on 
B-280937

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

two Caribbean islands (Curacao and Aruba) and in Manta, Ecuador. 

According to DOD, the forward operating location at Curacao and Aruba is 

operational, and Manta is expected to become operational by mid-June 

1999.

Balancing Human Rights 

Concerns Against the 

Provision of 

Counternarcotics Aid to the 

Colombian Military 

A third challenge facing U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia is the 

balancing of human rights concerns about abuses within the Colombian 

military against the provision of counternarcotics aid to the Colombian 

military. Over the years, human rights organizations and the State 

Department have documented human rights abuses by the Colombian 

military, particularly by the Colombian Army. Human rights abuses have 

included disappearances, arbitrary detentions, kidnappings, and torture of 

civilians.

According to U.S. legislation, Colombia’s security forces cannot receive 

U.S. counternarcotics assistance if there is credible evidence that a 

Colombian unit has committed gross violations of human rights unless the 

Secretary of State determines that effective measures are being taken to 

bring the responsible individual or individuals to justice.5

 The State 

Department has established screening procedures to determine which 

Colombian units meet the requirements of this policy before providing U.S. 

counternarcotics assistance.

According to the State Department, all counternarcotics units of the CNP 

and the Colombian Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps have passed the 

screening process. However, only three of six army brigades operating in 

the major drug trafficking areas have passed. Of the three units, two are 

actively involved in counternarcotics operations, and the other is minimally 

involved. U.S. embassy personnel stated that unless other army units pass 

the screening process, it will be difficult to provide the level of Colombian 

military support that the CNP needs to effectively reduce drug-trafficking 

activities.

Information Sharing With 

the Colombian Military

A fourth challenge facing U.S. decisionmakers is the problem of when 

information regarding insurgents can be shared with the Colombian 

5

See the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 1999 (Sec. 

568 of sec. 101 (d), Division A of P.L. 105-277). The Congress also included similar language in the 

Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1999 Appropriations Act ( Sec. 8130 of P.L. 105-262).
B-280937

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

military. U.S. guidance, initially issued in June 1998, restricted the sharing 

of any information on insurgent capabilities and activities unless it is 

directly related to an approved counternarcotics operation. However, 

within the area where most drug-trafficking activities occur, U.S. embassy 

officials stated that the drug traffickers and the insurgents have become 

virtually indistinguishable. As a result, U.S. officials are faced with making 

a difficult decision regarding when and if information on insurgent 

activities should be provided to the Colombian military. 

The following two examples demonstrate the dilemma that U.S. officials 

face in deciding whether to share information. 

• In August 1998, Colombian insurgents destroyed a joint military and 

CNP base that was also used by U.S. contractor personnel for coca 

eradication operations. The U.S. embassy did not know if it could share 

information about the insurgents with either the CNP or the Colombian 

military because the information was not directly related to 

counternarcotics operations. The U.S. embassy requested approval 

from U.S. agencies in Washington, D.C., but by the time it had received 

approval, the information, according to U.S. embassy officials, was 

useless.

• U.S. embassy officials have decided to routinely provide intelligence 

information related to the insurgents to Colombian units under control 

of the Joint Task Force. According to these officials, the information is 

being used to plan counternarcotics operations in an area controlled by 

insurgents; however, they do not have a system to ensure that it is not 

being used for other than counternarcotics purposes.

U.S. officials informed us that new guidelines on information sharing were 

issued in March 1999. According to these officials, these guidelines 

recognize the increasing involvement of the insurgents in drug trafficking 

activities and their demonstrated abilities to attack counternarcotics 

operations, personnel, and infrastructure, and establish a better means to 

facilitate the exchange of information with the Colombian military on 

insurgent activities within the drug-trafficking areas. 

Conclusions The counternarcotics efforts of Colombia and the United States have 

resulted in record seizures of illegal drugs and the disruption of drug 

trafficking organizations. However, there has been no reduction in the flow 

of cocaine or heroin from Colombia. It appears that the cocaine threat 

from Colombia has worsened since 1996 and could deteriorate even further 
B-280937

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

within the next 2 years. Not only are coca cultivation and potential cocaine 

production likely to increase, but also Colombia is now the primary 

provider of heroin to the eastern United States. Moreover, insurgent and 

paramilitary organizations have increased their involvement in drugtrafficking activities, which has made it more difficult for the government 

of Colombia to conduct counternarcotics operations in the areas under 

insurgent and paramilitary control. Until the government of Colombia can 

gain control over territory where drug-trafficking activities are occurring, 

counterdrug operations will be difficult and dangerous, and pose a 

formidable challenge to the United States and Colombia in their attempts to 

reduce the flow of drugs from Colombia into the United States.

Agency Comments DOD and State provided written comments on a draft of this report. 

Additionally, we discussed the draft report with DEA and the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy. DOD stated it had no objection to the report. 

State stated that it considers the report to be a good and balanced summary 

of the challenges facing the United States’ counternarcotics program in 

Colombia. The other agencies agreed that the report accurately portrayed 

the narcotics threat from Colombia, and U.S. and Colombian efforts to 

address the threat. Each agency also provided technical comments which 

we incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology

To address the nature of the drug threat from Colombia, we received 

briefings and analyzed documents from U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, 

and military officials and reviewed documentation such as cable traffic, 

drug eradication and interdiction reports, and studies in Washington, D.C.; 

at SOUTHCOM in Miami, Florida; and at the U.S. embassy in Bogota, 

Colombia. To address Colombian and U.S. counternarcotics efforts and 

the challenges faced by both governments, we visited various agencies 

involved in antidrug activities in Washington, D.C.; Miami, Florida; and 

Bogota, Colombia. In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials and 

reviewed planning, implementation, and related documents and reports 

concerning drug activities in Colombia at the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy; the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, and 

Justice; and other federal agencies. In Miami, we interviewed U.S. officials 

at SOUTHCOM and reviewed documents related to counternarcotics 

activities in Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed U.S. embassy officials, 

including the Ambassador, and analyzed reports and documents of various 

agencies responsible for implementing U.S. counternarcotics objectives in 
B-280937

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

Colombia. We also interviewed officials from the CNP and the U.N. Drug 

Control Program. Officials from the Colombian Ministry of Defense were 

not able to arrange a time to meet with us.

The information on Colombia’s laws in this report does not reflect our 

independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary 

sources.

We conducted our review between September 1998 and May 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees; the 

Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, the Secretary of State; the Honorable 

William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Lawrence 

Summers, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable Janet

F. Reno, the U.S. Attorney General; the Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey, the 

Director, U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy; the Honorable 

Thomas A. Constantine, the Administrator, DEA; and the Honorable Louis 

Freeh, the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Copies will also be 

made available to other interested parties upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call 

me at (202) 512-4268. The major contributors to this report were Ronald A. 

Kushner, Allen Fleener, Ronald Hughes, Anthony Padilla, and Rona 

Mendelsohn.

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director,

International Relations and Trade Issues
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Comments From the 

Department of State

26

Appendix II

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

27

Related GAO Products 31

Figures Figure 1: Trends in Andean Region Coca Cultivation, 1996-98 6

Figure 2: Areas of Colombian Insurgent, Paramilitary, and

Drug-trafficking Activities 8

Figure 3: Trends in Colombian Coca Cultivation and the

Effectiveness of Aerial Eradication Efforts, 1996-98 17

Figure 4: Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Eradication,

1996-98 18

Abbreviations

CNP Colombian National Police

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

ELN National Liberation Army

FARC Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces

SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of State ApenIdxi
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxIi
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

Related GAO Products

Drug Control: Status of U.S. International Counternarcotics Activities

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116, Mar. 12, 1998).

Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing

Challenges (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 26, 1998).

Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing

Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

Drug Control: Delays in Obtaining State Department Records Relating to

Colombia (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-202, July 9, 1997).

Drug Control: Observations on Elements of the Federal Drug Control

Strategy (GAO/GGD-97-42, Mar. 14, 1977).

Drug Control: Long-standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts

(GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

Review of Assistance to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-96-62R, Dec. 12, 1995).

Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1, 1995).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but Impact Is

Uncertain (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is

Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993).

Drug Control: Increased Interdiction and Its Contribution to the War on

Drugs (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-04, Feb. 25, 1993). 

The Drug War: Extent of Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela

(GAO/NSIAD-92-226, June 5, 1992). 

The Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru

(GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992).

The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia

and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991). 
Related GAO Products

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-136 Drug Control

Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia

(GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991).

Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Colombia and Bolivia

(GAO/NSIAD-89-24, Nov. 1, 1988).

Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities

(GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988).

Status Report on GAO Review of the U.S. International Narcotics Control

Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-87-40, July 29, 1987).

Drug Control: International Narcotics Control Activities of the United

States (GAO/NSIAD-87-72BR, Jan. 30, 1987).

(711362) Letr
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