Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

August 2001 CHEMICAL

WEAPONS

FEMA and Army Must

Be Proactive in

Preparing States for

Emergencies

GAO-01-850
Page i GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Funding Needed for Critical Items Exceeds Projected Costs 10

CSEPP Has Enhanced Emergency Responsiveness, but Most States

Still Not Fully Prepared 14

FEMA’s and Army’s Management Relations Have Improved, but

Relations With Some States Are Still Poor 20

Conclusions 28

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31

Appendix II CSEPP’s Funding and Life-Cycle Cost Estimates 35

Appendix III CSEPP’s Performance Measures and Critical Items 39

Appendix IV Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items in 10 States 45

Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense 59

Appendix VI Comments From FEMA 62

Tables

Table 1: Comparison of CSEPP’s Actual With Projected Funding

Amounts 10

Table 2: CSEPP’s Funding by State, Fiscal Years 1989–2000 36

Table 3: CSEPP’s On- and Off-Post Funding by Operation and

Maintenance and Procurement Categories, Fiscal Years

1988–2000 (as of Oct. 1, 2000) 37

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Table 4: Critical Items Measure States’ Emergency Preparedness 40

Table 5: Status of Eight Critical CSEPP-Funded Items in 1997 and

2001 41

Table 6: Status of 11 Other Critical CSEPP-Funded Items 43

Table 7: Detail on 10 States’ CSEPP Preparedness, February 2001 48

Figures

Figure 1: Practicing Decontamination of a Victim of a Chemical

Accident During Anniston, Alabama, and Umatilla,

Oregon, Communities’ 2001 Exercises 8

Figure 2: CSEPP’s Funding by On- and Off-Post Activities, Fiscal

Years 1988-2000 13

Figure 3: Total CSEPP Funding by State, Fiscal Years 1989-2000 14

Figure 4: Status of CSEPP-Funded Critical Items by State, February

2001 16

Abbreviations

CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
Page 1 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

August 13, 2001

The Honorable Jeff Sessions

The Honorable Gordon Smith

The Honorable Ron Wyden

United States Senate

The Honorable James V. Hansen

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

The Honorable Bob Riley

House of Representatives

Millions of people live and work near eight Army storage facilities

containing nearly 30,000 tons of chemical agents and are at risk of

exposure from a chemical accident at these facilities. Such an accident

could affect people in 10 different states. The Army plans to destroy its

entire chemical weapons stockpile by 2007 and is taking measures to

protect the public before and during the demilitarization process.1 In 1988,

the Army established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness

Program to assist the 10 states with communities near the eight storage

facilities obtain the additional necessary equipment and training they need

to be fully prepared to protect the public, the facilities’ workforces, and

the environment in the unlikely event of a chemical stockpile accident.

The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency share the

federal government’s responsibility for the program’s funding and

execution. On the basis of varying needs for critical items (such as

warning sirens, protective equipment, and response plans) required by the

states, the Army and the agency agree that when these items are in place,

the states and communities are fully prepared to respond to a chemical

emergency. The program established a self-imposed goal of reaching full

preparedness by 1998. In 1999, the Army estimated that the program would

cost about $1.2 billion through 2010.

 1

In April 1997, the U. S. Senate ratified the U. N.-sponsored Convention on the Prohibition

of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on

Their Destruction, commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, effectively

agreeing to dispose of the chemical stockpile weapons and materiel by April 29, 2007.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

In 1997, on the basis of a congressional request, we reported on the status

of the program and identified several key management weaknesses.2

 After

an accidental chemical release at the storage facility in Utah in May 2000,

you requested that we perform another assessment of the program’s status

and of any continuing management problems. As agreed with your offices,

we addressed the following questions: (1) What is the status of the

program’s funding? (2) What progress have the communities in the 10

states made toward being fully prepared? (3) What changes in federal

management relations with the states and communities in the program

could help achieve the goal of full preparedness? The scope and

methodology of our work are described in appendix I. Regarding reported

financial information, we did not independently determine its reliability.

Since its inception, the program has received over $761 million in funding.

One third of this amount, over $250 million, has been spent on the

procurement of critical items. Because each community has its own sitespecific requirements, funding has varied greatly. For example, Illinois

received as little as $6 million, and Alabama received as much as

$108 million since the states first received program funding in 1989. The

Army expected the states to have completed the procurement of critical

items by 1998. This is not the case and currently too little planned funding

remains to procure all the critical items the states have identified as

needed to be fully prepared for a chemical emergency. The Army’s 1999

estimate of the total funding needed to obtain all necessary items was also

too low. The program has already spent over 85 percent of all the

procurement funding it was expected to need through fiscal year 2010. In

2000, the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency increased

their estimate of total program costs but still did not include all the

procurement funding the states will need in the near term. The 2000

estimate is understated because the Army, the agency, and the states did

not identify all the items the program will need.

Three of the 10 states (Maryland, Utah, and Washington) in the Chemical

Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program are fully prepared to respond

to a chemical emergency and 4 others (Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, and

Oregon) are making progress and are close to being fully prepared. This is

a considerable improvement since 1997, when no state was fully prepared.

 2

See Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management of the Emergency

Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11, 1997).

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

But the overall program has not progressed as quickly as expected and has

failed to meet its own 1998 deadline for achieving full preparedness.

Currently, three states (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) are still

considerably behind in their efforts. Calhoun county in Alabama is far

from being fully prepared, does not have an agreed-upon response plan,

and has not done enough to educate the public about the program. This

raises the question of whether it would be able to adequately respond to a

chemical emergency. Problems in federal management relations with state

and local emergency management officials have contributed to delays in

achieving full preparedness. Some state and local emergency management

officials have said that, unless all critical items are in place, they will not

support the start of the Army’s destruction of chemical agents in their

locality. The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization is

committed to addressing local concerns regarding readiness to avoid

delays in the destruction of the chemical stockpiles.

In the last 4 years, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the

Army have made progress in tackling some long-standing program

management problems. After years of disagreement, in 1997, officials

signed a new memorandum of understanding defining their specific roles

and responsibilities in the program. By doing so, they addressed some of

the management problems that were caused by unclear roles and

responsibilities and the lack of coordination. However, a number of

problems have contributed to slowness in executing the program and to

leading all the states and local communities to full preparedness. A lack of

initiative in some areas by the Army and the agency, combined with poor

working relations with some states and communities, has resulted in the

failure to resolve major unresolved issues in the three states that are

farther behind. Specifically, the Army and the agency are not providing

Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky and their local communities enough

technical assistance and guidance to resolve outstanding issues. They have

not been effective in disseminating information on emergency

management or best practices and lessons learned in all seven states that

are still not fully prepared. And in all 10 states, they have issued uneven

and unclear performance measures, and they have not provided guidance

on plans and procedures for reentry to contaminated areas.

We are making recommendations to improve the Federal Emergency

Management Agency’s and the Army’s management and implementation of

the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program to bring all

communities to full preparedness. In comments on a draft of this report,

the Agency and the Army generally concurred with our recommendations.
Page 4 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Both provided technical comments that we considered and incorporated

in the report where appropriate.

In 1985, the Congress required the Department of Defense to carry out the

destruction of the U.S. stockpile of chemical agents and munitions and

established an organization within the Army to manage the disposal

program. The Congress directed the program to provide maximum

protection to the environment, the general public, the personnel involved

in disposing of the chemical weapons at the eight storage sites.3

 Further,

the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to make grants to state

and local governments, either directly or through the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) to assist them in carrying out functions

related to emergency preparedness. In 1988, the Army established the

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to help

communities near the stockpile storage sites establish a full level of

emergency preparedness and response capabilities. CSEPP also helps to

implement the emergency preparedness at the Army installations storing

the chemical stockpile.

The Congress originally set 1994 as the date for the complete destruction

of the stockpile. This date was later extended to 2007, after the Senate

ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their

Destruction, commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, on

April 24, 1997. Under the convention, April 29, 2007, is the deadline for the

destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles.

CSEPP is a partnership between the Army, as custodian of the chemical

stockpile, FEMA, which has long-standing experience in preparing for and

dealing with all types of emergencies, and state and local governments. In

October 1997, the Army and FEMA signed a revised memorandum of

understanding under which FEMA assumed responsibility for off-post

(civilian community) program activities. The Army continued to manage

 3

The storage facilities are Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah; Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland; Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Newport Chemical Activity, Indiana; Pine Bluff

Arsenal, Arkansas; Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado; Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky;

and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon. Besides the communities in the eight states listed

above, communities in Illinois and Washington could also be affected by chemical

accidents at Newport Chemical Activity, Indiana and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon,

respectively.

Background
Page 5 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

“on-post” (installation) emergency preparedness and provide technical and

financial support for both off-post and on-post activities. FEMA provides

the civilian community with expertise, guidance, training, and other

support. Specifically, FEMA’s CSEPP roles and responsibilities are to

(1) administer the off-post funds; (2) support the states in developing

response plans; (3) prepare, develop, deliver, and evaluate training;

(4) provide technical assistance; and (5) develop programs for evaluating

off-post readiness. Similarly, the states and communities also have

responsibility for developing response plans and evaluating resource

requirements. To improve overall management, the Army and FEMA use

12 “benchmarks,” or performance measures, to execute the program and

report on its status. These performance measures were revised in January

2000 and are now also used for budgeting, accountability, and for

assessing the status of states’ preparedness to respond to chemical

emergencies.

The Army’s Chemical Demilitarization Program (including CSEPP) has a

1999 total life-cycle (from start to finish) cost estimate of about

$15 billion.4

 The Army periodically updates the estimate. In 1985, the

Army’s original cost estimate for the disposal project, the largest portion

of the program, was $1.7 billion. This grew to nearly $10 billion in 1999. In

1988, it estimated that the cost of CSEPP would be $114 million. CSEPP

has a 1999 life-cycle cost estimate of $1.2 billion. Sharing responsibility for

the program, the Army provides the 10 states and the local communities

near the storage sites with funding for the off-post program through

FEMA. As with other emergency preparedness programs, FEMA

administers this program through its regional offices to the states.

Under the current management arrangement, the Army, FEMA, and the

states and counties share responsibility for preparing CSEPP annual

budgets. The states and counties are responsible for identifying the

requirements and developing annual requests for the critical items that

they believe are needed to be fully prepared to respond to a chemical

emergency. After each state prepares its initial budget proposal, it

 4

The Army initially established the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project to oversee the

destruction of the nation’s chemical weapons stockpile, while providing human health and

the environment with maximum protection. Since it began in 1986, it has become known

as the Chemical Demilitarization Program and has expanded to include CSEPP (1988), the

Non-stockpile Chemical Materiel Product (1993), the Alternative Technologies and

Approaches Project (1994), and the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment program

(1997).
Page 6 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

negotiates an acceptable level of funding for its proposed projects with the

appropriate FEMA regional office. The approved budget proposal is then

forwarded to FEMA’s headquarters for further review and approval. After

the Army approves a total funding amount that it will transfer to FEMA for

CSEPP’s off-post activities, FEMA’s headquarters prepares a Cooperative

Agreement with specific activities, funding, and periods of performance

for each state. On the basis of these Cooperative Agreements, FEMA

issues funds received from the Army as needed throughout the fiscal year

to match a state’s budgeted CSEPP spending. The states then apportion

the funds among various state agencies and the local communities

(counties and cities) surrounding the sites for their CSEPP operations.

Although the Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization is

responsible for the stockpile’s safe destruction, the current arrangement

between the Army and FEMA does not provide the Program Manager with

direct responsibility for CSEPP.5

 However, in the past, FEMA has received

supplemental funding from the Program Manager to help meet CSEPP’s

unexpected funding needs. But the Program Manager told us that the

program no longer has any uncommitted funds on hand to support

CSEPP’s activities.

The greatest risk to the local community is from an event that would cause

a chemical release while the chemical weapons are in storage. Lowprobability occurrences, such as an airplane crash, earthquake, or serious

accident in the storage area, could potentially cause a cloud or plume of

toxic chemical agent to be released into the air, putting the surrounding

community at risk of exposure. In the unlikely event of such an incident,

the professional or volunteer emergency personnel in the community

would be the first responders. The type of protective action response—

evacuation or sheltering in place—would be determined for each of the

numerous zones in the counties that surround each site on the basis of

recommendations made by emergency personnel at the Army post. To be

able to effectively support the evacuation or shelter-in-place emergency

response, local emergency management activities require that critical

items, such as warning sirens, protective equipment, and response plans

be in place. The Army and FEMA also fund joint training exercises that

 5

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) has policy, guidance

and oversight responsibility for CSEPP in coordination with FEMA. The U.S. Army Soldier

and Biological Chemical Command is responsible for the management and execution of the

on-post activities while FEMA is responsible for the management and execution of the offpost activities.
Page 7 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

bring together the personnel, equipment, and response plans to practice

emergency response preparedness. To illustrate, figure 1 shows three

scenes around a decontamination unit during (training) exercises at

Anniston, Alabama on March 2, 2001 and Umatilla, Oregon on May 8, 2001.
Page 8 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Figure 1: Practicing Decontamination of a Victim of a Chemical Accident During

Anniston, Alabama, and Umatilla, Oregon, Communities’ 2001 Exercises

Source: FEMA.
Page 9 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

The off-post emergency preparedness program is linked to the

demilitarization program through its budget and in two other ways. First,

the emergency program is designed to protect the public from a chemical

emergency while the chemical weapons are in storage and during the

demilitarization process. The public faces the highest risk when the

stockpile is in storage because that is when the greatest amount of agent is

present. When the destruction of the stockpile munitions begins, the risk

to the public begins to decrease as the stockpile diminishes. When the

destruction of the chemical weapons at a site is complete, the risk is gone

and CSEPP funding for local preparedness ceases.

Second, certain CSEPP and demilitarization program conditions must be

met before states will agree that it is safe to begin the destruction

operations. If state officials do not believe they have a satisfactory level of

emergency preparedness, it will be difficult for the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization to begin destruction of the chemical weapons at

a stockpile site. This linkage between the demilitarization and the

emergency preparedness programs has thus set the official date that a

state must be fully prepared for a chemical emergency as the date when

the demilitarization process is scheduled to begin. If a state is not

prepared and thus delays the start of demilitarization operations, it will

cost the Army millions of additional dollars to pay contractors and support

the facility.

The Army, FEMA, and the states continue to use the projected start of

demilitarization at each facility as the goal for having the needed critical

items in place at the local communities near the stockpiles. Furthermore,

this date also guides their program management and funding priorities.

Likewise, this date matches either state law or planning goals linking the

start of demilitarization operations with CSEPP readiness. For example,

Oregon requires the governor to officially sign a statement that emergency

preparedness at Umatilla is adequate before operations there are

authorized to begin. Officials in other states also told us that similar

emergency preparedness initiatives need to be completed before

demilitarization operations begin. Without state officials’ agreement that

their emergency preparedness is complete, the Army will not be able to

begin demilitarization operations.
Page 10 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

CSEPP’s funding needs have continued to grow since 1997, after the Army

said that the states would have all critical items in place by the end of 1998

and that, in particular, procurement funding requirements would diminish

soon thereafter. Funding has generally been in line with the Army’s

estimates of total needs through fiscal year 2000, but the program has

already spent nearly all the procurement funds that had been estimated as

needed through fiscal year 2010. The Army and FEMA are recalculating

cost estimates for fiscal years 2003-07, but according to information

provided by FEMA and the states, even this revised estimate will not

include money for all needed items. According to the Army’s and FEMA’s

financial documents, through the end of fiscal year 2000, the states

received about half of the total CSEPP funding. But they have received

different amounts because they each have different needs.

FEMA officials told us that the Army has generally funded the CSEPP

program in line with the Army’s life-cycle cost estimate and program cost

projections, but they added that these projected amounts are less than

past and current individual state requirements. For example, the states

have requested unfunded critical items that exceeded the procurement

funding that the Army predicted. To illustrate, through fiscal year 2000, the

Army provided almost 88 percent of the total procurement expenses

projected through fiscal year 2010. (See table 1.) Our review shows that

needed procurement funding will exceed the amount estimated for fiscal

years 2001-10. In contrast, during fiscal years 1988-2000, the program spent

just over 53 percent of the total projected operation and maintenance

funds.

Table 1: Comparison of CSEPP’s Actual With Projected Funding Amounts

Dollars in millions

Fiscal years Operation and maintenance Procurement Total

Actual funding

1988-2000 $509.0 $252.7 $761.8

1999 Working life-cycle

cost estimate

1988-2010 $948.2 $289.1 $1,237.3

Percent spent

1988-2010 53.7 87.4 61.6

Source: Our analysis of funding data provided by the Department of the Army, Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization, and the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. The 1999

Working Life Cycle Cost Estimate was provided by the Army Program Manager for Chemical

Demilitarization.

Funding Needed for

Critical Items

Exceeds Projected

Costs

State Requirements Are

Greater Than Program

Cost Projections
Page 11 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

FEMA and the Army rely on the states and local communities to initiate

funding requests. However, since the eventual funding decisions flow from

the Army’s budget process, the states and FEMA have found it difficult to

fund any newly identifiable requirements or other valid program needs

once the budget is set. Such added costs to the program arise when

unanticipated critical needs are asked for by the states on the basis of

unforeseen rapid population growth around some chemical storage sites

or when some critical items have needed unexpected repair or

replacement.

The Army’s budget for CSEPP is part of the Department of Defense’ s

overall program, planning, budgeting, and execution budget process,6

which entails long planning request lead times. The lead time for

projecting budget requests is 18 to 24 months beyond the time required for

a particular item or funding need. FEMA and the states and local

communities have not always adequately planned for anticipated and

replacement needs and have had many unanticipated needs arise within

this budget window. For example, some new and unanticipated CSEPP

requests were not included in the Army’s and FEMA’s budgets for fiscal

years 2002 and 2003 because the Army’s budget is already set and cannot

be expanded. As a result, when budget cost estimates and funding are

below the program’s actual requirements, FEMA and Army officials told us

that FEMA has had to delay or spread out funding for some critical items.

When FEMA and Army officials have to deny such funding requests, or socalled “unfunded requests,” from the states because funds are not

available, they deny the states and local communities the opportunity for

reaching full preparedness by not providing needed critical items in a

timely manner.

Correspondingly, if the Army and FEMA do not assist the states and local

communities in accurately identifying requirements in a timely matter and

determining the appropriate levels of funding, the states may not be fully

prepared when chemical demilitarization is set to start. Any delay in

achieving full preparedness could, in turn, delay the start of chemical

demilitarization operations and would potentially cost the Army millions

of dollars and jeopardize meeting the 2007 deadline. This unacceptable

scenario may call for increased federal funding and funding in a more

timely fashion.

 6

The Department of Defense uses this process as its primary decision structure to

determine program costs and requirements.
Page 12 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

The Army, with the assistance of FEMA and the states, began updating the

CSEPP life-cycle cost estimate in March 2000 and recalculating cost

estimates for fiscal years 2003-7. Army and FEMA officials said that the

estimate would increase by about $90 million. Though the revised cost

estimate was not available to us at the time of our review, FEMA and state

officials told us that not all the critical items that states will require nor the

associated funding for all needed items were included. Our discussions

with federal, state and local CSEPP officials identified several items,

costing at least $50 million, which were not included in the projected

procurement funding requirements. State officials told us that because of

population growth and unexpected equipment replacement needs, they

were not able to anticipate these critical needs. Such unfunded items

include a communications system for the counties and the state of Oregon,

the overpressurization of facilities in Alabama, and highway reader boards

(signs) in Indiana. FEMA officials told us they would try to add additional

funding needs to the revised cost estimate this summer. However, it is

unlikely that these additions will include all of the items needed in the

near future. These needed items have to be funded through new

appropriations. Though FEMA and the Army have some discretion to

reprogram or reallocate some funds for newly identified CSEPP needs,

this discretion is limited, and there are few available funds to reprogram to

meet unfunded requests.

In many cases, personnel in the local communities do not have adequate

experience and training to understand, identify, and prepare requests to

meet federal and state budget and cost estimates. Thus, FEMA officials

told us that state and local CSEPP officials have not always adequately

identified the critical items they will need. As a result, the latest cost

estimate is not sufficient to fund all critical items, and funding for the

program will have to be increased in order to procure all needed items to

achieve full preparedness.

Since the inception of the CSEPP program in 1989, the Army has provided

$761.8 million in funding. As figure 2 shows, the CSEPP off-post program

has received the bulk of program funds since its inception and is growing.

Most of the growth in program costs has been in FEMA’s off-post program,

while funding for the on-post program has stabilized at about

$30 million annually since fiscal year 1993. Typical on-post-funding

requirements include alert and notification and communication

equipment, as well as emergency operations personnel and training

expenditures. Likewise, off-post funding requirements encompass similar

expenditures plus public awareness activities and exercises. The Army’s

New Life-Cycle Cost

Estimate Understates

Future Requirements

Most CSEPP Program

Funds Support Off-Post

Activities
Page 13 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

on-post activities received $270.2 million, or about one-third of the

funding, and FEMA’s off-post activities received $491.6 million, or about

two-thirds. Of the total off-post amount, the states received about threefourths, or $368.9 million, and FEMA used the rest to fund its activities and

to purchase items for the states. (See app. II for further information on

CSEPP funding amounts and procedures.)

Figure 2: CSEPP’s Funding by On- and Off-Post Activities, Fiscal Years 1988-2000

Note: The Army’s on-post program began in fiscal year 1988, while FEMA’s off-post program was first

funded in fiscal year 1989.

Source: Our analysis of the Army funding documents provided by the Army Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization and the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command and FEMA.

In addition, both the Army and FEMA verified the amounts provided by the Army to FEMA.

The states received varying amounts of funding ranging from a low of

$6.2 million for Illinois to a high of $107.8 million for Alabama. (See fig. 3.)

Because each state had different emergency response capabilities when

the program began, FEMA uses the principle of “functional equivalence” to

guide resource allocation. Under this principle, FEMA provides each state

or local community with adequate assets to meet a level of response

capability agreed to by FEMA, the Army, and the states. Thus, FEMA and

the Army provide the states with levels of funding support according to

their requirements and mutually agreed-upon needs. For example, each

state should have emergency warning sirens; however, the number and

location of these sirens would depend upon local conditions and requests.

States Received Different

Amounts
Page 14 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Figure 3: Total CSEPP Funding by State, Fiscal Years 1989-2000

Note: The above amounts represent a combination of actual expenditures and available funding. See

table 2 in appendix II for more detail on the funds the states received.

Source: Our analysis of funding data provided by FEMA’s headquarters, the six FEMA regional

offices, and the 10 states.

The Army and FEMA have made significant progress in the last 4 years in

enhancing the states’ emergency preparedness. Three of the 10 states are

fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency, and 4 others are close

to being fully prepared. (See app. III for more details on each state’s

status.) In 1997, none of the states had attained all of the items deemed

necessary to respond to a chemical emergency. Despite significant

improvements in these states, more work is needed at the remaining three

states where issues about some critical items are still unresolved. One of

the counties in Alabama, Calhoun, has no agreed-upon response plan and

has not informed the public about the actions they may be directed to

take. This situation raises the question whether the county will be able to

adequately respond to a chemical emergency. Additionally, some state and

local emergency management officials indicated that until critical items

are in place, they will not support the Army’s initiation of the destruction

of chemical weapons at the stockpile site in their communities.

CSEPP Has Enhanced

Emergency

Responsiveness, but

Most States Still Not

Fully Prepared
Page 15 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

All the locations we visited indicated that their program has improved

since our June 1997 report. In 1997, none of the 10 states had attained all

of the program’s critical items considered necessary for emergency

preparedness; now 3 of the 10 states have. (See fig. 4.)

The three states (Maryland, Utah, and Washington) considered fully

prepared to respond to a chemical emergency individually cited several

reasons for their program’s success. For example, Maryland and

Washington state and local CSEPP officials indicated that their state had

an extensive disaster control program in place prior to CSEPP because of

their involvement in the Radiological Emergency Program.7

 In addition,

the Maryland state CSEPP director told us that an active cooperative

community effort, such as participation in integrated process team

meetings, helped CSEPP achieve its goals in Maryland. Utah’s and

Washington’s CSEPP officials indicated that communications,

cooperation, teamwork, and interpersonal relationships are the root of

their success in implementing CSEPP. Additionally, Washington state’s

CSEPP officials cited the inclusion of state and local CSEPP officials in

the budgeting process as contributing factors to the program’s success.

These three states, like the others, have ongoing needs for equipment

upgrades, equipment replacement, and/or expanding response capability.

For example, additional equipment such as sirens may be required to

accommodate a change in population growth. (For further information

about these additional needs in each state, see app. IV.)

 7

Because of the proximity of communities in Maryland and Washington to nuclear power

plants, those states follow federal guidelines issued by both the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Three States Now Fully

Prepared
Page 16 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Figure 4: Status of CSEPP-Funded Critical Items by State, February 2001

Note: States require different numbers of critical items to achieve a fully prepared emergency

response capability.

Source: Our analysis of data provided by FEMA, the Army, and state and county emergency

management agencies.

Four states (Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon) continue to lack all

the items critical for responding to a chemical emergency. But these states

have plans and actions in place to acquire the needed critical items by

2003. FEMA has either funded the items or has taken action to bring the

states into compliance with CSEPP guidance. In some cases, the items are

currently being distributed. Accordingly, we judged these states to be

progressing toward performance goals and full preparedness.

• Arkansas still has gaps in four of its critical items. For example, not all of

the personal protective equipment has been distributed to the emergency

Four States Are Close to

Full Preparedness
Page 17 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

responders. Additionally, two overpressurization projects8 will not be

completed until August 2002. The current tone alert radios9

 do not work as

intended and need to be replaced, and not all medical response personnel

have received the necessary CSEPP training.

• Colorado is in the process of distributing its tone alert radios. Once

Colorado completes this distribution effort, it will be considered fully

prepared.

• Illinois still has capability gaps in two of its critical items. Although FEMA

approved funding for 40 tone alert radios in February 2001, they have not

yet been delivered and distributed. And only one of three hospitals

participating in the program has a full supply of antidote.

• Oregon still has capability gaps in two of its critical items. The current

communications system is cumbersome to use and does not meet CSEPP’s

standards. A recent proposal to over-pressurize five facilities is under

review. Although not an item included in the assessment of CSEPP’s

preparedness by the Army and FEMA, the state also wants monitoring

equipment to analyze an area to determine if it is safe to enter after a

chemical accident.

The remaining three states (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) do not have

several critical items in place. It will require a major effort by the Army,

FEMA, and the states and their communities to have them in place in the

near future because the states have many unresolved issues concerning

these outstanding critical items. If these issues are not resolved shortly,

the start of demilitarization operations may have to be delayed. Army

efforts to destroy the stockpile within the Chemical Weapons Convention’s

mandated time frame may also be compromised. For example, plans are

for the Anniston, Alabama, site to be operational by March/April 2002—

some 9 to 10 months from now—requiring all critical items to be in place

by this date. Among the unresolved issues facing the three states are

controversies surrounding what facilities to over-pressurize, the number of

 8

An overpressurization system creates a higher air pressure inside a building so that no

outside air can enter the facility. This device allows people to remain safely inside during a

chemical accident.

9

A tone alert radio transmits to households in a response zone information about the

protective action they are to follow. They are placed in all houses and transmit the same

information as sirens in the zone.

Three States Lack Many

Critical Items and Have

Major Unresolved Issues
Page 18 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

highway reader boards to order, the number of shelter-in-place kits to

order, and the strategy for both evacuation and sheltering in place. Delays

have been attributed to issues such as (1) complicated projects that were

initially managed at the local level but were later assigned to a more

experienced entity to manage and (2) the lack of timely federal response

to requests.

• Alabama has major unresolved issues with FEMA and the Army and is

lacking five critical items (overpressurization, tone alert radios,

coordinated plans, CSEPP staffing, and shelter-in-place kits). There are

unresolved issues with two of these five items. Specifically, Army’s,

FEMA’s, and Alabama’s CSEPP officials have not agreed on how best to

address the state’s overpressurization projects and its coordinated plans.

State officials told us that Calhoun County and FEMA have not agreed on

the number of facilities requiring overpressurization systems. FEMA is

planning to over-pressurize some portion of 28 different facilities but has

funded only eight of these projects. FEMA advised us that it believes an

additional request by Calhoun County is without merit and not supported

by science. The issue of coordinated response plans centers on local

preference for a strategy of evacuation. Despite attempts by the Army and

FEMA to have the state and Calhoun County officials consider a strategy

combining evacuation and sheltering in place, Alabama’s overall

immediate response zone counties’ protective action strategy covered

evacuation only. In 1999, the Army funded a study that designed a strategy

with both evacuation and sheltering in place.10 Talladega county, Alabama,

uses the study’s guidebook to determine its response strategy. However,

Calhoun county’s CSEPP leaders and FEMA still do not agree on how to

incorporate and resource a strategy that includes shelter in place. As a

result, Calhoun county has not participated in FEMA’s outreach campaign.

In addition to five critical items, Alabama is also seeking additional sirens

and is considering requesting additional personal protective suits and

decontamination equipment. FEMA is in the process of reviewing the

request for the additional sirens.

• Indiana is lacking four critical items (personal protective equipment, tone

alert radios, mobile highway reader boards, and shelter-in-place kits).

Three of these items have been received but they are in storage and will

not be distributed until later in the year. Indiana has an unresolved issue

 10 Alabama CSEPP Protective Action Recommendation Guidebook, Innovative Emergency

Management, Inc. (Baton Rouge, La., Feb. 15, 2000).
Page 19 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

with its capability to use highway reader boards. According to state

CSEPP officials, the state had proposed using the Indiana Department of

Transportation’s mobile reader boards during a chemical emergency.

However, the transportation department decided that it could not share its

reader boards with CSEPP. Now, Indiana’s CSEPP managers say they need

additional funding to purchase reader boards for CSEPP. According to

FEMA officials, the agency has not received a request for highway reader

boards. Indiana is also seeking additional sirens and FEMA is in the

process of reviewing this request.

• Kentucky is lacking four critical items (overpressurization, tone alert

radios, coordinated plans, and medical planning). CSEPP officials and

FEMA have yet to resolve the issues involving overpressurization,

coordinated plans, and medical planning. Although two schools and one

hospital will be over-pressurized, state officials have identified at least

another 35 facilities that will require additional protection. FEMA and

state and local CSEPP officials have not agreed on the number of facilities

and type of protection they need. FEMA officials said the U. S. Corps of

Engineers has studied the need for overpressurization and will

recommend the number of facilities. Also, the state and counties are using

draft plans that have not yet been approved by state CSEPP officials.

Additionally, not all of the 13 hospitals that participate in the program

have the needed chemical antidotes. FEMA has not decided whether it will

provide funding to fully resource these hospitals. In addition to these four

items, Kentucky is seeking additional personal protective equipment,

decontamination equipment, and sirens. FEMA is in the process of

reviewing the request for these additional items.

Army and state CSEPP officials were concerned that without an approved

CSEPP response capability, states will delay the issuance of environmental

permits needed before the destruction of chemical weapons can take

place. In August 2000, the governor of Oregon appointed an executive

review panel to evaluate whether an adequate emergency response

program was in place and fully operational for any emergency arising from

the storage or destruction of chemical weapons at the Umatilla Chemical

Depot.11 The panel is expected to provide an interim recommendation in

 11The Oregon Executive Review Panel’s membership consists of representatives from

Umatilla and Morrow Counties, the States of Oregon and Washington, first responders,

mayors, Citizens Advisory Commission, Oregon Health Department, Environmental Quality

Commission, the Department of Environmental Quality, Oregon state police, Confederated

Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation.

States Want Emergency

Response Programs in

Place Before Destruction

of Chemical Weapons

Begins
Page 20 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

June 2001 and a final recommendation in October 2001 on whether the

governor should certify CSEPP as fully effective and operational. State

CSEPP officials were concerned that the lack of a CSEPP-approved

tactical communications system and the state’s need for equipment to

monitor for chemical agent will delay the issuance of environmental

permits in that state. FEMA officials however told us they had approved

funding for equipment to monitor for chemical agent.

Although Alabama does not have a CSEPP certification requirement, state

and county CSEPP officials told us they will not support the Army’s goal to

begin the destruction phase of the chemical demilitarization program until

critical CSEPP items are in place and fully operational. CSEPP officials in

Indiana and Kentucky expressed similar sentiments. The Program

Manager for Chemical Demilitarization has gone on record as being

committed to addressing local communities’ concerns regarding CSEPP’s

readiness to avoid delays in the start of demilitarization operations.

The Army and FEMA have improved their joint management of CSEPP

since our 1997 report, which found that no state was fully prepared and

cited several major management weaknesses. Since then, the Army and

FEMA have acted upon our recommendations. They have improved their

working relations with each other and have more clearly defined their

individual roles and responsibilities. They have not, however, been as

successful in their working relations with states and local communities.

FEMA, in particular, has not always taken a proactive approach to helping

states and their local communities with technical support, using best

practices, and disseminating information. FEMA has not provided as much

guidance as it could to help local communities fully understand all critical

aspects of the program. Thus, the local communities have not been able to

take advantage of all available resources, maximize coordination and

efficiency, and assume their place as full partners in the program.

Additionally, the national benchmarks and accompanying planning

guidelines for interpreting and assessing the program’s progress are

unclear. As a result, communities interpret the benchmarks differently and

apply different measures of capability. Moreover, the Army and FEMA

have failed to provide enough guidance on an essential element of the

program—reentry to areas potentially contaminated by chemical agents.

This lack of program guidance has caused uncertainty and concern among

state and local CSEPP officials.

FEMA’s and Army’s

Management

Relations Have

Improved, but

Relations With Some

States Are Still Poor
Page 21 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Since we reported on a number of management problems with CSEPP in

1997, FEMA and the Army have made considerable progress in how they

work together.12 Among the problems we reported on were that

(1) management roles and responsibilities were fragmented between Army

and FEMA offices and were not well defined, (2) planning guidance was

imprecise, (3) the budget process lacked coordination and

communications, and (4) financial data and internal controls were

inadequate. Partially in response to our recommendations, in October 1997

they signed a new memorandum of understanding that clarified their roles

and responsibilities in the program. This arrangement has greatly reduced

conflict in their direction and guidance of oversight. They also revised

benchmarks that are used to identify local communities’ needs and

progress. In addition, they use national planning guidance to shore up their

efforts to enhance accountability and performance.13

Since 1997, the Army and FEMA have both been placing greater emphasis

on public awareness and readiness campaigns. For instance, FEMA has

helped local communities establish procedures for the dissemination of

accurate and coordinated information in case of an emergency, and it has

established an “integrated process team” at each storage site to obtain

community input into initiatives. Also, FEMA and the Army have

established a site on the World Wide Web that provides a list of materials

that an emergency manager or planner can consult for basic information

about the program, including technical reports and publications. The Army

and FEMA have not, however, been able to develop the effective working

relations with all states and local communities that they developed with

each other.

FEMA and the Army have not been proactive in providing some muchneeded technical assistance, advice, and budget guidance. This void left

some state and local CSEPP officials in seven states without assistance in

areas where it was clearly needed. Three states and their communities are

still experiencing trouble carrying out their roles and have unresolved

issues. For example, many local CSEPP officials do not have either the

training or substantial expertise in chemical weapons, budgeting, or the

acquisition of very specialized high-tech equipment needed for emergency

 12See GAO/NSIAD-97-91.

13See Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

(CSEPP, May 17, 1996).

Federal Management

Problems Have Been

Addressed

FEMA and the Army Not

Always Proactive in

Providing Technical

Assistance
Page 22 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

response systems. Yet in spite of complaints by some local CSEPP officials

that they need more and better technical and budgetary assistance, Army

and FEMA officials have not always reached out to help communities

learn what they need, how to get it, or, most importantly, who they can

turn to for assistance. Army and FEMA officials said that they have

provided both general and specific information on many of these topics via

training opportunities, publications, and copies of exercise reports. But

because they view the program as primarily a state-managed endeavor,

they also normally rely on the state and local community officials to ask

for such assistance.

We found a number of cases where FEMA did not offer specific technical

assistance when local CSEPP officials were having difficulties with

complicated administrative processes or were unaware of available

options to meet requirements. For example, several local community

officials said they were unaware that various radio communication

systems (tone alert radios) and alert and notification (sirens) options are

available or that different states had varying experiences with contractors.

Similarly, various state officials said they needed additional technical risk

assessment assistance from the Army and FEMA to evaluate the toxic

properties of various stored chemicals and the potential adverse exposure

effects they may have on humans.14 Furthermore, several local community

officials said that unfamiliarity with federal contracting procedures and

accounting practices have caused unnecessary program delays and

confusion. Particularly in the case of CSEPP’s budgeting matters, the lack

of assistance and guidance has created delays in requesting needed items.

Many local CSEPP officials told us they still do not understand how the

Army’s budget process works and how to plan ahead for future

requirements and acquisitions. Without accurate and timely estimates,

program officials have difficulty determining how much funding they will

need and when they will need it.

We recognize the need for the Army and FEMA to give states and local

communities both flexibility and sufficient independence in carrying out

their programs. However, we believe that the Army and FEMA also have a

responsibility to fully inform state and local CSEPP officials of the types of

assistance the federal government is able and willing to provide. The

FEMA officials we spoke with agreed that some local CSEPP officials may

 14The National Resource Council is studying air borne chemical agent exposure limits for

the Army.
Page 23 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

not know of the types of assistance available, but said they had, in most

cases, responded to the local officials’ needs. FEMA officials said that,

starting in January 2001, they began to formally educate state and local

officials on budgetary issues through a seminar. However, this single

seminar did not reach all CSEPP staff in the states and local communities

and will need to be repeated. In commenting on a draft of this report,

FEMA said it is providing other budgetary assistance and guidance in the

form of additional instruction on topics such as federal grants and

financial processes. Most of these new initiatives had not been fully

implemented at the time we ended our review.

Although FEMA and the Army have both been placing greater emphasis on

public awareness campaigns, they have not always carried out effective

public information or awareness campaigns about CSEPP in local

communities. As a result, communities in some states are openly hostile or

suspicious of the overall aims and goals of the program and do not see it

as their own. Furthermore, FEMA has not taken the lessons learned from

some of the more successful states and applied them elsewhere to avoid

public relations problems or to increase overall understanding and

acceptance of the program.

One prime example of such problems has been the controversy in

Alabama over two different types of responses to a chemical emergency:

“shelter in place,” whereby people seek shelter in whatever building they

are in and take specific protective actions, and evacuation, which involves

leaving an area of risk until the hazard has passed and the area is safe for

return. Alabama’s local CSEPP communities had only planned for

evacuation for years. The Army funded the production of a guidebook

published in 2000 that provides emergency personnel with step-by-step

instructions to evacuate or shelter in place in the event of a chemical

accident or incident at the Alabama storage site. County officials claim

that the Army and FEMA have been trying to use the guidebook to

persuade them to adopt shelter-in-place strategies without addressing

several outstanding safety issues. The Army, which funded the guidebook

through FEMA under an existing Army contract at the request of the state

and counties, initially refused to endorse or assume any ownership of the

study. However, the Army acknowledged that local communities’

continued reservations to the idea of sheltering in place raised questions

about the whole CSEPP concept of sheltering-in-place. It has now formally

supported the guidebook, provided that its use does not hamper the

Army’s ability to meet mandated alert and notification times to the off-post

Ineffective Dissemination

of Information and Best

Practices
Page 24 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

community. The Army also announced that it would evaluate the

assumptions and scope of the guidebook for correctness and applicability.

Much of the controversy surrounding the study and its recommended

response strategy of sheltering or evacuation was due to poor relations

with the Calhoun county CSEPP officials. FEMA and Army officials did

not have a “partnered” strategy with local community participants and a

coordinated public information initiative on the study, thus causing a

public relations problem that placed both agencies on the defensive and in

a reactive, rather than proactive, mode. FEMA has had other controversies

that led to similar public relations problems, though not as severe, in

Indiana, Kentucky, and Oregon. At various times, some local community

leaders have been advocating a greater proactive role by the Army and

FEMA in public relations and team-building initiatives for the program—

not just for emergency planning, but also for the decision-making process

that comes before the planning and that requires local CSEPP officials’

involvement, support, and ownership. Strategies that include resources for

proactive information campaigns can be very effective in building local

CSEPP officials’ ownership.

FEMA has rarely leveraged the lessons learned from some of the more

successful state efforts and applied them elsewhere to increase

effectiveness while avoiding public relations problems. An example of a

successful approach that has not been used is FEMA’s very positive

experience in Oregon, where innovative management schemes and

practices were implemented to improve coordination, services, and local

community participation. We recommended such program coordination in

our 1999 report identifying strategies and results-oriented organizational

frameworks for enhancing the program’s implementation in Oregon.15

There, FEMA and the state of Oregon placed both of their CSEPP

representatives inside the local community (rather than at state or regional

headquarters) to provide a concrete and daily presence that is both

reassuring and more immediately effective. In addition, the state of Oregon

has organized a governing ruling board—composed of all key state and

local CSEPP officials—to provide more direction, coordination, and

oversight at the local level. All the Oregon CSEPP community participants

we spoke with expressed great satisfaction with this arrangement and

feelings of accomplishment, thanks to the new organizational structure.

 15See Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program for Oregon and Washington

(GAO/NSIAD-00-13, Oct. 26, 1999).
Page 25 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Although FEMA is not actively considering setting up or endorsing similar

structures elsewhere, officials said they had explored such an arrangement

in Alabama.

FEMA also has no plans to disseminate best practices or lessons learned

among the different states and communities. The Army and FEMA use the

quarterly meetings of CSEPP’s State Directors and annual gatherings of all

CSEPP stakeholders as an opportunity for participants to share

information and experiences. Only recently, in November, 2000, did FEMA

create a public affairs team to recommend ways to ensure that the public

is aware of protective action strategies. In addition, FEMA provides an

inventory of literature that may have implications for emergency

preparedness on a Web-site. This is not enough. If FEMA had a more

timely, proactive approach to sharing lessons learned with all 10 states and

had taken the initiative to apply them where unresolved issues were

slowing progress, the program would be farther along. A more proactive

management approach to share and apply success stories, such as with

special tone alert radios purchased by Arkansas, may have helped resolve

issues in Indiana.

The benchmarks FEMA uses to measure performance are not defined

consistently in the national planning guidance and in FEMA’s policy

papers. The information about the benchmarks in these documents

cannot be fully reconciled and used for measuring compliance.

Additionally, FEMA officials told us that the benchmarks were not

evaluated with the same standards in all states. This makes it difficult to

measure and compare performance or accountability and to identify

requirements correctly to assist in budgetary determinations.

The new and revised national benchmarks that FEMA issued in August

2000 identify both the items and processes necessary for full chemical

emergency preparedness. Also in 2000, FEMA and the Army issued

supplementary information (policy papers) to the national planning

guidance for the development of local emergency response plans.

However, the 1996 guidance does not consistently match the definition of

terms in the revised benchmarks. Furthermore, the guidance for

measuring compliance with the benchmarks (known as “community

profile” guidance) is not always internally consistent. For example, one

benchmark says that communities must have a “functioning

communications system” (so emergency personnel can talk to one

another) and another mentions a “functioning alert and notification

system” (to alert citizens of an emergency). But the community profile

Performance Measures

Vary Because Guidance Is

Inconsistent and Not

Standardized
Page 26 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

guidance does not specify what constitutes a functioning item, and the

1996 guidance cannot be traced to the definition of terms in the revised

benchmarks to determine what constitutes a functioning item.

The Army and FEMA believe that states are in the best position to

determine their priorities and requirements. They cite “functional

equivalency”—the concept that it is not necessary to provide every local

community with identical assets and resources, as long as the

community’s basic emergency management capabilities meet CSEPP’s

guidance. Thus, CSEPP policy allows benchmarks to be modified from

state to state as appropriate to address any unique community

circumstances. In some cases, however, states do need clarification on

the benchmarks and additional guidance in order to perform their

responsibilities. For example, at least three states (Alabama, Indiana, and

Kentucky) have had problems interpreting some of the benchmarks for

2000. And because there is limited guidance on how to measure the local

communities’ compliance with the benchmarks, state and federal

assessments are not standardized. Alabama, Oregon, and Utah, for

example, use different grading systems to measure local community

compliance. At the same time, FEMA’s regional offices have, at times, used

their own and different criteria for measuring compliance. Some state

officials expressed concerns about the lack of standardization of

benchmark measurement. For example, about the possible adverse

effects that this unevenness may have on funding in states with more

rigorous standards.

One of the areas where the Army and FEMA do not agree concerns

planning guidance for what is known as “reentry.” Reentry is the process

of determining if and when it is safe to return to a contaminated area or

leave shelters after a chemical accident. In 1996, we reported that the

planning guidelines for reentry were missing and needed to be developed.

Although the Army did develop draft guidance in 1997, 5 years later no

site-specific guidelines for reentry have been distributed or used.

Additionally, we found that no one at FEMA knew of generic (not sitespecific) guidance issued by the Army in 1997. Neither the Army nor

FEMA has endorsed or funded any technical or support studies to assist

local communities in planning for reentry. Currently, a working group,

FEMA and the Army Have

Not Completed Key

Planning Guideline
Page 27 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

composed primarily of state, local, and installation planners, is studying

reentry and recovery.16

The Army believes it has provided an adequate comprehensive framework

to communities for developing site specific plans to address reentry in any

given scenario. It said it has conducted classroom simulation exercises on

reentry with some communities. However, we do not believe the guidance

or exercises are sufficient. The guidance is not site-specific, and the

exercises are tabletop—not on-the-ground exercises—and have been

limited in number. State and local CSEPP officials do not agree that the

Army has provided sufficient guidance for their planning purposes.

The principal reason for inaction is a disagreement over whether reentry is

in fact part of the initial response to a chemical stockpile emergency, and

therefore part of CSEPP. If it is not considered an element of CSEPP, then

it is exclusively under the purview of the Army. While FEMA has been

largely noncommittal on the issue, Army officials insist that reentry must

be implemented and planned by the Army’s Service Response Force, 17 with

assistance from state and local officials. Army officials also believe that

because every emergency is different and unpredictable, there is no way to

assess local preparedness for reentry or make specific reentry plans until

an emergency actually happens. State and local CSEPP officials disagree

with the Army and have been working together on an interim conceptual

plan.

A 1994 planning concept paper on recovery from a chemical weapons

accident was prepared for the Army. But it contained only limited public

awareness information and no guidance based on it was distributed to the

states and their communities. The only guidance prepared by the Army has

not been distributed to the CSEPP community nor to FEMA officials we

interviewed. Furthermore, the guidance does not address the local CSEPP

officials’ concerns. The Army and FEMA have, thus, left unanswered a

number of questions on such issues as participants’ roles and

responsibilities, effective monitoring and verification schemes, and the

appropriate types of protective clothing that would be required.

 16 FEMA did not create this working group until December 2000, near the end of our

review. The group has formed five subcommittees to develop policy recommendations.

17An emergency response organization commanded by a general officer tasked with

performing and sustaining the Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance plan.
Page 28 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

While the Army and FEMA have made considerable progress in assisting

state and local communities to be fully prepared to respond to a chemical

emergency, thousands of people who live near at least three of the eight

chemical storage sites are still at a higher risk of exposure to a chemical

accident than necessary. Since the Army and FEMA have not always

actively assisted the states in determining their local communities’ CSEPP

needs, seven states have not been able to provide local emergency

responders with all the necessary items. Of these seven, three are still

seriously unprepared to respond to a chemical accident. The Army may

not be able to begin destroying its chemical agents at two of these sites on

schedule unless further improvements are made in the emergency

preparedness of those communities. As a result, residents will face higher

risks for a longer period, the Army may incur millions of additional dollars

to maintain the program beyond its projected completion date; and the

Army may not meet the Chemical Weapons Convention destruction

deadline.

To ensure that communities are safe and that demilitarization can begin on

schedule, the Army and FEMA need to move in a timely manner to apply

lessons learned and best practices to improve poor working relations with

these states and their communities, especially with those where

demilitarization of the stockpile is most threatened by delays. These

lessons include better guidance to the state and local CSEPP officials in

the three states with unresolved issues to determine needed critical items

and additional technical assistance to acquire them. In addition, the Army

and FEMA need to improve the accuracy of the life-cycle cost estimate for

CSEPP so that estimated funding is sufficient to procure all needed items

as quickly as possible. They also need to make the measurement of the

program’s benchmarks consistent in all states to better monitor

accountability and identify requirements correctly, and they need to

provide guidance and planning for reentry to all states and their

communities.

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army and the Director of the

Federal Emergency Management Agency adopt a more proactive approach

to improve working relations with Chemical Stockpile Emergency

Preparedness Program states and communities. Better relations would

help assure the states and their communities that all the necessary actions

will be taken to fully prepare them and keep them prepared to respond to

a chemical accident. Specific actions should (1) provide technical

assistance, guidance, and leadership to the three states with long-standing

issues to resolve their concerns, especially Alabama and its issues with

Conclusions

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Page 29 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

sheltering-in-place, evacuation, and the collective protection of facilities;

(2) provide all states and their communities with training and assistance in

preparing budget and life-cycle cost estimates and guidance and plans on

reentry; and (3) establish specific measures of compliance with the

benchmarks to more evenly assess performance and to correctly identify

requirements.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the FEMA and the Army generally

concurred with our recommendations.

In its comments, FEMA focused on the “need to capture and share lessons

learned and best practices” with local communities and cited a series of

very recent initiatives it has undertaken to do so. However, FEMA’s

characterization of this issue as one of our key concerns is incorrect.

Capturing and sharing lessons learned and best practices is only one of

several areas in which we believe FEMA and the Army need to become

more proactive. These include providing technical assistance, planning

guidance, and outreach.

FEMA also disagreed with our finding that three states are not fully

prepared to respond to a chemical emergency and claimed that the tables

in appendix III and IV show that all states are indeed fully prepared. FEMA

claimed that “the language in the body of the report does not accurately

reflect the GAO findings displayed in Appendix III and IV.” We disagree. As

our report and the tables in the appendices clearly show, seven states do

not have all the critical items they need to have in place and functioning in

order to respond to a chemical emergency—as FEMA’s own criteria (in

CSEPP guidance and in FEMA’s benchmarks) clearly state that they

should. The three states in question, furthermore, are even farther behind

in their preparedness than the other four. Furthermore, in its comments,

FEMA also acknowledged that Calhoun county, Alabama, is “far from

being fully prepared.”

The Army’s comments are included in their entirety in appendix V. FEMA’s

comments are reproduced in appendix VI.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

offices; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Assistant

Secretary of the Army (Installations & Environment); the Under Secretary

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 30 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

of Defense (Comptroller); the Director, Federal Emergency Management

Agency; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Please contact me at (202) 512-6020 if you have any questions. Key

contributors to this report were Donald Snyder, Joseph Faley,

Bonita Oden, James Ohl, and Stefano Petrucci.

Raymond Decker

Director, Defense Capabilities

 and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

During our review, we interviewed officials and obtained data from the

Department of Defense, including the Office of the Inspector General.

Within the Department of the Army, we interviewed and obtained data

from officials in the offices of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. In addition, we obtained data from

representatives of the Program Manager for the Chemical Demilitarization

Program and the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command.

Since we recently examined the Army’s on-post efforts, we focused our

efforts on FEMA’s off-post or civilian community activities.1

 Accordingly,

we met with officials of and obtained data from FEMA’s headquarters and

its regional offices concerned with CSEPP. Furthermore, we conducted

site visits and interviewed program officials at the Anniston Army Depot,

Alabama; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado;

Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana; Blue Grass Chemical Activity,

Kentucky; Edgewood Chemical Activity, Maryland; Umatilla Chemical

Depot, Oregon; and Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah. We either visited or

contacted state emergency management officials in the 10 states involved

in CSEPP: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,

Maryland, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.

The counties closest to the chemical stockpile storage sites, and therefore

the off-post areas most at risk during a chemical accident, are known as

the Immediate Response Zone counties. The adjacent counties, and the

areas with a lesser risk, are known as the Protective Action Zone counties.

Funding and time schedule restraints did not allow us to visit all of these

counties. However, we did interview emergency management officials in

all of the Immediate Response Zone counties. These counties are: Calhoun

and Talladega counties, Alabama; Grant and Jefferson counties, Arkansas;

Pueblo county, Colorado; Parke and Vermillion counties, Indiana; Madison

county in Kentucky; Morrow and Umatilla counties, Oregon; Tooele

county, Utah; and Benton county, Washington. The state of Maryland

refers to the at-risk area as the Emergency Planning Zone; we visited and

interviewed emergency management officials in Baltimore, Harford, and

Kent counties. We also visited and interviewed emergency management

officials in St. Clair, Alabama, and Pulaski, Arkansas, both of which are

Protective Action Zone counties.

 1

See Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in Program Accountability and

Financial Management (GAO/NSIAD-00-80, May 8, 2000).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

To assess FEMA’s financial management controls over CSEPP, we traced

the funding provided for this program from the Army through FEMA to the

states and local communities. We interviewed officials, obtained data, and

examined records to determine (1) the extent of CSEPP’s off-post funding

provided by the Army to FEMA for fiscal years 1989 through 2000,

(2) FEMA’s use of these funds, and (3) the funding FEMA provided for the

10 CSEPP states. For the fiscal years 1989 through 2000, we reconciled

CSEPP’s off-post funding that the Army stated it provided for FEMA with

the funding that FEMA stated it received from the Army. We similarly

reconciled the amount of funding FEMA stated that it provided for the

states with the amount of funding that the states stated they received from

FEMA. We initially wanted to determine the amount of funding used by

each of the 10 CSEPP states in terms of the CSEPP National Benchmarks.

However, we found that consistent and reliable data were not available,

especially for the earlier fiscal years, from either FEMA or the 10 CSEPP

states. We also attempted to determine the further distribution of the

funding provided to the states and to the local communities. However, not

all states were able to easily provide this information for the earlier fiscal

years, so we were unable to report these amounts.

In performing this review, we used the same accounting records and

financial reports that the Army, FEMA, and the 10 CSEPP states used to

manage and monitor the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness

Project. We did not independently determine the reliability of the reported

financial information. In some cases, because of the age of the financial

data collected, we had to rely upon oral statements and verified this

information to the extent possible and practical.

To determine the status of achieving CSEPP preparedness in communities

near the chemical weapons stockpiles and what remains to be done, we

started with our 1997 CSEPP report results.2

 Since our 1997 report, FEMA

has established new CSEPP National Benchmarks used to identify the

capabilities being funded and for the annual reporting to the Congress. In

our 1997 report, we considered 8 critical items and have since then, in

keeping with CSEPP’s evolving measures, considered 19 critical items

during this assessment. In determining our performance measures we, in

some cases, identified sub-elements within a benchmark and included

reentry. According to Army officials, reentry is not a CSEPP issue. Since

 2

See Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes needed in the Management of the Emergency

Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11, 1997).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

the Army and FEMA have yet to resolve their positions on reentry, we did

not consider it when determining whether a state is fully prepared. We did,

however, solicit comments regarding reentry planning from CSEPP

managers at the federal, state, and local levels. For our assessment of its

status, a state must have all its required items (with the exception of

reentry) in place and operational by February 2001 to be considered fully

prepared. (See table 4 and table 5 in app. III for a status update.)3

We then obtained FEMA’s latest categorization of the preparedness status

of the 10 CSEPP states as they relate to these CSEPP National

Benchmarks. We then visited each state except Illinois and discussed the

preparedness status of its program with the appropriate state emergency

management personnel. To the extent possible and practical, we also

contacted FEMA personnel from the appropriate FEMA regional offices as

well as county emergency management personnel. From this information,

we determined the preparedness status of each state’s program in terms of

how many critical items were in place and determined changes since our

1997 report. We then sent a structured questionnaire to the emergency

management personnel in the 10 states to confirm our analysis and obtain

their comments.

To ascertain how CSEPP lessons learned are developed and shared among

Army, FEMA, and the local communities and how this process might be

improved, we initially contacted the Army and FEMA. We discovered that

there is no formal, established CSEPP lessons learned process.

Accordingly, we asked Army, FEMA, state, and county officials for

examples of the lessons learned that they had shared with each other. We

also obtained their concerns and opinions about management issues

confronting the program.

 3

Our measure of preparedness was constant for each state. We found that when state and

federal assessments of a local community’s compliance with the national benchmarks was

made, the criteria often varied.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

We performed our review from November 2000 through April 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards,

except for limitations regarding financial information.
Appendix II: CSEPP’s Funding and Life-Cycle

Cost Estimates

Page 35 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Since the inception of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness

Program (CSEPP) in 1988, the Army has provided $761.8 million—

$509 million in operation and maintenance funding and $252.7 million in

procurement funding.1

 The Army-managed on-post activities at the eight

storage sites received $270.2 million (one-third) of the total. The Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-managed off-post activities

received $491.6 million (two-thirds) of the total. The off-post funds are to

be used to help the communities surrounding the storage sites in 10 states

enhance their emergency management and response capabilities in the

unlikely event of a chemical stockpile accident. The Army funds and

FEMA manages the procurement of the additional items needed to bring

each community to a CSEPP standard of preparedness. The Army has

made several life-cycle cost estimates for the program.

Of the $491.6 million provided for the off-post activities, FEMA used

$122.6 million (one-fourth) through fiscal year 2000, including some funds

used to support the efforts by the 10 states.2 This included $79.4 million

used by FEMA.

• $29 million of the operation and maintenance funding was used to support

FEMA’s headquarters and the six regional offices involved with CSEPP.

• $42.3 million of the operation and maintenance funding was used to

support planning, exercises, training, public affairs, and automation efforts

being performed by the CSEPP states.

• $8.1 million in procurement funding was also used to support the CSEPP

states’ efforts.

In addition, FEMA currently has $41 million in unissued funding—

$1.9 million in operation and maintenance funding for fiscal year 2000 and

$39.1 million in procurement funding for fiscal years 1998 through 2000.

Most of these funds will be issued to the states for their program efforts

 1

Operation and maintenance funds are available for obligation for 1 year (2 years starting

with fiscal year 2000) and procurement funds are available for obligation for 3 years.

Appropriation accounts are closed 5 years after the obligation period has expired.

2

Also included in the $122.6 million is $2.2 million ($1.2 million in operations and

maintenance funding and $1 million in procurement funding) consisting of (1) funding that

lacks supporting documentation for FEMA funding used in fiscal years 1989 through 1996

and (2) expired funding subsequently returned to the Treasury.

Appendix II: CSEPP’s Funding and Life-Cycle

Cost Estimates

Army Funds the

CSEPP Program

FEMA’s Use of OffPost Funds
Appendix II: CSEPP’s Funding and Life-Cycle

Cost Estimates

Page 36 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

with smaller amounts retained for FEMA’s headquarters and regional

offices.

The remaining $368.9 million, or 75 percent of the off-post total of

$491.6 million, was distributed to the 10 states, as shown in table 2.

Annually, each state prepares a budget proposal and, in essence,

negotiates a level of projects and funding with the appropriate FEMA

regional office. Then, the approved budget proposal is forwarded to

FEMA’s headquarters for further review and approval. Once approved,

FEMA’s headquarters prepares cooperative agreements with specific

activities, funding, and periods of performance for each state. On the basis

of these cooperative agreements, FEMA issues funds in increments

through the fiscal year to match the state’s budget proposal and agreed

upon activities. The funding provided is within the Army’s life cycle cost

estimate. In turn, the states disburses the funds received from FEMA to

the various state offices and local communities.

Table 2: CSEPP’s Funding by State, Fiscal Years 1989–2000

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Alabama Arkansas Colorado Illinois Indiana Kentucky Maryland Oregon Utah Washington Total

1989 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0 $0.8

1990 1.6 4.6 2.2 0.1 4.0 1.0 0.4 1.1 3.7 1.0 19.6

1991 1.3 3.3 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.5 0.6 11.6

1992 5.5 3.5 2.9 0.6 3.8 2.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.5 20.8

1993 9.9 1.5 1.4 0.4 0.9 5.3 7.7 8.1 7.0 8.3 50.6

1994 11.5 1.6 1.4 0.8 2.1 5.1 3.7 7.8 5.3 1.3 40.6

1995 16.0 4.7 3.6 0.7 1.3 3.8 3.7 3.9 2.8 3.9 44.4

1996 8.2 2.0 1.6 0.5 1.7 3.4 1.6 2.7 6.9 1.4 30.0

1997 6.0 1.9 1.4 0.6 1.6 4.0 1.5 5.4 4.6 1.7 28.7

1998 6.9 1.8 0.3 0.6 3.0 5.3 0 7.4 4.9 2.0 32.2

1999 34.8 2.5 1.7 1.0 3.2 2.1 0.9 4.4 4.8 1.5 56.8

2000 5.9 4.1 1.5 0.6 2.1 2.5 1.3 6.9 5.7 2.2 32.8

Total $107.8 $31.5 $19.3 $6.2 $24.2 $35.3 $22.5 $49.5 $48.3 $24.3 $368.9

Note: Funding as of September 30, 2000. The above amounts represent a combination of actual

expenditures and remaining funds. For earlier fiscal years’ appropriation accounts that are no longer

available for obligation or are closed, the amounts are actual expenditures incurred. These amounts

equate to the funding received less any unused funds returned to FEMA. For appropriation accounts

that are available for obligation or open, the amounts represent a combination of actual expenditures

and remaining funds available for obligation. In addition, numbers may not total because of rounding.

Source: Our analysis of funding data provided by FEMA’s headquarters, the six FEMA regional

offices, and the 10 states.
Appendix II: CSEPP’s Funding and Life-Cycle

Cost Estimates

Page 37 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Army funding provided through fiscal year 2000 included $509 million in

operation and maintenance funding and $252.7 million in procurement

funding, as shown in table 3 below. Of this amount, the Army managed onpost activities at the eight Army storage sites that received total funding of

$270.2 million.

The $761.8 million total funding from fiscal year 1988 through fiscal year

2000 is slightly below the Army’s projected funding. As part of an

acquisition program, the Army prepares a life-cycle cost estimate for

CSEPP. In 1997, the Army estimated the life-cycle cost of this program to

be $1,273.6 million (in 1997 current-year dollars). Of this amount,

$776.2 million ($536.4 in operation and maintenance funding and

$239.8 million in procurement funding) was incurred through fiscal year

2000, and the remaining funds are estimated costs through fiscal year 2010.

In 1999, the Army prepared a working life-cycle cost estimate that

reflected a slight decrease to $1,237.3 million (in 1999 current-year

dollars). This estimate included $781.7 million ($517.7 million in operation

and maintenance funding and $264.1 million in procurement funding)

incurred through fiscal year 2000, and the remaining funds are estimated

costs through fiscal year 2010. The 1999 working estimate is $19.9 million

above the $761.8 million in actual funding provided by the Army through

fiscal year 2000. In addition, the Army has an ongoing Defense Acquisition

Board Review whereby it and FEMA are undertaking a complete review of

the CSEPP life-cycle cost estimate through fiscal year 2009 to more

adequately address required resources-based upon requirements

established by the various on-and off-post entities.

Table 3: CSEPP’s On- and Off-Post Funding by Operation and Maintenance and Procurement Categories, Fiscal Years 1988–

2000 (as of Oct. 1, 2000)

Dollars in millions

On-post funding Off-post funding Total funding

Fiscal year O&M Procurement Total O&M Procurement Total O&M Procurement Total

1988 $2.5 $0 $2.5 $0 $0 $0 $2.5 $0 $2.5

1989 2.4 2.3 4.7 1.0 5.6 6.6 3.4 7.9 11.3

1990 4.0 8.2 12.2 9.9 21.6 31.5 13.9 29.7 43.7

1991 6.3 3.3 9.6 13.6 14.3 27.8 19.8 17.6 37.5

1992 10.0 1.8 11.8 15.2 13.2 28.4 25.2 15.0 40.2

1993 24.5 6.6 31.1 26.7 29.2 55.8 51.2 35.8 87.0

1994 19.6 3.5 23.1 27.5 20.8 48.2 47.1 24.3 71.3

1995 23.7 0 23.7 30.2 2.3 32.5 53.9 2.3 56.2

1996 30.0 3.4 33.3 26.9 19.6 46.5 56.8 22.9 79.8

Life-Cycle Cost

Estimates and Army

Funding Through

Fiscal Year 2000
Appendix II: CSEPP’s Funding and Life-Cycle

Cost Estimates

Page 38 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Dollars in millions

On-post funding Off-post funding Total funding

Fiscal year O&M Procurement Total O&M Procurement Total O&M Procurement Total

1997 27.5 0.2 27.7 29.0 21.5 50.5 56.5 21.7 78.2

1998 30.5 0.4 31.0 32.7 26.3 58.9 63.2 26.7 89.9

1999 28.5 1.2 29.7 28.7 12.1 40.8 57.2 13.3 70.5

2000 28.1 1.7 29.8 30.2 33.9 64.1 58.4 35.6 93.9

Total $237.6 $32.6 $270.2 $271.5 $220.1 $491.6 $509.0 $252.7 $761.8

Legend:

O&M = operation and maintenance

Note: Funding as of September 30, 2000. The Army’s on-post program began in fiscal year 1988

while FEMA’s off-post program was first funded in fiscal year 1989.

