FILED 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 JULY 21, 2003 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 02-15029

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 02-20424-CV-DLG

WILLIE R. FLINT, on behalf of himself

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ABB, INC., f.k.a. ABB Power,

T&D CO., INC., et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(July 21, 2003)
*

 Honorable John P. Fullam, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

2

Before BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and FULLAM*

, District

Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

This case presents two questions. The first is whether § 502(a)(1)(B) of the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §

1132(a)(1)(B), authorizes an ERISA plan beneficiary to receive interest on reinstated

benefits when the employee-benefit plan (the “Plan”) does not explicitly provide for

interest on reinstated benefits. The second question is whether plaintiff-appellant

Willie R. Flint has stated a claim under § 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §

1132(a)(3)(B), that would allow him to recover interest on reinstated benefits.

I. BACKGROUND

Flint is a former employee of defendant-appellee ABB, Inc. After an

automobile accident in March 1998, Flint applied for and received disability benefits

under ABB’s Plan. He had been receiving disability benefits for approximately three

years when ABB, through its claims processor, Kemper National Services

(“Kemper”), received information from Flint’s attending physician indicating that

Flint was no longer totally disabled. Under the terms of the Plan, ABB could stop
3

paying disability benefits if Flint either (1) was “no longer totally disabled” or (2)

failed to “give proof of [his] continued disability.”

Given the Plan’s provisions, ABB investigated whether to continue paying

Flint’s disability benefits. It requested an independent labor-market survey, which

concluded that “several appropriate positions were found” in which Flint could work.

Consequently, ABB informed Flint on June 19, 2001 that he was no longer “totally

disabled” within the meaning of the Plan and that his disability benefits would

terminate on July 1, 2001. June 19, 2001 was the first time that Kemper informed

Flint that his case was under review.

Flint wrote a letter dated July 2, 2001 to appeal the disability termination. On

August 31, 2001, ABB, through Kemper, denied Flint’s appeal. In October 2001,

Flint again appealed the termination of benefits and this time provided Kemper with

additional medical information. Flint also asked Kemper to give him a filing

extension so that he could have more time to furnish additional medical information

to support his claim for reinstatement. He asked for this extension because his doctor

was unable to see him within the appeals period. In November 2001, Kemper

acknowledged receiving the second appeal and granted Flint an extension in which to

provide additional medical information supporting his claim. Flint provided the

additional medical information, and shortly thereafter, Kemper reinstated Flint’s
4

benefits and made the reinstatement retroactive to July 1, 2001. Kemper issued a

check for these benefits on December 28, 2001. Flint has conceded that the appeals

process, which ultimately led to the reinstatement of his benefits, did not violate the

Plan, the ERISA statute, or any Department of Labor regulations.

Flint brought suit against ABB in February 2002, maintaining that he is entitled

to interest payments on the retroactive Plan benefits. Flint characterized these

retroactive benefits as “delayed benefits.” Flint conceded that “[t]he Plan documents

are silent regarding the payment of interest on Delayed Benefits”; nevertheless, he

claimed that § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA allow plaintiffs to recover

accrued interest on reinstated benefits, even when an employer’s plan is silent on the

issue.

ABB moved to dismiss Flint’s claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that Flint had not stated a claim upon which relief

could be granted. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Flint had not

alleged facts that would entitle him to relief under either § 501(a)(1)(B) or § 502(a)(3)

of ERISA. The court held that § 501(a)(1)(B) does not create an implied right to

recover accrued interest for reinstated payments, but instead allows recovery only for

“benefits specified in the plan.” It also held that § 502(a)(3)’s catch-all provision

concerning “appropriate equitable relief” might allow plaintiffs to recover accrued
5

interest for reinstated benefits—but only when benefits are unreasonably delayed or

wrongfully withheld. The court concluded that Flint had not pleaded facts

demonstrating that ABB had unreasonably delayed or wrongfully withheld his

benefits. Accordingly, it dismissed Flint’s claim without prejudice and allowed Flint

to amend his complaint, which he did; the district court concluded, however, that

Flint’s amended complaint had not alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle him to

relief under § 502(a)(3)(B)’s catch-all provision. Flint also requested a declaration

that he and other plan members had present and future rights to receive interest on

reinstated benefits, but the district court denied this relief as well.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim,

accepting all allegations in the complaint as true and construing facts in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Harper v. Thomas, 988 F.2d 101, 103 (11th Cir. 1993). A

court cannot use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint for

failure to state a claim “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Sheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45S46

(1957)). 
1

 Flint cites the Supreme Court’s opinion in Curtis v. Innerarity, 6 How. 146 (1848), which

states, “Every one who contracts to pay money on a certain day knows, that, if he fails to fulfil

his contract, he must pay the established rate of interest as damages for his non-performance. 

Hence, it may correctly be said, that such is the implied contract of the parties.” Id. at 154.

6

III. ANALYSIS

We must decide whether Flint has stated a claim under either § 502(a)(1)(B) or

§ 502(a)(3)(B) that entitles him to interest on his reinstated benefits.

A. Whether Interest for Reinstated Benefits Is an Implied Term of § 502(a)(1)(B)

Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA provides that a participant or beneficiary of an

employee-welfare benefit plan may bring a civil action

to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his

rights under the te rms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits

under the terms of the plan . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

Flint argues that accrued interest payments constitute “benefits due to him

under the terms of his plan” within the meaning of § 502(a)(1)(B), reasoning that

paying interest on reinstated benefits is an implied term of the Plan. The basis for this

argument is that (1) ERISA plans are contracts and (2) the default rule in contract law

is that a party is entitled to receive interest on unpaid obligations to pay money.1

According to this theory, ABB breached the contract by delaying the payment of

benefits and, consequently, should pay Flint interest to compensate him for the time
7

value of the reinstated benefits.

We are reluctant to infer an implied cause of action from § 502(a)(1)(B). The

Supreme Court has “observed repeatedly that ERISA is a ‘“comprehensive and

reticulated statute,” the product of a decade of congressional study of the Nation’s

private employee benefit system.’” Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,

534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251

(1993) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361

(1980))). The Court has “emphasized [its] unwillingness to infer causes of action in

the ERISA context, since that statute's carefully crafted and detailed enforcement

scheme provides ‘strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other

remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’” Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254

(quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–47 (1985)).

Furthermore, no circuit has recognized a claim for interest under § 502(a)(1)(B)

of ERISA. The only circuit to address the issue directly has ruled that if interest is not

a benefit expressly provided for in the employee-benefit plan, it cannot be recovered

under § 502(a)(1)(B), because “only benefits specified in the plan can be recovered

in a suit under section 502(a)(1)(B).” Clair v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 190 F.3d

495, 497 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.). Given the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to

allow implied causes of action under ERISA and the fact that, like the plan in Clair,
8

the Plan here does not provide for such interest, we follow Clair and conclude that

Flint’s claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) fails.

B. Whether Flint Has Stated a Claim Under § 502(a)(3)(B) that Would Allow Him

to Recover Interest on Reinstated Benefits

Flint argues that § 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA supplies another basis for recovering

accrued interest for reinstated benefits. Section 502(a)(3) provides that a civil action

may be brought

by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice

which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or

(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such

violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms

of the plan . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added).

Flint maintains that awarding accrued interest on reinstated benefits falls into the

category of “appropriate equitable relief.” ABB responds, correctly, that interest on

money past due under a contract is a classic form of compensatory damages and, as

such, does not qualify as “equitable relief” under § 502(a)(3)(B). See Knudson, 534

U.S. at 210 (explaining that suits for money damages are “the classic form of legal

relief” and, therefore, are not recoverable under § 502(a)(3)(B)).

Flint, however, proposes an alternative theory for the causative event that gives

rise to ABB’s alleged duty to pay for the time value of the “delayed benefits.” Flint
2

 An unjust enrichment occurs when the defendant holds something that belongs to the plaintiff

or receives, without legal cause, a transfer of goods or services from the plaintiff. The law of

unjust enrichment is concerned solely with enrichments that are unjust independently of wrongs

and contracts. When the plaintiff relies on a breach of contract to supply the “unjustness” of the

defendant’s holdings, the right on which he or she relies arises from the breach of contract, not

from an unjust enrichment; analogously, when the plaintiff relies on a wrong to supply the

“unjust factor,” the causative event is a wrongful enrichment rather than an unjust enrichment. 

See Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 Texas L. Rev. 1767, 1783

(2001).

9

argues that ABB violated its fiduciary duties to him when it initially terminated his

benefits and that ABB should therefore disgorge the benefit derived from this breach.

Under this theory, the case is one of wrongful enrichment—the wrong being the

breach of a fiduciary duty and the enrichment being the time value of the money that

ABB should have paid to Flint between July 1 and December 28, 2001. Because

courts of equity traditionally ordered fiduciaries to disgorge wrongful enrichments,

Flint maintains that the relief he seeks is “appropriate equitable relief” under

§ 502(a)(3)(B).

Several circuit courts of appeals—speaking in terms of a fiduciary’s “unjust

enrichment” (rather than its “wrongful enrichment”2

)—have held that interest

payments on delayed benefits may, in some circumstances, constitute “other equitable

relief” within the meaning of § 502(a)(3)(B). See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins.

Co., 277 F.3d 223, 229–30 (2d Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 245

F.3d 748, 749–50 (8th Cir. 2001); Clair, 190 F.3d at 498–99; Fotta v. Trustees of the

United Mine Workers of Am., 165 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1998). Most of these cases,
10

however, were decided before Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,

534 U.S. 204 (2002), in which the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “appropriate

equitable relief” was more narrow than the interpretations found in previous decisions

by the circuit courts of appeals. The Court instructed that, in determining whether

relief “is legal or equitable in a particular case (and hence whether it is authorized by

§ 502(a)(3)) remains dependent on the nature of the relief sought,” and the Court

resisted plaintiffs’ attempt to characterize their claim for enforcement of a

reimbursement provision of an ERISA plan as one for equitable restitution. Id. The

Court’s decision in Knudson, therefore, raises the question whether § 502(a)(3) ever

allows an award of interest for delayed benefits or whether such a claim is an

impermissible attempt to dress an essentially legal claim in the language of equity.

We need not, however, decide that issue in this case. Even assuming that

§ 502(a)(3)(B) could be the basis for recovering interest, Flint’s amended complaint

does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Flint maintains that ABB

breached its fiduciary duty by terminating his benefits without first requesting or

allowing him a reasonable opportunity to provide evidence of continued disability

before making the determination to discontinue benefits. Three circumstances

described in the pleadings, however, lead us to reject Flint’s argument. First, the Plan

provided that ABB could stop paying disability benefits when Flint was “no longer
3

 Flint’s best argument to the contrary is that once ABB sent the June 19th notice, it voluntarily

assumed the obligation to give Flint a reasonable time period in which to provide additional

medical information. Yet, as the district court noted, neither the Plan nor ERISA regulations

impose an advanced-warning requirement, and, given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to find

implied duties under ERISA, we decline to infer such an implied duty here.

11

disabled,” and, here, Flint’s own doctor had advised ABB that Flint was no longer

completely disabled. Furthermore, an independent report recommended several jobs

that Flint could perform within the limitations prescribed by Flint’s doctor. Second,

the Plan specifies that “[i]n no case will benefits be paid by this Plan . . . for any

period on or after the date [the employee] fail[s] to furnish satisfactory proof [of

disability] as required by the insurance company . . . .” Therefore, the Plan entitled

ABB to terminate benefits when Flint failed to provide proof of his continuing

disability by July 1, 2001.3

 Furthermore, given that ERISA employers owe a fiduciary

duty to all of their covered employees, ABB had a duty to protect and preserve benefit

funds according to the provisions of the Plans and the ERISA statute. Finally, Flint

has not pleaded facts that would show that ABB unduly delayed the ERISA appeals

process or wrongfully refused to reinstate his benefits retroactively at the end of the

process. Cf. Clair, 190 F.3d at 499 (holding that plaintiff was barred from collecting

accrued interest when employer disbursed benefits according to the procedure and the

time period outlined in the employee-benefit plan). To the contrary, Flint’s own

allegations make clear that the appeals process functioned according to Plan
12

provisions and ERISA regulations—and that this process led to the retroactive

reinstatement of benefits within six months of the initial adverse decision.

Accordingly, Flint has not stated a claim under § 503(a)(3)(B).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.