[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Hunt v. E. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-407.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-407

THE STATE EX REL. HUNT ET AL. v. THE CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Hunt v. E. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 

2023-Ohio-407.]

Mandamus—R.C. 2744.06—Writ sought to compel city to satisfy monetary 

judgment against it—Writ granted.

(No. 2021-1592—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided February 15, 2023.)

IN MANDAMUS.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Marilyn Conard (“Conard”)1and relator Charles D. Hunt won a civil 

judgment of nearly $8 million against respondent, the city of East Cleveland, and 

former city police officer Todd Carroscia. The trial court also awarded nearly $2.5 

million in prejudgment interest. In this original action, Hunt and relator Maisha 

1. Marilyn Conard died after the court of appeals affirmed the judgment in her favor.
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Conard, as administrator of the estate of Conard, seek a writ of mandamus ordering 

the city to satisfy the judgment, plus pre- and postjudgment interest, or, 

alternatively, to take the steps described in R.C. 2744.06(A) for appropriating the 

funds necessary to satisfy the judgment. We grant the writ.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} On October 5, 2008, Carroscia responded to a call concerning another 

police officer’s pursuit of a stolen motorcycle. See Hunt v. E. Cleveland, 2019-

Ohio-1115, 128 N.E.3d 265, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.). While driving at high speed, 

Carroscia’s police vehicle collided with a car driven by Hunt, in which Conard was 

a passenger. Id. at ¶ 2, 92. Hunt and Conard were seriously injured.

{¶ 3} Hunt and Conard sued Carroscia and the city for their injuries. In 

2017, a jury returned a verdict in Hunt’s and Conard’s favor, finding that their 

injuries were caused by the negligence of Carroscia and the city. The jury also 

found that Carroscia “acted with a conscious disregard for [Hunt’s and Conard’s] 

rights and safety.” The jury awarded total compensatory damages of $7,710,180

($6,119,738 to Hunt and $1,590,442 to Conard). The jury also awarded $1 million 

in punitive damages—$500,000 to each plaintiff—against Carroscia only. The trial 

court entered a judgment on the jury verdict. The trial court later entered a separate 

order awarding prejudgment interest in the amounts of $1,958,316.16 to Hunt and 

$508,941.44 to Conard.

{¶ 4} Carroscia and the city appealed to the Eighth District Court of 

Appeals, which affirmed the judgment. See Hunt.

2

 We declined jurisdiction over 

the city and Carroscia’s discretionary appeal. 156 Ohio St.3d 1470, 2019-Ohio2953, 126 N.E.3d 1185. Carroscia and the city appealed to the United States 

2. The court of appeals held that the order awarding prejudgment interest was not properly before 

it, because the city and Carroscia had not amended their notice of appeal or filed a separate notice 

of appeal to bring the trial court’s ruling before the court. Hunt, 2019-Ohio-1115, 128 N.E.3d 265, 

at ¶ 26-27. 
January Term, 2023

3

Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. E. Cleveland v. Hunt, __ U.S. __, 140 

S.Ct. 576, 205 L.Ed.2d 359 (2019). Following the exhaustion of its appeals, the 

city took no action to pay the judgment.

{¶ 5} In December 2021, relators commenced this original action, seeking 

a writ of mandamus ordering the city to pay the amounts owed on the judgment, as 

required by R.C. 2744.06. In addition to the principal amount awarded by the jury 

and the prejudgment interest awarded by the trial court, relators contend that as of 

May 3, 2022, the city owes postjudgment interest in the amounts of $1,939,732.96 

to Hunt and $503,852 to Conard’s estate, which they calculated by using the Ohio 

Department of Taxation’s certified interest rates for 2017 to 2022. In all, relators 

claim that as of May 3, 2022, the city owes Hunt $10,017,787.10 and Conard’s 

estate $2,603,235.94.

3

{¶ 6} We granted an alternative writ and set a schedule for the parties to 

submit evidence and briefing. 166 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2022-Ohio-1156, 185 N.E.3d 

1100. Relators submitted evidence and merit briefs; the city filed a merit brief but 

did not submit evidence.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Relators Are Entitled to Mandamus Relief

{¶ 7} To obtain the requested writ of mandamus, relators must establish (1) 

a clear legal right to enforcement of the judgment, (2) a corresponding clear legal 

duty on the part of the city to pay it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the 

ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. Estate of Miles v. Piketon, 121 Ohio 

St.3d 231, 2009-Ohio-786, 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 17.

{¶ 8} For the clear legal right and duty enforceable in mandamus, relators 

rely on R.C. 2744.06(A), which provides:

3. Relators do not seek a writ ordering the city to pay the punitive damages assessed against 

Carroscia. See R.C. 2744.05 (no punitive damages may be awarded against a political subdivision).
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Real or personal property, and moneys, accounts, deposits, 

or investments of a political subdivision are not subject to execution, 

judicial sale, garnishment, or attachment to satisfy a judgment 

rendered against a political subdivision in a civil action to recover 

damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by 

an act or omission of the political subdivision or any of its 

employees in connection with a governmental or proprietary 

function. Those judgments shall be paid from funds of the political 

subdivisions that have been appropriated for that purpose, but, if 

sufficient funds are not currently appropriated for the payment of 

judgments, the fiscal officer of a political subdivision shall certify 

the amount of any unpaid judgments to the taxing authority of the 

political subdivision for inclusion in the next succeeding budget and 

annual appropriation measure and payment in the next succeeding 

fiscal year as provided by section 5705.08 of the Revised Code, 

unless any judgment is to be paid from the proceeds of bonds issued 

pursuant to section 133.14 of the Revised Code or pursuant to annual 

installments authorized by division (B) or (C) of this section.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 9} Thus, when a political subdivision has been found liable for a civil

judgment in an action described in R.C. 2744.06(A), it shall pay the judgment from 

funds appropriated therefor, include the amount in the appropriation for the next 

fiscal year, or satisfy the judgment through the proceeds of bonds or through annual 

installments. See id. “It is axiomatic that when used in a statute, the word ‘shall’ 

denotes that compliance with the commands of that statute is mandatory unless 

there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative intent that it receive a construction 

other than its ordinary usage.” State ex rel. Botkins v. Laws, 69 Ohio St.3d 383, 
January Term, 2023

5

385, 632 N.E.2d 897 (1994). And there is no “clear and unequivocal legislative 

intent” here to indicate anything other than that the requirements of R.C. 

2744.06(A) are mandatory.

{¶ 10} Relators have demonstrated a clear legal right to enforcement of their 

judgment and a clear legal duty on the part of the city to satisfy it. Hunt and Conard 

prevailed at trial in a civil action claiming injuries caused by the city and Carroscia 

and obtained (1) a judgment totaling $7,710,180 in compensatory damages on a 

jury verdict finding the city (and Carroscia) liable for negligence and (2) an order 

awarding $2,467,257.60 in prejudgment interest. And to date, the city has neither 

satisfied the judgment nor arranged to do so in any of the ways described in R.C. 

2744.06(A). See State ex rel. Shimola v. Cleveland, 70 Ohio St.3d 110, 112, 637 

N.E.2d 325 (1994) (finding a “clear legal right” for the relator to receive and a

“clear legal duty” of Cleveland to pay the unpaid principal amounts of judgments 

and accrued statutory postjudgment interest).

{¶ 11} Relators have also established that they lack an adequate remedy in 

the ordinary course of the law. Relators cannot commence judgment-enforcement 

proceedings, because under R.C. 2744.06(A), the city is immune from execution. 

See Shimola at 112. In Shimola, we granted a writ of mandamus compelling 

Cleveland to pay judgments that it had failed to pay. Id. We also ordered Cleveland 

to pay postjudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03. Id. Under this authority, relators 

are entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the city to pay the amount of the

judgment; prejudgment interest, as ordered by the trial court; and statutory 

postjudgment interest.

{¶ 12} The city argues that Shimola is “completely inapposite” because the 

respondent there (Cleveland) did not answer the mandamus complaint and we

therefore did not resolve the case on the merits. The city’s interpretation of Shimola 

is inaccurate. While it is true that Cleveland did not timely respond to the complaint 

in that case, we did not resolve the case on that basis. We determined on the merits 
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that the relator was entitled to a writ of mandamus based on the relator’s evidence 

because “a default judgment may be entered against the state [or a political 

subdivision] only if the ‘claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 

satisfactory to the court.’ ” Shimola at 112, quoting State ex rel. Weiss v. Indus. 

Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 470, 473, 605 N.E.2d 37 (1992); see also Civ.R. 55(D).

{¶ 13} The city also tries to distinguish Shimola, 70 Ohio St.3d 110, 637 

N.E.2d 325, on the basis that the underlying case there involved solely a negligence 

claim. Because the underlying case here involved a jury finding that Carroscia 

engaged in wanton or reckless misconduct, the city contends that R.C. 2744.06(A) 

does not apply. The city is again incorrect. R.C. 2744.06(A) applies generally to 

“damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by an act or 

omission of the political subdivision or any of its employees in connection with a 

governmental or proprietary function.” And in any event, the city overlooks the 

fact that the jury found negligence on the part of both the city and Carroscia.

{¶ 14} For these reasons, Shimola is on point and supports relators’ claim 

to mandamus relief to compel the city’s compliance with R.C. 2744.06(A).

B. The City’s Arguments Are Improper Collateral Attacks on the Judgment

{¶ 15} In opposing issuance of the writ, the city attacks the underlying 

premise that it is liable for the damages determined by the jury and ordered by the 

trial court. See Estate of Miles, 121 Ohio St.3d 231, 2009-Ohio-786, 903 N.E.2d 

311, at ¶ 1, 36 (denying writ of mandamus because the judgment at issue was 

against the former police chief only and not against the municipality). The city’s 

arguments, however, are an improper attempt to relitigate issues that it already 

raised and lost in the underlying trial and appeal.

1. Trial Court’s Judgment Is Not Ambiguous

{¶ 16} First, the city argues that the trial court’s entry of judgment is 

defective under Civ.R. 58 and therefore does not establish that relators have a clear 

legal entitlement to have the city satisfy the judgment. We reject this argument.
January Term, 2023

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{¶ 17} Civ.R. 58(A)(1) provides:

Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(B), upon a general 

verdict of a jury, upon a decision announced, or upon the 

determination of a periodic payment plan, the court shall promptly 

cause the judgment to be prepared and, the court having signed it, 

the clerk shall thereupon enter it upon the journal. A judgment is 

effective only when entered by the clerk upon the journal.

{¶ 18} The city contends that the trial court did not enter a valid judgment 

under Civ.R. 58, because it merely recited the jury’s verdict. The trial court did 

not, says the city, enter judgment on the jury verdict or identify which of the two 

defendants the jury returned its verdict against.

{¶ 19} We disagree with the city’s reading of the trial court’s judgment 

entry. The trial court’s judgment entry did more than simply record the jury’s

verdict. The trial court issued its judgment entry on a form indicating that the case 

was disposed pursuant to a jury trial. The journal entry recited what the jury 

awarded, and the court’s form expressly noted that it was a disposition of the case.

{¶ 20} The city makes much of the fact that the judgment entry did not state 

specifically that the city was liable, as it referred only to the amounts awarded to 

Hunt and Conard. The city also notes that the entry refers to defendant Carroscia 

(against whom punitive damages were assessed) as not being liable for attorney 

fees. But this does not make the judgment ambiguous. There were only two 

defendants that went to trial, and moreover, a judgment against Carroscia 

necessarily meant that the city was liable. See R.C. 2744.02(B) (“political 

subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the 

negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the employees 

are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority” [emphasis 
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added]). Accordingly, we view the trial court’s entry as a clear pronouncement of 

a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against both defendants, consistent with 

the jury’s verdict.

2. Immunity Arguments

{¶ 21} The city also argues that there is not a clear legal right or duty 

enforceable in mandamus because the city “cannot be liable, without more, for the 

actions of an individual employee.” But the city’s challenge to its liability is 

nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on the trial court’s judgment, 

which has already been affirmed on appeal. See Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of 

Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 25 (in absence 

of fraud or want of jurisdiction, a judgment is considered valid and may not be 

collaterally attacked in another proceeding). As noted above, the judgment in this 

case imposes liability on the city and R.C. 2744.06(A) imposes a legal duty on the 

city to satisfy the judgment. The city cannot relitigate its liability in this mandamus 

proceeding.

3. The City’s Liability Is Established

{¶ 22} In addition to rearguing (erroneously) that it is immune from 

liability, the city also contends that there has been no finding of negligence against 

it. The city further contends that it cannot be held liable for the entire amount of 

the jury’s verdict, because there has been no “apportionment of damages” as 

between its liability and Carroscia’s liability. Like the immunity arguments above, 

these arguments are collateral attacks on the judgment of the trial court and are 

legally incorrect.

{¶ 23} The city’s argument that there was no finding of negligence against 

it ignores the jury interrogatory that expressly found “Defendants” (i.e., the city and 

Carroscia) negligent. Moreover, as a matter of law, there is no requirement for a 

separate finding of negligence as to the city. The city’s argument ignores that R.C. 

2744.02(B)(1)(a) imposes liability against a political subdivision for an employee’s
January Term, 2023

9

negligent operation of a motor vehicle and for willful or wanton misconduct in 

operating a vehicle during an emergency call.

{¶ 24} The city’s “apportionment of damages” argument is also without 

merit. The city had the burden to establish at trial whether an apportionment of 

damages was appropriate. See Pang v. Minch, 53 Ohio St.3d 186, 559 N.E.2d 1313 

(1990), paragraph six of the syllabus. The fact that there was no apportionment of 

damages in the jury’s verdict does not, as the city argues, call into question the 

city’s liability to pay the entire judgment. To the contrary, the absence of 

apportionment is consistent with the concept of joint and several liability among 

tortfeasors. See id. at 197.

{¶ 25} Finally, the city contends that relators have an adequate remedy in 

the ordinary course of the law in that they may seek recovery from Carroscia. In 

fact, the city argues that because the jury found that Carroscia’s misconduct was 

willful and wanton, he is the only defendant liable for the harm and therefore the 

only defendant from whom relators may seek recovery. This argument fails

because the city is liable under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) for the injuries caused by 

Carroscia’s willful and wanton misconduct in his operation of a motor vehicle 

during an emergency call.

4. Prejudgment Interest

{¶ 26} The city also contends that it cannot be ordered to pay prejudgment 

interest, because it is in a fiscal emergency. Essentially, the city argues that the 

trial court’s order of prejudgment interest was erroneous because it did not consider 

the city’s fiscal-emergency status. This argument is also without merit, as it seeks 

to litigate an issue that the city forfeited by not appealing the trial court’s order 

awarding prejudgment interest. See Hunt, 2019-Ohio-1115, 128 N.E.3d 265, at 

¶ 26-27. Moreover, the city did not submit any evidence in this case to support the 

assertion that it is in a fiscal emergency, nor did it cite authority for the proposition 
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that a city’s fiscal-emergency status can override the statutory duty imposed by 

R.C. 2744.06(A).

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 27} R.C. 2744.06(A) imposes a clear legal duty on the city to satisfy the 

judgment rendered in favor of Hunt and Conard. The city’s arguments in this case 

are an impermissible attempt to relitigate the unsuccessful defenses it raised at trial 

and the arguments it lost on appeal. We therefore grant a writ of mandamus 

ordering the city to pay relators all money necessary to satisfy the judgment, 

prejudgment interest, and statutory postjudgment interest calculated from April 27, 

2017, to the date the judgment is paid. If the city does not have sufficient funds 

presently appropriated for the payment of the judgment and interest, it shall comply 

with the requirements of R.C. 2744.06(A) for appropriating funds to satisfy the 

judgment, prejudgment interest, and statutory postjudgment interest.

Writ granted.

KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 

and DETERS, JJ., concur.

_________________

DiCello Levitt Gutzler, L.L.C., Robert F. DiCello, Kenneth P. Abbarno, and 

Justin J. Hawal, for relators.

Willa M. Hemmons, East Cleveland Director of Law, and Heather 

McCollough, Assistant Director of Law, for respondent.

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