IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, )

) DIVISION ONE

 Respondent, )

) No. 80372-7-I

v. )

) UNPUBLISHED OPINION

ROBERT LEE HARRIS, )

)

 Appellant. )

_______________________________ )

DWYER, J. — Robert Harris appeals from his conviction of delivering 

methamphetamine in Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.

1 Harris

contends that the trial court erred by denying a motion to suppress his 

post-Miranda2 admission of guilt, asserting that he made the statement as the 

result of a two-step interrogation process designed to subvert Miranda. 

Additionally, Harris contends that the trial court failed to recognize its authority to 

impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range. We conclude that 

the trial court did not err in either of these respects. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

On February 18, 2017, Robert Harris was arrested for selling 

methamphetamine to Anthony Ducre, an undercover police officer. Prior to 

purchasing the drugs from Harris, Officer Ducre approached a woman named 

 1 Chapter 69.50 RCW.

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
No. 80372-7-I/2

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“Carmela” in Cal Anderson Park in Seattle’s Capitol Hill neighborhood. Officer 

Ducre asked Carmela if she had any “clear,” which is a street name for 

methamphetamine. Carmela offered to let Officer Ducre smoke her pipe 

containing methamphetamine. Officer Ducre declined and stated that he wanted 

to buy a larger amount of methamphetamine.

Carmela introduced Officer Ducre to Harris, who was standing on a 

nearby street corner. Officer Ducre told Harris that he was “looking for 20,”

meaning 20 dollars’ worth of methamphetamine. Harris told Officer Ducre to 

“hold out [his] hand” and poured out .7 grams of methamphetamine from a small 

baggie. Officer Ducre paid Harris with a 20 dollar bill.

After the transaction, Officer Ducre walked away and signaled for 

uniformed officers to arrest Harris. Officers arrested Harris and recovered a 20

dollar bill and a baggie containing 1.74 grams of methamphetamine from Harris’s 

person. A forensic scientist from the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory 

confirmed that the substance Harris provided to Officer Ducre contained 

methamphetamine. 

Around 12:30 p.m., the police took Harris to the nearby east police 

precinct. Harris was initially placed in a temporary holding cell. Shortly before 

2:00 p.m., Harris was questioned by Officer Matthew Blackburn in an 

interrogation room. Officer Blackburn first approached Harris about becoming a 

confidential informant. The part of the interview concerning Harris becoming a 

confidential informant was not recorded. Officer Blackburn testified that he does 
No. 80372-7-I/3

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not record interviews with potential confidential informants because, if released, 

those recordings could endanger the informant. 

Officer Blackburn presented to Harris a cooperation disclaimer form and a

cooperation release form. At 2:06 p.m., Harris and Officer Blackburn both signed 

the cooperation disclaimer form. This disclaimer form states that Harris had 

“entered into and completed this agreement freely, voluntarily, and knowingly and 

being aware of all risk(s) involved, which may be significant.”

At 2:08 p.m., Harris and Officer Blackburn both signed the cooperation 

release form. Under this form, Harris was required to telephone Officer 

Blackburn by 6:00 p.m. on February 23, 2017, and complete three separate 

narcotics transactions from suspected drug dealers. In return, Officer Blackburn

agreed to release Harris pending further cooperation and, if Harris cooperated, to

not forward Harris’s case to the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. 

Officer Blackburn testified that he never told Harris that he had to confess as part 

of the cooperation agreement. 

After signing the cooperation release form, Harris remained in the room for 

approximately one hour. Harris was under arrest and was not free to leave. 

Officer Blackburn testified that, during this time, Harris did not express any desire 

to either speak to an attorney or refrain from giving a recorded statement.3 

Officer Blackburn then recorded an interrogation of Harris. The entirety of 

this recorded interrogation lasted for two minutes between 3:14 p.m. and 3:16 

 3 At trial, Officer Blackburn testified that he did not recall what conversations he had with 

Harris during this hour-long period before Harris gave a recorded confession. At the hearing on 

the admissibility of Harris’s recorded confession, there was no testimony regarding what, if 

anything, Officer Blackburn and Harris discussed during this hour-long period.
No. 80372-7-I/4

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p.m. During this recorded interrogation, another police officer—Officer Kristopher 

Safranek—was also present. Officer Blackburn read Harris the Miranda rights 

prior to interrogating him. After receiving the Miranda rights, Harris expressly 

affirmed that he understood them. Harris subsequently confessed to delivering 

methamphetamine. Officer Safranek testified that there were no unrecorded 

questions asked of Harris while Officer Safranek was in the interrogation room. 

Harris was not booked into jail that day. However, because Harris did not 

contact Officer Blackburn to follow through with the cooperation agreement,

Harris’s case was forwarded to the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. 

The State charged Harris with one count of Violation of the Uniform 

Controlled Substances Act for delivering methamphetamine. Harris initially 

entered drug court, but his case was ultimately set for trial. Following a jury trial, 

Harris was convicted as charged. At the sentencing hearing, Harris requested an 

exceptional sentence below the standard range. The trial court imposed a 

sentence of 20 months of incarceration, which was the low end of the standard 

range. Harris appeals. 

II

Harris first contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion to 

suppress his recorded confession. Specifically, Harris asserts that his 

confession was made as the result of a two-step interrogation process designed 

to subvert the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 

16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). We disagree.
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A

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we first determine 

“whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact and 

whether the findings support the conclusions of law.” State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 

242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). “Evidence is substantial when it is enough ‘to 

persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the stated premise.’” Garvin, 166 

Wn.2d at 249 (quoting State v. Reid, 98 Wn. App. 152, 156, 988 P.2d 1038 

(1999)). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. State v. 

Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 131, 942 P.2d 363 (1997). However, “[w]e review 

conclusions of law from an order pertaining to the suppression of evidence de 

novo.” Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 249. 

B

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no 

person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 

U.S. CONST. amend. V. To assure that an accused is accorded this privilege 

against compulsory self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court 

in Miranda set forth procedural safeguards to be employed during custodial 

interrogation: “In order to combat [the compelling] pressures [of custodial 

interrogation] and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against 

self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his 

rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” Miranda, 384 U.S. 

at 467. Specifically, an accused must be clearly informed of his or her right to 

remain silent and right to counsel, either retained or appointed, and that any 
No. 80372-7-I/6

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statements made can and will be used against the individual in court. Miranda, 

384 U.S. at 467-72. After an accused is apprised of his or her rights and given 

the opportunity to invoke those rights, he or she “may knowingly and intelligently 

waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a 

statement.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The requisite warnings and showing of 

waiver are “prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a 

defendant.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 

The Supreme Court has been protective of this right. For instance, 

in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 

(2004), a plurality of the Court held that Miranda warnings given midinterrogation—after the defendant had already confessed—were designed to be 

ineffective and, thus, the defendant’s confession repeated after the warnings 

were given was inadmissible. In that case, the interrogating officer first obtained 

the defendant’s confession during a custodial interrogation that was not preceded 

by Miranda warnings. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604-05. Then, after a 20-minute 

break, the officer provided Miranda warnings and again obtained the defendant’s 

confession. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605. The Court reasoned that “[b]y any 

objective measure . . . it is likely that if the interrogators employ the technique of 

withholding warnings until after interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession, 

the warnings will be ineffective in preparing the suspect for successive 

interrogation, close in time and similar in content.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613.

In the aftermath of the Seibert decision, Division Two recognized a federal 

court’s construction of the opinion:
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“[A] trial court must suppress postwarning confessions obtained 

during a deliberate two-step interrogation where the midstream Miranda warning—in light of the objective facts and 

circumstances—did not effectively apprise the suspect of his 

rights. . . . This narrower test—that excludes confessions made 

after a deliberate, objectively ineffective mid-stream warning—

represents Seibert’s holding.”

State v. Hickman, 157 Wn. App. 767, 774-75, 238 P.3d 1240 (2010) (first 

alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 

(9th Cir. 2006)). In determining whether an interrogation process deliberately 

subverts Miranda, courts should consider “‘the timing, setting and completeness 

of the prewarning interrogation, the continuity of police personnel and the 

overlapping content of the pre- and postwarning statements.’” Hickman, 157 Wn. 

App. at 775 (quoting Williams, 435 F.3d at 1159). 

The Hickman court thus held that a defendant’s post-Miranda statements 

were inadmissible because a detective’s midstream Miranda warnings 

ineffectively apprised the defendant of his rights under the Fifth 

Amendment. Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 776. In that case, a detective informed 

the defendant that they would engage in a two-part interview consisting of

administrative questioning followed by an advisement of the Miranda rights and a 

criminal investigation concerning the defendant’s suspected failure to register as 

a sex offender. Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 770. However, during the first part of 

the interrogation, the detective elicited statements from the defendant indicating 

that he had violated the reporting requirements. Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 775-

76. The detective then stopped the interview, explained that they were going to 

shift into the criminal investigation, and advised the defendant of the Miranda
No. 80372-7-I/8

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rights. Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 770. The defendant then made a recorded 

statement. Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 770. Division Two reasoned that the 

detective’s “midstream Miranda warnings, without a significant break in time or 

place and without informing [the defendant] that his pre-Miranda statements 

could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, did not 

[sufficiently] inform [the defendant] of his Fifth Amendment right to 

silence.” Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 776.

Similarly, in State v. Rhoden, 189 Wn. App. 193, 202, 356 P.3d 242 

(2015), Division Two again held that a confession made after a defendant 

received the Miranda rights was inadmissible because it resulted from a 

prohibited, deliberate two-step interrogation procedure. In Rhoden, the 

defendant was first questioned by a police officer while he was handcuffed in his 

living room. 189 Wn. App. at 196. Without informing the defendant of 

the Miranda rights, the officer asked whether there were any drugs or guns in the 

residence. Rhoden, 189 Wn. App. at 196. The defendant told the police officer 

that there were drugs and at least one gun in his bedroom. Rhoden, 189 Wn. 

App. at 196. The same police officer then escorted the defendant to the kitchen, 

read the Miranda rights, and questioned him a second time. Rhoden, 189 Wn. 

App. at 196. Upon receiving the Miranda rights, the defendant confessed to 

having methamphetamine in his bedroom. Rhoden, 189 Wn. App. at 196. 

Division Two reasoned that “the objective evidence of ‘the timing, setting and 

completeness of the prewarning interrogation, the continuity of police personnel 

and the overlapping content of the pre- and postwarning statements’ all support 
No. 80372-7-I/9

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the conclusion that the two-step interrogation procedure used here was 

deliberate.” Rhoden, 189 Wn. App. at 202 (quoting Williams, 435 F.3d at 1159).

C

Even viewed in light of the foregoing authority, the trial court did not err in 

concluding that Officer Blackburn properly administered Miranda rights to Harris 

and that Harris’s confession was admissible. The following findings of fact 

entered by the trial court support its ruling:

14. No other questions outside of the taped interview were asked of 

the Defendant while Officer Safranek was present.

. . . .

16. Officer Blackburn approached the Defendant after he was 

arrested with a proposed agreement to become a confidential 

informant.

17. The discussion regarding becoming a confidential informant 

was not recorded.

18. There was credible testimony from Officer Blackburn that it was 

not recorded because it can put informants in danger to do so since 

the audio can get disseminated causing discussions to not remain 

secret.

. . . .

20. In the agreement, two promises were made to the Defendant. 

(1) police would not book him into jail on that day, and (2) charges 

would not be referred to the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s 

Office if the Defendant followed up on his end of the agreement.

21. No other promises were made.

22. There was no evidence that conversation about the confidential 

informant agreement was coercive.

33. The Defendant providing a confession was not a term of the 

agreement.
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Because Harris does not challenge any of these individual findings of fact,

they are verities on appeal. See Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d at 131. 

The trial court’s findings of fact and the evidence presented during the CrR 

3.5 hearing support the trial court’s conclusion that Harris’s Miranda rights were

properly observed. Notably, Harris’s situation is significantly different from that of 

the suspects in the Seibert, Hickman, and Rhoden decisions. In those cases,

each defendant confessed both prior to and after receiving Miranda

warnings. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604-05; Rhoden, 189 Wn. App. at 196; Hickman, 

157 Wn. App. at 775-76. This fact was essential to each court’s holding that the

defendants’ post-Miranda confessions were inadmissible. 

Indeed, in Seibert, the Court reasoned that “[b]y any objective 

measure . . . it is likely that if the interrogators employ the technique of 

withholding warnings until after interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession, 

the warnings will be ineffective in preparing the suspect for successive 

interrogation, close in time and similar in content.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613

(emphasis added). 

Likewise, in Hickman, the court reasoned that a detective’s 

“midstream Miranda warnings . . . without informing [the defendant] that his 

pre-Miranda statements could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal 

prosecution, did not [sufficiently] inform [the defendant] of his Fifth Amendment 

right to silence.” Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 776 (emphasis added). 

Finally, in Rhoden, the court reasoned that a deliberate two-step 

interrogation procedure occurred because of “‘the timing, setting and 
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completeness of the prewarning interrogation, the continuity of police personnel 

and the overlapping content of the pre- and postwarning statements.’” Rhoden, 

189 Wn. App. at 202 (emphasis added) (quoting Williams, 435 F.3d at 1159). 

Here, there is no evidence that Harris confessed prior to receiving Miranda

warnings. The trial court’s findings of fact and the evidence presented at the CrR 

3.5 hearing indicate that Officer Blackburn’s initial conversation with Harris was 

limited to the topic of Harris becoming a confidential informant. The trial court 

found that, during Officer Blackburn’s initial conversation with Harris, only two 

promises were made: “(1) police would not book him into jail on that day, and (2) 

charges would not be referred to the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office if 

the Defendant followed up on his end of the agreement.” Officer Blackburn 

testified that he never told Harris that he had to give a confession as part of the 

cooperation agreement. Likewise, the trial court found that Harris “providing a 

confession was not a term of the agreement.” As the trial court found, “[t]here 

was no evidence that conversation about the confidential informant agreement 

was coercive.” 

Indeed, the evidence and findings of fact indicate that Officer Blackburn’s 

interrogation of Harris was limited to what was contained in the recording. Officer 

Safranek—who was present for the recorded interrogation—testified that there 

were no unrecorded questions asked of Harris while Officer Safranek was in the 

interrogation room. Similarly, the trial court found that “[n]o other questions 

outside of the taped interview were asked of the Defendant while Officer 

Safranek was present.” Therefore, there is nothing in the record indicating that 
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Harris confessed to delivering methamphetamine prior to receiving the Miranda

warnings.

Because the record is devoid of evidence that Harris made an 

incriminating statement prior to receiving the Miranda warnings, Officer 

Blackburn did not engage in a deliberate, two-step interrogation procedure 

designed to subvert the requirements of Miranda as prohibited by Seibert. 

Therefore, when Officer Blackburn read Harris the Miranda rights, Harris was 

“‘effectively apprise[d] . . . of his rights.’” Hickman, 157 Wn. App. at 774 

(quoting Williams, 435 F.3d at 1157-58). 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by admitting Harris’s confession.

III

Harris next contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that it 

lacked the authority to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard 

range. In particular, Harris asserts that the trial court was authorized by State v. 

Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717, 888 P.2d 1169 (1995), to impose an exceptional 

sentence. We disagree. 

A

A standard range sentence generally cannot be appealed. RCW 

9.94A.585(1). But when “a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence 

below the standard range, we may review the decision if the [trial] court either 

refused to exercise its discretion at all or relied on an impermissible basis for 

refusing to impose an exceptional sentence.” State v. Khanteechit, 101 Wn. App. 

137, 138, 5 P.3d 727 (2000). Accordingly, we may review a trial court’s
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imposition of a sentence within the standard range if “[the trial court] erroneously 

believed it lacked the authority to [impose an exceptional sentence].” State v. 

McGill, 112 Wn. App. 95, 100, 47 P.3d 173 (2002). However, “a trial court that 

has considered the facts and has concluded that there is no basis for an 

exceptional sentence has exercised its discretion, and the defendant may not 

appeal that ruling.” State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 

1104 (1997).

B

In State v. Alexander, our Supreme Court affirmed an exceptional 

sentence below the standard range imposed upon a defendant convicted of

delivering a controlled substance. The defendant approached an undercover 

police officer and asked if he wanted to buy cocaine. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d at 

719. The police officer asked for 20 dollars’ worth, and the defendant led the 

police officer to a donut shop to meet another man who had cocaine. Alexander, 

125 Wn.2d at 719. The police officer attempted to pay the other man directly for 

the cocaine, but the defendant intercepted the money, keeping $5 for himself and 

giving $15 to the other man. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d at 719. In exchange for the 

$15, the man gave the defendant .03 grams of cocaine, which the defendant then 

passed to the police officer. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d at 719. The court held that

the trial court properly imposed an exceptional sentence because: (1) the crime 

involved “an extraordinarily small amount of a controlled substance”; and (2) the 

defendant had a “low level of involvement” in the drug transaction. Alexander, 

125 Wn.2d at 721-22.
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C

Here, the trial court did not erroneously believe that it lacked authority to 

impose an exceptional sentence. Rather, it determined that Alexander was 

factually distinguishable from Harris’s case in significant ways. First, during the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that Alexander “involved someone with 

much less participation in the drug deal than [Harris].” Whereas the defendant 

in Alexander acted as an intermediary to a drug transaction, Alexander, 125

Wn.2d at 719, Harris dealt drugs directly to an undercover police officer. In 

addition, the trial court concluded that there was “also a much smaller amount of 

drugs in [Alexander].” Indeed, in Alexander, the defendant transferred .03 grams 

of cocaine. 125 Wn.2d at 719. Harris, on the other hand, transferred .7 grams of 

methamphetamine and had an additional 1.74 grams on his person. In

determining that Alexander did not control the disposition of Harris’s sentence, 

the trial court “considered the facts and . . . concluded that there [was] no basis 

for an exceptional sentence.” Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330. In so doing, 

the sentencing court did not err.

Accordingly, Harris may not appeal the standard range sentence imposed 

upon him.
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Affirmed.

 We concur: