IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 1, 2021

BRENT LANDON CARTER v. SHANNON DALE CARTER

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Overton County

No. 17-CV-35 Ronald Thurman, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. M2020-01704-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This divorce action concerns the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate 

and award of alimony to the wife. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT, 

J. and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

William A. Cameron and Bradford G. Wood, Jr., Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellant, 

Brent Landon Carter.

Charlene Robin Vance, Watertown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Shannon Dale Carter. 

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

The parties, Brent Landon Carter (“Husband”) and Shannon Dale Carter (“Wife”),

married in September 1995. Two children were born of the marriage. Both children have

since attained the age of majority.1 Throughout the marriage, Husband maintained a 212-

acre farm owned by his mother, Orlene Carter (“Grandmother”). In exchange for his 

efforts, Grandmother allowed the parties to live on her land. 

 

1 Husband was tasked with remitting child support in the amount of $621 per month for the 

youngest child until he attained the age of majority. 

12/10/2021
- 2 -

The parties first placed a single-wide trailer on the land for their use. They later 

built a small house (“the Block House”), where they resided for three years.2 In February 

2003, Grandmother deeded Husband 4.99 acres, including the land on which the Block 

House was built. 3 Thereafter, the parties moved to another house (“the Farmhouse”) on 

Grandmother’s property. They rented the trailer and the Block House to tenants for 

additional income.4 The parties renovated the Farmhouse with funds, in part, from Wife’s 

parents, the Smiths.5 The Smiths also purchased furniture for the Farmhouse and provided 

10 bred cows to start the parties’ herd farming operation in 2002. 

The marriage was contentious, at best, with the parties placing blame for the demise 

of the marriage on each other. Husband complained of Wife’s verbal mistreatment of him, 

poor housekeeping skills, and lack of financial management. Wife countered with claims 

of Husband’s overall neglect and verbal and physical assault. 

Husband ultimately filed a complaint for divorce on May 12, 2017, to which Wife 

responded with her own counter-complaint and request for alimony. The parties agreed 

that irreconcilable differences justified the dissolution of the marriage, leaving the trial 

court to consider, inter alia, issues pertaining to the marital estate and alimony. 

The trial court heard the matter over the course of three days, beginning in 

December 2019, with the final hearing date on October 27, 2020. At the start of the trial, 

Husband was 51 years old and Wife was 46 years old. Husband was employed throughout 

the marriage in education, first at Tennessee State and then at Tennessee Tech University. 

Husband has also earned a Master’s Degree. His monthly gross income from his 

employment in 2019 was $4,437.58. He also managed various streams of revenue from 

cattle farming, hay baling, beekeeping, and a vending machine business. 

Husband claimed that he did not net any income from his various business ventures, 

providing tax documents establishing that he reported a loss each year6and claiming that 

he closed the vending business in 2005. Wife submitted evidence to establish that Husband 

moved approximately 72 cows after she left the Farmhouse. She was able to locate some 

of their cattle on a nearby property and submitted photographic evidence showing Husband 

 

2 They also constructed a barn on the same parcel. 

3 Grandmother explained that she deeded each of her four sons 4.99 acres at that time.

4 The Block House rents for $550 per month, while the trailer rents for $350 per month. 

5 Grandmother, unimpressed with the parties’ efforts, declared that not much value was added to

the Farmhouse through the renovation. 

6 Husband’s accountant, Debra Jagnandan, confirmed Husband’s claimed losses and explained that 

“a lot of farmers” continue in their farming efforts due to the deductions and claimed expenses available. 
- 3 -

feeding the cattle on property owned by Thelma Bowers.

7

 Husband agreed that he had 23 

cows at property owned by Ms. Bowers and 6 cows at the Farmhouse, denying Wife’s 

claim that he possessed 72 cows. He stated that the 6 cows at the Farmhouse were marital 

property because they were gifted by the Smiths, while the other 23 cows were gifted solely 

to him by his father in 2012.

8

 

Despite Husband’s claims that his cattle farming was not profitable, Wife submitted 

evidence to establish that he sold 35 head of cattle from May 2016 through April 2019 for 

approximately $24,000, with 17 head of cattle sold during the pendency of the divorce in 

violation of the temporary injunction. Husband further denied ownership of several items 

of farming equipment that were expensed by him in his tax documents. He was also unclear 

as to how many checking accounts he possessed and for what purpose. 

The only real property possibly subject to equitable division was the Block House 

and the 4.99 acres deeded to Husband during the marriage. Husband argued that the 

property remained his separate property throughout the marriage. He initially claimed that 

the Block House was built by his friends without payment because “[t]hey just wanted to 

do something for me.” He stated that they also wanted to learn construction and practice 

new skills. He later admitted that the builders expected payment and that he executed a 

promissory note in the amount of $35,000. The parties also used the property to secure a 

mortgage, with an outstanding balance of approximately $13,000. 

Wife was employed full time at Averitt Express at the time of the marriage. She 

resigned for a number of years to care for the children and then pursued an education from 

Tennessee Tech University during the marriage. Following her graduation, she obtained 

employment with the Overton County Board of Education, where she currently teaches

third grade. Her current gross yearly income is approximately $43,689. She has

outstanding student loan debt in excess of $40,000, and she testified concerning surgeries 

she has undergone and ongoing physical issues that may cause additional time out of work. 

She further testified that she was unable to meet her monthly financial obligations as a 

result of medical bills, prompting her to withdraw funds early from her retirement accounts. 

The parties maintained separate checking accounts throughout the marriage. 

Husband asserted that he separated his finances due to Wife’s overspending. Wife claimed 

that Husband kept his income, including the rental and farming income, for himself and

only accepted responsibility for the electricity, water, and internet bills. He did not 

contribute to the care and maintenance of the children, leaving her to use her lesser funds 

for the children’s necessaries, including daycare in the preschool years, groceries, and the 

 

7 Ms. Bowers confirmed that Husband requested access to her approximate 55 acres to house some 

cattle in exchange for his maintenance of the land. 

8 Wife testified in rebuttal that she recently spotted 9 new cows on the farm. 
- 4 -

like. She asserted that she amassed a significant amount of credit card debt and student 

loans to pay for living expenses as a result of Husband’s failure to contribute. She likewise 

provided that Husband operated the different business ventures, e.g. rentals and farming, 

largely with cash and would amass substantial amounts and then deposit funds as needed. 

Following the separation, the Smiths purchased a residence for Wife and the 

children to reside and also provided furniture for their use. Wife was tasked with remitting 

rental payments commensurate with the mortgage in the amount of $750 per month but 

was frequently unable to remit payment. Husband remained in the Farmhouse, where he 

is not tasked with remitting payment for his residency. 

Following the hearing, the trial court advised the parties that it did not find 

Husband’s testimony credible, stating “[H]is testimony as it relates to these folks just 

showing up and building a house at no charge, he lost me then.” The court further provided 

that it believed that Husband expensed more than what was permitted for tax purposes and 

even denied ownership of farming equipment when the evidence showed he depreciated 

the items for his own tax purposes in the amount of $6,000. The court found Wife’s 

testimony credible as it related to the division of assets and request for alimony. 

In so finding, as pertinent to this appeal, the court awarded the 4.99 acres and the 

Block House to Wife as marital property, tasking Husband with remitting payment on the 

outstanding mortgage balance. The court further awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the 

amount of $1,000 and half of her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, finding that Wife 

had a need and that Husband possessed income beyond what he submitted for the court’s 

consideration. The court continued, 

The Court finds that there are great discrepancies in Husband’s various 

income documentation submitted to this Court at trial;

The Court finds that as to the cattle that [Wife’s] father gave them, [Husband] 

has been playing hide and seek with them;

The Court finds that the cattle which were housed on [property owned by 

Ms. Bowers] have been moved two or three times during this litigation;

The Court finds as to the cattle there is proof in the record that Husband has 

sold numerous head of cattle throughout this litigation period and the Court 

does specifically find that such action by Husband was a dissipation of the 

marital estate;

* * *

That each party is hereby awarded sole ownership and rights to any vehicles 
- 5 -

in their respective names free and clear of the other spouses; 

That each party is hereby awarded sole ownership and rights to any and all 

other personal property in their respective names free and clear of any claim 

of the other spouse; 

That on the retirement and investment accounts, the total of all combined 

accounts shall be divided equally between the parties with the amount of 

withdrawals made by Wife from her accounts during the marriage being 

charged against Wife’s one-half;

That Wife is hereby awarded a judgment against Husband in the amount of 

[$12,686.73] representing one-half of the cattle sold by Husband at the 

Crossville Stockyard[.]

This timely appeal followed. 

II. ISSUES

A. Whether the trial court erred in its classification of the Block House 

as marital property. 

B. Whether the trial court erred in its division of the marital estate. 

C. Whether the trial court erred in its alimony determination. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This action was tried by the court without a jury, so we review the trial court’s 

findings of fact de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness unless the 

evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 

483, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). We give great deference to the trial court’s credibility 

assessments. Id. We do not disturb “factual findings based on witness credibility unless 

clear and convincing evidence supports a different finding.” Coleman Mgmt., Inc. v. 

Meyer, 304 S.W.3d 340, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). We review the trial court’s 

conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 

321, 327 (Tenn. 2007).
- 6 -

IV. DISCUSSION

A.

Husband first claims that the court erred in its classification of the 4.99 acres and 

the Block House as marital property.9 The division of the parties’ marital estate begins 

with the classification of the property as separate or marital property. Miller v. Miller, 81 

S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Marital property, generally, is “all real and 

personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during 

the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by either 

or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-4-121(b)(1)(A). Separate property is defined in part as “all real and personal property 

owned by a spouse before marriage, including, but not limited to . . . property acquired by 

a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(b)(2).

Husband points to the deed of the 4.99 acres that was gifted to him by Grandmother

after the Block House was built in support of his contention that the property remained 

separate. Wife responds that the property was properly classified as marital when they 

lived there as a family and then later used the property to generate rental income for the 

benefit of the family. “[S]eparate property may be deemed marital by operation of law 

under theories of commingling or transmutation.” Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 

240, 247 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tenn. 

2002)).

[S]eparate property becomes marital property [by commingling] if 

inextricably mingled with marital property or with the separate property of 

the other spouse. If the separate property continues to be segregated or can 

be traced into its product, commingling does not occur. . . . [Transmutation] 

occurs when separate property is treated in such a way as to give evidence of 

an intention that it become marital property. . . . The rationale underlying 

these doctrines is that dealing with property in these ways creates a rebuttable 

presumption of a gift to the marital estate.

Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d at 256. This Court has recognized:

 

9 As a threshold issue, Husband asserts that the trial court erroneously failed to itemize the parties’ 

property with the appropriate classification and value. Despite the length of the marriage, the parties did 

not amass a significant estate subject to division. The record reflects that the trial court divided the minimal 

property at issue in its final order but did not provide a specific classification for each item divided. 

However, we hold any error harmless when the court provided a classification for the only issue on appeal 

pertaining to the marital property, namely the 4.99 acres and the Block House. 
- 7 -

Four of the most common factors courts use to determine whether real 

property has been transmuted from separate property to marital property are: 

(1) the use of the property as a marital residence; (2) the ongoing 

maintenance and management of the property by both parties; (3) placing the 

title to the property in joint ownership; and (4) using the credit of the nonowner spouse to improve the property.

Fox v. Fox, No. M2004-02616-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2535407 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Sept. 1, 2006) (internal citations omitted).

Here, the parties improved the property by constructing a house, where they lived 

for approximately three years during the marriage. The property was then used to generate 

rental income. While the parties kept their finances separate, each contributed a portion to 

the household through their various streams of income, including the rental income from 

the property at issue. The property was also encumbered by a mortgage that was paid using 

the rental income from the property. We do not agree with Husband that the timing of the 

deed transfer, after the Block House was constructed, affects the parties’ treatment of the 

property as marital. With these considerations in mind, we affirm the court’s classification 

of the property at issue as marital. 

B.

Husband next takes issue with the court’s award of the real property to Wife and the 

court’s failure to provide him with a commensurate amount of the 4.99 acres and the Block 

House. The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning an equitable distribution of

marital property, and an appellate court will defer to a trial court’s distribution unless it is 

inconsistent with the statutory factors or is not supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Baggett v. Baggett, 422 S.W.3d 537, 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).

In all divorce cases, after classifying the parties’ property, the trial court is directed 

to “equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without 

regard to marital fault in proportions as the court deems just.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(a)(1). An equitable division of marital property does not require that the property be 

divided equally. Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 109–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (citing

Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 341 (Tenn. 2002)). Nor does it require that each 

party receive a share of every item classified as marital property. Morton v. Morton, 182 

S.W.3d 821, 833–34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting King v. King, 986 S.W.2d 216, 219 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). In making its determination, the trial court must consider statutory 

factors in view of the evidence presented by the parties. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c);

Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tenn. 2003).

In making an equitable division of marital property, the trial court is guided by the 

following relevant factors:
- 8 -

(1) The duration of the marriage;

(2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability, 

earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of 

the parties;

(3) The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the 

education, training or increased earning power of the other party;

(4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital 

assets and income;

(5) (A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, 

appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property, 

including the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage 

earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as homemaker or wage 

earner to be given the same weight if each party has fulfilled its role;

(B) For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets means 

wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital property available for 

equitable distributions and which are made for a purpose contrary to the 

marriage either before or after a complaint for divorce or legal separation has 

been filed;

(6) The value of the separate property of each party;

(7) The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;

(8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of 

property is to become effective;

(9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the 

reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable 

expenses associated with the asset;

(10) [T]he value of an interest in a closely held business or similar asset . . 

. ;

(11) The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse; and

(12) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the 

parties.
- 9 -

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). The factors are not listed in order of importance, and each 

is to be considered in relation to the specific facts of each case. See Powell v. Powell, 124 

S.W.3d 100, 108 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 

Here, the factors weigh in support of the court’s determination. This was a marriage 

of long duration; Husband held an advanced degree, a higher income through his regular 

employment, and various streams of income and assets that were not fully disclosed to the 

trial court; and Wife has undergone various surgeries for ongoing physical issues that could 

affect her ability to work in the future. Husband was evasive as to his ownership of separate 

property, hid cattle from Wife, and sold cattle in violation of the court’s temporary 

injunction. Further, Husband lives in the Farmhouse without financial obligation. Based 

on the statutory factors and the court’s broad discretion in such matters, we find no error 

in the court’s distribution of the 4.99 acres and the Block House. 

C.

Lastly, Husband takes issue with the court’s awards of alimony in futuro and solido, 

claiming that such awards were not supported by the evidence when Wife was educated 

and maintained full-time employment. Trial courts have “broad discretion to determine 

whether spousal support is needed and, if so, the nature, amount, and duration of the 

award.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011); Burlew v. Burlew, 

40 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tenn. 2000). 

The role of an appellate court in reviewing an award of spousal support is to determine 

whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard and reached a decision that is not 

clearly unreasonable. Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn. 2006).

“Alimony” is defined, in pertinent part, by Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edition, as

[a] court-ordered allowance that one spouse pays to the other spouse for 

maintenance and support . . . after they are divorced. Alimony is distinct 

from a property settlement. 

Tennessee recognizes four different types of alimony: rehabilitative alimony, transitional 

alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido. In determining whether to award 

alimony, the court must first consider whether the spouse seeking alimony is economically 

disadvantaged. Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 2003). “Once the trial court 

has found a party to be economically disadvantaged relative to his or her spouse, it must 

determine the nature, amount, length of term, and manner of payment of the award.” Id. 

