### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 24, 200 6
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JERM EIL R ALP H TA RTE R

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty

No. S48596 Jerr y Scott, Judge

No. E2005-01013-CC A-R3- CD - F iled March 8, 2006

The de fenda nt, J erme il Tarter , was convicted of one count of sale of m ore than .5 g rams of c ocaine wi thi n o ne tho us a ndfe e t of a sch oo l, one c ou nt o f d e liv e ry of mor e than . 5 g rams o f c oc a ine wi thi n on e tho us a nd fe e t of a sc ho ol, a ndon e c ou nt o f p os se ssi on of mor e than . 5 g rams o f c oc a ine wi thi n one thousand fe et o f a s ch o ol. The trial court initi ally merg ed the c onvictions for delivery and possession of coc aine into the convic tion for the sale o f co ca ine and then later dismissed the convictions for de livery

of coc aine a nd possession of coc aine

. T h e trial c ourt imposed a Rang e I sentenc e of twe nty

y ear s in the Depa

rtment of Correc tion. I n this appeal, the de fenda nt asserts that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support the convic tions, that the t rial court err ed by permitting the surveillance tape to be a dmitted into evidence, a nd that the trial c o u rt err ed by permitting the prosec utor to vouch for

the truthfulness of the s tate' s witnesses. The state challeng es on appe al the trial court' s ru ling dismissing the c onviction for possession of c ocaine . The c onvictions and sentenc e are aff irmed. The judg ment of the trial c ourt dismissi ng the convictions for delivery and possession of c oc a ine is r e ve rs e d. Th e jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n f or sa le of mo re than . 5 g rams o f c oc a ine is modified to show that the convictions for delivery of more than .5 g rams of c ocaine and possession of mor e than . 5 g rams o f c oc a ine ha ve be e n me rg e d in to o ne jud g me nt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nts of the Trial Court Affi rm ed in p art; Reve rsed in part; Modif ied

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., deli v ered the opinion of the cour t, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

L arry R. Dillow, Kingsport, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, J erme il Tarter

.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt At torne y Ge ne ra l; and Joseph E. Perrin, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION-2-

On No ve mbe r 1 4, 20 03 , O ff ic e r Fre dd ie Ai ns wo rth o f the F ir st Judic ia l D ist ri c t D ru g Ta sk For ce pa rticipated in an investigation c onducted by the Second Judi cial District Dr ug Task F orce

. Of fi c e r A ins wo rth, wh o w a s w or kin g un de rc ov e r w ith a

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a nt, Dor is Sal y e rs , te sti fi e d th a t he wa s p ro vid e d $ 10 0 in mark e d b ill s a nddir e c te d t o a r e sid e nc e on Se vie r S tr e e t in King sport. Other of

fice rs nea r the re sidence set up audio an d video re cording equipment. Upon their ar rival at the residence, Ms. Saly ers approac hed a white male, a sked for "Ca thy ," and learned that she was not the re. At that point, the defe ndant, a black male, approa ched them an d Of fi cer Ainsworth aske d the def

endant f or " a buck," which he de scribed a s street sla n g for " a Hundr ed Dollars ($100.00) worth." Acc ording to the office r, the defe ndant then " pulled a medicine bottle out of one of his pockets and he shook out . . . four rocks." Offic er Ainsworth rec alled that " [t ]here wa s sti ll 2 0, 25 ro c ks

. . . in the me dic ine bo ttl e , th e sa me c olo r andsh ape as wha t he had pu t in to m y hand." He g ave the defe ndant $100 and then le ft. The of fice r later g av e t h e s ubstance s to Ag ent Eddie Ne lson.

Af te rw ard , O ff

ic e r A insw orth s e le c te d th e de fe nd a nt, a bla c k ma le , f

ro m a ph oto g ra ph ic lineup, explaining that he wa s ninety perc ent ce rtain of the identification. He stated that later, w hen he eve ntually

saw the defe ndant in person at the pr eliminary hearing, he became one hundr ed per cent
certain of his identification.

Offic er Cliff F erg uson of the King sport Police Depa rtment, who had known the defe ndant for a pproxi mately eig ht y ear s and was familiar with his phy sical appe ara nce, vie wed the vide otape of the tra nsaction and ide ntified the def endant a s th e i n d i v idual who sold coca ine to Offic er Ainsworth. Off

icer Fe rg uson also saw a

digitally enhanc ed ver sion of the videotape which "t o ok some of the g lare off of " the imag es. He expressed ce rtainty that the def

endant wa s the perpe trator.

Offic er Eddie Nelson of the Second J udicial District Drug Task F orce , who had pr ovided Offic er A insworth with money to make the c ontrolled purcha se, confirme d his rece ipt of the coc aine from Of fice r Ainsworth. He rec alled that he pla ced it in a se aled envelope and mailed it to the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation L ab in Knoxvil le. Offic er N elson testified that at the r equest of the assistant district attorney , he sent the origina l videotape r ec o rd i n g of the tra nsaction to the Reg ional Org anized Crime I nformation Center to have the qua lityenhanc ed.

Steven Hobbs of the Re g ional Org anized Crime I nformation Center in N a s h v il le

te s ti f ie d that he re vie we d a nddig iti zed the vid e ota pe

. He state d that he re du c e d th e g a mma se tti ng s in or de r t o re mov e so me of

the g lare . H ob bs e xpla ine d th a t heus e d a vid e o e dit in g s y st em to isolate c e rt a in fr a me s o f the vid e o a ndc re a te ph oto g ra ph s.
Offic er B ry an B is h o p , Di rector of the Sec ond J udicial District Drug Task F orce , who supervised the investigation, testified that h e o p er ated the surveillanceequipment during the transac tion. He explained that he made no attempt to rec over the "buy " money beca use he did not want to compromise the " ong oing inve stigation."-3-

Celeste White, a fore nsic chemist with the Tennessee Bure au of I nvestig ation, testified that she re ceive d the pac kag e conta ining the r ocks collec ted byOffic er N elson, weig hed the substanc e, a ndthe n u se d a n u ltr a vio le t sp e c tr op ho tom e te r and a n inf ra re d sp e c tr op ho tom e te r t o d e te rm ine its chemica l composition. Testing established tha t the s u b s t an ce was c ocaine base and weig hed .54 g rams. Ty ler Fleming , Direc tor of Student Ser vices for King sport CitySchools, testified that at the time of the off

enses, the N ew Hor

izon S chool, which house d an alternative school prog ram a nd
sever al other pr og rams, wa s located at 520 Myrtle Street. J ake Whit e, an e mploy ee of the Cityof King sport Geog raphic I nformation Sy stem Division, compiled a m ap which showed the Ne w Horizon School and shaded a one-thousand- foot buff

er zone a round the school. The map established that th e re sid e nc e on Se vie r Str e e t wa s with in one tho us a ndfe e t of the Ne w H orizon Sc ho ol. Whit e testified that the distance from the cente r of the N ew Horizon S chool building to the r esidenc e on Se vie r S tr e e t w a s 9 05 fe e t.

Do ri s A nn Sa ly e rs , w ho wa s c a lle d a s a wi tne ss f or the de fe ns e , te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s u na ble to identify

the individual who sold the drug s to Office r Ainsworth. It was her rec ollection that the perpe trator wa s a blac k male we aring a hooded sw eatshirt. During cross-e x amination by the state, Ms. Sa ly e rs a c kn ow le dg e d that sh e ha d me dic a l pr ob le ms w hic h a ff e c te d h e r m e mory

a ndhe r a bil ity to i de nti fy

pe op le , in c lud ing he r o wn famil y me mbe rs

.
I The de fenda nt asserts that the e vidence is insufficient to supp o rt the convictions. He specific ally

contends that the st at e failed to establish his i dentity as the pe rpetrator bey ond a
rea sonable doubt. On a

ppeal, of course , the s tate is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona

ble infer ence s which mig ht be dra wn t h er ef ro m

. State v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W. 2d83 2, 83 5 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) . T he c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the we ig ht t o b e g ive n th e ir testimony , and the rec onciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entr usted to the jury

as the trier of fac t. By

rg e v. State, 575 S.W .2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) . When the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e is cha lleng ed, the r eleva nt question is whether, a fter r ev i ew i n g the evidenc e in the lig ht most favora

ble to the state, a ny

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) ; State v. Wi lliams, 657 S .W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983) . Questions concerning the cr edibilityof the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, as well as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t. L iakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956). Be cause a ver dict of g uilt against a defe ndant
remove s the presumption of innoce nce and raises a presumption of g u ilt, the convicted cr iminal de fe nd a nt b e ars the bu rd e n o f s ho wi ng that th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in a

g uil ty verdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992).

I dentity , of cour se, is an indispensable e lement. See White v. State, 533 S.W .2d 735, 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)

. Our law provides that identification of the perpetrator of a c rime may be
acc omplished by

either dire ct or c ircumstantial evidenc e, or both. State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tenn. 1975) . The de termination of identit y is a question of fa ct for the jury afte r-4-

consideration of all competent evidence . See B igg ers v. State, 411 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tenn. 1967); Sanders v. State, 281 S.W. 924, 924 (Tenn. 1925); State v. Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 8 5 , 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Crawfor d, 635 S.W .2d 704, 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)

. At the time of the off

ens es, Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-417 pr ovided as fo llo ws : ( a ) It i s a n o f f e n s e f o r a d e f e n d a n tt o k n o w i n g l y: (1) Ma nufac ture a

controlled substanc e; (2) De liver a c ontrolled substance ; (3) Sell a c ontrolled substance ; or (4 ) Pos se ss a c on tr oll e d su bs ta nc e wi th i nte nt t o manu fa c tur e , d e liv e r o r s e ll such controlled substanc e.

. . . . (c) A violation of subsection (a ) with respe ct to: (1) Coca ine is a Class B f elony i f t h e am o u nt involved is point five (.5) g rams or more of any

substance containing cocaine and, in addition there to, may be fined not more tha n one hundre d thousand dollars ($ 100,000)

. . . . Tenn. Cod e A n n

. § 3 9 -1 7 -4 1 7 (a ), (c ) ( 2 0 0 3 ). T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed s ec t i o n 3 9 -17-432 pr ovides that a " violation o f § 39-17-417 . . . that oc curs . . . within one thousand f eet ( 1000' ) of the r eal property that comprises a

pub l i c o r private e lementary school, middle school or sec ondary school shall be punished one (1) classification hig her than is pr ovided in § 39-17-417." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432( b) (2003)

. The e vidence adduce d at trial established that Of fice r Ainsworth a nd Ms. Saly ers we nt to a residenc e on Sevier

Street for the purpose of m aking a controlled purcha se of c ocaine . Whil e at the residenc e, they

wer e appr oache d by

a blac k male who a sked if he c ould be of a ssistance. Ms. Saly ers an dO f f ic e r A in s w o r thin d ic ate d to th e in d iv id u a l th a t th e y w a n te d to p u r c h a s e $ 1 0 0 w o r thof
cocaine. The individual then re moved a medic ine bottle from hi s pocket, shook four piece s of a rock- like substance into Of fice r Ainsworth' s hand, and a cce pted $100 in cash. L ater , Offic er Ainsworth identified the defe ndant from a photogra phic l ineup. W hile Offic er A insworth conce ded that he wa s only ninety perc ent s ure of the i dentifica tion when he viewed the photogr aphic a rra y , he testified that upon s eeing the defendant at the prelimi nary hearing he became one hundr ed per cent positive that the defe ndant was the perpetrator

. Offic er Fer g uson, who had known the defe ndant for some eig ht y ear s, testified that he obser ved the videota pe of the transac tion and rec og nized the de fe nd a nt a s th e pe rp e tr a tor

. Te sti ng e sta bli sh e d that the su bs ta nc e pr ov ide d to Of fi c e r A ins wo rth
wa s . 54 g rams of c oc a ine ba se

. Th e jury a c c re dit e d th e te sti mon y

of the state ' s w itn e sse s, a s w a s it s prer og ative. See State v. Summera ll, 926 S.W .2d 272, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). I n our view, the evidenc e wa s sufficient f or a r ational trier of

fac t to have found be y ond a re asonable doubt that the de fe nd a nt c omm itt e d th e c ri me s.

II-5-

The de fenda nt next ass er t s that the trial court erre d by deny ing his motion to suppress the videotape of

the drug transa cti on. He c ontends that the quality of both the orig inal videotape a nd t h e e n h a n c e d v e r s i o n i s s o p o o r t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t s h o u l d n o t h a v e a d m i t t e d t h e mi n t o e v i d e n c e

. In response , the state submits that the defe ndant has waived this issue by failing to inc lude a copy of the hea ring on the motion to suppress in the rec ord on appe al. I n the alternative, the state asserts that the trial court did not err by admitting the videota

pe.

I nit ia lly , th e de fe nd a nt h a s fai led to incl ud e a tr a ns c ri pt o f the he ari ng on the mot ion to suppress. It is the dutyof the appellant to prepa re a complete and acc urate rec ord on appe al. Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). The f

ailure to pre pare an ade quate r ecor d for r eview of an issue results in a waive r of that issue. Thompson v. State, 958 S.W .2d 156, 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . Furthermore , the defe ndant fa iled to present this issue in his moti on for a new tria l . I t is well-established that an
app e llate c ou rt

ma y no t c on sid e r i ssu e s n ot r a ise d in a mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l un le ss the y

wo uldre su lt in dismi ssal of the c ase. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) (stating that "in a ll cases trie d by a jury , no issue prese nted for r eview sha ll be predic ated upon error in the admission or exclusion of evidence , jury ins truc tio ns g rante d o r r e fu se d,

. . . or oth e r g ro un d u po n w hic h a ne w t ri a l is so ug ht, un le ss the sa me was spec ifically

stated in a motion for a new trial; otherwise such issues will be treate d as wa ived" ); State v. Martin, 940 S.W .2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that a def endant r elinquishes the rig ht to arg u e o n ap p e a l a n y is s u e s th a t s h o u ld h a v e b e e n p r e s e n te d in a mo ti o n f o r n e w tria l); State v. Dodson, 780 S.W .2d 778, 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). Moreove r, t he re cord e stablishes that the de fe nd a nt did no t, in fa c t, ra ise the iss ue of the qu a lit y of the vid e ota pe in his mot ion to s up pr e ss. Finally , the def

endant not only

failed to objec t to the admission of t h e v i d eo t ape at trial but confirme d that he had no obje ction to the admission of either the origina l videotape or enhanc ed version. I n conseque nce, the defe ndant would not be entitl ed to relief on this iss ue. Te nn. R. App. P. 3 6( a ) ( " No thi ng in this ru le sh a ll be c on str ue d as re qu ir ing re lie f be g rante d to a pa rt y re sp on sib le for a n err or or who f

ailed to take w hateve r ac tion was rea sonably available to preve nt or nullify the harmful e ffe ct of a n err or." ).

Ha d the de fe nd a nt pr e se rv e d the iss ue fo r our re vie w, ho we ve r, he wo uld no t be e nti tle d to relief . The c ontent of the videota pe of the transac tion is o b v i o u s l y relevant. I n addition, the probative va lue of this evidenc e substantially outweig hs the dang er of unfair pr ejudice. T here was no objection to the authenticity of the videota

pe. Th at p o rt i o n s of the videotape might have been
a ff e c te d b y the g lare of

the su n doe s not af

fe c t its adm iss ibi lit y . "P ro vid e d th a t a tape re c or din g is proper ly authenticated, the incompletene ss of it goe s only to its weig ht and not to its admiss ibilit y ." State v. Har

ris, 637 S.W .2d 896, 898 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) ; s ee al s o S t at e v. B easle y , 699 S.W. 2d5 6 5 , 5 6 9 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 8 5 ) ; A l d r i d g e v

. S t a t e , 5 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d 2 1 6 , 2 1 8 ( T e n n

. C ri m. App. 1977). The trial court did not er r by admitting the videota

pe into evidenc e.

III Finally , the def

endant a sserts that the trial c ourt err ed by permitting the prosec utor to vouch for the tr uthfulness of the state ' s witnesses during his closing arg ument. The state submits t hat the prosec utor' s statements wer e not improper.-6-

Trial courts have subs t an t i al discre tionary authority in determining the proprie ty of final arg ument. Although c ounsel is ge nera lly g iven wide latitude, c ourts must restrict a n yimproper
ar gu m en t

. S p ar k s v

. S t at e, 5 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 6 4 , 5 6 7 ( T e n n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 7 8 ). Ge n er al l y s p ea k i n g, closing arg ument "must be te mperate, must be predic ated on e vidence introduced during the trial of the ca se, and must be p er t i n ent to the issues being tried." State v. Sutton, 562 S .W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978) . To merit a ne w trial, howe ver, the arg ument must be so inflammatory or improper

as to a ff e c t th e ve rd ic t. H arring ton v. Sta te , 38 5 S. W.2 d 7 58 , 7 59 (T e nn . 1 96 5) . In Jud g e v. Sta te , th is court a rticulated the fac tors to be consider ed in making that determination:
(1) the c onduct complained of viewed in the c ontext and the li gh t o f t he fa cts and circ umstances of

the ca se; (2) the c urative me asure s undertake n by the court and the prose cution; (3 ) the int e nt o f the pr os e c uto r i n ma kin g the imp ro pe r s ta te me nts ; (4) the cumulative eff

ect of the improper conduct a nd any other e rror s in the rec ord; and (5) the r elative stre ng th or wea kness of the c ase.
539 S.W .2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976)

. Most restrictions during fi n al ar g ument are place d upon the state. That is based in g reat
me a su re up on the ro le of

the pr os e c uto r i n th e c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m: [The prosecutor ] i s the repr esentative not of an ordina ry party to a controve rsy , but of a so ve re ig nty

wh os e ob lig a tio n to g ov e rn i mpartia lly is a s c omp e lli ng a s it s obligat i o n t o g overn at all; and whose intere st, theref ore, in a criminal prose cution is not that it shall win a ca se, but that j u s t i ce s h al l be done. A s such, he is in a pe c uli ar and ve ry de fi nit e se ns e the se rv a nt of the la w, the tw of old a im o f w hic h is that g uil t sh a ll n ot e sc ape or inn oc e nc e su ff

e r. He ma y

pr os e c ute wi th e arn e stn e ss and vig or-- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike har d blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his dutyto refr ain from imprope r methods
c a lc ulate d to pr od uc e a

wr on g fu l c on vic tio n as it is to use e ve ry le g iti ma te me a ns to bring about a just one.

I t is fair to s ay t hat the ave rag e jury , in a g reater or le sser de g ree , has
c o n f i d e n c e t h a tt h e s e o b l i g a t i o n s , w h i c hs o p l ai n l y r e s tu p o n t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y, will be faithfully observe d. Consequently , improper sug g estions, insinuations, and, espec ially , assertions of personal knowle dg e ar e apt to car ry much weight ag ainst the
acc used whe n they

should properly

car ry none.

Be rg er v. U nited States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see a lso Judge , 539 S.W .2d at 344-45. Thus, the state mus t re fr a in fr om ar g ume nt de sig ne d to inf la me the jury a nd sh ou ld re stric t its com me nta ry to matters in evidenc e or issues at trial. The prose cutor must not express a personal belief or opinion, but whether

that qualifies as misconduc t often depe nds upon the specif ic term i n o l o gy u s ed. F or-7-

example, arg ument predic ated by the words "I think" or "I submit" does not nece ssarily indicate a n expression of persona l opinion. United St ates v. Stulga , 5 8 4 F. 2 d 142, 147 (6th Cir. 1978). The prosec ution is not permitted to ref lect unfa vorably

upon defe nse counse l or the trial tac tics employ ed during the cour se of the trial. See Dupre e v. State, 410 S.W .2d 890, 891-92 (Tenn. 1967); Moore v. Stat e, 1 7 S

. W

. 30, 35 (Tenn. 1929) ; Watkins v. State, 203 S.W . 344, 346 (Tenn. 1918) ; McCrac ken v. State, 489 S.W.2d 48, 50 (T en n

. C ri m. App. 1972). Althoug h there may be no commentary

on the conse quences o f an a cquittal, the prosec ution may point out the gr avity

of a particula r crime and empha siz e the importanc e of law enfor ceme nt. See State v. Da kin, 614 S.W .2d 812, 815 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) ; Bowling v. State, 458 S.W .2d 639, 641 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).

This court has obse rved that there a re f i v e gener ally

rec og nized area s of prosec utorial mis c on du c t r e la te d to c los ing arg ume nt:

1. I t is unprofessional conduc t for the prosecutor intentionally to misst ate the evidenc e or mislead the jury as to the infer ence s it may draw

. 2. I t is unprofe ssional c onduct for the prosec utor to e x press hi s p er s onal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimonyor evide nce or the g uilt of the de fe nd a nt. 3. The prose cutor should not use ar g u m ents ca lculated to inflame the p a s s i o n s o r

p r e j u d i c e s o f t h e j u r y. 4. The prose cutor should re fra in from ar g ument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on t he evide nce, by injecting issues broade r than the g uilt or innocence of the acc used under the controlling law, or by making predic tions of the c on se qu e nc e s o f the jury ' s v e rd ic t. 5. I t is u n p r o f

e s s io n a l c o n d u c t f

o r a p r o s e c u to r to in te n ti o n a ll y r e f er to or
arg ue fa c ts o uts ide the re c or d u nle ss the fa c ts a re ma tte rs of common pu bli c knowledg e. State v. Goltz, 111 S .W.3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (c itations omi tted).
During his closing a

rg ument, the prosec utor made the following rema rks conce rning Offic er A i n s w o r t h ' s t e s t i m o n y:

He se le c te d th e [d]e fe nd a nt' s p ho tog ra ph , b ut h e said, " I ' m ni ne ty pe rc e nt s ur e ." Th is isn't a man that' s just going to be ca rele ss with the facts and jus t say , "O kay , I know what the team line is. The time line is thi s is a m an t h at did it, so Ijump on board and eve n though I ' m ninety perc ent, I just jump on board." No. He sa id, "No, I was nin e ty pe rc e nt at th a t po int

in t ime ." Ag e nt Ain sw orth, dida ny bo dy pr e ssu re y ou to
sa y y ou we re a hu nd re d pe rc e nt? " No bo dy e ve r pr e ssu re d me .[" ] Mr . A ins wo rth, did y ou have an opportunity

to see the [d] efe ndant i n person a g ain? Yes, I did. What at po in t in ti me ? [" ]I

wa s a hu nd re d p e rc e nt c e rt a in this is the g uy ." Ye ste rd a y in [c]o urt, " Ar e y ou a

hu nd re d p e rc e nt cert a in n ow ? " " I a m a hu nd re d p e rc e nt c e rt a in t h i s i s t h e gu y

. " A n y

d o u b ti n y o u r m i n d ? "N o , s i r. No d o u b t i n m y m i n d

. " T h at 's-8-

the testimony

of somebody

as he told y ou, that, "Y es, I want to see convictions. I
wa nt t o id e nti fy

pe op le that are se lli ng dr ug s, " bu t he a lso s aid , "but I also

. . . my focus or why I ' m here is to tell y ou the truth," and he told y ou the truth. This is the person that sold him coca ine. . . .
At that point, defense counsel objec ted to the re marks as imprope r vouching . The trial c ourt
overr uled the objec tion.

I n o ur vie w, th e pro secutor ' s st a te me nt that O ff ic e r A ins wo rt

h to ld the trutha mou nte d to improper vouc hing. E x pressions of persona l opinion by the prosec utor are g ener ally prohibited as a f o r m o f u n s w o r n , u n ch ec k ed t es t i m o n y wh i ch t en d s t o ex p l o i tt h e i n fl u en ce o f t h e p ro s ec u t o r's office and undermine the objective de tachment that shoul d s ep ar ate a lawy er f rom the advoc ated
c a us e . Se e L ackey v. Sta te , 5 78 S.W. 2d10 1, 10 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 78 ). Whe n c on sid e re d in the context of the entire f

inal arg ument, which was g ener ally temperate and other wise appr opriate, h o we v er , i td o es n o tap p ear t h at t h e co m m en t , wh i ch wa s i s o l at ed , h ad an y ef fe ct o n t h e j u ry 's
ve rd ic t. T hu s, a ny

e rr or wo uld qu a lif

y a s ha rm le ss. Se e Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 36 (b ); Te nn

. R. Cr im. P. 52(a)

.
IV The state ha s also raised a claim on appe al. I t submit s that the trial court erre d by dismiss ing the conviction for

possession of more than .5 g rams of c ocaine . Th e state c ontends that the
c on vic tio n f

or po sse ssi on of

c oc a ine re la te d to th e pie c e s o f c ra c k c oc a ine that O ff ic e r A ins wo rth observe d inside the medicine bottle rather than the cocaine sold to Office r Ainsworth. The state does not challeng e the dismissal of t h e co n v iction for delivery of more tha n .5 g rams of c ocaine . The defe ndant has not addr essed the issue.

The re cord e stablishes that at the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court mer g ed the c onvictions for de livery

of coc aine a nd possession of coc aine into the convic tion f o r s al e of coc aine ove r the state' s objection. The state challeng ed the tria l court' s ruling at the hearing on the motion for a new trial and the tria l court ruled that the delivery and possession convictions should be dismissed rather than merg ed:
The only cocaine that we ha ve here is the cocaine that was actually sold. That' s the only quanti t yof coc aine that wa s sold, and I held that all these of

fense s would be merg ed into the sale of

cocaine cha

rg e.
Sta te o f T e nn e sse e v. Willi a m F . Ca rt wrig ht, 20 04 , T e nn . Crim. Ap pe a ls, L exis 427, holds that just m erg ing is not sufficie nt; that, actua lly , I need to just enter one Judgment of Convi ction for the sale, so not only must the [s] tate' s [m ]ot ion be
over- ruled, the [c] ourt sua sponte is a ctually g oing to dismiss

. . . the count cha rg ing delivery of a ha lf .

. . g ram of cocaine wit hin a thous and (1,000) fee t of a school, a nd the cha rg e of posse ssion of more th an fi v e-te nths of a g ram of c ocaine within a thousand (1,000) f

eet of a school, a nd leave the only conviction being the c onviction-9-

for th e s a le o f

f iv e

- te n th s o f

a g r a m o f c o c a in e w ith in o n e th o u s a n d ( 1 , 0 0 0 ) f e e t of a school, a s dictated by

State v. Wil liam F. Cartwrig ht

. . . . I think that' s . . . the law by wh ic h I ' m bo un d in thi s c a se , a nd the re ' s n ot any qu e sti on , b ut the re c a n b e on ly one convic tion. I t's more than merg er. It's just the fact that the other two c onvictions
are dismiss ed; it's sua

sponte, and the [s]t ate' s [m ]ot ion is over-rule d.

Citi ng State v. J ose D. Holmes, No. 02C01-9411- CR-00251 (Tenn. Crim

. App., at Jackson, Nov. 22, 1995), t he st ate contends that a dis missal of the possession count was imprope r bec ause the possession count related to the ad d i t ional cra ck coc aine in the medic ine bottle. I n Holmes, the de fe nd a nt w a s a

rr e ste d d uring a n u nd e rc ov e r dru g b uyin M e mph is. Th e de fe nd a nt i nit ia lly delivere d two rocks of

cra ck coc aine to an unde rcove r dete ctive who wa s wait i ng in a nea rby car

. Holmes was then appre hended afte r a brief chase

. After Holmes' s arr est, office rs sea rche d his car
a nddis c ov e re d a n a dd iti on al ba g c on ta ini ng wh a t w a s late r d e te rm ine d to be c ra c k c oc a ine . T his
c ou rt ru le d th a t se pa

rate c on vic tio ns fo r s a le of c oc a ine and p os se ssi on of c oc a ine didno t vi olate dou b l e j eopar dy

principles bec ause " [t ]wo separa te offe nses occ urre d, involving two distinct qu a nti tie s o f c oc a ine ." Ho lme s, sli p op

. a t 7. I n o ur vie w, thi s c a se is d ist ing uis ha ble fr om H olm e s. I n Holmes, there was suff icient proof to e stablish that the defe ndant sold an amount of a substance that tested positive f

or coc aine a nd possessed a se parate amount of a substance that tested positive for c ocaine

. I n this c ase, howeve r, the only proof that the defe ndant may have possessed an amount of cocaine in a ddition to that sold to Offic er Ainsworth was the testimony that t h er e w er e o t her "r ock s " in th e d e f

e n d a n t' s me d ic in e b o tt le

. T h e r e w a s n o p r o o f to e s ta b li s h th e w eig ht of the
a dd iti on a l " rocks " or

that th e y , in fa c t, c on taine d c oc a ine . T he pr oo f i n th is c a se is s imp ly insufficient to support sepa rate convictions for sale and possession of more than .5 g rams of c ocaine

. I f, as the s t ate contends, the convic tion for possession of coc aine is base d upon the coc aine in the medicine bottle, that convic tion should be rever sed and dismissed. I n our view, how ever , the re cord does not support the state' s assertion. The trial court c oncluded that "the only cocaine that we ha ve is the coca ine that was a ctually sold." The rec ord supports this c onclusion. Be cause the conviction for possession of cocaine conviction re lates to the same c ocaine as the c onviction for sale of coc aine,
se pa rate c on vic tio ns fo r the se of fe ns e s w ou ld v iol a te do ub le je op ard y princ ipl e s. Although se parate convictions ar e violative of double jeopar dy pri n ci ples, the trial court should not have dismissed the convictions for de livery and possess i o n of coc aine. In State v. Ad dis on , 9 73 S.W. 2d26 0 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ), thi s c ou rt ob se rv e d tha t dismi ssa l is no t th e on ly
re me dy a va ila ble wh e n c on vic tio ns vio la te do ub le je op ard y princ ipl e s:

Moreove r, there is no need to " dismiss , vacate," or " strike," a particular " conviction" if wh a t is me a nt b y

the te rm " c on vic tio n" is the re turn o f the ju ry verdi c t of g uil t. Rather, the jury

verdic t stands as a leg itimate f inding of fa ct and law which the tria l court should pre serve by merg ing the same off

ense c ounts into one judgment of conviction . . . .

973 S.W .2d at 267. Thus, the trial c ourt should not h av e dis missed the convictions but instead should have e ntere d a sing le judg ment of convict i o n fo r s al e of more tha n .5 g rams of c ocaine ,-10-

no tin g in that ju dg me nt that the c on vic tio ns fo r de liv e ry a nd po sse ssi on of c oc a ine we re me rg e d in to that offe nse. Althoug h the trial court obviouslyintended to dismiss t he convic tions for delivery and po sse ssi on of

c oc a ine , th e re c or d o n a

pp e a l c on ta ins se pa

rate jud g me nts fo r tho se c on vic tio ns

.
Acc ordi n g ly , the convictions and se ntence are aff irmed. The judg ment of the trial c ourt dismiss ing the convictions for delivery of m ore than .5 g rams of cocaine and possession of more than .5 g rams of c ocaine is rever sed. The judg ment of convic tion for the sale of more tha n .5 g rams of
cocaine is modified to show that the convictions for delivery and possession of c ocaine have be en merg ed into that offe nse.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE