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# 									Online Press Briefing with Gabriel Escobar, Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS), Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs							

Special Briefing

Gabriel Escobar, Deputy Assistant SecretaryBureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

March 12, 2024

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**MODERATOR:**  Good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussels Media Hub.  I would like to welcome everyone joining us for today’s virtual press briefing.  We are very honored to be joined once again by Gabriel Escobar, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.

Finally, a quick reminder that today’s briefing is on the record.  And with that, we’ll get started.  I’ll turn it over to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for his opening remarks.

**MR ESCOBAR:** Thank you, John; I appreciate it.  And thank you to everybody for joining us.  I want to apologize in advance – I have a little bit of a cold, so if you hear me coughing, I apologize in advance.

The – I am happy to be in Brussels again.  I am – this is the start of a fairly lengthy trip.  I arrived in Brussels on Sunday and met with my counterparts from the European Union and in NATO.  I had some very intense discussions, very in-depth discussions with my counterpart, the EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák.  We will – my team and I will travel from here to Pristina, where we will focus on the effects and a possible resolution for the uncoordinated decision to ban dinars and transfers from Serbia to citizens of Kosovo who depend on those social services, those social payments.

In – we will depart Pristina, go to Vienna where we will have conversations with OSCE and ODIHR, hopefully, and then we will go to Montenegro where we will show our support for the current government and their – the path that the government has firmly set Montenegro on, on NATO membership and EU candidacy, and all of the efforts that they’ve made in advancing both of those.

Afterwards, we’ll return to Washington, and we hope to have in Washington next week an in-person Quint discussion on all of these issues and more issues on the Western Balkans.

So with that, I think we can start with the questions.  Back to you, John.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you, sir.  First question, let’s go ahead and start with Arbër Vllahiu from RTV21 in Kosovo, who asks:  “Is the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia at a critical stage of stagnation, taking into account that there are no steps forward in the implementation of the Brussels and Ohrid agreement?”

**MR ESCOBAR:** Well, I will say yes, we’re at a very critical moment.  And I have to say that we are struggling to get both Brussels and Ohrid back on track.  And we have to say that – I have to say that from the American perspective, there is no other alternative than the EU-facilitated dialogue.  The dialogue has been the mechanism that’s resolved many of the challenges in the bilateral relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, and it continues to be the primary mechanism for resolving these differences.

I urge both parties to respect the agreements that have already been reached; to implement all the agreements, particularly the ones outlined under Ohrid; and to show goodwill in preventing any provocations that would derail the – any of the agreements and create more tension between the two countries.

So that is going to be one of the primary reasons for my visit to Kosovo.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to a live question now.  Tatiana, who says that she’s from north Mitrovica.  Tatiana, please go ahead.

**QUESTION:**  Thank you for the opportunity, Mr. Escobar.  The U.S. has been expressing strong concern about the unilateral moves of the government in Pristina for about the same amount of time.  Will you take any other measures that would improve the situation on the ground?  And coming from the north of Mitrovica, I have shared the real consequence and misery of the (inaudible) service in Kosovo – it’s slowly surpassing the level of sincere and strong concern expressed by international partners towards Kosovo, and there is no family now on which this latest regulation does not leave consequences.

I have my own example from yesterday – was pretty stressful with my parents in Raška, with my father losing his conscious, collaborating, and I don’t know, the whole family had to leave the job and had to travel to Raška.  And there were good examples that police officers at the gate were so helpful, helping us to pass all the long many-kilometer convoy to go and rescue the father, and he was transported to another city and to another state.  Thank you very much.

**MR ESCOBAR:** Yeah.  Well, look, on the implementation of the central bank decision, we are hearing many reports of difficulties and hardship that the citizens of Kosovo who depend on social payments from Serbia are experiencing.  And we do call on the Government of Kosovo to take the concerns of the international community about the treatment of minorities inside of Kosovo – to take those concerns seriously.

