UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5025

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY SCOTT MILLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger, 

District Judge. (5:11-cr-00078-1)

Submitted: June 29, 2012 Decided: July 10, 2012

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Carl E. Hostler, PRIM LAW FIRM, PLLC, Hurricane, West Virginia, 

for Appellant. Lisa Grimes Johnston, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Anthony Scott Miller pled guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to failing to register and update 

registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). The district court 

sentenced Miller to twenty-four months’ imprisonment and a 

thirty-year term of supervised release, and Miller now appeals.

Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no meritorious grounds 

for appeal, but questioning the reasonableness of Miller’s 

supervised release term. Counsel concedes, however, that 

Miller’s plea agreement included a waiver-of-appellate rights 

provision with respect to his sentence. Miller filed a pro se 

supplemental brief challenging his conviction and sentence.

The Government seeks to enforce the appellate waiver 

provision of the plea agreement and has moved to dismiss 

Miller’s appeal. In response, Miller’s counsel acknowledges the 

appeal waiver but argues that the thirty-year term of supervised 

release amounts to a miscarriage of justice. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive 

his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United 

States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This Court 

reviews the validity of an appellate waiver de novo and will 

enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue on appeal is 
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within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Blick, 408 

F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).

An appeal waiver is valid if “the defendant knowingly 

and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.” Id. at 

169. To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, 

this Court examines “the totality of the circumstances, 

including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as 

the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the 

terms of the plea agreement.” United States v. General, 278 

F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

In his plea agreement, Miller agreed to waive his 

right to appeal any sentence of imprisonment or fine within or 

below the Guidelines range corresponding to offense level 

fourteen. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 

that Miller knowingly and intelligently entered into the plea 

agreement and that his waiver of appellate rights was knowing 

and intelligent. Because Miller’s sentence of imprisonment 

falls within the Guidelines range applicable to offense level 

fourteen, we find that he has waived his right to appeal his 

prison term. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to 

dismiss in part and dismiss Miller’s appeal as to his prison 

term. However, Miller’s appeal waiver does not include his 

conviction or supervised release term. We therefore deny in 
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part the motion to dismiss as to issues falling outside the 

scope of the appeal waiver.1

In his Anders brief, counsel challenges Miller’s term 

of supervised release. We review the length of a defendant’s 

supervised release term for reasonableness, using an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007); United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 

2008). This review requires the Court to first examine the 

sentence for “significant procedural error,” including “failing 

to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, 

treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the

[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The Court 

then “‘consider[s] the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence imposed[,]’” United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 

(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51), taking into 

account the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51. If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the Court 

applies a presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 

 1 Because this is an Anders appeal, we are obliged to review 

the entire record rather than merely the issues specifically 

raised by Miller.
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551 U.S. 338, 346-59 (2007) (upholding presumption of 

reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). 

Miller argues that the thirty-year term of supervised 

release imposed by the district court is excessive and, hence, 

is unreasonable. In determining the length of a supervised 

release term, a sentencing court must consider several criteria,

including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the 

sentence to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to 

protect the public, to provide the defendant with training, 

medical care, or correctional treatment; the sentencing range 

for the applicable category of offenses; pertinent policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and the need to 

avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity among similar situated 

defendants. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 

(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), & 3583(c) (2006). The 

district court’s thorough explanation of the sentence imposed 

demonstrates that the court took these factors into 

consideration when fashioning Miller’s supervised release term. 

Moreover, Miller presented no arguments sufficient to rebut the 

presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines 

term of supervised release. We therefore conclude that Miller’s 

supervised release term was reasonable.
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We have examined the entire record in accordance with 

the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues 

for appeal.2 Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to 

dismiss in part and deny it in part. We dismiss the appeal of 

Miller’s sentence of imprisonment and otherwise affirm the 

judgment of the district court. This Court requires that 

counsel inform Miller, in writing, of the right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 

Miller requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this Court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

Miller. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART

 2 We conclude that Miller is not entitled to relief on his 

pro se claims.