1

0 7

- 1 6 2 5

- c v (L) M iner v. C l

inton C oun ty UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T erm, 200 7 (A rgue d: M ay 22 , 20 08 Dec id ed: Sep te mb er 5, 2 008) Docket Nos. 07-1625-cv (L); 07-2461-cv (CON) V AL ER I E M I NER , D A V I D M I NER , A LEXAND ER T UPAZ , A ND L O U RD E S T UPAZ ,

Plainti ffs-Appella nts, v. C L I NT ON C O UN TY , N E W Y O RK , A ND J AN ET D UP R EY , I N H ER I ND I VI DU AL C APACI TY A ND I N H ER O FF I CI AL C AP AC I TY AS C L I NT ON C OUNTY T R EA S UR ER ,

Defenda nts-App ellees
. B ef or e: C AB R ANES , K

A T ZMA NN , and B.D. P AR KER , Circuit Jud ges. Plaintiffs in two ca ses cons olidated on a ppeal file d suit in the United States District Court for th e No r th ern D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( T ho mas J . M cAvo y andGar y L . Sh arpe, Judges

), alleg ing viola tions of th eir r igh ts to du e pr oce s s andequ al p r ot ect io n o f the l aws s te mming f r omClin to n Co un ty ’s foreclosur e of their propert ies as a result of unpaid propert y taxe s. In both cases, the Distr ict Court gr ant ed s um mar

y ju dgm ent

fo r def end ant s . We h ol d that

(1 ) d ue p r oce s s do es no t r equ ir e actual no ti ce of fo r eclo s ur e, see J

ones v . Flower s, 54 7 U. S. 2 20, 226 (2 006), th at d ef end ant s ’ act

io ns wer e r eas on ably calc ulated unde r the circumstances to pr ovide notice of for eclosure, and that pla intiffs were not entitled to additiona l notice of default judgment where the previous notice of foreclosure met the requirements of

due process. (2) We also agree with the District Court that defenda nts did not violate pl ain ti ff s ’ r igh ts to du e pr oce s s andequ al p r ot ect io n o f the l aws by r ef

us ing t o acc ept

r ede mp ti onaf

te r2

def aul t j udgm ent

was ent er ed o r

r ef us ing t o gr ant

pl ain ti ff s a s har e inth e s urplus fr oma ta x s ale. (3 ) We f in d n o m er

it inpl ain ti ff

s ’ cl aimth at r eas on abl e r es tr ict io ns onth e me th odof

paym ent of lo ngoverdue taxe s—s uch as requiring payme nt by cash, money order, or certif

ied che ck—viola te due pro ce ss. Affirmed. M ARK S CHNEI DER , P lat ts bu rgh, NY, for plainti ffs-app ellants
. R O BERT A. R

AUS CH , M ayna r d, O’ Con no r , Smith & Catalin ot to , L

LP , Albany, N Y, for defendan ts-app ellees
. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : In two actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1 983, plaintiffs Alexa nder and Lourdes T upaz a nd Vale r ie an d D avi d M

in er all ege v io lat io ns of th eir r igh ts to du e pr oce s s andequ al p r ot ect io n o f the l aws
as a r es ul t o f Cl

in to n Co un ty ’s enf

or cem ent of var io us fo r eclo s ur e pr ov

is io ns of New Yor k’s Real Propert y Tax Law. W e consolidated the ir cases on appealfrom the United Sta tes Dis trict Court for the No r th ern D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( T ho mas J . M cAvo y andGar y L . Sh arpe, Judges

) due to overlapping clai ms against the same defendants and now a ffirm the Distr ict Court’s entries of

judgment in favor of the de fe nd a nts o n a llcl aim s. As exp lai nedingr eat er

det ail bel ow, pl ain ti ff

s do no t h ave a d ue p r oce s s r igh t t o actual

no ti ce of for eclosure. They are e ntitled to notice that is reasonably c alcul ated under the ci rcumst ance s to reach the inte nded recipie nts, alert them to a pending foreclosure, and advi se them of an opportunity to be heard. C linton County did not viola te plaintiffs’ right t o due process where, as here, the C ounty
s ent a no ti ce o f f

or eclo s ur e by

cer ti fi ed m ail

andr eas on ably be lievedth at the n ot ice h ad b eendel

ive r ed. Plaintiffs were not entitled to a dditional notice of default judgment, to an a dditional opportunity to redeem their property after for eclosure, or to a share of any profits from a tax sale for the s ame rea son: Clinton C ounty provided plaintiffs with the process they we re due by sending a notice of foreclosure3

th at “was r eas on ably cal cul ate d t o r eachth e in te nd ed r ecip ien t whens ent .” Jones v . Flower s, 54 7 U. S. 220 , 22 6 ( 200 6) . We al s o f

in d n o v io lat io n o f the r

igh t t o equal

pr ot ect io n o f the l aws inth e Cou nt y’s refus al to permit taxpay ers to r edee m their propert y by pa ying the ba ck-taxes after default judgment has been ente red or its refus al to grant plai ntiffs a share of any surplus f rom a tax sale bec ause plaintiffs have not submitted evidenc e showing adv erse tr eatment on a n impermiss ible ba sis compared wi th per s on s who wer e s imila rly s ituat ed. Fi nally, we co nclud e that th e Cou nt

y’s r equ ir eme nt th at l ongoverdue tax pa yments be submitted in the form of cash, money order, or certified check doe s not vio lat e du e pr oce s s . BAC KGROUND Unles s other

wis e s tat ed, th e f

ollo wing f act s ar e no t dis pu te d. Th e Tupa zes The Tupazes purchased two undevelope d properties in the Town of Platts burgh, Clinton Cou nt y, N ew Yo r k, i n 1 987 . Si nce th at t im e, thes e pr op er ti es hav e be en the s ub ject of th r ee t ax foreclosur e proceedi ngs. The inst ant dispute arises f rom the allege d failure of defendants Clinton County a nd Janet Duprey, the C linton County Treasurer, to give adequa te notice of the foreclosure
as s oci ate d wi thun pai d p r op er ty tax es fr om200 2. Between May 2 002 and February 200 3, defenda nts s ent five letters by firs t class mail to the T up azes no ti fy

ing themof

th eir ov er du e t axes . See Tupaz v. Cl inton Coun ty , 499 F. Supp . 2d182 , 18 4 (N .D .N .Y. 200 7)
. T he f

in al l et te r , s ent

onFe bruar

y 11 , 20 03, warnedth e T up azes th at i f thei r 200 2 taxes were not pai d by October 10, 2003 , the County w ould initiate foreclosure proceeding s. Each of th e lette r s was add r es s ed t o the T up azes at thei r ho me i n S tat en I s lan d, New Yor k— th e add r es s th at appea red on record in the county tax rolls and whe re defendants had sent previous notices of fo r eclo s ur e. Id

