1 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Intrernational Operations, Committee on Foreign

Relations, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

at 10:30 a.m. EDT

Wednesday, May 10, 2000

UNITED NATIONS

Reforms Are Progressing, but Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been Achieved

Statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade

Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-169
2 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the status of reforms to improve the United

Nations (U.N.). Our remarks are based on our report prepared for this Committee and

released today, which provides a comprehensive analysis of the reforms.1

In recent years, the United Nations has had fundamental problems. In 1994, the U.N.’s

inability to procure goods and services fairly and on time reached a crisis. Also there was an

overall failure of its human resources system to staff critical posts with the right people.

Peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia failed to accomplish their missions.

By 1997, the Secretary General stated that the United Nations had become fragmented,

inflexible, and, in some areas, superfluous. Member states demanded improvements. In

response, the Secretary General proposed a reform program consisting of three core

elements--(1) restructuring U.N. leadership and operations, (2) developing a performancebased human capital system, and (3) introducing programming and budgeting processes

focused on results. The Secretary General stated that these elements formed an integrated

program; all were necessary to create a United Nations that achieved results and

continuously improved. While not all of the reform elements applied to the entire United

Nations,2 the overall program provided a model for a U.N.-wide reform process. The

Secretary General set the end of 1999 as the target date to put the reforms in place. Today, I

will discuss the status of the reform program and highlight some results.

SUMMARY

The United Nations has substantially restructured its leadership and operations and partly

implemented a merit-based and performance-oriented human capital system, and these

reforms have strengthened U.N. operations. However, while progress is being made, the

overall objectives of the reform have not yet been achieved. Specifically, the United Nations

1

United Nations: Reform Initiatives Have Strengthened Operations, but Overall Objectives Have Not

Yet Been Achieved (GAO/NSIAD-2000-150, May 10, 2000).

2

The United Nations is composed of the Secretariat, which carries out much of the work mandated by

member states, and the programs, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees, which conduct

specific lines of work.
3 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

has not yet implemented reforms to focus its programming and budgeting on managing the

Secretariat’s performance. These initiatives would enable member states to hold the

Secretariat accountable for results and are key to the success of the overall reform because

they institutionalize a shift in the organization’s focus from carrying out activities to

accomplishing missions. As figure 1 illustrates, U.N. reform is an interrelated process and

requires that all core elements be in place to succeed.

Figure 1: U.N. Reform Program--Elements Interrelated and Partially in Place

Source: GAO

BACKGROUND

The United Nations carries out a wide range of activities, including peacekeeping in

locations such as Kosovo, East Timor, and the Congo; humanitarian and refugee operations

in Sudan and Tajikistan; and thousands of development, economic, social, and human rights

projects worldwide. Organizationally, the United Nations is comprised of three types of

entities. First are the member states’ governing or intergovernmental bodies, such as the

Security Council and the General Assembly, which set U.N. objectives and mandate

Restructure leadership

and operations

Substantially in place.

Some operations strengthened.

Introduce results-oriented

programming and budgeting

Not in place.

General Assembly considering

proposals.

Create performance-oriented

human capital system

Partly in place.

Basic personnel tools

developed.
4 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

activities in accordance with the U.N. Charter. Second is the Secretariat, the central working

unit of the United Nations, which carries out work mandated by the governing bodies. The

Secretariat consists of the Secretary General, whom the U.N. Charter specifies as the chief

administrative officer of the United Nations, and the staff necessary to carry out the

mandated work. Third are the U.N. programs and funds, which the General Assembly

authorized to address specific areas of work of continuing importance. Examples of the

programs and funds are the U.N. Children’s Fund and the U.N. Development Program. Many

of the programs are authorized to have their own governing bodies and budgets (paid for by

voluntary contributions from participating nations). Consequently, while the Secretary

General is the U.N.’s highest-ranking official and his reform proposals influence these

programs, he does not have authority to direct the programs to undertake reforms.