There are five reasons why we are concerned about this decision.  One is the speed in which it was implemented, and we’re not – we are not discussing the legitimacy of the decision.  We’re discussing the implementation of the decision.  Now, I’ll remind you that it took France almost a year to implement the euro, and in northern Kosovo, they wanted to implement it in less than three weeks.  The second is that the government provided no alternative, no government alternative, for the people to receive them, to receive their payments.  And these people depend on the payments and they should receive them; they’re entitled to them.  The third is that there was no outreach to the affected communities.  And so a lot of the people who were affected by this decision were left guessing as to what the next step was.

Finally, the – two weeks before the announcement of this decision, Kosovo, along with the other countries of the Western Balkans, had agreed in Skopje, during a summit of the Western Balkans countries and the European Union, that there would be a payment mechanism by the end of this year.  So in other words, if Kosovo would have waited, the payment mechanism for transparent electronic payments would have been solved.  And lastly, the fifth reason is the – we have been struggling to allow – to get Kosovo to allow the international community to help find – provide some technical assistance to find a resolution for this issue.

So we need the Government of Kosovo to work with the international community to help find a solution to this, what I would say was a disastrous decision and even incompetent decision of implementation of a decision that has created chaos in the economy of Kosovo.

**MODERATOR:**Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to one more live question.  Xhezair Dashi – Xhezair, please, go ahead.

**QUESTION:**Thank you.  Do you hear me?

**MR ESCOBAR:**Yes.

**QUESTION:**Well, the U.S. has a great many times expressed dissatisfaction with the Kosovo’s Government course of action.  This course of action has not changed an inch, despite the vocal dissatisfaction expressed by even high officials such as Jim O’Brien.  The Department of State has said that this course actions – this course of action limits the possibilities of the U.S. to serve as an advocate for Kosovo in the international arena.  My question is:  Do you reckon it to be possible for Kosovo to become a member of NATO and Council of Europe if the current approach by the Kurti government continues uninterrupted?

**MR ESCOBAR:**Well, quite honestly, I – part of the reason that Ambassador Hovenier has highlighted the fact that it’s made – been difficult for us to advocate for Kosovo in the international arena is that the road to the European Union and the road to NATO runs through five non-recognizers in the EU and four in NATO.  Now, all of those countries, before they move forward, they would like to see movement on all of the issues that are encompassed in the EU-facilitated dialogue.  So by ignoring the dialogue, Kosovo is ignoring their European partners, so it is impossible for us to convince them to move forward on further integration for Kosovo.  So yes, I’m very concerned that Kosovo is not hearing the American offer of partnership to move Kosovo’s integration further and faster.

**MODERATOR:**Thank you, sir.  I’ll go to a submitted question now from Jovana Djurisic from *Pobjeda* daily in Montenegro.  Jovana asks:  “Have your views on the entry of the leader of the former Democratic Front into the Government of Montenegro changed?  And do you expect that, according to the announced reconstruction, that the Democratic Front will really be part of the – of executive power?”

**MR ESCOBAR:**Well, the decision on the coalition and bringing the party into the coalition is not a decision for the United States.  What we have said – and we’ve said it both privately and publicly – is that we worry that this party is not a true partner in all of the things that we hope for Montenegro.  Montenegro is firmly on a path to Euro-Atlantic integration.  They are the frontrunner in the European – the European Union candidacy process.  They are a very solid member of NATO.

Now, this party has said that they would call into question Montenegro’s NATO membership.  They would – they have stalled their – in the past, they have stalled movement on the reform packages that are required for European Union membership.  They have said that they would de-recognize Kosovo, which would create further tension in the region.  And so, I – and they haven’t changed.  In fact, in many of the actions by the speaker of the parliament, we haven’t seen a commitment to Euro-Atlantic values.  So we are concerned about the possibility of a partner that does not share the same values as the rest of the coalition coming into the government.

**MODERATOR:**Thank you.  We’ll go back to a live question.  Leart Hoxha, please, go ahead.

**QUESTION:**Yes, can you hear me?

**MR ESCOBAR****:**Yes.

**QUESTION:**So is there time or is there talk to reconsider the role of EU and the U.S. in Pristina-Belgrade dialogue and having them make a transition from being facilitators to some sort of maybe arbitrators, if we clearly see that none of the parties is willing and committed to implementing Brussels and Ohrid agreement?

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Look, I won’t speak on behalf of the European Union.  From the United States perspective, there is no alternative to the EU-facilitated dialogue.  The countries are in Europe.  Their aspirations for both of them is to be members of the European Union.  And ultimately – for Kosovo, at least – what is most important is that they get more recognitions from the – from European states.  So the dialogue is very important to Kosovo, whether they accept it or not, and we stand firmly behind that effort.

But in terms of the negotiating strategy, whether it goes from facilitation to arbitration to negotiation, I think that is – has been a very important part of this strategy, that there are times when the European Union has presented options directly to the two parties, including the basic agreement, and a draft statute of the Association for Serb Municipalities.  So I do think that the European Union has given many options for this dialogue to be successful for both countries.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to another live question.  This time Ivan Mirchevski.  Ivan, please go ahead.  Ivan, can you hear us?

**QUESTION:**  Can you hear me?

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Yes.

**QUESTION:**  Okay.  Thank you.  Mr. Escobar, I would like to ask you something regarding the latest U.S. Senate resolution that means that —

**MR ESCOBAR:**  I’m sorry, what?

**QUESTION:**  Resolution from the U.S. Senate.

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Yeah.

**QUESTION:**  That was opening the first cluster of the EU target of Macedonia.  That doesn’t mean that U.S. foreign policy has started to change something regarding the Bulgaria policy toward Macedonia, because you know you – I believe you already know that almost 80 percent of the Macedonia citizens —

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Ivan, I’m sorry.  We lost you for a bit, and I didn’t hear your question.

**QUESTION:**  Can you hear me now?

**MR ESCOBAR:**  I can.

**QUESTION:**  Okay.  I’m speaking about the resolution of the U.S. Senate, meaning that U.S. Senate resoluted that Macedonia should start immediately to open first cluster of the negotiation with the EU.  And my question is regarding the foreign policy of the United States toward the Bulgaria foreign policy.  Does that means that USA will start to push a bit more Bulgaria in order to change their attitudes and their requests to unconditionally – Macedonia unconditionally (inaudible) contribution, especially to change the preamble of the – our constitution?

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Well, look, I am – I want to start by saying that both North Macedonia and Bulgaria are valued NATO members and Allies, and so we want a peaceful resolution of any issues.  But we encourage dialogue between North Macedonia and Bulgaria to be – remain based in fact and rooted in the commitment that North Macedonia continues to have an EU perspective.  And I believe that we have assurances from Bulgaria that they do want North Macedonia to be a member of the European Union.  So we want to take advantage of those opportunities, because North Macedonia should be a full candidate and an immediate candidate for European Union membership.

**MODERATOR:**  Going to the next live question, dialing in RTK, which is I assume the outlet.  RTK, could you please identify yourself and go ahead.  RTK, can you hear us?  Go ahead, RTK.   Nope.  Let’s go to Linda then.  Linda, can you please identify yourself and your outlet, and then the mike is yours.  Linda, can you hear us?

Okay.  Let’s go to another submitted question, and then we’ll go back to Linda and RTK.  Marco Sostero from Kyodo News in Austria asks:  “How did the U.S. policy towards Serbia and Kosovo change since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022?  Is there a stronger rapprochement with Serbia to push back Russian influence in the country?”

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Well, I’ll say that our policy for the region has not changed, but the urgency with which we have to address challenges to European stability on – within the European continent have changed.  So it’s far more urgent that we start to resolve some of the open questions in the Western Balkans.  Now, that has always included opening a path for Serbia to be greater – more integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures.  But in doing so, we want to make sure that we don’t sacrifice our other alliances and our other partnerships in the region, and Kosovo is one of them.  Kosovo is a very important partner.

So we would like both Serbia and Kosovo to be productive members of the Euro-Atlantic community and to have a peaceful and predictable relationship between the two of them.  The path to that, as I said before, is the EU-facilitated dialogue.

**MODERATOR:**  Thanks.  We’ll try to go to a live question again, Augustin Palokaj.  Augustin, please go ahead.  Augustin, can you hear us?  We are striking out.

Let’s try to go to Koha.*  Koha*, please, go ahead.  Koha*, you’re still muted.  Can you hear us?

**QUESTION:**  Yes.  Yes, I can hear now.

**MODERATOR:**  Great, thank you.

**QUESTION:**  Thank you.  Thank you very much.  My question would be:  Which are going to be the consequences for Kosovo and for Serbia if they don’t implement the agreement for which all agreed in Brussels and in Ohrid?  So are there any consequences?  Because we have seen the complaints from Kosovo Government that European Union is still holding some sanctions, even they have fulfilled some steps regarding the situation in the north of Kosovo.  According U.S., does Kosovo Government fulfill all the – let’s say all the steps during now?

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Well, look, I will say that the primary responsibility for Kosovo at this point is to begin moving on their legally binding obligation to form the (inaudible).  There has been no movement on that.  So I’m not sure which steps you’re talking about with regard to the dialogue, but we’re still waiting for that.  Now, there has been some steps in allowing a constitutionally – a constitutional right for residents of the Serb majority municipalities to do a recall vote, but that is a constitutional right.

So we are still waiting for both sides to do more on the dialogue.  For Serbia, we want – what we’d like to see is that the moves that they have made in support of the dialogue to become legally binding so that they are legally enacted and not reversible.  So the – we would like to see more from both sides, and because the Ohrid Agreement is guaranteed by the European Union, the consequences of not moving forward on either Ohrid or Brussels dialogues is a slower integration of both countries into the European Union.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you.  Let’s go to Marko Subotic.  Marko, please, go ahead.  Marko, can you hear us?

We will go back to Linda to see if we can engage with her.  Linda, can you hear us?

**QUESTION:**  Yeah, I think now.  Can you hear me?

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, yes.  Please, go ahead.

**QUESTION:**  Thank God.  Okay.  Mr. Escobar, my question is actually about Kosovo Government and your relations with them, because it looks like – as you have said and the U.S. Government has made it clear, you have a real challenge and problem and difficulty in dealing with Kosovo Government and Prime Minister Kurti.  At what stage are we now?  So do you see and do you consider the Prime Minister Kurti and Kosovo Government as a partner or is sort of stuck into something in the middle?  Just for us to understand.

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Well, look, I’ll – I will reiterate what I’ve always said.  The partnership between the United States and Kosovo is between the people of the United States and the people of Kosovo.  It doesn’t run through one man or one party.  But I would say that currently we do have a problem of communication with the prime minister, and it’s not just the United States, so it’s not a problem that the United States has.  I think it’s a problem that Kosovo has in its communication with the European Union, with NATO, with the UK, with the United States, and with many other partners, including Albania and North Macedonia.  So we want – we’ve had – enjoyed a very, very close partnership with Kosovo in the past.  We would very much like to have that relationship back to the way it was before.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you, sir.  We have one more live question.  Ivan Kuzmanovski from Sitel TV.  Ivan, please, go ahead.

**QUESTION:**  Hello.  Can you hear me?

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Yes.

**QUESTION:**  Mr. Escobar, can you tell us why did you decided not to visit Macedonia in this tour around Europe?  And what is your message to the Macedonian political leaders before the elections in the country?

