NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM J. NORDHOLM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

TIM BARKELL; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35357 

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00011-JCL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Jeremiah C. Lynch, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted August 5, 2020***

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Former Montana state prisoner William J. Nordholm appeals pro se from the 

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due 

process violations while he was a pretrial detainee and retaliation while he was a 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c).

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-35357 

prisoner. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo crossmotions for summary judgment. Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th 

Cir. 2016). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on 

Nordholm’s due process claim because Nordholm failed to raise a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether defendants were required to provide him with a predeprivation hearing prior to charging him with booking and bonding fees. See 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (balancing factors to determine 

whether government has provided sufficient due process). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nordholm’s 

conspiracy claim because Nordholm failed to raise a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to whether defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. 

See Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010) (a 

conspiracy claim requires the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to 

violate constitutional rights).

However, summary judgment was improper on Nordholm’s retaliation 

claim. The record reflects that, following Nordholm’s attempt to have a complaint 

served on defendant Barkell, defendants Barkell, Sather, Durkin, and Staley 

refused to provide additional grievance forms to Nordholm and refused to process 

certain grievances he had submitted. Taking this evidence in the light most 
3 19-35357 

favorable to Nordholm, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether 

these defendants retaliated against Nordholm. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 

1262, 1269-72 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim and

concluding that a reasonable person “may have been chilled” by a written warning 

about a prisoner’s grievances). We note that the district court expressly stated it 

did not reach any issues concerning exhaustion. We reverse and remand for 

further proceedings on this claim as to defendants Barkell, Sather, Durkin, and 

Staley only.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nordholm’s motion 

for class certification because, as a pro se litigant, Nordholm has no authority to 

represent anyone other than himself. See Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 

1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United 

States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (a pro se litigant has no authority to 

appear as an attorney for others).

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.