The expenses of the Secretariat are funded through regular budget assessments of the U.N.

member states. The U.N. regular budget for the biennium 2000-2001 is $2.5 billion, of which

the U.S. contribution is assessed at 25 percent.3

Member states are assessed separately for

U.N. peacekeeping activities. For 2000-2001, the cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations is

estimated to be $3.6 billion, of which the United States is to contribute 25 percent.4

Member

states are also assessed for the costs of international tribunals on war crimes and genocide.

Finally, the United Nations receives voluntary, or extrabudgetary, contributions for the funds

and programs—estimated to be $3.7 billion for the 2000-20001 biennium. The United States

has historically paid about 25 percent. Figure 2 shows U.N. budgets for the last three

bienniums.

3

Members’ assessments for the regular budget are determined by a scale of assessments approved by the General

Assembly on the basis of advice from the Committee on Contributions. Each member has a single vote in the

General Assembly regardless of its assessment.

4

U.N. peacekeeping is assessed on an annual basis. The U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping is 30.4 percent; the U. S.

Congress has capped U.S. contributions at 25 percent since 1994.
5 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

Figure 2: U.N. Budgets, 1996-2001

(Dollars in millions)

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

1996-97 1998-99 2000-01

T ribun als

P eac ekeeping

E xtrabudgetary

R egular budget

Note: Voluntary or extrabudgetary amounts are U.N. estimates. Peacekeeping amounts combine two annual

budget cycles and are estimates for 2001.

Source: U.N. budget documents.

U.N. LEADERSHIP AND OPERATIONS SUBSTANTIALLY RESTRUCTURED

The United Nations has substantially restructured its operations, and we found this has

provided more cohesive and unified leadership for the organization. A major problem for the

United Nations has been the fragmentation and lack of cooperation among the Secretariat

departments and the programs. To begin addressing this problem, the Secretary General

formed (1) the senior management group and (2) the executive committees. The Senior

Management Group consists of the heads of all U.N. departments and programs and has been

meeting weekly since September 1997 to collectively decide on unified U.N. policies.

Previously, the heads of some of the programs met only once a year at the General Assembly.

Now there is a regular mechanism for developing a single U.N. direction. The four executive

committees are organized around the U.N.'s core missions--peace and security, development

operations, humanitarian affairs, and economic and social issues. Human rights is a core

issue that cuts across all U.N. missions. Consisting of the senior managers of the

departments and programs in each area, the executive committees try to translate senior

management group decisions into coordinated action by all U.N. entities. Figure 3 provides
6 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

an overview of the U.N.'s leadership structure as it exists today and shows that the intended

goals are to carry out more unified and effective U.N. activities, particularly in the field and

at the working level where services are delivered.

Figure 3: U.N. Leadership and Operations Substantially Restructured

Humanitarian Affairs

Departments

Humanitarian Affairs

Emergency Relief Coordinator

Political Affairs

Programs and Funds

Development Program

Children in Armed Conflict

High Commissioner for

Refugees

Executive Committees

Secretary General

Deputy Secretary

General

Senior Management Group

Support services

Legal

Management

General Assembly

Public

Internal

Human Rights

As of May 2000

Source: GAO analysis of U.N. documents and data.

Goal of restructuring is to achieve unity of

action and more effective programs in the field

and at the working level

Economic and Social Affairs

Departments

Economic and Social Affairs

Regional Commissions

Africa

Asia and the Pacific

Europe

Latin America/Caribbean

Western Asia

Programs and Funds

Conference Trade &

Development

Environment Program

U.N. University

Development Operations

Programs and Funds

Development Program

World Food Program

Childrens’ Fund

Fund Population Activities

Drug Control Program

Human Settlements

Fund for Women

Program on HIV/AIDS

Conference on Trade &

Development

Fund Agricultural Development

High Commissioner for

Refugees

Peace and Security

Departments

Political Affairs

Peacekeeping Operations

Humanitarian Affairs

Emergency Relief Coordinator

Programs and Funds

Development

High Commissioner for

Refugees

Children in Armed Conflict

Shaded areas are major areas of the

restructuring
7 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

We found that these reform initiatives have resulted in a more coherent and unified

leadership for the United Nations and have begun to reduce competition among the various

U.N. agencies and to foster more coordinated actions in the field. The following examples

help illustrate areas where the reforms have made a difference.

