### The Honorable George F. Gunn, Jr., Senior United State s 1 

### Distri ct Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting b y designation. The Honorab le Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge 2 

### for the Southern District of Iowa. - 1 - ___________ No. 96-2334

___________ Sherri L. Helfter, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa United Parcel Service, Inc., * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: January 17, 1997 Filed: June 10, 1997

___________ Before LOKEN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNO LD, Circuit Judges, and GUNN, Senior 1 District Judge.

____________ GUNN, Senior District Judge.
Sherri L. Helfter appeals the District Court's ord er granting United 2 Parcel Services ("UPS") summary judgment on her claims of (1) disability discrimination, (2) age discrimination, and (3) failure to disclose medica l information. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. I. Background The undis puted facts reveal that Ms. Helfter, a 46-year-old female, began working for UPS at its Davenport facility in 1977 as a part-tim e sorter. The job entailed sorting packages by city,

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state an d zip code. Over the years, Ms. Helfter developed a number o f problems with her han ds, arms, neck, and shoulders. She sought treatment
as e arly as 1986. She was diagnosed with chronic, recurrent overus e syndrome in her hands , neck, and shoulders, carpel tunnel syndrome of the right wrist and chronic tenosynovitis of the lef t hand. In 1989, upon Ms. Helfter's request for an accommodation, UPS assigned her to "small-sort" work. This involves the sorting and lifting of packages under five pounds

. As a result of a perceived reduction in performance, UPS removed Ms. Helfter from active e mployment on March 3, 1993, to evaluate her physical condition. On August 11, 1993, Ms. Helfter was given permanent medica l
res trictions which included a restriction as to sustained, highl y repetitive activities using either hand, and a lift limit of ten pound s frequently and twenty pounds occasionally. Beca use of these restrictions, Ms. Helfter cannot return to her job as a sorter.

On UPS's motion for summary judgment, the District Court determined that Ms. Helfter fail ed to submit evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether she is disabled under the Iowa Civi l Rights Act ("ICRA"). On her claim of age discrimination under the ICRA an d the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the District Court rule d that Ms. Helfter failed to submit evidence showing that she is qualified for th e job of sorter, that UPS articulated a legitimate, non

discrim inatory reason for placing Ms. Helfter on inactive status--he r physica l inability to perform her job--and that Ms. Helfter failed t o create a genuine issue of fact as to pretext. F inally, the District Court held Ms. H elfter's claim that UPS breached a duty to disclose medica l information it had regarding her work-related in jury failed as a matter of law.

On appeal, Ms. Helfter argues that (1) she produced sufficien t evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether she is disabled; (2) she produced suff icient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether UPS discriminated against her due to

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her age; and (3) the District Court erred by con cluding that her claim for breach of duty to dis close medical information failed as a matter of law. We address each of these contentions below.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We re view the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same sta ndard as the District Court and examining the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lang v. Herald , 107 F.3d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter o f law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S
. 242, 247-48 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Although we have stated that "summary judgment should seldom be granted in employment discrimin ation cases," Crawford v. Runyon , 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994), summary judgment is proper whe n
a plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on an essential element of her case. See Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. , 59 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1995).

B. Disability Discrimination Ms. Helfter raises two arguments with respect to the District C ourt's ruling on her disability discrimination claim. First, she contends that the Dis trict Court improperly discounted her affidavit and depositio n testimony in determining that she failed to pres ent sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether she is substantially limited in majo r life activities other than work. Second, Ms. Helfter maintains that the District Court erred by concluding the medical evidence and her ow n testimony does not raise an issue of fact as to whether she i s substantially limited in the major life activity of work.

### - 4 - Iowa courts are guided by federal standards in applying the ICRA

. Proba sco v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n , 420 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1988)

. Fe deral courts analyze disability discrimination claims by using th e burden-shifting framework established in McDonne ll Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Price v. S-B Power Tool , 75 F.3d 362, 364-65 (8t h Cir .), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 274 (1996). Under that approach, Ms

. Helfter has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Price , 75 F.3d at 365. A prima facie case consists of the following elements : (1) plaintiff is disabled; (2) plaintiff was qualified for her position; and (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of he r disability. See Boelman v. Manson State Bank , 522 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Iow a 1994).