Numbers may not sum to total because of rounding.

Source: Our analysis of the Army’s funding documents provided by the Army Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization and the Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command and FEMA. In

addition, both the Army and FEMA verified the amounts provided by the Army to FEMA.
Appendix III: CSEPP’s Performance Measures

and Critical Items

Page 39 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

This appendix reviews the development of the CSEPP benchmarks used

by the Army and FEMA to measure the program’s status and guide

funding. We used subcategories of these benchmarks—specific critical

items—to measure the program’s status in 2001. Overall, half of the

needed items are in place in all the states. In 1997, none of the critical

items were in place in all the states.

As CSEPP has developed, its performance measures have expanded. In

1993 and 1996, the Army and FEMA issued CSEPP benchmarks and

program guidance that identified off-post items critical to respond to a

chemical stockpile emergency. Specifically, the National CSEPP

Benchmark guidance issued in 1993 identified nine items needed for

emergency preparedness: alert and notification system, emergency

operations center, communications system, automated-data-processing

system, training programs, exercise programs, community involvement

(for public information and education), CSEPP personnel, and

coordinated plans.

The CSEPP National Planning Guidance, dated May 6, 1997 supplements

this list by describing various aspects about each needed item so that it

meets CSEPP’s standards. For example, the 1993 benchmark lists the need

for a functional communications system; the planning guidance further

states that the system must be reliable with at least two independent

methods of simultaneous communications to protect against equipment

failure.

In August 2000, FEMA and Army issued CSEPP Policy Paper Number 18,

which reaffirms the 1993 guidance and adds three additional benchmarks

that include administrative support, medical program, and protective

action strategy. And, according to the FEMA CSEPP FY 2000 Annual

Report to Congress (Dec. 15, 2000), personal protective equipment,

decontamination equipment, and medical preparedness are needed for

operations at the CSEPP sites. These items are now considered in the

program’s benchmarks.

We used the Army’s and FEMA’s guidance to measure whether the 18

critical items were in place, were being put in place, or were not agreed to

by the states and local communities, the Army, and FEMA. In our 1997

assessment, we considered eight critical CSEPP items. Since that report,

we have added 10 more items needed to meet CSEPP’s guidance for full

preparedness. Some of our critical items are subcategories of the CSEPP

Appendix III: CSEPP’s Performance

Measures and Critical Items

Army and FEMA

CSEPP Performance

Measures Have

Evolved

GAO’s Performance

Measures
Appendix III: CSEPP’s Performance Measures

and Critical Items

Page 40 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

benchmarks. For example, in table 4, we divide the CSEPP benchmark

alert and notification system into the following categories: sirens, tone

alert radios, and highway reader boards. We also included reentry, for a

total of 19 items considered.

To judge preparedness, we looked at 18 critical items to determine if they

were in place and operational (we excluded reentry in this analysis

because it does not affect the ability to respond to an emergency). If an

item met the requirements that the states, communities, and FEMA and

the Army had agreed to, we measured its status as “Yes.” If the states and

communities were in the process of acquiring the item, we measured it as

“Partial.” If the item was not in the process of being acquired and there

was no agreement to obtain it, then it was measured as “No.” In cases

where a state had a critical item in place but required additional

equipment, such as sirens to place near newly constructed housing, we

coded the status as “Yes*.” This means that the initial requirement had

been met, but as the benchmark item was being completed, needs had

changed and more of the item was requested.

We found that 9 of the 18 CSEPP-funded items are in place and operational

in all states where the item was part of the preparedness requirements.

Table 5 compares the eight items we reported on in 1997 and in 2001 and

shows only four of eight items in place and operational in all states.

Table 6 contains the additional 10 items we reviewed and shows 5 of 11

items in place and operational.

Table 4: Critical Items Measure States’ Emergency Preparedness

Critical items Performance measure used In GAO’s assessment

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Measure: document that all alert and notification components are in place and operational.

Automated data processing Measure: determine whether the on- and off-post emergency operations centers have

functional automated-data-processing systems.

Communications system Measure: determine whether a CSEPP standard communication system is in place and

operational.

Coordinated plans Measure: determine whether coordinated plans are approved and exercised.

Emergency operations center

• joint information center

Measure: document that a functional emergency operations center is in place for each

immediate response zone county and that the state has a joint information center.

Exercise program Measure: document that approved exercise programs are in place and have been utilized.

Medical support

• decontamination units

Measure: identify the number of hospitals participating in the program; determine whether

medical staff have received CSEPP training; and determine the availability of antidote, if

applicable.

Determine if required decontamination units are in place and operational.
Appendix III: CSEPP’s Performance Measures

and Critical Items

Page 41 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical items Performance measure used In GAO’s assessment

Personnel vacancies/CSEPP staffing Measure: determine if all CSEPP-funded positions are filled.

Personal protective equipment/suits Measure: determine if personal protective suit components are in place and operational.

Protective actions

• overpressurization projects

• shelter-in-place kits

Measure: determine if work on identified facilities requiring overpressurization has been

completed.

Determine if required shelter-in-place kits are in place and operational.

Public outreach/education

• community involvement

• public awareness campaign

Measure: determine if there is a mechanism in place for citizens to voice their concerns

regarding the program.

Determine if state and counties sponsor CSEPP calendars, brochures, pamphlets,

newsletters, and other similar materials to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Measure: document that approved training programs are in place and have been utilized.

Reentry planning Measure: document that the state and counties have a reentry plan.

Source: FEMA’s guidance on benchmarks.

Table 5: Status of Eight Critical CSEPP-Funded Items in 1997 and 2001

Program

element

Alabama

and

counties

Arkansas

and

counties

Colorado

and

county

Illinois

and

counties

Indiana

and

counties

Kentucky

and

counties

Maryland

and

counties

Oregon

and

counties

Utah

and

counties

Washington

and county

Automated

data

processing

system

1997 status

2001 status

P

Y

P

Y

P

Y

P

Y

P

Y

P

Y

P

Y

P

Y

P

Y

P

Y

Emergency

operations

centers(s)

1997 status

2001 status

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

P

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

Communications

system

1997 status

2001 status

P

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

Y

Y

P

P

P

Y

Y

Y

Personal

protective

equipment

1997 status

2001 status

P

Y*

N

P

N

Y

N

Y*

N

P

N

Y*

N

Y

Partial

Y*

Y

Y*

N

Y

Decontamination

equipment

1997 status

2001 status

P

Y*

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y*

P

Y

N

Y Y

N

Y
Appendix III: CSEPP’s Performance Measures

and Critical Items

Page 42 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Program

element

Alabama

and

counties

Arkansas

and

counties

Colorado

and

county

Illinois

and

counties

Indiana

and

counties

Kentucky

and

counties

Maryland

and

counties

Oregon

and

counties

Utah

and

counties

Washington

and county

Overpressurization

projects

1997 status

2001 status

N

P

Y

P

N

NR

NR

NR

N

Y

NR

P

Y

Y

N

P

NR

NR

NR

NR

Sirens

1997 status

2001 status

Y

Y*

Y

Y*

N

Y

NR

NR

Y

Y*

Y

Y*

P

Y

N

Y*

Y

Y*

Y

Y

Tone alert

radios

1997 status

2001 status

N

P

N

P

N

P

NR

N

N

N

P

P

N

NR

N

Y

P

Y

N

Y

Legend:

Y (Yes) means that the CSEPP-funded item is fully operational and meets standards

Y* (Yes*) means item is in place. However, there is a new requirement for additional items; local

communities are acquiring the additional capability

P (Partial) means that local community is in the process of acquiring the capability to fulfill an earlier

requirement

NR means that the state and counties do not have a requirement for the CSEPP item

N (No) means the state and counties do not have the required CSEPP item, although funding may

have been approved

Note: Status as of February 2001

Source: 1997 information is from our prior report, Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in

the Management of the Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11, 1997).

Information for 2001 is based on our analysis of data provided by FEMA, the Army, and state and

county emergency management agencies.

Four of the eight CSEPP-funded items evaluated in our 1997 report are in

place and operational in all 10 states. Since the time of our 1997 report, all

10 states have acquired CSEPP-approved automated data processing

systems and emergency operations centers. In addition, the initial

requirement for sirens and decontamination equipment has been funded

and items are in place and operational. However, some states have

identified a need to expand their capability in these two areas to

accommodate changes in local demographics, such as population growth,

and to replace outdated equipment.

In some locations, the remaining four items—overpressurization projects,

personal protective equipment, tactical communications systems, and tone

alert radios—are in varying stages of readiness.
Appendix III: CSEPP’s Performance Measures

and Critical Items

Page 43 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Table 6: Status of 11 Other Critical CSEPP-Funded Items

Program

element

Alabama

and

counties

Arkansas

and

counties

Colorado

and

counties

Illinois

and

counties

Indiana

and

counties

Kentucky

and

counties

Maryland

and

counties

Oregon

and

counties

Utah

and

counties

Washington

and

counties

Coordinated

preparedness/

response

plans P Y Y YYP Y YYY

Community

involvement

program YY Y YYY Y YYY

CSEPP

staffing P Y Y Y Y Y Y Y* Y Y*

Exercise

program YY Y YYY Y YYY

Joint

information

center YY Y YYY Y YYY

Highway

reader boards Y Y Y NR N Y Y Y Y* Y

Medical

planning /

equipment YP Y PYP Y YYY

Public

awareness

program YY Y YYY Y YYY

Shelter-inplace kits N NR NR NR N Y NR Y Y Y

Training Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Reentry

planning NN P NNN N NPP

Legend:

Y (Yes) means that the CSEPP-funded item is fully operational and meets standards

Y* (Yes*) means the item is in place. However, there is a new requirement for more of this item

P (Partial) means the local community is in the process of acquiring the capability to fulfill an earlier

requirement

N (No) means the state and counties do not have the required CSEPP item, although funding may

have been approved

NR means that the state and counties do not have a requirement for the CSEPP item

Note: Status as of February 2001

Source: Our analysis of data provided by FEMA, the Army, and state and county emergency

management agencies.
Appendix III: CSEPP’s Performance Measures

and Critical Items

Page 44 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Five of the 11 other CSEPP-funded items are in place and operational. All

10 states have CSEPP-approved community involvement, exercise, and

training programs in place. They also have functional joint information

centers and on-going public awareness campaigns. The other six items

(coordinated plans, CSEPP staffing, highway reader boards, medical

planning/support, shelter-in-place kits, and reentry plans) are at varying

stages of completeness.

CSEPP federal managers have not prepared guidance on reentry planning.

Some local officials have begun to plan on their own for reentry after a

chemical accident. For example, CSEPP managers in Colorado, Utah, and

Washington have indicated that they have preliminary local community

plans in place. These plans identify the roles and responsibilities of state

emergency response agencies during the reentry phase. We measured the

status of this item by whether the local communities and/or the state had

developed a plan. All state CSEPP officials told us they are eager for

FEMA to issue reentry guidance and they want to have nationally

approved CSEPP coordinated plans. However in commenting on our draft

report, the Army believes it has adequately provided a comprehensive

framework to the communities for developing site specific plans to

address the reentry and restoration for any given scenario and said it has

recently begun classroom simulation exercises on reentry and restoration

with some CSEPP communities
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 45 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

This appendix presents the results of our review of the emergency

preparedness in the 10 CSEPP states. For each state, we list the 19 critical

items and provide our assessment of each. We include a summary of the

condition of each item in each state, on the basis of our observations and

interviews with state and local CSEPP officials in the state. The status of

the critical items is discussed for each state in alphabetical order within

the categories of fully prepared, progressing, and unresolved issues. Table

7 presents our summary of the comments of state and local CSEPP

officials we talked to concerning the status of the 19 critical items in the

states.

• Maryland’s CSEPP officials said that the state had an extensive disaster

control program in place prior to CSEPP because of its involvement in the

Radiological Emergency Program.1

 It’s easier to plan for a chemical event

in Maryland because only one chemical agent (mustard) is stored in bulk

in Maryland and according to the Army, mustard agent is the most stable

and least toxic agent in the U.S. stockpile. The local CSEPP officials

credited the mitigation activities undertaken by the Army that reduced the

“at risk” population from 333,000 to 55,000. In addition, the Maryland State

CSEPP director told us that a cooperative community effort, such as

participation in the integrated process team (a group of key CSEPP

personnel that focus on a particular issue), helps CSEPP achieve its goals

in Maryland.

• Utah’s CSEPP officials said that communications, cooperation, teamwork,

and interpersonal relationships are the root of Utah’s success in

implementing CSEPP. For example, Utah integrated all of the affected

parties and entities into its CSEPP effort early in the program to facilitate

effective communications and foster good working relationships amongst

the CSEPP stakeholders.

• Washington state’s CSEPP officials said that like Maryland it too had an

extensive disaster control program in place prior to CSEPP because of its

involvement in the Radiological Emergency Program. And like Utah,

Washington’s CSEPP officials cite good coordination among all

 1

Because of the proximity of some locations to nuclear power plants, they follow federal

guidelines for radiological emergency preparedness issued by both the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

States That Are Fully

Prepared
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 46 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

participating agencies and the inclusion of state and local CSEPP officials

in the budgeting process as contributing factors to the program’s success.

• Arkansas still has gaps in five of its critical items. For example, not all of

the personal protective equipment has been distributed to the first

responders. According to state CSEPP officials, the overpressurization

project at the local high school is underway and expected to be completed

in August 2001. The elementary school project is in the design phase, and

its estimated completion date is August 2002. FEMA approved the

overpressurization project for an elementary school for $2.25 million.

According to a state CSEPP official, 15 additional sirens are needed and

FEMA is reviewing this issue. The current tone alert radios do not work as

intended, and Arkansas has $2.5 million to replace them. Medical training

is ongoing. Thus far not all medical response personnel have received the

necessary CSEPP training.

• Colorado is in the process of distributing its tone alert radios. Once

Colorado completes this distribution effort, it will be considered fully

prepared.

• Illinois still has capability gaps in three of its critical need items. For

example, a state CSEPP official indicated that the state has a need for

additional replacement personal protective suits and FEMA is reviewing

this issue. Although FEMA approved funding for 40 tone alert radios in

February 2001, they have not yet been delivered and distributed in

Vermillion County. In addition, only one of three hospitals participating in

the program has a full supply of antidote.

• Oregon still has capability gaps in five of its critical items. The current

communications system, consisting of a high-banded very high frequency

radio, is cumbersome to use and does not meet CSEPP’s standards. A

450-megahertz communications system project has been studied and

approved. Its estimated cost is $7.2 million; FEMA is committed to funding

the project, which is expected to be complete no later than August 2002. A

proposal for five additional overpressurization projects is under review.

The state and counties identified a need for additional personal protective

suits, sirens, and CSEPP staff. FEMA will then validate the need for more

suits and it has funded a sound propagation study to validate the need for

the seven additional sirens requested. FEMA officials said they will

consider the need for more staff. Oregon has also recently requested

chemical-monitoring equipment to allow reentry after a chemical accident.

States That Are

Progressing Toward

Full Preparedness
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 47 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

• Alabama has at least two unresolved issues involving overpressurization

projects and coordinated plans, resulting in gaps in its emergency

response capability. State officials told us that Calhoun County, the Army,

and FEMA have yet to agree on the number of facilities requiring

overpressurization systems.2

 Calhoun County requested that more than 130

facilities be over-pressurized. Excluding the emergency operations

centers, currently there are no facilities in the immediate response zone

that have been over-pressurized. According to FEMA officials, they are

planning to over-pressurize some portion of 28 different facilities but has

only funded eight of these projects. Part of the delay in these projects was

due to the limited procurement experience of the county. The projects

were turned over to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to manage, and

work has begun on five schools.

• Another unresolved issue in Alabama centers around its coordinated

emergency response plans. Despite the Army’s attempt to have the state

and Calhoun county consider a strategy including both evacuation and

sheltering, Alabama’s overall immediate response zone counties’

protective action strategy remained for evacuation only. As early as

November 5, 1993, the Army informed the local emergency management

directors of both of Alabama’s immediate response zone counties that an

evacuation-only strategy may not be feasible. In 1999, the Army funded a

study to produce a guidebook with step-by-step instructions to Alabama

county emergency personnel on how best to respond to a chemical

emergency. The study supported the Army’s position that a strategy of

evacuation and shelter-in-place provided the safest response to a chemical

incident. Talladega county, Alabama, uses the guidebook to determine its

emergency response strategy. However, Calhoun county’s CSEPP leaders

and FEMA still do not agree on how to incorporate and fund the

guidebook strategy. FEMA is in the process of funding Alabama’s shelterin-place kits, providing the resources to purchase additional sirens, hiring

additional staff, and supporting a public awareness campaign.

• In Indiana, it isn’t clear whether FEMA will provide more funding for

highway reader boards. According to state CSEPP officials, the state now

needs more funding for highway reader boards, which FEMA approved

earlier. The state later reprogrammed the funds in support of another

 2

An overpressurization system creates a higher air pressure inside a building so that no

outside air can enter the facility. This device allows people to remain safely inside during a

chemical accident.

States With

Unresolved Issues
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 48 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

CSEPP project but was hoping to use the Indiana Department of

Transportation’s reader boards during a chemical emergency. However,

the transportation department decided that it did not have enough reader

boards for CSEPP to use. Now Indiana’s CSEPP managers are in need of

more funding to purchase this capability. The state is also now considering

purchasing shelter-in-place kits, but FEMA has not yet provided funding.

FEMA is also funding personal protective equipment.

• Kentucky’s CSEPP officials and FEMA have yet to resolve issues involving

enhanced sheltering projects, coordinated plans, and medical planning.

Although 2 schools and 1 hospital will be over-pressurized, the state

identified over 35 facilities that will require enhanced sheltering. FEMA

and state and local CSEPP officials have not yet finalized the number of

facilities. Also, CSEPP needs school buses to be placed by two schools to

evacuate students during an emergency. Additionally, the state and

counties are using draft plans that have not yet been approved. A state

CSEPP official we interviewed was unaware of a target date for final

approval. Additionally, of the 13 hospitals that participate in the program,

only about half have the needed chemical antidote. Local CSEPP officials

are concerned that FEMA has not acted in a timely fashion to fill this gap.

FEMA has not decided if it will provide funding to fully outfit these

hospitals.

Table 7: Detail on 10 States’ CSEPP Preparedness, February 2001

Alabama

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radio

• reader boards

Yes*

Partial

Yes

CSEPP provided 98 sirens off-post. Alabama now needs additional sirens.

Tone alert radio distribution is currently under way.

Three highway reader boards have been funded and procured.

Automated data processing Yes The Emergency Management Information System and the Federal Emergency

Management Information System are installed in the state and counties. The state

and three counties use the Federal Emergency Management Information System. The

remaining three counties, along with the Anniston depot, use the Emergency

Management Information System.

Communications system Yes The CSEPP-approved automated telephone dialing system, dedicated phone lines,

and 800-megahertz communication system are complete and operational.

Coordinated plans Partial Plans are in place and have been exercised; questions remain on how to best

incorporate evacuation and sheltering protective action strategies.

Emergency operations

center

• joint information center

Yes

Yes

Calhoun and Talladega County Emergency Operation Centers have been in operation

since 1994.

The Joint Information Center is located at the former Ft. McClellan and has been used

during exercises.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 49 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale and alternate year

exercises. They also participate in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident Response

and Assistant exercises.

Medical support

• decontamination units

Yes

Yes*

Nine hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided for the

emergency medical staff, and the antidote is available.

CSEPP purchased five units; they are operational. More funding is needed to

purchase additional decontamination units.

CSEPP’s staffing/personnel

vacancies

Partial All CSEPP positions are filled. FEMA recently provided Calhoun County with funding

for five additional full-time equivalent positions. According to county officials, three

more full-time equivalent positions are still needed to perform the 24-hour manning

task.

Personal protective

equipment/suits

Yes* CSEPP purchased over 2,000 suits for emergency workers in Alabama. A need for

additional suits has been identified.

Protective actions

• overpressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

Partial

No

The Army is constructing over-pressurization systems in five schools in Calhoun

County. FEMA is planning to over-pressurize a total of 28 facilities in Alabama.

However, local CSEPP officials have additional facilities they want FEMA to consider.

FEMA approved the request for shelter-in-place kits. There are no kits in the Alabama

communities at this time.

Public outreach/education

• community involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities

to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning No After the closing of Ft. McClellan, Alabama was left without a reentry plan.

Arkansas

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Yes*

Partial

Yes

CSEPP provided 58 sirens; 38 are off-post. Arkansas wants additional sirens.

The tone alert radios are experiencing mechanical problems and must be replaced.

CSEPP provided six highway reader boards.

Automated data

processing

Yes The Emergency Management Information System and the Federal Emergency

Management Information System are installed in the state and counties; the

Emergency Management Information System is used regularly.

Communications system Yes CSEPP’s approved automated telephone dialing system, dedicated phone lines,

and 800-megahertz communication system are complete and operational.

Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised.

Emergency operations

center

• joint information center

Yes

Yes

The immediate response zones have fully operational emergency operations

centers.

The joint information center is located in Jefferson County and has been used

during exercises.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 50 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale and alternate-year

exercises. They also participate in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident Response

and Assistant exercises.

Medical support

• decontamination units

Partial

Yes

Twenty-three hospitals participate in the program; some medical emergency staff

have not received CSEPP training. The antidote is available.

CSEPP purchased 13 units; they are operational.

CSEPP staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes All CSEPP positions are filled. The state would like to convert some part-time

positions to full-time.

Personal protective

equipment/suits

Partial CSEPP purchased 2,030 suits for first responders in Arkansas. These suits have

not all been distributed to the first responder agencies. A need for additional suits

has been identified.

Protective actions

• over-pressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

Partial

NR

White Hall High School project is not complete, and the Moody Elementary School

project is in the design phase.

Arkansas did not request shelter-in-place kits; they are not required at this time.

Public outreach/education

• community involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the

communities to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning No Arkansas does not have a reentry plan at this time.

Colorado

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Yes

Partial

Yes

CSEPP provided 19 sirens; 13 are off-post. No additional sirens are needed at this

time.

Tone alert radio distribution is under way. These radios have not all been distributed

to the local community.

CSEPP provided five highway reader boards.

Automated data

processing

Yes The state and county have both the Emergency Management Information System

and the Federal Emergency Management Information System; each is operational.

The State uses a Department of Energy hazardous prediction model regularly, while

the county uses the Emergency Management Information System regularly.

Communications system Yes CSEPP’s approved automated telephone dialing system, dedicated phone lines,

and 800-megahertz communication system are complete and operational.

Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised.

Emergency operations

center

• joint information center

Yes

Yes

The immediate response zone has a fully operational emergency operations center.

The joint information center is located at the University of Southern Colorado and

has been used during exercises.

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale, and alternate-year

exercises. They also participate in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident Response

and Assistant exercises
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 51 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Medical support

• decontamination units

Yes

Yes

Two hospitals participate in the program, and training has been provided for the

emergency medical staff. Antidotes are not necessary, because of the type of agent

stored in Colorado.

CSEPP purchased four units; they are operational.

CSEPP staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes All CSEPP positions are filled. The state noted that it is difficult to attract and retain

highly qualified automation specialists.

Personal protective

equipment/suits

Yes CSEPP purchased more than 600 suits for first responders in Colorado. Most have

been provided to the first responder agencies.

Protective actions

• over-pressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

NR

NR

The state, with FEMA’s input, decided that overpressurization was not required,

given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community. However,

this protection was offered only to the residents living nearest to the stockpile.

The state, with FEMA’s input, decided that shelter-in-place kits were not required,

given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community. The kits

were provided to residents living nearest to the stockpile.

Public outreach/education

• community

involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional. Also, the Sierra Club has

expressed its interest in the program.

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities

to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning Partial Colorado’s CSEPP team formalized a reentry plan with Army/FEMA/EPA in March

1999 and conducted full-scale reentry Alternate Year Exercise in April 2000. This is

not considered a nationally approved plan.

Illinois

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

NR

No

NR

There is no requirement for sirens in the protective action zone.

FEMA funded 40 tone alert radios in February 2001; they are not yet in place.

The state does not have a requirement for highway reader boards.

Automated data

processing

Yes The state has both the Emergency Management Information System and the Federal

Emergency Management Information System; each is operational. However, the

states and counties use the Emergency Management Information System regularly.

Communications system Yes The CSEPP-approved 800-megahertz communication system is complete and

operational. The state also uses a high-band radio frequency, pagers, and the radio

amateur civil emergency service. A dedicated hotline system is now being installed.

Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised.

Emergency operations

center

• joint information

center

Yes

Yes

The emergency operations centers are fully operational.

Illinois uses the facility in Indiana. The joint information center is located in Rockville,

Indiana, and has been used during exercises.