• During the Kosovo crisis, the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General, the

Emergency Relief Coordinator, the High Commissioners for Refugees and Human

Rights, and other senior managers used the senior management group to develop a

single U.N. response. The High Commissioner for Refugees would regularly report to

the group through video-conferencing and provide real-time information on the

situation on the ground. Since the top-level managers were members of the group,

the United Nations was able to develop a unified response and provide clear direction

to the departments and programs. One initial direction was that the High

Commissioner’s office would lead the U.N.’s initial response to the crisis and other

U.N. entities would support the Commissioner. As the U.N.’s role in Kosovo evolved,

the Secretary General continued to work through the Senior Management Group to

develop a unified concept for U.N. operations and to ensure that all departments and

programs pooled their resources to support U.N. tasks in humanitarian affairs,

civilian police, and civil administration. According to senior U.N. officials, the

management group was also used to ensure that all heads of U.N. departments and

programs had a consistent understanding of the U.N.’s mandate in Kosovo,

particularly for their dealings with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe and the World Bank, which were also responsible for tasks in Kosovo.

• Leadership by the executive committee on peace and security enabled various U.N.

departments to integrate some peacekeeping efforts and has resulted in better

planning for new missions. For example, in developing plans for the U.N. operation

in East Timor in 1999, the Under Secretary General for Political Affairs provided the

group a full and candid assessment of the political situation and strategies for

conducting the referendum, according to members of the executive committee.

According to a senior political officer in the Department of Political Affairs, his

openness with his priorities paved the way for unified strategy and planning among

his department, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Human Rights
8 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

Coordinator, and others on the committee. As a result, the plan for the East Timor

operation was more comprehensive and better integrated than other U.N.

peacekeeping plans we have examined in our past work, and resulted in deploying

the mission more quickly and with fewer problems than past complex operations. I

should add that these reforms do not address the capacity of the United Nations to

undertake the scale of its current peacekeeping responsibilities or the organizational

limits of the United Nations in leading operations calling for the use of force.5

• In Guatemala, initiatives to integrate U.N. development activities under the

development assistance framework have helped improve the effectiveness of U.N.

support for the 1994 peace accords by coordinating the work of 17 separate U.N.

agencies. The U.N.’s efforts to demobilize combatants, which officials of the U.S.

Agency for International Development described as a model for international

cooperation, resulted in U.N. agencies conducting joint planning and taking steps to

avoid duplicative programming. For example, the U.N. Population Fund had

incorporated reproductive health activities into the U.N. Children’s Fund and the U.N.

Development Program’s development projects. In addition, all U.N. agencies fully

coordinated their efforts in an effective response to Hurricane Mitch and in

producing a country development report, which for the first time included a candid

section on human rights. Although the government objected to this report, all U.N.

agencies in country were united in defending the report.

Despite improvements in some of the areas, we also found that the reforms are still in

process and that U.N. agencies do not fully coordinate their activities at the working levels

and in the field. The following examples illustrate areas where we found some continuing

weaknesses in U.N. cooperation.

• The improved policy coordination and information sharing apparent at the U.N.’s

highest levels and on critical issues are less evident in day-to-day activities at

working levels of the organization. Several U.N. officials who recently worked both

in U.N. headquarters and in field peacekeeping operations confirmed the need for

5 United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace (GAO/NSIAD-97-34, Mar. 27,

1997).
9 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

increased interdepartmental coordination and cooperation on day-to-day policy and

operational matters. During our fieldwork in the Middle East and Guatemala, senior

and mid-level peacekeeping and political officers told us that coordination between

them remains at a low level and they are continuing their practice of following

instructions respectively from both the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and

the Department of Political Affairs. They do not see evidence from their instructions

that these departments are coordinating their work on a day-to-day basis.

