COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Lemons* and Frank 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

DANIAL J. WILLIAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗∗ BY 

v. Record No. 1099-99-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK 

 JULY 25, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Charles E. Poston, Judge 

 Cynthia D. Garris for appellant. 

 Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 ∗

 Justice Lemons participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme 

Court of Virginia. 

∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Danial J. Williams (appellant) challenges his convictions for 

capital murder and rape. On appeal, he contends that the trial 

court erred in refusing to permit him to withdraw his pleas of 

guilty. We disagree and affirm the convictions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On January 22, 1999, appellant pled guilty to the July 7, 

1997 capital murder and rape of Michelle Moore Bosko (victim). 
Appellant signed a stipulation of facts implicating himself and 

six other men in the victim's rape and murder. In the 

stipulation, appellant stated that he did not ejaculate when he 

had intercourse with the victim. At the April 28, 1999 sentencing 

hearing, appellant moved to withdraw his pleas of guilty. The 

trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty, 

stating that the court found the pleas were voluntarily and 

intelligently made, they were not entered under fraud, coercion, 

or undue influence, and that the new evidence asserted by 

appellant was not a defense to his case. The trial court then 

pronounced sentence. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty. We find no error and 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 "[W]hether or not an accused should be allowed to withdraw a 

plea of guilty for the purpose of submitting one of not guilty is 

a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court 

and is to be determined by the facts and circumstances of each 

case." Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 324, 52 S.E.2d 872, 

873 (1949). The trial court's finding as to the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence in support of a motion to 

withdraw a plea of guilty will not be disturbed unless plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it. See Hoverter v. 

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Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 454, 465, 477 S.E.2d 771, 776 (1996) 

(citation omitted). 

No fixed or definite rule applicable to and 

determinative of all cases can be laid down. 

However, the motion should not be denied, if 

timely made, and if it appears from the 

surrounding circumstances that the plea of 

guilty was submitted in good faith under an 

honest mistake of material fact or facts, or 

if it was induced by fraud, coercion or undue 

influence and would not otherwise have been 

made. 

Parris, 189 Va. at 324, 52 S.E.2d at 873. 

 Appellant argues that, subsequent to the entry of his pleas, 

another man confessed to committing the crimes alone, which 

exculpates appellant and is indicative that he entered his pleas 

inadvisedly. In support of his argument, appellant asserts that 

the physical evidence links the other man to the crimes. 

 Before accepting appellant's pleas, the trial court asked 

appellant whether he understand the plea agreement and whether he 

had the opportunity to discuss the plea agreement with his 

attorneys. Appellant answered in the affirmative, and the trial 

court found that appellant's pleas were voluntarily and 

intelligently made. The trial court, therefore, did not err in 

ruling that appellant's pleas were not entered under fraud, undue 

influence, or coercion. 

 At the time he entered his guilty pleas, appellant admitted 

in the stipulation of facts that he committed the crimes along 

with six other men. He testified under oath that the information 

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in the stipulation of facts was true. Clearly, he knew that other 

people were involved in the crime. He also stated that he did not 

ejaculate when he had intercourse with the victim, indicating that 

there was no genetic evidence to link him to the crimes when he 

entered his pleas. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's 

determination that the pleas were not based on a mistake of 

material facts. 

 We, therefore, find that appellant's pleas were voluntarily 

and intelligently made, were not made as a result of fraud, 

coercion, or undue influence, and his assertion that new evidence 

exculpates him is contrary to his own statement under oath that 

his admissions in the stipulation of facts were true. For these 

reasons, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

Affirmed.

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