Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Baumrucker v. Express Cab Dispatch, Inc., 2017 IL App (1st) 161278

Appellate Court 

Caption

MARGARET BAUMRUCKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EXPRESS 

CAB DISPATCH, INC., d/b/a Express Cab Company, EXPRESS 

CAB COMPANY, INC., d/b/a Express Cab Company, and LUIS 

LEAL, Defendants-Appellants.

District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-16-1278

Filed July 18, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-L-6839; the 

Hon. Michael R. Panter, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Rostyslaw J. Smyk and Daniel L. Polsby, of Ruberry, Stalmack & 

Garvey, LLC, of Chicago, for appellants.

Michael T. Reagan, of Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, of Ottawa, 

and Joseph P. Shannon and Patrick D. Cummings, of Shannon Law 

Group, of Woodbridge, for appellee.
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Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Neville and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Three weeks after Express Cab Dispatch, Inc., and Express Cab Company, Inc. 

(collectively, Express Cab), leased Luis Leal a taxi cab, he hit a pedestrian, Margaret 

Baumrucker, while she was walking to her job at MacNeal Hospital in Berwyn. Although Leal 

was driving at a slow speed, he knocked Baumrucker to the ground, injuring her left shoulder. 

Baumrucker has had years of physical therapy, and according to her physician, the shoulder 

injury is permanent and will likely cause her pain and restrict some activities for the rest of her 

life. 

¶ 2 Baumrucker sued Express Cab alleging negligence and willful and wanton entrustment of 

the cab to Leal. She sued Leal for negligence. Baumrucker argued that Express Cab acted 

recklessly by failing to check Leal’s driving record, which would have shown that while living 

out of state, he had been convicted of driving while intoxicated in 2000 and ticketed for 

speeding more than 85 miles per hour in 2010. Express Cab conceded Leal was negligent and 

Baumrucker was injured but contested the extent of her injuries and the allegations that they 

acted willfully and wantonly by entrusting the cab to Leal.

¶ 3 After trial, a jury returned a verdict for Baumrucker and awarded her $897,740.81, which 

included $397,740.81 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The trial 

court denied defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) and 

motion for a new trial on damages. Defendants contend (i) the evidence did not support the 

jury’s verdict on the willful and wanton entrustment claim, (ii) Leal’s driving record should not 

have been admitted into evidence, (iii) the trial court abused its discretion in permitting 

Baumrucker to present expert witness testimony that Express Cab had a nondelegable duty to 

run a background check on prospective drivers, (iv) the trial court abused its discretion in 

instructing the jury on punitive damages, and (v) the compensatory and punitive damages 

awards were excessive. 

¶ 4 We affirm. The jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial 

court’s evidentiary rulings and jury instruction were not an abuse of discretion, and the 

damages were reasonable and not excessive. 

¶ 5 BACKGROUND

¶ 6 On October 17, 2011, at about 3 p.m., Margaret Baumrucker was walking to MacNeal 

Hospital in Berwyn, where she worked as a psychiatric nurse. Baumrucker, who was 60 years 

old, was crossing the street at the crosswalk with the right of way. Luis Leal, who was driving 

a cab he leased from Express Cab, stopped to let a passenger out and suddenly accelerated, 

hitting Baumrucker. She was knocked to the pavement, injuring her left shoulder. Baumrucker 

was treated in the MacNeal Hospital emergency room and released. 

¶ 7 Baumrucker filed a complaint against Leal and Express Cab alleging negligence. She later 

amended her complaint to add counts against Express Cab for willful and wanton entrustment. 
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Her amended complaint alleged (i) negligent operation of a motor vehicle; (ii) negligent 

entrustment of the cab to Leal; (iii) willful, reckless, and wanton entrustment of the cab to Leal; 

(iv) negligent hiring of Leal; and (v) reckless, willful, and wanton hiring of Leal. The reckless 

entrustment claims were based on Baumrucker’s allegation that Express Cab knew or should 

have known Leal posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the public because he had a 2000 

conviction for driving while intoxicated and several related offenses, including failure to pay 

fines, perform community service, attend victim impact panels, and register for DUI school, 

and a 2010 speeding conviction. (Baumrucker sought to introduce additional convictions, but 

the trial court excluded evidence of Leal’s nondriving criminal record.) The trial court denied 

defendants motion to dismiss Baumrucker’s reckless entrustment counts. 

¶ 8 The trial court heard pretrial argument on defendants’ motion in limine, seeking to prevent 

Baumrucker from presenting Andrew Sievers as an expert witness to testify that (i) Leal was an 

unqualified and incompetent driver, (ii) Express Cab was negligent in entrusting him with a 

cab, and (iii) Express Cab was reckless in failing to screen him regarding his driving record 

and background. Defendants also sought to bar mention of Leal’s criminal convictions or 

arrests and argument that Express Cab was negligent or reckless when it entrusted the cab to 

Leal. 

¶ 9 After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the negligent entrustment claim but allowed 

Baumrucker to proceed on the willful and wanton entrustment claim. The court also found 

Sievers could testify as to his opinion about causation and liability, Express Cab’s screening 

process, and Leal’s driving record. 

¶ 10 The trial court also heard argument on Baumrucker’s motion in limine seeking to bar 

production of Leal’s chauffer’s license. Baumrucker argued defendants violated Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 213 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007) by failing to timely comply with her multiple 

requests for the license, which defendants produced just three weeks before trial. She also 

contested the authenticity of the license, which was a poorly replicated faxed document that 

did not include Leal’s name or the date of issuance. Defendants made an oral motion to bar 

argument that Leal did not possess a chauffer’s license; they asserted Cicero does not permit 

operation of a cab without a license and they had produced Leal’s license. The trial court 

agreed that defendants’ failure to produce the chauffer’s license sooner violated Rule 213, but 

found no prejudice to Baumrucker. The trial court held the license was admissible and 

Baumrucker could challenge authenticity. 

¶ 11 The case was tried before a jury. (Leal was served a summons and Express Cab filed an 

appearance on his behalf, but Leal did not appear at trial despite Baumrucker’s request under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 237 (eff. July 1, 2005) compelling his appearance; he also did not 

appear for three noticed depositions.) Donald Batryn, Express Cab’s fleet manager, called as 

an adverse witness, testified he was in charge of finding new drivers. Express Cab does not hire 

drivers but leases cabs for a flat fee. Express Cab does not give prospective drivers a written 

test or a road test and does not conduct a criminal background check. And while Express Cab 

provides orientation for new drivers, it does not provide either training or a training or safety 

manual. 

¶ 12 Express Cab hires drivers who have a chauffer’s license issued by the town of Cicero. 

According to Batryn, Leal completed an application to lease a cab and was hired in September 

2011. On the application, which was admitted into evidence, Leal left blank the spaces asking 

for his social security number, and his prior taxicab and work experience. In the space asking 
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for his prior address, he listed “ABQ, NM.” Spaces on the application indicating whether the 

applicant was interviewed and the application was acceptable were left blank. Batryn or his 

brother interviewed Leal and accepted the application, but Batryn could not recall which of 

them did. 

¶ 13 Leal had no prior cab driving experience, but according to Batryn, he had a Cicero 

chauffer’s license. Batryn said to his knowledge, the Cicero police department conducts a 

written test, a road test, and a five-year criminal background check on chauffer license 

applicants. He acknowledged he had not seen proof of those tests or a copy of a background 

check. 

¶ 14 Leal obtained an Illinois driver’s license on April 26, 2011, some five months before 

Express Cab hired him. Batryn testified that Leal’s driving record was the most important 

document in deciding to hire Leal, and in accordance with the company’s practice, he looked at 

Leal’s five-month Illinois driving record. He did not obtain Leal’s driving record from New 

Mexico, where Leal previously lived, or his prior work history but testified he had “done 

everything required by me.”

¶ 15 Batryn acknowledged that Leal had been convicted of driving while intoxicated in New 

Mexico and related offenses and, in September 2010, of speeding in excess of 85 miles per 

hour in Arizona. If Batryn had known about the convictions, he probably would not have 

allowed Leal to drive for the company, but Express Cab is not required to acquire applicants’ 

out of state driving records. After the accident, Express Cab did not change its hiring 

procedures. 

¶ 16 During Batryn’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence the copy of Leal’s 

purported Cicero chauffer’s license. The license was issued in 2011 but did not have a specific 

date. It did not include Leal’s name but had the number “168” on it. It also had a picture of a 

man, whom Batryn recognized as Leal. Batryn has seen hundreds of chauffer’s licenses issued 

by Cicero, and the exhibit admitted into evidence appeared to be a Cicero chauffer’s license.

¶ 17 Baumrucker presented Andrew Sievers as an expert witness to testify about the vetting 

process for commercial drivers. Before becoming a safety consultant, Sievers worked in the 

trucking industry, in various safety and risk management positions. When hiring a driver for a 

cab or other commercial vehicle, Sievers said that, at minimum, an employer should require 

applicants to complete a form listing their driving record for the previous three years and 

conduct an interview; a criminal background check; a physical exam, including vision and 

drug tests; and a road test. 

¶ 18 According to Sievers, Express Cab failed to meet this minimum standard. It did not check 

Leal’s employment history, interview him, do a criminal background check, or conduct a 

physical, drug test, eye test, or road test. Sievers also said Express Cab’s failure to provide a 

safety manual, explaining rules and regulations and company policies and procedures, falls 

below reasonable standards. As for Leal’s application, it was deficient, lacking Leal’s social 

security number, employment history, taxi driving history, criminal background, or driving 

record. According to Sievers, Express Cab’s screening of Leal was “the worst I’ve ever seen in 

screening a commercial driver” and “it’s real apparent they did not care; because if they cared 

they would have done at least a little bit of a background check, and they didn’t do any.” Had 

there been safety controls in place, Sievers testified Express Cab could have easily determined 

Leal was unfit to drive a cab. 
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¶ 19 Over defendants’ objection, Sievers said Express Cab’s failure to perform a background 

check was willful and wanton and put the motoring public at increased unnecessary risk. 

Defense counsel moved to strike, arguing Sievers should not be permitted to give an opinion 

on an ultimate issue. The trial court overruled the objection but instructed the jurors they would 

determine whether Express Cab engaged in willful and wanton conduct. 

¶ 20 On cross-examination, Sievers testified that the standards he identified were good practice 

for owners and operators of commercial vehicles and admitted they were not based on any 

federal or state laws or regulations. They were his opinion based on Chicago requirements, 

which he acknowledged were not the same as the rules that apply in Cicero, Express Cab’s 

base. He acknowledged a Cicero ordinance requires chauffer’s license applicants to pass a 

driving test and that Cicero determined if an applicant had any criminal convictions in the 

previous five years. But, he said, regardless of the rules in Cicero for obtaining a chauffer’s 

license, Express Cab had a nondelegable duty to confirm prospective drivers are fit and safe. 

¶ 21 Baumrucker testified she was 60 years old at the time of the accident and a nurse for 40 

years, then working in the psychiatric department at MacNeal Hospital. Leal’s cab hit her on 

the right shoulder and hip and slammed her left shoulder to the concrete, causing pain in the 

upper part of her back, going down the spine. Immediately after the accident, Dr. Sarah 

Johnson in the MacNeal Hospital emergency room evaluated Baumrucker and sent her home 

with a sling for her left arm. Three days later, Baumrucker followed up with her primary care 

physician, Dr. Suman Gupta, who sent her for an MRI of her shoulder and prescribed a muscle 

relaxant and physical therapy. The MRI did not show a fracture. 

¶ 22 Baumrucker went to physical therapy from November 2011 to April 2013 and again from 

September 2013 to March 2014. She estimated she had more than 60 physical therapy sessions, 

and since her last one, she had been exercising at home four times a week. She said the physical 

therapy helped, but she still had shoulder pain, which became exceedingly uncomfortable by 

day’s end. The pain often woke her in the middle of the night. She took ibuprofen about three 

times a week. 

¶ 23 Dr. Gupta referred Baumrucker to Dr. William Sterba, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Sterba 

injected cortisone in her shoulder, which relieved the pain for a few days. Dr. Sterba told 

Baumrucker surgery would be a last resort. Baumrucker was reluctant to undergo 

surgery—she is diabetic, has a blood clot in her leg, and was diagnosed with Parkinson’s 

disease in 2012, and those underlying conditions increase the risk of surgery and can lead to 

slow healing. 

¶ 24 At her attorney’s direction, Baumrucker saw another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Samuel 

Chmell, in August 2012. Dr. Chmell ordered an MRI, told her she had a torn labrum, and 

recommended surgery. Baumrucker told Dr. Chmell she would prefer to continue with 

physical therapy because of the risks associated with surgery. 

¶ 25 Dr. Chmell testified that Baumrucker has traumatic derangement syndrome (persistent 

pain) in the left shoulder and adhesive capsulitis (frozen shoulder). He did not operate because 

of her underlying health problems, namely, (i) diabetes, which increases the risk of infection, 

and (ii) frozen shoulder and Parkinson’s disease, which make postsurgery rehabilitation more 

difficult. Should Baumrucker decide on surgery, it will cost about $50,000 with additional 

costs for two to three months of rehabilitation. If she does not have surgery, she will likely 

need regular care and treatment for the shoulder for the rest of her life, including periodic 

physical therapy, doctor visits, and medication. 
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¶ 26 Dr. Chmell opined that Baumrucker’s left shoulder problem is permanent and she will 

likely suffer shoulder pain for the rest of her life and be unable or restricted from doing certain 

activities, including reaching overhead with her left shoulder and lifting and carrying things 

with the left arm. She also will likely have trouble sleeping as she will be awakened by a sharp 

pain when rolling onto her left side. 

¶ 27 On cross-examination, Dr. Chmell said adhesive capsulitis is more likely to occur in 

someone with diabetes, but it would not have occurred but for the accident. Defense counsel 

impeached Dr. Chmell with his discovery deposition testimony in which he said “I think her 

adhesive capsulitis is related to her diabetes.” Because of the underlying risks, Dr. Chmell 

would not operate on Baumrucker unless she demanded it. 

¶ 28 Thirteen weeks after the accident, Baumrucker returned to work; however, MacNeal 

Hospital terminated her three months later. She was earning about $1700 a week. Baumrucker 

acknowledged that due to Parkinson’s disease, she cannot work as a nurse. She said that 

because of her shoulder, she still has trouble doing certain tasks, like carrying grocery bags, 

putting dishes away, bathing, yard work, and chores around the house. She continues to do 

physical therapy and takes over-the-counter pain medication. 

¶ 29 After plaintiff rested, defendants moved for a directed verdict on the willful and wanton 

entrustment counts, which the trial court denied. Defendants presented one witness, Dr. 

Edward Boone Brackett. Dr. Brackett reviewed Baumrucker’s medical records and examined 

her on August 18, 2014. He said her X-rays showed some mild osteoarthritis but no fracture or 

dislocation. He said that the X-ray taken four days after the accident showed a bone bruise that 

should heal in four to six weeks and would not require surgery. 

¶ 30 In the jury instructions, the trial judge included Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 

35.01 (2011) (hereinafter, IPI Civil (2011) No. 35.01), an instruction on willful and wanton 

conduct and punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict for Baumrucker and awarded her 

$897,740.81, including $397,740.81 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive 

damages. The jury specifically found that Express Cab acted willfully and wantonly in 

entrusting the cab to Leal. The trial court denied defendants’ motion for a judgment n.o.v. and 

motion for a new trial on damages. 

¶ 31 ANALYSIS 

¶ 32 Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict and 

their motion for a judgment n.o.v. because Baumrucker failed to present sufficient evidence to 

support a finding of willful and wanton entrustment. Specifically, they argue that under 

long-standing precedent, they were only obligated to make sure Leal had a valid Illinois 

driver’s license and a chauffer’s license before leasing him the cab. They argue that the trial 

court should not have allowed Baumrucker’s expert, Andrew Sievers, to testify that in his 

opinion Express Cab, at minimum, was obligated to perform an additional independent 

background investigation on Leal. Express Cab also asserts that Leal’s prior driving-related 

convictions—a 2000 DUI and a 2012 speeding ticket—were not sufficient to support a finding 

of willful and wanton entrustment and asks us to reverse the jury’s verdict. 

¶ 33 “A directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. is properly entered in those limited cases where 

‘all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so 

overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever 

stand.’ ” Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992) (quoting Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern 
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R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967)). “In ruling on a motion for a judgment n.o.v., a court does 

not weigh the evidence, nor is it concerned with the credibility of the witnesses; rather it may 

only consider the evidence, and any inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 

party resisting the motion.” Id. “[A] judgment n.o.v. may not be granted merely because a 

verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. “The court has no right to enter a 

judgment n.o.v. if there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom, demonstrating a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility 

of the witnesses or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the 

outcome.” Id. at 454. When the trial court has erroneously denied a motion for judgment n.o.v., 

we will reverse the verdict without remand. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 

IL 112530, ¶ 37. Although a motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment n.o.v. are 

made at different times, they raise the same questions and are governed by the same rules of 

law. Id. We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on both motions. Id.

¶ 34 Willful and Wanton Entrustment 

¶ 35 The Illinois Supreme Court has defined willful and wanton misconduct as a course of 

action showing actual intent or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Klatt v. 

Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 481, 488 (1965). Whether particular conduct can be 

characterized as willful and wanton depends on each case’s facts and ordinarily presents a 

question of fact for the jury to determine. Stehlik v. Village of Orland Park, 2012 IL App (1st) 

091278, ¶ 34. But the trial court may grant a motion for directed verdict where all of the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, so overwhelmingly 

favors the movant that no contrary verdict could stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 

37 Ill. 2d at 510. 

¶ 36 Express Cab concedes that liability may arise from entrusting a vehicle to someone whose 

incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the 

owner or entrustor of the vehicle. Lockett v. Bi-State Transit Authority, 94 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1983); 

Giers v. Anten, 68 Ill. App. 3d 535, 538 (1978). But Express Cab contends Illinois courts have 

held that a cab company cannot be deemed reckless so long as the company determined that a 

prospective driver had a valid Illinois driver’s license and a chauffer’s license before entrusting 

the driver with a cab. 

¶ 37 For support, Express Cab relies on two cases, Richards v. Checker Taxi Co., 168 Ill. App. 

3d 154 (1988), and Ledesma v. Cannonball, Inc., 182 Ill. App. 3d 718 (1989). In Richards, the 

plaintiff, who was injured while a passenger in a Checker taxi, obtained a jury verdict against 

Checker for negligence and willful and wanton entrustment. Richards argued that Checker’s 

failure to review an abstract of its employee’s driving record from the Illinois Secretary of 

State’s office sufficed to support the jury’s verdict of willful and wanton entrustment. 

Richards, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 156. The appellate court disagreed, finding no authority required 

Checker to obtain a copy of the driver’s record before entrusting him with a cab and noting that 

the only requirements, taking into account certain statutory obligations, were that the driver, 

because he was a taxi driver, have a valid chauffeur’s license and, because the vehicle was 

leased to the driver, a valid driver’s license. Id. at 157. The evidence showed that the driver met 

both requirements. But, the court stated that in addition to requiring proper licensing, Checker 

had a practice of contacting a prospective taxicab driver’s previous employer to obtain 

information on his or her driving record and employment performance. Id. The court also 
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pointed to evidence showing that in the two years the driver worked for Checker before the 

accident, he had no major traffic violations. Id. The court concluded “[b]ased on the record 

before us, we find no evidence to demonstrate that Checker’s conduct was wilful and wanton 

in entrusting [the driver] with a taxicab. Id.

¶ 38 In Ledesma, a bicyclist who was struck by a messenger driver sued the driver’s employer, 

Cannonball, Inc., alleging in part that the company willfully and wantonly entrusted a vehicle 

to the driver. The evidence showed that the driver filled out a job application stating that he had 

a valid Illinois driver’s license and insurance for his vehicle. Ledesma, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 

721-22. The driver acknowledged his license had previously been revoked and in response to 

another question concerning whether he had had any traffic violations in the past year, the 

driver wrote “ ‘Yes *** License revoked for accident. Traffic ticket for speeding.’ ” Id. at 722. 

After completing the application, the driver was interviewed by a personnel assistant, who 

stated in her deposition that the driver’s prior license revocation was not determinative in the 

decision to hire, and that Cannonball considered other factors, including knowledge of the 

Chicago area, communication skills, physical appearance, and driving record. Id. She also said 

at that time when the applicant had a valid driver’s license, the company had no policy to 

investigate a potential employee’s prior driving record beyond the information in the 

application. Id.

¶ 39 Cannonball filed a motion for summary judgment on the willful and wanton entrustment 

count, which the trial court granted, and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court found 

“there was no authority to require Checker to obtain a copy of the driver’s record before 

entrusting the vehicle to him, and noted that the only requirements, taking into account certain 

statutory obligations, were that the driver, because he was a taxi driver, have a valid 

chauffeur’s license and, because the vehicle was leased to the driver, that he have a valid 

driver’s license.” Id. at 729 (citing Richards, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 157). The court also stated 

“[s]imilarly, the plaintiff here presents no authority which would suggest that Cannonball was 

required to investigate [the driver’s] past driving record. Like the evidence presented in 

Richards, the evidence here showed that Cannonball checked to make sure that [the driver] had 

a valid Illinois driver’s license and that he was insured before hiring him and entrusting him 

with the vehicle. Moreover, we note that, similar to the evidence in Richards, the evidence here 

showed that while [the driver] was in Cannonball’s employ, he had no major traffic 

violations.” Id. at 729-30. 

¶ 40 Express Cab argues that Richards and Ledesma recognize that a prior driving record is 

irrelevant so long as the prospective driver has a valid driver’s license and a chauffer’s license. 

Defendants assert that because the parties do not dispute Leal had a valid Illinois driver’s 

license and Express Cab believed Leal had a valid Cicero chauffer’s license, Express Cab met 

that standard and cannot be deemed to have acted willfully and wantonly in entrusting Leal 

with a cab. Express Cab also asserts that Leal’s possession of an Illinois driver’s license 

necessarily means that the Illinois Secretary of State determined that, regardless of violations 

in other states, his driving record was good enough to warrant driving privileges in Illinois. 

And that Cicero, by ordinance, required that applicants for a chauffer’s license complete a 

written test and a driving test, not be addicted to alcohol or drugs, and not have a disqualifying 

criminal record. Defendants assert that Baumrucker did not present evidence showing Leal 

failed to meet the requirements of the Cicero ordinance. 
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¶ 41 Express Cab maintains that rather than follow the standard set forth in Richards and 

Ledesma, the trial court permitted Sievers to present a different “minimum” standard to the 

jury requiring a cab company to perform an independent investigation before entrusting a 

vehicle to a prospective driver. And this standard was based solely on Sievers’s opinion rather 

than a community standard and or existing law. We disagree. 

¶ 42 First, as to Sievers, Express Cab does not provide a persuasive argument for excluding his 

testimony. He testified based on his knowledge of industry standards, that commercial 

transportation companies, including those who lease cabs, have an independent duty to vet 

commercial drivers. Express Cab had the opportunity to cross-examine Sievers on that 

opinion. Further, Express Cab could have presented its own expert to rebut Sievers but did not 

do so. 

¶ 43 Turning to Richards and Ledesma, neither case sets forth a bright line rule that a driver’s 

license and chauffer’s license alone are sufficient to insulate a cab company from liability for 

willful and wanton entrustment. In Richards, the court concluded that the absence of a driver’s 

abstract from the Illinois Secretary of State did not render the employer’s vetting process 

deficient. But, the court looked at factors in addition to the employee’s possession of a driver’s 

license and a chauffer’s license in determining that the plaintiff had no claim for willful and 

wanton entrustment. In addition to requiring the proper licenses, Checker maintained a 

practice of contacting prospective taxicab driver’s previous employer to obtain information on 

his or her driving record and employment performance with that company. The court also 

noted that the driver “had been leasing a taxicab from Checker for over two years” and 

“incurred no major driving violations” and that based “on the record before us, we find no 

evidence to demonstrate that Checker’s conduct was wilful and wanton in entrusting [the 

driver] with a taxicab.” Richards, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 157.

¶ 44 Similarly, in Ledesma, the court looked beyond licensing in determining whether 

Cannonball was willful and wanton in vetting a prospective driver before entrusting him with a 

vehicle. The court noted that the driver completed a job application, which included questions 

about his driving record, whether his license had ever been revoked or suspended, and whether 

he had any driving violations in the past year. Ledesma, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 721-22. Cannonball 

also interviewed the driver and explained the factors that influence hiring decision, including 

knowledge of the Chicago area, communication skills, physical appearance, and driving 

record. Id. at 722. 

¶ 45 As noted, whether particular conduct can be characterized as willful and wanton depends 

on the facts of the case. Stehlik v. Village of Orland Park, 2012 IL App (1st) 091278, ¶ 34. As 

the Richards court stated, “the determination of whether an individual would be a competent 

and safe taxicab driver is subjective rather than objective.” Richards, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 157. 

Although proper licensing is required, it is not the lone factor when deciding whether a cab 

company was willful and wanton in entrusting a driver with a cab. And, we cannot say that 

when viewed in the light most favorable to Baumrucker, even absent the testimony of Sievers, 

the evidence so overwhelmingly favors Express Cab that the jury’s verdict should be reversed. 

First, Express Cab required prospective drivers to complete an application, but Leal’s was 

incomplete and devoid of crucial information, including his Illinois driver’s license number, 

social security number, and past job experience. Indeed, the application also has a space for 

marking whether the application was acceptable or not, and that space was blank. Thus, unlike 
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Richards and Ledesma, where the defendants had certain practices and procedures when hiring 

a driver and adhered to them, Express Cab failed to follow its own vetting standards. 

¶ 46 Batryn testified that a driver’s driving record was the most important document in 

analyzing a driver’s fitness, but Express Cab considered only the five month driving record he 

accrued after getting his Illinois driver’s license. Leal’s employment application listed his 

address as “ABQ, NM,” which would indicate he had a driving record in New Mexico, but 

Express Cab did not ask for his driving record from that state. Batryn acknowledged that if he 

had known about Leal’s prior driving record, which included a DUI and a speeding ticket, he 

probably would not have entrusted the cab to him. 

¶ 47 Batryn also acknowledged that Leal had never driven a cab before, but Express Cab did not 

provide him training, a safety manual, or company policies and procedures. Unlike the drivers 

in Richards and Ledesma, Leal did not have experience that would lead Express Cab to believe 

he could be entrusted with a cab. 

¶ 48 Even if we agreed that Express Cab only was required to determine whether Leal had a 

valid driver’s license and chauffer’s license, the validity of the chauffer’s license was a 

question of fact and based on the evidence it would be reasonable for the jury to determine that 

Leal did not possess a valid chauffer’s license. The trial court stated that Baumrucker could 

challenge the validity of the license, and considering the facts in the light most favorable to her, 

the jury could have concluded that Leal did not have a valid chauffer’s license. 

¶ 49 As noted, Express Cab violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007) by 

failing to produce a copy of Leal’s purported chauffer’s license, despite Baumrucker’s 

repeated requests. Defendants turned over a purported license a mere three weeks before trial. 

The trial court permitted Baumrucker to challenge the license’s authenticity, and her attorney 

pointed out that the license, which was a photocopy of poor quality, did not have Leal’s name 

or other identifying information or a date of issue. The license was not self-authenticating 

because it did not have Cicero’s seal or a certification under seal that the town president and 

clerk who signed the license had official capacity to sign and that their signatures were 

genuine. See Ill. R. Evid. 902(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Moreover, defendants did not present any 

witness to authenticate the license. See Ill. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“Testimony 

that a matter is what it is claimed to be” satisfies the authentication requirement.). For instance, 

an official from Cicero did not testify as to its authenticity, and Leal, himself, was not present 

to testify as to how he obtained the license. Batryn could only testify that the purported license 

looked like other Cicero chauffer’s licenses and the photo looked like Leal. But, based on the 

poor quality of the document and the lack of testimony authenticating, the jury could have 

reasonably concluded Leal did not have a chauffer’s license.

¶ 50 Defendants also assert that Leal’s driving record, which included a 15-year-old DUI 

conviction and a speeding ticket were insufficient to support a willful and wanton entrustment 

verdict. But, as noted, in making that assessment the jury was permitted to consider all of the 

facts presented. The jury did not view Leal’s driving record in isolation; they considered other 

factors, including his inexperience driving a cab and lack of training, both of which were 

known by Express Cab when they entrusted him with a cab. Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to Baumrucker, we cannot say that the evidence so overwhelmingly favors 

defendants that the verdict cannot stand. Thus, the trial court properly denied the motions for a 

directed verdict and a judgment n.o.v.
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¶ 51 Evidentiary Errors 

¶ 52 Next, defendants assert that the trial court made numerous evidentiary errors that deprived 

them of a fair trial—(i) admission of Sievers’s expert’s testimony and (ii) Leal’s 2001 DUI 

conviction and 2010 speeding ticket. The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless that discretion was 

abused. Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 312-13 (1993). 

¶ 53 Defendants contend the trial court erred in permitting Sievers to testify as to his opinion on 

the “minimum” standard for vetting a commercial driver because it was his personal opinion, 

based on conjecture and speculation, rather than a community standard. Preliminarily, we 

address Baumrucker’s argument that defendants waived their right to raise this issue by failing 

to object to Sievers’s testimony at trial. Baumrucker acknowledges that defendants objected to 

the testimony in a pretrial motion in limine and asserts that to preserve the issue for appeal, 

they also needed to object when the testimony was offered. 

¶ 54 A court’s evidentiary rulings are not reviewable on appeal unless properly preserved. 

Thornton v. Garcini, 237 Ill. 2d 100, 106 (2009). When the court makes its rulings before trial 

in response to the parties’ motions in limine, the rulings are interlocutory and remain subject to 

reconsideration throughout trial. Cetera v. DiFilippo, 404 Ill. App. 3d 20, 40 (2010). So denial 

of the complaining party’s pretrial motion to exclude evidence is not sufficient to preserve the 

issue for appeal. Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 569 (2002); Cetera, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 40. 

The complaining party also must make a contemporaneous objection at trial when the evidence 

is introduced to allow the trial court the opportunity to revisit its earlier ruling. Simmons, 198 

Ill. 2d at 569. Failure to object at trial results in forfeiture of the issue on appeal. Id. Express 

Cab acknowledges it did not make a continuing objection to Sievers’s testimony but asserts 

that we should review it as plain error. 

¶ 55 A reviewing court may consider a forfeiture under the plain-error doctrine in civil cases. 

Wilbourn v. Cavalenes, 398 Ill. App. 3d 837, 855-56 (2010) (citing Palanti v. Dillon 

Enterprises, Ltd., 303 Ill. App. 3d 58, 66 (1999)). Although the plain-error doctrine finds much 

greater application in criminal cases, in limited circumstances it may be applied in civil cases. 

Arient v. Shaik, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, ¶ 37; Wilbourn, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 856 (citing 

Gillespie v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 135 Ill. 2d 363, 375 (1990)). The cases that have applied it 

have restricted the plain-error doctrine to situations where the act complained of was a 

prejudicial error so egregious that it deprived the complaining party of a fair trial and 

substantially impaired the integrity of the judicial process. Arient, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, 

¶ 37; Wilbourn, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 856; Matthews v. Avalon Petroleum Co., 375 Ill. App. 3d 1, 

8 (2007); In re Marriage of Saheb, 377 Ill. App. 3d 615, 627 (2007). This court has observed 

that applying the plain-error doctrine to civil cases should be “exceedingly rare.” Arient, 2015 

IL App (1st) 133969, ¶ 37 (citing Wilbourn, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 856, citing Palanti, 303 Ill. 

App. 3d at 66). The question, then, is whether the case before us is the “exceedingly rare” civil 

case that requires applying the plain-error doctrine. Id. 

¶ 56 Defendants complain that Sievers was improperly “permitted to make up his own legal 

standard” that a taxi company has a nondelegable duty to perform an independent investigation 

and road test on prospective drivers, which is contrary to existing case law as stated in 

Richards and Ledesma. This testimony, they argue, prevented defendants from receiving a fair 

trial and, if allowed, will deteriorate the judicial process. We disagree. 
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¶ 57 Generally, a person will be allowed to testify as an expert when his or her experience and 

qualifications provide knowledge that is not common to laypersons and when the testimony 

will aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusions. Thompson v. Gordon, 221 Ill. 2d 414, 428 

(2006). An expert only needs to have knowledge and experience beyond that of an average 

citizen. Id. at 429. Sievers’s opinion was based on 25 years in the commercial transportation 

industry, 12 years’ experience as a trucking safety consultant, personal experience hiring 

commercial drivers, and the requirements imposed by the city of Chicago. Further, as noted, 

we do not agree with defendants that Richards and Ledesma set forth a bright line rule on 

proper vetting of cab drivers. Sievers’s experience enabled him to provide the jury with his 

opinion about proper vetting procedures, and defendants were not deprived of a fair trial. As 

noted, Express Cab could have presented its own expert to refute Sievers’s testimony 

regarding the proper standard of care. There is no reason to review Sievers’s testimony for 

plain error. 

¶ 58 Express Cab objected when Sievers offered his opinion on the ultimate issue as to whether 

Express Cab acted willfully and wantonly by entrusting the cab to Leal. Thus, we will consider 

that question. An expert witness may generally express an opinion as to the ultimate issue. 

Townsend v. Fassbinder, 372 Ill. App. 3d 890, 905 (2007). The test for whether to admit an 

expert’s opinion on the ultimate issue is whether that opinion aids the trier of fact to understand 

the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Id. Sievers’s testimony meets the standard.

¶ 59 In addition, Express Cab contends the trial court erred in admitting Leal’s driving record 

into evidence. Specifically, the trial court should have barred Leal’s 2000 DUI conviction 

under Illinois Rule of Evidence 609(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), which states that evidence of a 

conviction is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of 

conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date. 

Express Cab further asserts that even if Rule 609(b) does not apply, the trial court should have 

barred admitting into evidence Leal’s DUI conviction because its probative value was 

outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice, given that the accident was unrelated to the use of 

alcohol or drugs. Express Cab acknowledges that Leal’s speeding ticket is more recent but 

again asserts that it is unfairly prejudicial as the accident occurred at a slow rate of speed. 

¶ 60 Initially, we must point out that Rule 609 does not apply to the facts before us; it expressly 

applies to evidence of convictions admitted for the “purpose of attacking the credibility of a 

witness.” Ill. R. Evid. 609(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Leal was not a witness and did not even appear 

at trial, so the evidence was not admitted for that purpose. Further, in a reckless entrustment of 

a vehicle cause of action, a driver’s driving record “carrie[s] the potential of prejudicing the 

jury against defendant” but is “highly relevant, if not essential, to plaintiff’s case, and to 

preclude its use was, in practical effect, to abolish plaintiff’s cause of action for wilful and 

wanton misconduct.” Lockett, 94 Ill. 2d at 74. Because Leal’s driving record was relevant to 

the willful and wanton entrustment claim and not barred by Illinois Rule of Evidence 609(b), 

the trial court acted properly in admitting it into evidence. 

¶ 61 Jury Instruction on Punitive Damages 

¶ 62 Next, Express Cab argues that the trial court abused its discretion by giving IPI Civil 

(2011) No. 35.01, because Baumrucker failed to present evidence to support a jury verdict that 

Express Cab acted willfully and wantonly. Baumrucker contends that defendants waived this 
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issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. But, defendants did raise it in the posttrial motion 

for a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. 

¶ 63 In general, a trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate jury instructions, and its 

determination will be reversed for an abuse of discretion. In re Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d 

1008, 1015 (1998). But a litigant waives the right to object on appeal to instructions or verdict 

forms that were given to a jury, when the party fails to make a specific objection during the 

jury instruction conference or when the form is read to the jury. Marek v. Stepkowski, 241 Ill. 

App. 3d 862, 870 (1992). Additionally, even if the litigant properly objects to an instruction or 

verdict form, the litigant is still required to submit a remedial instruction or verdict form to the 

trial court. See id. Timely objection and submission assists the trial court in correcting the 

problem and prohibits the challenging party from gaining an advantage by obtaining reversal 

based on the party’s own failure to act. Morus v. Kapusta, 339 Ill. App. 3d 483, 489 (2003). 

The record does not indicate that defendants made a specific objection during the jury 

instruction conference or tendered a remedial instruction. And, because we find that 

Baumrucker did present sufficient evidence to establish reckless entrustment, we reject 

defendants’ argument that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the jury the punitive 

damages instruction. 

¶ 64 Damages 

¶ 65 Finally, Express Cab argues that the compensatory and punitive damages were excessive 

and the trial court should have granted its motion for a new trial. 

¶ 66 On a motion for a new trial, a trial court will weigh the evidence and set aside the jury’s 

verdict and order a new trial if the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 454. “A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the 

opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, 

arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. A 

trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 455. The abuse-of-discretion standard applies because the trial judge had the 

benefit of previous observation of the appearance of the witnesses, their manner in testifying, 

and the circumstances aiding in the determination of credibility. Id. at 456. 

¶ 67 The amount of a verdict is generally at the discretion of the jury. Dahan v. UHS of 

Bethesda, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 770, 781 (1998). A question of damages is to be determined by 

the trier of fact, and “a reviewing court will not lightly substitute its opinion for the judgment 

rendered in the trial court.” Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill. 2d 98, 113 (1997); Klingelhoets v. 

Charlton-Perrin, 2013 IL App (1st) 112412, ¶ 67. But a court will order a remittitur or, if the 

plaintiff does not consent, a new trial, if a verdict is excessive. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 

179 Ill. 2d 367, 412-13 (1997). In Richardson, the supreme court indicated that an award may 

be viewed as excessive should it (i) exceed the range of fair and reasonable compensation, (ii) 

be the result of passion or prejudice, or (iii) be so large that it shocks the judicial conscience. 

Richardson, 175 Ill. 2d at 113. Remittitur will not be ordered when an award “ ‘falls within the 

flexible range of conclusions which can reasonably be supported by the facts.’ ” Best, 179 Ill. 

2d at 412 (quoting Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 470 (1992)). The opinion 

also states that when reviewing an award of compensatory damages for nonfatal injuries, a 

court may consider, among other things, “the permanency of the plaintiff’s condition, the 
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possibility of future deterioration, the extent of the plaintiff’s medical expenses, and the 

restrictions imposed on the plaintiff by the injuries.” Richardson, 175 Ill. 2d at 114. 

¶ 68 Defendants contends that the jury’s award of $50,000 in compensatory damages for future 

surgery was excessive because Baumrucker testified she did not want surgery and her 

physician, Dr. Chmell, said he would not perform it unless she demanded it and that her 

adhesive frozen shoulder was related to diabetes and not the accident. 

¶ 69 Taking defendants’ last contention first, Dr. Chmell did not testify that Baumrucker’s 

frozen shoulder was due to her diabetes. Instead, he testified that “the diabetes makes it more 

risky and more common for it to happen. I don’t think the adhesive capsulitis would have 

occurred but for the accident though.” 

¶ 70 Similarly, defendants mischaracterize the jury’s award of $50,000 for future medical 

expenses as money for surgery she will never have. True, Baumrucker agrees with defendants 

and her own doctor that her diabetes and Parkinson’s disease do not make her an ideal 

candidate for surgery. But Dr. Chmell testified that the shoulder condition was permanent and 

that Baumrucker, who was 63 years old at trial, would require physical therapy off-and-on for 

the rest of her life if she did not undergo corrective surgery. Baumrucker asked for $87,000 to 

cover physical therapy and all other future medical expenses. The jury awarded her $50,000. 

That is not unreasonable. 

¶ 71 As for the remainder of Baumrucker’s compensatory damages, defendants do not object to 

the award of $25,640.81 for medical expenses and $22,100 in lost wages. Baumrucker also 

requested $250,000 for pain and suffering and $250,000 for loss of normal life. The jury 

awarded her $150,000 for each. Those amounts are not unreasonable given the permanency of 

her injury, which will cause pain for the rest of her life and restrict her ability to do basic 

activities like carrying grocery bags, putting dishes away, bathing, yard work, and other 

household chores. 

¶ 72 Defendants next assert the punitive damages were excessive and warrant a new hearing 

under the Illinois common law standard or the federal due process standard. 

¶ 73 As for the Illinois common law standard, once the court has determined as a matter of law 

that punitive damages can be awarded for a particular cause of action, the jury must decide 

based on the evidence whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently willful or wanton to 

warrant the imposition of punitive damages. Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill. 2d 109, 116 

(1998). The measure of punitive damages to be awarded also presents a question for the jury. 

Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186 (1978). 

¶ 74 In reviewing a jury’s award of punitive damages, relevant circumstances to consider 

include, but are not limited to, the nature and enormity of the wrong, the financial status of the 

defendant, and the potential liability of the defendant. Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill. 2d 192, 204 

(1989). Each case must be assessed in light of the specific facts and circumstances involved, 

and the underlying purpose of a punitive damage award must be satisfied. Id.

¶ 75 “[T]he amount of a punitive damages award will not be reversed unless it is so excessive 

that it must have been a result of passion, partiality, or corruption.” Franz v. Calaco 

Development Corp., 352 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1139 (2004). Although the purpose of punitive 

damages is to punish and deter wrongful conduct, juries have been charged with their 

determination because they depend so closely on the jury’s fact finding. Id. at 1142. Because a 

jury’s determination of the amount of punitive damages is a predominately factual issue, we 
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will not reverse a jury’s determination as to the amount of punitive damages unless it is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. Cirrincione, 184 Ill. 2d at 116; Franz, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 

1145. 

¶ 76 Defendants also claim that the jury’s award of $500,000 in punitive damages was so 

excessive that it violated their constitutional right to due process. This analysis differs 

significantly from the Illinois common law analysis. The due process clause of the fourteenth 

amendment prohibits grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor because they 

serve no legitimate purpose and constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property. State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). Punitive damage 

awards generally serve the same purposes of punishment and deterrence as criminal penalties; 

however, they are not subject to the protections applicable to a criminal proceeding. Id.

Instead, they are “imprecise[ly]” determined by juries with wide discretion to choose amounts. 

Id. Further, the United States Supreme Court has expressed “concern” that juries may be 

basing their awards on “ ‘biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local 

presences.’ [Citation.]” Id.

¶ 77 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court developed three guideposts to determine 

whether an award of punitive damages by a jury comports with due process: (i) the degree of 

reprehensibility of the conduct, (ii) the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered 

by the plaintiff and the amount of punitive damages awarded, and (iii) the difference between 

the punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable 

cases. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). We apply de novo

standard of review to those factors to ensure the punitive damages award is based on the 

“ ‘application of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice.’ ” Cooper Industries Inc. v. 

Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 

(Breyer, J., concurring, joined by O’Connor and Souter, JJ.)).

¶ 78 The Supreme Court considers the first factor, the degree of reprehensibility of the 

defendant’s conduct, to be the most important. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. In evaluating the 

reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the Court has instructed us to consider whether (i) 

the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; (ii) the tortious conduct evinced an 

indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; (iii) the target of the 

conduct had financial vulnerability; (iv) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an 

isolated incident; and (v) the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or 

mere accident. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419. The existence of only one of these factors weighing 

in the plaintiff’s favor may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damage award, and the 

existence of none of these factors in the plaintiff’s favor would render the award suspect. Id. 

¶ 79 Defendants argue that, under the common law and due process standards, the punitive 

damages award should be overturned because the only factor favoring Baumrucker is that she 

sustained a physical injury. They assert that the actual accident was a slow speed collision that 

occurred because of Leal’s inadvertence and that Baumrucker failed to prove that Express Cab 

acted maliciously or with deliberate indifference to her safety by leasing the cab to Leal 

because Express Cab did all that was required by the Cicero ordinance. 

¶ 80 We disagree and find that the jury’s punitive damages award was not excessive or against 

the manifest weight of the evidence and did not violate defendants’ due process rights. 

Analyzing the due process factors first, we note that no comparable Illinois law imposes a civil 

penalty, like a fine, for willful and wanton entrustment. Thus, we need not consider this factor. 
- 16 - 

Next, in examining the reprehensibility of defendants’ conduct, the evidence showed that as far 

as Express Cab knew, Leal only had been licensed to operate a motor vehicle for five months 

because it did not bother to investigate anything beyond his recently issued Illinois license. As 

Batryn admitted, had he known of Leal’s driving record beyond those five months, he probably 

would not have hired him. Instead, Express Cab remained willfully ignorant and put a cab 

driver on the road with little investigation into whether he could endanger the public. Further, 

according to Batryn, Express Cab knew Leal had never driven a cab but failed to ensure that he 

was properly trained to reduce the likelihood that he would harm pedestrians and other drivers. 

And Express Cab did not change their vetting procedures after the accident to ensure that 

potentially dangerous, untested, and untrained drivers would not be driving their cabs. 

¶ 81 As for the disparity between the actual harm and the punitive damages award, defendants 

argue the $500,000 punitive damages award should be reversed because it bears no 

relationship to the actual damages suffered—$25,640.81 in medical expenses. First, we note 

that under the Illinois common law analysis, the amount of punitive damages imposed on a 

defendant does not have to bear any particular proportion to the size of the plaintiff’s 

compensatory recovery. Deal, 127 Ill. 2d at 204. Further, the jury awarded Baumrucker a total 

of $397,740.81 in compensatory damages, which included the $25,640.81 in medical 

expenses. Thus, the punitive damages were about 26% greater than the compensatory damages 

and not as defendants contend, 20 times greater than the compensatory damages award. And 

the evidence does not show the punitive damages award was so excessive that it must have 

been a result of passion, partiality, or corruption. Thus, we will not reverse and remand for a 

new damages hearing. 

¶ 82 Affirmed.