• We also found impediments to fully integrating country development activities. In

Guatemala, the common country assessment was delayed because agencies sought to

include development indicators in line with their own mandates and programming,

rather than agreeing on overall indicators of U.N. success. In Mozambique, U.N.

officials said that some of the country team’s working groups were largely inactive—

such as education and water and sanitation-- because officials were reluctant to

spend time working on issues not directly related to their agencies’ priorities. About

one-third of the U.N. officials we interviewed had no requirement or job expectation

to participate in the U.N. development assistance framework. According to these

officials, their career, promotion, and reward paths are through their parent

organizations, and their work on the framework is an adjunct to their agency duties.

REFORMS TO DEVELOP A RESULTS-ORIENTED

HUMAN CAPITAL SYSTEM PARTLY IN PLACE

The Secretariat has partly implemented initiatives to begin transforming its human resources

culture into one that is results oriented, responsive, and accountable. Fundamental tasks

remain to be completed, such as developing U.N. procedures that allow the organization to

staff critical needs and fully automating its personnel database. Nonetheless, in comparison

to the situation in 1994, when the human capital system was in crisis, positive steps have

been taken, such as implementing a merit-based appraisal system and a U.N.-wide code of

conduct. Also, the overall plan for reforming the human capital system shares the elements

and values that are common to high-performing organizations.6

For example, a hallmark of

6

GAO reports on human capital describe the approach that leading public and private sector

organizations have taken. See, for example, Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency

Leaders (GAO/GGD-99-179, Sept. 1999).
10 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

high-performing organizations is that human capital procedures are directly linked to

achieving organizational objectives. The Secretariat's new merit-based appraisal system

requires that managers set performance expectations for all staff and that the expectations

be linked to achieving U.N. objectives.

Implementation of the new appraisal system helps illustrate the progress the Secretariat has

made in reforming its human capital system. The appraisal system is intended to help

introduce a results-based culture to the Secretariat by providing honest feedback to staff

about their performance. Ratings are based on a staff member's performance in meeting

expectations, as measured by agreed-upon indicators. In comparison, the old appraisal did

not set work expectations; ratings were uniformly high, with about 80 percent of staff

receiving the highest rating; and the Secretariat did not routinely compile statistics on staff

performance. Figure 4 shows the distribution of ratings for the most currently available

period and demonstrates that most staff are now rated as meeting expectations and that

there is a relative dispersion in the ratings.

Figure 4: Distribution of U.N. Secretariat Staff Appraisals, 1999

Source: U.N. documents.

0.1 1.4

55.9

34.4

8.2

0

20

40

60

80

100

Percent of

ratings

Consistently

exceeds

Frequently

exceeds

Fully

meets

Partially

meets

Does not

meet

Expectations
11 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

The Secretary General has also followed up on the application of the appraisal system. For

the 1998/99 appraisal cycle, the Deputy Secretary General sent letters to two departments

that had ratings markedly higher than the other departments. The letters instructed the

departmental chiefs to counsel supervisors on the requirements for fair and welldocumented ratings. He also sent letters to the promotion board informing the board that

the ratings in these departments might be inflated and to consider this in its promotion

decisions. Finally, in November 1999, the Under Secretary General issued an administrative

instruction that set out the consequences of receiving less than fully successful performance

ratings, ranging from not receiving the annual salary pay increase to dismissal, depending on

the length of time the staff member had not fully met expectations.

The United Nations plans to fully put into place its human capital reforms over the next 2-4

years. The following examples help illustrate some of the progress made and the tasks

remaining.

