United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 6, 2019*

Decided February 6, 2019

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐2086

JAMES E. MANLEY,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

KEITH BUTTS,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:16‐cv‐03292

Tanya Walton Pratt,

Judge.

O R D E R

Indiana inmate James Manley petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under   

28 U.S.C. § 2254 to contest the discipline he received—loss of earned good‐time credits

and demotion to a lower credit‐earning class—after a hearing officer at New Castle

Correctional Facility found him guilty of being a “habitual conduct rule violator.” The

district court denied Manley’s petition, concluding that Manley received due process

during his disciplinary proceedings. We agree and affirm the judgment.

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐2086    Page 2

In 2016, a prison disciplinary officer charged Manley with being a “habitual

conduct rule violator,” which the Indiana Department of Corrections defines as an

inmate who has been found guilty of five “unrelated” Class C conduct offenses within

six months. See IND. DEP’T OF CORR., MANUAL OF POLICIES & PROCEDURES, No. 02–04–101,

App. I: Offenses, at 3 (June 2018), www.in.gov/idoc/files/02‐04‐101%20Appendix%20I%

206‐4‐2018.pdf.). The conduct report specified six convictions that Manley had accrued

over a six‐week period, each for refusing a housing assignment in violation of the

Department’s disciplinary code section C‐356. Manley was notified of the charge later

that day and was given a printout listing the underlying offenses and dates of

conviction; the six charges were grouped and adjudicated at disciplinary hearings held

on three different days before hearing officer Tyrone Thompson.

At a hearing on the habitual‐violator charge, Thompson found Manley guilty.

Thompson rejected Manley’s argument that several of the predicate offenses were

“related” because more than one of the disciplinary hearings had been held on the same

day; he deemed the six offenses “unrelated” based on the underlying conduct reports,

which showed that each violation occurred on a different day. In one of its standing

orders, the facility defines multiple assignment‐refusal offenses as “unrelated” if the

refusals occur on different days. As a result of the conviction, Manley lost 90 days of

good‐time credit and was demoted to a lower credit‐earning class.

Manley appealed to Warden Keith Butts, challenging this disciplinary decision

on several grounds, including the adequacy of the notice for his hearing and the

accuracy of the conduct report. Butts denied Manley’s administrative appeal, as did the

state appeal review officer.

Manley then petitioned for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The

district court denied his petition as well as his subsequent motion to alter or amend the

judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).

On appeal, Manley first contends that Thompson was not impartial because he

reviewed the underlying conduct reports. But examining the factual basis for guilt, and

then determining that such a basis exists, does not amount to bias or an impermissible

investigation. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2003). Thompson

appropriately reviewed the earlier reports to establish the dates of the qualifying

offenses and thus determine whether the habitual‐violator charge was supportable.
No. 18‐2086    Page 3

Manley next argues that he did not receive sufficient notice that his repeated

refusal to accept housing assignments would render him a habitual‐rule violator

because he did not learn of the standing order defining “unrelated” until after his

hearing. But Manley did not raise this argument in his habeas petition, so it is deemed

waived. See Ben‐Yisrayl v. Neal, 857 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2017). In any event, even

without specific awareness of the standing order, Manley reasonably could be expected

to understand that multiple refusals of direct orders—given by a variety of officers on

different days—are not “related” offenses in the commonsense meaning of the word.

Third, Manley contends that he received inadequate administrative review of the

disciplinary decision because Butts did not specifically address the arguments that

formed the basis of his appeal. To the extent that Manley was entitled to meaningful

review at the administrative level, he received it. The warden’s response was not

“merely pro forma.” Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 320 (7th Cir. 1992). Rather, Butts

generally addressed the substance of Manley’s arguments when he stated that he had

reviewed the conduct report, the disciplinary record, and Thompson’s findings; found

no procedural errors that would have impeded the hearing or appeal process; and

concluded that the conduct report and the evidence in the record supported both the

charge and the sanctions imposed.

Finally, Manley argues that his habitual‐violator conviction violates equal

protection. He points to the Department’s executive directive—issued while his habeas

petition was pending—that bars disciplinary convictions for a different C‐356 offense

(refusing to participate in a state sex‐offender program) from supporting a habitual‐

violator charge. In Manley’s view, “equal protection” requires that this directive apply

to all C‐356 violations, including refusals to accept a housing assignment. But prison

administrators may treat inmates differently so long as their basis for doing so is

“rationally related to a legitimate penological interest.” Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990,

991 (7th Cir. 2016). And it is reasonable for the Department to treat inmates who refuse

to partake in a therapeutic program differently from those who refuse to comply with

direct orders regarding prison housing assignments.

     AFFIRMED