In setting the type, duration, and amount of support, courts are guided by the following list 

of factors:

(1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial 
- 10 -

resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or 

retirement plans and all other sources;

(2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and 

opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the 

necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such 

party’s earnings capacity to a reasonable level;

(3) The duration of the marriage;

(4) The age and mental condition of each party;

(5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, 

physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;

(6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek 

employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a 

minor child of the marriage;

(7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and 

intangible;

(8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in 

§ 36-4-121;

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible 

contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and 

tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, training or 

increased earning power of the other party;

(11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its 

discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and

(12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as 

are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i). In addition to the factors found in Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 36-5-121(i), the two most relevant factors in determining the amount of 

alimony awarded are the economically disadvantaged spouse’s need and the obligor 

spouse’s ability to pay. Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 342 (Tenn. 2002). When 

considering these two factors, the primary consideration is the disadvantaged spouse’s 
- 11 -

need. Watters v. Watters, 22 S.W.3d 817, 821 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). “There are no hard 

and fast rules for spousal support decisions, and such determinations require a ‘careful 

balancing’ of the relevant factors.” Miller v. Miller, No. M2002-02731-COA-R3-CV, 

2003 WL 22938950, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003) (citing Anderton v. Anderton, 

988 S.W.2d 675, 682–83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)).

Alimony in futuro

Wife was awarded alimony in futuro, which is a long term form of spousal support 

that is typically awarded

when the court finds that there is relative economic disadvantage and that 

rehabilitation is not feasible, meaning that the disadvantaged spouse is unable 

to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the 

spouse’s standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to 

the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce 

standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering 

the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). This type of alimony is awarded on a “long term basis 

or until death or remarriage of the recipient” spouse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). 

Awards of alimony in futuro “remain in the court’s control for the duration of such award, 

and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a 

showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-

121(f)(2)(A); Bowman v. Bowman, 836 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). 

Again, the majority of the factors weigh in favor of such an award to Wife. This 

was a marriage of long duration; Husband held an advanced degree, a higher income 

through his regular employment, and various streams of income and assets that were not 

fully disclosed to the trial court; and Wife has undergone various surgeries for ongoing 

physical issues that could affect her ability to work in the future. We find no abuse of 

discretion under the circumstances presented here. 

Alimony in solido

Wife was also awarded alimony in solido, in the form of half of her attorney’s fees. 

The decision to award (or deny) attorney fees as alimony in solido is also within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 361; Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 

140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). The appellate court will not interfere with an award, 

except upon a showing of an abuse of discretion, where the evidence preponderates against 

the award. Long v. Long, 957 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Elliot v. Elliot, 825 

S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
- 12 -

An award of attorney fees in divorce cases is considered spousal support, generally 

characterized as alimony in solido. Yount v. Yount, 91 S.W.3d 777, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2002). An award of such fees is subject to the same factors that must be considered in the 

award of any other type of alimony. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 113; Yount, 91 S.W.3d at 

783. Therefore, the statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-

101(d)(1) are to be considered in a determination of whether to award attorney fees. 

Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d at 751.

An award of attorney fees “is conditioned upon a lack of resources to prosecute or 

defend a suit in good faith.” Id. (quoting Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983)). 

The award of attorney fees as additional alimony is most appropriate where the divorce 

does not provide the obligee spouse with a source of funds, such as from property division, 

with which to pay his or her attorney fees. Yount, 91 S.W.3d at 783. 

The facts of this case support an award of half of Wife’s attorney’s fees and 

litigation expenses as alimony in solido, as Wife currently lacks the funds to pay these fees. 

She is economically disadvantaged compared to Husband, who held a superior earning 

capacity and did not present credible evidence concerning his income. While Wife was 

awarded the marital property, she would be required to deplete this asset to pay the entirety 

of her fees. We find no abuse of discretion under the circumstances presented here. 

Lastly, at the conclusion of her brief, Wife seeks to recover her attorney fees

incurred on appeal. However, this request was not presented in the statement of issues or 

supported by argument in Wife’s brief. A request for attorney fees is waived if not included 

in the statement of issues. See Keeble v. Keeble, No. E2019-01168-COA-R3-CV, 2020 

WL 2897277, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2020) (citing Killingsworth v. Ted Russell 

Ford, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 406, 410–11 (Tenn. 2006)). Accordingly, Wife’s request for

attorney fees on appeal is waived.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The case is 

remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal are taxed 

to the appellant, Brent Landon Carter.

_________________________________

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE