IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-50583

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE JUAN VALDEZ ACOSTA, also known as Mario Rico, also known as Juan

Mario Lopez, also known as John Jose Chavez,

Defendant-Appellant

Cons. w/ No. 12-50585

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE JUAN VALDEZ-ACOSTA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:12-CR-437-1

USDC No. 3:12-CR-1040-1

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 12, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 12-50583 c/w No. 12-50585

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

2

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Juan Valdez Acosta (Valdez) pleaded guilty to attempting to illegally

reenter the United States following removal and falsely claiming United States

citizenship. The district court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 57

months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release and 36 months

of imprisonment and one year of supervised release. In a related case, the

district court revoked Valdez’s term of supervised release arising from a prior

illegal reentry conviction, and it sentenced him to a consecutive sentence of 24

months of imprisonment with no further term of supervised release. Valdez filed

notices of appeal from both judgments, and the cases were consolidated on

appeal. However, as Valdez has failed to raise any challenge to his supervised

release revocation and resulting sentence, he has abandoned those issues on

appeal. See United States v. Charles, 469 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2006).

According to Valdez, the district court’s imposition of terms of supervised

release was procedurally and substantively unreasonable in light of the

Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation that a court ordinarily should not

impose a term of supervised release on a deportable alien unless supervised

release would provide additional deterrence and protection based on the facts of

the case. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), comment. (n.5). As Valdez challenges the

imposition of the terms of supervised release for the first time on appeal, we

review for plain error only. See United States v. Dominguez-Alvarado, 695 F.3d

324, 327-28 (5th Cir. 2012). Under the plain error standard, Valdez must show

a clear or obvious forfeited error that affected his substantial rights. See Puckett

v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If Valdez makes such a showing, we
No. 12-50583 c/w No. 12-50585

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have discretion to correct the error but should do so only if the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See id. 

The district court’s imposition of terms of supervised release did not

constitute procedural or substantive error, plain or otherwise. The district

court’s discussion at sentencing of Valdez’s long criminal history and admitted

substance abuse problem satisfied the procedural requirement for a

“particularized explanation and concern [that] would justify imposition of a term

of supervised release.” Dominguez-Alvarado, 695 F.3d at 330. Moreover, we

have held that implicit consideration of § 5D1.1(c) is sufficient. United States v.

Becerril-Pena, 714 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2013). “The amendments, after all,

did not alter our highly deferential review of within-Guidelines sentences,”

which requires the application of “a baseline infer[ence] that the [district] judge

has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines.”

Becerril-Pena, 714 F.3d at 350 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Valdez’s assertion that the district court committed substantive error by failing

to account for § 5D1.1(c) and the statutory sentencing factors of rehabilitation

and monitoring is insufficient to rebut the presumption of reasonableness

applicable to Valdez’s within-guidelines terms of supervised release. See United

States v. Cancino-Trinidad, 710 F.3d 601, 607-08 (5th Cir. 2013).

AFFIRMED.