Present: All the Justices 

ANTHONY MANUEL ALFONSO, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 981333 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 April 16, 1999 

DARLENE ROBINSON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal of a judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a 

negligence action, we consider whether the trial court erred in 

instructing the jury on the issue of willful and wanton 

negligence. 

On November 23, 1994, shortly before midnight, Anthony 

Manuel Alfonso was operating a tractor-trailer owned by 

Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc. He was proceeding in one 

of three northbound lanes on Interstate Route 95 in Prince 

William County on a "very dark" stretch of roadway. The truck 

stalled and, although Alfonso could not restart the engine, he 

was able to steer the truck into the right-hand lane of the 

highway near a rest area. 

About the same time, Darlene Robinson was operating a 

passenger van at a speed of approximately 55-60 miles per hour 

in the right-hand lane of the highway. Her van collided with 

the rear of Alfonso’s trailer, and Robinson was seriously 

injured in the accident. 
 Robinson filed a motion for judgment against Alfonso and 

Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc. (collectively, Schneider), 

seeking damages for her injuries. In her amended motion for 

judgment, she alleged that Alfonso negligently failed to perform 

certain statutory duties placed on the driver of a disabled 

motor vehicle. In Count I, Robinson alleged that Alfonso 

negligently failed to activate the truck's flashing hazard 

lights and to use warning flares or reflective triangles as 

required by state and federal regulations. In Count II, 

Robinson alleged that Alfonso’s actions constituted willful and 

wanton negligence and exhibited a total disregard for the safety 

of the traveling public. In its grounds of defense, Schneider 

alleged that Robinson was guilty of contributory negligence. 

 Prior to a jury trial, Schneider admitted that Alfonso was 

guilty of simple negligence in failing to place reflective 

triangles behind the disabled truck. At trial, Robinson and 

Michelle Annette Andrus, who was driving directly behind 

Robinson's van prior to the collision, testified that no flares 

or reflective triangles had been placed in the roadway behind 

the truck before the collision. They each also stated that 

while Alfonso’s truck had the usual “running lights” on prior to 

the accident, the truck’s flashing hazard lights were not 

activated. Trooper G.R. Austin of the Virginia State Police, 

who arrived at the accident scene about five minutes after the 

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collision, testified that the truck’s hazard lights had not been 

activated at the time he arrived. 

 Both Robinson and Andrus stated that they had seen the 

truck from about a quarter-mile or a half-mile away, but that 

they thought the truck was moving. Robinson testified that she 

did not realize the truck was stopped until she was “on top of 

it.” She explained that she tried to avoid the collision by 

applying her brakes and swerving to the left, but that she was 

unable to get around the truck. 

 Andrus testified that she did not realize the truck was 

stopped until the Robinson van collided with it. After the 

accident, Andrus stopped to assist the occupants of Robinson’s 

van. She observed Alfonso return from the rest area about 10 to 

15 minutes after the accident. 

 Alfonso testified that when the disabled truck came to a 

stop, he unsuccessfully tried to send a message to his employer 

on the truck’s computer that the truck needed to be towed from 

the highway. Alfonso then left the truck and ran about 100 

yards to the rest area to use a telephone to call for 

assistance. Although he had reflective triangles in his cab, 

Alfonso did not place them behind the truck. He testified that 

he thought he could run to the rest area, summon help, and 

return to the truck within ten minutes to set out the triangles. 

3
 Alfonso stated that he had activated the truck’s flashing 

hazard lights before the truck stalled, because traffic in the 

area had temporarily stopped due to road construction. He 

testified that the truck’s “flashers” were still on when he left 

the truck to run to the rest area. As he was returning from the 

rest area after placing the telephone call, Alfonso heard 

Robinson’s van collide with his truck. Alfonso estimated that 

he had been away from the truck for three to five minutes. 

 On cross-examination, Alfonso testified that he had 

attended eight weeks of training classes in 1990 in order to 

work as an interstate truck driver, and that he received further 

training from his employer later that year. Alfonso stated that 

he learned from his training classes that the deployment of 

warning flares or reflective triangles was “the first thing you 

should do” after securing a truck that had become disabled. He 

knew that the purpose of the safety triangles was “to warn 

people who are coming up from behind and let them know that 

you’re stopped.” He also stated that he was aware that federal 

regulations governing interstate trucking require drivers to 

place flares or reflective triangles at specified distances 

behind a disabled truck “as soon as possible, but in any event 

within ten minutes.” 

 Both at the end of the plaintiff’s case and at the 

conclusion of all the evidence, Schneider moved to strike 

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Robinson’s evidence on Count II, arguing that Alfonso’s conduct 

did not rise to the level of willful and wanton negligence. The 

trial court denied both motions to strike the evidence and 

submitted the case to the jury on the issues of proximate 

causation, willful and wanton negligence, and contributory 

negligence. 

 A special verdict form1 returned by the jury contained three 

findings: 1) that Alfonso’s negligence was a proximate cause of 

the accident; 2) that Alfonso’s negligence was willful and 

wanton; and 3) that Robinson was not guilty of contributory 

negligence. The jury awarded damages in favor of Robinson in 

the amount of $550,000, plus interest from the date of the 

accident. On the defendants’ motion, the court reduced the 

award of damages to $450,000, the amount requested in the 

amended motion for judgment. The court denied Alfonso's motion 

to set aside the verdict and entered final judgment in favor of 

Robinson in that amount, plus interest. This appeal followed. 

 Schneider argues that the trial court erred in submitting 

the issue of willful and wanton negligence to the jury. He 

contends that Alfonso’s violation of a ”motor vehicle safety 

statute” did not constitute willful and wanton negligence, and 

 1

Although the use of a special verdict form is not at issue 

in this appeal, we note that this Court has not sanctioned the 

use of special verdicts in negligence actions. See Johnson v. 

Smith, 241 Va. 396, 401, 403 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1991). 

5
that his conduct was not egregious and did not manifest a 

complete disregard for the safety of others. Schneider asserts 

that Alfonso’s actions in trying to contact his employer by 

computer, and in running to the nearby rest area to obtain 

assistance by telephone, demonstrate that Alfonso attempted to 

remove the truck from the highway as soon as possible out of 

concern for the safety of others. 

 In response, Robinson argues that the evidence concerning 

Alfonso’s conduct presented a factual question of willful and 

wanton negligence that was properly submitted to the jury. 

Robinson contends that the evidence supported a conclusion that 

Alfonso acted with conscious disregard for the rights of other 

drivers on the highway, or with reckless indifference to the 

knowledge that his conduct probably would cause injury to 

another driver. We agree with Robinson's argument. 

 Willful and wanton negligence is action taken in conscious 

disregard of another’s rights, or with reckless indifference to 

consequences that the defendant is aware, from his knowledge of 

existing circumstances and conditions, would probably result 

from his conduct and cause injury to another. Harris v. Harman, 

253 Va. 336, 340-41, 486 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1997); Clohessy v. 

Weiler, 250 Va. 249, 252, 462 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1995); Griffin v. 

Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321-22, 315 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1984). Each 

case raising an issue of willful and wanton negligence must be 

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evaluated on its own facts, and a defendant’s entire conduct 

must be considered in determining whether his actions or 

omissions present such a question for a jury’s determination. 

Clohessy, 250 Va. at 253, 462 S.E.2d at 97; Huffman v. Love, 245 

Va. 311, 315-16, 427 S.E.2d 357, 360-61 (1993). 

 Willful and wanton negligence, unlike gross or ordinary 

negligence, requires an actual or constructive consciousness 

that injury will result from the act done or omitted. Infant C. 

v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 239 Va. 572, 580-81, 391 S.E.2d 

322, 327 (1990); see Wolfe v. Baube, 241 Va. 462, 465, 403 

S.E.2d 338, 339-40 (1991); Boward v. Leftwich, 197 Va. 227, 231, 

89 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1955). However, ill will is not a necessary 

element of willful and wanton negligence. Infant C., 239 Va. at 

581, 391 S.E.2d at 327; Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 909, 114 

S.E.2d 617, 621 (1960). 

 Schneider is correct in its contention that the intentional 

violation of a traffic law, without more, will not support a 

finding of willful and wanton negligence. See Harris, 253 Va. 

at 341, 486 S.E.2d at 102; Baker, 201 Va. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 

621-22. We disagree, however, with Schneider’s further 

assertion that our prior decisions require a conclusion that 

Alfonso was not guilty of willful and wanton negligence as a 

matter of law. 

7
 Schneider's argument relies primarily on our holdings in 

Harris and Clohessy.2 In Harris and Clohessy, we concluded as a 

matter of law that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the 

level of willful and wanton negligence. In Harris, the evidence 

showed that the defendant “tailgated” the plaintiff’s vehicle 

while travelling at a speed between 10 and 30 miles per hour in 

excess of “the 30 m.p.h. speed which was safe for that stretch 

of road.” 253 Va. at 338, 486 S.E.2d at 100. In Clohessy, the 

record demonstrated that the defendant’s vehicle hit a 

pedestrian walking in the street as the defendant was driving at 

night without headlights and with a fogged windshield while 

operating her vehicle about ten miles in excess of the speed 

limit. 250 Va. at 251, 462 S.E.2d at 96. 

 The defendants’ conduct in Harris and Clohessy was not as 

egregious as Alfonso’s conduct. A critical characteristic 

distinguishing the present case from those two cases is that 

Alfonso was a professional driver who had received specialized 

safety training warning against the very omissions he made prior 

 2

Schneider also relies on our holding in Harris Motor Lines 

v. Green, 184 Va. 984, 37 S.E.2d 4 (1946). This reliance is 

misplaced, however, because we did not decide an issue of 

willful and wanton negligence in Green. There, the issue 

presented was whether the trial court erred in instructing the 

jury on the doctrine of last clear chance. Id. at 989, 37 

S.E.2d at 5. We concluded that both drivers “were guilty of 

such negligence as efficiently contributed to the accident and 

which continued down to the time of the accident” and, thus, 

8
to the accident. As stated above, Alfonso admitted at trial 

that he was instructed that the deployment of safety flares and 

reflective triangles was the first act that should be taken 

after securing a disabled truck. He knew that the purpose of 

such safety devices was to warn motorists that they were 

approaching a stopped vehicle. Despite this training and 

knowledge, Alfonso consciously elected to leave the disabled 

truck in a travel lane of an interstate highway without placing 

any warning devices behind it. 

 Such evidence that a defendant had prior knowledge or 

notice that his actions or omissions would likely cause injury 

to others is a significant factor in considering issues of 

willful and wanton negligence. See e.g., Huffman v. Love, 245 

Va. at 315, 427 S.E.2d at 360; Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 

270, 272-73, 374 S.E.2d 1, 2-3 (1988). In the present case, 

Alfonso’s prior knowledge was a conceded fact that related 

directly to the specific circumstances with which he was 

confronted on the night of the accident. 

 Alfonso’s knowledge and omissions were factors to be 

considered in the context of the other evidence in the case. 

The evidence stated above showed that the disabled truck 

remained entirely on the traveled portion of the highway, and 

 

that the doctrine of last clear chance was inapplicable. Id.

at 990-91, 37 S.E.2d at 6. 

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that Alfonso left the truck unattended in nighttime traffic in a 

"very dark” area where there were no light fixtures and the 

speed limit was 55 miles per hour. Also, viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Alfonso did not 

activate his hazard lights before leaving the vehicle 

unattended, and he did not return to the truck until 10 to 15 

minutes after leaving it on the highway. 

 We conclude that the cumulative evidence of Alfonso’s 

knowledge and conduct raised a question of willful and wanton 

negligence for the jury’s determination. Thus, the trial court 

did not err in instructing the jury on this issue. 

 For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

Affirmed.

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