The HONORABLE CHARLES B. KORNMANN, United States *

District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting 

by designation.

 The HONORABLE H. DAVID YOUNG, United States Magistrate 1

Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was

referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

___________

No. 96-1264

 ___________

David Barber, *

 *

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

 * Appeal from the United States

 v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Shirley S. Chater, *

Commissioner, Social Security * [UNPUBLISHED]

Administration, * 

 *

Defendant-Appellee. *

__________________________

Submitted: June 13, 1996

 Filed: August 6, 1996

 __________________________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,

and KORNMANN, District Judge. 

*

PER CURIAM.

David Barber appeals the judgment of the district court affirming

1

the Social Security Administration's denial of disability insurance

benefits. We affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND

David Barber, a thirty-eight year old man with a ninth-grade

education and past relevant work experience as an assembly line worker,

maintenance worker, and car detailer, first applied for disability benefits

on August 30, 1988, claiming permanent disability due to neck and back

injuries suffered when a transmission fell on him. Following the Social

Security Administration's denial of benefits and a convoluted procedural

history which we will not recount here, a second supplemental hearing was

held on November 8, 1993, at which Barber, his wife, and a vocational

expert each testified. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Barber

disability benefits based on his finding that Barber was capable of

performing past relevant work as a car detailer. 

The ALJ followed the sequential five-step analysis set forth in the

regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f) (1993). The ALJ found that

Barber had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 5,

1986. He also found that Barber suffered from a mild cervical disc

degeneration and spondylosis at C4-5, borderline intellectual functioning,

a dysthymic disorder, and a series of psychological disorders affecting his

physical condition, including a mixed personality disorder NOS with

passive/aggressive and schizotypal characteristics, a panic disorder with

agoraphobia, and a somatoform pain disorder. The ALJ found, however, that

these impairments were not severe enough to meet, or in combination, to

equal a listed impairment. The key determination in this case is step

four, in which the ALJ determines whether the claimant's impairment

precludes him from performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

The ALJ discredited Barber's subjective complaints of pain and found that

Barber retained the residual functional capacity to perform work-related

activities that did not involve heavy manual labor or work requiring

overhead activities, or heavy repetitive pushing or
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pulling. The ALJ also found that Barber's mental impairments would

preclude him from performing only tasks involving unusual stress, highly

complex tasks, or a high level of judgment. As a result, the ALJ found

that Barber's impairments did not preclude him from performing past

relevant work as a car detailer. Following the Appeals Council's denial

of his request for review, Barber sought review in the district court. On

January 3, 1996, the magistrate granted the Commissioner's motion for

summary judgment and dismissed Barber's complaint. Barber appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review the denial of social security benefits to determine whether

the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as

a whole. Novotny v. Chater, 72 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1995). Substantial

evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quotations omitted). We must

affirm the decision of the ALJ so long as substantial evidence supports his

position, regardless of whether substantial evidence supports an alterative

conclusion. Jones v. Chater, 86 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1996).

Barber first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective

complaints of pain. He points out that he has been diagnosed as suffering

from a somatoform disorder, a psychiatric malady causing the victim to have

an exaggerated perception of his physical ailments. The ALJ may not

summarily dismiss a claimant's subjective claims such as a somatoform

disorder without expressly determining that the claimant's testimony is not

credible. Metz v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995). Instead, the

ALJ must consider the claimant's prior work history, as well as any

observations by third parties regarding: (1) the claimant's daily

activities; (2) the duration, intensity, and frequency of the pain; (3)

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (4) precipitating

and aggravating factors; and (5) functional
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restrictions. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1992).

The ALJ properly applied this framework by noting several telling

inconsistencies that undermined Barber's complaints of pain, specifically:

(1) a consistent absence of objective medical evidence supporting Barber's

claimed level of pain; (2) repeated observations by treating physicians

that Barber was deliberately exaggerating his symptoms; (3) Barber's

relatively unrestricted range of daily activities; (4) Barber's sporadic

and conservative treatment history coupled with the low dosage of his pain

medication; and (5) Barber's poor work history. "The ALJ may discount the

claimant's allegations of pain when he explicitly finds them inconsistent

with daily activities, lack of treatment, demeanor, and objective medical

evidence." Jones, 86 F.3d at 826. Moreover, the ALJ made a specific

finding that Barber's subjective complaints of disabling pain were simply

not credible. "If an ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant's testimony and

gives a good reason for doing so, we will normally defer to that judgment."

Dixon v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 237, 238 (8th Cir. 1990). Each of these

inconsistencies is well-supported by the record, and the mere fact that the

record does contain some support for Barber's claim that he is suffering

from some degree of somatoform disorder does not require reversal in light

of the ALJ's express credibility determination. See Metz, 49 F.3d at 377.

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of

Barber's subjective complaints of pain, including his somatoform disorder.

 Barber next contends that his mental impairments preclude his return to

past relevant work as a car detailer. The ALJ's finding that Barber's

mental impairments would preclude him from performing only tasks involving

unusual stress, highly complex tasks, or a high level of judgment, however,

is also supported by substantial evidence. Dr. William Wilkins rated

Barber's capacity to return to work as fair to good. Dr. Joseph Crupie

found Barber "oriented to
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time, place, and person" with a "low average IQ," "no gross cognitive

deficit," and an adequate ability to concentrate. Dr. B. Eliot Cole found

Barber to be "alert, pleasant, and cooperative" with no evidence of

hallucinations or delusions and rated Barber's ability to return to work

as fair. Dr. Ken Dowless found Barber to be "fully oriented and alert"

although suffering from situational depression. A second consultation with

Dr. Cole characterized Barber as alert and logical with "no problems with

attention, but some difficulty with concentration." 

This evidence supports the ALJ's determination that, despite Barber's

depression and anxiety, he is still capable of communicating, behaving

properly, exercising basic judgment, and carrying out simple instructions.

While Dr. W. Gerald Fowler opined that Barber's mental impairments rendered

him incapable of performing even a low stress job involving simple

instructions, that diagnosis is at odds with the clear weight of the

psychiatric record as a whole. Accordingly, the ALJ properly discounted

Dr. Fowler's opinion in favor of the conflicting substantial evidence.

Piepgras v. Chater, 76 F.3d 233, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1996).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.