• Beginning in 1999, the Department of Management extended the use of the

Integrated Management Information System--the Secretariat’s data system on

budget, finances, management, and personnel—to the entire Secretariat. This

provided the Office of Human Resources Management with basic data on all

Secretariat staff with a contract of 1 year or longer, such as staff hiring date,

current and past positions, work location and office, nationality, age, and gender.

The office now generates regular reports of the Secretariat workforce, including

projections of retirements by position, grade level, and type of employment for

short-term planning. While this development provides the United Nations with a

basic management tool, several steps need to be taken to make the personnel

information system fully functional, including linking the databases electronically

with all offices (currently the Secretariat has real-time access to personnel data

for 48 percent of professional staff-- those located at headquarters in New York

and at the offices in Geneva and Vienna); completing an inventory of existing staff

skills and knowledge; and automating a list of job qualifications for each

Secretariat position.
12 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

• The Secretariat has begun identifying and filling critical needs projected for the

next 2-4 years but has not begun developing a long-range workforce planning

strategy. This will start once basic tools are in place and after the General

Assembly debates the U.N.’s future role at the millenium assembly in the summer

and fall of the year 2000.

• The Office of Human Resources Management has developed a comprehensive

plan to improve recruitment and mobility, which includes lateral moves, job

exchanges, temporary assignments, and job rotation systems within departments

and field missions. The office discussed these proposals with staff committees

during 1999 and plans to continue discussing the proposals through April 2000, as

part of its policy to consider all staff views regarding human capital reforms. At

the end of April 2000, the Office plans to complete a report on the proposal and

submit it to the General Assembly, which must approve any changes to staff rules

and regulations needed to implement the proposal.

REFORMS TO MANAGE FOR RESULTS NOT YET ADOPTED

A core element of the U.N. reform was to introduce processes to hold the U.N. Secretariat

accountable for results by (1) focusing and clarifying the objectives member states expected

the Secretariat to achieve; and (2) adopting performance-oriented programming and

budgeting, that is, linking budgeted activities with performance expectations and measures.

The United Nations is considering these initiatives, including the use of performance

measures in its principal planning document—the medium-term plan. However, these

proposals have not yet been adopted because some member states believe they are tactics to

cut the budget. Another problem is that the Secretariat does not have an overall system to

monitor and evaluate the results and impact of its programs. Such a system is necessary to

implement performance management. Figure 5 depicts the U.N. program planning cycle and

the status of the key initiatives to modify it.
13 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

Figure 5: Status of Initiatives to Modify the U.N. Program Planning Cycle

Source: GAO analysis based on U.N. documents and discussion with U.S. and U.N. officials.

The Secretary General proposed that the General Assembly focus the Secretariat's work by

limiting the number of new work requirements or mandates for the Secretariat and clearly

stating what it expected the Secretariat to do. These initiatives were not adopted. For 1997

and 1998, the most recent 2- year period for which information was available, we found that

the number of new tasks mandated by the General Assembly increased from 246 to 587 and

that 20 percent of these mandates had vague or open-ended expectations.

The Secretary General also proposed revising the budget process to focus on performance.

He proposed that budgets would specify not only program costs but also expected program

results and performance indicators. Member states could thus hold the Secretariat

accountable for results. The Secretary General further proposed intermediate steps to

prepare for and build confidence in this results-based approach, such as developing

acceptable and reliable performance indicators; incorporating qualitative information in the

performance measures; and pilot-testing proposed changes. The General Assembly is

considering these proposals but has not yet approved them. Some member states are

Programming Programming

Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation

Secretariat monitors and

evaluates program results

No progress in devising a strategy or

implementing a system to measure

program impact

No progress in devising a strategy or

implementing a system to measure

program impact

No progress in adopting results-based

budgeting a sunset provisions

No progress in adopting results-based

budgeting a sunset provisions

No progress in devising a strategy or

implementing a system to measure

program impact

No progress in devising a strategy or

implementing a system to measure

program impact

Results-based budgeting not adopted. Results-based budgeting not adopted.

