No. 03-14-00635-CV

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IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________

MICHAEL LEONARD GOEBEL AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 

207 CAZADOR DRIVE, SAN MARCOS, TEXAS 78666,

Appellants,

v.

SHARON PETERS REAL ESTATE, INC.,

Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW, HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 14-0385-C

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APPELLEE’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AS MOOT

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Dr. J. Hyde

Texas Bar No. 24027083

THE J. HYDE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

111 E. 17th Street #12015

Austin, TX 78711

Telephone: (512) 200-4080

Fax: (512) 582-8295

E-mail: jhyde@jhydelaw.com

Counsel for Appellee

ACCEPTED

03-14-00635-CV

4505486

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

3/16/2015 10:07:10 AM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/16/2015 10:07:10 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
2

No. 03-14-00635-CV

__________________________________________________________________

IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________

MICHAEL LEONARD GOEBEL AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF 

207 CAZADOR DRIVE, SAN MARCOS, TEXAS 78666,

Appellants,

v.

SHARON PETERS REAL ESTATE, INC.,

Appellee.

__________________________________________________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW, HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 14-0385-C

__________________________________________________________________

APPELLEE’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AS MOOT

__________________________________________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellee/Plaintiff Sharon Peters Real Estate, Inc., (“Peters”) by and through 

undersigned counsel, respectfully files this reply in support of its motion to dismiss 

this appeal as moot, and in support thereof states as follows:

1. As explained in Peters’ underlying motion to dismiss, Appellant 

Goebel’s appeal of the county court’s judgment granting Peters immediate 

possession of the real property at issue is moot because the writ of possession has 
3

been issued and executed, Goebel is no longer in possession of the property, and 

Goebel has no claim of right to current possession. McDonald v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. 

Ass’n, No. 03-13-00770-CV, 2014 WL 1433061, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 

10, 2014, order) (mem. op.) (“An appeal from a forcible-detainer action becomes 

moot if appellant is no longer in possession of the property, unless the appellant 

holds and asserts ‘a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual 

possession’ of the property.” (quoting Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San 

Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006))). 

2. In his response to the motion to dismiss, Goebel argues that his points 

of error on appeal—both of which implicate the county court’s alleged lack of 

jurisdiction to render the judgment of possession—amount to a claim of right to 

current possession. They do not. 

3. First, Goebel asserts that Peters, who was not the prevailing party in 

the justice court, failed to timely perfect an appeal to the county court that rendered 

the judgment currently on appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.9 (“A party may appeal a 

judgment in an eviction case by filing a bond, making a cash deposit, or filing a 

sworn statement of inability to pay with the justice court within 5 days after the 

judgment is signed.”). As noted in Peters’ motion to dismiss, this assertion lacks 

merit for the reasons stated in Peters’ response to Goebel’s “Motion for Emergency 
4

Stay of Writ, or, in the Alternative, Writ of Re-entry,” which this Court denied.1 

But even assuming (erroneously) that Peters did not properly perfect an appeal and 

that the county court thus lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment of possession, 

the fact remains that the judgment was executed and Goebel is no longer in 

possession of the property. And the county court’s purported lack of jurisdiction to 

award possession to Peters has nothing whatsoever to do with whether Goebel has 

a right to “current, actual possession” of the property.

4. Goebel appears to confuse Peters’ right to obtain a judgment of 

possession (which he claims was rendered in error) and Goebel’s own right to 

possess the property. Following the foreclosure sale of the property to Peters and 

at all times relevant to this eviction, Goebel’s occupancy status was that of a tenant 

at sufferance. (CR 192; Exhibit 5 to Motion to Dismiss). Such status gives him no 

right to current possession.

5. Goebel also asserts that he is entitled to possession as the prior owner 

of the property because the foreclosure sale was allegedly invalid. But Goebel’s 

challenge to Peters’ title, which he is currently pursuing in an independent suit in 

 1 Goebel now appears to argue that Peters was required to pay a $500 bond under Rule 506. TEX.

R. CIV. P. 506.1(b) (“A plaintiff must file a $500 bond.”). Rule 506, however, is the general rule 

governing appeals from the justice court, and the provision regarding the amount of the bond 

conflicts with the more specific rule governing appeals in evictions. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.9(b) 

(“The justice court judge will set the amount of the bond or cash deposit to include the items 

enumerated in Rule 510.11.”). Rules 510.9 and 510.11, not Rule 506.1, apply to the amount of 

the bond required to appeal an eviction to the county court.
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district court, has no place in this case and again gives him no potential right to 

current possession.

6. As argued in the motion to dismiss, this Court’s case law is 

abundantly clear that alleged defects in a foreclosure sale do not deprive the justice 

and county courts of jurisdiction over an eviction brought by the purchaser against 

the occupant/prior owner where the deed of trust provides for a landlord/tenant-atsufferance relationship. See, e.g., Wilder v. Citicorp Trust Bank, F.S.B., No. 03-

13-00324-CV, 2014 WL 1207979 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 18, 2014, pet. dism’d 

w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (noting that this Court “has consistently held that defects in the 

foreclosure process cannot be used either to negate a landlord-tenant relationship 

provision in a deed of trust or to raise a question of title depriving the justice or 

county courts of jurisdiction to resolve the question of immediate possession”). 

Instead, a “displaced property occupant” like Goebel “is entitled to bring a separate 

suit in district court to resolve any title issues.” Rodriguez v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 

No. 03-10-00093-CV, 2011 WL 182122, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 6, 2011, 

no pet.) (mem. op.); Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). 

7. Goebel’s “separate suit” challenging the foreclosure sale is currently 

pending in the Hays County District Court at Cause No. 14-0878. (CR 243). In the 

event final judgment is eventually rendered in his favor on his title claim in that 
6

case, he may be entitled to obtain possession of the property at that time. 2 But the 

claims asserted in that case have no bearing on his entitlement to “current, actual 

possession of the Property,” which is the relevant inquiry in an eviction. To put it 

another way, if Goebel were to file a forcible-detainer action today seeking 

immediate possession of the property, he would have no grounds to support it. 

Accordingly, any error by the trial court in rendering the judgment of possession—

jurisdictional or otherwise—simply does not amount to a live issue in this appeal.3

8. In sum, because Goebel is no longer in possession of the Property, and 

because he has no potentially meritorious right to current, actual possession of the 

Property, Goebel’s appeal of the judgment of possession is moot. Marshall, 198 

S.W.3d at 787.

WHEREFORE, Peters respectfully requests that the Court GRANT its

motion to dismiss and dismiss this appeal as moot.

 2 Although that case was initially filed back in June 2014, Goebel has done little to pursue his 

claims on their merits. Instead, the majority of his filings in that case have involved attempts to 

restrain the underlying eviction. Indeed, Goebel did not even add the foreclosing beneficiary as 

a party defendant until November 2014 after Peters filed a motion to compel the joinder of the 

beneficiary under Tex. R. Civ. P. 39.

3 As noted in the motion to dismiss, Peters has waived and abandoned any right it may have to 

collect on the county court’s award of costs in the judgment. Thus, that award does not preserve 

a live issue for this appeal.
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Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ J. Hyde

______________________________

Dr. J. Hyde

State Bar No. 24027083

THE J. HYDE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

111 E. 17th Street #12015

Austin, Texas 78711

Phone: (512) 200-4080

Fax: (512) 582-8295

E-mail: jhyde@jhydelaw.com

Attorney for Appellee 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5 and 

Local Rule 4(d), a copy of Appellee’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss 

Appeal as Moot was served on this 16th day of March, 2015, via e-service, upon 

the following:

David Rogers

1201 Spyglass, Suite 100

Austin, TX 78746

/s/ J. Hyde

______________________________

Dr. J. Hyde