Th e presence or absence of a disability is a threshold question

. Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co. , 533 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 1995). A person is dis abled if she has a physical or mental impairment which substantiall y limits on e or more major life activities. Probasco , 420 N.W.2d at 434

. Major life activities include caring for one's self, performing manua l tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, and working. Id

. Sittin g, standing, lifting, and reaching are also considered major lif e activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). "Substantially limits" means unable to perfor m a major life activity that the average person in the genera l population can perform, or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particula r major lif e activity as compared to an average person in the genera l popula tion. Id. , § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). The following factors ar e considered in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) its duration or antic ipated duration; and (3) its long-term impact. Id. , § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).

Ms. Helfter first contends that the District Court improperl y discounted her affidavit and deposition testimony concerning the

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limits her conditions place on major life activi ties other than work. The affidavit states:
[M]y condition limits me substantially in major lif e activities. Such activities include cleaning my house , preparing meals, carrying groceries, opening regula r knobs on doors, driving a motor vehicle, secretaria l work, using small utensils such as a sc rewdriver or knife and fork without modification, holding coffee cups , sitting in a fixed position for longer than 30 minutes or standing for more than 45 minutes.

App. at 18 6. Ms. Helfter's deposition testimony is no more expansiv e concerning the limits her impairment places on her activities. App. at 38

- 40.

We do n ot believe that the District Court erred by discounting Ms

. Helfter's affidavit and deposition testimony due to its conclusory nature. We have described general statements in affidavits and deposition testimon y simi lar to Ms. Helfter's as conclusory and have determined that suc h stateme nts, standing alone, are insufficient to withstand a properly

supported motion for summary judgment. See, e.g
. , Berg v. Bruce , ___ F.3d

___, 1997 WL 194474 at ** 4-5 (8th Cir. Apr. 23, 1997); Herrero v. St
. Louis Univ. Hosp. , 109 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1997).

Ms. Helft er next argues that the medical evidence in the recor d creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether sh e is substantially limited in major life activities other than work. App. at 88-108. As noted above , Ms. H elfter cannot perform sustained, highly-repetitive activities wit h eithe r hand, or lift more than ten pounds frequently and twenty pound s
occas ionally. App. at 103. Although this evidence indicates that Ms

. Helfter's impairments limit work-related activit ies, we do not believe the
ev idence creates a genuine issue of material fact on whether th e impairments impose substantial limitations on her major life activitie s other than work. See, e.g. , Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc. , 85 F.3d 1311, 1319.

### - 6 - Ms. Helft er next argues that the District Court erred by concluding she had fai led to create a genuine issue of material fact as to th e limitations her impairments place on the major l ife activity of work. Ms. Helfter maintains tha t the medical evidence and her own testimony creates
an issue of fact as to whether she is substantially restricted from classe s of jobs that require the same level of skill and dexterity as her sorter job at UPS. Ms. Helfter's affidavit indicates t hat she has not looked for other wo rk, but states that she is familiar with a wide range of othe r jobs, which she knows she could not perform. App. at 186. Ms. Helfte r furthe r argues that she is not required to introduce independent , demographic evidence to survive summary judgment.

An impai rment is a disability only if it significantly restricts a perso n's ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs i n various classes as co mpared to the average person with comparable skills. Aucutt , 85 F.3d at 1319. The inability to perform a single, particular jo b does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Id. The fa ctors to be considered include: the number and type of job s from which the impaired individual is disqualified; th e geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; and the individual's job training, experience, and expectations. Probasco , 42 0 N.W.2d at 432; 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(j)(3)(ii).

The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a summary judgment for a n emp loyer in a federal disability discrimination case involvin g substantially similar facts in McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. Co. , 110 F.3d 36 9 (6th Cir. 1997). There, the plaintiff was diagnosed with carpal tunne l syndrome and was limited to lifting a maximum of twenty pounds, restricted from using vibrating tools, and could not perform repetitive motions with her right hand. Id. at 371. The Court held:

[A] t best, [plaintiff's] evidence supports a conclusio n that her impairment disqualifies her fr om only the narrow range of assembly line manufacturing jobs that requir e repetitive motion

### - 7 - or frequent lifting of more than ten pounds. It follows tha t her limited impairment would not significantl y restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes.

Id. at 373.

Simil arly, in Bolton v. Scrivener , 36 F.3d 939, 943-44 (10th Cir

. 1994), the Court affirmed a summary judgment for the employer despit e evidence that the plaintiff could not return to his former job as an order selector in a grocery warehouse due to permanent partial disability in his feet and restrictions on his ability to lift. The Court explained:

This evidence, however, does little to show tha t [plai ntiff] is restricted from performing a class o f job s. The evidence does not address [plaintiff's ] vocational training, the geographical area to which h e has ac cess, or the number and type of jobs demandin g similar training from which [plaintiff] would b e disqua lified. . . . Because [plaintiff] failed t o produce evidence showing a significant restriction in his abilit y to perform either a class of jobs or a broa d range of job s in various classes, we affirm the award of summary judgment to [defendant] on [plaintiff's] AD A claim.

Id. at 944 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Based on these authorities and our review of the record, we agre e with the District Cou rt that Ms. Helfter failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether her impairment rendered her unable to perform a clas s of jobs or a broad ra nge of jobs in various classes within a geographical area to which she has reasonable access. Instea d, we believe the evidence shows that Ms. Helfter is restricted only from performing jobs that requir e
a subs tantial amount of sustained repetitive motion and heavy lifting

. This is insufficient to render her disabled within the meaning of the ICRA

. Our concl usion on this issue makes it unnecessary for us to address th e alternative arguments advanced by the parties.

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C. Age Discrimination

Ms. H elfter next argues that the District Court erred by grantin g defendant summary jud gment on her age discrimination claim under the ICRA and the ADEA. The District Court determined tha t plaintiff's inability to perform t he job of sorter precluded her claim at the prima facie stage

. The Court further observed that plaintiff had pr oduced no evidence to show that defendant's reason for placing her on inactive status--her physical restrictions--was a pretext for discrimination.

The burde n-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Gre en applies to claims brought under both the ADEA and the ICRA

. Huts on v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 63 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1995) ; Kunzman v. Enron Corp. , 902 F. Supp. 882, 902 (N .D. Iowa 1995). Plaintiff ha s the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of ag e discrimination. Nitschke v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 68 F.3d 249, 251 (8t h Cir

. 1995). If plaintiff makes this showing, the burden shifts t o defend ant to produce evidence that plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. If the defendant discharges thi s burden , then plaintiff must prove that defendant's asserted reason i s merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.

To establ ish a prima facie case, Ms. Helfter must show that (1) she is a m ember of the protected class; (2) she meets the minimu m qualif ications for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employmen t action; and (4) the employer continued to attempt to fill the position wit h applic ants having similar qualifications. Hase v. Missouri Div. o f Employm ent Sec. , 972 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1992). Upon review of th e record, we agree with the District Court that Ms . Helfter failed to create
a genuine issue of fact as to whether she is qualified to perform he r previo us job as a sorter. The evidence reveals that Ms. Helfter wa s removed from that position because she was physically unable to perform th e job, and she cannot return to that job. Accordingly,

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the District Court correctly granted UPS summary judgment on Ms. Helfter's age discrimination claim.

D. Failure to Disclose Medical Information

Ms. Helft er alleged that UPS failed to disclose medical information to her which it had concerning her work-related injury. The District Cour t determined that this allegation does not state a claim for relief unde r Iowa law. On appeal, Ms. Helfter has failed to cite any authority t o support this claim. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's decision to dismiss this claim.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, we affirm the District Court' s judgment in favor of UPS.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT