Supreme Court

No. 2015-299-Appeal.

(ND 14-266)

Jeffrey Dieffenbach :

v. :

J. Brian Haworth et al. :

O R D E R 

This case came before the Supreme Court on May 4, 2016, pursuant to an order directing 

the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised herein should not be summarily 

decided. We conclude that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be decided at this 

time. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Family may be forever, but in-laws are not. On December 20, 1998, the plaintiff, Jeffery 

Dieffenbach (Dieffenbach), then a Connecticut resident, executed two promissory notes in favor 

of his then-wife’s parents, the defendants, J. Brian Haworth and Jean Haworth (collectively, the 

Haworths). The first promissory note contained Dieffenbach’s promise to pay Brian Haworth 

$15,000 with interest to accrue annually at a rate of 10 percent. The second promissory note was 

executed in favor of Jean Haworth in the amount of $6,000 at 10 percent interest per annum. 

Dieffenbach and the Haworths’ daughter subsequently divorced, and the now former son-in-law

defaulted on the promissory notes. The case at bar is the most recent litigation in a protracted 

dispute—spanning sixteen years, two states, and multiple levels of the federal-court system1

—

1 See In re Haworth, Bankr. No. 01-50184, C.A. 3:06 CV 403 (CFD), 2008 WL 4755851, at *1

& n.2 (D. Conn. Oct. 29, 2008), aff’d, 356 F. App’x 529 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 

Dieffenbach v. Haworth, 562 U.S. 947 (2010).

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that stems from Dieffenbach’s failure to satisfy his payment obligations on the two promissory 

notes. This order will discuss only the facts and travel that are relevant to this appeal.

2

In 2000, when Dieffenbach failed to make any payments on the notes, the Haworths filed 

suit in the Connecticut courts to collect on the debt, plus accrued interest. On October 4, 2000, 

the parties stipulated to a judgment in which Dieffenbach agreed to pay the Haworths $30,000,

unless, by November 30, 2000, he paid them “$21,000 with interest at 10 percent per annum 

from December 20, 1998 to the date of payment” (stipulated judgment). Dieffenbach failed to 

honor the stipulated judgment, but, on February 26, 2001, he paid $10,000 in partial satisfaction. 

By 2003, Dieffenbach had relocated to Rhode Island. On March 31, 2003, in an effort to 

secure the remaining $20,000 pursuant to the Connecticut stipulated judgment, the Haworths

filed an action in Newport County Superior Court against Dieffenbach. In 2004, the hearing 

justice entered judgment for the Haworths and against Dieffenbach in the amount of $20,000 

plus interest and costs. The judgment remained unsatisfied. Six years later, on March 1, 2010, 

the Haworths filed a notice and motion for the issuance of a writ of attachment for Dieffenbach’s 

wages with the Newport County Superior Court. On November 19, 2010, in a bench decision, 

the hearing justice granted the motion.

On December 7, 2010, after the Superior Court justice issued his bench decision but 

before an order was entered,

3 Dieffenbach filed a motion in the Connecticut trial court, seeking, 

inter alia, a protective order to bar enforcement of the stipulated judgment on the ground that it 

2 For a full recitation of the facts underlying this dispute, we refer readers to Haworth v. 

Dieffenbach, 38 A.3d 1203, 1205-07 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (Haworth I) and In re Haworth, 

2008 WL 4755851, at *1. 

3 The order was entered on December 9, 2010. Dieffenbach timely appealed the decision to this 

Court but withdrew his appeal on July 3, 2012, in light of the Connecticut Appellate Court’s 

decision in Haworth I. 

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was usurious as a matter of Connecticut law. See Haworth v. Dieffenbach, 38 A.3d 1203, 1206-

07 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (Haworth I). In that action, he did not seek the return of the $10,000 

he already had paid. See id. On February 28, 2012, the Connecticut Appellate Court declared

that “the stipulated judgment is usurious as a matter of law and cannot stand,” id. at 1209, and 

that “justice requires that the court grant a protective order to bar the enforcement of the illegal 

judgment against [Dieffenbach],” id. at 1210. 

This brings us to this latest salvo. Flushed with victory in Connecticut, on April 8, 2014, 

Dieffenbach filed a complaint against the Haworths in Second Division District Court in 

Newport. He alleged that, because the Connecticut Appellate Court had declared the stipulated 

judgment to be usurious, he was entitled to a refund of the $10,000 payment that he made to the 

Haworths on February 26, 2001 in accordance with the stipulated judgment. The District Court 

dismissed the complaint, and Dieffenbach appealed to the Superior Court in Newport County on 

July 8, 2014. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial justice denied Dieffenbach’s 

motion and, applying Connecticut law,4 granted summary judgment for the Haworths. Judgment 

entered on July 7, 2015, and Dieffenbach timely appealed. 

The doctrine of res judicata bars relief in this case, and its application precludes this 

Court from hearing the merits of this case on appeal. See Town of Richmond v. Wawaloam 

Reservation, Inc., 850 A.2d 924, 932 (R.I. 2004) (invoking doctrine of res judicata where neither 

party argued for its application on appeal and the trial court decision rested on other grounds). 

To avoid the waste of judicial resources and the potential for contradictory judgments, id., the 

4 In his bench decision, the trial justice cited Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-4 (2013), which provides, in 

relevant part, that “[n]o person * * * shall, as guarantor or otherwise, directly or indirectly, loan 

money to any person and, directly or indirectly, charge, demand, accept[,] or make any 

agreement to receive therefor interest at a rate greater than [12] per cent per annum.” He noted 

that “[t]here [is] no Connecticut case law giving the borrower the right to be reimbursed for 

payments made before the loan needed to be satisfied, relying on [Conn. Gen. Stat. §] 37-4.”

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doctrine of res judicata bars “the relitigation of all the issues that were tried or might have been 

tried in the original suit,” Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1188 (R.I. 2005) (quoting FosterGlocester Regional School Committee v. Board of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 1014 n.2 (R.I. 

2004)). Res judicata applies in cases where “there exists identity of parties, identity of issues, 

and finality of judgment in an earlier action.” Id. (quoting Beirne v. Barone, 529 A.2d 154, 157 

(R.I. 1987)). 

In the case at bar, despite already having paid $10,000 in partial satisfaction of the 

judgment, Dieffenbach did not demand its return when he sought a protective order from the 

Connecticut state courts to bar enforcement of the stipulated judgment or otherwise seek a refund 

in that state’s courts. Dieffenbach could have litigated the issue of the refund at that time but 

failed to do so. In spite of having received a final judgment from the Connecticut Appellate 

Court, Dieffenbach brought yet another action against the Haworths in Rhode Island on an issue 

concerning the validity of the stipulated judgment that was litigated in Haworth I. Consequently, 

Dieffenbach was barred from bringing this claim, which should have been made in the 

Connecticut courts when he challenged the usurious nature of the stipulated judgment. 

Entered as an Order of this Court this 26th day of May, 2016. 

By Order,

_______________/s/__________________

 Clerk

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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE

Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet

TITLE OF CASE: Jeffrey Dieffenbach v. J. Brian Haworth et al.

 

CASE NO: No. 2015-299-Appeal.

 (ND 14-266)

 

COURT: Supreme Court

DATE ORDER FILED: May 26, 2016

JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

WRITTEN BY: N/A – Court Order

SOURCE OF APPEAL: Newport County Superior Court

JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:

Associate Justice Walter R. Stone

ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:

 For Plaintiff: Richard D’Addario, Esq.

For Defendant: Kathleen M. Connell, Esq.