United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 5, 2021*

Decided February 5, 2021 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 20-2393 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TERRAUN PRICE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Hammond Division. 

No. 2:01 CR 98 

James T. Moody, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Nearly two decades after he was convicted of cocaine-base (“crack”) offenses, 

Terraun Price moved to reduce his sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ 

supervised release to time served and 4 years’ supervised release under the First Step 

Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). Because the district 

court did not abuse its broad discretion in granting Price’s request to reduce his term of 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-2393 Page 2 

supervised release while denying his request to reduce his prison sentence, 

see United States v. Sutton, 962 F.3d 979, 986 (7th Cir. 2020), we affirm. 

In 2003, a jury convicted Price of two counts: conspiracy to distribute 50 grams of 

crack cocaine (the conspiracy count), 21 U.S.C. § 846, and use of a communication 

facility to distribute controlled substances (the distribution count), 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 

The court sentenced Price to life in prison and 5 years’ supervised release for the 

conspiracy count. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2002). For the distribution count, the 

court sentenced him to a concurrent sentence of 48 months in prison and 1 year of 

supervised release. 

Twelve years later, in 2015, the district court on its own initiative considered 

whether Price was eligible for a sentence reduction on the conspiracy count based on 

Amendment 782 to the sentencing guidelines. That Amendment retroactively reduced 

the offense level for certain drug offenses by two levels. U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, 

amend. 782 at 66 (2014). The court determined that he was eligible and that the updated 

guidelines called for a sentence between 360 months and life. The court reduced Price’s 

prison term to 360 months but declined to reduce his term of supervised release. 

After Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, Price moved to reduce his 

sentence further. The district court ruled that Price was eligible to seek relief because 

this Act reduced the statutory penalties for the conspiracy count by applying the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010 to that crime. § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222; United States v. Shaw, 

957 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 2020). Under the reduction, this count became subject to a 

statutory prison term of 5 to 40 years instead of 10 years to life and a supervised-release 

term of at least 4 years instead of at least 5 years. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) 

(2018), with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2002). 

But the district court declined to exercise its discretion to reduce Price’s prison 

sentence, reducing only the term of supervised release to 4 years. First, it noted that 

Price’s guidelines range for the prison term remained unchanged since it last lowered 

his sentence—360 months to life. Then, in balancing the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(which it said it considered unchanged from the time of his conviction) and expressly 

taking into account Price’s post-conviction behavior, the court explained why it left the 

prison term unchanged: Price’s post-conviction behavior and pursuit of education, 

though commendable, did not alter the seriousness of his crime—he supervised a largescale drug conspiracy as “a high-ranking member and close associate of . . . the 

conspiracy’s head”—and the continuing need to deter like conduct. 

On appeal, Price first argues that the court procedurally erred by relying on its 

assessment of the § 3553(a) factors from his original sentencing. When considering 
No. 20-2393 Page 3 

sentence reductions under the First Step Act, district courts may consider “updated 

statutory benchmarks, current Guidelines, and post-sentencing conduct,” all of which 

may produce a reassessment of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. 

Hudson, 967 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2020). Moreover, a court cannot deny a motion under 

the First Step Act by simply citing its reasoning from the original sentencing. 

United States v. Corner, 967 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2020). But the court adhered to these 

norms and did not just repeat itself from the original sentencing. The court considered 

the new penalties, the current guidelines range, and Price’s laudatory post-conviction 

behavior. In weighing this new information, the court permissibly ruled that, despite an 

exemplary prison record, the § 3553(a) factors identified at sentencing (the public 

danger of Price’s oversight of a large drug conspiracy and the need to deter it) still 

applied and warranted keeping his prison term at the low end of the advisory range. 

Price responds that the court unreasonably relied on the seriousness of his 

offense given the shift in how crack-cocaine offenses are viewed. Congress passed the 

Fair Sentencing Act because many offenders—disproportionately African American—

received excessive punishment. Shaw, 957 F.3d at 737. But Price’s contention is wrong 

for three reasons. First, the Sentencing Commission amended the guidelines four years 

before Price’s 2015 sentence reduction so that they aligned with the changing views 

embodied by the Fair Sentencing Act. U.S.S.G. App. C, Vol. III, amend. 750 at 392 (2011) 

(making permanent Emergency Amendment 748); see United States v. Taylor, 778 F.3d 

667, 669 (7th Cir. 2015). When the district court reduced Price’s sentence in 2015, Price 

thus benefited from the very paradigm shift that he claims the court failed to consider 

when he moved for another reduction over three years later. Second, his within-currentguidelines sentence represents what is now deemed reasonable in light of the Fair 

Sentencing Act. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007). Third, it is a 

serious matter to play an important role in a conspiracy selling an illegal substance, as 

Price did, and the evolving view towards crack-cocaine offenses does not change that. 

See United States v. Weaver, 716 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting higher punishments 

for leaders of conspiracies as compared to members recognize their greater culpability). 

Finally, Price insists that a remand is necessary so that the district court can 

reconsider his motion in light of Hudson and Corner, which post-date the ruling on this 

motion. In Hudson we held that district courts, when reducing sentences for convictions 

covered by the First Step Act, may also reduce a sentence imposed for a non-covered 

offense. Hudson, 967 F.3d at 611. Price observes that the district court here did not 

consider whether it should reduce the sentence on his non-covered offense (the 

distribution count), and under Corner a failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of 

discretion. See Corner, 967 F.3d at 666. But unlike the situation in Hudson, reducing the 

sentence for Price’s non-covered offense would have no bearing on his overall sentence, 
No. 20-2393 Page 4 

so any error was harmless. See United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). 

The sentence on the distribution count runs concurrently with the longer term that Price 

is serving on his conviction for the conspiracy count. Because his overall sentence is 

controlled by the lengthier sentence for the conspiracy count, a remand would serve no 

purpose. See id. Moreover, we also held in Corner that district courts must consider 

modified statutory penalties before deciding whether to reduce a sentence or not under 

the First Step Act. Corner, 967 F.3d at 666–67. The district court did so here, even 

without having the benefit of the decision. 

AFFIRMED