Mandates

Objectives

Oversight

General Assembly

and other governing

bodies approve

programs/budgets

and set policy.

Programming

Secretariat plans programs to

implement mandates/objectives

Strategy or system to measure

program impact not developed.

Not in place

System to measure program results and

impact

Results-based budgeting not adopted.

Not in place

Results-based budgeting

Mandates

Objectives

Oversight

General Assembly

and other governing

bodies approve

programs/budgets

and set policy

Programming

Secretariat plans programs to

implement mandates/objectives

Budgeting

Secretariat develops budget

to implement programs

Not in place

Initiatives to focus and clarify objectives

and mandates.

Sunset provisions.
14 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

concerned that performance-oriented budgeting is a tactic to cut the U.N. budget. For

example, in 1998, the Group of 77—a block of over 130 U.N. member states classified as

developing countries took the position that results-based budgeting was a radical departure

from accepted practices. They stated there should be no predetermined ceilings on budgets,

that all mandates should be fully funded, and that any attempt to use results-based budgeting

to cut the budget would be resisted. Although the General Assembly has not yet approved

performance budgeting, it authorized the Secretariat to specify expected program

accomplishments and performance indicators in its primary program planning document—

the medium-term plan.

Member states were also concerned that the Secretariat lacked a system to monitor and

evaluate program results and impact. Currently, numerous U.N. departments monitor their

programs, and over 20 U.N. departments and offices have their own evaluation units.

However, in the absence of results-oriented budgeting, monitoring largely involves counting

outputs, such as the number of conferences held or staff years spent. Evaluations do not

systematically provide information on program impact and whether objectives have been

met. Furthermore, the United Nations has not developed a centralized strategy to improve

monitoring and evaluation. Presently there is no centralized strategy that identifies

limitations or gaps in existing efforts, employs guides to help provide some consistency and

reliability in evaluation, or creates an approach to unify monitoring and evaluation functions

to support performance-oriented budgeting.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What distinguishes this U.N. reform from others tried in the past is the effort to transform

the United Nations into a performance-based organization by implementing interrelated

reform initiatives. The initiatives put into place thus far—substantially realigning the

organization and introducing a merit-based appraisal system tied to U.N. objectives--are

moving the United Nations in this direction. There is also evidence that these reforms are

strengthening operations on the ground, where United Nations services and programs are

actually delivered. However, without fully implementing programming, budgeting, and

evaluation processes focussed on performance, the U.N. will not have the management

systems to sustain the gains made and transform the organization.
15 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

To help ensure that the United Nations maintains momentum in its overall reform efforts,

our report recommends that the Secretary of State report annually to the Congress on the

status of the Secretary General’s reform plan, including an assessment of whether U.N.

agencies and departments are effectively coordinating efforts at the country level, effectively

implementing a results-oriented human capital system, and effectively implementing a

performance-oriented management system.

Additionally, to support the United Nations in transforming the organization into one that is

performance oriented and continuously improves, we recommend that the Secretary of State

and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations work with

other member states to

• take intermediate steps at the Secretariat to implement results-oriented budgeting, such

as setting measurable goals and performance indicators for each section of the budget

and

• require the Secretariat to develop an organizational strategy for monitoring and

evaluating the results and impact of Secretariat activities.

The Department of State, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and the United Nations

generally agreed with our findings on U.N. reform. State and the U.S. Mission also said they

would report regularly to the Congress, in the context of the oversight process, on the status

of the U.N. reform plan and would continue working on improving the U.N.’s planning,

budgeting, and evaluation systems.

-- - - - -

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I

would be happy to respond to any questions you or other members may have.
16 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

CONTACT AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Harold J. Johnson at (202) 512-4128.

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Tet Miyabara, Pat Dickriede,

Rick Boudreau, and Mike Rohrback.

(711527)
17 GAO/NSIAD-00-169 U.N. Reform

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