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Yeah.  Well, for two reasons.  One, the situation in Kosovo is dire, so I need to visit Kosovo.  But on the other side, I – Montenegro1 is facing a very, very important election, one that’s going to be very critical to their future, and I didn’t want anyone to think that the United States was interfering in the electoral campaign that’s going on right now.

What is happening in North Macedonia right now – I would say that North Macedonia has been a very solid partner, both bilaterally and in multilateral fora such as NATO and the OSCE.  The previous government has been committed to their NATO membership, committed to European candidacy, and our expectations is that whatever government follows from the elections will similarly be committed to their NATO membership, committed to European Union candidacy, and committed to the fight against corruption.  So I hope that after the elections there’ll be opportunities to visit North Macedonia.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you.  We’ll go to another submitted question, from Lisa O’Carroll from *The Guardian*.  “What are your concerns regarding Putin’s use of Serbia to use the pro-Russia sentiment in the leadership to destabilize Europe?  For instance, Vucic said that the former head of Serbia’s Security and Information Agency, Aleksandar Vulin, was not a Russian agent and always worked for Serbia, but the US sanctioned him.”

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Yeah.  Look, I do – I have to clarify that what’s happening in the Balkans, while it opens the door for Russian malign influence, it is not always caused by Russia.  The problems that are occurring in the Balkans right now are deep-seated, longstanding problems that exist between the countries of the region.  So in resolving many of these issues, we hope that we would close off the opportunities for Russia to use the – any instability in the Balkans as a way of weakening transatlantic security.

So we are very focused on the issues as they are and the issues with regard to the Balkans and not as a sideshow for what’s happening in other parts of the – of Europe, including the war in Ukraine.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you.  I think we have time for one last question.  Let’s go back to – Xhezair Dashi I think has a follow-up question.  Xhezair, is that accurate?

**QUESTION:**  Yes.  I want to ask Mr. Escobar about – Miroslav Lajcak, speaking earlier, said that the whole implementation process is blocked because the Kosovo Government does not adopt a decree to send the draft statute of the ASM for constitutional review.  What does the Kosovo Government tell you about this refusal to send it for constitutional review?  And do you take this to mean as they have not accepted the draft as it is?

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Well, they have never given us a full answer as to whether they accept it as it is, and we find it hard to understand why they wouldn’t submit it for constitutional review.  So we’d still encourage Kosovo to move forward.  And I want to reiterate the association would not be another Republika Srpska.  It would not be a state within a state.  There is nothing in the statute that allows for executive authorities, executive powers, or anything that could create constitutional or functionality issues for Kosovo.

It is simply the opportunity for municipalities, Serb-majority municipalities, to coordinate the delivery of municipal services in Serbian language for citizens of Kosovo.  That’s it.  And it is a legally binding obligation.  So we have heard many different reasons why it hasn’t been submitted or why it hasn’t moved forward, but we reject all of them.  It should move forward, and it should move forward as soon as possible.

In fact, we believe that the whole question of the dinar issue right now would be resolved through the association.  The association, as recommended by the European Union, by the EU special representative, includes provisions for the transparent transfer of money from Serbia to those who are entitled to it in Kosovo through a transparent mechanism under the Kosovo law and within the constitutional framework of Kosovo.  So the association itself would solve the dinar issue, and so we want Kosovo to move forward as soon as possible.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you, Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar.  I think that’s all the time that we have today.  Thanks so much for joining us.  We appreciate your time.

**MR ESCOBAR:**  Thank you very much.  And thank you to everybody for joining.

**MODERATOR:**  Shortly we’ll send the audio recording of the briefing to all the participating journalists and provide a transcript as soon as it is available.  We’d love to hear your feedback; you can always reach us at thebrusselshub@state.gov.  Thanks again for everybody’s participation, and we hope you can join us again in the future for another press briefing.  This ends today’s session.

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[1] North Macedonia. [back to 1]

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