NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0816n.06 No. 08-3461 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. GERARDO B ONI L L A, Def endant- Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN D I STRI CT OF O H IO

B e fo re : SI L ER, MO OR E, and GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. S ILER , Ci r c u itJu d g e . F o ll o w in g h is c o n v ic ti o n b a s e d o n a conditional g uilty plea, Def endant Ge rar do Bonilla a

ppeals the district court’s denial of his motion to s uppress the e vidence found in his vehicle. F or the followingrea sons, we REVERSE the district c ourt’s dec ision deny ing the motion to suppress and REMAND for proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. BACK GR OUND I n 2007, Bonilla wa s traveling e as t b o u n d o n Interstate 70 in Pre ble County , Ohio in a Chevrolet Ava lanche with Colorado tag s when he was stopped by Deputy Sheriff G era ld Be mis of the Montg omery County Sheriff’ s Depa rtment for following a trac tor-tra iler too c losely

. Be mis had

re c e ive d a

c a ll o n h is c e ll p ho ne fr om T ro op e r R ic ha rd B arr e tt o f t

he Oh io S ta te Hi g hw ay

Pa tr ol,B arr e tt t e sti fi e d th a t hi s su sp ic ion s aro se be c a us e B on ill a wa s dri vin g a larg e ve hic le wi th 1 ou t- of -s ta te ta g s a

pp ro xima te ly

te n mi le s p e r h our u

nd e r t he sp e e d li mit

and loo ke d n e rv ou s. Al tho ug h Ba

rr e tt fo llo we d Bo nil la fo r ap pr oximate ly sixte e n mile s, he did no t obse rv e any tr a ff ic violations. - 2 - who aler ted B emis that he had be en following Bonilla for six teen miles and obse rved suspicious activities. Be mis, who travels wit h a dog, was stationed on I nterstate 70 a nd followed B onilla after 1 the Avala

nche pa ssed him. Be mis testified that he observe d Bonill a following too closely –approximately one ca

r leng th–to a Saturn ca

r that had r ece ntly

merg ed onto the interstate

. Be mis then saw Bo n i l l a follow too closely to a trac tor-tra iler and pulled B onilla over at approximately

4:01 p.m. B e mis tol d B on ill a

that he wa s b e ing sto pp e d for fo llo wi ngtoo c los e ly

and or de re d B on ill a out of the car. Bonilla tol d Be mis he was g oing to “Columbus on vacation.” B onilla then consente d to a pat dow n. B on ill a tol d Be mis that his p a sse ng e r w a s h is g ir lf ri e nd , b ut c ou ld n ot r e c a ll h e r l a st

name a nd had only

known her for a littl e while. When B onilla stated that his dr iver’s lice nse wa s in the car , Be mis told him to wait there while B emis retrie ved the lice nse and pa sseng er infor mation. Bonilla then r eca lled his passeng er’ s last name and sa id that he had known he r for three y ear s. When Be mis asked the passe ng er w here they wer e traveling , the passeng er state d that they wer e traveling to “Columbus to vi sit friends.” B emis testified that it was at t h at p o i n t that he thoug ht Bonilla’s story “didn’t make sense” and made up his mind that he wanted his dogto conduct a “ fre e-a ir” sniff of the ve hicle. B e mis re tur

ne d to his car at a

pp ro xima te ly 4:0 7 p.m. to wr ite B on ill a a tr a ff ic tic ke t, r un his license throug h L EADS and NCI C, and ca ll for bac kup in order to have his dog conduct a sniff of Bonilla’s ve hicle. B emis’s intent was to fill out the citation and then walk the dog around the car .- 3 -

I t took approxi mately

eig ht minutes for the L EADS and NCI C chec k to be completed. Bonilla wa s require d to lean ag ainst the deputy ’s ca r duringthe time Be mis checke d his l i ce n s e an d wrote the traff ic ticket. Bemis did not let Bonilla re-e nter the Avalanc he because it had not been se arc hed for

wea pons. Once the re sults of the chec ks came up on the terminal, Be mis re mained in his cruiser a nd continued completinga “F orm 16" and a tr aff ic citation for f

ollowing too close ly

. At approximately

4:23 p.m., two backup office rs arrived at the s cene . Be mis cease d writing the tic ke t, r emo ved the pa sse ng e r f ro m th e Av a lanc he , a

nd pla c e d B on ill a

and the pa sse ng e r i n separ ate police vehicles. Be mis ha d not c ompleted filling out the ticket for B onilla at this ti me; he

c la im e d i t u s u a l l y t o o k t h i rt y t o t h i rt y - f i v e m i nu t e s t o i s s u e an o u t
- o f

- s t a t e dr i v e r a t r a f

fi c tic ke t. Be mis then walked his dog around the vehicle. At 4:25 p.m., the dog alerted t o an odor coming f rom the vehicle . Be mis informed Bonilla that narc otics had been detec ted. A subsequent sear ch of the vehicle tur

ned up ten kilog rams of c ocaine

. B on ill a wa s la te r ind ic te d fo r (1 ) c on sp ir a c y to po sse ss wi th the int e nt t o d istri bu te in e xce ss

o f 5 k il o g r a ms o f c o c a in e in v io lati o n o f 2 1 U

. S. C. § § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) , ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( ii ) , an d 846; (2) po sse ssi on

wi th t he int e nt t o d istri bu te in exc e ss of 5 k ilo g ra ms o f c oc a ine in v iol a tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. §§ 84 1( a )( 1) and (b )( 1) (A )( ii) ; and (3 ) t ra ve lin g in i nte rs ta te c omm e rc e wi th t he int e nt t o d istri bu te

coca ine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Bonilla’s moti on to suppress the evidenc e wa s denied by the district court. Bonilla then e ntere d a conditional plea ag ree ment in which he a g ree d to plead g uilty to the conspirac y

char g e and the other two co u n t s were droppe d. He wa s sentence d to a term of imprisonment of 60 months.- 4 - STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW “This Court revie ws a district court’s decision on a mot ion to suppress the evidenc e under ‘t wo c omp lim e nta

ry sta nd ard s. F ir st, the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f fact ar e up he ld u nle ss c le a rl y

err oneous. Second, the court’s leg al conclusion as t o the exist ence of proba ble ca use is revie wed de novo.’” Un ite d S

tat es v . H ill , 1 9 5 F. 3 d 2 5 8 , 2 6 4 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Diaz , 25 F.3d 392, 394 ( 6th Cir.1994)). DI SCU SSIO N I. Validi ty of the Traff

ic Stop B on ill a arg ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t court e rr e d in deny inghis mot ion to s up pr e ss b e c a

us e B e mis did no t ha ve pr ob a ble c a us e to e ff e c tuate the tr a ff

ic sto p. “ [S]o lo nga s th e of fi c e r h a s p ro ba

ble c a us e to believe that a

traff ic violation has occ urre d or wa s occur ring , the re sultant stop is not unlawful and does not violate the F ourth Amendment.” Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 430 F.3d 345, 352 (6th Cir. 2005) (c i t i n g United States v. Bradshaw , 102 F.3d 204, 210 ( 6th Cir.1996)). I n arguing that the traff

ic stop lacke d probable cause , Bonilla fir st asserts t hat B emis’s and Ba rre tt’s testimoni es we re not c redible. H is a rg ument is unpe rsuasive; the district court found no is s u e w it h th e c r e d ib il it

y o f B e mi s o r B ar

r e tt , an d n e it

h e r d o w e . “ We a f

f o r d th e d is trict court’ s

cr ed i b i l i t y

d et er m i n at i o n s re gar d i n g wi t n es s t es t i m o n y gre at d ef er en ce an d m u s t u

p h o l d i t s fi n d i n gs of fa ct unless they ar e cl ea rl y erroneous.” United States v. Esteppe , 483 F.3d 447, 452 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Con c e rn ingB on ill a ’s argume nt t hat th e ini tia l st op by

B e mis wa s n ot su

pp or te d by pr ob a ble

cause even if

Be mis’s testimony

is considere d cre dible, Bonilla’s a rg ument fails in this respec t as well. Probable c ause is satisfied when the facts and circumstance s within the office r’s knowle dg e,- 5 -

based on r easona

bly trustworthy information, are sufficient to warr ant a man of rea sonable c aution t o b el i ev e t hat an of

fense has bee n or is being committed. Da v is , 4 3 0 F

. 3 d a t 3 5 2

. B o n il la was stopped for violating Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.34(A) , which provide s, Th e op e rator

of a mot or ve hic le

. . . s ha ll n ot f oll owano the r v e hic le

. . . mo re c los e ly than is rea sonable a

nd prudent, having due reg ard f or the spee d of suc h v eh i cle. . . an d t h e t r a f f i c u p o nan d t h e c o n d i t i o no f

t h e h i g h w ay. Section 4511.34 require s one ca r-leng th betwee n vehicles for every ten miles per hour

of spee d. See United States v. Duk

es , 257 F. App’ x 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2007). B e mis wi tne sse d B on ill a

fo llo wi nga

pp ro xima te ly

on e c ar- le ng th b e hin d a Sa tur n a nd a lso fo l l o wi n g t o o cl o s el y

t o a t ra ct o r- t ra i l er

at s p ee d s ap p ro ac h i n g s i x t y m i l es p e r h o u r. Al t h o u gh Bem i s ad m i t t edt h at h e b ega nfo l l o wi n g Bo n i l l a b as edo nBa rr et t ’s i n i t i al o b s er v at i o n , his moti vation is irr eleva nt. Se e Hi ll , 1 9 5 F. 3 d

at 2 6 4 (c i t i n g W

hren v. U nited States , 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996)) (“[A]n officer

may stop a vehic l e fo r a traff ic violation when his true motivation is to searc h for contra band, as long as the off

icer had proba

ble ca use to initially

stop the vehicle.” ). B emis had probable cause to believe a traff ic violation had occ urre d. Since his te stimony has not be en prove n incre dible, the evidenc e supporting the proba ble ca use dete rmination is sufficient. II. Legality of

the Searc h and Seizure B on ill a arg ue s tha t the dis tr ic t court e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

to s up pr e ss b e c a

us e B e mis lacke d the re asonable suspicion of criminal ac tivity require d to detain him based on suspicions of ill e g a l dr uga c tiv ity

. An of

fi c e r may sto p a

ve hic le wh e n h e ha s p ro ba ble c a us e to b e lie ve a

tr a ff ic violation has occur

red. Da v is , 430 F .3 d at 352

. “ Ho we ve r, on c e the purp os e of the tr a ff ic sto p is completed, a

police off

icer may not f

urther detain the vehicle or its oc cupants unless something that

occur red dur ing the traff

ic stop g ener ated the ne cessa ry rea sonable suspicion to j ustify a fur ther- 6 -

detention.” United St ates v. Torres-Ramos , 536 F.3d 542, 550 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citations and interna l quotations omit ted). Be fore we de termine whe ther B emis had re asonable suspicion to detai n Bo nilla for drug activity , we must first define the scope of the initial traff ic stop. See id. Her e, we know the scope of the tr a ff ic sto p w a s e xce e de d at so me po int be c a us e the sto p c ulm inate d in the arr e st o f B on ill a for tra nsporting dr

ug s in his v eh i cl e. Thus, we must determine the point at which the orig inal purp os e of

the tr a ff ic sto p– wr iti ngthe tr a ff

ic c itatio n– c e a se d a

nd the de ta inm e nt of B on ill a and his passeng er be g an. Id. Once the s co p e an d duration of the stop is deter mined, we then f

ocus on wh e the r B e mis ha d a re a so na ble and art ic ulate su sp ic ion that c ri min a l a c tiv ity wa s a fo ot at th e tim e of B onilla’s detention. See id.

A. Scope of the Traff

ic Stop I n o rd e r t o r e ma in w ith in t he sc op e of

the ini tia l tr a ff

ic sto p, the off

ice r’s actio ns mus t

rea sonably relate t o the purpose of the orig inal stop. Un ite d S tat es v . B e ll , 5 55 F .3 d 5 35 , 5 41 (6 th Cir . 200 9) ( I nt h e a

b s e n c e o f r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n , “ a l l t h e o f f i c e r ’ s a c t i o n s m u s tb e r e a s o n a bly

re l at edi ns co p e t o ci rc u m s t an ce s j u s t i f y i n g t h e o ri gi n al i n t er fe re n ce . ” ( ci t i n g United States v. Townsend , 305 F.3d 537, 541( 6th Cir. 2002 ) (inter nal quotations omitt ed)) ). The c ore que stion

conce rning when a traff

ic stop turns into a Four

th A mendment issue has been framed as: “at what po int in t ime did

the purp os e of the tr a ff

ic sto p e nd

and the de te nti on

of the dr ive r a

nd the [ve hic le ’s ] occupa nts . . . beg in? ” Torres-Ramos , 536 F.3d at 550. Requesting a drive r’s lice nse, reg istration, r ental paper s, running a computer chec k there on, and issuing a

citation do not exceed the sc ope of a traff i c s t o p fo r a s p eedingviolation. Hi ll , 195 F.3d at 269. “‘[O]nce a motor vehic le has be en lawf ully detained f

or a tra ffic violation, the police- 7 -

office rs may

order the driver

to ge t out of the vehicle w ithout viol ating the Four th Amendment’s proscr iption of unreasona bl e s ea rches and seizures.’” Arizona v. Johnson , 129 S. Ct . 781, 786 (2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Pennsylv ania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1 9 7 7 ))

. Moreove r, “the use of a well-tra ined nar cotics-de tection dog ” duringa traff i c s t o p does not, in itself, infring e any constitutionally

protec ted privac y

interests. Illinois v. Caball es , 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). Whe n the do g ma de a “ hit ” duri ng a sn if f of the Av a lanc he , B e mis ha d t he re a so na ble suspicion nece ssary to seize Bonilla and sear ch his vehicle. See D iaz , 25 F.3d a t 393-94. Howe ver, Bonilla c ontends that he wa s detained on suspicion of illeg al ac tivity befor e the dogaler

ted. Her e, B onilla was order ed out of the car , patted down, and que stioned about wher e he w as g oing. H is passeng er w as also questioned a s to where the two wer e traveling . Bonilla wa s require d to lean ag ainst the cruise r d u ring the entire L EADS and NCI C chec k of his license, w hich took

a pp ro xima te ly

se ve nte e n mi nu te s. At

4:0 7, B e mis c a lle d fo r ba c ku p wi th the int e nt of

ru nn inghis dog around the vehicle. U pon the ar rival of ba ckup at a

pproxi mately

4:23, Be mis stopped writing the traf fic c itation, ex ited his cruiser, r emoved the pa sseng er f rom the Ava lanche , place d Bonilla a nd the passeng er in diff

ere nt police cr

uisers, and c onducted a sniff with his dog

. During the sniff, the dog “hit” and a lerted B emis. Tw o r e c e nt c a se s are ins tr uc tiv e in de te rm ini ng wh e n the purp os e of a tr a ff ic sto p tu rn s in to a detainment. I n Torres-Ramos , the purpose of a traff ic stop f or speeding ended w hen the dr iver wa s place d in the b ack of a patrol car and the pa sseng er w as questioned. 536 F .3d at 551. Once the driver w as plac ed in the patrol car for rea sons suc h as failing to identify the owner

of the ve hicle he was driving , the cour

t considere d t h e o ri gi n al stop to have ende d and a de tainment requiringThere was no c onstitut ional violation in To r r es - R amos , h oweve r, bec ause the office r had 2 rea sonable suspicion that the driver unlawfully possessed the vehicle he was trave ling in. 536 F.3d at 553. - 8 - rea sonable suspi cion t o have be g un. Id. We held, “[i] ssuing a speedingticket does not re quire a n 2 office r to detain a

n individual in order to sepa rate ly question a passe ng er r eg ardingowner ship or trave l plans” and there fore conclude d it was at this point that the original purpose of t he stop ende d. Id. I n Un ite d S

tat es v . B lai r , 524 F.3d 740, 752 (6th Cir. 2008), the purpose of a ta g -lig ht stop was fulf illed as soon as the off

icer obtained all the information nec essar y to write a c itation for the vio la tio n a

nd no pr oo f o f i ns ur anc e . Thus , a s so on a s th e of fi c e r r e tur ne d to the de fe nd ant’ s v e hic le two minutes later and inf

ormed the defe ndant that a dog would be called to the scene (af ter c onsent to sear ch was denied) , we held that the remainder of the s top require d rea sonable suspi cion and wa s in violation of the Fourth Ame ndment. Id. The situations in Torres-Ramos and Blair are simil ar to the instant ca se whe re, upon the

arr iva l of ba c ku p, B e mis sto pp e d wr iti ng the tr a ff ic c itatio n, re mov e d the pa sse ng e r fr om t he ve hic le and plac ed Bonilla and the passeng er in the ba ck of c ruisers be fore having his dog pe rfor m a sniff. At this point , the offic er’ s actions ce ased be ing r easona bly related in scope to t h e ini tial stop, see Be ll , 555 F.3d at 541, and any conce rns of t h e o ri g inal traff ic stop were oversha dowed by the office r’s suspicions of the c ontents of the vehic le. Fr om this point , the scope of the initial stop had been e x cee ded and B emis was re quired to have a re asonable suspicion that criminal ac tivity was afoot. Se e Hi ll , 195 F.3d at 264.- 9 - B. Reasonable Su spicion The district cour

t held that the totality

of the c ircumstance s g ave B emis rea sonable suspicion to justi fy the detention of B onilla for the minimal amount of time it t ook him to verify the suspicions he ha d. Ho we ve r, sin c e B e mis c e a se d p ur su ingthe or ig ina l pu rp os e of the tr a ff ic sto p a nd be g a n to purs ue the su sp e c te d dr

ug tr a ff ic kin g a c tiv ity , he wa s re qu ir e d to have a “ re a so na ble and art ic ula ble suspicion that criminal ac tivity was a foot,” id. (c i t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . E rwi n , 155 F .3 d 8 18 , 8 22 (6 th Cir.1998) (en banc) ), reg ardle ss of how short the de tention was. Un ite d S tat es v . U rri e ta , 520 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2008) (“ Under the Four th Amendment, eve n the brief est of dete ntions is t oo long i f t h e p o l i ce l ac k a re as o n ab l e s u s p i ci o n o f s p ec i fi c c ri m i n al ac t i v i t y . ”) (c i t i n g Townsend , 305 F.3d at 541, 545). Under Te rry

v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the r eas o n ab l e s u s picion framework involves “ a two-par t analy sis of the rea sonablene ss of the stop.” Da v is , 430 F.3d at 3 5 4

. We first determine “‘w hether there was a

proper basis for t h e s t o p , wh i ch is judg ed by examining whethe r the law

e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic ia ls w e re awa

re of sp e c if ic and art ic ula

ble fa c ts w hic h g a ve ri se to r e a so na ble suspicion.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . G ar

za , 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1993)). We make this deter mination based on the t otality of t he cir cumstance s. Id. Second, if we conclude that the basis for the stop wa s proper at its inc ep t i o n, we must then dete rmine “‘ whether the deg ree of intrusion . . . was rea sonably related in scope to the situation at ha nd . . . .’” Id. (q u o t i n g Ga rza , 10 F.3d at 1245). For purposes of the s ituation at hand, we f ocus on the fir st part of the Te rry ana ly sis , that is , whether Be mis had rea sonable suspicion sufficient to detain B onilla at the moment he stopped writing the ticket for

the traf fic violation and be g an pursuit of the dr ug investigation. See United- 10 -

States v. Garrido , 467 F.3d 971, 981 ( 6th Cir. 2006). “Rea sonable suspi cion requires spec ific and articula ble fa cts, which, take n toge ther with rational inf ere nces from those fac ts, reasona bly war rant the continued de tention of a motorist after a tra ffic stop.” Un ite d S

tat es v . S mi th , 263 F.3d 571, 588 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Te rry , 392 U.S. at 21). Her e, B emis decide d to detain B onilla and conduc t th e d o g sear ch base d on (1) the information re lay ed to him by Ba rre tt, including B o n illa’s nervous a ppear ance , the vehicle ’s size and out- o f

- s tate li c e n s e p late , ( 2 ) B o n il la ’ s in te n d e d d e s ti n a ti o n , ( 3 ) B o n il la ’ s an d h is p a s s e ng er’ s statements that they

wer e g oing to “ C o lumbus for vac ation” and “ Columbus t o visit friends,” respe ctively , and (4) the fa ct that B onilla could not initi ally rec all his passeng er’ s last name or the amount of time he ha d known her

. Th e g ov e rnme nt a c kn ow le dg e s that no ne of the se fa c tor s, vie we d in de pe nd e ntl y , a pp e a r t o indicate c riminal activity , but it arg ues t h at t h e coll ective vie w of these fac tors rise to the leve l of

rea sonable suspi cion. One case will seldom provide “useful ‘pr ece dent’ for another ” in eva luating

rea sonable suspicion. Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983). Thus, we will survey sever al

c a s e s in th is c ir c u it an d ma k e a r e a s o n a

b le s u s p ic io n d e te r

mi n a ti o n b a s e d o n a to ta li ty of the circ umstances. See Torres-R amos , 5 36 F .3 d at 55 2- 53 ; Garrido , 467 F.3d at 982-83. Although g ener ally

included as one of seve ral g rounds for r easona ble suspicion, a drive r’s

nervousne ss when stopped is often c ommon and, there fore , g iven little weig ht. Se e Ur rie ta , 520 F

. 3 d a t5 7 7 ( f i n d i n g “ n e r

v o u s n e s s i n h e r e n t l y unsuspicious ”). L ikewise, Bonilla’s desti nation of C olumbus, Ohio is not indi cative of illega l activity

. See id. at 576-77 (notingthat “travel between population cente rs i s a relativity weak indicator of illega l activity beca use there is almost no city in the country

that could not be cha

rac terize[d] as either

a- 11 -

major nar cotics distribution c enter or a city throug h which drug courie rs pass on their w ay to a major

narc otics distributi on cente r”) (interna l quotations omi tted). Third, the g overnme nt argues that the discr epanc ies betwe en B onilla’s and his passeng er’ s tr a ve l pl ans are g ro un ds fo r r e a so na ble su sp ic ion

. I nc on sis te nc ie s in the c la ime d purp os e of a tr ip may be g rounds for r easona

ble suspicion. Hi ll , 195 F.3d at 272. H oweve r, in Hi ll , the discre pancie s in trave l plans wer e much more suspi cious than i n the i nstant case . There , the def endants provide d an implausible explanation for their trip, including multipl e conflicting stories about the duration of the trip, illogica l inconsistencies about c oordinating the trip with a third par ty (a pur ported move) , and a state me nt a

bo ut mil ita

ry mov ingpr oc e dure s th a t th e of fi c e r k ne w w a s su sp ic iou s b a se d o n h is experience

. Id. Th e ins tant c a se is d ist inguis ha ble a s the dif

fe re nc e be tw e e n “ fo r v a c a tio n” and “ to vis it f ri e nd s” is n e g lig ibl e , a

nd it i s pla us ibl e that the tw o we re tr a ve lin g to Col umb us to a c c omp lis h both stated objectives. See Townsend , 305 F.3d at 543 (defe ndants’ story was n o t fo u n d to be suspicious although the office r thoug ht the defe ndants wer e lying a bout their trave l plans). L a stl y , th e fa c t th a t Bo nil la c ou ld not re me mbe r his pa sse ng e r’ s las t nam e and state d h e on ly knew her for a short ti me eve n though she was his g irlfriend doe s raise some r ed fla g s, but it does not rise to the level of

suspicion o f t he pre sence of contra band. See Torres-R amos , 536 F.3d at 55 2- 53 (s umm ari z in g t he p a st d e c isi on s o f t his c ourt wi th r e g ard

to g ro un ds fo r a

re a so na ble suspicion). At minimum , Bonilla’s state ment was a temporar y memory lapse, at most, a lie. Even assuming that Be mis recognized the statement as a lie, Bon i l l a q u i ckly rec anted with truthful information. Fur

ther, B emis testified that althoug h he found Bonilla’s omission of his girlf riend’s name “ unusual,” it did not pr ompt him t o want to have his dog c onduct a sniff of B onilla’s vehicle.- 12 -

B e mis te sti fi e d h is s us pic ion s aro se a ft e r the a lle g e d in c on sis te nc y fr om t he pa sse ng e r a

bo ut t he ir trave l plans to “visit friends.” Although Bemis had his suspicions, they did not rise to the level re quired of suspe cting Bonilla of c riminal activity . As this court held in Be ll , Although the rea son ab l e-suspicion c alculation examines the totality of the cir cu m s t an ce s , ev en wh er e t h e go v ern m en tp o i n t s t o s ev er al fa ct o rs t h at t h i s court ha s “re cog nized as valid considerations in forming rea sonable suspicion,” the y may not toge ther provide rea sonable suspicion if “they are all relatively minor and ... subject to significa

nt qualification,” pa

rti cu l arly wher e the “ case lacks a

ny of the strong er indicators of c riminal conduct that have ac companied t hese minor f actor s in other case s.” 5 5 5 F. 3 d at 5 4 0 (c i t i n g Townsend , 305 F.3d at 545). The inst ant case l acks a ny strong indicators of

c ri min a l c on du c t ot

he r t ha n mi no r a c tio ns by

B on ill a tha t are ge ne ra lly

pr e se nt w he n a

dr ive r i s pulled over. B onilla’s failure to promptly provide the of

fice r wit h his passeng er’ s corr ect information was not pa rticul ar l y i ndicative of

criminal ac tivity . Thus, the totality of the

c ir c ums tanc e s d id no t g ive ri se to a re a so na ble su sp ic ion

that B on ill a

wa s tr ans po rt ingdr

ug s in his

ve hic le a t th e mom e nt w he n B e mis sto pp e d w ri ti ng the tr a ff ic c ita tio n a nd pla c e d B on ill a

and his passeng er in police cruiser s. Since we c onclude that no rea sonable suspicion w as prese nt at the inception of the detention

on su sp ic ion

of tr ans po rt ingdr

ug s, th e det ent ion w a s an unla wf ul s e izur e and

we do no t ne e d to addre ss the seco n d p ar t of the Terry analy sis, whether the time and intrusiveness of the stop were

rea sonable. Se e Da v is , 430 F.3d at 354. The fa ct t hat Bemis only detained B onilla for a shor t period of tim e wh e n h e c e a se d w ri tin g the tic ke t and pla c e d Bo nil la and his pa sse ng e r in pol ic e c ru ise rs is ir re le va nt s inc e B e mis la c ke d rea sona ble su sp ic ion

to d o s o. Thus , th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in deter mining B emis’s detainment of B onilla for a shor t period of time wa s rea sonable.- 13 - CO NC LU SION REVERSED and REMANDED f or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.- 14 -

GR I FFIN, C i rc u i tJ u d ge, d i s s en t i n g. I joi n Se c tio n I (V a lid ity of the Tr a ff ic Sto p) of the ma

jor ity ’s op ini on , but res pectf ull y dissent from m y colleag

ues’ analy sis and holdi ng reg arding the s ubsequent searc h. I n my view, the

se arc h d id n ot v iol a te de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht t o b e fr e e fr om “ un re ason a ble ” se arc he s und e r t

he F ourt h Amendment. Theref

ore, I would aff

irm the order of the di strict court denying de fenda nt’s motion to suppress. I. Th e re c or d r e ve a ls that D e pu ty B e mis ini tiate d th e sto p at a pp ro xima te ly

4:0 1 p .m. B e mis ta lke d w ithB on ill a

and his g ir lf ri e nd , g a the re d th e ir

do c ume nts , a

nd re tur ne d to his po lic e ve hic le at about 4:07 p.m. At that time, he ca lled for back-up office rs because he decide d to conduct a “fr ee

a ir sn if f” of de fe nd ant’ s v e hic le . B e mis te sti fi e d th a t he uti lize d th e L EA DS s y ste m a pp ro xima te ly

“ [8] min ute s in to t he tr a ff ic sto p[,]” and that the oth e r of fi c e rs re sp on de d “ pr ob a

bly 20 min

ute s in to the t raf fic stop. Probably 12 minutes afte r [ he] had asked for [ back- up].” He fur ther testified that while waiting , he “w as completing [hi s] forms . . . . and starting the traf fic c itation.” Whe n th e oth e r o ff

ic e rs arr ive d at a

pp ro xima te ly

4:2 3 p.m. , Be mis sto pp e d w ri tin g the tic ke t,

re mov e d B on ill a ’s g ir lf

ri e nd fr om t he c ar, and

pla c e d h e r a

nd B on ill a in s e pa rate po lic e ve hic le s. As the majority

acknow ledg es , at that time, Be mis had not completed writing the traf fic c itation. Ma j. O p. a t 3. B e mis te sti fi e d th a t it us ua lly too k thir ty to thi rt y -f ive min ute s to iss ue an o ut- of

-s ta te driver a traff ic ticket. B emis beg an to de ploy his dr ug dog around the vehicle r oug hly twenty -four minutes into hi s encounte r with Bonilla – a t i m e we l l wi thin the thirty to thirty -five minutes

nece ssary for the of fice r to have completed the tr aff ic stop.- 15 -

Be mis then walked his K-9 a round Bonilla’s vehicle to c onduct a f ree -air sniff

, which lasted only one minute. The rec ord indicates that the bac k-up off icer s arr ived at roug hly

4:23 p.m., and that the K-9 f irst alerte d to the odor of illega l na rcotic emitting from the vehicle at approxim ately 4:24 p. m. T he K- 9 w a s re wa

rd e d and pla c e d ba c k in the patr ol ve hic le by 4:2 5 p. m. B e mis su bs e qu e ntl y asked B onilla to drive the vehic l e t o a p olice post, wher e the ve hicle wa s sear ched. T he sea rch

reve aled ten kilos of c ocaine

. II. The gra nt or denial of a

motion to s uppress is a mixed question of law and f act. United States

v . E lli s , 497 F.3d 606, 611 ( 6th Cir. 2007). “On a ppeal, we revie w the district cou rt’s finding s of fac t for cle ar e rror

and its conclusions of law de novo.” Id. When review ing a district c ourt’s denia l of a motion to suppress on the law , we c onsid er t h e ev i d en ce in the light most favor able to the go v er n m ent. Un ite d S

tat es v . S mi th , 5 4 9 F. 3 d

3 5 5 , 3 5 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g U n it e d S ta tes v. Mo ntgom e ry , 377 F.3d 582, 585 ( 6th Cir. 2004)). III

. A. The dogsniff, which does not constitute a “sea rch” under the Four

th Amendment, United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), occ urre d wh i l e Be mis was proper ly in possession of Bonilla’s license and reg istration. See I llinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“ [T] he use of

a we ll- tr a ine d n arc oti c s- de te c tio n d og– o n e t h a t d o e s no t e xpos e no nc on tr a ba nd ite ms that ot

he rw ise

wo uld re ma in h idd e n f

ro m pu bli c vie w . . . duri nga

lawf ul tr a ff ic sto p, g e ne ra lly do e s n ot i mpl ic a te leg itimate privacy

interests.”) (interna l q

u o ta ti o n ma r k s and citation omitted). Most importantly , any de lay in B on ill a ’s de te nti on c a

us e d by c on du c tin g the br ie f dr ug do g sn if

f a mou nte d to a de min imi s- 16 -

int ru sio n o n B on ill a ’s lib e rt y int e re st. Thus , it

wa s n ot a

n unr e a so na

ble vio la tio n o f h is F ourt h Amendment rights. See I ngraham v. W

right , 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (“ There is, of course , a de mi nimis l e ve l of

imp os iti on

wi th w hic h th e Con sti tut ion is n ot c on c e rn e d. ” ); United States v. A le x a n d er , 4 4 8 F.3d 1014, 1017 ( 8th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven if a dog sniff is thirty seconds to two min ute s o ver th e lin e dr awn

a t th e e nd

of a ro uti ne tr a ff

ic sto p, a tw o mi nu te de lay

to c on du c t a canine sniff is a de mi nim is int ru sio n on the dr ive r’ s p e rs on a l li be rt y that do e s n ot v iol a te the F ourt h Amendment.”) (interna l citations and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v . Boyc e , 351 F. 3 d 1 1 0 2 , 1 1 0 7 n . 4 (1 1 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . P ur c e ll , 236 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 20 01 ) f or the pr op os iti on

that “ thr e e min

ute de te nti on

a ft e r r e qu e ste d in fo rm a ti on arri ved wa s de mi nim is and not an unc onstitut ional detention”)

. B. Fur thermore , the district court did not err in finding that Be mis had rea sonable suspicion that criminal ac tivity

was a foot to prolong the traf fic stop. “In evaluating the constituti onality of a Te rry stop, we eng ag e in a two- part a naly sis of the rea sonablene ss of the stop.” Un ite d S tat es v . D av is , 430 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir. 2005)

. First, we ask “w hether there was a

proper basis for the stop, whic h is j ud g e d b y

e xami nin g wh e the r the law e nf or c e me nt of

fi c ia ls we re awa

re of sp e c if

ic and art ic ula ble fac ts which gave rise to reasonable suspicion.” Un ite d S tat es v . G ar

za , 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1993) (inter

nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Whether r easona ble suspicion exis ts must be considere d under the totality of t h e ci rc u m s tance s, rec og nizi ng that “eve n a string of innoce nt behavior added toge ther may ” satisfy this lega l standard. United States v. Richardson , 385 F.3d 625, 6 3 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d Sta te s v . A rv izu , 534 U.S. 266, 273-75 (2002). “I f the de tention is p ro pe r, the n the se c on d q ue sti on is w he the r t

he de g re e of

int ru sio n . . . wa s r e a so na

bly re la te d in“Rea sonable suspicion ca n be base d upon police off icer s’ own o b s ervations or upon the 1 collective know ledg e of othe r off icer s.” United States v. Braggs , 23 F. 3 d 1047, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). I t is important to note that Ba rre tt “ teac h[s] [criminal inter diction] for sever al [ f] ed era l a g e nc ie s . . . ” in t

he Un ite d St a te s, Cana da , a nd Me xico , and tr a ins of

fi c e rs to l oo k f

or c e rt a in t hin g s, “ c e rt a in d ri vin g mann e ri sms . . . p a tte rn s o f d e me ano r f ro m th e dr ive r” that “ ind ic a te su sp ic iou s” behavior

. - 17 - sc op e to t he sit uatio n at ha

nd , w hich is j ud g e d b y

e xami nin g the re a so na

ble ne ss o f t

he of fi c ia ls’ conduct g iven their suspicions and surrounding circ umstances.” Torres-Ramos , 536 F.3d 542, 551- 52 (6th Cir. 2008) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). He re , the re c or d sh ow s that B e mis ha d k no wl e dg e of

the fo llo wi ngfa c ts w he n h e a lle g e dly expanded the scope of the initial stop: (1) Trooper Ba rre tt’s observations that (a) def endant wa s driving a lar g e vehic le with tinted windows and out-of- state “ta g s” approx imately ten miles per hour under the speed limit; (b) defe ndant appe are d very rig id in his posture; and (c ) defendant appeare d “sc ar e d to d

e ath ” when Bar

rett drove by

his vehicle (empha sis added); (2) defendant claime d not

1 to know his girl

friend’s last name becausehe had known he r for “a l ittle whi le” ; (3) howeve r, when defendant learne d that Be mis was going to speak with hi s girlfr iend, he sudde nly reme mbere d her las t na me , a nd sta te d th at h e ha d k

no wn h e r fo r th re e y e ar

s ; ( 4) defe ndant stated that he wa s g oing to Colum bus on vaca

tion; (5) while defe ndant’s girlfr iend s tated that they wer e going to Colum bus beca use they had neve r bee n there , and that they wer e g oing to visit friends. I n Torres-Ramos , w e fo un d th a t th e fo llo wi ng fa c ts w e re su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shre a so na

ble

su sp ic ion : (1) that [the driver ] acted ner vously in response to [the office r’s] questions; (2) that the van wa s from [out of state] and had tinted windows; (3) that [the d ri ver] was unable to provide the last name of the va n’s owner (thoug h she did provide a rea son, i.e., a rec ent marria g e); and (4) that [t he driver’ s] desc ription of her tra vel plans we re vag ue. With respec t t o the trave l plans, [t he off icer ] was suspicious about [ theAs the majority acknow ledg es, “[i] nconsistencies in the c laimed purpose of a trip may be 2 gro u n d s fo r r ea s o n ab l e s u s p i ci o n . ” M aj

. Op

. at 1 1 , ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . H ill , 195 F.3d 258, 272 (6th Cir. 1999). - 18 - dr ive r’ s] c la im that sh e ha d fl ow n fr om L os An g e le s to Va nc ouve r, Was hin g ton

to g et the van e arlier

that wee k, y et could not re member the flig ht details. Torres-Ramos , 536 F.3d at 552. There are clea

r par allels betwe en the f

acts of this ca se and those in Torres-Ramos . First, the office r obser

ved the driver acting nervously . Second, the a utomobile was a lar g e vehic le with tinted windows and out-of-state plates. Third, the office r confr onted a dr iver who w as unable to provide the la st n a me of

so me on e e a c h d

ri ve r w ou ld c lea rl y

be e xpe c te d to kn ow– th e va n’ s o wn e r i n Torres-Ramos , and the driver’ s g irlfriend and passeng er in the prese nt c ase. Four th, b o t h drivers provided a

rg uably plausible explanations for not knowing t h e i ndividual’s last name – a rec ent marria g e in Torres-Ramos and a new dating relationship i n the instant case . Finally , in eac h case , the drivers’ descr iptions of their trave l plans were vag ue. Indeed, in the pr esent c ase, not only wer e the trave l plans provided by the driver

ambig uous, they also conflicte d with the plans stated by the passeng er. I n this reg ard, the finding s of fa ct by the district court we re not c lear ly err oneous. 2 Al tho ug h th e ma

jor ity fi rs t c orrectl y

state s th a t a

de te rm inatio n r e g ard ingre a so na ble suspicion must be based on a totality of the circ umstances, they then proce ed to addre ss eac h fac tor supporting a fi n ding of

rea sonable suspicion in isolation. Maj. Op. at 10-12. “ Te rry , howeve r, prec ludes this sort of divide-and- conquer analy sis.” Arv izu , 534 U.S. at 274. The Supreme Court has consistently

reje cted attempts by

lower c ourts to e valuate a nd reje ct fa ctors “in isolation from

eac h other” beca

use this approa ch “does not take into acc ount the ‘totality of the c ircumstance s’ as [t he Supreme Court’ s ] ca s es have unde rstood that phrase .” Id . Her e, def endant’ s behavior,Al tho ug h B on ill a ’s and his g ir lf ri e nd ’s ans we rs we re c on sis te nt r e g ard ingthe ir ult imate 3 d e s t i n a t i o n , C o l o mb u s , B e m i s t e s t i f i e d t h a tt h e s t a t e d

p u r p o s e o f t h e i r t r i p w a s i n c o n s i s t e n t : “ It didn’t match up. She didn’t say : We are on va cation g oing to Columbus. She said: we ar e g oing to visit some frie nds. We have ne ver be en to Columbus so we are g oing to g o to Colum bus.” - 19 - specific ally , driving too slowly and his appar ent rig idness, standing alone, a re innoc uous. Yet, whe n coupled with his repor

ted ner vousness, “he appea

red to be scar ed to death,” def endant’ s unusual and

c on fl ic tin g ans we rs a

bo ut h is g ir lf

ri e nd , and the i nc on sis te nt s ta te me nts fr om d e fe nd ant a nd his g irlfriend reg arding the stated purpose of their trip, there are sufficie nt releva nt fac tors to support 3 a finding of re asonable suspicion that criminal ac tivity was a foot. I n this reg ard, the majority ’s ana ly sis is fundame ntally flawe d beca use i t is li mited to whether the evidenc e supports a f

inding that de fenda

nt w as eng ag ed in tr ansporting “contr aband” rathe r than

su sp ic ion of c ri min a l a c tiv ity

in g e ne ra l: L astly , the fa ct that B onilla could not remembe r his passeng er’ s last name a nd stated he on ly kn e w he r fo r a sh or t tim e e ve n tho ug h sh e wa s his g ir lf ri e nd do e s r a ise so me red f lag s, but it does not rise to the leve l of suspicion of the pre sence of contra band. * * * Thus, the totality

of the c ircumstance s did not give r ise to a reasonable suspicion that Bonilla wa s transporting drug s in his vehicle at the moment whe n Be mis stopped writing the traf

fic c itation and place d Bonill a and his pa sseng er in police cruiser s. Ma j. O p. a t 11 -1 2. I t is we ll- se ttl e d tha t re a so na ble su sp ic ion

that “ c ri min a l a c tiv ity

may be a fo ot” does not require suspicion of a specific crime, but rather c riminal activity in ge nera l. Te rry , 3 92 U. S.

a t 30 ; see also United St ates v. Martinez , 808 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1987) (“ I n Te rry v . O hio , the Supreme Court re cog nized that a rea sonable suspicion of c riminal activity based on cont e mp o r a n e o u s o b s e r

v a ti o n s ma

y ju s ti f y a te mp o r ar

y s to p an d d e te n ti o n f

o r th e p u r

p o s e of- 20 -

inv e sti g a tin g that su sp ic ion , e ve n th ou g h the of fi c e r do e s no t have pr ob a

ble c a us e to be lie ve that a particula r cr ime has bee n committed.”) (f ootnote omitted). The majo ri t y

acknow ledg es that “B emis only detained B onilla for a shor t period of time,” but finds this fact “irr eleva nt” bec ause the y

hold that “ Be mis lac ked re asonable suspicion to do so.” Maj. Op. at 12. B eca

use I concl u d e t h at re as onable suspicion wa s prese nt, Ibriefly addre ss the second pa rt of the Te rry

analy sis – whether the time and intrusiveness of the stop were rea sonable. As no te d a

bo ve, th e dru g dogsn if

f o nly too k o ne min

ute to c omp le te . D ur ingthi s ti me , B e mis “‘dilig ently

pursued a

means of inve stigation that was likely to confirm or d i spel [his ] sus picions quickly [.] ’” United States v. Orsolini , 3 0 0 F. 3 d 7 2 4 , 7 3 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Sharpe , 4 70 U. S. 6 75 , 6 86 (1 98 5) . A c c or din g ly , b e c a us e the a dd e d d e te ntion

wa s “ su ff

ic ie ntl y limit ed in time” and “ used the lea st intrusiv e [ i n v est iga tive] m eans r easona

bly available [,] ” I conclude that the duration and scope of the detention wa s constitutionally permissible. Benne tt v. City of E as tpo int e , 410 F.3d 810, 825 (6th Cir. 2005) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). G iven A r vi

zu and our f

indings in Torres-Ramos , Iconclude that, under the totality of the circ umstances, the f

org oing f acts a re suf ficient to establish a r easona ble suspicion that cr i m i nal

a c tiv ity wa s a fo ot. Mo re ov e r, be c a us e Ia lso fi nd

that th e “ de g re e of int

ru sio n . . . wa s r e a so na

bly related in scope to th e s i t u at i on at hand,” Iwould hold that it was constitutionally permissible for Be mis to briefly

detain B onilla bey ond the scope of the initial stop to r un his drug dog around the vehicle. Ga rza , 10 F.3d at1245 (internal quotation mar ks and citation omitted). I V. F or the se re a so ns , I

wo uld a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r de nying the mot ion to s up pr e ss. Ac c or din g ly , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.