. No ne o f the l et te r s wer e r eturnedas un del ive r abl e. Id

. T he T up azes con te ndth atF o r th e re le v a n t tim e p e r io d , N e w Y o r k la w re q u ire d th a t o n ly o n e n o tic e b e se n t b y c e r tifie d m a il. S ee 1 N
. Y
. R e a l P ro p . T a x L a w § 1 1 2 5 (20 0 5 ). T h e statu te w a s su b se q u e n tl y am e n d e d to re q u ire tha t tw o not i ces of fo r e c lo su r e b e se n t, e ith e r b y c e r tifie d m a il a n d fir st c la ss m a il o r b o th b y c e r tifie d m a il. S ee N
. Y. Re a l Pr o p . Ta x La w § 1 1 2 5 (1 )(b ) a n d (5 ) (2 0 0 8 ). 4 they neve r received these le tters , although they acknowledge that the County’s record of their home address was corr ect. Having rec eived no response from the Tupazes, in October 2003, defendants included the Tupazes in a list of all delinque nt taxpaye rs to whom they sent a Notice a nd Petition of For eclosure (the “Notice” or “Notice of For eclosure”), indica ting that the final da te for r edemption of the property by p aying the o ver du e t axes was J anu ary 16 , 20 04. Id
. T he N ot

ice w as s ent

to th e T up azes ’ St ate n I s lan d ad dr es s viacer ti fi ed m ail
. Id
. Defendants subs equently rec eived a delive ry receipt for the 1 No ti ce o f F or eclo s ur e, i ndicat ing that th e lette r was del ive r ed o n O ct ob er

16. T he d eli

ver y r eceipt di d not contain a l egible signature fromthe recipient indic ating who rec eived the packa ge. Instead, the “Signa tu r e” b oxhada li ne d r awn w ithi n i t an d didno t o th er

wis e co nt aina r eadily i den ti fi abl e signature. In addition to the Notice, defenda nts publis hed notice i n two Clinton C ounty newspape rs pu r s uan t t o N ew Yo r k Real Pr op er ty T ax L aw § 1 124
. Id

. While the p ar ti es di s pu te whe th er th e T up azes r ecei

vedth e No ti ce, ther e is no di s pu te th at def end ant s bel

iev ed that it hadbee n d eli

ver ed. Se e i

d. at 185. Defenda nt Janet Duprey, the Cli nton Cou nt y T r eas ur er , at te s te d that

up onr ecei

ving the r eceipt , s he p r es um ed that “the m ail ing ha [d ] i nd eed bee n d eli ver ed an d r ecei

ved .” Id
. (quo ti ng A ff

id avi t o f J anet

L. Dupr ey ( “D up r ey Af

fi dav it ”) ¶ 14 ). Dupr ey f ur th er “as s um ed that

th e pl ain ti ff

s hadin dee d r ecei

vedth e No ti ce” b ecau s e they “ha d receive d numerous pr

ior letters and wa rnings” at the same address. (D uprey Affidavit ¶ 22. ) She
te s ti fi ed that , p ur s uan t t o s tan dar d p r act ice f or con fi r ming ille gib le s ign atu r es , the Co un ty T r eas ur er ’s of fi ce co nf irmed , b y ch ecki ng the U ni te d S tat es Po s tal Ser vic e web s it e, that

th e No ti ce was del

ive r edI n he r depos i t i on t es t i m ony of A ugus t 20 05, D upr ey s t at ed t hat s he di d not r em em ber who chec ked t he 2 w ebs i t e or when ex act l y t he webs i t e was che cked i n t hi s ca s e , but i n he r D ecem ber 2006 af f i davi t s he s t at ed t hat som eo ne i n the C ou nty T rea su rer’s offi ce ch ec ke d t he w eb si t e “ on t h[e ] s am e d ay [on w hich t he y re ce i ve d t he d eli ve ry r e c e ip t] o r sh o r tly th e r e a ft e r .” (D u p r e y A ff id a v it, ¶ 1 3 .)
N ew Y ork st ate l aw d oe s no t req u i re su ch no t i ce . N ew Y ork R ea l P rop erty T ax L aw § 11 31 st ates: 3 In t he ev en t of a fail u re to red ee m or an sw er b y a ny pe rson ha ving the ri gh t t o re d ee m or an sw er,

s uch pe r s on s hal l f

or ever be bar r ed and f

or ecl os ed of

al l r i gh t , t i t l e, an d i nt er es t an d equi t y of r edem pt i on i n a nd t o t he p ar cel i n whi ch t he p er s on h as an i nt er es t an d a j udgm ent i n f or ecl os ure m ay b e ta k e n b y d e fa u lt a s p r o v id e d b y su b d iv isio n th r e e o f s e c tio n e le v e n h u n d r e d th irt y -s ix o f th is title
. A m ot i on t o r eope n a ny s uch def aul t m ay not be br ough t l at er t han one m ont h a f t er ent r y of

t he ju d g m e n t. W e ha ve p r evi ous l y he l d t hat t hi s pr ovi s i on does not r equi r e s er vi ce o f t he def aul t j udgm ent of

t ax f or ecl os ure i n or der t o be gi n t he t hi r t y- day pe r i od w i t hi n whi ch a m ot i on t o r eope n m us t be f i l ed w hen t he g over nm ent ha s g i ven not i ce o f fo r e c lo su r e . S ee W eign er v . C ity of N ewYork , 8 5 2 F
. 2 d 6 4 6 , 6 5 2 (2d C ir. 1 9 8 8 ). 5 on October 16, 2003 within the zip code applic able to the Tupaz es’ residence. After comparing the 2 “signature” on the October 16 delivery rece ipt to previous delivery receipts for not ices of foreclosur e th at h ad b eens ent

to th e T up azes ’ St ate n I s lan d ad dr es s , s he c on clu dedth at p r evi ou s no ti ces hadbee n
a cc ep te d wit h e qu ally i nd ec ip he ra bl e m a rki ng s. Acc ording to Duprey, it was “not at all unusual to
r ecei ve a c er ti fi ed m ail

r eceipt with anill egi bl e s ign atu r e or s im ply a m ar k inth e s ign atu r e bo x indi cat ing it s r ec ei pt .” ( Dupr ey Af

fi dav it , ¶ 1 4 (emp has is add ed) .) Sh e was no t aw ar e of any o th er fa ct or th at
wouldhav e s ugg es te d a f

ailur e t o d eli

ver th e No ti ce. The Tupazes did not pay the ove rdue taxes, redeem the property, or otherwise respond by the appointed da te, and the C ounty initiated foreclosure proceeding s in the County Court of Clinton County. On February 20, 2 004, the C ounty Court entered a de fault judgment of foreclosur e ag ainst the T up azes as well

as s ever al o th er

tax paye r s who hadno t r ede eme d thei r pr op er ty . T

upaz , 499 F. Supp. 2d
. at 186. The C ounty did not send the Tupazes a notice of judgme nt and the Tupaze s learned of the 3 foreclosur e in March 2004, w hen Mr. T upaz c alle d the County Treasurer’s office and wa s told that the Cou nt y hadfo r eclo s ed o n the p r op er ti es . Id
. T he T up azes con te ndth at thi s call was th e f ir s t t im e they learnedth at they

owe d t axes andth at the Co un ty hadin s ti tu te d f

or eclo s ur e pr oce edi ngs . D up r eyThe ot her pl ai nt i ffs i n t he L uesse nh op a p p e a l, w h o se c la im s w e r e p r e v io u sly c o n so lid a te d w ith th e T u p a z e s’ in 4 o r d e r to re so lv e a c o m m o n q u e stio n o f s u b je c t m a tte r ju r isd ic tio n , a r e n o t p a r tie s in th is a p p e a l. S ee L uesse nh op v. C l inton C oun ty , 466 F. 3d 259, 262- 64 ( 2d C i r . 2006 )
. The M i ner s , who ar e j oi nt ap pel l ant s i n t hi s ap pea l , were not pa r t i es i n t he L uesse nh op a p p e a l. 6 attested that, during this phone call, Mr. Tupaz admitted that he ha d signed the October 2003 delivery
r eceipt . Sh or tly ther eaf

te r , the T up azes s ought

to vacat e the f

or eclo s ur e ands et

as id e the d ef

aul t judgment in state court. After concluding tha t the Tupazes were properly served with notice of foreclosur e and tha t their motion to r eopen procee dings was time-barred under the applica ble statute of limit ati on s , the c ou r t d eni ed thei r r equ es t i n a d ecis io n whichwas s ub s equ ent ly af fi r medonapp eal. See In re Fo reclos

ure of Tax Liens by County of Clin ton , 17 A.D .3d914 , 91 4- 15 ( N. Y. Ap p. Di

v. 3 d D ep’ t 2 005 ). The Tupazes then brought this Section 198 3 action in the United States Distr ict Court for the Northern D istr

ict of New York, c laiming tha t defendants’ alleg ed failure to serve them with notice of th e f or eclo s ur e de pr

ive d themof

du e pr oce s s of

law an d that

th e s tat e s tatut e pr ov

iding f or per s on al
no ti ce o f f

or eclo s ur e is un con s ti tu ti on al. T he D is tr ict Cou r t ( T ho mas J . M cAvo y, Judge

) c on clu dedth at the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S.C. § 1341, deprive d it of s ubject matter jurisdiction over challe nges to the enforcement of state tax lawand, in the a lternative, that the Notice of For eclosure did not violate du e pr oce s s . T he T up azes th en f ile d a t im ely app eal i n o ur

Cou r t. On appea l, we c oncluded tha t the Distr ict Court had subject matter jurisdiction to res olve the T up azes ’ cl aim s . See Luessenhop v. Clin ton County , 466 F.3d 259, 26 4-68 (2d Cir. 2006). We rema nded the 4 case for reconsideration of the T upaze s’ due process clai ms in light of the Supreme Court’s int ervening decision in Jones v

. Flower s, 54 7 U. S. 2 20, 225 (2 006) ( ho lding that

“wh en m ail ed n ot

ice o f ataxs ale i s returned unclaimed, the State must take additiona l reasonable steps to attempt to pr ovide notice to the pr op er ty own er bef or e s ell ing hi s pr op er ty , if

it is pr act icab le t o d o s o”)
. See Luessenhop , 46 6 F .3d at 2 71- 72. We ordered that, on remand, the District Court make a finding a s to whether the County thought7

th at the N ot

ice o f F or eclo s ur e hadfaile d t o r eachth e T up azes and , if s o, whe th er

th eir “f ailur e t o act

is
excu s ed b ecau s e [the f

ir s t c las s ] l et te r s pr es um ably had r each ed thei r

des ir ed d es ti nat

io n. ” Id
. at 2 72. On remand, the District Court cons idered additiona l evide nce a nd arguments, including the Dupr ey Af

fi dav it , an d gr ant ed s um mar

y ju dgm ent

infa vo r of def end ant s . T he Co ur t d et ermi nedth at “[t]here is no evidence presented fr om which a reasonable fac t finder could conclude that Defendants hadany r eas onto bel

iev e that th e P lai nt if fs ” ha d n ot

r ecei vedth e No ti ce. T

upaz , 49 9 F . Supp . 2dat 188 . T he Co ur t n ot ed that nei th er th e No ti ce n or

th e pr evi ou s mailings hadbee n r eturned
. Id
. It further reasoned that any suspicions about the line in the signa ture box were reasonably resolved by the
con fi r mat io n o n the P os tal

