UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4242

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAVANT V. WASHINGTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

District Judge. (3:09-cr-00235-FDW-1)

Submitted: September 20, 2012 Decided: November 5, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Matthew Collin Joseph, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Richard Lee Edwards, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lavant V. Washington appeals the district court’s 

revocation of his supervised release.* On appeal, Washington 

argues that the Government did not prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that he violated the conditions of his release, and 

that the district court erred in revoking his supervised 

release. Although we affirm the revocation of supervised 

release, we remand for the purpose of correcting a clerical 

error in the judgment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.

We review a district court’s judgment revoking 

supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th 

Cir. 1999). To revoke supervised release, a district court need 

only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006). 

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. 

United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). A 

 * The judgment erroneously states that Washington was found 

guilty of all three violations. However, the record reveals 

that at the revocation hearing, the district court found in 

Washington’s favor with respect to the third violation. Because 

the judgment does not accurately recite the disposition of this 

case, we remand to the district court for correction of the 

written judgment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.
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factual finding is clearly erroneous if this court “on the 

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Harvey, 

532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). If the district court’s account of the evidence is 

“plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” this 

court will not reverse the district court’s finding even if it 

“would have decided the fact differently.” United States v. 

Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

We conclude that the district court did not clearly 

err in finding that Washington violated the terms and conditions 

of his supervised release when he failed to attend a scheduled

mental health session and when he failed to return telephone 

calls from his probation officer as instructed. We further 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

revoking Washington’s supervised release based upon these 

violations. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We remand to the district court with instructions for the court 

to correct the judgment to conform to its oral findings. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 36. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED