United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 2008 Decided February 22, 2008 

No. 06-3045 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

DALE ANN HARRIS, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 04cr00384-01) 

 Howard B. Katzoff, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for appellant. 

 Sarah T. Chasson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the briefs were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Wendy L. 

Short, and Bryan Seeley, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 
2 

Before: TATEL, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Dale Ann Harris argues: (1) 

there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction for 

possession with intent to distribute PCP; (2) the police 

violated her Fifth Amendment rights by subjecting her to 

custodial interrogation without a Miranda advisement; and 

(3) the district court violated her due process rights by asking 

compound questions during jury selection. We reject these 

challenges and affirm her conviction. 

I 

Officers from the Metropolitan Police Department 

executed a search warrant on Harris’s apartment, where she 

lived with her two children. When the police entered, they 

handcuffed Harris and the other two women inside. Officer 

Robert S. Cephas then directed the handcuffed Harris to a 

hallway area, and without informing her of her Miranda 

rights, asked, “is there anything in the apartment that I should 

know about?” Harris responded there were two guns in the 

bedroom and the police recovered the guns. In the 

meanwhile, other officers searched the kitchen and seized 

jars, vials, tin foil, and spoons, which contained suspect liquid 

or vegetable matter or smelled like phencyclidine (“PCP”). 

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s forensic lab tested 

the seized items and found that one jar and three vials 

contained a total of 34 grams of PCP, a large amount 

consistent with distribution. A fingerprint specialist also 

found Harris’s latent print on one of the vials containing PCP. 
3 

A federal grand jury indicted Harris for: (I) possession of 

PCP with intent to distribute; (II) possession with intent to 

distribute within 1,000 feet of a school; and (III) possession 

of a firearm in relation to drug trafficking. The district court 

denied Harris’s motion to suppress her statements about the 

guns, holding she was not “in custody.” During the voir dire, 

the district court asked potential jurors several compound 

questions requiring them to decide for themselves whether 

factors like law enforcement employment histories 

undermined their objectivity. At the close of the 

government’s case-in-chief, the district court granted Harris’s 

motion for acquittal on the gun charge. The jury then found 

Harris guilty on Counts I and II and the district court 

sentenced her to 33 months in prison on Count II.1

 Harris 

now appeals. 

II 

Harris argues the government did not present sufficient 

evidence to support her conviction because it did not prove 

she “possessed” the PCP found in her kitchen. In considering 

sufficiency-of-evidence challenges, we view the “evidence in 

the light most favorable to the government, and affirm a 

guilty verdict where any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (emphasis in original). We conclude the government 

presented more than enough evidence to satisfy this 

permissive standard. 

The government had the burden of proving Harris either 

actually or constructively possessed PCP. To demonstrate 

constructive possession, it had to show she “had the ability to 

 

1

 The district court properly dismissed Count I as a lesser-included 

offense. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 307 (1996).
4 

exercise knowing dominion and control over the [PCP].” See 

United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Harris argues that even 

though the police found PCP in her kitchen, the government 

presented no evidence she exercised “knowing dominion or 

control” over this contraband. Yet, “[a] jury is entitled to 

infer that a person exercises constructive possession over 

items found in his home,” and this inference applies “even 

when that person shares the premises with others.” Id. at 620;

see also United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1179 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991) (“The natural inference is that those who live in a 

house know what is going on inside, particularly in the 

common areas.”). Thus, “if there was sufficient evidence 

from which a juror could infer that [Harris] lived in the 

apartment where [s]he was arrested, the jury could infer that 

[s]he constructively possessed the drugs.” Morris, 977 F.2d 

at 620. In this case, only Harris and her two children were 

listed on the apartment’s lease and she does not dispute she 

lived there. 

Harris argues the government has to present some 

evidence of “knowing dominion and control” in jointoccupancy situations where drugs and related accoutrements 

are completely hidden from view. We agree, since a contrary 

view could unfairly sweep up unwitting roommates or 

housemates and subject them to the harsh criminal 

punishments associated with drug crimes. See United States 

v. James, 764 F.2d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting United 

States v. Bonham, 477 F.2d 1137, 1139 (3d Cir. 1973) (en 

banc) (finding evidence insufficient where there was “nothing 

except the joint occupancy of the room upon which an 

inference of possession could be based”)). But this is not a 

hidden contraband case. Harris’s fingerprint was on a vial 

with PCP in it and the police found PCP in four containers, at 

least two of which were readily visible upon opening the 
5 

freezer or kitchen cabinet. Moreover, the kitchen was littered 

with evidence that police experts testified was consistent with 

PCP distribution: from jars smelling of PCP to tinfoil 

containing a black leafy substance. See Jenkins, 928 F.2d at 

1179 (finding sufficient evidence of constructive possession 

where there was a computerized scale on the kitchen counter 

and cocaine pieces on the cutting board in defendant’s 

apartment). Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence that 

Harris constructively possessed the PCP.2

III 

Harris argues we should vacate her conviction because 

Officer Cephas violated her Fifth Amendment rights under 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by placing her in 

handcuffs, leading her to the hallway, and immediately asking 

her “is there anything in the apartment that I should know 

about?” As every television viewer knows, an officer 

ordinarily may not interrogate a suspect who is in custody 

without informing her of her Miranda rights. See id. 

Whether Cephas subjected Harris to custodial interrogation is 

a question we do not reach today. Compare United States v. 

Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1982) (suspect 

handcuffed during a Terry stop and then asked questions was 

not “in custody” for Miranda purposes), with United States v. 

Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] reasonable 

 2

 The government argues it also presented sufficient evidence 

that Harris actually possessed PCP. See United States v. Molinaro, 

877 F.2d 1341, 1348–49 (7th Cir. 1989) (defendant’s fingerprints 

on a bag containing cocaine “certainly suggests” he actually 

possessed the bag). We need not reach this argument because our 

finding that Harris constructively possessed the PCP is sufficient to 

sustain her conviction. 
6 

person finding himself placed in handcuffs by the police 

would ordinarily conclude [he was] in custody.”). 

Even assuming Cephas violated Harris’s Fifth 

Amendment rights, the district court’s admission of Harris’s 

answer pinpointing the location of the guns was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. “Error is harmless if it appears 

‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did 

not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” United States v. 

Green, 254 F.3d 167, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Chapman 

v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also Neder v. 

United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999). While the jury could 

have drawn some incriminating inference from Harris’s 

knowledge about the guns, see United States v. Payne, 805 

F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“it has uniformly been 

recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess 

firearms”), here, the link between the drugs and guns was so 

attenuated the district court dismissed the charge of 

possessing a firearm in connection with drug trafficking. 

Tellingly, once the district court dismissed this charge, the 

government made only one glancing reference to Harris’s 

knowledge of the guns in its closing argument. Instead, it 

focused on the strong evidence of Harris’s connection to the 

drugs: from Harris being the only adult responsible for the 

lease to her fingerprint appearing on the vial containing PCP 

to conspicuous evidence of drug dealing in plain view in the 

kitchen. In light of this strong evidence and the minor role 

the guns played in relation to the drug counts, the government 

has shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that introduction of 

Harris’s statement did not contribute to the verdict. 

IV 

As part of the voir dire, the district court asked 

prospective jurors the same compound questions we found 
7 

troubling in United States v. West, 458 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 

2006), and United States v. Littlejohn, 489 F.3d 1335 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007). As in those cases, the district court explained to 

the jurors that, first, the court would ask them to consider 

whether they had a characteristic or experience that could bias 

their judgment. The jurors were not to raise their hands at 

this point. Then, the court would ask if the potentially 

prejudicial factor actually rendered them unable to be fair and 

impartial. Only if they answered affirmatively to this second 

question would they raise their hands and come up to the 

bench. 

The district court asked several compound questions, 

including whether potential jurors were members of crime 

prevention groups or had been the victims of violent crimes. 

Most relevant for our purposes, the court asked the following 

two-part question: 

[Are] you personally, a close family member or a 

close personal friend presently or previously 

employed by any law enforcement agency? Don’t 

raise your hand if your answer is yes. ... If your 

answer is yes. As a result of that experience that 

either you have had personally or a close family 

member or close friend ... do you believe that you, 

you personally would be unable to be fair and 

impartial to both sides if selected as a juror ... ? 

None of the jurors raised their hands and the district court 

overruled Harris’s objection to this method of questioning. 

The district court also asked several one-part questions, 

directly asking jurors to raise their hands if they knew any 

potential witnesses or believed they could not hold the 

government to its burden of proof. 
8 

“[W]hether a juror can render a verdict based solely on 

evidence adduced in the courtroom should not be adjudged on 

that juror’s own assessment of self-righteousness without 

something more.” West, 458 F.3d at 11. Accordingly, 

compound questions can violate a defendant’s Sixth 

Amendment rights by undermining his ability to have a “full 

and fair opportunity to expose bias or prejudice on the part of 

the veniremen.” Littlejohn, 489 F.3d at 1342. We vacate a 

jury’s verdict in response to a district court’s use of 

compound questions only if the district court “abuses its 

discretion, and there is substantial prejudice to the accused.” 

Id. In West and Littlejohn, this circuit conducted casespecific analyses for virtually identical compound lawenforcement questions. 

West held the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

asking the compound law enforcement question. In that case, 

an officer caught the defendant carrying a bag with a gun 

inside. West explained there was no abuse of discretion 

because officer credibility was not at issue since the 

defendant admitted he was carrying the bag and his only 

defense was he did not intend to possess the gun. In addition, 

the defendant already had the current employment 

information for most potential jurors and never asked for past 

employers. Finally, some of the traditional one-part questions 

the district court asked provided the defendant additional 

opportunities to learn about juror prejudice. See 458 F.3d at 

7–8. West also held there was no substantial prejudice 

because the district court instructed the jury to give no special 

weight to the testimony of law enforcement officers, the 

defendant made no showing of actual juror prejudice, and the 

evidence against the defendant was overwhelming because 

the police caught him red-handed. See id. at 8–9. 
9 

Littlejohn presents a strong contrast to West. There, the 

police found a gun in a laundry basket in the defendant’s 

mother’s home. The police claimed that when they broke into 

the house, the defendant darted out of the room containing the 

gun; but the officer’s testimony was somewhat inconsistent 

and the defendant’s mother claimed the room and laundry 

basket belonged to the defendant’s brother. 489 F.3d at 

1337–38. Accordingly, this circuit held the district court 

abused its discretion in asking the compound law enforcement 

question and this was substantially prejudicial to the 

defendant. Littlejohn stressed the officer’s credibility was 

paramount, since the government’s case turned on whether 

the jury believed his account that the defendant was running 

out of the room. Moreover, the evidence against the 

defendant was extremely thin since the police did not see him 

with the gun and the defendant’s mother testified the room 

and laundry basket belonged to his brother. In addition, there 

was no evidence the defendant received a list of potential 

jurors’ current employers, and he asked about past 

employment history, including employment history related to 

the officers’ employer. Finally, Littlejohn came to this 

conclusion despite both the district court’s use of one-part 

questions that could have exposed juror prejudice and the 

defendant’s failure to show actual juror bias. Id. at 1344–47. 

This case is far more like West than Littlejohn on the 

overlapping abuse of discretion and substantial prejudice 

inquiries. Most importantly, the evidence of Harris’s guilt 

was strong and the verdict did not turn on police credibility. 

Harris was the lessee of the apartment, the kitchen was 

littered with PCP and drug paraphernalia, and her fingerprint 

was on a vial containing PCP. Harris argues officer 

credibility was at issue because she challenged the way the 

police handled the evidence and because the police testified 

that items in the kitchen smelled of PCP, even though some of 
10 

them tested negative for the drug. While these factors make 

Harris’s case stronger than West, it is still far from a situation 

like Littlejohn where “the jury could never have convicted 

[defendant] without crediting [the officers’] testimony.” 

Littlejohn, 489 F.3d at 1345. After all, Harris never argued 

police misconduct somehow placed her fingerprints on the 

vial containing PCP, nor could she link anyone else to the 

drugs. Furthermore, as in West, Harris had the current 

employment information of potential jurors and never 

specifically asked for former employer information or 

employment history specifically relating to the Metropolitan 

Police Department. Finally, as in West (and Littlejohn), the 

district court asked one-part questions that helped expose any 

potential juror bias and Harris did not show any evidence of 

actual juror bias. 

 In sum, while the district court should not have used 

these compound questions, we affirm Harris’s conviction for 

much the same reasons as in West. 

* * * 

 The judgment of conviction is therefore 

Affirmed.