Exercise program Yes The state participates in federally managed full-scale and alternate year exercises.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 52 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Medical support

• decontamination units

Partial

Yes

Only one of three hospitals is stocked with the needed antidote; more antidote is

needed.

CSEPP purchased 10 units; they are operational.

CSEPP

staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes All CSEPP positions filled.

Personal protective

equipment

Yes* CSEPP provided funding to purchase 400 suits for first responders in Illinois. The

state identified a need for additional suits for their replacement cycle.

Protective actions

• over-pressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

NR

NR

The state, with FEMA’s input, decided that overpressurization was not required,

given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community.

The state along with FEMA’s input decided that shelter-in-place kits were not

required, given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community.

Public

outreach/education

• community

involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

Illinois does not have its own Citizens Advisory Commission but has representation

on the Citizens Advisory Commission in Indiana.

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities

to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning No Illinois does not have a reentry plan.

Indiana

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Yes*

No

No

CSEPP provided 27 off-post sirens. Indiana may now needs additional sirens.

Tone alert radios distribution has not begun; they are now stored in a warehouse.

CSEPP intended to use the state department of transportation’s mobile reader

boards. However, they are not available for CSEPP to use.

Automated data

processing

Yes The state and counties have both the Emergency Management Information System

and the Federal Emergency Management Information System; each is operational.

However, they use the Emergency Management Information System regularly.

Communications system Yes The CSEPP approved 800-megahertz communication system is complete and

operational. The state also uses a high-band radio frequency and is considering

using an automated telephone dialing system and cellular telephones. Phase one of

their microwave system is almost complete.

Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised.

Emergency operations

center

• joint information

center

Yes

Yes

The emergency operations centers are fully operational.

The joint information center is located in Rockville, Indiana and has been used during

exercises.

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale and alternate year

exercises. The state also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident

Response and Assistant exercises.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 53 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Medical support

• decontamination units

Yes

Yes

One hospital participates in the program, training has been provided to the

emergency medical staff, and the antidote is available. New antidote kits have been

ordered to replace expired kits. Although Indiana’s in place medical support meets

our criteria, the local CSEPP officials expressed concern about the contracted

ambulance service. It will not transport contaminated victims because it has no

proper way to clean the vehicle. The Veterans’ Administration in Danville, Ill., will

provide the ambulance service.

CSEPP provided 22 units; they are operational.

CSEPP

staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes All CSEPP positions filled.

Personal protective

equipment

Partial Only 32 of 200 suits have been distributed, distribution is ongoing.

Protective actions

• overpressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

Yes

No

The Vermillion County jail is over-pressurized. The state is considering overpressurizing two schools located in the immediate response zone.

The counties have the funding needed to purchase the sheltering kits. Indiana has no

sheltering kits in place at this time.

Public

outreach/education

• community

involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional.

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities

to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning No Indiana does not have a reentry plan at this time

Kentucky

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Yes*

Partial

Yes

CSEPP provided 29 all are in the immediate response zone. According to the state,

five additional sirens will be installed in July 2001.

The tone alert radio distribution has not been completed. The local communities plan

to complete distribution by September 2001.

CSEPP provided three highway reader boards.

Automated data

processing

Yes The Emergency Management Information System and the Federal Emergency

Management Information System are installed in the state and counties; the

Emergency Management Information System is used regularly.

Communications system Yes CSEPP’s approved automated telephone dialing system is in five of nine counties.

Kentucky also has dedicated phone lines and an 800-megahertz communication

system; both are complete and operational.

Coordinated plans Partial Coordinated plans are still in draft form; they have not yet been approved.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 54 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Emergency operations

center

• joint information

center

Yes

Yes

The emergency operations centers are fully operational.

The joint information center is located across from the emergency operations center

in Madison County. It has been used during exercises.

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale and alternate year

exercises. It also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident Response and

Assistant exercises

Medical support

• decontamination units

Partial

Yes*

Thirteen hospitals participate in the program. Only half the hospitals have the needed

antidote and more medical training is required.

CSEPP purchased 13 units; they are operational. Madison County wants to purchase

three Wells Fargo storage trailers to accompany the decontamination units.

CSEPP

staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes All requested CSEPP positions are funded.

Personal protective

equipment/suits

Yes* CSEPP purchased over 1,000 suits. The state identified a need for 200 additional

suits for replacement and training.

Protective actions

• overpressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

Partial

Yes

The Army is installing overpressurization systems at two schools and one hospital. At

least 35 additional facilities will need other forms of enhanced sheltering capability,

such as the installation of carbon filters. In addition, Kentucky will use prepositioned

school buses to evacuate children if an incident occurs during school hours. FEMA is

planning to fund this effort.

The shelter-in-place kits distribution began Dec. 2000.

Public

outreach/education

• community

involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional.

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities

to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning No Kentucky does not have a reentry plan at this time.

Maryland

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Yes

NR

Yes

CSEPP provided 15 sirens; 9 are off-post. They are in place and operational.

Tone alert radios are no longer required because of the Army implementing effort to

reduce the risk of an incident occurring at the stockpile site. The population “at risk”

was reduced from 333,000 to 55,000.

CSEPP did not provide highway reader boards; this capability was in existence prior

to CSEPP.

Automated data

processing

Yes The Emergency Management Information System and the Federal Emergency

Management Information System are installed in the state and counties; the

Emergency Management Information System is used regularly.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 55 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Communications system Yes CSEPP’s approved automated telephone dialing system is in place. Maryland also

has dedicated phone lines, an 800-megahertz communication system, cellular

telephones, and pagers. The state has access to the radio amateur civil emergency

service.

Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised.

Emergency operations

center

• joint information center

Yes

Yes

The emergency operations centers are fully operational.

The joint information center is located across from the emergency operations center

in Madison County. It has been used during exercises.

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale and alternate-year

exercises. It also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident Response and

Assistant exercises

Medical support

• decontamination units

Yes

Yes

Six hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided, and no antidote

is required given the chemical agent stored at the stockpile site.

CSEPP purchased two units; they are operational.

CSEPP staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes All CSEPP positions are filled. The state noted that it is difficult to attract and retain

highly qualified automation specialists.

Personal protective

equipment/suits

Yes CSEPP purchased over 400 suits. The suits have been distributed to the state’s first

responder agencies.

Protective actions

• overpressurization

projects

shelter-in-place kits

Yes

NR

Army collective protection specialists are working to enhance the overpressure

capability at one of the four schools that have this system.

Shelter-in-place kits are no longer required due to the Army implementing effort to

reduce the risk of an incident occurring at the stockpile site. Population “at risk” was

reduced from 333,000 to 55,000

Public outreach/education

community involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

A Maryland Citizens Advisory Commission and Maryland Community Integrated

Process Team are in place and functional.

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the

communities to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning No Maryland does not have a reentry plan at this time.

Oregon

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Yes*

Yes

Yes

CSEPP provided 49 sirens, 42 are off-post. A new study is under way, the state

estimates there is a need for at least five additional sirens.

Tone alert radios have been distributed.

CSEPP provided nine highway reader boards.

Automated data

processing

Yes Only the Umatilla depot has both he Emergency Management Information System

and the Federal Emergency Management Information System. Both are fully

operational. The state and counties use the Federal Emergency Management

Information System regularly.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 56 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Communications system Partial The state and counties have a tactical radio system in use on a set of VERY HIGH

FREQUENCY frequencies. However, it does not meet CSEPP’s standards. FEMA is

funding the state’s requirement for a 450-megahertz system.

Coordinated plans Yes Coordinated plans (incident command system) were approved January 2001

Emergency operations

center

• joint information

center

Yes

Yes

The emergency operations centers are fully operational.

The joint information center is collocated with the Umatilla County Emergency

Operations Center. It has been used during exercises.

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale and alternate year

exercises. It also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident Response and

Assistant exercises.

Medical support

• decontamination units

Yes

Yes

Three hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided, and the

antidote is available.

CSEPP purchased four units; they are operational.

CSEPP

staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes* All CSEPP positions are filled. The county requested a full-time equivalent position

for a systems administrator, and Morrow County would like CSEPP to provide five bicounty positions whose funding is currently shared with the county.

Personal protective

equipment

Yes* CSEPP purchased 500 suits. The state indicated that there is a need for 300

additional suits and some extra-large sized suits.

Protective actions

• overpressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

Yes*

Yes

CSEPP over-pressurized 12 schools, 2 hospitals, and 1 nursing home. FEMA will

fund five additional facilities to be outfitted with an overpressurization system. In

addition to having overpressurization capability, local CSEPP officials have requested

monitors to determine if chemical agent is present.

The shelter-in-place kits have been distributed.

Public

outreach/education

• community

involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

A Citizens Advisory Commission and governor-appointed executive review panel are

in place and functional.

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities

to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning No Oregon does not have a reentry plan at this time.

Utah

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Yes*

Yes

Yes*

CSEPP provided the off-post community with 37 sirens. A recent study validated the

need for 22 additional sirens.

Tone alert radios were distributed to every household in the immediate response

zone.

FEMA funded a recent request for nine reader boards.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 57 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s

assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Automated data

processing

Yes The state and counties have both the Emergency Management Information System

and the Federal Emergency Management Information System. Both are fully

operational. The state and counties use the Federal Emergency Management

Information System regularly.

Communications system Yes CSEPP’s approved automated telephone dialing system is in place. Utah also has

dedicated phone lines, an 800-megahertz communication system, and pagers. The

state has access to the radio amateur civil emergency service.

Coordinated plans Yes Coordinated plans are in place and operational.

Emergency operations

center

• joint information center

Yes

Yes

The emergency operations centers are fully operational.

The joint information center is located at the former Officers’ Club at the Tooele

Army Depot. It has been used during exercises.

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale and alternate year

exercises. It also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident Response and

Assistant exercises.

Medical support

• decontamination units

Yes

Yes

Three hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided, and the

antidote is available.

CSEPP purchased four units and is in the process of purchasing one more; they are

operational.

CSEPP staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes All CSEPP positions are filled.

Personal protective

equipment/suits

Yes* CSEPP purchased 300 suits; they are operational and have been provided to first

responder agencies. Replacement suits are now needed.

Protective actions

• overpressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

NR

Yes

The state, with FEMA’s input, decided that overpressurization was not required,

given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community.

The shelter-in-place kits were distributed with the tone alert radios.

Public outreach/education

• community

involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

Utah has a Citizens Advisory Commission in place and operational.

Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities

to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning Partial The state indicated that it has a two-step initial plan in place but said that FEMA or

the Army does not financially support it.

Washington

Critical item

GAO’s assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Alert and notification

• sirens

• tone alert radios

• reader boards

Yes

Yes

Yes

CSEPP provided 20 off-post sirens.

The tone alert radios were distributed to every household in the immediate

response zone.

The state has 10 highway reader boards.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP’s Critical Items

in 10 States

Page 58 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Critical item

GAO’s assessment,

Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials

Automated data

processing

Yes The state and county have both the Emergency Management Information System

and the Federal Emergency Management Information System. Both are fully

operational. The state and counties use the Federal Emergency Management

Information System regularly.

Communications system Yes CSEPP’s approved automated telephone dialing system is in place and

operational. Washington also has a high-band radio frequency system, dedicated

phone lines, an 800-megahertz communication system, and pagers. The state has

access to the radio amateur civil emergency service.

Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised.

Emergency operations

center

• joint information center

Yes

Yes

The emergency operations centers are fully operational.

The joint information center is collocated with the Umatilla County Emergency

Operations Center. It has been used during exercises.

Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-scale, and alternate-year

exercises. They also participate in quarterly Chemical Accident/Incident Response

and Assistant exercises.

Medical support

• decontamination units

Yes Five hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided, and the

antidote is available.

CSEPP purchased seven units; they are operational.

CSEPP

staffing/personnel

vacancies

Yes* All CSEPP positions are filled. The county is seeking an additional full-time

equivalent position for automation support. The state noted that it is difficult to

attract and retain highly qualified automation specialists.

Personal protective

equipment

Yes The state has more that 300 suits; they are in place and operational.

Protective actions

• overpressurization

projects

• shelter-in-place kits

NR

Yes

The state, with FEMA’s input, decided that over-pressurization was not required,

given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community.

Shelter-in-place kits were distributed with the tone alert radios.

Public

outreach/education

• community

involvement

• public awareness

campaign

Yes

Yes

Washington does not have its own Citizens Advisory Commission but has

representation on the Citizens Advisory Commission in Oregon and has

representation on the Oregon’s governor-appointed executive review panel.

Brochures, newsletters, and other similar materials are being used in the

communities to educate the public about CSEPP.

Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP’s standards are in place and offered regularly.

Reentry planning Partial Washington has a preliminary plan in place but it states that the Army and FEMA

do not support it.
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 59 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Appendix V: Comments From the

Department of Defense
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 60 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 61 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons
Appendix VI: Comments From FEMA

Page 62 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons

Appendix VI: Comments From FEMA
Appendix VI: Comments From FEMA

Page 63 GAO-01-850 Chemical Weapons (350002)

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