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S. HRG. 108–1019 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 18, 2004 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, 

Ranking 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

ROBERT W. CHAMBERLIN, Republican Chief Counsel 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

GREGG ELIAS, Democratic General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, 

Ranking 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on May 18, 2004 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Burns ................................................................................... 36 

Statement of Senator Fitzgerald ............................................................................ 47 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Lott ...................................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 43 

Statement of Senator Smith ................................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Wyden .................................................................................. 34 

WITNESSES

Blakey, Marion C., Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration ................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Hecker, JayEtta Z., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. General 

Accounting Office ................................................................................................. 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Mead, Hon. M. Kenneth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

APPENDIX

McCain, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from Arizona, prepared statement ................ 53 

Response to written questions submitted to Marion C. Blakey by: 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................ 53 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 58 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to: 

Hon. Kenneth M. Mead .................................................................................... 63 

JayEtta Z. Hecker ............................................................................................ 64 

(1) 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2004 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Trent Lott, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI 

Senator LOTT. If the witnesses would come forward and take 

their seats, we’d be glad to get started this morning. Well, first I’d 

like to thank our witnesses for appearing again before the subcommittee to take a look at FAA as a whole and its attempt to 

modernize and the plans to deal with the expected record air travel 

this summer. I look forward to hearing the testimony again of Marion Blakey, the Administrator of FAA; Ken Mead, Inspector General of the Department of Transportation; and JayEtta Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, GAO. Thank you all for 

being here. 

I’ve said many times that the only way FAA can ever become efficient is if they’re allowed to modernize. We’ve talked a lot about 

it, we’ve put some money in it, but we still have a long way to go, 

and I want to continue to see what the vision is and how we’re 

going to get to where we need to be in the future of aviation. 

Under the direction of current Administrator Blakey, the FAA 

has been making strides in this area. They are preparing for the 

future, but we need to know how it’s going. Congress should continue to monitor the FAA and ensure that they are indeed prepared 

for what the future will hold. 

I’d like to ask the members if they would withhold their opening 

statements, just go ahead and hear the testimony of the witnesses, 

and we’ll give you extra time if you need it for your questions. Do 

you object, Conrad? Good. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator LOTT. Yes, sir. 

Senator SMITH. I have to go preside shortly. I just want to pose 

a question I know my colleague will pose as well. We have a major 

fire season coming up. MTSB has said—they’ve grounded these airVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
2 

planes that are older than I am. I understand why they’re grounding them. However, we need your help. We need them certified 

safe. We need something to replace them, if not them, we need 

something, or else a lot of people are going to be in a lot of jeopardy. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, that’s all I wanted to say. 

Senator LOTT. Well, those are the aircraft that are used in fire 

fighting? 

Senator SMITH. Correct. 

Senator WYDEN. I’ve got a follow up to that too. 

Senator LOTT. All right. You’re posing—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I’d like to chime in also. 

Senator LOTT. On the fires in Oregon? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. No, but if you have airplanes that’s older 

than you, that’s one problem. The airplanes are older than me. 

Senator LOTT. That’s a huge problem. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LOTT. And all I have to say is, if you want new airplanes, we’ll build them. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Chairman, on a serious note, and this 

is a serious hearing, I have to leave. I planned my morning accordingly and I have, as my colleagues have also, a schedule that’s already laid out based on the fact that we would be able to make our 

statements and if necessary—— 

Senator LOTT. I think my idea to move forward with the testimony of the witnesses has been overridden by the need for the 

members to make statements and pose questions, and to accommodate that, we’d be glad to do it. Are you OK? We want that issue 

addressed when you respond, and I’m sure Senator Wyden will follow up on it. 

Senator Burns, you want to—— 

Senator BURNS. No, I’m just going to listen to the witnesses. 

Senator LOTT. All right. Senator Lautenberg, you want to make 

a statement here before you have to go? Go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

appreciate it. This is a subject of which I’ve been deeply involved, 

and I’m glad to see Marion Blakey, Ken Mead and Ms. Hecker. 

These are very important players in the decisions we’re going to 

make and I am happy to see you despite my throat. 

Airline travel, such an important component of the economy and 

the rebuilding of our economy, 700 million passengers a year depend on the FAA to ensure that planes are safe to fly on, facilities 

are operating properly, and that flight operations are conducted in 

a safe manner. 

There are two major challenges I foresee for the FAA, modernizing the equipment, as the Chairman already mentioned, used to 

manage and control air traffic in our air space; and ensuring an 

adequate workforce to operate and maintain the air traffic control 

system. And I’m hopeful that the newly formed Air Traffic Organization will have access to the tools to address these challenges adeVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
3 

quately. But I remain concerned that the policies of the administration are being forced on the FAA. 

It’s no secret that I believe very strongly that the management 

of our skies is something that should be performed by the government and no one else. Our air traffic control system is too important to jeopardize by playing budget or name games, and I don’t 

care whether it’s called contracting out, privatizing, or outsourcing. 

I will oppose shifting ATC functions to the lowest bidder as long 

as I’m a United States Senator. 

And when I look at what happened with NASA when that agency 

contracted out too much of its in-house expertise, it didn’t have 

enough people who could properly oversee the contractors. And 

right now FAA is spending millions of dollars in an attempt to 

begin privatizing part of the air traffic control system, the flight 

service stations. Congress did not specifically authorize this endeavor, and in the end, there aren’t any assurances that any money 

will actually be saved. 

The DOT Inspector General advised the FAA to look at consolidating these facilities, but said nothing about the privatizing or 

outsourcing the operations and their maintenance. And I’m also 

concerned about the staffing level of the air traffic controllers. Now, 

it’s my understanding that about 7,100 controllers, nearly half of 

the work force, are eligible for retirement in the next 9 years, and 

I’d like to know why there hasn’t been any hiring of controllers this 

entire Fiscal Year. What can Congress expect to have—when can 

Congress expect to have FAA’s plan to deal with the upcoming 

wave of retirements? We know that it takes a long time to get a 

controller fully operational. 

There are some things which are rightly expected from the Federal Government. One of them, is the highest possible level of safety when they travel by plane, and we ought not to diminish that 

in any way. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity 

to speak. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman: 

Thank you for holding this hearing on a subject I am passionate about: air safety. 

Airline travel is such an important component of our economy and our way of life. 

700 million passengers every year depend on the FAA to ensure that planes are safe 

to fly on, facilities are operating properly, and flight operations are conducted in a 

safe manner. 

There are two major challenges I foresee for the FAA: (1) modernizing the equipment used to manage and control air traffic in our airspace; and (2) ensuring an 

adequate workforce to operate and maintain the air traffic control system. 

I am hopeful that the newly formed Air Traffic Organization will have access to 

the tools to address these challenges adequately, but I remain concerned that the 

policies of White House ideologues are being forced on the FAA. 

Modernization of the equipment used to control traffic in our skies is a multi-billion dollar proposition. 

The FAA has a spotty record managing the upgrade. 

In a study last year, the DOT Inspector General found that cost growth, schedule 

delays, and performance problems continue, with 20 major projects experiencing 

overall cost growth of about $4.3 billion and schedule slips ranging from one to 

seven years. 

I’m anxious to hear what progress FAA has made in getting its arms around these 

major acquisitions, and what more needs to be done. 

4 

It’s no secret that I believe very strongly that the management of our skies is 

something that should be performed by the government and nobody else. 

Our air traffic control (ATC) system is too important to jeopardize by playing 

budget and ‘‘name’’ games—I don’t care whether it’s called ‘‘contracting out,’’ 

‘‘privatizing,’’ or ‘‘outsourcing.’’ 

I will oppose shifting ATC functions to the lowest bidder for as long as I’m a U.S. 

Senator. 

Just look at what happened with NASA and the Space Shuttle. When NASA contracted out too much of its in-house expertise, the agency didn’t have enough people 

who could properly oversee the contractors. 

Right now, the FAA is spending millions of dollars in an attempt to begin 

privatizing part of the air traffic control system—the flight service stations. 

Congress did not specifically authorize this endeavor and in the end, there aren’t 

any assurances that any money will actually be saved. 

The DOT Inspector General advised the FAA to look at consolidating these facilities, but said nothing about privatizing or outsourcing the operations and their 

maintenance. 

I’m also concerned about the staffing level of air traffic controllers. I understand 

that 7,100 controllers—nearly half of the workforce—are eligible to retire in the 

next nine years. 

I want to know why the Administration hasn’t hired any controllers this entire 

Fiscal Year. When can Congress expect to have FAA’s plan to deal with the upcoming wave of retirements? 

I understand there’s an effort to allow controllers to serve longer than current 

rules allow, and FAA is also looking to cut training for controllers. 

These are not long-term solutions to an emerging staffing crisis. Either you have 

enough properly-prepared controllers or you don’t. 

We need to know that there are enough controllers, that they are employed by 

and directly accountable to the Federal Government, and that they aren’t being 

forced to deal with any more stress than they already have on the job. 

There are some things which people rightly expect from the Federal Government. 

One of them is the highest possible level of safety when they travel by plane. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg. Administrator, 

we’d be glad to hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF MARION C. BLAKEY, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. BLAKEY. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you, 

Chairman Lott, and members of the Subcommittee. It’s a pleasure, 

in fact, to discuss the future of the United States air traffic system. 

This little question that traffic levels are coming back since 9/11, 

we’ve already taken a number of steps to avert a repeat of the 

delays that plagued us during the summer of 2000. 

In March, the FAA convened an important conference with airline and aviation decisionmakers to iron out a plan to address 

looming congestion as the traffic comes back this year. Together, 

we developed express lanes that are essentially highways in the 

sky designed to speed departures from busy airports. The group 

also agreed to delay triggers, which spread minor delays in the system as necessary to avoid bottlenecks at major intersections. 

I’m also pleased to say that Secretary Mineta and I were able to 

broker a 5 percent reduction in the flight schedule of United and 

American at Chicago’s O’Hare with an additional 2.5 percent cutback scheduled in mid-June. It’s unfortunate, but the fact of the 

matter is, as Chicago goes, so goes the system, and a runway can 

only handle so many planes in an hour. Posted schedules now at 

Chicago still exceed that number. So far, we’ve successfully averted 

what could become a bottleneck that could choke the entire system. 

5 

We’ll continue to track O’Hare delays to determine if additional action is needed. 

But while we’re working to handle the increase in traffic that 

comes with this summer, we’re also getting ready for what is to 

come a few years from now. Step number one for the FAA is to 

take a hard look at how we operate. Taking advantage of personnel 

and procurement reforms already in place, we’re transitioning to a 

much more business-like, bottom-line focused model. We’re following the best practices from the private sector and academia. In 

our new Air Traffic Organization, we’ve stripped away about a halfdozen layers of management. We’ve taken responsibility and accountability to the right levels. 

The people who develop and buy the equipment to modernize our 

system are also responsible for that purchase throughout its life 

cycle now. By integrating the authority and accountability for capital investments within the new organization, the goal is to link 

our capital budget to the operating budget that will lead to reductions in future operating costs. 

Safety. Safety is one thing, however, that hasn’t changed. It remains our highest priority. In fact, the three-year average for fatal 

commercial accidents is at its lowest in history. This is a cause for 

tremendous credit to this Congress and to the work here in this 

country of all of the partners in aviation. We’ve put in place two 

new safety organizations to further enhance safety for air traffic 

control to make sure that our world-leading safety record remains 

second to none. The first office monitors day-to-day operations. The 

second is positioned outside the new Air Traffic Organization to enhance and exercise independent review. 

In terms of investments, our flight plan is serving the taxpayer 

well. It’s a five-year blueprint, a lens through which all of our activities our measured. For the first time ever, all of our activities 

are linked directly to our budget and our performance measures 

are metrics driven. The flight plan is serving as a to-do list essentially for accountability. The results are there for all to see posted 

on our website on a quarterly basis. You can go to www.faa.gov and 

see exactly how we’re doing. 

The flight plan, of course, addresses our near-term needs, and incorporated within it and stretching further down the road is the 

Agency’s operational evolution plan, a rolling ten-year effort that’s 

well underway. The OEP, as it’s known, is designed to address arrival and departure delays, weather, and congestion. The OEP set 

a robust goal to squeeze 30 percent more capacity out of the system 

without increasing delays, and the latest news from this program 

is good. The Nation’s top 35 airports already have an increase in 

capacity of 6.5 percent over the year 2000, our baseline year, with 

an average of less than 14 minutes of delay. 

At this point, I’d be remiss not to mention a commitment we 

made to this Congress to address the issue of the wave of controller 

retirements that are coming up in future years. We’ve committed 

to get a plan to you by the end of the year. As you see on this 

chart, we have projected retirements through the year 2015, and 

while our track record in forecasting retirements has been remarkably good, we can’t be precisely sure of the retirement rate in the 

future. As you know, there are many factors that will affect an inVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
6 

dividual employee’s decision, and that what this cumulatively is all 

made up of. 

But during this year, we’re planning to drill down to the facility 

level and understand to the greatest degree possible when these retirements will occur, and therefore, what our planned hiring and 

training plans should be. 

Now, under the leadership of Secretary Mineta and at the direction of Vision 100, the landmark legislation that this committee got 

enacted last year, we’re also looking to take the longer view with 

the creation of a joint planning and development office called the 

JPDO. This office is an intergovernmental body composed of DOD, 

DHS, NASA, FAA, Commerce, Transportation, and the Vice President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

The effort brings together some of aviation’s best minds to focus 

on aviation in the year 2025 and beyond. Specifically, the JPDO’s 

mandate is to manage the development of our national plan for the 

next generation air transportation system. The first edition of this 

plan will be published in December and serve as a road map for 

our future aviation system. 

I think most telling about this effort is the organization’s motto: 

New ideas are welcome. That demonstrates a willingness to think 

beyond what might always be considered the traditional course for 

the FAA and much of government and create a road map for the 

future. It represents an unprecedented collaboration among all 

aviation system stakeholders, ranging from government to industry. It also represents a new day for aviation, and I think it’s clear, 

it represents a new FAA. 

I thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Blakey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARION C. BLAKEY, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Chairman Lott, Senator Rockefeller, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Good morning. It is my pleasure to appear before you this morning to discuss the 

future of the air traffic system in this country. This is a very timely hearing as we 

approach Memorial Day weekend and the start of the busy travel season with its 

daily reminders of the benefits and challenges of air travel in this country. Today, 

I would like to bring you up to date on what we at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are doing to manage the system while planning for the future. 

As you all know, September 11 triggered a severe downturn in aviation. However, 

based on our recent forecasts, aviation is rebounding, and we are taking steps to 

be ready for its resurgence. We are already working with the aviation community 

to stay ahead of the curve. In the near term, we have taken several concrete steps 

to ensure that delays are kept to a minimum. In March, we convened ‘‘Growth without Gridlock,’’ an unprecedented three-day conference with aviation decision makers 

to develop a strategy to reduce delays this summer. We sat down with representatives of the airlines, pilots, controllers, military, business, regional and GA airports, 

and a collection of aviation organizations. As a result, working together, we developed a new approach. We agreed on ‘‘express lanes,’’ that allow for reduced departure delays by keeping certain parts of the airspace around congested airports clear 

to allow for more rapid departures. The group also agreed to ‘‘delay triggers’’ that 

can reduce bottlenecks at our busiest airports by imposing minor delays on the 

ground at airports sending flights into a congested area until our controllers can 

clear the congestion. The theory is that by imposing minimal delays when necessary, where necessary, we can reduce major delays that clog the entire system. 

I must emphasize that these near-term steps do not resolve long-term capacity 

issues. We must continue to build runways where needed, improve our airspace designs, and field new capital investments, and improve our management of the air 

7 

traffic system. We at the FAA must act more like a business with a customer focus. 

This will pay real dividends. 

That’s why we are working to transform the way the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO) does business. We have designed the ATO to be a more streamlined, effective means of providing the safest air traffic control in the world to the most complex airspace in the world. The ATO will execute our Flight Plan, implement our 

Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) and lead us into the future with the Joint Planning Development Office (JDPO). As you know, last August, after a long and comprehensive search, Russ Chew became the ATO’s first Chief Operating Officer 

(COO), a position created by statute under the leadership of this Committee. He is 

primarily responsible for all aspects of providing air traffic services and products. 

Our foundation has not changed: any conversation about air traffic is premised 

upon the uncompromising commitment to safety by Secretary Mineta and me. Every 

decision we make is done with the safety of the flying public in mind. I am pleased 

to announce that the three-year commercial airline accident rate is the lowest in 

history. That’s a tribute to the highly skilled men and women of the FAA and the 

industry we support. 

Air Traffic Organization 

Thanks in large part to the continuing support from this Committee, the FAA is 

completely restructuring how we manage air traffic services. Congressional support 

for greater efficiency and accountability at the FAA has enabled FAA to be more 

flexible, adaptable, and business-like. Today, I want to briefly describe how our recent changes will position us to meet once again a growing aviation system. 

Those who use our system want an agile organization that can create greater access—and that is what we intend to provide. Indeed, with every change, we will continue to ensure that safety remains our top priority. Accordingly, we have added a 

new office—the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service—to monitor the safety of our 

air traffic operations and help us ensure accountability. We have placed this office 

outside the ATO to ensure its independence, locating it within the FAA’s Office of 

Regulations and Certification. We have also added a Vice President for Safety Services inside the ATO, and we will conduct risk-targeted, data-informed audits that 

will provide trend analysis and review systemic issues. 

To obtain a more results-oriented, more accountable process that will reduce future operational costs, we are also integrating the authority and accountability for 

capital investments within the ATO. In the past, capital programs and operations 

have been managed separately, and success had been driven and defined by building 

the system, not measuring the operational benefit. Thus, the definition of success 

was not always results oriented. Further, from a fiscal perspective, the capital budget was inadequately linked to the future operating costs of any given procurement. 

Consequently, operational costs have increased year after year with little consequence to capital decisions or the program portfolio. 

Through a more integrated approach to managing capital and operations, past 

mistakes will be corrected and the ATO will have greater fiscal insight to make 

long-term investments. We expect to be able to reduce our unit operating costs and 

fund near term operational improvements that pay the biggest dividends. 

To do this, we are developing new financial management tools to pinpoint unit 

cost and productivity, which will enhance our fiscal effectiveness. Field managers 

need to know the full import of their financial decisions and headquarters’ managers 

need to know which facilities are most efficient. In the future, each Vice President 

will know the value of their decisions by measuring their service performance—in 

terms of safety and efficiency—and what resources are required to achieve it. To 

that end, we are developing new cost reports that include labor distribution information. Timely reporting on safety, costs, and operational performance will give us a 

better understanding where our resources are being used. 

The ATO must ensure the highest rate of return for each dollar invested. Ensuring organizational excellence means more people actually providing the products 

and services, with fewer, more effective people managing them. Russ Chew, our 

COO, has already flattened the organization, which has resulted in better communication and more efficient decision-making. He now is six management layers from 

the controller or technician versus 11 in the original structure. We arc increasing 

our target average ratio of the number of eight staff employees per manager. But 

streamlining the organization, in and of itself, means little unless you empower the 

managers by creating new financial reports and processes that give them the information necessary to make informed, data driven decisions, and then be accountable 

for them. We are not waiting for our final realignment before making changes. No 

longer will one line of business make purchasing decisions for another line of business to use. Even though the ATO was only started in February, we are optimistic 

8 

about seeing some early productivity and efficiency improvements by the end of this 

Fiscal Year. 

Future Aviation Capacity and Delays 

We have put in place an even more effective organization that will help us meet 

the air traffic demands of this century. This more agile organization will be better 

positioned to implement our Flight Plan and the Operational Evolution Plan. The 

Flight Plan links the agency’s activities through 2008 to our budget requests. It 

aligns all of our business plans to ensure accountability at all levels. Beyond the 

Flight Plan, the OEP, a rolling ten-year plan, takes our capacity and efficiency plans 

out a decade to 2014. Looking even further into the future, the JPDO is crafting 

a plan for the Next Generation Air Transportation System to meet air traffic demand in the long-term, out to 2025. 

The OEP’s objective is to add capacity enhancements that will accommodate a 30 

percent increase in demand over the ten-year period. Since the plan’s inception in 

2001, there has been a 6.5 percent increase in effective capacity (i.e., the amount 

of traffic that can be handled within a 14 minute delay) due to OEP activities and 

industry changes. The OEP’s capacity solutions are divided into four core areas: Arrival/Departure Rates, Airport Weather, En Route Congestion, and En Route Severe 

Weather. Within each core area, we have identified specific strategies for addressing 

known or projected capacity problems. The OEP also tracks 35 airports that are the 

most heavily traveled and located in the most densely populated areas because the 

OEP activities at these airports will have the greatest positive effect on the system. 

We are increasing capacity and reducing delays in a number of ways. First, let 

me start with runways, for they are the means to provide the single most significant 

capacity increases and delay reduction. Runways are expected to account for a significant part of the overall expected 30 percent gain in capacity over next ten years. 

In the last five years, eight new runways have opened at the 35 OEP airports allowing almost a million more operations annually. The OEP currently includes seven 

runway projects (six new runways and one runway extension) that will be commissioned in the next five years allowing these airports to accommodate an additional 

840,000 more operations annually. Taken together, these 15 runway projects represent a 12 percent increase in capacity over the period from 1999 through 2008. 

New runway construction and runway extensions are the most effective method 

of increasing passenger throughput, or ‘‘arrival and departure rates’’. Because the 

35 OEP airports account for 73 percent of all passenger enplanements, by increasing 

the throughput of those passengers’ flights, we affect the entire system. We know 

that runways themselves are just one part of the solution and cannot maximize capacity alone. For example, studies have shown that 40 to 60 percent of the projected 

capacity gained from new concrete will be lost without the necessary changes to terminal and en route airspace. The OEP is instrumental in attaining the maximum 

capacity increases from a new runway. It provides a coordination mechanism to ensure that all procedures, navigational equipment and pilot training are ready when 

new runways are opened. 

A second critical element of the OEP, and of particular interest to this Committee, 

is our ongoing National Airspace Redesign (NAR). The U.S. airspace has remained 

largely unchanged while technology, demand and diversity of aircraft using the system have advanced. The NAR is a multi-year initiative to review, redesign, and restructure the nation’s airspace to meet the increasing operational demands on the 

national airspace system. This effort is addressing, both locally and system-wide, 

the congestion, complexity and limited departure points in the current airspace that 

cause operation. 

In addition, next January, we plan to implement a program in the airspace over 

the continental U.S. that will enable us to reduce vertical separation at certain altitudes that will make six additional, more fuel efficient, flight levels available for aircraft operations. It will enhance both air traffic control flexibility and efficiencies for 

our customers. Canada and Mexico are planning for full implementation at the same 

time. This program, known as the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM), 

has been successfully implemented in Europe, the Pacific Ocean, Australia and 

parts of Canadian airspace already. 

Redesign efforts will occur at the higher altitudes as well as in the terminal area, 

taking advantage of new navigational technologies such as advanced area navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigational Performance (RNP) that increase the potential for pilots to fly more efficient routes and altitudes they select. This is in contrast 

to the more rigid assigned routes and altitudes that have been the basis for air traffic control in congested airspace. Performance procedures will also allow for more 

efficient use of the constrained terminal airspace. Benefits associated with these 

changes will be dependent on the level of equipage of aircraft. While non-equipped 

9 

aircraft will still be accommodated, airspace and procedures will be designed to offer 

additional benefits for those aircraft having additional capabilities. 

Recent airspace redesign has already proven its value in several critical regions 

of the country. For instance, because airspace between Chicago and the New York 

often clog capacity, we created new sectors to mitigate these bottlenecks. A new departure fix at Philadelphia has increased aircraft arrivals and departures to the 

west. Modeling to support this new route projected departure increases of up to 4 

to 5 aircraft an hour, thus reducing delays at a critical east coast hub airport. Moreover, two new off-shore radar sectors created for our New York Center have permitted 65 percent of departures to leave on time. They otherwise would have been 

delayed or cancelled due to sever weather. These and other near-term solutions 

show a real benefit to the traveling public and have already provided FAA customers with $100 million per year in savings. 

Recognizing that there are limited resources, the OEP examines solutions that 

would make use of existing systems, especially aircraft avionics. At the same time 

we continue to pursue new technology that brings capacity enhancements. In some 

cases, we are just beginning implementation of new tools and making investment 

decisions so that our customers can expect to see increased benefits over time. For 

example, we are providing improved weather products to ATC facilities that can 

help our controllers minimize traffic flow disruption from fast moving weather by 

optimizing safe routes that avoid the storm. We are also providing our controllers 

with new tools to help them manage traffic levels and the predicted traffic increases. 

Some of our controllers now have the tools to predict spacing conflicts, with the User 

Request Evaluation Tool, known as URET. At the ten sites where URET has been 

deployed, airlines are saving both time and fuel and other operating costs. We are 

in the process of equipping the rest of our en route centers with this technology. 

Once that phase is complete, we project an increase of direct routings by 15 percent 

which will further reduce users operating costs. Also, controllers at five of our facilities can sequence arriving and departing aircraft with technology known as Traffic 

Management Advisor (TMA). At each location where TMA is now in use, we get a 

three to five percent increase in capacity. All of these tools ultimately reduce delays. 

We are also seeing the safety and capacity benefits from technology that supplements radar coverage. Pilots and air traffic controllers can ‘‘see’’ aircraft and ground 

vehicle traffic with greater precision creating additional airspace, runway and taxiway efficiencies. What this means is that we can now provide ‘‘radar like’’ service 

in remote airspace. Alaska’s Capstone program is using this technology and seeing 

the benefits of shorter, more efficient routings during inclement weather. We also 

expect to use this technology to increase the arrival and departure rate at some airports. The diverse application of this technology may also allow visual approaches 

to continue into marginal visual flight rules conditions as bad weather moves into 

the approach airspace, reducing the need to divert aircraft. 

We are always working to anticipate changes in aviation trends that require us 

to adjust our strategies for increasing capacity. Today, the OEP focuses on 35 of the 

Nation’s busiest airports, but it will be expanded to include other airports needing 

capacity in the future. Just over a year ago, we began assessing the capacity of the 

Nation’s airports given the anticipated demand for air travel. This analysis, A Look 

into the Future: An Analysis of Airport Demand and Operational Capacity Across 

the NAS, should be released this month. We looked at socioeconomic trends in demand with changes in population and income and compared those to existing and 

forecast capacity. We identified locations where additional capacity is needed now, 

and where capacity would be needed in 2013 and in 2020. We also found that if certain OEP capacity targets are not met, then we will experience even greater than 

anticipated capacity constraints at airports already identified as needing capacity in 

2013 and 2020. The long-term projections of the Capacity Study support the OEP 

initiatives as well as the JPDO’s efforts to assess system growth out to 2025. The 

Capacity Study tells us that the FAA and the aviation industry must continue to 

work together to ensure that adequate capacity is in place when and where needed, 

and reinforces the importance of keeping pace with current and future demand, and 

publishing a formal plan to identify and track our improvements. 

For the development of longer-term plans and concepts, and under the direction 

of Vision 100, we have established the JPDO. Its mandate is to coordinate goals, 

priorities, and research activities within the Federal Government as well as with 

United States aviation and aeronautical firms to create a National Plan-a roadmap 

for our future aviation system in furtherance of the Next Generation Air Transportation System Initiative. 

In developing the National Plan, the JPDO will establish the 2025 target and capture the major priorities that represent the coordinated decisions of member agencies. While these decisions will be in broad four-to-five year windows, it will be the 

10 

individual agencies that will prioritize the specific projects and programs needed to 

carry out their individual portions of the National Plan. Both the Secretary and I 

believe that the combination of these plans and programs will position us to meet 

future needs of the system. This would not be possible without the unprecedented 

commitments of support provided by the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and 

Homeland Security, NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology 

Policy. Even the JPDO motto—‘‘New Ideas Are Welcome’’-demonstrates a willingness to think beyond what otherwise might be considered ‘‘traditional’’ as they create the roadmap for the future. These efforts represent unprecedented collaboration 

among all aviation system stakeholders ranging from government to industry. 

At the forefront of the National Plan’s goals for the future air transportation system, is the goal of increased capacity. While we are still building the plan that will 

take us to 2025 and beyond we expect to see an ‘‘early victory’’ for future capacity. 

As you know full well, weather creates significant delays—delays that we can’t 

eliminate but delays that can be ‘‘managed’’ with skill, technology and procedures. 

To this end, the JPDO is developing an Integrated Plan for Aviation Weather, the 

first step toward bringing all of these efforts together for maximum benefit. 

We are encouraged by this early success but it represents a fraction of the work 

that must be done to maintain our leadership role in aviation and to create the infrastructure for the future system. 

Cape Town Treaty 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, you had requested that we briefly address an issue that 

is particularly important to the aviation community: the Cape Town Treaty, which 

is now awaiting action by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Treaty is 

composed of two instruments: the Cape Town Convention, containing the basic 

terms and provisions that underlie the regime that reflects modern asset-based financing practices in this country, and the Aircraft Protocol, which makes the Treaty 

operational specifically as to aircraft, aircraft engines and helicopters above a certain size. Once in force, the Treaty will provide significant economic benefits both 

here at home and abroad. By creating an internationally recognized system of rights 

and enforceable remedies in aircraft equipment, the Treaty reduces the risk assumed by creditors in financing transactions and thus should reduce the costs of 

those transactions. 

For countries such as the U.S. that manufacture aircraft, those reduced costs 

should encourage increased exports and export-related economic growth—not just by 

major manufacturers, but also by smaller companies that make the parts and provide related aviation services. In addition, the Convention and Aircraft Protocol will 

benefit the companies that provide the capital that finance the sale of such equipment around the world. U.S. financial institutions are major players in aircraft financing. The creditor protections provided for by the Convention and Protocol will 

benefit them by significantly reducing the risk they now incur when financing aircraft in countries whose laws do not meaningfully protect creditors in the event of 

a default or insolvency. 

The full implementation of this Treaty should hasten the replacement of older 

equipment with state-of-the-art aircraft, making the world’s skies safer and cleaner 

as newer equipment is acquired and brought into service. This will benefit aviation 

both within the United States and abroad, particularly in developing countries 

whose carriers have had to pay high interest rates or who have not been able to 

access the commercial credit markets at all because of their credit risk. In short, 

Mr. Chairman, this Treaty is a ‘‘win-win-win’’ proposition. It is a fine example of 

how international legal cooperation can benefit all parties. I want to highlight the 

extraordinary collaborative nature of the Cape Town Treaty effort. It is an example 

of what a strong government/industry partnership can produce. 

The financing provisions on secured interests under the Treaty do not require any 

implementing legislation here in the U.S., because they are fully consistent with 

U.S. law under the Uniform Commercial Code. To this extent, the Treaty is selfexecuting. However, certain technical amendments to the FAA’s Civil Aircraft Registry functions are required to fully integrate our Registry with the new, fully computerized International Registry that will be established under the Treaty. Last 

week, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee favorably reported 

a bill that we support, H.R. 4226. Although it is somewhat different from the Administration’s proposal that we sent to Congress last fall, it nevertheless accomplishes essentially the same goal full implementation of the Treaty. The bill designates the FAA’s Registry as the ‘‘entry point’’ for authorizing filings to the International Registry while maintaining the full documentation system of the FAA registry. It also provides for expedited rulemaking so that the FAA may quickly update 

its regulations and put into place all requirements for implementing the Treaty. 

11 

And importantly, to avoid any confusion over what legal standards apply during the 

rulemaking process, the bill provides that the Treaty’s provisions would supercede 

inconsistent FAA regulations. We support the bill and look forward to working with 

this Committee as the Treaty and legislation advance. 

That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Ms. Blakey. 

Mr. Mead, welcome back. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. MEAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You’ll recall that our office 

was heavily engaged during the summer of 2000 when we experienced gridlock and during that time we reported on that situation 

as well as a host of airline customer service issues. This summer 

we probably won’t see the same magnitude of system-wide disruption that we saw in the summer of 2000 when nearly 30 percent 

of flights were delayed or canceled, but the potential for congestion 

and delays this summer in some key airports is very real and will 

approach 2000 levels. 

Today I want to address four areas, current traffic and delay conditions, the changing drivers of conditions. They’re different than 

they were in 2000 to some extent, and FAA’s actions in the past 

4 years, and some recommendations for next steps. I’d like to emphasize though, as we did in the summer of 2000 and its aftermath, that while the focus as we approach the summer is necessarily on Band-Aids and quick fixes to get you through the summer, you can’t afford to postpone the quest for longer-term solutions, and DOT and FAA have welcome initiatives on the way in 

that regard, and they’re clearly steps in the right direction. The 

key is going to be follow-through and closure on the actions to be 

taken. 

Also, you have important issues of controller retirement. A big 

bubble is approaching, and that’s because a lot of the controllers 

that were hired right after the strike are now retirement eligible. 

Another big issue is the adequacy of revenues inflowing to the trust 

fund. They’re not materializing as had been anticipated 2 or 3 

years ago, and as a result of that, you’ve got multi-billion dollar declines. 

A couple reasons, Mr. Chairman. One is, a large component of 

the trust fund revenues is derived from the ticket tax, which is 7.5 

percent applied to the ticket price. In the summer of 2000, for example, there were a lot of $1,000, $2,000 tickets that business travelers were paying. That market has—the bottom has fallen out of 

that market. So you have the 7.5 percent being applied to a much 

smaller ticket base. 

Second, there are a lot—there’s a recurrence of point-to-point 

service in the system. Part of the trust fund’s revenue is based on 

a lot of segments, and as you reduce the number of segments, so 

too goes the revenue. 

Traffic is nearly back to the 2000 levels and delays are emerging 

in several key markets. Twenty-one percent of flights delayed system-wide in the first quarter of 2004, the average delay is about 

46 minutes. Still below 2000 levels, but delays are up 24 percent 

12 

in the first quarter of 2004 compared to the first quarter of 2003. 

The story is worse at some individual airports. Administrator 

Blakey mentioned Chicago O’Hare. Thirty-seven percent of the 

flights were delayed there in the first quarter of 2004, average 

delay 64 minutes. That was worse than 2000. Another airport that 

bears watching is our own Washington Dulles Airport. Independence Air, formerly Atlantic Coast, has announced its intent to add 

as many as 300 new flights by the end of the summer. If that occurs, passenger and traffic levels will stress the airport’s runways, 

gates, security checkpoints, and the air traffic control system. 

Other airports to watch this summer are listed on the handout. 

You have it front of you. This is the one with yellow, and that’s on 

page 4 of my testimony. Of particular note are Philadelphia, Atlanta, LaGuardia, and Cincinnati. All of those airports have more 

traffic than they did in 2000, had at least one in five flights delayed last summer, and are further increasing their schedules this 

summer. 

New factors are contributing to the delays that did not exist or 

were less prominent four summers ago. Those forces include increased reliance on regional jets, new and expanded low-cost carrier service, and post-9/11 security screening requirements. 

Take regional jet growth. Since May 2000, scheduled regional jet 

departures have increased by 180 percent system-wide. In 2000, 9 

percent of flights were on regional jets. Now it’s 29 percent of 

flights. These aircraft use the same runways as larger jets, but 

they can cause heavy congestion at some airports and in airspace 

and they carry fewer passengers. That’s why system operations can 

be up but emplacements can still be down. 

Low-cost carrier expansion. Contrary to the situation in 2000, 

low-cost carriers are now entering the weakened legacy or network 

carriers’ hubs and are expanding into transcontinental markets. 

Low-cost carriers now control 21 percent of the domestic market, 

up from 15 percent just 4 years ago. 

Passenger security screening delays. When the TSA instituted 

new post-9/11 screening procedures at airports, Secretary Mineta 

established a wait-time goal of 10 minutes or less at screening 

checkpoints. The TSA is now under, of course, the Department of 

Homeland Security, and they report that their national wait time 

in April was 3.8 minutes during off-peak hours and about 8 minutes during peak hours, but they correctly note that those averages 

are quite misleading in that they don’t represent the peak times 

within a week or seasonal fluctuations. 

Just some examples. Atlanta, the news media reported, had a 

half-mile line last week. LaGuardia terminal B routinely on weekdays evenings 30 to 60 minutes. There is a host of other airports 

we can get into in a Q&A period that are experiencing times that 

go well over 10 minutes. 

I think that information on all parts of the travel experience is 

necessary for consumers to make decisions based on door-to-door 

trip times, not just takeoff to landing times. Therefore, we’re recommending that the government, just like the airlines are required 

to report their on-time performance, we think the Transportation 

Department, in coordination with DHS, ought to be reporting 

monthly airport-specific wait times at security screening checkVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
13 

points for peak and off-peak hours. And I also want to tell you that 

yesterday Secretary Mineta directed the appropriate departmental 

officers to take the steps necessary to do that. 

I’d like to speak to some of the FAA actions over the past 4 

years. I think you have a pretty good report card on steps the FAA 

has taken in the last 4 years, and it should help this summer. 

Steps taken by the FAA and the Department include negotiating, 

directing, or brokering or scheduling reductions with the carriers at 

Chicago O’Hare. That was clearly not the case in the summer of 

2000. I think there was a lack of willingness to do that. 

Plans for this summer include, as the Administrator was noting, 

express lanes in the sky, holding flights at origin airports when 

delays at a destination airport reach 90 minutes or more. FAA and 

the airlines now have traffic management calls daily and FAA completed its choke point initiative to address bottlenecks between 

Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Boston. New runways provide the 

largest increases in capacity. In the last several years, six of them 

have been built at key hub and destinations airports and they will 

help this summer. Seven new ones are expected to be completed between now and 2008. But of the five airports that are experiencing 

the most congestion, only one of them’s going to have one in the 

next couple years, and that would be Atlanta. 

Also, a number of airspace redesign and technology-related efforts, such as a new precision landing system, were advanced in 

the aftermath of the summer of 2000. For the most part, those efforts have not progressed sufficiently to help out this summer. 

Now, with summer fast approaching and traffic back to 2000 levels at a dozen airports, an action item we’re recommending FAA 

move forward on promptly is to complete and publish its revised 

capacity benchmarks, preferably before the end of this month. 

These benchmarks were first developed in the aftermath of the 

summer of 2000 and set forth the number of flights an airport can 

support within the constraints of the airport and air traffic system 

under good and bad weather conditions. They are useful for, among 

other things, disclosing capacity levels at that airport in relation to 

what the airlines are scheduling, and by comparing capacity to 

scheduling, FAA and the airlines are in a much better position to 

anticipate and ameliorate delays before they materialize. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, as air traffic operations increase, it’s 

important not to lose sight of safety. Two key areas to watch, runway incursions, potential collisions, which are potential collisions 

on the ground, and operational errors, which are when planes are 

allowed to come close together in the air. 

There has been progress in both of these areas over the past 

year, but the numbers are much too high and as the traffic is increasing with those numbers really must come down. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:] 

14 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Short and Long-term Efforts to Mitigate Flight Delays and Congestion 

Mr. Chairman, 

Thank you for inviting us to testify today. As the Subcommittee will recall, our 

office was heavily engaged during the summer of 2000 when congestion and delays 

created gridlock conditions in some parts of the aviation system. We were also directed, by statute, to review airline customer service issues that grew out of the 

delay problems. Since then, we have regularly reported on air traffic control modernization and industry operations and finances. Our next report updating the performance of the aviation system will be issued in June. Our testimony today is 

based on this body of work. 

Given the difficult financial circumstances within parts of the airline industry, it 

seems counterintuitive that we would be here today talking once more about some 

of the same congestion and delay problems that existed 4 years ago as a result of 

the economic robustness of the industry. Although we are unlikely to see the same 

levels of disruption that we saw during 2000, when nearly 1 in 4 flights were delayed or cancelled, the potential for congestion and delays this summer in some key 

airports is very real and the highest it has been since that terrible summer in 2000. 

Today we would like to address four areas: current traffic and delay conditions, 

the changing drivers of congestion—including new security-related airport congestion, FAA’s actions in the past 4 years, and what these all mean as we move forward this summer and beyond. This summer, our focus will necessarily be on finding quick fixes when problems surface. That will help us through the short term, 

but at the same time, we cannot afford to postpone the quest for long-term solutions 

to address the underlying root problems. We note that for the longer term, the Department and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have established a Joint Planning and Development Office to develop a longer term vision for the next generation 

air transportation system. 

In addition to the Department’s efforts to move forward this summer, we are making two recommendations today. 

• First, FAA should complete and publish its revised capacity benchmarks as soon 

as possible, preferably before the end of May. These benchmarks were first developed in the aftermath of the summer of 2000 and set forth the number of 

flights a specific airport could support within the constraints of the airport’s 

runways and the air traffic control system under varying weather conditions. 

As such, they were useful for disclosing capacity levels at specific airports in 

relation to proposed airline scheduling as well as for projecting additional capacity that could be gained through new runways, technology, and procedures. 

• Second, the Department of Transportation, in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security, should collect and report, on a monthly basis, airport-specific data disclosing wait-times at airport passenger security screening 

checkpoints, just as the airlines are required to report their on-time performance to the Department of Transportation. Secretary Mineta has directed DOT’s 

Office of Aviation and International Affairs and the Bureau of Transportation 

Statistics to develop a statistically valid means to measure and report on security wait-times at the Nation’s most congested airports. Such information, in 

conjunction with currently collected causation data, will form a complete picture 

of delays in the aviation system and pinpoint where action is needed. 

Current Conditions: Traffic is Rebounding and Existing Delays Are Likely 

to Worsen This Summer 

Even though we are not yet into the summer months—typically the busiest for 

the airlines—we are already seeing delays and congestion resulting from the rebound in airline traffic. As Figure 1 illustrates, traffic levels in the past few months 

have come very close to or exceeded levels for comparable months in 2000. 

15 

1 At the 55 Airports tracked by the FAA in the Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) 

database. 

As traffic has grown, so have delays. Although average arrival delays 1 in the first 

quarter of 2004 of 21.3 percent were below those experienced in the first quarter 

of 2000 (23.7 percent), they are up 24 percent from the same period in 2003. 

This recent delay growth is particularly pronounced at some key airports. At Chicago-O’Hare, 37 percent of flights were delayed in the first quarter of 2004 comVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE

518MEAD1.eps 518MEAD2.eps
16 

pared to a delay rate of 21 percent in the first quarter of 2003. The average length 

of delay in the first quarter of 2004 at O’Hare totaled 64 minutes versus an average 

delay of 54 minutes in the first quarter of 2003. In the first quarter of 2000, 27 percent of flights at O’Hare were delayed for an average of 50 minutes. 

One situation that bears watching, in particular, is the impact of the expected 

service growth at Washington’s Dulles airport. In June, when Independence Air is 

launched by former regional carrier Atlantic Coast Airlines as a new low-cost carrier, traffic at Dulles will increase significantly. With Independence Air’s announced 

intent to add as many as 300 additional daily flights by the end of the summer, 

and United’s intent to bring new regional partners to Dulles to replace the flights 

once operated by Atlantic Coast, the level of operations will increase significantly. 

Security lines are likely to be an issue in addition to airside congestion. 

Other airports to watch include Philadelphia, Atlanta, New York-LaGuardia, and 

Cincinnati. All have operations levels that exceed those of the summer of 2000, experienced delay rates greater than 20 percent last summer, and are increasing their 

schedules this summer by more than 6 percent. Figure 3 identifies other airports 

that experienced delays last summer that are expecting increased operations in the 

summer of 2004. 

Figure 3: Airports With Delays Last Summer That are Increasing Schedules for Summer 2004*

Airport 

Percent Flights 

Delayed Summer 

2003 

Average 

Delay 

(Minutes) 

Percent Increase in 

Flights Summer 2004 

vs. Summer 2003 

1 Newark 27.00 59.19 7% 

2 Philadelphia 25.40 51.27 9% 

3 NY-Kennedy 25.13 56.36 20% 

4 West Palm Beach 24.47 46.49 12% 

5 Atlanta 24.24 48.78 9% 

6 Raleigh-Durham 23.45 48.29 13% 

7 Fort Lauderdale 22.95 49.12 10% 

8 Washington-Dulles 22.53 51.59 17% 

9 Orlando 21.76 49.28 9% 

10 NY-LaGuardia 21.66 59.66 8% 

11 Baltimore 21.65 53.45 5% 

12 San Antonio 21.28 45.55 6% 

13 Chicago-O’Hare 21.18 64.26 9% 

14 Boston 20.97 49.74 9% 

15 Cincinnati 19.57 48.41 6% 

* Airports in boldface all have scheduled operations for the summer of 2004 that exceed schedules filed in the summer of 2000. 

As Operations Increase, Focus Must be Kept on Safety 

As air traffic operations increases, it is important not to lose sight of safety. There 

are two key areas to watch—runway incursions (potential collisions on the ground) 

and operational errors (when air traffic controllers allow planes to come too close 

together in the air). Operational errors pose a significant safety risk, with an average of three operational errors per day and one serious error (those rated as high 

risk) every 7 days in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. We have seen some progress on runway 

incursions during the first 7 months of FY 2004; however, the most serious runway 

incursions have continued to increase. In addition, although operational errors decreased marginally, they are still much too high. 

17 

Runway Incursions and Operational Errors 

For the 7 month PeriodOctober 1, 2003 through April 30, 2004*

Total Incidents Most Serious Incidents 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

Percent 

Change 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

Percent 

Change 

Runway Incursions 185 182 (2) 13 19 46 

Operational Errors 601 589 (2) 32 22 (31) 

*FY 2004 information is preliminary as all incidents may not have received a final severity rating. Serious incidents for runway

incursions include category A and B incidents. Serious incidents for operational errors include high severity incidents. 

Changing Drivers of Congestion: Regional Jets, Low-Cost Carrier 

Expansion, and New Security Screening Procedures 

In addition to the traditional causes of delays, including weather and over-scheduling, there are new forces in place this summer that did not exist or were less 

prominent four summers ago. These forces, including significantly increased reliance 

on regional jets, new and expanded service by low-cost carriers, and post-9/11 security screening requirements, are presenting new challenges for our airports and airways. 

• Regional Jet Growth Places Heavy Demands On Airports and Air Traffic Control. 

In recent years, the network carriers have begun to rely more heavily on their 

regional partners to serve smaller markets with their fleets of smaller regional 

jets. In May 2000, scheduled flights aboard regional jets accounted for only 9 

percent of all flights. In May 2004, scheduled flights aboard regional jets will 

account for 29 percent of all offered flights. Since May 2000, scheduled regional 

jet departures have increased by 180 percent. 

Data from all 31 large hub airports that are tracked by the FAA indicate that 

the growth is more pronounced on an airport-by-airport basis. In 12 of the 31 

airports, including some of those that experienced serious delays in 2000, the 

number of scheduled flights in May 2004 exceeded the number of scheduled 

flights in May 2000. In 9 of those 12 airports, however, the number of available 


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18 

seats scheduled still lagged behind the number of available seats offered in May 

2000, indicating, at least in part, how smaller number of passengers. 

• Low-Cost Carrier Expansion Adds New Flights to Large and Medium-sized Markets 

Low-cost carriers, which once opted to operate at alternative, but more affordable secondary airports, are now challenging legacy carriers in their hubs in 

most large and medium-sized markets, and in transcontinental markets which 

they had previously not served. Earlier this month Southwest Airlines began 

operations at Philadelphia International Airport, going head-to-head against incumbent carrier U.S. Airways on several of its most profitable routes. Frontier 

Airlines is scheduled to begin serving Philadelphia from Los Angeles later this 

month. 

Low-cost carriers together now control about 21 percent of domestic air capacity-up from 15 percent 4 years ago. From a consumer standpoint, the impact 

of a low-cost carrier entering a market is often a sudden and significant reduction in average airfares. In fact, most low-cost carrier strategies are built on 

generating new passenger demand rather than shifting existing passengers 

from incumbent carriers. As a result, from an operational standpoint, the lowcost carriers new operations, coupled with incumbent carriers’ competitive response to new entry can produce significant additional demands on an airport’s 

runways and airspace. 

• Post 9–11 Security Screening Process Increases Travel Complexity. 

When the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created within the 

Department of Transportation after September 11, Secretary Mineta established 

a goal that airline passengers be processed through new Federally-staffed airport passenger screening checkpoints in 10 minutes or less; a standard that was 

considered appropriate to meet the dual needs of ensuring secure airways while 

maintaining national mobility. 

TSA is periodically collecting data at a rotating list of selected airports. In 

April, TSA reports that average national wait time in April was 3.8 minutes 

during off-peak hours and 7.9 minutes during peak hours, although TSA advises 

that these numbers may be misleading as they do not reflect particular peaks 

during the week or in different seasons. 

Meanwhile, many airports, airlines, and consumers are becoming very vocal 

about lines at security checkpoints that routinely extend an hour or longer. For 

example, at Atlanta-Hartsfield Airport last week, news media reported that security lines stretched 1/2-mile long on one morning. At LaGuardia’s ‘‘B’’ terminal, which houses all of the airport’s low-cost carriers, security lines routinely 

stretch 30 to 60 minutes long in the evenings. With an anticipated growth in 

passengers during the busy summer season-some predict even longer delays. 

19 

At Phoenix-Sky Harbor International Airport, lines at security checkpoints 

averaged nearly 30 minutes in April 2004. 

Passengers, airlines, and airports need accurate information concerning all aspects of the travel experience. It is time for detailed airport-specific data to be 

collected and reported, similar to the process used by the airlines to report 

delay occurrences and causes. If there are problems such as those being 

anecdotally reported, the first step to addressing them is to adequately quantify 

them. 

The national goal is to provide high quality security in such a way that recognizes the importance of passenger mobility. In our work related to airline customer service commitments, one of the key shortfalls by the airlines was in how 

frequently and accurately they communicated with passengers about the occurrence of delays. The airlines made significant investments in systems to improve communications and the Government should adhere to the same standard. 

Since 2000, FAA Has Made Progress in Managing and Enhancing Capacity, 

But Additional Actions Need to Be Taken 

An important lesson from the summer of 2000 is that it is very difficult to make 

decisions and take action in the middle of a busy travel season. FAA and the airlines have taken a number of actions since the summer of 2000 that will help to 

enhance the flow of air travel this summer. Nevertheless, several efforts, including 

a new precision and approach landing system, that FAA believed held promise in 

the aftermath of the summer of 2000 have not materialized. 

Actions Taken 

• The Department and FAA have demonstrated a willingness to work with airlines at Chicago O’Hare to adjust airline schedules when flights exceeded the 

physical capacity of the airport. This willingness to take a hands-on approach 

to address delays was not present in 2000. 

• FAA and the airlines have worked together to develop plans specifically for this 

summer. These include establishing express lanes in the sky and establishing 

a 90-minute delay trigger. When delays at an airport reach 90 minutes or more, 

other airports sending flights into the congested area will hold until congestion 

clears. 


518MEAD4.eps
20 

• FAA and the airlines now have daily conference calls about the status of the 

National Airspace System and expected weather patterns to help manage traffic, which provides an automatic feedback mechanism. 

• FAA completed its ‘‘choke point’’ initiative to address bottlenecks in airspace 

that caused delays in the heavily traveled airspace triangle between Chicago, 

Washington DC, and Boston. 

• New runways have been built at Phoenix, Detroit, Miami, Denver, Houston, and 

Orlando airports. The first phase of a runway project in Cleveland was also 

completed last year. Without a doubt, congestion would be much worse this 

summer without the new capacity in the system, particularly since five of the 

new runways are at hubs for network carriers and Orlando is a destination airport for much of the Eastern U.S. 

• We note that for the longer term, the Department and FAA have established 

a Joint Planning and Development Office to develop a longer-term vision for the 

next generation air transportation system. 

Actions Needed 

During the summer of 2000, it was clear that a number of factors, including airline scheduling, impact of weather on various runway configurations, and air traffic 

control considerations determined how many aircraft an airport could handle under 

good and bad weather conditions. In 2000, FAA did not coordinate these data. 

This was highlighted in Congressional hearings, and the Agency developed and 

published capacity benchmarks for the 31 busiest airports in 2001. These benchmarks set forth the number of flights a specific airport could support within the constraints of the airport’s runways and air traffic control system under varying weather conditions. As such, they were useful for disclosing capacity levels at specific airports in relation to proposed airline scheduling as well as for projecting additional 

capacity that could be gained through new runways, technology, and procedures. Because of the reduced traffic that followed the economic downturn and 9111, the 

benchmarks were not as critical to FAA for decision-making purposes in 2002 and 

2003. 

As of today, we do not have updated capacity benchmarks but we understand that 

they are almost done. FAA has been updating its capacity benchmarks for months, 

and has expanded its analysis to include 35 airports, but has not yet released them. 

FAA should move to finalize and publish these updated benchmarks as soon as possible, preferably before the end of May 2004. 

A number of efforts were advanced in the 2000–2001 time-frame for enhancing 

capacity in the near-term, including airspace redesign, the Local Area Augmentation 

System (a new precision landing system), and Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (a new way for controllers and pilots to exchange information). There was 

even some discussion about accelerating the development of the Local Area Augmentation System. Since then, all three of these efforts have experienced problems. 

While FAA completed its choke point initiative, our recent work shows that much 

work remains to get airspace redesign efforts on track and determine what can be 

accomplished in the near-and long-term. For example, FAA has over 40 ongoing airspace redesign projects but many of the them are not on schedule due to environmental issues, changes in the scope of projects, and/or difficulties in developing new 

procedures. In addition, the Local Area Augmentation System and Controller-Pilot 

Data Link Communications clearly had merit but they faced fundamental problems 

with respect to misjudging technological maturity or unexpected cost growth that 

needed to be addressed before they could move forward. 

New runways provide the largest increases in capacity, and seven new runways 

are expected to be completed between now and 2008. There are about 10 other new 

runway projects in various planning stages, including a major effort at Chicago 

O’Hare, but FAA does not yet have firm completion dates for them. While the six 

recently completed runways will enhance capacity and limit delays at those airports, 

only one of the five airports (Atlanta) currently seeing the most delays is expected 

to have a new runway within the next 2 years. It is important that FAA continue 

to monitor the status of new runway projects to ensure they come on line. 

21 

Status of Major New Runway Projects—May 2004 

Where Do We Go From Here? 

Increased flights and the onset of summer weather disturbances are likely to exacerbate the problems already apparent in the system. Summer schedules filed by 

the airlines indicate significant increases in flight operations, including those in 

markets already experiencing significant delays. Also, passenger counts are likely 

to increase during the airlines’ busiest season, further exacerbating security-related 

delays. 

• FAA Needs to Complete and Publish Revised Capacity Benchmarks. FAA needs 

to complete its updates and finalize its work on airport capacity benchmarks 

and publicly release them. These benchmarks show the maximum number of 

flights that can be handled each hour for both good and bad weather at the airports analyzed. 

If the airlines’ scheduled flights at an airport exceed its good weather capacity 

or far exceed its bad weather capacity (particularly if it is an airport that can 

be expected to experience many days of severe weather in the summer), then 

we can expect delays radiating out into the aviation system from this airport. 

But by having updated benchmarks and using them to analyze scheduled operations, the Department and FAA will be in a position where they can anticipate 

and attempt to ameliorate delays before they materialize this summer. 

• Accurate and Specific Airport Security Wait-time Data Needs to be Collected and 

Publicly Disclosed. Information on all parts of the travel experience is necessary 

for consumers who make travel decisions based on total door-to-door trip 

times—not just take-off to landing times. Both the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security have mandates concerning air 

transportation. DOT has a mandate to ensure safety and mobility, while DHS 

has a mandate to ensure security. The two agencies need to work collaboratively 

to find a way to meet these missions. As a start, a reasonable wait-time standard needs to be developed at each airport, for peak and off-peak hours. Data 

measuring performance against this standard should be submitted to the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE

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partment of Transportation, similar to the monthly delay data the Department 

required from the air carriers following the gridlock experienced in 2000. 

The collection of this data has had some positive impacts on the industry. Monitoring and publishing performance statistics has exerted pressure on the airlines to publish more realistic schedules and improve on-time performance. 

In response to this emerging problem, Secretary Mineta has directed the Office 

of Aviation and International Affairs and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics to develop a statistically valid means to measure and report on security 

wait-times at the Nation’s most congested airports. Such information, in conjunction with currently collected causation data, will form a complete picture of 

delays in the aviation system and pinpoint where action is needed. 

• Short-term Allocation of Capacity. We are likely to see travel disruptions this 

summer as demand once again exceeds capacity in some markets. The Administration has several options for addressing the problems. It could take a ‘‘handsoff’ approach and rely on airlines to take actions to match schedules to available 

capacity. In recent years, some major airlines have taken actions to depeak 

their dominated hubs to alleviate self-imposed congestion and the self-imposed 

penalties of delays and cancellations that result. 

At airports where no single carrier dominates, airlines are reluctant to voluntarily reduce schedules for fear of ceding market share to competitors. In these 

situations, the Administration could take a more interventionist, command and 

control approach such as brokering or ordering schedule adjustments. The Administration has shown that it is willing to do so by its actions to deal with 

the spiraling delays at Chicago O’Hare earlier this year, although it is still too 

early to tell whether the most recent round of schedule reductions will have its 

desired impact. Administrative intervention within a competitive marketplace is 

not an ideal long-term solution, but given the severity of delays in Chicago, 

there were few other options available with potential for immediate relief. 

If neither of these options provides relief, and the situation continues to get 

worse, the time may be appropriate to begin to identify and evaluate marketbased solutions. Even if administrative solutions work this summer to reduce 

queuing and customers’ dissatisfaction with uncertain and unreliable service, 

their continued use would introduce distortions into aviation markets over time. 

• Long-Term Solutions Will Require Rethinking of How System is Funded. One 

of the most significant changes between 2000 and 2004 is the loss of the premium business passengers. In addition to hurting the industry’s revenues, the 

Aviation Trust Fund took a hard hit when the market for thousand dollar unrestricted tickets dried up. The Trust Fund’s primary funding source the 7.5 percent ticket tax—applied to lower average fares results in lower tax revenue to 

the trust fund. In 2001, FAA estimated that Trust Fund revenues in 2005 

would be about $14.5 billion. That estimate has now been reduced to $11.1 billion. 

Figure 6: Aviation Trust Fund: Comparison of Trust Fund Receipts 

$ in billions 


518MEAD6.eps
23 

It is against this backdrop that aviation funding is constrained and any material increases are going to require either a change in the tax structure, i.e., how 

revenue is generated for the Trust Fund, or a greater reliance on the General 

Fund. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any questions 

that you might have. 

Senator LOTT. Ms. Hecker, thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF JAYETTA Z. HECKER, DIRECTOR, 

PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, 

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Ms. HECKER. Thank you very much. I’m very pleased to be here, 

really honored to represent a long-term body of work on a number 

of issues. My focus today will be a little longer-term perspective 

than you’ve heard, focusing on the challenges that FAA faces in 

transitioning into a performance-based organization. 

Basically, I’ll cover three issues, the context being, the first, the 

major challenges in the environment that FAA is in. The second 

will be some of the promise and status of the major implementation 

reforms, including acquisition reform, personnel reform, and the establishment of a performance-based organization. And then finally 

drawing on some best practices work I’ll discuss some critical success factors that are key to FAA transforming into a performancebased organization. 

The first point on the challenges really is captured in some ways 

by the front page of my statement, which has a chart on it, which 

basically outlines, graphs on an index, FAA expenses relative to air 

carrier operating expenses. As we know, this industry is still recovering from financial losses of unseen proportions, and as a result, 

tax receipts are also falling by significant levels, over 20 percent 

since 1999. Yet during that same period, we see an escalation of 

clear proportions relative to air carrier costs. 

Now, these cost pressures on FAA and the decline in the trust 

fund really have to be taken in the context of really what is a grave 

financial crisis facing the country and the obvious pressure that is 

on any general fund contributions to any sector of the economy. Basically, the bottom line of this is that cost cutting really has to be 

a watch word of FAA. It is, there’s no doubt that it’s a critical part 

of a lot of the plans and that’s really an extremely important environment that the FAA has recognized that it’s in. 

Now, looking to the types of improvements that have been put 

in place, both administratively and by legislative direction, of acquisition reform, personnel reform, and the ATO, it’s interesting 

because we have nearly 10 years since the first two of those initiatives were in place, and yet despite those reforms, systemic management issues, including inadequate management controls and 

oversight of human capital issues have continued to contribute to 

cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. 

Quickly in the personnel area, FAA has in fact used some of its 

extensive new authority and implemented another many reforms, 

but those are far from fully implemented, and notably, the organization is still working to implement tools that are absolutely essential to tracking cost and workforce data. 

24 

In the acquisition area, similarly, reforms have been introduced, 

improvements in oversight of investment risk, but again, continued 

weaknesses impede FAA’s ability to manage investments effectively 

and make sound decisions. It perhaps in some ways explains why 

despite billions of dollars in investments in both ongoing and completed ATC modernization projects, there’s really very little expectation of improvements in operating efficiencies as a result of these 

modernization efforts in controlling or reducing overall costs. 

So clearly we haven’t had a cost-conscious management of the 

capital budgeting. In fact, Administrator Blakey recently noted the 

core problem is that the operational outcome of capital investments 

hasn’t been measured, the definition of success of these projects 

was not results-oriented, and in particular, the capital budget was 

not linked to future operating costs. 

All of that sets the stage for perhaps one of the most significant 

reforms for the organization and it’s the establishment of an air 

traffic organization with the focusing on becoming a performancebased organization. It clearly holds promise for needed change and 

long overdue improvements in many areas. But while it has just 

gotten started really in February, it’s just beginning to be staffed 

up, progress has been slow relative to some initial milestones, and 

moreover, the office faces extraordinary challenges in implementing 

reforms. 

Again the Administrator has recognized this, said that success of 

the ATO is absolutely crucial to the future of air travel, noting, this 

is a quote from one of your statements, we can’t be more accountable, cost efficient, and customer service oriented unless we change 

our way of doing business. 

That brings us to the third point that I have in this best practices and global panel that we had, bringing together high performing organizations and honed in an what the critical success 

factors are for organizations transforming to be more performance 

oriented. The four characteristics are the clear mission, effective 

use of partnerships, a clear client focus, and strategic management 

of human capital. 

Our past work has shown, however, that while there has been 

real progress in defining the mission and even quantifying it and 

having performance goals, that employee behaviors have not reflected a strong commitment to the mission focus. 

In the strategic partnership area, while there have been efforts 

in this area, it has always been difficult and really time consuming 

to form effective partnerships. 

On the client focus, FAA has clearly recognized that it has failed 

to have a consistent and clear customer focus, again noting that 

the Administrator has said, we must be more customer-driven in 

all our activities. 

The strategic management of people is absolutely critical. 

They’ve begun to put in place a pay-for-performance system, and 

one of the more important early challenges will be to watch the 

new contract negotiations with air traffic controllers. Again, because of the bottom line of personnel costs, the Agency cannot control operational costs without taking a look at making more effective use and ensuring productivity of its people. 

25 

In summary, then, while FAA has taken promising steps through 

the creation of the ATO, and is working to restructure itself, it still 

faces significant and long-standing systemic management challenges. The core of these challenges and the focus of continuing 

oversight and the focus of these activities already within FAA are 

assuring that the costs of its services are well understood, effectively tracking and documenting improvements in productivity of 

both its acquisition and control of work force, and better aligning 

capital decisions with measurable customer valued performance 

outcomes. 

That concludes my statement. We have a number of ongoing assignments in many of these areas for you and others and we hope 

we can be of support to the Congress in providing oversight of 

these critical reforms. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hecker follows:] 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Federal Aviation Administration 

CHALLENGES FOR TRANSFORMING INTO A HIGH-PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

Why GAO Did This Study 

Over the last two decades, FAA has experienced difficulties meeting the demands 

of the aviation industry while also attempting to operate efficiently and effectively. 

Now, as air traffic returns to pre-9/11 levels, concerns have again arisen as to how 

prepared FAA may be to meet increasing demands for capacity, safety, and efficiency. 

FAA’s air traffic control (ATC) modernization efforts are designed to enhance the 

national airspace system through the acquisition of a vast network of radar, navigation, and communication systems. Nine years have passed since Congress provided 

FAA with personnel and acquisition reforms. However, projects continue to experience cost, schedule and performance problems. FAA’s Air Traffic Organization 

(ATO) is its most current reform effort. Expectations are that the ATO will bring 

a performance management approach to ATC modernization. 

This statement focuses on three main questions: (1) What are some of the major 

challenges and demands that confront FAA? (2) What is the status of FAA’s implementation of reforms and/or procedural relief that Congress provided? and (3) What 

are some of the critical success factors that will enable FAA to become a high-performing organization? 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is making no recommendations. 

What GAO Found 

A forecasted increase in air traffic coupled with budgetary constraints will challenge FAA’s ability to meet current and evolving operational needs. The commercial 

aviation industry is still recovering from financial losses exceeding $20 billion over 

the past 3 years. Many airlines cut their operating expenses, but FAA’s budget continued to rise (see figure). However, transportation tax receipts into the Airport and 

Airways Trust Fund, from which FAA draws the majority of its budget, have fallen 

by $2.0 billion (nearly 20 percent) since 1999 (in constant 2002 dollars). Cost-cutting 

and cost-control will need to be watchwords for FAA from this point forward. 

FAA has implemented many of the reforms authorized by Congress 9 years ago, 

but achieved mixed results. Despite personnel and acquisition reforms the agency 

contended were critical to modernizing the Nation’s air traffic control (ATC) system, 

systemic management issues continue to contribute to the cost overruns, schedule 

delays, and performance shortfalls. FAA’s most current reform effort, the Air Traffic 

Organization (ATO)—a new performance-based organization mandated by AIR–21 

that is operating the ATC system—is just now being put in place. 

To meet its new challenges, FAA must fundamentally transform itself into a highperforming organization. The key characteristics and capabilities of high-performing 

organizations fall into four themes: (1) a clear, well articulated, and compelling mission; (2) strategic use of partnerships; (3) focus on the needs of clients and cusVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
26 

tomers; and (4) strategic management of people. FAA has taken some promising 

steps through its new ATO to restructure itself like high-performing organizations, 

but still faces significant and longstanding systemic management challenges. Even 

modest organizational and operational changes at FAA can be difficult and time consuming. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and the DOT 

Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 

STATEMENT OF JAYETTA Z. HECKER, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TEAM, 

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

challenges that FAA faces both in the immediate environment and over the next 

decade. We all recall that in the summer of 2000, the air traffic control system 

lacked the capacity to handle demand efficiently, and flight delays produced neargridlock conditions at several U.S. airports. A combination of factors—the downturn 

in travel caused by the general economic slowdown, SARS, and of course the crises 

instigated by the events of 9/11—reduced traffic significantly and reduced pressure 

on the air traffic control system. 

Passenger traffic and airline operations are slowly returning to previous levels, 

making this an appropriate time to re-examine the status of nation’s aviation leadership and infrastructure and its preparations for the future of air transport over 

the next decade. FAA’s budget request for 2005 provides a starting point from which 

to review the agency’s direction. 

My statement today focuses on three main questions: (1) What are some of the 

major challenges and demands that confront FAA? (2) What is the status of FAA’s 

implementation of reforms and/or procedural relief that Congress provided? And (3) 

What are some of the critical success factors that will enable FAA to become a highperforming organization? Our statement is based on our past reports on ATC modernization and airline competition work—updated to reflect important milestones 

and recent interviews with key stakeholders in the aviation community, including 

several current and former FAA officials. We performed our work in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary: 

Significant external and internal demands will challenge FAA’s ability to meet 

current operational needs and require it to adapt to meet the evolving needs of the 

aviation industry. The commercial aviation industry is still recovering from financial 

losses exceeding $20 billion over the past 3 years. The downturn in travel has affected the Airport and Airways Trust Fund, from which FAA draws the majority of 

its budget. Transportation tax receipts into the Trust Fund fell by a total of $2.0 

billion (19.6 percent) between 1999 and 2003. The overall condition of the Federal 

budget adds more pressure on FAA’s budget. Taken together, cost-cutting and costcontrol need to be watchwords for FAA from this point forward. To meet the demands of the aviation industry for safe, secure, and efficient operations and for adVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE

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1FAA’s Modernization Efforts—Past, Present, and Future (GAO–04–227T): October 30, 2003. 2 Human Capital Management: FAA’s Reform Effort Requires a More Strategic Approach, 

GAO–03–156, February 2003. 

ditional capacity to meet forecasted growth, FAA will need to continue to improve 

its management controls. Traditionally, FAA’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively—particularly regarding its air traffic control modernization projects—have 

been hampered by inadequate management of information technology and financial 

management controls. 

Nine years have passed since Congress provided FAA with the personnel and acquisition reforms the agency contended were critical to successfully modernizing the 

Nation’s air traffic control (ATC) system. Despite these reforms, systemic management issues, including inadequate management controls and human capital issues 

continue to contribute to the cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that FAA’s major ATC projects have consistently experienced in the past. 

• Personnel reforms addressed three broad areas: (1) compensation and performance management, (2) workforce management, and (3) labor and employee relations. FAA has taken steps to implement a number of reforms in each of the 

three areas.1 For example, in the area of labor and employee relations, FAA implemented initiatives establishing new partnership forums for union and nonunion employees and a new model work environment program.2 However, in 

February 2003, we found that the agency had not fully incorporated elements 

that are important to effective human capital management, including data collection and analysis, performance goals and measures, and establishing links 

between reform goals and program goals. 

• As part of its procurement reforms, FAA introduced a new acquisition management system in 1996 to reduce the time and cost to deploy new products and 

services. To FAA’s credit, our work has shown improvements in the agency’s 

oversight of investment risk, tracking key information from the investment selection process in a management information system, and implementation of 

guidance for validating costs, benefits, and risks. However, in estimating the 

costs of new projects, FAA has not yet incorporated actual costs from developing 

related systems. Moreover, the agency has not yet implemented processes for 

evaluating projects after implementation in order to identify lessons learned 

and improve the investment management process. These weaknesses have impeded FAA’s ability to manage its investments effectively and make sound decisions about continuing, modifying, or canceling projects. 

• FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is one of its most current reform effort. 

Under the leadership of a Chief Operating Officer, the ATO is a new performance-based organization that is operating the ATC system. While the ATO holds 

promise for laying the foundation for much needed and overdue organizational 

change, progress has been slow, and the office still faces significant challenges 

to implementing reform. 

To meet the challenges of the 21st century, FAA must fundamentally transform 

itself to become a high-performing organization. Our work has shown that high-performing organizations have adopted management controls, processes, practices, and 

systems that are consistent with prevailing best practices and contribute to concrete 

organizational results. Specifically, the key characteristics and capabilities of highperforming organizations fall into four themes (1) a clear, well articulated, and compelling mission; (2) strategic use of partnerships; (3) focus on the needs of clients 

and customers; and (4) strategic management of people. To facilitate the transformation of Federal agencies to high performing organizations, we have also recommended that agencies apply the Chief Operating Officer concept to provide longterm attention and focus on management issues and transformational change. FAA 

has begun implementing this concept. While FAA has taken some promising steps 

through its new ATO to restructure itself in a manner consistent with high-performing organizations, the agency still faces significant and longstanding systemic 

management challenges which must be overcome if it is to meet the demands and 

match the pace of ongoing changes in the aviation industry and transform itself into 

a world-class organization. Our work for more than two decades has shown that 

even modest organizational and operational changes at FAA can be difficult and 

time consuming, which underscores the difficult road ahead for FAA’s leadership. 

28 

Significant External and Internal Demands Will Challenge FAA’s Current 

and Evolving Operations 

FAA faces significant demands that will challenge its ability to operate both in 

the current environment and in what it expects to encounter in the coming decade. 

With the industry still attempting to recover from the most tumultuous period in 

its history, FAA’s funding is constrained by lowered Airports and Airways Trust 

Fund receipts and increased pressure on the contribution from the General Fund. 

To meet its current and future operational challenges, FAA is facing demands for 

greater efficiency and accountability. And it goes without saying that FAA must continue to meet demands for maintaining safety standards. 

The U.S. Commercial Aviation Industry Is Still Recovering From Unprecedented 

Financial Chaos 

Since 2001, the U.S. airline industry has confronted financial losses of previously 

unseen proportions. Between 2001 and 2003, the airline industry reported losses in 

excess of $20 billion. A number of factors—including the economic slowdown, a shift 

in business travel buying behavior, and the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 

terrorist attacks—contributed to these losses by reducing passenger and cargo volumes and depressing fares. The industry has reported smaller losses since 2001, but 

still may not generate net profits for 2004. 

To improve their financial position, many airlines cut costs by various means, notably by reducing labor expenditures and by decreasing capacity through cutting 

flight frequencies, using smaller aircraft, or eliminating service to some communities. According to data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, large U.S. 

air carriers cut their operating expenses by $7.8 billion from 2000 through 2002. 

The drop in total large air carrier operating expenses stands in sharp contrast to 

increases in FAA’s budget. (See Figure 1.) 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and the DOT 

Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 

Budgetary Pressure on FAA Will Increase Over Time 

FAA’s budget—which has increased from $9 billion in 1998 to $14 billion in 

2004—will be under pressure for the foreseeable future. Over the past 10 years, 

FAA has received on average approximately 80 percent of its annual funding from 

the Airports and Airways Trust Fund (Trust Fund), which derives its receipts from 


518HECK2.eps
29 

3The Trust Fund was established by the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 (P.L. 91– 

258) to help fund the development of a nationwide airport and airway system and to fund FAA 

investments in air traffic control facilities. It provides all of the funding for the Airport Improvement Program, which provides grants for construction and safety projects at airports; the Facilities and Equipment account that funds technological improvements to the air traffic control system; and a Research, Engineering, and Development account, which supports aviation safety, 

mobility, and environmental goals. In Fiscal Year 2002, the Trust Fund provided 79 percent of 

the funding for FAA Operations, which represented almost 50 percent of Trust Fund expenditures. The Trust Fund is supported by 10 dedicated excise taxes. In Fiscal Year 2002, the Trust 

Fund received about $10 billion in revenue from these taxes and interest. in average yields, has 

resulted in lowered receipts into the Trust Fund. On average, domestic yields have fallen since 

2000, and are at their lowest levels since 1987. As a result, the total amount of transportation 

taxes that were remitted to the Trust Fund declined by $2.0 billion (19.6 percent) between Fiscal 

Years 1999 and 2003 (in 2002 dollars). 

taxes and fees levied on airlines and passengers.3 The downturn in passenger travel, accompanied by decreases 

Contributions from the General Fund have averaged about 20 percent of FAA’s 

budget since 1994, but total Federal spending is under increasing stress because of 

growing budget deficits. According to the March 2004 analysis from the Congressional Budget Office, the Federal deficit under the President’s fiscal 2005 budget 

will be $358 billion. 

Clearly, a major challenge for FAA both now and into the future will be cost-cutting and cost control. 

• Operating costs represent over half of FAA’s budget. For 2005, the Administration has requested $7.8 billion for Operations. Because salaries and benefits 

make up 73 percent of that total, restraining the growth in operations spending 

will be extremely difficult, even with improvements in workforce productivity. 

• Capital expenses (i.e., the Facilities and Equipment account) represent less than 

20 percent of FAA’s budget, but virtually none of the projects requested for 

funding for 2005 is expected to generate any savings in the Operations account. 

• Funds for airports’ capital development have more than doubled since 1998, rising from $1.6 billion (18.3 percent of the total) to a requested $3.5 billion (25.1 

percent of the total) in 2005. Current funding levels are sufficient to cover much 

of the estimated cost of planned capital development. However, building new 

runways is not always a practicable way to increase capacity. FAA must decide 

how to increase capacity and service, as well as improve system efficiency and 

safety. 

Financial Pressure Adds Premium to Improving Management Controls 

FAA’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively—particularly regarding its air 

traffic control modernization projects—have been hampered over time by inadequate 

management of information technology and financial management controls. FAA’s 

ATC modernization projects have consistently experienced cost, schedule, and performance problems that we and others have attributed to systemic management 

issues. 

The effect has been extraordinary cost growth and a persistent failure to deploy 

systems. FAA initially estimated that its ATC modernization efforts could be completed over 10 years at a cost of $12 billion. Two decades and $35 billion later, FAA 

still has not completed key projects, and expects to need another $16 billion thru 

2007, for a total cost of $51 billion. GAO has kept major FAA modernization systems 

on the watch list of high-risk Federal programs since 1995. 

We believe that, in the current budget environment, cost growth and schedule 

problems with ongoing modernization efforts can have serious negative consequences: postponed benefits, costly interim systems, other systems not being funded, or a reduction in the number of units purchased. 

Forecasts of Future Aviation Activity Add Further Demands for Immediate 

Improvements in FAA Operations 

FAA recognizes that future U.S. air transport activity will likely place significant 

demands on its ability to keep the system operating. FAA’s most recent forecasts 

project significant increases in overall system activity by 2015. Along with increased 

movements of aircraft and passengers comes an increased workload for FAA, as well 

as demands for more efficient operations and/or an expansion of capacity. (See Table 

1). 

30 

4The Operational Evolution Plan is an ongoing 10-year plan developed by the FAA to increase 

the capacity and efficiency of the national airspace system, while enhancing safety and security. 5STARS will replace controller workstations with new color displays, processors, and computer software at FAA and DOD terminal air traffic control facilities—within 5 to 50 nautical 

miles of an airport. 

Table 1.—Forecasted Increase in Commercial Air Passengers, Operations, and FAA Workload 

2003 2015 (est.) Percent 

change 

Industry activity measure Enplanements (millions) 641.4 1057.6 65.0 

Large carrier fleet 4,090 5,732 40.1 

Regional carrier fleet 2,672 4,303 61.0 

FAA workload measure Instrument operations (millions) 26.3 36.8 39.9 

Commercial instrument flight rule 

aircraft handled at Air Route Traffic Control Centers (millions) 

31.9 44.9 40.8 

Source: FAA. 

Evidence of FAA’s inability to meet system capacity demands already exists from 

the experience at Chicago O’Hare earlier this year. To reduce flight delays, FAA 

asked American Airlines and United Airlines to reduce their peak scheduled operations by 7.5 percent by June 10. As Secretary Mineta has already recognized, unless system capacity expands, the nation will face ‘‘. . . more and more O’Hares as 

[the] economy continues to grow, and as new technology and competition bring even 

greater demand.’’ It seems clear, however, that FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan,4

a few additional runways, and updating more controller workstations with the 

Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) 5 are not the answer 

to the system’s need for capacity. We cannot pave our way to the year 2025. 

Despite Personnel and Acquisition Reforms, Systematic Management Issues 

Continue to Impede ATC Modernization 

Over the years, systematic management issues, including inadequate management controls and human capital issues have contributed to the cost overruns, 

schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that FAA has consistently experienced 

in acquiring its major ATC modernization systems. Historically, some of the major 

factors impeding ATC acquisitions included an ineffective budget process and an inability to provide good cost and schedule estimates. A number of cultural problems 

including widely diffused responsibility and accountability, inadequate coordination, 

and poor contract management/oversight also slowed the progress of individual 

projects. Problems within FAA’s acquisition and procurement processes included an 

inability to obligate and spend appropriate funds in a timely manner, a complicated 

procurement and acquisition cycle, failure to field systems in a timely fashion, and 

an inability to field current technology systems. FAA lacked a means to strategically 

analyze and control requirements, and good cost and schedule estimates were often 

not effectively developed and integrated into acquisition plans. To address many of 

these issues, Congress passed legislation in 1995 exempting FAA from many of the 

existing Federal personnel and procurement laws and regulations and directed the 

agency to develop and implement new acquisition and personnel systems. More recently, in 2000, the Congress and the administration together provided for a new 

oversight and management structure and a new air traffic organization to bring the 

benefits of performance management to ATC modernization. 

FAA Has Taken Steps to Implement Human Capital Strategies, but Further Efforts 

are Needed 

According to FAA, burdensome government-wide human capital rules impeded its 

ability to hire, train, and deploy personnel and thereby hampered its capacity to 

manage ATC modernization projects efficiently. In response to these concerns, Congress granted FAA broad exemptions from Federal personnel laws and directed the 

agency to develop and implement a new personnel management system. 

• Human capital reforms: Following the human capital exemptions granted by 

Congress in 1995, FAA initiated reforms in three primary areas: compensation 

and performance management, workforce management, and labor and employee 

relations. In the area of compensation and performance management, FAA introduced two initiatives—a new, more flexible pay system in which compensation levels are set within broad ranges, called pay bands, and a new performVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
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6To provide FAA’s ATC modernization efforts with needed direction and stability, the Congress established a 5-year term for the FAA Administrator in 1994. Former Administrator Garvey was the first to complete a term of this length in 2002. 7 Congress established a 5-year term for the FAA Administrator in 1994. 

ance management system intended to improve employees’ performance through 

more frequent feedback with no summary rating. Both new systems required 

an exemption from laws governing Federal civilian personnel management 

found in title 5 of the United States Code. In the area of workforce management, FAA implemented a number of initiatives in 1996 through the establishment of agency-wide flexibilities for hiring and training employees. In the area 

of labor and employee relations, FAA established partnership forums for union 

and nonunion employees and a new model work environment program. Other 

human capital initiatives have included restructuring FAA’s organizational culture and implementing means to provide sustained leadership. 

• Organizational culture: FAA issued an organizational culture framework in 

1997 that attempted to address some of the vertical ‘‘stovepipes’’ that conflicted 

with the horizontal structure of ATC acquisition team operations. A key piece 

of this framework included the establishment of integrated product teams in an 

attempt to improve collaboration among technical experts and users. Moreover, 

integrated teams have not worked as intended. For example, competing priorities between two key organizations that were part of the Wide Area Augmentation System’s integrated team ultimately negated its effectiveness and undermined its ability to meet the agency’s goals for the system. 

• Sustained leadership: Until former Administrator Garvey completed her 5-year 

term in 2002,6 FAA had been hampered by a lack of sustained leadership at 

FAA was also problematic.7 During the first 10 years of the ATC modernization 

effort, the agency had seven different Administrators and Acting Administrators, whose average tenure was less than 2 years. Such frequent turnover at 

the top contributed to an agency culture that focused on short-term initiatives, 

avoided accountability, and resisted fundamental improvements to the acquisition process. 

Nine years have passed since the agency received broad exemptions from laws 

governing Federal civilian personnel management. While FAA has taken a number 

of steps since personnel reforms were implemented, it is not clear whether and to 

what extent these flexibilities have helped FAA to more effectively manage its workforce and achieve its mission. The agency did not initially define clear links between 

reform goals and program goals, making it difficult to fully assess the impacts of 

personnel reform. FAA has not yet fully implemented all of its human capital initiatives and continues to face a number of key challenges with regard to personnel 

issues. In our February 2003 report, we found that the agency had not fully incorporated elements that are important to effective human capital management into 

its overall reform effort, including data collection and analysis and establishing concrete performance goals and measures. Currently, the agency is still working to implement tools to keep accurate cost and workforce data. The new Air Traffic Organization has announced plans for establishing cost accounting and labor distribution 

systems, but they are not yet in place. More comprehensive cost accounting systems 

and improved labor distribution systems are necessary to maximize workforce productivity and to plan for anticipated controller retirements. More broadly, taking a 

more strategic approach to reform will allow the agency to better evaluate the effects of human capital initiatives, which it sees as essential to its ATC modernization effort. 

ATC Projects Continue to Experience Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems 

FAA established its current acquisition management system (AMS) in 1996 following acquisition reform. The agency has reported taking steps to overseeing investment risk and capturing key information from the investment selection process 

in a management information system. It has also implemented guidance for validating costs, benefits, and risks. 

FAA has also taken steps to improve the management of its ATC modernization 

efforts. For example, it implemented an incremental, ‘‘build a little, test a little’’ approach that improved its management by providing for mid-course corrections and 

thus helping FAA to avoid costly late-stage changes. In the area of management 

controls, FAA has (1) developed a blueprint for modernization (systems architecture) 

to manage the development of ATC systems; (2) established processes for selecting 

and controlling information technology investments, (3) introduced an integrated 

framework for improving software and system acquisition processes, and (4) imVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
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proved its cost-estimating and cost-accounting practices. Nonetheless, ATC modernization efforts continue to experience cost, schedule, and performance problems. 

FAA is not yet incorporating actual costs from related system development efforts 

in its processes for estimating the costs of new projects. Further, the agency has not 

yet fully implemented processes for evaluating projects after implementation in 

order to identify lessons learned and improve the investment management process. 

Reliable cost and schedule estimates are essential to addressing some of the ongoing 

problems with ATC acquisitions. 

In addition to controlling cost and schedule overruns, FAA needs to take concrete 

steps to identify and eliminate redundancies in the National Airspace System 

(NAS). FAA must review its long-term ATC modernization priorities to assess their 

relative importance and feasibility in light of current economic constraints, security 

requirements, and other issues. The ongoing challenges facing air traffic control 

modernization efforts led Congress and the administration to create a new oversight 

and management structure through the new Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in order 

to bring the benefits of performance management to ATC modernization. 

Progress in Establishing the New Air Traffic Organization Has Been Slow 

The ATO was created by an executive order in 2000 to operate the air traffic control system. In the same year, Congress enacted legislation establishing the Air 

Traffic Services Subcommittee, a five-member board to oversee the ATO and a chief 

operating officer to manage the organization. The ATO was designed to bring a performance management approach to ATC modernization efforts. 

The Air Traffic Services Subcommittee has made some initial efforts with regard 

to the establishment of the ATO. They have taken steps to focus on the structure 

of the ATC system, including reviewing and approving performance metrics for the 

ATO, establishing a budget, and approving three large procurements that FAA initiated. 

However, progress in establishing the organization has been slow, given that FAA 

received the mandate to establish the ATO nearly four years ago. FAA encountered 

difficulties finding a qualified candidate to take the position of chief operating officer, and did not fill the vacancy until June 2003. The final executive positions for 

the organization including the Vice-Presidents of Safety and Communications were 

just filled last month. 

Key tasks for the ATO will include organizational restructuring, implementing effective financial management and cost-accounting systems, evaluating day-to-day 

business practices, and fostering growth with efficiency. Rapidly changing technology, limited financial resources, and the critical importance of meeting client 

needs will present significant challenges in order for the ATO to truly evolve into 

a high performing organization. 

FAA’s Future Success Hinges on Several Critical Success Factors 

To successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century, FAA must fundamentally 

transform its people, processes, technology, and environment to build a high-performing organization. Our work has shown that high-performing organizations have 

adopted management controls, processes, practices, and systems that are consistent 

with prevailing best practices and contribute to concrete organizational results. Specifically, the key characteristics and capabilities of high-performing organizations 

fall into four themes as follows: 

• A clear, well-articulated, and compelling mission. High-performing organizations have a clear, well-articulated, and compelling mission, strategic goals to 

achieve it and a performance management system that aligns with these goals 

to show employees how their performance can contribute to overall organizational results. FAA has taken its first steps toward creating a performance 

management system by aligning its goals and budgetary resources through its 

Flight Plan—blueprint for action for Fiscal Year 2004 through 2008—and its 

Fiscal Year 2005 budget submission. In addition, the new ATO has published 

both its vision and mission statement. 

Our past work has found that FAA’s ability to acquire new ATC modernization 

systems has been hampered by its organizational culture, including employee 

behaviors that did not reflect a strong commitment to mission focus. Given the 

central role that FAA’s employees will play in achieving these performance 

goals and overall agency results, it is critical for them to both embrace and implement the agency’s mission in the course of their daily work. In addition, our 

work has found regularly communicating a clear and consistent message about 

the importance of fulfilling the organization’s mission helps engage employees, 

clients, customers, partners, and other stakeholders in achieving higher performance. 

33 

8 Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, Key Issues for the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s FY 2005 Budget, CC–2004–038 (April 22, 2004). 

• Strategic use of partnerships. Since the Federal Government is increasingly reliant on partners to achieve its outcomes, becoming a high-performing organization requires that Federal agencies effectively manage relationships with other 

organizations outside of their direct control. FAA is currently working to forge 

strategic partnerships with its external customers in a number of ways. For example, the agency recently announced a program to create ‘‘express lanes in the 

sky’’ to reduce air traffic delays this spring and summer and is in the early 

stages of working with selected Federal partners to develop a long-term plan 

for the national aerospace system (2025) and to leverage Federal research funds 

to conduct mutually beneficial research. In addition, FAA has ongoing partnerships with the aviation community to assess and address flight safety issues 

(e.g., development of technology to prevent fuel tank explosions and to reduce 

the potential for aircraft wiring problems through development of a ‘‘smart circuit breaker’’). 

However, our past work has shown that forging strategic partnerships with organizations outside of FAA can be difficult and time-consuming. For example, 

FAA’s efforts to establish voluntary data sharing agreements with airlines— 

Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program (FOQA)—spanned more than a 

decade, due in part, to tremendous resistance from aviation community stakeholders who formed a rare alliance to oppose several of FAA’s proposals. In addition, when attempting to increase airport capacity (e.g., new runways), FAA 

and airport operators have frequently faced opposition from the residents of surrounding communities and environmental groups. Residents are often concerned 

about the potential for increases in airport noise, air pollutant emissions, and 

traffic congestion. 

• Focus on needs of clients and customers. Serving the needs of clients and customers involves identifying their needs, striving to meet them, measuring performance, and publicly reporting on progress to help assure appropriate transparency and accountability. To better serve the needs of its clients and customers, FAA published Flight Plan, which provides a vehicle for identifying 

needs, measuring performance, and publicly reporting progress. Flight Plan includes performance goals in the areas of safety, greater capacity, international 

leadership, and organizational excellence, which are linked to the agency’s 

budget and progress monitored through a Web-based tracking system. 

However, over the years, FAA’s efforts to meet client and customer needs have 

not always been successful, and some have had a long lasting negative impact. 

FAA has had particular difficulty fielding new ATC modernization systems 

within cost, schedule and performance goals to meet the needs of the aviation 

community. Agency promises to deliver new capabilities to airlines via improvements to the ATC system led some airlines to install expensive equipment in 

their aircraft to position themselves to benefit from expected FAA services; however, when the agency failed to deliver on those promises, participating air carriers were left with equipment that they could not use—no return on their investment. In addition, shifting agency priorities have made it difficult for the 

aviation industry to anticipate future requirements and plan for them in a costeffective manner (e.g., providing air carriers with adequate lead time to purchase new equipment and airframe manufacturers with lead time to incorporate 

changes into new commercial airplane designs). Furthermore, the absence of a 

full-functioning cost-accounting system makes it difficult for FAA to assess the 

actual cost of providing services to users of the National Airspace System. 

• Strategic management of people. Most high-performing organizations have 

strong, charismatic, visionary, and sustained leadership, the capability to identify what skills and competencies the employees and the organization need, and 

other key characteristics including effective recruiting, comprehensive training 

and development, retention of high-performing employees, and a streamlined 

hiring process. Toward this end, FAA has hired a Chief Operating Officer (COO) 

to stand up its new ATO. Our work on high-performing organizations has recommended use of the COO concept to facilitate transformational change in Federal agencies and to provide long-term attention and focus on management 

issues. Furthermore, FAA has placed 78 percent of its workforce under a payfor-performance system 8 and implemented a training approach for its acquisition workforce which reflects four of the six elements used by leading organizaVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
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9To deliver training effectively, leading organizations’ training approaches generally include 

six elements: (1) prioritize initiatives most important to the agency; (2) demonstrate top-level 

commitment and provide resources; (3) identify those who need training on specific initiatives 

and set training requirements; (4) tailor training to meet the needs of the workforce; (5) track 

training to ensure it reaches the right people; and (6) measure effectiveness of training. GAO 

found that FAA’s acquisition organization has highly developed processes for elements 1, 2, 4, 

and 5. 

tions to deliver training effectively.9 However, it is too soon to know the extent 

to which these elements of effective training will be incorporated into the new 

ATO. Finally, FAA is currently conducting an Activity Value Analysis, a bottoms-up effort to establish a baseline of ATO headquarters activities and their 

value to stakeholders. The results of this analysis are intended to help FAA’s 

leadership target cost-cutting and cost savings efforts. 

Despite FAA’s efforts to date, our past work has found the agency’s strategic management of human capital lacking. For example, organizational culture issues at 

FAA (e.g., its vertical, stovepiped structure) have discouraged collaboration among 

technical experts and users of the ATC system and contributed to the agency’s inability to deliver new ATC systems within cost, schedule and performance goals. 

One of the most significant early challenges facing the ATO will be negotiating a 

new contract with air traffic controllers, which is due to expire in September 2005. 

The DOT IG has repeatedly noted that despite the importance of controllers’ jobs, 

that FAA simply cannot sustain the continued salary cost growth for this workforce, 

which rose from an average salary of $72,000 in 1998 to $106,000 in 2003. Given 

the inextricable link between FAA’s operating costs and its controller workforce, 

striking an acceptable balance between controllers’ contract demands and controlling spiraling operating costs will be a strong determinant of the ATO’s credibility 

both within FAA and across the aviation industry. 

While FAA has taken some promising steps through its new ATO to restructure 

itself in a manner consistent with high-performing organizations, the agency still 

faces significant and longstanding systemic management challenges. These challenges must be overcome if FAA is to keep pace with ongoing changes in the aviation industry and transform itself into a world-class organization. Our work for 

more than two decades has shown that even modest organizational, operational, and 

technological changes at FAA can be difficult and time consuming, all of which underscores the difficult road ahead for FAA and its new ATO. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that 

you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Ms. Hecker. Your testimony was very 

interesting. I look forward to having a chance to ask you some 

questions, but in order to accommodate my colleagues, I’ll save my 

questions for a little later. Senator Wyden, would you like to go 

now? 

STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you for your thoughtfulness, Chairman 

Lott, and for holding this hearing. Ms. Blakey, as you know, we 

have this huge problem in the West with respect to fires. We’re 

hundreds of millions of dollars short in terms of the Forest Service 

budget for reducing the acreage that’s at risk. We already have had 

fires there. We need to know what you’re doing now with the Forest Service in cooperation to deal with this air tanker situation. As 

you know, a lot of the tankers the Forest Service relies on are not 

airworthy. The agency is scrambling to find alternative plans, and 

I would like you to start by telling us exactly what the plan is that 

you’re pursuing with the Forest Service to turn this around. 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, I’m very pleased to respond, Senator Wyden, 

because I do understand that this is a significant problem from the 

standpoint of the upcoming season as well as a long-term problem 

that we’ve been aware of for some time. I must start by testimony 

35 

on this though by pointing out that the FAA has no public authority over public use aircraft. 

Senator WYDEN. We understand that. What we need to know is 

what you’re doing though with the Forest Service cooperatively to 

turn this situation around. 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, with the understanding that the Forest Service, of course, has the lead on this, and we’re doing our best to help 

them from a technical standpoint, I would say this, that we have 

pulled together a highly experienced technical group from our aviation, regulation, and certification staff. We have sat down with the 

Forest Service, looked at the history to the best degree we know 

it of these aircraft, and I would stress that because what you’re 

really up against here is former military aircraft that were close to 

the end of their useful life when they were mustered out of the 

military, and at that point it was extremely difficult to judge issues 

of fatigue, issues of corrosion, what may have been the kind of 

flight history that they have had. 

But nevertheless, at that point, of course, they came into the fire 

fighting fleet, and in many cases have served extremely well. But 

as I say, there is a background lack of data which hampers all of 

us. Recently we sat down, in fact, in the last couple of days, with 

one of the contractors who is providing service to the Forest Service 

and learned that they have a system where they’re able by instrumentation on board these aircraft as well as further mining data, 

in this case from the Navy, to try to get a more accurate picture 

of what the upcoming maintenance, what the upcoming repair requirements may be from the standpoint of these aircraft. So there 

are some measures that we are looking into that we can take beyond providing technical advice and as much skilled review with 

the Forest Service as we can. Ultimately it will be up to the Forest 

Service to determine the resources that are necessary. 

Senator WYDEN. Would you assume someone who would work 

with Senator Smith and I on an ongoing basis until we turn this 

situation around? He and I are very concerned about it. We’re 

going to be asking Chairman Lott’s staff if we can have a field 

hearing on it. Would you assign someone who can work with us 

and report to us even weekly now until we get this turned around? 

Ms. BLAKEY. We have some dedicated people already and I’d be 

delighted to have one of our senior people work with you, absolutely. 

Senator WYDEN. Very good. Question for you, Mr. Mead, and I 

appreciate the Chairman’s thoughtfulness. You know, before the 

tragedy of 9/11, we had these huge service problems and this whole 

question of people being bumped and overbooking and the like. I’m 

hearing constantly again about these kinds of problems. Have there 

been improvements made that you know of to deal with these kinds 

of problems when people are being bumped? 

I just had a constituent tell me about this horror where they basically spent days floating around the countryside trying to get a 

flight when they were bumped without any notice, a large family. 

Mr. MEAD. Our report recommended the Department of Transportation issue some regulations on this bumping area, and just to 

summarize what some of the problems we found—— 

Senator WYDEN. Have they done that? 

36 

Mr. MEAD. No, they have not. 

Senator WYDEN. So today there are no additional rights. If you 

get bumped this summer, there are no additional rights and the 

Department of Transportation did not follow your recommendations 

with respect to bumping? 

Mr. MEAD. They did not implement those recommendations. I 

cannot say what individuals airlines may have done on their own. 

We’d have to go out and do another follow up review on that. You 

know, one of the problems was, if you are a voluntary bumpee, you 

get more money or more compensation than if you end up being, 

if you hold out and you ultimately become an involuntary bumpee. 

Another issue, which was a case, was I think three or four airlines, was where the airlines would decide their bumping process 

would—customers that were paying, for example, full coach or were 

paying business would not be bumped or they would not follow the 

order of check-in, which is, reverse order of check-in is the normal 

process for selecting bumpees. So, yes, I can—the Department—we 

had asked the Department to issue some regulations and they 

didn’t. 

Senator WYDEN. My time is about up. One last question if I 

might, Ms. Blakey. Repair station oversight, that was identified as 

a problem by Mr. Mead in the past. It’s an outsourcing issue. We 

talk about jobs being outsourced. Some of this stuff is being done 

by foreign companies, foreign governments as well. You all are late 

with respect to the report that was required earlier by the legislation. When are we going to be getting that? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I’ll have to check and make sure that we have it 

on the way. What I am proud to tell you is that we’ve issued the 

regulations, a revised set of regulations having to do with repair 

stations in January in fact, which really does a comprehensive 

overhaul of the way we are exercising oversight in this area. 

We’re also reorganizing the way we have structured our staff to 

more closely match where the actual work is now being done, because as you correctly note, much of it has moved from the airlines’ 

own maintenance shops to the floor of repair stations. Much of it 

in this country, I would point out, there has been tremendous 

growth in terms of repair stations here in the U.S., but we are exercising greater oversight here and abroad as a result of these new 

regulations. 

Senator WYDEN. My time is up, but if you would, I do think that 

seeing the report that documents how the Agency is responding to 

the criticisms that Mr. Mead talked about is important. It sounds 

like what you’ve done is constructive, and we appreciate that, but 

we really do need to have the report that describes how the Agency 

is responding to what Mr. Mead said earlier. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Senator Wyden. Senator Burns. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA 

Senator BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ve just got a couple 

questions. You know, they always define public service as trying to 

accommodate, and I’m getting the feeling here with these tankers 

that we’re not trying to accommodate to take care to relieve this 

37 

problem. Can you tell me when you—when all airplanes that fly in 

this country other than military you don’t have any supervision or 

jurisdiction over? Is that what you’re telling me? 

Ms. BLAKEY. No, not at all. In fact, we have jurisdiction over 

most aircraft that fly in this country, certainly in the civil airspace, 

civil aviation, absolutely. What we do not have, and this is the case 

by statute, we do not have authority over public use aircraft, those 

that are operated by other entities of government. 

Now, having said that, Senator Burns, I would say this, that in 

many, many cases we are asked by agencies, and this is the case 

with the Forest Service as well, to review the aircraft that they acquire into their fleets at the point they do so and we will review 

them and issue a type certificate, meaning that we determine as 

best we can, given the fact that these do not have a history that 

we know from the point of design and production all the way 

through, but we determine as best we can what the operational 

characteristics of those aircraft should be, flight hours, ability or 

not to carry cargo, ability or not to carry passengers, all sorts of 

operational issues. And we will issue a type certificate at that point 

which gives at least the government entity guidelines if you will, 

but from that point on, the operation of those, the maintenance of 

those, it is the authority for the public government agency, not the 

FAA. 

Senator BURNS. Well, I know when you go down this path, that’d 

be fine, but these airplanes are not owned by the Forest Service, 

the Forest Service do not pay the pilots. I guess I don’t, I just don’t 

understand where that line is one way or another. I’m just amazed 

that we can’t get together and certify these airplanes to be airworthy. I think we’ve got a fire season that’s coming up that’s 

going to be a dandy and I think we need airplanes. Now, I don’t 

think we need unsafe airplanes. That’s not to say at any cost. But 

if we knew what the problems were in these airplanes, we could 

fix them before we get right into the heart of the fire service. 

That’s what I’m saying. Somebody has to be calling somebody and 

making some accommodations for the public here and public service and that’s kind of what I’m—I’m really concerned about this, 

and I think we’re trying to push something off we don’t want anything to do about and we’re doing it with a definition of under a 

statute that’s very fuzzy at best. 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well—— 

Senator BURNS. Am I wrong on that? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I think the statute is clear in terms of authority. 

The—at this point, as I say, the FAA, and this has been true since 

the beginning of the FAA’s existence has not had authority over 

other government agencies’ aircraft. 

That said, we have set up a group of our staff who are very expert in issues of fatigue and corrosion to work with the Forest 

Service on this particular problem, and I think they are making 

progress together. There was a big meeting this morning, in fact, 

up here with some other colleagues of yours on the Hill with the 

idea of trying to step through the specifics on this, and I’d be happy 

to share with you a briefing on this whenever that works for you. 

Senator BURNS. Well, I think it’s going to have to happen one 

way or the other. Now, I have another question. Ever since I’ve 

38 

been in the Senate, which is 15 years, we’re still looking for a radar 

system between Bozeman, Butte, and Helena. 

Senator LOTT. There’s not one big enough, I guess. 

Senator BURNS. Well, I tell you what, we still have a dark spot 

out there, and I don’t know how may times we got to request it, 

and I don’t know how many other places in the country is like that, 

but I don’t like that situation too much because I fly through that 

zone a little bit. 

Ms. BLAKEY. All right. I made a note, I took an assignment here. 

Let me get back to you on the specifics. 

Senator BURNS. I would certainly appreciate that, because we’ve 

been trying to get that out there. There’s just a dark spot in that 

little triangle right there and there shouldn’t be, and we’ve been 

trying to get that all fixed up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LOTT. Well, thank you, Senator Burns, and having flown 

with Senator Burns in that area, I can say it is scary and we need 

to do something about it and I don’t intend to do it again until we 

get some coverage. 

Senator BURNS. Actually, you know what he’s complaining about, 

we had to fly rather low for about an hour and a half and he didn’t 

like to look at water tanks or read brands. 

Senator LOTT. He landed me in a cow pasture, Madam Administrator. I’m sure he broke every rule in the book. I started to call 

you right then. 

Senator BURNS. That’s why they have cow pastures. 

Senator LOTT. In all seriousness, several years ago we did try to 

get the Forest Service to try to take a look at their fleet and upgrade and modernize the planes that they have for fighting fires 

and to go with affordable planes designed specifically for fire fighting, and we could not get them to do that, and that was several 

years ago, and now obviously there’s a real problem with fatigue 

and corrosion. It’s a serious one. I think the Forest Service is going 

to have to face up to getting some aircraft for this purpose, because 

they could do a lot more good, a lot more efficiency and more affordable, I think. 

Let me ask you, Madam Administrator, a couple of questions 

that I know we need to get on the record here. FAA is requesting 

nearly $500 million less than the authorized levels for the facilities 

and equipment account for Fiscal Year 2005 and these authorizations were based on language FAA submitted to us for the multiyear reauthorization bill. The cuts have caused concern at FAA. 

Modernization is seriously underfunded and further delays to the 

schedule that many of the projects we’re counting on, and they 

could certainly have delays as a result. 

Can you justify this decrease in funding for projects and explain 

how you’re coping with it? Now, I know how it works. OMB, you 

go up through the chain of command and you make your request 

and you get a number back at some point. I can imagine you’re not 

happy with this, but it’s a fact of life, $500 million for your agency 

is a significant blow. What do you have to say about that? 

Ms. BLAKEY. The capital account, what we call F&E, is one that 

has a number of different programs in it, some of which are fairly 

immediate in terms of modernization, others of which are longer 

term, further out on the horizon. What I can assure you is that the 

39 

modernization programs, our major capital programs, are proceeding. This is the terminal modernization, the deployment of 

STARS, the change that we need to make in the host system, the 

brains if you will, for air traffic control, it’s called ERAM, and 

again, that is on track, and the early stages of this, I’m happy to 

report, are also on schedule. So those are funded and we are moving ahead with this. 

We also have a number of other critical programs that we are 

moving very smartly ahead with and I think will show real results 

in the near term. There are several programs that we have essentially deferred at this point. They are what I would characterize as 

the further-out programs, much more R&D is the way I believe 

they should be looked at. 

But this is not a function solely of funding. It is also a function 

of the maturity of the technology involved. One of them is called 

LAAS, Local Area Augmentation System, and this goes to the issue 

of providing a very precise signal to aircraft to achieve ideally 2 

and 3 instrument landings. Right now we are finding that the actual ability to have a verified signal that has real integrity has 

been elusive. We have not been able to achieve that yet. These are 

going where no one’s gone before. I would really stress that some 

of this technology, it’s not as though this is off the shelf. It is something that has to be developed and smart, scientific brains are 

working it. 

Another program we’ve deferred is called—— 

Senator LOTT. Now, you did say you were deferring this LAAS 

program? 

Ms. BLAKEY. We are, we are, and that is a very substantial pro- gram. It was projected to cost as much as $900 million over the life 

span of the development. 

Senator LOTT. But you could—you’d be replacing as many as 8 

to 10 instrument landing systems with one LAAS, so while it costs 

$1 million per system, over the long run it would save you a lot 

of money and they’re a lot more efficient. Isn’t that correct? Why 

was the decision made not to fund this project? 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, that is what it is intended to do, we would 

like for it to do, but that does not mean it is what it can do at this 

point, and we are moving ahead with research in this area, but we 

do not feel that there is any justification at this stage for a fullscale deployment in this area because I say, it cannot—— 

Senator LOTT. So it’s not a cost factor, you’re saying? You’re saying that you’re not convinced the system is yet ready for full acquisition and deployment? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I’m confident the system is not ready for full deployment, in fact. Yes, that’s correct. And we have several others. I 

mean, I could tick through several that we have essentially at this 

point put on hold. One of them has to do with the fact that we’re 

not running out of spectrum as quickly as we thought we were. 

That’s a next generation communications system, another controller pilot data link, essentially e-mail between the cockpit and 

the ground, which in the long run certainly will reduce the amount 

of voice transmission between air traffic controllers and pilots. 

But again, we just completed a pilot study in Miami. There are 

factors involved with that that meant it was going to be a very exVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
40 

pensive system if we pursued the system that we piloted there. It’s 

time to step back, take a look at what we can do, learn from that, 

and then go forward with one that will be frankly more capable 

and more cost efficient. 

Senator LOTT. Madam Administrator, I am concerned about this 

summer. You’ve all testified that we expect traffic to be back up to 

2000 levels. There are a lot of explanations for the delays. I guess 

it begins when you get to the airport. TSA obviously is having 

problems. There are articles today in the news media, TSA to shift 

screeners to ease airport lines. Maybe that’ll help. I know of instances where people have gotten to the airport in plenty of time 

to wait in line, but by the time they waited in line, 30, 40, 50 minutes, they get up to the counter and it’s sorry, it’s too late to screen 

your baggage, you don’t get to go on. 

So the problem begins with TSA and we’re going to be aggressively pursuing them. I still think TSA is not employing common 

sense with their screeners and we’ll have to get into that. But the 

delays at the airports is a whole other thing. This is ridiculous, average delay minutes 59 minutes, 51 minutes, 53 minutes. What in 

the world is going on? I think a lot of it is attitudinal. I don’t think 

that the airlines, the workers, the air traffic controllers, any of 

them have a mentality, we’ve got a job to do here, we need to do 

it efficiently, on time, and with a lot of energy and enthusiasm. But 

what are we going to do about the increased traffic and the delays, 

and particularly at Dulles Airport I understand they’ll have three 

runways closed for construction throughout the summer at the 

same time the airport expected an additional 300 flights a day. 

How do you make that work? 

Ms. BLAKEY. It’s going to be challenging. I think that’s the honest truth. Although we have done everything we know in terms of 

both assigning sufficient controllers to Dulles as well as the consolidated Potomac TRACON, which was put in place and funded such 

that it is now operational, and this has allowed us to redesign the 

airspace around Dulles to have a much more efficient system, if 

you will, in the upper airspace. 

So these are things that certainly are handling the needs at Dulles now, and we are cautiously optimistic about Dulles this summer 

as these operations come in. I will tell you that we’re watching it 

very carefully, there’s no question about it. 

Senator LOTT. Well, maybe Dulles is unique, but where is the 

problem? I mean, you say, like at Chicago and Atlanta there are 

just too many flights, too many people for the system. But I cannot 

understand how the airlines or anybody feels like they’re gaining 

when they make everybody fly mad, you know. It’s just a miserable 

experience. And I’ve warned the airlines and everybody in this industry, you got to be careful because this is the one industry we 

all have to endure as Members of Congress, and if we get mad, if 

our constituents get mad enough, we will do some things that won’t 

be very pretty. 

Now, let me ask you, Ms. Hecker, a couple of questions if my colleagues will bear with me. Your testimony I found very interesting. 

You’re saying employee performance has not shown support for the 

changes or something to that effect that you must be customer 

driven. Exactly who were you referring to? Is it air traffic control? 

41 

When you say employee performance has not shown support, who 

are you talking about? 

Ms. HECKER. Well, controllers in particular and their performance and their linkage to the actual performance of the system is 

really just a new undertaking at the Agency, so the idea of what 

kind of linkage there is of individual controllers, the information is 

limited. It has been limited in part by contract and that’s one of 

the reasons that the new contract will be so important to enable 

the Agency to proceed to get the kind of measurement of employee 

performance and reward performance in a more comprehensive and 

systematic way than they’ve been able to within the constraints of 

the current contract. 

Senator LOTT. Are you saying there’s no control of the controllers? Is that what I thought I heard you saying? 

Ms. HECKER. There is no systematic measurement of their contribution to the goals. There has been a new initiative to begin to 

try to document their—— 

Senator LOTT. Are you saying there’s not a clear commitment to 

the new goals that are being set? Is that what you’re saying? 

Ms. HECKER. That the data isn’t there of what kind of contribution is made and that that is just a new initiative to improve the 

data, but part of it is also a constraint in the contract. There’s a 

new provision for certain increments of extra bonus. I think Ken 

has done work that documents it’s about two-tenths of 1 percent of 

the overall salary, but 4.9 percent increase is given automatically. 

So the linkage of pay to performance is extremely weak. 

Senator LOTT. Madam Administrator, I did think that you had 

a significant percentage of your pay that was linked to performance. Now, isn’t that correct? 

Ms. BLAKEY. We have just moved in that direction, Senator Lott, 

and I would point out that there are very few places in government 

where this is the case, so in fact we’re really the leading edge on 

this, and we did just negotiate a new extension of our contract with 

air traffic controllers, which in fact does link a percentage of their 

pay to four key metrics-driven performance measures so you can 

see whether you hit the numbers or not. 

So I would suggest that we in fact are moving out on this. Seventy-five percent of the FAA’s workforce is no under a pay-for-performance system. I will grant you the percentages are small, but 

again, in government, we’re doing something that really very few 

others are even attempting. 

Senator LOTT. That’s good. Mr. Mead, your testimony is always 

interesting, but let me ask you the same question I asked the Administrator, only just more direct. Why the big increase in delays? 

I know that there’s a multiple answer. What are they? 

Mr. MEAD. One big one is the increased use of regional jets. 

They’re much more cost-effective—— 

Senator LOTT. They’re clogging the system up just by numbers? 

Mr. MEAD. I don’t want to be negative on the use of regional jets. 

I mean, they definitely serve their purpose. But yes, because they 

carry fewer passengers and the growth has been huge, as I mentioned, 180 percent growth in just 4 years, and a lot of the larger 

air frames that can carry more people are off parked in the desert. 

That’s one reason. 

42 

And another—I noticed you were looking at the charts, it’s on 

page 4 of my testimony, the one in yellow—you know, I mentioned 

that FAA needs to get out its capacity benchmarks and they need 

to get them out soon. Those basically say how many flights an airport can handle at peak hours in good and bad weather conditions. 

Now somebody ought to be looking at those capacity benchmarks 

and comparing them to the projected airline schedules this summer, and if they’re totally out of kilter, I don’t mean just by a little 

bit, but materially out of kilter, I think that the government and 

the airlines ought to sit down and have a face-to-face. 

Senator LOTT. Madam Administrator, are you doing that? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I would point out that the benchmarks for airports 

are publicly available right now. The study that the Inspector General is referring to is one that we will be bringing out in June so 

that—and it will be a much expanded study. In fact, it gives a good 

bit more information than before. 

Senator LOTT. He did suggest that you have a sit-down, face-toface meeting on this. Sounds like a good idea to me. 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, we have, as you know, very actively worked 

with the airlines in terms of Chicago O’Hare, which is where we 

are having truly excessive delays, 90 minutes or more in may 

cases. 

I would point out that a lot of the weather delays we have, of 

course, are due to weather, and we do need to see that with the 

convective weather season coming this spring and summer, some of 

this is inevitable regardless of the overall capacity. 

The other thing I would say is this, that while we do believe that 

there are situations in which we have to step in, we’d like to see 

the market work. This is a market-based system, and so therefore, 

for the government to reach in wherever we’re experiencing delays 

is something that we want to do very, very carefully. 

Mr. MEAD. Mr. Chairman, may I add something? 

Senator LOTT. Yes, Mr. Mead, go ahead, because I interrupted 

you to get the Administrator’s response. 

Mr. MEAD. I didn’t think you interrupted me. Let’s go deja-vu 

back to the summer of 2000. There was an extreme reluctance, extreme, to get into the issue of airline scheduling, so we had situations all across the country. Chicago O’Hare was just one of several 

poster children where airlines were scheduling routinely more 

flights to depart at a given time of day than could physically be 

handled at the airport and FAA knew it. But there was this reluctance because of the system of deregulation we have to interfere. 

Now, this time around, the Administration has showed a willingness, at least at O’Hare, to intervene, and I think in the short 

term, since you can’t construct a runway overnight, the new technologies aren’t going to be in place, that we have to do something. 

Senator LOTT. Well, let me respond to your comment and maybe 

the Administrator will hear me. I understand about letting the 

market work, but we know there’s a problem coming. And we also 

know, and I’ve got a proven record of trying to be supportive of the 

airlines and the aviation industry, they are not able to control 

themselves. They cannot help themselves until we make it very 

clear to them you’re creating a mess here that we’re going to have 

answer for, I don’t think they’re going to deal with it, and I think 

43 

somebody’s going to have to be very aggressive in trying to get 

their attention. I’ll try to do it, but I would think that the government is going to have to step in, not make them do this or that, 

but make them understand we cannot have this kind of chaos and 

delay, 90 minute delays, that’s ridiculous. 

This is the United States of America 2004 and they’re creating 

a guaranteed mess and I’m not going to take the blame for it. And 

so I’ll go on the record right now, say it’s coming, let’s do something 

about it. Airlines do it, airports do it, FAA do it. Somebody’s got 

to do it because we’ve got a problem coming here. 

Ms. BLAKEY. Senator Lott, may I point out one thing, because 

this really is a credit to this committee. You all have given us a 

new tool with Vision 100 and that is the ability to convene the carriers on a spot basis looking at a particular airport and set some 

targets on schedule that we would like to see them step up to if 

we really run into difficulties, so that is a new tool. 

Senator LOTT. I hope you will. It’s just human nature. I found, 

even in the Senate, if you can get Senators of different persuasion 

to sit down it’s amazing how many problems are resolved or go 

away. It works in every walk of life. Senator Rockefeller. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 

follow on line with your questioning, because I agreed with everything that you said. I’m actually very interested in your phrase, 

Ms. Blakey, it is after all a free enterprise system, and therefore 

it’s not the place of the government, with the exception of O’Hare 

in a later part, to enter in. How does that balance with the needs 

of the public? 

In other words, you have something called eminent domain. People have to get from Washington to Clarksburg, West Virginia and 

somebody wants to build an interstate, the government intervenes 

and has eminent domain and takes people’s property, and that’s because there’s a higher order here. 

And I think what we’ve all decided is that aviation is more a part 

of the future than roads in terms of location of business and international traffic and all the rest of it. So what is the derivation of 

your statement? From whence does that come that the public interest follows the—that is, delays, which are just stunning here, just 

stunning, that it follows, the public interest follows entrepreneurship’s rights. I mean, I think that’s a very basic question here. 

Ms. BLAKEY. I certainly would say that the intent that we’re operating from the FAA standpoint is to support the public’s interest 

in every way that we know how to do so. And I think that we have 

seen a great deal of good public result from deregulation of the airline industry and from the kind of proliferation we’ve seen. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But you’re not answering my question. 

The philosophy that causes you to ad lib that statement that you 

just made, which I thought was the most important thing you 

said—— 

Ms. BLAKEY. What I would say is this, that I think there’s a balance that you have to achieve and you also have to look at of 

course the cause of delays and whether or not the government in 

44 

intervening is going to be effective in those situations. I think there 

are situations such as O’Hare where it is the responsibility of the 

government to reach in because we do believe it is an overscheduling, pure and simple. At other airports, it is a function of 

a multiplicity of factors, a lot of which can be weather, and that 

is a variable that is much harder to therefore be arbitrarily setting 

the rates and capacity and schedule at those airports. So it’s a balance is what I would suggest to you. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. So you’re saying that weather is not a 

problem, or that where the delays, which after—I mean, O’Hare is 

up there at the top, but so are a lot of other places, and they’re 

all shocking, that you would just let it rest unless it was—it was 

God-given. 

Ms. BLAKEY. No, we wouldn’t let it rest. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Whatever the result was, you’d let it just 

go. 

Ms. BLAKEY. In fact, let me tell you what we have just done, because I think it’s a good example of where the government really 

can step in and exercise significant influence on this. We had a 

conference in March where we brought together all the players, literally all of the major carriers, as well as air traffic control, as well 

as the general aviation community, and said, look, we’re all going 

to have to take a step back for the good of the system. Everyone 

is going to have to compromise a little bit to make this system run 

better. 

And that was what we achieved in 3 days, and it was not easy 

hammering out with folks to say that, look, when we’re taking significant delays at one airport, we’re going to ask everybody else to 

hold back. Significant delays, the group came together and said, 

OK, 90 minutes, that’s too long. At that point, its exercise of what 

we call a delay trigger, and that means that other airports are 

going to have ground delays until we can flush the one that is experiencing significant delay out. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. So the airport triggers were in fact a government solution? 

Ms. BLAKEY. They were. But I want to point out we worked very 

closely in collaboration with all of the interest parts of the aviation 

community to try to achieve this. We did the same thing in terms 

of establishing express lanes, where if the traffic flow all needs to 

go in one direction, a handful of folks wanting to go in the opposite 

direction cross-wise are going to have to fly high or low, they’re 

going to have to fly on a different pattern, and it may not be optimal from their standpoint, but that’s because we want to move passengers, we want to move the public as efficiently as is possible, 

and that does mean that others may have to stand down. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. OK. 

Ms. BLAKEY. So that’s two key examples where—and this is for 

the system as a whole. This affects airports all over the country. 

When we run into a problem, we now have a better mechanism to 

do it. And what I think is that with this on board, if this works 

this summer, I think we can achieve some other measures as well 

operationally. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. And I understand, Madam Administrator, 

I would just caution you not to use that phrase publicly. 

45 

Ms. BLAKEY. OK. I must have misspoken and I apologize. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Oh, you didn’t misspeak. I think you said 

what you felt, and I’m not going to argue with you because you 

have a right to your views, but I just wouldn’t use that publicly 

where the convenience is up to the airlines and the government 

will step in in a couple of cases but not otherwise. I don’t think you 

want to get into that. 

Second question is Secretary Mineta, you said he wanted to triple the capacity of air traffic within the next two decades. Now, we 

are all well aware and accustomed to people coming up, administrators coming up and sloughing off $500 million cuts because 

OMB has to review your testimony, you can’t come up here unless 

they’ve looked at your testimony and they made the cuts, but you 

asked for the money, and you asked for them for such things as facilities and equipment, the F&E account, safety, modernization, capacity programs, things of this sort. 

I’m trying to pin you down a little bit here. You walked away 

from the fact that you’d been deprived of money that you had asked 

for for specific programs, and you said, well, the LAAS program, 

you said, well, that’s not really ready yet, and that was the end of 

that. 

What I want to know, what is it that you were not able to get as a result of the $500 million which you requested which the OMB 

declined to give you after the Secretary set out as his ambition the 

tripling of all of this in 10 to 20 years, some examples? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I was going to say I could provide you with a more 

comprehensive list than I probably can do here, but I would say 

this, that in some cases we are slowing down some of the deployment of specific systems, the deployment, for example, in the area 

of WAAS is somewhat slower. This is the Wide Area Augmentation 

System, the most advanced radar deployment. This is somewhat 

slower than it might have been otherwise. So there are a number 

of steps that we’re taking throughout. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Is that Herndon style the most advanced 

radar? 

Ms. BLAKEY. It’s ASR–11. That is—that’s the specific system that 

I have in mind. But certainly there are a number of areas—— 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. What does Herndon use? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I think it’s an ASR–11, but I’d have to check. There 

may be someone here that—— 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Because that’s the state-of-the-art. 

Ms. BLAKEY. Is Herndon, does it—I don’t think Herndon has an 

ASR–11, right? Herndon has the contribution of a number of different radar sources. So I’ll tell you where ASR–11 is most prominently is Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. That was the first deployment we’d made of that back about 6, 7 months ago now. So it’s 

a new radar and it’s beginning to come online. It links up with the 

STARS terminal modernization program, and it’s an enabler from 

that standpoint. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But you’re not saying that you were 

pleased when your budget was cut? 

Ms. BLAKEY. What I would suggest is this, that these are tight 

budget times. It’s something that I think we all understand that 

not only from the standpoint of the Federal Government as a 

46 

whole, but we are working with a much diminished trust fund. Our 

industry is down, and that does mean that there therefore is a diminution of resources to draw on, and I think we have to adapt when 

the budget climate shifts, and that’s what we’re doing. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Well, I mean, you could also argue that 

the airline industry is absolutely crucial to the Nation, the security 

of the nation, could be a danger to the Nation as we’ve already 

seen. When the President decides he is going to go to war in a certain place or whatever, money is not an object, he just goes around 

to the appropriators and gets it very quietly, something which Senator Lott and I are not thrilled about. So that’s the priority. It 

seems to me aviation is a clear national priority and it doesn’t 

occur to me that the Administrator of the FAA ought to be saying, 

well, we have to adjust to fiscal realities. I would have thought that 

your job was to fight for every single darn nickel you could get and 

go face to face with OMB and raise a stink, short of getting fired. 

I mean that. Do you want to comment, Mr. Mead? 

Senator LOTT. She’s from Tupelo, Mississippi originally, so I’m 

sure she raised a huge stink. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I like her very much and she’s very good, 

but I’m still asking these questions. 

Mr. MEAD. I would like to offer a perspective on the half a billion 

dollars that you were referring to. First, the Administrator was correct when she described where the things that were the objects of 

the cuts were in terms of their development. FAA had been representing that one of the precision landing systems, for example, 

that they were purchasing, was capable of doing precision landings 

1, 2, and 3. That was not so. Categories 2 and 3 were ones that 

had to go, that had to go, need to go to R&D. I think that they 

would be using that money for R&D if they had it. 

Second point I’d like to make is if you look at the size of the cut, 

it correlates almost exactly with the increase in the operations account, which is the salaries account. The salary base at FAA is 

rather high, it’s very generous, and on page 13 of my testimony 

there’s a chart about what’s happening to the aviation trust fund, 

and there are about $3 billion less money going into it than they 

thought was going to be going into it 3 years ago. But I think 

you’re going to be looking at very tight fiscal times for the foreseeable future, unless you’re prepared to go make greater incursions 

into the general fund at the Treasury. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I’ll accept that. The second question I was 

going to ask will be vigorously opposed by one Senator who’s here 

now, and that is that some of us really, and obviously you do too, 

Ms. Blakey, that O’Hare is a major, major national priority, that 

those runways are not laid out efficiently, and that until they are, 

along with other adjustments that are made, it’s going to clog up 

the entire system, and I don’t think there’s a huge coincidence between the 64 percent average, minutes average delay, and the layout of those runways. 

Now, that was a big subject last year. I remember waiting 3 

hours on the floor to give a speech on it, but the other Senator here 

present other than the Chairman was talking all during that time 

so I wasn’t able to do that. Now, where does that stand and how 

47 

hard are you fighting for doing O’Hare correctly? What happens at 

O’Hare directly affects what happens in Charleston, in Huntington, 

in Beckley, West Virginia. 

Ms. BLAKEY. I couldn’t agree more. In fact, O’Hare has proven 

at this point to be the central, if you will, nerve center for the aviation system these days because so many carriers are hubbing 

through there and so much of our population either as destination 

or must go through there. 

At this point, we have established a program office, a dedicated 

office to focus explicitly on the modernization program there and 

looking at the plans that have been advanced there from the airport authority, working closely of course with both the city and the 

state on this. Our expectation is that we will be able to put out for 

public comment as of February of this year the environmental impact statement, which is one of the key, as you know, steps in 

terms of being able to move forward with that modernization. 

I don’t know what that is going to tell us right now. We’re working on that and the design of the airport layout plan. But our expectation is to move this as fast as we can doing it well and carefully. I must stress though that this is the most complex airport 

project bar none in history, $6.6 billion is what the city is projecting will be the cost involved here. And as a result of that, we 

are moving forward intensely. 

But as I say, we have to do this right and we have to do the correct analysis and modeling, and so that does mean that it will 

probably be—in fact, it will be—September 2005 before we expect 

to issue a final record of decision on it, and that will of course be 

what triggers the ability to move forward with the construction 

work, and I can’t prejudge what that will look like at that point 

and how that will be put together. 

Senator LOTT. Speaking of Chicago, Illinois, Senator Rockefeller, 

maybe it’d be a good time to hear the questions from the Senator 

from Illinois. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER G. FITZGERALD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS 

Senator FITZGERALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and boy, I don’t 

know where to begin with all this stuff. I want to compliment the 

Chairman and the Ranking Member for doing this hearing, want 

to compliment Ms. Blakey for the wonderful job she’s doing and Director Mead and Ms. Hecker. 

First on delays, though, let me urge the members of this committee to think back to 1999 when this committee passed legislation which later cleared the Senate and then the House lifting the 

FAA’s regulation that imposed delay controls. That regulation had 

been in effect since 1969 and it stopped delays at O’Hare, at Newark, and at LaGuardia. And it did that by limiting the scheduled 

takeoffs and departures and arrivals to the capacity of each of 

those airports. 

And I was a freshman Senator at the time and I remember 

standing on the floor of the Senate with an internal chart from the 

FAA that had been prepared by an FAA consultant that said if 

Congress lifts, or if the FAA lifts the delay controls at these airports, delays will go up exponentially. Well, Congress went ahead 

48 

and lifted the delay controls and immediately by the summer of 

2000, passengers were brought to their knees all around the country. So it’s not the FAA’s fault, those delays, it’s Congress’ fault. 

We lifted the delay controls. 

Now, O’Hare has capacity to do three takeoffs and landings a 

minute, and if the airlines are only allowed to schedule three takeoffs and landings a minute, there will be no delays. But after those 

delay controls were lifted, United and American were scheduling as 

many as 25 to 30 takeoffs at the same on-minute period, 8:45 in 

the morning there will be 25 to 30 planes scheduled to take off, and 

everybody knows only three of them are going to be able to take 

off. So it’s Congress’ fault, specifically it’s this committee’s fault for 

the delays, and so if Americans are angry at delays, they should 

look right back here. 

And I want to compliment the FAA for going back this year and 

trying to put some delay controls back on at O’Hare. I want to urge 

you to be tougher though because you have only put those delay 

controls on United and American. They do have 87 percent of the 

capacity at O’Hare, or the flights at O’Hare, but the other airlines 

have then just filled the void, and so we’re really not reducing the 

number of flights to match the capacity of the airport. 

And I hate to sound like Cassandra, but I think in this case I 

am. If we go back to my speech on the floor of the Senate, I predicted all this would happen and it immediately did happen. That’s 

why I’m asking you to take me seriously when I try to rebut Senator Rockefeller on O’Hare. We can spend—and it’s not $6 billion, 

it’s $6.6 billion for the runways—but the full project is $15 billion 

at O’Hare. It’s going to drain all the AIP funds from everybody 

else’s airports in the country for the next 10 years, and my prediction is we will get almost no additional capacity at O’Hare because the limiting space, the limiting factor is not runway capacity 

at O’Hare, it’s airspace. We have the most congested airspace in 

the country, the class B airspace over Chicago O’Hare, and you can 

spend all that money and you’re not going to get much more capacity because they can’t put—stuff any more planes in that. 

And also I have to fault the Clinton administration. Governor 

Thompson back in the 1980s in Illinois started following up on an 

FAA mandate. FAA ordered Chicago in 1984 to build another airport, and Governor Thompson and then Governor Edgar, they got 

the ball rolling. In 1993, Mayor Daley called President Clinton and 

asked him to remove the Chicago third airport from the NPIAS list, 

the National Plant for—otherwise, that third airport would have 

been up and running by the year 2000. We wouldn’t be talking 

about delays in O’Hare. And we still have a viable—we have now 

restored the third airport to the NPIAS list. I hope the FAA will 

give due consideration to that proposal. 

Also, airlines block new airports all over the country. We’ve only 

built one new airport, and that’s in Denver, even though passenger 

travel has increased 400 percent since deregulation. The hub carriers have blocked every new airport because they don’t want—in 

Chicago, for example, United doesn’t want any new entrants coming in and competing with their effective monopoly. 

And anyway, I’ve got to go to my questions, but I wanted to take 

some of the heat off the FAA on those delays, because I think it’s 

49 

Congress’ fault. On the O’Hare expansion, I’m just wondering, and 

maybe Mr. Mead or Ms. Blakey can answer this question. I know 

you’re considering that proposal, the environmental study is underway, and you’re also looking at this suburban airport. I’m wondering, I don’t think there’s anything in the statutes that allows 

you to consider the economic forces at play in analyzing O’Hare’s 

proposal. I don’t know if you can look at market realities, but I’m 

urging you if you have that statutory ability to look at market realities. 

The average ticket price at O’Hare has dropped from $170 in 1999 to $140 last year. Meanwhile, this O’Hare expansion plan will 

raise the current per passenger landing fees from $8.70 currently 

to about $26, even assuming a $5 billion contribution from the AIP 

fund toward the expansion program. And this is all at a time while 

the main carrier at O’Hare, United, is in bankruptcy, has a $5 billion unfunded pension liability and has even defaulted on the 

bonds issued 20 years ago to build their terminal at O’Hare, and 

yet they’re being relied on to pay this $26 per passenger along with 

American, which is also in poor financial shape. 

To what extent can you look at economics and the feasibility of 

this being paid for when you consider the O’Hare expansion project, 

either of you? 

Mr. MEAD. Senator, you know we have a letter of inquiry from 

you on the O’Hare project, and we can’t look at the cost effectiveness per se, but you mentioned earlier the delta between what are 

the stated costs of the runway per se, and all the supporting collateral projects that are in the modernization plan. 

I think Chicago should be prepared to demonstrate where the 

money’s going to come from and how much they are going to be relying on the Federal Government for, and they should be able to 

perform a cash-flow analysis. And that is one of the key issues that 

we’re currently exploring. 

We’ve seen this issue develop in other modes of transportation. 

Virginia is a recent example where there are a bunch of highway, 

highway bridge projects in the Virginia State transportation plan, 

but we were interested in is, well, Wilson Bridge was there in 

Springfield and when we looked closely at the plan, the same dollar 

bill was going to three or four different projects. 

And in response to your inquiry, a core issue we’re examining is 

just how much of the modernization plan are they prepared to go 

forward with, and if they are prepared to go forward with, where 

is the money going to come from? 

Senator FITZGERALD. So to that extent you are looking at the economics. They have to demonstrate a cash-flow. 

Mr. MEAD. The financials, yes. 

Senator FITZGERALD. As a former banker, let me just remind you, 

I’ve never seen a poorer pro forma submitted by a potential borrower, so I wouldn’t be surprised if they’re able to put something 

together that looks plausible, we—— 

Mr. MEAD. Well, we’ve had experience with these, Senator, and 

a lot of other projects in this country, so I think we know what 

rocks to turn over. 

Senator FITZGERALD. With respect to air traffic control at Chicago, the controllers in my area, and they’re meeting with me 

50 

today, they complain, they believe there’s a dangerous understaffing at Chicago TRACON. The delays and operational errors 

have increased. Chicago TRACON has 100 authorized controllers, 

but only 75 are now employed, and I’m told that a third of those 

are eligible to retire within the next 2 years. 

Ms. Blakey, have you looked at that understaffing situation at 

Chicago TRACON and do you have any ideas about that? 

Ms. BLAKEY. We have as a matter of fact. In fact, we sent a team 

in because the issue of operational errors certainly had got our attention back in January, and so we sent in a team to look on a very 

intensive basis at all aspects of the operation as well as question 

some staffing, training, what might be the issues to be addressed 

there. 

That report is currently in the works and I think we’re going to 

have some good results out of that. But I can tell you it is not a 

staffing issue. I’d be happy to get you the numbers. In fact, if 

you’re having a meeting today, that might be helpful if I turned 

that around for you fairly quickly. 

Senator FITZGERALD. If we could get them real quickly, I think 

my meeting’s in about an hour, so maybe if somebody could shoot 

them to Robin in my office. 

Ms. BLAKEY. I’d be delighted to. 

Senator FITZGERALD. I’d appreciate that. And Mr. Mead, you did 

mention my inquiry to your office. Do you have any idea of when 

we might be able to expect a report back from you on that? 

Mr. MEAD. Let me get back to you. 

Senator FITZGERALD. OK. 

Mr. MEAD. I don’t want to publicly state a date and then have 

to recant it. 

Senator FITZGERALD. I understand that. Now, the City of Chicago 

has recently publicly accused the FAA of moving too slowly in completing the environmental impact statement, and says that the 

FAA has greatly expanded the scope of studies to be completed before it rules. And I understand that the FAA has denied these 

charges, and I was personally unaware of any expansion of the 

scope of the studies that you’re requiring, and I’m wondering, has 

the FAA changed the scope? And if the scope of the studies has 

been changed, can I see any FAA documents that do in fact expand 

the scope? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I believe the FAA is pursuing the kind of analysis 

and the kind of review that’s really required by both our approach 

to the airport layout plan as well as the EIS. So we consider this 

to be important, and as I said, something that has to be done with 

real care, because it must be something at the end of the day that 

I think will withstand criticism from all sides, and certainly something that because many of these airport projects, as you well 

know, have been delayed by litigation for many, many years thereafter. It is better for us to do the up-front work and to do it with 

rigor than to later be trying to fill in things that should have happened initially, and so I would argue for that. 

Senator LOTT. Madam Administrator, on that point, if you’ll yield 

for this, in Vision 100, we specifically provided the FAA with a 

number of new tools aimed to streamlining the environmental review process for key airport capacity projects. This is a good examVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
51 

ple here of hopefully how that could be helpful. Is it helping, those 

new tools? 

I know you don’t want to have lawsuits, but I was in hopes that 

new language would give you authority to cut through some of the 

ridiculous environmental delays and impediments. 

Ms. BLAKEY. What streamlining has allowed us to do—we are applying increasingly. But essentially what it has allowed us to do is 

to not have sequential review where everything has to line up 

trunk to tail, and therefore have a very prolonged process. We can 

do concurrent review. We can also look at issues of redundancy and 

try to achieve where we may be requiring, or other agencies are requiring similar or some kinds of analysis. Let’s pull it together and 

be certain that we are performing what’s important here, but not 

doing it time and time again. 

So that’s what I would say we’ve got with this, and certainly 

we’re trying to do everything that is smart and efficient in Chicago. 

It’s a big project and we want to make sure that we’re doing that. 

Mr. MEAD. I can’t speak to the scope of the environmental impact 

assessment, but I do know that one of the concerns about the timing, the FAA’s timing of this, is that the September 2005 conclusion of that effectively means a loss of a construction season, because there isn’t much time before the cold sets in in Chicago and 

so there’s that concern that, well, can it be accelerated somehow or 

completed earlier so that they can, if they’re going to build another 

set of runways, that they can get construction underway when they 

have good weather. 

Senator FITZGERALD. We’re talking about the delays caused by 

construction at Dulles. Wait until Chicago is torn up for 10 years 

with a 10 year unremitting construction season. 

One final question, Mr. Chairman, if I may. The city I guess has 

already applied for hundreds of millions of dollars of airport improvement programs grants, and my prediction is eventually to do 

this whole project they’ll have to take all the AIP funds for years 

so that there will be no money for any other airport in the country. 

But my question is, will concerned communities around O’Hare 

and individuals like myself have an opportunity to comment as the 

grant review process goes forward? I’d like to make arguments, for 

example, that it would not be a wise usage to drain all the AIP 

funds for the next 10 years into this project, which I ultimately 

argue won’t increase capacity, it’s just an expenditure of money. 

Ms. BLAKEY. Well, I can tell you this, that they’ve got some other 

folks who are ahead of them in the queue in terms of use of those 

funds to the extent they are discretionary. As you know, a great 

deal of this is essentially entitlement money, and therefore is allotted throughout the airports in the system on a formula basis. 

But to the extent there is discretionary money there, there are 

some very vigorous competitors for it, and in fact, we have lots of 

calls on that. So that said, the rationale is certainly something that 

we are very willing to make public, in fact, we do make public on 

a regular basis. 

Senator FITZGERALD. Can other people—can individuals like myself who are concerned about the issue comment on their application for a grant? 

52 

Ms. BLAKEY. So far as I know, this is all public documentation 

and certainly one can comment. There is not a formal comment period in the sense you have with the rulemaking, for example, or an 

environmental impact statement. 

Senator FITZGERALD. OK. 

Ms. BLAKEY. But the documents are public. 

Senator FITZGERALD. OK. Well, Mr. Chairman, thanks for doing 

this. You’re a great Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee. You 

love aviation and you’re engaged in it, and Madam Blakey, thank 

you, and Mr. Mead, Ms. Hecker, thank you all very much. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Senator Fitzgerald. Let me just say I 

want the record to reflect since you did foretell what would happen, 

I supported you all the way on this issue. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LOTT. One last question, Ms. Blakey, and maybe Ms. 

Hecker might want to respond on this too. AIP funds, I’ve been 

very concerned about how the AIP funds have been rated for legitimate reasons in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 for security costs, 

but we stopped that in the FAA reauthorization I believe. But I’m 

still worried about FAA funds being used for noise abatement 

projects well beyond what had been indicated or called for earlier. 

And I’m worried that it’s going for commercial portions of terminals 

like perhaps shop concessions, parking garages, off-airport road 

construction, and things of that nature. 

Are those things happening? And in the alternative, are we limiting these hopefully to where we really need planning instruction 

for runways, taxiways, aprons, and things that really are needed 

for safety and to expand the capability of the airport? 

Ms. BLAKEY. I’ll tell you, we are guarding those AIP funds pretty 

jealously these days, because we do understand how much the actual fundamental infrastructure, as you say, the runways, the 

taxiways, are going to make calls on them. The Vision 100 did give 

a bit more flexibility for small airports, but as you know, that’s a 

relatively small amount of the money as well, and that’s the only 

place where I think you will see a bit of expansion in terms of applicability, and part of that is to let those small airports be more 

economically viable, because again, for the growth of the system in 

the long run, that’s what they need as well. But that was the new 

statutory allowance. 

Senator LOTT. Well, we are going to be having a vote on the floor 

in a few minutes. Senator Fitzgerald, do you have any more questions? One other thing is that, you know, who’s going to keep an 

eye on what’s going on in Chicago at O’Hare when the Senator 

from Illinois is not with us? I worry about that. 

Senator FITZGERALD. That’s a very good question. 

Senator LOTT. Very good question. I’ll suspect you’ll keep on eye 

on it no matter where you are. 

Senator FITZGERALD. I’ll try. 

Senator LOTT. Thank you all for being here and this will be a 

part of our continuing effort to be supportive and to keep up with 

what you’re doing and make sure that we’re providing the assistance you need from Congress. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:08 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(53) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

Four years ago, the biggest problem facing the Nation’s aviation system appeared 

to be the congestion. The system could not keep up with demand. 

Since then, we have rightfully concerned ourselves with security and the financial 

state of the airline industry. I am convinced, however, that aviation will never fully 

recover unless the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can provide an air traffic 

control system that will accommodate the predicted growth in air travel. Without 

an adequate aviation system, airlines will be constrained from true competition. And 

without competition, consumers will suffer. Already we have seen that the Secretary 

of Transportation has imposed flight restrictions at Chicago’s O’Hare airport. I 

would hope such reductions are temporary and that the FAA, the airport, and the 

airlines can find a better solution. Hopefully we have used the breathing room afforded by the downturn in traffic to prepare for the future. 

I am also convinced that the FAA will only be able to develop and provide an air 

traffic control system that can meet future demand, if the FAA itself starts doing 

its job differently. We must ensure that the FAA spends its resources wisely and 

that it manages its modernization program to ensure projects are on budget, on 

time, and delivers the benefits promised. 

Over the last 10 years, the Congress has passed legislation to reform the FAA The 

FAA has been removed from the Federal procurement and personnel rules, it has 

been given a board of directors, and has recently hired a Chief Operating Officer 

to oversee the operation and modernization of the air traffic control system. I am 

eager to hear today how these steps are working. 

I believe that this is a critical juncture for an aviation community which is facing 

very difficult times. However, we must be equally concerned about the FAA and its 

programs and work to ensure that our Nation’s aviation system has proper oversight. Our aviation system is the leader in safety and efficiency. We must ensure 

that this remains the case. 

I thank the witnesses for coming and look forward to their testimony. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO MARION C. BLAKEY

Question 1. At the start of this year, DOT Secretary Mineta expressed a desire 

to triple the capacity of air traffic within the next two decades, and indicated the 

need to ‘‘modernize and transform our global transportation system, starting right 

now.’’ Less than a month after the Secretary’s statement, the Administration released a budget plan that would cut more than $350 million from last year’s funding 

level for the FAA’s Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account—which funds air traffic 

modernization and capacity programs. 

• What steps are you taking at the FAA to ensure that gutting funding for modernization and safety programs by such a drastic amount will not have an adverse impact on the system? 

• If Congress provides more funding than requested, where will it be used? 

Answer. The President’s FY 2005 request includes sufficient funding to safely operate and maintain the existing NAS infrastructure. There is no significant impact 

to our major modernization programs, including the Terminal Automation Modernization Program, the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) program, and 

the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), which are budgeted and continuing 

as planned. Program reductions were carefully considered and limited to projects 

that had minimal benefits or could not be implemented in the near term due to economic downturn and aircraft equipage. Among projects deferred as a result of the 

lower budget request were the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), the Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC), and the Next Generation Air to 

54 

Ground Communications System (NEXCOM 1B). Delaying funding for these systems will have no near-term impact on the operation or the safety of the NAS. Consideration for any additional capital funding would be given to infrastructure modernization and facility projects that help reduce FAA operations and maintenance 

costs and system outages and/or projects providing near-term user benefits. 

Question 2. Air traffic and passenger levels are expected to continue to rise as we 

head into the busy travel season. We are starting to see indications that delays 

could be bad this summer. Already, the Administration has pushed American and 

United to reduce their schedules at O’Hare by five percent and down to 7.5 percent 

by mid-June, in an effort to reduce traffic. At the same time, FAA has released a 

report indicating that O’Hare is one of five airports that need additional flight capacity immediately to meet passenger demands and alleviate delays across the country. 

(a) How have the cuts to United and American Airlines schedules affected traffic 

at O’Hare? 

Answer. Beginning November 2003, significant increases in scheduled operations 

led to major delays and flight cancellations at O’Hare. In order to reduce delays and 

improve on-time performance, the FAA separately obtained the agreement of the 

two largest operators at O’Hare, American Airlines and United Airlines, to reduce 

proposed scheduled flights during peak hours by five percent by early March 2004 

and an additional 2.5 percent by mid-June 2004. FAA’s Orders subsequently implementing the reductions applied only to those two hu carriers since their flights account for most of the growth since the phase-out of the High Density Rule. The Orders will expire October 30, 2004. 

In June, both carriers complied with the 2.5 percent reduction during peak hours, 

while slightly increasing their total daily operations over May schedules. Even after 

the combined 7.5 percent peak hour reductions from proposed schedules, preliminary analysis indicates that delays are still excessive. 

(b) Are you looking at staffing levels and procedures in an effort to develop a solution to this problem? 

Answer. We will be reviewing facility by facility staffing over the next several 

months as we work on the development of a ‘‘Comprehensive Workforce Plan for Air 

Traffic Controllers’’, due to Congress this December. O’Hare and the other OEP airports are likely to be reviewed for appropriate staffing levels. 

(c) After some fighting, locals agreed to move forward on increasing capacity at 

O’Hare and we provided FAA the authority to take action promptly by enacting airport construction streamlining legislation. What is the status of this effort? Why has 

the FAA not been able to move faster to address this situation? 

Answer. The City of Chicago is pursuing an aggressive construction schedule for 

their proposed O’Hare Modernization Program (OMP). The start of OMP construction, however, is dependent on the FAA’s completion of an Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS) and issuance of a favorable Record of Decision (ROD). 

Considerable effort has been made by the FAA to streamline the EIS process and 

schedule for the proposed OMP project. Even prior to the passage of Vision 100 Reauthorization legislation last fall, the FAA had already applied its best practices 

from past lessons learned to assemble adequate resources and put in place a process 

that would result in timely and successful completion of the OMP EIS. We have continued to look for opportunities to work even more effectively at our task. The resulting OMP EIS schedule is the product of extensive coordination between the FAA 

and its consultants and other agencies. The Chicago OMP is a large and complex 

undertaking unlike any other airport expansion in the U.S. Therefore, certain planning and environmental analyses associated with the OMP EIS are some of the 

most complex and detailed work undertaken by the FAA to date. The FAA views 

the projected EIS schedule as an aggressive yet achievable schedule. The OMP EIS 

schedule projects a draft EIS by February 2005 and the EIS ROD by September 

2005. 

Significant effort has and will continue to be devoted to applying EIS streamlining 

provisions while still ensuring full compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to produce a defendable EIS. FAA’s streamlining efforts have included the development of written agreements with other governmental agencies involved in the OMP EIS process. These agreements have and will continue to yield 

efficiencies in our streamlining efforts towards a successful and accelerated environmental assessment of the OMP proposal. 

The FAA and those involved with the O’Hare EIS process schedule have moved 

to address the O’Hare proposal faster than any other major FAA Operational Evolutionary Plan (OEP) proposal. The FAA Administrator has established a dedicated 

55 

Chicago Area Modernization Program Office to provide corporate oversight for the 

integration of all necessary FAA activities. 

Question 3. The Aviation Daily on May 18, 2004, reports that Administrator 

Blakey is considering charging fees to controllers for classes. Reports indicate that 

up to 7,000 controllers may retire in the next several years, and it takes up to 3 

years to fully train a controller. 

(a) What analysis has the FAA done on a fee proposal? Please provide any such 

reports or analysis. 

Answer. The Air Traffic Organization has been looking at alternative methods for 

lowering training costs for newly hired air traffic control specialists. One of the options being considered is charging tuition for newly hired candidates attending the 

Federal Aviation Administration Academy in Oklahoma City. To date no in-depth 

analysis has been conducted on the feasibility of this proposal. 

(b) Please provide any reports and analysis on staffing recruitment efforts. 

Answer. The agency has nine different sources from which it can hire controllers. 

These sources include students from special college programs, veterans, retired military controllers and other former controllers. Recently, we have opened the door to 

the broader population of individuals with no aviation background or prior training 

to apply for employment as a controller. To be considered for employment from 

other than the traditional sources, applicants must pass a comprehensive test that 

evaluates skills necessary to perform air traffic duties. This test is called the Air 

Traffic–Selection and Training (AT–SAT) examination. Candidates for AT–SAT 

would be recruited mostly at job fairs or locations near air traffic facilities where 

hiring is most needed. 

(c) Please provide any reports and analysis on how the FAA intends to address 

future staffing needs, and its analysis and projections of staffing retirements. 

Answer. Per direction from Congress under section 221(b) of Vision 100 

(P.L. 108–176, Dec. 12, 2004), FAA will provide Congress by December 2004 a detailed report on how the agency plans to meet its future controller staffing needs. 

This report will include plans on how the FAA will address expected increases in 

controller retirements. 

Question 4. I was concerned to learn that an arbitrator recently found the FAA 

in violation of an agreement with PASS to maintain systems specialist staffing at 

a minimum of 6,100. As a result, the arbitrator ordered the FAA to immediately 

raise the total number of technical employees to the minimum staffing level of 

6,100. The systems specialist workforce is already stretched thin, and it is my understanding that 6,100 systems specialists is the absolute minimum number necessary to safely maintain the air traffic control system. 

(a) How many systems specialists is the agency below 6,100? 

Answer. As of 06/07/2004, there are 5861 PASS technical employees on board 

which is 239 under the agreed upon staffing level of 6,100. Additionally, there are 

172 PASS technical employees on board in the Operations Control Centers that are 

not counted in that number. 

(b) How quickly can the agency hire the systems specialists necessary to meet its 

agreement of 6,100? 

Answer. Pending availability of funds, it is anticipated that the agency can hire 

this number of PASS technical employees within 180 days of initiating the process. 

Currently, funding to support the increased number of employees is not available. 

(c) What are the agency’s plans to prevent falling below 6,100 systems specialists 

in the future? 

Answer. Pending availability of funds, the agency intends to hire on a continual 

basis throughout next Fiscal Year to ensure that the number agreed upon is met. 

It is anticipated that attrition of current PASS technical employees will require the 

agency to hire approximately 300 specialists on an annual basis to sustain the number agreed upon. 

Question 5. I understand that the agency intends to hand over the inspections and 

reviews required by the Aging Aircraft Safety Rules to private individuals known 

as designees. 

In light of the agency’s decision to hand over these [aging aircraft] inspections to 

private individuals, is there really an adequate number of FAA Inspectors? If so, 

why was it necessary for the agency to designate these inspections? 

Answer. Yes, there are an adequate number of inspectors. The FAA safety mission 

requires the FAA to promote aviation safety by establishing standards and ensuring 

compliance to those standards. Ensuring compliance with standards is a shared responsibility between industry and the FAA. The FAA relies on qualified private persons designated by the FAA to leverage our safety workforce. 

56 

Section 506(c) of Vision 100 directed the agency to have the National Academy 

of Sciences (NAS) conduct a study of the methods used by the FAA to estimate staffing standards for inspectors to ensure proper safety oversight. On June 5, 2004, 

FAA and NAS reached final agreement on the study and NAS will submit a final 

report to Congress within 20 months. Meanwhile, the agency will continue to review 

aviation safety inspector (ASI) staffing levels necessary to accomplish its safety mission as part of Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission. 

Regarding the aging aircraft inspections, FAA intends to perform these inspections through the use of a combination of ASIs and designees. There are approximately 2,500 aircraft requiring inspections in the next 4 years. 

The Aging Aircraft Statute of 1991 requires the Administrator to perform the 

records review and airplane inspections and allows for the use of designees. FAA 

is not handing over the records reviews and airplane inspections to its designees. 

However, FAA is supplementing the current workforce with the use of designees, 

specifically designated airworthiness representatives, or organizational designated 

airworthiness representatives, to conduct inspections and records reviews in conjunction with the ASI workforce. 

(b) How many inspectors does the agency plan to hire in FY 2005? 

Answer. The current number of inspectors is 3,547. The FAA will maintain current levels of inspector staffing. FAA anticipates losing approximately 180 inspectors in FY–05 due to attrition. New inspectors will be hired as required to fill vacancies. 

(c) In 2002, the FAA produced a document called ‘‘Workforce Planning and Restructuring’’ which included demographics on the FAA workforce. According to the 

document, the average age of an FAA Inspector is 52.3 years old with significant 

retirements expected over the next several years. I understand that it takes a minimum of three years to train an FAA Inspector, what are your plans to ensure that 

we have an adequate number of FAA Inspectors? 

Answer. The Flight Standards’ aviation safety inspector (ASI) workforce has an 

average age of 52.9 years. FAA’s Flight Standards Office hires new ASIs with demonstrated skills and experiences and gives them an extensive formal training curriculum. In addition, an ASI receives on-the-job training before he or she is considered fully qualified to perform the job tasks of an aviation safety inspector. At a 

maximum, a new ASI completes both aspects of training within three years. 

In order to ensure an adequate number of ASIs, FAA has developed a Human 

Capital Plan that is a proactive approach to succession planning for retiring inspectors. This plan takes into account various demographic and geographical data and 

identifies the appropriate skill sets required to perform the job. FAA has a centralized applicant pool with a registry of approximately 3,300 qualified applicants that 

we use to fill our vacancies. Attrition rates are consistent within the inspector work 

force. Our manufacturer inspector attrition rate for the past 5 years has been 5 percent per year. The rate for aviation safety inspectors is 4.7 percent for this same 

time frame. We closely monitor both of these rates. 

Question 6. At least 70 FAA Operational Supervisors have recently written the 

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) expressing their opposition to the 

FAA’s plans to consolidate the Center Weather Service Units (CWSUs) at the 20 Air 

Route Traffic Control Centers in the continental United States into five Units. It 

appears that very few if any ARTCC managers or supervisors were ever consulted 

about the feasibility of such a consolidation of the CWSUs or whether this consolidation would affect the real operational environment. Is the FAA continuing with its 

plans to consolidate the 20 CWSUs in the face of opposition from the agency personnel who rely on their services on a day to day basis? 

Answer. Although some FAA supervisors are on record as opposing any change 

to the status quo, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the National 

Research Council (NRC), and our site visits (as summarized in the Assessment of 

Current Operations) have made it clear that the status quo is unacceptable. Therefore, FAA leadership and management are developing a proposal for the safe, efficient, and most cost-effective change to provide weather support to the FAA. Expert 

opinions from field supervisors will be considered as the proposal is developed. No 

decisions have been made, and we certainly understand the National Weather Service employees’ anxiety and the need for timely weather advisories to be available 

to all air traffic controllers. One of the plans being considered would consolidate and 

enhance the weather products being disseminated to the entire National Airspace 

System (centers and other air traffic facilities). This proposal would provide the latest technology to forecast and distribute weather products 24 hours a day, seven 

days per week. We believe that safety can be enhanced by implementing some 

version of the recommendations in the NWS report ‘‘Integrated Concept for EnhancVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
57 

ing Weather Support,’’ dated December 2003. Again, no decision has been made on 

the proposed concept. 

Question 7. In a January 20 letter to the National Weather Service Employees Organization, the NTSB wrote that ‘‘the loss of CWSU staffing at the majority of 

ARTCCs, the lack of face-to-face interaction between meteorologists and controllers, 

and the potential for deficiencies in the timeliness of information dissemination during critical events could negatively impact safety’’ if the CWSUs were consolidated 

and that the NTSB was withholding judgment on the FAA’s plans to consolidate the 

CWSUs until the FAA addressed these issues. What has the FAA done to satisfy 

the NTSB’s serious concerns about your plans to consolidate the CWSUs and leave 

15 ARTCCS without any meteorologists? Will you proceed with your consolidation 

plans without the approval of the NTSB? 

Answer. In response to recommendations from the NTSB concerning the Center 

Weather Service Units (CWSUs), the FAA has prepared reports to the NTSB every 

6 months for the past 8 years—most recently on November 21, 2003, and June 8, 

2004 (draft). In addition, the FAA prepares informal briefings to the NTSB staff, 

held March 5, 2002, and most recently on June 29, 2004. In all of these discussions, 

the FAA and the NTSB have realistically assessed the current operations of the 

CWSUs, and the FAA has been consistently candid in stating its intentions. The 

FAA is proceeding with planning the restructuring of the CWSUs while maintaining 

an open and transparent relationship with the NTSB. It is our desire that the NTSB 

will support the final plan selected for restructuring the CWSUs. 

Question 8. From time to time, small general aviation or commercial aircraft experience difficulty, either due to weather conditions, or problems within the aircraft 

itself such as instrumentation failures. During these events when weather is degraded, requiring flight under instrument flight rules (IFR), aircrews contact the Air 

Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) for assistance to locate an airport with favorable weather conditions so they can operate under visual flight rules (VFR) to 

enable the aircraft to land safely. Air traffic controllers depend on the immediate 

advice of the on-site meteorologist who knows what airports are VFR and, more importantly, will remain VFR for an aircraft in distress to be directed to. In some of 

these cases, aircraft have been low on fuel, and every second counts in getting the 

right information to the air traffic controller to relay to the aircrew. 

How realistic is it to believe that an air traffic controller who is controlling other 

aircraft within a sector he is operating to stop and make a phone call to, or set up 

a video conference with, a remotely located meteorologist? 

How much time would be needed for that remotely located meteorologist, who is 

responsible for a vastly larger area of airspace than under the present configuration 

of CWSUs, to become familiar with the weather situation in a particular area? 

Answer. There are abundant weather information sources available to pilots at 

automated flight service stations (AFSS), at Flight Watch offices, at terminal radar 

approach controls (TRACON), and lastly, even from the air route traffic control center (ARTCC) coordinators. 

The time that it would take for a meteorologist to respond to a request for weather information will depend entirely on what CWSU resources are available at the 

time of the request, and the available weather information from other sources. The 

plan the FAA accepts for restructuring the CWSUs will seek to reduce the time required to retrieve and respond to all requests for current weather information and 

forecasts. 

Question 9. The National Transportation Safety Board has recommended that the 

FAA provide meteorological coverage at all times during forecasted significant 

weather. The FAA has claimed that it cannot afford to hire the 42 additional meteorologists it would take to keep all the CWSUs open 24 hours a day. 

Rather than reducing the number of CWSU’s in the continental United States 

from 20 to 5 so that they can be staffed 24 hours a day, has the FAA given consideration to staffing 5 CWSUs on a 24/7 basis to cover the minimal aircraft operations 

overnight across the country and leave the remaining CWSU staffed as they are? 

The National Weather Service has offered a number of improvements for the 

CWSU program including products, services, training, and cost sharing. As for cost 

sharing, the NWS has offered to provide the FAA with AWIPS, their weather communication system. Won’t this cover the cost of the 10 additional meteorologists 

needed to keep 5 Centers open 24 hours a day? 

Answer. The suggestion of operating the national Center Weather Service Unit 

program with five centers, 7 days a week and 24 hours a day, will be given thoughtful consideration. The concept of remote meteorological support is used throughout 

the industry and the private sector. As we consider several options, our concern for 

safety remains paramount. 

58 

The FAA will carefully examine the potential contributions from the National 

Weather Service and the potential savings from any proposed replacement to the 

current Weather and Radar Processor (WARP) display system. Any potential cost 

savings that could be realized would be used to develop, jointly with the NWS, a 

substantially improved and efficient Federal program that operates 7 days a week 

and 24 hours a day. 

Question 10. With trust fund revenues down, the AIP process has obviously been 

affected. At the same time the Airbus A–380 will require significant changes at 

many of the airport s in the U.S. that it would serve. How much money is the FAA 

providing through the AIP process to accommodate the A–380? How much funding 

is being provided by airport and project? 

Answer. The FAA has provided $37.5 million of AIP funds for projects needed to 

accommodate the A–380. In FY03, the FAA issued a Letter of Intent to the Anchorage International Airport (ANC) of which $37.5 million is for improvements related 

to the A380 ($15 million for rehabilitating runways 6R/24L and $22.5 million for 

construction of taxiway Y). 

The FAA also anticipates funding projects related to the A380 at the following two 

airports: 

• Memphis International Airport (MEM): $34 million in FY06–07 to widen two 

runways, Runways 18L/36R and 18C/36C 

• San Francisco International Airport (SFO): $17 million in FY05 and $4 million 

in FY06 for rehabilitating and widening Runway and Taxiways. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

MARION C. BLAKEY

Question 1. What are the expected costs of extending mandatory retirement ages 

for air traffic controllers, rather than hiring newly trained controllers? Are there 

safety implications extending mandatory retirement ages for air traffic controllers? 

Answer. The agency has conducted an extensive review of the feasibility of extending the employment of controllers who reach the mandatory retirement age of 

56 as an alternative to hiring new controllers. The major parameters involved in 

such a review are: (1) the salaries of the senior controllers and new hires; (2) the 

cost of overtime while new hires are being trained; and (3) training costs. Because 

of the myriad of variables involved, it is not feasible to ascertain the cost/benefit 

of this option with any practical level of certainty. However, of the various scenarios 

studied, we found that the high cost of senior controller salaries indicated that a 

clear case could not be made to support the economic feasibility of this approach. 

However, the agency does believe that, primarily at large high volume facilities, 

operational needs will clearly justify retaining some controllers on duty past age 56. 

To that end the agency has developed controller selection criteria, which is currently 

being reviewed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that can be used for 

this effort. Once approved, the criteria will be used on an as needed basis, but such 

retentions will not have a major effect on our need to hire new controllers. Although 

safety implications have not been looked at in a separate review, we believe that 

the selection criteria developed will make this a non-issue. Furthermore, because exemptions under current law, we now have 540 en route and terminal controllers 

over the age of 56 in our system. Of that number, approximately 350 were PATCO 

rehires. Many of them are either exempt from mandatory separation or came back 

under FERS which allows them to remain in a covered position until they have 20 

years of covered service before being separated. 

Question 2. Is FAA in complete compliance with the terms of OMB Circular A– 

76 in preparing for the competition of this [sic] contract? 

Answer. FAA is in complete compliance with OMB Circular A–76. Pursuant to 

Public Law 104–50 (the 1996 DOT Appropriations Act), Congress directed FAA to 

develop and implement a new acquisition management system. The FAA Acquisition 

Management System (AMS) took effect on April 1, 1996, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 

40110(d). FAA has since amended the AMS to accommodate use of the OMB Circular A–76. Therefore, where the OMB Circular refers to the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR), the Agency will apply the AMS. 

FAA requested and OMB granted three deviations from the Circular specifically 

for the Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) public-private competition. Deviations include permission for: 

• a performance period that exceeds five years; 

59 

• a waiver from the requirement that the evaluation factor for cost must equal 

at least 50 percent of the weight of all evaluation factors; and 

• provision for staggering the submission of technical and cost proposals for all 

offerors and tenders. 

In accordance with the Circular, the Competitive Sourcing Official (CSO) also 

granted two waivers for the AFSS public-private competition: 

• an extension of the timeline from 12 to 15 months from the date of Public Announcement; and 

• use of the trade-off source selection method. 

Question 3. What is FAA doing to address the problem of dense, continuous smoke 

in the cockpit? 

Answer. The FAA’s transport airplane airworthiness requirements address protection of the flight crew from smoke in the cockpit. The emphasis is to prevent or control small fires before they erupt and cause catastrophic conditions. Smoke goggles 

and oxygen masks are required for the flight crew and flight deck smoke evacuation 

procedures must be developed and presented in the FAA approved airplane flight 

manual (AFM). 

An Emergency Vision Assurance System (EVAS) from Vision Safe Corporation has 

been approved by the FAA for installation on a number of airplane models. The device was neither evaluated in flight nor in the presence of dense smoke and was 

approved on what is known as a non-interference basis. This approach is used by 

the FAA to evaluate certain types of equipment that are not required and for which 

no defined minimum safety standard exists, to ensure that the equipment does not 

adversely affect any of the required equipment on board necessary for the aircraft’s 

safe operation. 

EVAS addresses a very rare event where multiple failures of smoke detection and 

fire suppression must occur to the extent of defeating the normal smoke evacuation 

process allowing very dense smoke to accumulate. Accident case history indicates 

that aircraft fire scenarios that progress to the point that the flight crew vision is 

impaired usually are catastrophic for reasons other than flight crew not being able 

to see the instruments. The FAA has not mandated EVAS installation because data 

does not support imposing such a design concept at this time given the current operational concerns and the outstanding safety record of the existing fleet. 

Question 4. Why does FAA equip its own fleet of aircraft with smoke-protection 

systems to allow pilots to fly under conditions of dense, continuous smoke in the 

cockpit? 

Answer. The FAA currently has equipped a portion of its fleet with a smoke protection system that allows the flight crew, in the unlikely event of a smoke filled 

environment, an unobstructed view of the flight path and primary instruments was 

well as the ability to read approach plates and emergency procedures. 

Question 5. A recent Washington Post article (‘‘Airline Safety Costs a) Billions or 

b) Pennies. Answer Below’’ by David Evans on April 4, 2004) cites the cost of equipping the U.S. commercial fleet of planes with FAA-certified smoke protection equipment at about three pennies per ticket. Do you agree with that assessment? If not, 

what is the cost estimate based on both current and future technology to provide 

protection from dense continuous smoke in the cockpit? 

Answer. The FAA is not currently considering a smoke protection rule and consequently has not estimated the cost of such a proposal. However, the principles employed by the agency in rulemaking are much broader than simply ‘‘cost per ticket.’’ 

It is in the interest of the aviation industry to provide a safe transportation system, and it provides many safety improvements without regulation. The FAA promulgates only such regulations as are required by law or that address a compelling 

need to protect public health and/or safety. 

When a rule is considered, cost and benefit analysis is a primary tool the FAA 

employs to evaluate its likely consequences. It provides a formal way to assist in 

finding the most efficient way to achieve the desired objective and to help determine 

if the benefits of a proposed rule justify the costs. Economic analysis is just one factor in making the final judgment on whether to promulgate a rule. 

Question 6. How will allowing designees to perform inspections and reviews required by the Aging Aircraft Safety Rules affect the safety of operations of these 

aircraft? Will designees have the same training and experience that their FAA counterparts have? 

Answer. The safety of aging airplanes will not be affected in any way by the use 

of designees to perform a portion of the inspections and records reviews mandated 

by the Aging Airplane Safety Act of 1991. FAA is revising guidance and developing 

60 

training for implementation in FY 05 so that designees will have the same training 

and experience as their FAA counterparts. 

The FAA has been using designees to augment FAA functions for approximately 

60 years. Under 49 U.S.C. 44702(d), the Administrator may delegate these functions. To become a designee of the Administrator, applicants must meet stringent 

requirements for experience and training, present three letters of recommendation 

and finally, be screened by the National Examiner Board (NEB). The designees 

must also attend specific training and recurrent training every two years. 

Through a designee oversight system, the FAA conducts surveillance activities on 

all designees to determine continued compliance with their authorized functions. 

The FAA retains the authority to terminate designations upon a finding that the 

designee has not properly performed his/her duties under the designation or for any 

reason that the Administrator deems appropriate. 

Question 7. Is the FAA evaluating whether to extend mandatory retirement ages 

for pilots? 

Answer. No. The FAA is not currently evaluating whether to extend the mandatory retirement age for pilots. The FAA has reviewed the rule multiple times over 

the years and on each occasion has decided to retain the rule. 

Some background information may be helpful. The ‘‘Age 60 Rule’’ first went into 

effect in 1959 because of the growing complexity of commercial aviation and the recognition that aging is associated with a progressive deterioration of certain abilities 

necessary for flying. It is clear that there is progressive anatomic, physiological and 

cognitive decline associated with aging. While it is variable in severity and onset 

among individuals, impairment cannot yet be predicted in a specific individual. 

In 1993, the FAA released the report of an extensive study that correlated available accident data with the amount of flying by pilots, as a function of age. After 

conducting a public hearing and considering thousands of written comments, it was 

again decided to retain the rule. In 1997 an appeals court ruled in favor of the 

FAA’s decision not to initiate a rulemaking to change the Age 60 rule. On May 18, 

1998 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of that decision by the Professional Pilots Federation and others. The FAA, upon request by Congress, once 

again assessed accident and incident data in respect to pilot age and provided a 

final report of this study to Congress in March 2003. Because it is unacceptable to 

work as a pilot until failure or obvious impairment, the age of 60 has served well 

as a regulatory limit. 

Question 8. How many systems specialists does the FAA currently employ? 

Answer. As of 06/07/2004, there are 5861 PASS technical employees on board 

which is 239 under the agreed upon staffing level of 6,100. Additionally, there are 

172 PASS technical employees on board in the Operations Control Centers that are 

not counted in that number. 

Question 9. When does the FAA plan to submit its air traffic controller staffing 

plan per paragraph (a) of Section 221 of P.L. 108–176? 

Answer. That plan is under development and we expect to meet the December 12, 

2004 deadline for submission to Congress. 

Question 10. Does the FAA have any plans to require equivalent safety standards 

and safety reporting standards for both air traffic control towers operated under the 

contract tower program and FAA-operated towers? 

Answer. The safety standards and safety reporting standards required for FAAoperated air traffic control towers are currently required for air traffic control towers operated under the contract tower program. 

More specifically, FAA contract tower employees are required to possess an FAA 

control tower operator certificate, and a qualified FAA certifying official performs 

certification of contract employees. Each contractor is required to submit a Quality 

Assurance Plan to the FAA for each contract facility, which is reviewed and approved by the FAA. 

Each facility is subject to the FAA quality assurance and evaluation program. 

Each undergoes a full facility evaluation conducted separately by the contractor and 

by the FAA. In addition, the facilities are covered by and required to comply with 

all FAA processes relative to incident and accident reporting investigation and follow-up. Finally, each contract facility falls under an FAA parent hub facility and 

is subject to oversight by the FAA Hub Manager. 

Question 11. Why does the FAA allow repair stations not subject to its regulation 

to perform work on U.S. aircraft? 

Answer. Under controlled circumstances, an FAA-certificated repair station can 

outsource maintenance if it has procedures in place to assure the airworthiness of 

the articles that are being maintained. The recently revised repair station rules require FAA approval of maintenance functions outsourced to non-certificated faciliVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Sep 06, 2016 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\21364.TXT JACKIE
61 

ties. The following requirements must be met before an item may be returned to 

service: 

• The FAA-certificated repair station remains directly in charge of the work performed. 

• The non-certificated facility must follow a quality control system equivalent to 

the system followed by the certificated repair station. 

• The certificated repair station verifies, by test and/or inspection, that the work 

has been performed satisfactorily and is airworthy. 

Certificate holders use non-certificated maintenance facilities to perform maintenance functions that require precise skills such as machining operations or heattreating that are not limited to aviation applications. Often there is not a certificated person that can perform these functions in the vicinity of an FAA certificate 

holder. FAA surveillance can now be conducted at the non-certificated facility in accordance with 14 CFR 145.223(b) and the certificated repair station cannot return 

the article to service if the non-certificated source does not permit the FAA to inspect the facility. 

Question 12. The FAA was scheduled to award a contract on the flight service A– 

76 study on March 17, 2005. Is this still the case? 

Answer. Yes, the contract will be awarded on or before March 17, 2005. The exact 

date is contingent upon the number of potential service providers who will actually 

submit proposals. 

Question 13. Do you intend to seek any form of Congressional approval or briefings before awarding this contract? 

Answer. The AFSS public-private competition performance award will be handled 

like any other FAA major system acquisition. The established Congressional notification system will apply. 

Question 14. FAA’s own training plan called for 80 percent of the Airways Facilities workforce to receive basic core skills training and certification by this year, but 

I understand less than 40 percent of the workforce has been fully trained and received their certification. How does FAA plan to accomplish this goal of 80 percent? 

Answer. The initial Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Appendix V attachment 

to the Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS) and Airway Facilities (AF) 

Bargaining Unit Agreement, 2000–2005, established a goal of 80 percent for achieving A+ and Network+ certification for technical bargaining unit employees. 

However, under a subsequent agreement made in 2003 between a joint FAA and 

PASS workgroup, the agency shifted from tracking the percentage of the entire 

workforce receiving this training, to ensuring that only the employees who need this 

training based on their respective areas of responsibility are required to complete 

it. The annual training requirement based upon employees’ area of responsibility 

was completed. 

At present, we are ensuring, on case-by-case bases, that those technicians that 

need this certification for their job performance are receiving it. 

Question 15. How much money is included in the agency’s FY 05 budget for this 

task? 

Answer. Approximately $5,000,000 has been spent during the past three years to 

accomplish these certifications, which, as noted above, has been completed. In the 

future, this funding level will vary as it relates to prerequisite training for new 

equipment training courses and, therefore, depends upon the number of deployments of such equipment. There is not a separate line in our budget for this training, rather it is part of the agency’s overall training program. We expect that the 

FY05 funding level to be approximately $2,000,000. 

Question 16. What core skills training has the agency scheduled for FY05? 

Answer. In addition to the A+/Network+ coursework, the FAA academy has classes scheduled in telecommunications, internetworking, applications, and personal 

computer hardware. Various technical training courses also have instruction on information technology skills specific to a particular type of equipment (such as programming language, e.g., UNIX), imbedded within the curriculum. 

Question 17. What are FAA’s plans for using the Traffic Management Advisor 

(TMA) tool, which was designed to address bottlenecks, in areas outside of Chicago? 

Does FAA plan to continue to replicate its use in other areas? 

Answer. Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) has been installed at seven Air Route 

Traffic Control Centers: Denver, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Miami, Atlanta, Oakland, and Houston. TMA has also been installed at Chicago and upcoming installations are planned at Albuquerque and Memphis. Initial daily use of the Chicago 

TMA is expected during September 2005. 

62 

Question 18. You testified that ‘‘we have designed the ATO to be a more streamlined, effective means of providing the safest air traffic control in the world to the 

most complex airspace in the world.’’ Is this FAA’s goal for the safety level of the 

operations of the U.S. air traffic control system? If so, which metrics does FAA intend to use to compare levels of safety? If not, what safety levels are sought by FAA 

in the design of the ATO and how will they be gauged? 

Answer. On March 8, 2004, the Administrator announced the establishment of the 

Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV). The primary mission of the AOV will 

be oversight of the safety related issues pertaining to the provision of air traffic 

services. This includes establishing safety standards for air traffic services provided 

by the FAA nationally and internationally and monitoring the system for compliance with those standards. The Service is also responsible for developing and maintaining the policy and requirements for the Safety Management System (SMS), 

monitoring compliance with the SMS, providing leadership and direction in planning and managing audits and evaluating SMS performance and assessing the adequacy of the follow-up recommendations in accordance with approved safety standards and SMS criteria. 

Concurrent with the establishment of the AOV, the level of safety of the NAS was 

baselined via a comparative gap analysis of ICAO requirements and FAA standards. 

We determined that FAA meets, and in many cases exceeds, ICAO safety requirements. This baseline will serve for future measurement of safety performance. 

Changes to the existing safety standards will be accepted provided they are in compliance with the SMS. Additionally, any changes to existing aircraft separation 

standards require specific approval that will only be granted when the SMS documentation indicates they are safe. 

Question 19. Your testimony infers that the head of the new Air Traffic Safety 

Oversight Service office director will report directly to the Director of the Office of 

Regulations and Certification. If this new office is to remain independent in its oversight capacity, why doesn’t its director report directly to the FAA Administrator? 

Answer. The new organization will essentially regulate the ATO in much the 

same way that the agency regulates the airlines. As one of its first tasks, it will 

approve a standardized way to assess the safety ramifications of changes to air traffic standards and procedures. Its duties will also include approving those procedures, stopping procedures if safety issues are involved and issuing safety directives. 

To guarantee independence, the director will not be a part of the ATO, meaning 

he/she will not be subject to the Chief Operating Officer of the ATO, but will instead 

report to the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification. That Office 

has a long history of regulating airlines and other service providers. This organizational approach complies with a recommendation from the National Civil Aviation 

Review Commission in 1997 that safety oversight of the FAA’s air traffic function 

be provided by a separate part of the agency. 

Question 20. How will ATO be able to ‘‘correct past mistakes’’ in managing capital 

and operations? Do you mean that this organization will not repeat past mistakes? 

Answer. The Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is structured to improve management, accountability and communication at all levels and to operate in a more business-like manner. The business service unit concept has been implemented to push 

accountability for spending down to the lower operational service units. A Senior 

Vice President for Finance has been hired who is responsible for financial oversight, 

standards and practices of the ATO as a whole. He is responsible for the entire finances of the ATO, including the Research, Engineering & Development (R,E&D), 

Facilities & Equipment (F&E), and Operations (Ops) accounts. FAA will now have 

significantly more coordination across appropriations. Metrics are being implemented to push cost controls down to the lowest level and measure one facility’s performance against another. We are restructuring our Acquisition Management System (AMS) to add additional justification for projects prior to initiating them. Business units now have a vested interest in ensuring that large capital projects are delivered on time and under budget. Finally, five levels of management have been 

eliminated, thereby allowing issues to surface in time to address them. 

The organizational changes made under the ATO are intended to improve both 

the efficiency of delivery and the quality of services provided to our customers. The 

potential for repeating past mistakes has been mitigated by the new organizational 

structure that takes into account lessons learned from the past. 

Question 21. What standards are the agency complying with in its contract competition for the maintenance and operation of flight service stations: Federal Acquisition Regulations, OMB Circular A–76, or other guidance? 

Answer. FAA is utilizing OMB Circular A–76 and FAA’s Acquisition Management 

System, as appropriate. 

63 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

HON. KENNETH M. MEAD

Question 1. What are the expected costs of extending mandatory retirement ages 

for air traffic controllers, rather than hiring newly trained controllers? Are there 

safety implications for extending mandatory retirement ages for air traffic controllers? 

Answer. FAA has not estimated the additional costs of extending mandatory retirement ages for air traffic controllers rather than hiring newly trained controllers. 

However, at best, extending the mandatory retirement age is only a short-term solution and the costs would be greater as career air traffic controllers are paid at a 

higher rate than newly certified controllers. FAA is working on a rulemaking that 

establishes procedures for extending the retirement age based on a controller’s 

qualifications, and the Agency is establishing a process to review each controller’s 

request for a waiver. The waiver process should minimize any safety risk. 

Question 2. Is FAA in complete compliance with the terms of the OMB Circular 

A–76 in preparing for the competition of this contract? 

Answer. FAA is in the process of conducting an A–76 competition of the Flight 

Service Stations. We are receiving regular briefings but have not conducted an audit 

of the competition process. According to FAA’s Office of Competitive Sourcing, the 

Agency has been working closely with OMB to ensure that the process strictly adheres to OMB’s terms and that any deviations from the A–76 circular are approved 

by OMB. 

Question 3. What is FAA doing to address the problem of dense, continuous smoke 

in the cockpit? 

Answer. While we have not conducted any audit work on this safety issue, we do 

know that FAA has approved the use of one device, the Emergency Vision Assurance System (EVAS), to protect pilots from continuous smoke in the cockpit. The 

EVAS can be procured by operators; however, FAA has not mandated the system 

for commercial aircraft and has no plans to do so. FAA has also issued an advisory 

circular to the industry recommending (but not mandating) that operators test various ways to protect against smoke in the cockpit. 

Question 4. Why does FAA equip its own fleet of aircraft with smoke-protection 

systems to allow pilots to fly under conditions of dense, continuous smoke in the 

cockpit? 

Answer. According to FAA, the agency has equipped some of its aircraft with 

smoke protection equipment. It is perplexing that FAA has equipped its own aircraft 

but has not mandated similar action for the commercial transport fleet. FAA has 

not provided us with the specific information we requested on this (number of aircraft equipped) or the agency’s rational, other than receiving a discount for FAA aircraft. 

Question 5. A recent Washington Post article (‘‘Airline Safety Costs a) Billions or 

b) Pennies. Answer Below’’ by David Evans on April 4, 2004) cites the cost of equipping the U.S. commercial fleet of planes with FAA-certified smoke protection equipment at about three pennies per ticket. Do you agree with that assessment? If not, 

what is the cost estimate based on both current and future technology to provide 

protection from dense, continuous smoke in the cockpit? 

Answer. We cannot make judgments on the cost to equip the U.S. transport fleet 

with smoke protection equipment as presented in the article because reliable cost 

estimates do not exist, and we have not done work specifically on this matter. FAA 

is not planning to mandate that commercial air carriers equip their aircraft with 

smoke protection equipment at this time. Consequently, FAA has not conducted a 

formal cost and benefit analysis, which would be required for a rulemaking action. 

Question 6. How will allowing designees to perform inspections and reviews required by the Aging Aircraft Safety Rules affect the safety of the operations of these 

aircraft? Will designees have the same training and experience that their FAA 

counter parts have? 

Answer. The pending agency aircraft safety rules require aircraft to undergo inspections and record reviews after the 14th year of service, with an emphasis on 

detecting fatigue cracking. Given the anticipated workload from the rule, FAA envisions that Agency maintenance inspectors as well as designees will be used to perform the required inspections for the aging aircraft program. The details of exactly 

how this will work have yet to be determined. We note that air carriers must obtain 

approval from FAA before they can use a designee. FAA has established specific requirements for the experience and training of designees. For example, designees 

must have 5 years of applicable experience. In a related area, FAA has relied on 

designees to help certify aircraft and aircraft components for a number of years. As 

64 

with other important safety issues, follow through and oversight will be critical once 

these changes for older aircraft have been mandated. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

JAYETTA Z. HECKER

Question. What are the expected costs of extending mandatory retirement ages for 

air traffic controllers, rather than hiring newly trained controllers? Are there safety 

implications for extending mandatory retirement ages for air traffic controllers? 

Answer. In June 2002, we issued a report Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Better 

Prepare for Impending Wave of Controller Attrition (GAO–02–591) that examined air 

traffic controller attrition issues, including a discussion of the mandatory retirement 

age. In this work we did not attempt to assess the costs of extending the mandatory 

retirement age for controllers beyond age 56. However, controllers approaching the 

mandatory retirement age would most likely have accrued extensive years in service 

as an air traffic controller, and thus there is a good possibility that they would be 

approaching the upper end of the salary scale at their specific facility. We note that 

FAA generally restricts hiring to those 30 and younger. Thus the salary of those 

at age 56 would be much higher than a newly trained controller. As such, there 

could be short-term costs of extending the mandatory retirement age. The actual extent of these costs would also depend on how many controllers actually choose to 

stay beyond age 56, given the opportunity. In our report, we found that about 30 

percent of the controllers responding to our survey indicated that they would consider delaying their retirement date if they could obtain an age waiver. 

With regard to the potential safety issues associated with extending the mandatory retirement age, the report notes that the House Report associated with establishing the age 56 provision in 1972, justified the provision by stating that ‘‘air traffic control is a young man’s business . . . and that because of the natural forces 

of aging, magnified by the stresses of control functions, the productive and proficient 

life of the controller is substantially less than that which prevails in most other occupations.’’ The House Report further states ‘‘as the controller approaches age 50 

his mental faculties of alertness, rapid decision making, and instantaneous reaction 

. . . begin a definite decline.’’ In addition, the associated Senate Report states ‘‘like 

skilled athletes, most controllers lose proficiency to some degree after age 40, and 

in the interest of the public’s safety, should not be retained as controllers in busy 

facilities beyond the time they can perform satisfactorily.’’ 

While safety was cited a reason for establishing the age 56 separation age, a number of controllers continue to control traffic beyond that age. For example, we found 

that as of June 30, 2001, about 700 of the nearly 18,000 active controllers were beyond age 56 because of various exemptions. According to FAA, 287 of those controllers were appointed before May 16, 1972 and were thus exempt from the separation 

provision. There are also some exemptions related to FERS employees. As a result 

of the exemptions, there will likely be additional controllers in the future who will 

exceed age 56. For example, our report noted that FAA had rehired about 850 controllers that were fired in 1981, after President Clinton in 1993, lifted the ban on 

hiring former striking employees. FAA officials told us that most of the rehires are 

exempt from the mandatory separation provisions because they were originally 

hired before May 16, 1972. We found that the oldest such controller was 69, as of 

June 30, 2001. 

Only limited actions are taken to assess whether those controllers who are exempted from the age 56 provision have adequately retained the skills and abilities 

necessary to perform their duties. FAA requires all controllers to pass annual physical examinations that test sight, hearing, and overall health conditions but no additional tests—such as those for mental acuity or changes in reaction time—are given 

controllers who surpass age 56. 

We concluded in the report that the safety and equity issues associated with the 

age 56 separation exemptions could affect morale of the controller workforce and the 

safety of air traffic. As a result, we recommended that FAA study the safety and 

equity impacts of allowing controllers to work past the age of 56. Recently, FAA testified that in response to the Congress it is preparing regulations that would permit 

controllers, under certain conditions, to work beyond the mandatory separation age 

of 56. In addition, FAA was directed by the Congress in Vision 100 to prepare a 

workforce plan consistent with our earlier recommendations. FAA expects to complete the report in December 2004. 

Æ 

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