Ser vic e web s it e. Id

. Finally, the Distr

ict Court observed that “there is no evidenc e that . . . a nyone a t Clinton County was aw are of any fac ts befor e the final da te of redemption th at [ th e T up azes] didno t r ecei ve ad equ ate no ti ce.” Id

. at 1 89. On that basis, the Court concluded that defenda nts had provided suf ficient notice of the fo r eclo s ur e t o s ati s fy

th e r equ ir eme nt s of

du e pr oce s s . Id

. at 1 90. T he Co ur t al s o co nclud ed that New York Re al Property Tax Law § 1125 , which requires only c ertified mailing of a notic e of foreclosur e but does not require a return of the mail rece ipt, is consis tent with the standard set for th in Jones for due pr oce s s . Id

. Citing our dec ision in Weigner v. City of New Yor k , 85 2 F .2d646 , 65 2 (

2dCir . 19 88) (concluding tha t due process does not require notice of the entry of for eclosure judgment whe re the property owner received notic e of the foreclosure pr ocee dings and an opportunity to respond), the Cou r t r ejec te d the T up azes ’ ch all eng e t o the c on s ti tu ti on ali ty of New Yor k Real

Pr op er ty T ax L aw § 113 1. T upaz , 49 9 F . Supp . 2dat 1 90. T he Co ur t f ur th er con clu dedth at n either

du e pr oce s s no r

equ al pr ot ect io n r equ ir ed that pr op er ty own er s be g

ive n a r igh t t o r ede em thei r

pr op er ty af te r fo r eclo s ur e. Id

. at 190-91. In considering their clai m that due process r equired they be given a right to any surplus pr oce eds ob tai nedby the Co un ty inexce s s of

th e am ou nt

of tax es owe d, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t rul ed that the Tupazes lac ked standing to bring this claim bec ause the property had not yet bee n sold and the8

Cou nt y hadno t y et

ob tai nedany s urplus pr oce eds
. Id
. at 192. The C ourt also obs erved that, assuming that the Tupazes had standing, due process did not require that plaintiffs be affor ded a right to any
s urplus . Id

. T hi s app eal f

ollo wed
. The Miners I t i s un di s pu te d that

th e Min er s r ecei

vedno ti ce o f the f

or eclo s ur e onth eir

pr op er ty als o l ocat ed in Clinton C ounty. Defendants sent a notice of foreclosure in October 2005, indica ting that the Miners
we re re quire d to pa y t he ov er du e t a xe s from the pre vi ou s tw o y ea rs by Ja nu a ry 20 06 . Th e n oti ce also stated that the only methods of accepta ble pay ment were ca sh, money order, or certif ied che ck. The Miners did not pay the ta xes by the due da te and defenda nts initiated default proceeding s in the County Cou r t f or Clin to n Co un ty . I t i s un di s pu te d that , inM ar ch 2 006 , M r s . Min er call ed the Co un ty

T r eas ur er ’s of

fi ce an d was in fo r medth at d ef

aul t j udgm ent

hadno t b eenent er ed b ut was exp ect ed t o b e en te r ed the n ext day. Mrs. Min er di d n ot pay a nythi ng, andth e Cou nt y Cou r t e nt er ed the o r der

of fo r eclo s ur e onM ar ch 1 0, 2 006
. The Miners subs equently sought to reopen the foreclosure proceedings in order to vacate the judgment inCou nt y Cou r t, bu t thei r

r equ es t w as denied
. T hi s dec is io n was af fi r medonapp eal. See Clinton C ounty v. Miner , 39 A.D .3d101 5, 1 015 -1 6 ( N. Y. Ap p. Di

v. 3 d D ep’ t 2 007). The Miners also filed a Se ction 1983 a ction in the United Sta tes Dis trict Court for the Northern Di s tr ict of New Yor k. They

clai medth at thei r

r igh ts of du e pr oce s s andequ al p r ot ect io n r equ ir e that the default judgme nt be vac ated; that de fendants should r econve y the property for f ull payment of the taxes owed; a nd that, if the property is not reconvey ed, they should be pe rmitted to r etain a ny surplus ob tai nedat afo r eclo s ur e s ale o f thei r pr op er ty . T hey

als o ar gue d that New Yor k’s Real P r op er ty

T ax Law is unconstitutional to the extent that it does not permit vacatur of the judgment, reconvey ance of9

the pro pe rty , a nd the right t o re tain a ny surp lu s. Finally, the y objec ted to defendants’ refus al to ac cept a pe rson al c he cka s pa ym en t fo r ov er du e t a xe s. I n anor al rul

ing, the D is tr

ict Cou r t ( Gar

y L . Sh arpe, Judge

) granted defendants’ motion for
s um mar y ju dgm ent .. T he Co ur t c on clu dedth at the Co un ty was un der

no leg al o r

con s ti tu ti on al ob ligati onto s ell

th e pr op er ty

back to pr op er ty

own er s af

te r fo r eclo s ur e. W

it h re spe ctto t he Min er s’ clai m that they should be allow ed to recoup the surplus , the Court held that “[w ]here adequa te steps are tak en t o n ot

if y the o wne r s . . . th e co un ty is no t c om pelledto r eturn the s urplus fr oma ta x s ale. ” (T r ans cr ip t o f M in er Hear ing, Apr il 1 2, 2 007 , at

20. ) Fin ally, the Co ur t rul ed that th e Cou nt

y’s
r equ ir eme nt th at d eli nquen t t axes be p aidby c as h, mo ney or der , o r cer ti fi ed c hec k was con s ti tu ti on ally accep tab le. T hi s app eal f

ollo wed
. DISCUSSI ON As we h ave o bs er

vedonmany oc cas io ns , “[ w]e r evi ew de novo a district court’s grant of sum mary ju dgm ent .” Mc

Cart hy v. Dun & B rad

st re et Co rp. , 48 2 F .3d184 , 20 2 ( 2dCir . 20 07) . Su mm ary ju dgm ent is app r op r iat e only i f “ th er e is no gen ui ne i s s ue as to any m ate r ial fa ct .” F ed. R. Civ . P . 56 (c). “A f act is
mat er ial whe n i t migh t af

fe ct th e ou tc om e of

th e s ui t u nd er

gov erni ng l aw. A n i s s ue o f f act is gen ui ne i f th e evi den ce is s uchth at ar eas on abl e ju ry co ul d [ hav e] r eturn[ed] a ver di ct

fo r th e [app ell ant

]. ” Mc Cart hy , 48 2 F .3dat 2 02 (

in te r nal cit ati on s andqu ot ati onmar ks omit te d) . I n r evi ewing the r eco r d, we “resolve all a mbiguities, and credit a ll factualinferences that could rational ly be draw n, in favor of the par ty op po s ing s um mar

y ju dgm ent .” Id

. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the burden of demonstr ating that no mate rial fact exi sts lies with the moving pa rty, “[u]nless the nonmoving pa rty offers some hard evidence showing that its vers ion of the events is not wholly fanciful, summary ju dgm ent is gr ant ed t o the m ov

ing pa r ty .” Id

. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).I n Jones , t he Arka ns as C om m i s s i oner of St at e Lands s ent a not i ce o f f or ecl os ure t o J ones by cer t i f i ed m ai l af

t er 5 J ones ha d f

ai l ed t o pa y hi s pr oper t y t ax es . 54 7 U
. S. at 223. Pri or t o t he l at e pa ym ent s t hat pr om pt ed t he n ot i ce, J ones h a d n o h isto r y o f d e lin q u e n t p r o p e r ty ta x p a y m e n ts. Id. N o o ne w as at Jone s’ ho m e to si gn for t he no t i ce of fore closu re w h e n d e liv e r y w a s a tte m p te d , a n d th e P o sta l S e r v ic e u ltim a te ly re tu r n e d th e le tte r to th e C o m m iss io n e r a s “ u n c la im e d .” 10 Noti ce of For eclosure The Tupazes contend that defenda nts knew or s hould have known that the Notice of Fo r eclo s ur e di d n ot

r eachth e T up azes andth at, inlig ht of th at f act , d ef end ant s ’ f ailur e t o t ake additionalsteps to give notice was a viol ation of the Tupazes’ right to due process pur suant to Jones v
. Flowe rs , 54 7 U. S. 2 20 (

200 6)
. I n the c on te xt

of r eal e s tat e f

or eclo s ur es , d ue p r oce s s do es no t r equ ir e actual no ti ce. Dusenbery v. United Sta tes

, 53 4 U. S. 1 61, 170 (2 002). Rath er , the g ov ernm ent mu s t p r ov

id e “n ot ice r eas on ably calc ulated, unde r all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pende ncy of the ac tion and af fo r d theman o pp or tu ni ty

to pr es ent

th eir ob ject io ns .” Mullan e v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 33 9 U.S . 30 6, 3 14 ( 195 0) . I nd eed , “[ t] he r eas on abl ene s s andhen ce the c on s ti tu ti on al v ali di ty of [the] cho s en
me tho d [ of n oti ce] ma y b e d ef en de d o n th e grou nd tha t i t i s in it sel f re a son a bly c er tain to i nfo rm th ose af fe ct ed. ” Id

. at 3 15; se e al

so id. (“ [W] henno ti ce is a per s on ’s du e . . . [ t] he m eans emp lo yedmu s t b e s uch
as one desirous of

actua lly informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to ac complish it.”). In Jones , in which a notice of foreclosure and a notice of tax sale we re returned and stamped “unclai med,” the Supreme Court recogniz ed that the gove rnment may have additionalobligations “whe n the government bec om es awar e pr

io r to th e t aki ng that

it s att emp t at

no ti ce h as faile d. ” 54 7 U. S. a t 2 27. Acco r di ngl y, when the g overnment has “promptly [acquired] additiona l information” that its not ice of foreclosure faile d t o r eachth e in te nd ed r ecip ien t, id. at 231, it “must take a dditional reasonable steps to attempt to pr ov id e no ti ce t o the p r op er ty

own er bef or e s ell ing hi s pr op er ty , if

it is pr act icab le t o d o s o. ” Id

. at 2 25;
se e al so id. at 229 (observing that, in such circumstances, “[n]o one ‘de sirous of actually informing’ the
own er s ” of

th e pe nding f

or eclo s ur e ands ale w ould“do no thing wh en a c er ti fi ed l et te r s ent to th e owner is r eturnedun clai med ” (qu ot ing Mulla ne, 339 U.S. a t 315)). 5Id. at 224. Tw o ye ar s l at er , J ones ’ pr oper t y was s chedul ed f or a t ax s al e. The C om m i s s i oner s ent a not i ce o f s al e t o t he s am e ad d res s by cert i fi ed m ai l ; t hi s not i ce w as al s o ret urned as “unc l ai m ed
. ” Id. T he Su pre m e C ou rt l i ke ne d t he se ci r cum s t anc es t o a ca s e i n whi ch “ t he Com m i s s i oner pr epa r ed a s t ack of l et t er s t o m ai l t o del i nquent t ax pay er s , ha nded t hem t o t he post m an, and t hen w at ched as t he d epart i ng post m an acci d ent al l y d ropped t he l et t ers do w n a s t orm drai n. ” Id . a t 2 2 9
. W hi l e t he Tupaz es di s put e t he f act t hat t he def

endant s che cked t he webs i t e i n O ct ober 2003 , t hey hav e 6 p r o v id e d n o “ h a r d e v id e n c e ” to su p p o r t th is d isp u te . M c C ar t hy v . D u n & Br

ad s tr e e t C o r p. , 48 2 F
. 3d 18 4, 20 2 (2d C i r. 2 0 0 7 ). T h e T u p a z e s d o n o t c o n te st th e a ss e r tio n th a t th e P o sta l S e r v ic e w e b site in d ic a te d th a t a d e liv e r y o c c u r r e d
. In ste a d , th e y c o n te n d th a t D u p r e y o r so m e o n e fr o m th e C o u n ty T r e a su r e r ’s O ff ic e d id n o t c h e c k th e P o sta l S e r v ic e ’s web s i t e i n O ct ob er 2 00 3 a s D up r ey c on t en ds
. To s up po r t t hi s c on t en t i on , t he Tup a z es p oi nt t o a web s i t e pr i nt ou t 11 The Tupazes interpret our statement in Lussenhopth at the D is tr ict Cou r t w as r equ

ir ed t o “a s k . .
. whe th er th e Cou nt

y tho ug ht that the Tupazes had rece ived notice ,” 466 F.3d a t 272, to require a finding of defendants’ subjective intent. W e now c larify that a District Court is r equired to exa mine whe ther a def end ant ’s bel

ief was ob ject

ive ly r eas on abl e un der

th e cir cum s tan ces . See Jones , 54 7 U. S. a t 2 26 (r equ ir ing “n ot ice r eas on ably cal cul ate d, un der all th e cir cum s tan ces ” (qu ot

ing Mulla ne, 33 9 U. S. a t 3 14) ). The record in this case compe ls the conclusion that defendants reasonably be lieve d that the No ti ce o f F or eclo s ur e r each ed the T up azes . We agr ee wi thth e Di s tr ict Cou r t that

th e T up azes pr es ent ed n o ev

id enc e that

“anyon e at

Clin to n Co un ty

was awar e of

any f act s bef or e the f in al d ate . . . th at [ th e T up azes] didno t r ecei ve ad equ ate no ti ce.” T

upaz , 49 9 F . Supp . 2dat 1 89. T he N ot ice, whi ch hadbee n s ent

by c er ti fi ed m ail , was nev er r eturnedto def

end ant s . Cf. Jones, 547 U.S . at 224(n ot ing that two notices had bee n returned and stamped “unclaimed”). In addition, none of the previous letters s ent by f ir s t c las s mail t o the T up azes ’ h om e inSt ate n I s lan d h ad b eenr eturned , cr eat ing a p r es um pt

io n that th ey h ad b eendel

ive r ed t o the c orr ect

add r es s . See Akey

v. Clinton C

ounty , 375 F.3d 231, 23 5 (2d Cir. 200 4) (“Wher e . . . the Co un ty pr ov id es evi den ce that

th e no ti ces of

fo r eclo s ur e wer e pr op erly ad dr es s ed andmailedinacco r dan ce wi thr egular of fi ce p r oce du r es , it

is ent it ledto a pr es um pt

io n that th e no ti ces
wer e r ecei ved .”) . M or eov er , d ef

end ant s r eas on ably r eli ed o n the c er ti fi ed m ail del ive ry r eceipt

whi ch indica ted that the Notice ha d been de livered. A s the Dis trict Court determined, any suspicions about th e li ne w ithi n the s ign atu r e bo x wer e r es ol vedby the c on fi r mat

io n o n the P os tal

Ser vic e web s it e, which “ve r if [i ed] th at the c er ti fi ed m ail hadbee n d eli

ver ed an d r ecei

ved .” T upaz , 49 9 F . Supp . 2dat 1 88. 6obt ai ned f r om def endant s di s pl ayi ng a dat e s t am p of A pr i l 21, 2004
. T h e y i n fe r fr o m the p rin to u t t h a t d e fe n d a n ts chec ked t he webs i t e onl

y a fte r th e d e fa u lt j u d g m e n t, n o t w h e n the y re c e ive d the d e li v e ry re c e ipt. W e a g r ee t ha t t he web s i t e pr i nt ou t s ho ws t ha t de f en da nt s c he ck ed t he Pos t a l Se r vi ce web s i t e i n Apr i l 2 00 4, b ut w e di s ag r ee t hat i t pr oves t hey di d not che ck t he webs i t e i n O ct ober 2003
. To t he c ont r ar y, D upr ey t es t i f i ed at her d ep ositi on t ha t w he ne ve r he r offi ce en co u ntere d a q u esti on ab l e si gn atu re, w hich ha pp en ed w i t h so m e re gu l arit y, i t w as a r out i ne p r ocedur e t o ve r i f y del i ver y on t he Pos t al Ser vi ce’ s webs i t e. Al t houg h s he c oul d not r em em ber at her depos i t i on w hen exa ct l y t hi s pr ocedur e ha d been undert ake n i n t he Tupaz es ’ ca s e, D upr ey c l ar i f i ed i n he r s ubs equent af f i davi t t hat th e P o sta l S e r v ic e w e b site w a s c h e c k e d “ o n th a t sa m e d a y ” h e r o ff ic e re c e iv e d th e T u p a z e s’ d e liv e r y re c e ip t “ o r sh o r tly t her eaf t er . ” ( D upr ey Aff

i davi t ¶ 13. ) The Apri l 21, 2004 pr i nt out does not con t r adi ct D upr ey’ s s w or n r ecol l ect i on a nd t he Tupaz es ha ve n ot com e f or t h wi t h a ny b as i s i n t he r ecor d t o doubt D upr ey’ s cr edi bi l i t y. A c c o r d in g ly , w e fin d n o e r r o r in th e D istr ic t C o u r t’s r e lia n c e o n D u p r e y ’s a ff id a v it in th is r e g a r d
. 12 Defendants also relied upon their previous dealings with the Tupaze s and prior experience serving notice. The Tupaze s, who had twice before been threatene d with foreclosure, had responded to pr evi ou s no ti ces , f

or whi ch d eli

ver y r eceipt s hadbee n r eturnedwith s imila rly ille gib le s ign atu r es . Cf. Jones , 54 7 U. S. a t 2 23 (

no ti ng that

tax paye r hadno hi s to ry of

del in qu ent pr op er ty taxpaym ent s ). The Tup a ze s a rgu e t ha t se rvi ce by ce rti fie d m ailca nn ot sa ti sfy the re quire me nts o f du e p roc ess unless the delivery recei pt is completed with an ide ntifiable signature. W e ca nnot agree. A lthough some
cou r ts hav e he ldth e abs enc e of a s ign atu r e ona del

ive ry r eceipt

may def eat a pr es um pt

io n o f d eli ver y, see, e.g . , Mo o re v. Dunham , 24 0 F .2d198 , 19 9 ( 10th Ci r . 19 56) (h ol di ng that , u nd er Ok lah om a law, an unsigned return r ece ipt was insuff icient to establish valid service), we ca n find no suppor t for the propos ition that the signature must be identifiable. Indeed, unde r the st andard established in Mulla ne and reaffirmed in Jones

, a reasonable person “desir ous of actually informing” a ta xpaye r of a pending fo r eclo s ur e wo ul d n ot

r equ ir e a le gib le s ign atu r e wh er e, as her e, d eli ver y was con fi r medus ing other
mea ns . Jones

, 54 7 U. S. a t 2 29 (qu ot

ing Mulla ne, 33 9 U. S. a t 3 15) . D ef end ant s to ok

th e “ad di ti on al
r eas on abl e s te ps ,” Jones

, 547 U.S. a t 234, of confirming the delivery on the Postal Service website and
com par ing the O ct ob er

200 3 d eli ver y r eceipt to r eceipt s fr ompr

io r s ucc es s ful d eli

ver ies
. In the circumstances pres ented here, w e agree with the District Court that Clinton County provided adequa te notice to the Tupaze s. Accordingly, there was no viola tion of the Tupazes’ right to du e p roc ess.13

N ew Y ork R eal

P r op er ty TaxLaw § 1131 T he T up azes con te ndth at N ew Yo r k Real Pr op er ty T ax L aw § 1 131 vio lat es th e co ns ti tu ti on al guarantee of due process of law be cause it does not mandate service of notice of a default judgment of tax foreclosure where notice of foreclosure has been served. We rejected a similar claim in Weigner v. New York , 85 2 F .2d646 , 65 2 ( 2dCir . 19 98) ands ee n o r eas onto r eco ns id er th at d ecis io n. T he D is tr

ict Court properly relied on our holding in Weigner th at “ ‘d ue p r oce s s only r equ ir es no ti ce o f the p end enc y of th e act io n an d anop po r tu ni ty

to r es po nd ’ an d d oes no t r equ ir e mu ni cip ali ti es ‘t o s endaddit io nal
no ti ces as eachs te p i n the f or eclo s ur e pr oce edi ngs [i s ] co mp let ed. ’” T upaz, 499 F. Supp . 2dat 1 90 (quo ti ng Weigner

, 85 2 F .2dat 6 52)
. We agr ee wi thth e Di s tr ict Cou r t. T o the e xt ent

th at the T up azes
argue th at a ctual

no ti ce was r equ

ir ed, we al s o r ejec t that

pr emi s e. See Jo nes, 547 U.S. a t 226 (“Due pr oce s s do es no t r equ

ir e that a pr op er ty

own er r ecei ve ac tu al n ot

ice b ef or e the g ov ernm ent

may tak e hi s property.”). Right t o Redempti on after For eclosure Deadline Both the Tup a ze s a nd the Min er s a rgu e t ha t th ey we re de prive d o f th ei r rights t o d ue pro ce ss and equa l protection beca use defendants did not permit a reasonable time for reconveya nce a fter the def aul t j udgm ent s wer e en te r ed. W e a gre e wit h th e D ist ric t C ou rt i n b oth ca ses t ha t de fe nd a nts d id no t i nfri ng e o n p la in ti ffs’
r igh ts to du e pr oce s s or

equ al p r ot ect

io n b y de nyi ng themr

igh ts of r ede mp ti onaf

te r th e de fa ul t ju dgm ent s wer e en te r ed. Def end ant s pr ov

id ed p lai nt

if fs adeq uat e no ti ce o f f

or eclo s ur e andan op po r tu ni ty

to be h ear d, whi ch i s all

th at d ue p r oce s s r equ

ir es . Se e T

upaz , 49 9 F . Supp . 2dat 1 91. On ce ju dgm ent was ent er ed, pl ain ti ff

s lo s t thei r r igh ts to th e pr op er ty

un der New Yor k la w andhadno fu r th er
r igh t t o r ede mp ti on . Id

. ; see also N.Y. R eal Prop. Tax Law § 1131 (extinguishing “a ll right, title, and in te re st a nd eq ui ty

of re de mp ti on ” i n afore cl ose d p rop er ty ). W e f in d n o d ue pro ce ss vi ol a ti onbe ca use def end ant s r ecei

vedadeq uat e no ti ce an d anop po r tu ni ty to be h ear d p r

io r to th e de fa ul t j udgm ent .It i s l i ke l y tha t t he T u pa zes d o n ot ha ve st an d i ng be ca u se the T u pa zes’ pro pe rt i es h av e n ot be en sol d an d t he re 7 is n o in d ic a tio n th a t a sa le h a s o c c u r r e d o r is im m in e n t, s e eTu pa z , 49 9 F
. Su pp . 2d at 18 5. H ow ev er, w e d o n ot ad d ress th is iss u e b e c a u se w e c o n c lu d e th a t, e v e n if th e T u p a z e s h a d sta n d in g to b r in g th is c la im , th e r e w a s n o v io la tio n o f th e ir ri gh t t o d u e p roc ess. 14 To maintain an e qual protection cla im, plaintiffs were required to show “adverse treatment of in di vid ual s com par ed w

ith o th er s imila rly s ituat ed i ndivi du als [an d that ] s uchs elec ti

ve tr eatmen t w as based on impermiss ible considerations such as race, religi on, intent to inhibit or punish the exe rcise of
con s ti tu ti on al r

igh ts , o r mal ici ou s or badfaith i nt ent

to in ju r e a pe r s on .” Bi

zzar ro v. M ir anda , 39 4 F .3d 82, 86 ( 2dCir . 20 05) (i nt ernal

qu ot ati onmar ks omit te d) . N either th e T up azes no r

th e Min er s hav e shown that defendants treated them adversely c ompared with similarly situated property owners, nor hav e they s ho wn that

any a dv er s e tr eatmen t w as bas ed o n i mp ermi s s ib le co ns id er ati on s . N ew Yo r k la w exp r es s ly p ermi ts cou nt

ies to es tab lis h a d eadl

in e f or r ede mp ti onandto r ejec t o ff er s of paym ent af te r th at d ate . See N.Y. R eal Prop. Tax Law § 1110(1) (limiting payment of tax lien to a pe riod “ on or befor e the expiration of the redemption period”(empha sis added)). The fact that other counties may a llow
r ede mp ti onaf

te r ju dgm ent is in s uf fi cien t t o s us tai n anequ al p r ot ect io n cl aimagai ns t Cl

in to n Co un ty . We ther ef or e agr ee wi thth e t

wo dis tr ict ju dge s th at p lai nt

if fs hav e no t e s tab lis hedvio lat io ns of th eir
r igh ts to du e pr oce s s andequ al p r ot ect io n. Retention o f Surp lus Fro m Tax Sale The Tupazes and the Miners also s eek redress for an al lege d infringement of their r ights to due process and equal protection bec ause Cli nton County wil l not allow the m to retain the surplus proceeds fr omth e t ax s ale, i.e. , the am ou nt of th e s ale l es s un pai d t axes , f ees , an d p enal ti es . I n s up po r t o f thei r equal protection c laim, they also contend that C linton County ha s engage d in “predatory foreclosure pr act ices ” inor der

to r ais e addit

io nal r even ue. The Di stri ctC ou rts i n b oth ca ses p rop erly di smi ssed pl ain ti ffs’ cl aim s for a sha re of a ny surp lu s. 7 The retention of any surplus from a tax auction is constitutional beca use there was no violation of pl ain ti ff s ’ r igh t t o d ue p r oce s s r elat ed t o the n ot ices of fo r eclo s ur e. See Nelso n v. City of New York , 35 2W e a r e n o t a w a r e th a t a n y c o u r t h a s a d d r e ss e d th e C o m p tr o lle r ’s o p in io n o r a n a ly z e d th e u n d e r ly in g issu e in 8 th e tw e n ty y e a r s s in c e th e o p in io n w a s iss u e d
. 15 U.S. 103, 1 10 (1956) (“[N]othing in the Federal C onstitut ion prevents [for eclosing on aproperty and retaining asurplus fr om a tax a uction] where the rec ord s hows adequa te steps were taken to notify the owners of the charges due and the foreclosure proceedings.”). Reg arding their equalprotection claims, the record does not suppor t a concl usion that Clinton Cou nt y has di s cr

imin ate d ag ain s t p lai nt

if fs onan i mp ermi s s ib le b as is com par ed t o s imila rly s ituat ed t ax paye r s . See Bizzarro , 39 4 F .3dat 8 6. The e vid enc e of fe r ed t o s ho w that

th e Cou nt

y harbo r ed an impermiss ible, profit-dr

iven motive is merely a recitation of the amounts retained in tax foreclosure pr oce edi ngs inth e las t s ever al ye ar s . P r oo f that th e Cou nt

y r ou ti nely r et ain s th e s urplus fr omtax sales—a practice which the S upreme Court approved over fifty yea rs ago in Nelson —d oes no t i ndicat e a discriminatory intent. Method of P ayment Finally, the Miners alle ge that their right to due process was impaired beca use defendants refus ed to acc ept a personal che ck as payment for the overdue tax es, alleg edly in violation of New Y ork Rea l Propert

y Tax Law § 1125. The District Court r ejec ted this claim without ela boration. (Tr anscript of Min er Hear ing, at 20. ) O n ap peal , the M

in er s r ely o n anop inio n b y the N ew Yo r k St ate Com ptr oller stating that “a town may

not adopt a loca l lawwhich pe rmits its tax collecting officer to r efuse to acce pt a per s on al ch eck a ndr equ ir es th at p aym ent

be m ade b y cer ti fi ed c hec k, m on ey o r der or ban k ch eck. ” Of fi ce o f the S tat e Com ptr oller , O p. No . 87 -3 4 ( Apr . 30 , 19 87) , 19 87 N .Y. St . Co mp . 53 , 19 87 N .Y. Com p. LE XI S 15 0. 8 T akenonit s fa ce, the Co mp tr oller ’s op inio n d oes no t n eces s ar ily app ly t o a s ituat

io n wh er e, as in the Min er s’ c a se, aco un ty pe rmi ts pa ym en t by

pe rson al c he ckfor o n-tim e p aym en ts bu t re quire s aW e no t e t hat t he Com pt r ol l er ’ s opi ni on i s addre s s ed t o “ t own[ s ] , ” not counti es , but we need no t addre s s t he 9 l eg al s i gn i f

i can ce t hi s di s t i nct i on m ay hav e, i f an y. 16 cer ti fi ed c hec k f

or lat e paymen ts . T he s tatut e cit ed b y the Co mp tr oller ins up po r t o f his op inio n d oes 9

no t p r ov id e any gui dan ce o n the p ermi s s ib le m etho ds of paym ent fo r ov er du e pr op er ty

tax es . See N. Y. Real P r op . T ax L aw § 9 24 ( “T he c ollect ing of fi cer s hall r ecei

ve t axes at the t

im es andpl aces s et

fo r thin the no ti ce of re ce ip t of

the ta x ro lla nd wa rra nt a nd a t a ny oth erti me or p la ce du rin g u sua l b usi ne ss hours during the period of collection.” ). In addition, we a re unawa re of any provisions of New Y ork law tha t express ly prohibit counties from es tablishing reasonable regulations for the colle ction of delinquent property taxes, al though at lea st one provis ion permits a county to set a method of payment whe r e a co un ty

act s as a tax co lle ct

io n ag enc y andcollect s tax es inin s tallm ent s . See N. Y. Real

Pr op . T ax Law § 97 3 (authorizing pay ment “in installments as provided in the locallaw e nacted by the county”). M or e im po r tan t, th e Min er s hav e no t e xp lai nedho w the p r ohib it io n o f p aym ent

by p er s on al che ck p r even te d themfr ompayi ng thei r ov er du e t axes af

te r th ey r ecei vedth e no ti ce o f f

or eclo s ur e. The notice of foreclosur e, whic h was sent in October 2005, stated the County’ s payment policy months inadv ance of

th e f in al d ate of

r ede mp ti oninJ anu ary 20 06 a ndth e de fa ul t j udgm ent inM ar ch 2 006
. The Miners , who conc ede that they receive d this notice, had ample time to obtain a c ertified checkor a money order but failed to pay their overdue taxes in any form. Under these circumstances, the Miners
we re no t de prive d o f th ei r right t o d ue pro ce ss. CONCLUSI ON Fo r th e r eas on s s tat ed ab ov e, we AF F IRM the judgments of the District Court.