### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON November 20, 2000 S ession CHRIS FARLEY v. CHARLES ELLIS, ET AL 

### . A Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Crockett County No. 7642 The Honorable George R. Ellis, Judge

No. W2000-00354-COA-R3-CV - Filed December 27, 2000

Plaintiff sued defendants

to enforce alle

ged oral agr

eement to convey re

al estate or alternatively for damages. The trial court found that the oral agreement violated the statute of fraud

s, but ordered, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the specific perfo

rmance of the or

al agreement.

Defendants have appealed.

Tenn.R.App.R. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed As Modified and Remanded

W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S., delivered t he opinion of the c

ourt, in which A LAN E. H IGHERS , J. and D AVID R. FA RMER , J., joined.
Mitchell G. Tollison

, Humboldt, For Appe

llants, Charles Ell

is and Wanda Borde

rs Ellis Jerald M. Campbell, Jr., Trenton, For Appellee, Chris Farley
OPINION
Plaintiff, Chris Farley, filed a complaint on March 9, 1999, ag ainst defendants , Charles Ellis (hereinafter

defendant or Ellis) and Wanda Borders Ellis (her

einafter Ms. Bord

ers) seeking specific performance

of an alleged ora

l agreement to co

nvey real estate or i n the alternative for money da mages. The complaint alleges that the defendants, Charles Ellis and Dorothy Ellis, plaintiff’s mother, were married in June 1990. In the summer or fall of 1993, d efendant began asking the plaintiff to move from Arkansas to Crockett County, Tennessee, to hel p defendant

care for plaintiff’s mother. The complaint avers that in exchange for plain tiff doing this, Char les Ellis agreed to deed “some” ac

reage of land to p

laintiff. The com

plaint further av

ers that Ellis

continued asking plaintiff to move a nd, finall y, in appro ximately June or Ju ly, 1994, plaintiff

did begin improving the real property. He worked on clearing the land for nearly three months and lived there part of that time in a trailer in defendant’s yard. P laintiff further avers that subsequently he purchased

a double-wide trailer, moved it on the property, and moved his family from Arkansas to the property. He alleges that he expended sums o

f money in placing i

mprovements on the

property-2-

andspent many hours of

labor improving the property. Plaintiff further avers that some time after doing this work, he requested the defendant to deed the property as he had agreed, but that instead, defendant “told plaintiff he could live on the property as long as he liked, so l ong as h e paid the property taxes on the land.” The compla int avers that plai

ntiff’s mother an

d Ellis divorced and that plaintiff had paid the property taxes every year that he lived on the property since he was told to

do
so by the defendant, except for the 1998 property taxes, which Ellis paid before plaintiff knew that they were due. Plaintiff avers that in April of 1998, defendant, began telling the plaintiff that he must move himself and hi

s mobile home from th

e real property

, and also quit clai

med the property to defendant,

Wanda Borders Ellis, who was then W anda Borders. Ms.

Borders then made

attempts to remove plaintiff from the property and file

d a criminal tresp

ass warrant against the plaintiff. The complaint alleges that the property was transferred to said Wanda Borders in an attempt to defraud the court and the plaintiff and prays that the conveyance be set aside. Plaintiff avers that defendant breached his contrac t with pla

intiff by not transferring the property and prays that defendant be required to specifically perform the contract. Alternatively, plaintiff seeks r eimburseme

nt for h is labor and improvements on the real estate, for the losses he incurred by moving from Arkansas and for

the cost of moving hi

s home to another location. Alternatively, he prays that he be allowed to live on the property as long as he pays the taxes.

Defendants

responded to the c

omplaint by a motion to

dismiss for failure

to state a claim,
a moti on t o strike the allegations concerning the alleged fraudulent transfer, and an affirmative defense of the statute of

frauds. Defendants further answered the complaint by denying the material allegations thereof as to an agreement. Defendants also filed a counter- complaint seeking possession of the property and rental for the property from April 17, 1998 until plaintiff removes himself from the property at the rate of $150.00 per month.

A non-jury trial was held on September 27 , 1999. Mr. Farley testified regarding the oral agreement as fo

llows:

Butthe property itself, I i nveste d all the money into it

. Charlie said, “Hey, you can put you a trailer up there. You can live there as lon g as wan t. I’m going to give you the property. Eventually, I’ll deed it in your name.”

Me and my wife event

uallystarted having trouble, as far as the marriage and stuff. You know, it wasn’t nothing that we didn’t breeze through later on. But he told me - - the exact wor

ds he said is, “Hey, if ya’ll got a divorce, I don’t want a bunch of scallyw ags living up there, so right now I’m going to hang on to the deed.”

O nce it became apparent to Mr. Farley that he was not going to receive the deed, h e continuedliving on the property. Prior to the marriage of Ms. Borders to Ellis in June of 1999, Mr. Farley was called to testify in a custody dispute regarding Ms. B orde rs’ child from a previous-3-

marriage. The nature of his testimony was that Ms. Border s was living with Ellis . Subsequent to testifying, he received a letter from Ms. Rainwater, counsel for Ms. Borders, asking him to remove himself from the property. Mr. Farley claimed to have spent fourteen tho usand to f ifteen thousand dollars in making improvements

to the property, ho

wever, he did

not have documentation to verify that amount. He stated that the improvements to the property at his expense includ e: a septic tank, a concrete driveway, a water line, dozer work, grass seed, trees, a conc rete pad, an outbuilding, concr ete sidewalks and molding. He als o claims compensa

tion for his labor in

making these impro

vements. Regarding the property taxes on the land, Mr. Farley estimates they were $22.23 before he moved his trailer on the land and $232.00 after.

Mrs. Dorothy Ellis next testified, stating that she wanted her son an d his wife and child

to move to Crockett County. Charles Ellis said that they could have the place where Chris Farley now resides. Mr. Ellis told her two times that he was going to deed the land to her son, but after they hadrelocated, Mr. E

llis stated that he w

anted to wait a while before changing the deed. Mr. Farley andhis wife worked very hard to make the land level and attractive. Dorothy Ellis further testified that the terms of

the agreement included that her son would receive the land, if he helped in taking
care of her, as she had suffered two nervous breakdowns. Barbara Froio, Mr. Ellis’s sister, testified that before Mr. Farleymoved from Arkan sas, her brother told her sometime in 1993 or 1994 that he had made a verbal agreement with Mr. Farley to give him a place to live.

Mr. Wayne B. Parlow, owner of Parlow Realty Company and Parlow Appraisal

Services, testi fied on behal f of the defendants. Mr. Parlow stated that he had prepared an appraisal of the 5.62 acretract of land deeded from Ellis to Ms. Borders on March 17, 1999, and determined that the value of the land w

as $15,000.00. Mr.

Parlow estimated t

hat the market r

ental value of the property was $150.00 per month, $1,800.00 annually.

Mr. Charles Ellis testif

ied on his own beha

lf, denying that he

told Mr. Farley tha

t he could live on his land as long as he paid the taxes. He admits that he allowed Mr. Farley to live on the land so that Dorothy Ellis ’s grandchild cou ld be near her, and stated that Mr. Farley never paid any rentwhile living on the property. Mr. Ellis had no intention of reimbursing Mr. F arley fo r improvements

mad e on the land, because he benefitted from the improvements, as he was living
on the land. Mr. Ellis denies that he encouraged, or asked Mr. Farley to move from Arkansas, and testified that he had no intention at any time of deeding the property to Mr. Farley. Mr. Ellis stated that the only thing thathe had communicated to Mr. Farley regarding the land was that “while he
was living ther e, he would pay the taxes. Not

as long as you want t

o live there, no.”

Mr. Ellis testified that he conveyed the prop erty to Ms. Borders in April of 1998, for the consideration of $10.00, but denies that the conveyance had an y relation to

a court order ma

ndating that Ms. Borders’s daughter not reside or be left alone with Mr. Ellis. Ms. Borders testified that she is the
owner of the 5.62 acre

tract and althoug

h she has no plans f

or the l and, she wants Mr. Farley to leave, because she would rather have the land vacant.-4-

On February 3, 2000, the trial c ourt filed its decr

ee which include

d finding of facts an d conclusions of law. The court found that in the summer of 1993, Mr. Ellis made an offer to plaintiff that he would deed plain

tiff land for a home in exchange for plaintiff relocating his family from Arkansas to Crockett County, Tennessee, to he lp Mr. Ellis with his wi

fe, Dorothy Ellis.

The trial court found that

after one year, Mr. Farley accepted the offer, began improving the subject land, and relocated his family. After Mr. Farley fulfilled his part of the agreement, Mr. Ellis refused to deed the promised property to him, but told him he could r

emain on the prope

rty for as long as h

e paid the property taxe s. The cou rt took judicial notice that Charles Ellis began a liaison with Wanda Borders, and that she alleged that she was not living with Mr. Ellis, but staying in the camper trailer outside of his residence. The trial court found that in 1998, Charles Ellis told Chris Farley that he would have to move. Mr. Ellis subsequently transferred the property to Wanda Borders, following the entry of an order forbidding Wanda Borders to bring her minor daughter on to the property of Charles Ellis. The trial court found that Chris Farley had testified at a custody hearing that Wanda Borders had beenliving with Charles E llis. That court fo

und a lack of cre

dibilityin the testimony of Charles Ellis and Wanda Borders. Some time thereafter, Charles Ellis marr ied Wanda Border

s, andChris Farley continuedto make improvement on the property. In addition, the trial court found that although Charles Ellis denied that he made an offer to induce Chris Far ley to move from Arkansas to Tennessee , he had no credit able explanation

as to why Chris Farle

y moved to this property, and expended time and money to improve the l an d. The court found that Charles Ellis was not a credibl

e witness.

The trial court found that plaintiff relied upon the promise of Mr. Ellis in moving his family from Arkansas to Tenn

essee, and in spe

nding a great deal of money on the subject property, and that a valid contract

existed between plaintiff and Mr. Ellis, based upon the theory of promissory estoppel. The tria

l court stated in pe

rtinent part:

The ag ree ment between Charles Ellis and Chris Farley violates t he statute of fraud

s; nevertheless,

specif ic performance is

appropriate under the equitable estoppel doc trine . At this juncture, justice andgood consciencedictate that the agr eemen t, which Charles Elli s entered into with Chris Farley should be enforced. The conveyance to Wanda Borders Ell

is is set aside as an attempt by Charle s Ellis and Wanda Bor ders to fraudule

ntly evade performing his contract with his former stepson. Charles Ellis is ord ered to deed the

property to Chris Fa

rley as he agreed to do when he induced him to move to Tennessee. Defendants have appealed and present five issues for review.
Since this case was trie

d by the trial cour

t sitting without a jur

y, we review the

case de novo upon the record with

a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact b

y the trial court. U

nless-5-

the evidence preponderates against the findings, we must affirm, absent error of law. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

The first issue fo

r review as state

d in defendants’ b

rief is:

I. The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of matters not presented at tria

l. Defendants comp

lain about the tria

l court’s followin

g statements in the f

indings of fact:

The court takes judicial notice that at sometime between then andthis hearing Charles Ellis began a liaison with Wanda Borders. At one point she alleg

ed that she was not

living with Charles Ellis but was staying in the camper trailer outside of his residence.
Charles Ellis told Chris Farle y that he would

have to remove himself from the property in 1998. Aft er a hearing in this court where Wanda Bor ders w as ordered not to take her minor daughter back t o the home of Charles Ellis where the court found she had b een living, Charles Elli s testified that he

sold this property

t o Wanda Borders for ten dollars. In the custody hear ing of Wa nda Borders, Chris Farley had te stifie d that she had been livin g with Charles Ellis. The court found a lack of credibility in the testimony of Charles Ellis an

d Wanda Borders.

“The court cannot take judicial knowledge of a former suit in the same cou rt . It must be establ is hed by evidence.” (Citations omitted.) Hudson v. Shoulders , 22 Tenn.App. 301, 122 S.W.2d 817, 819 (1938).

In Sutherland v. Sutherland , 831 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), this Court said:

Cou rts m ay not take “judicial notice” of testimony in prior unrelated cases. Courts must decided cases on competent evidence introducedin the trial of the case. However, it may take judicial notice of certain fac

ts which are commo

n know ledge to all intelligentm en. 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 14 (1967). “[F]ac ts which are not judicially cognizable must be pro ved, even th ough known to the judge or to the court as an individual.” Id. at § 15.
Id. at 285.

While it appears that the trial court erroneously took judicial notice of certain fac ts in a prior case it appears from the record as a whole that the facts which the trial court noticed did not have a bearing on the

trial court’s dec

ision in this case. T

herefore, this i

ssue is without merit

.-6-

The second issue p

resented for re

view, as stated in a

ppellants’ brief

, is:

II. The evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that defendant Charles Ellis had no cr edible explanation as to why plainti ff moved to the property at issue and spent time and mon e y making it livable.

The tri al courtmerely stat ed in its findings o

f fact that “he [E

llis] had no credible explanation why Chris

Farley moved to this property and spent so much time and money on making it livable. The court did not find Charles Ellis a credible witness.”

Defendants

point out in their brief that Ellis testified that plaintiff’s mother wantedhim to
move and have the grandchild there and also that the plaintiff wanted to move to be with his

mother.

The transcript shows no factual basis for these statements,

such as conversa

tions with Farley andsim ila r te sti mon y. Perhaps, t he trial ju dge felt that this was E llis’s impression. I

n any event

, the trial court consid

ered the recor

d as a whole

and as the trier of fact must give the testimony the weight, faith, and credit which it deserves. The trial court had the benefit of oth er explanations made by Mr. Ellis concern ing his dealings with plaintiff and was charged w

ith the responsibili

t y of weighing that

evidence, alo ng wi th a ll t he o the r evi den ce, t o de ter min e Mr . El lis ’s c redi bil ity. We find no merit in this issue. The three remaining issues presented for review, as stated in appellants’ brief, ar e:
III

. T he trial court erred in setting aside the conveyance from defendant Charl

es Ellis to defenda

nt Wanda Borders

Ellis.

IV. The trial court e

rred in concludin

g that plainti

ff had an enforceab l e parol contract for the sale of land in violation of the statue of frauds and or dering defendant Charles Ellis to deed the property to plaintiff.

V. The trial c ourt erred in refusing to g rant the relief s

ought in defendants’ co

unter-complaint. We believe these three issues can be combined into a single issue:

Whether the trial court

erred in ordering the

specific performance of the alleged oral contract , and, if so, whethe r plaintiff is entit

led to any relief.

Charles and Wanda Ellis contend that, assuming that there existed an oral contract, as alleged by plaintiff

, such contract w

ould be in

violation o f the statue of frauds, and therefore-7-

u nenforceable

. Defendants contend that under Tennessee law, such a contract is voidable at the election of either party. Once an oral contract is disaffirmed, ne ither spec ific perfo rmance, nor damages are available. They further argue that the allege d oral contract is not

enforceable,

as it did notcontain the essential terms or mutuality of obligation. Defendants assert that Mr. Farley realized
a profit of $15,000.00 by selling his property and moving from Arkansas to Tennessee to becloser to his mother at her request. Furthermore, after Charles and Dorothy Ellis divorced, there was no longer a reason for Chris Farley to live on the prope rty.
The Tennessee statute of fr auds prohibits the enforcement of contacts for the sale of land unless the promise or agreement is in writing, and signed by the pa rty to be charged. See T. C.A. § 29-2-101(5). Te

nnessee appella

nt courts continuou

sly have de

nied enforceme

nt o f a n oral contract for the sale of land on

the basis of

part performance, making it the rule in this state that part performance

of an oral contract for the sale of land will not take the agreement

out of the statute of frauds. Baliles v. Cities Service Co., 578 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tenn. 1979) (citing Knight v. Knight, 222 Tenn. 367, 436 S.W.2d 289 (1969); and Goodloe v. Goodloe , 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1905)). The statue of fra

uds is designed “

to reduce contracts to a

certainty, in order to avoid perjury
on the one hand and fraud on the other.” Price v. Tennesse e Products & Chemical Cor poration, 53 Tenn. App. 624, 385 S.W.2d 301 (1964). Therefore, to comply with the statute of frauds, such agreement

must show, with rea

sonable certainty, the

material terms intended by the parties to the sale. See Johnson v. Haynes , 532 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975), (“The mem

orandum must contain the essential terms of the contract expressed with such certainty that they may be understood from the memorandum itself or some other writing to which it refers or with which it is connected withoutresort to parol evidence.”) Id . at 565. To comply wi th the s tatute of frauds, the memorandum

agreement to

sell real estate

must show with reas

onable certaint

y the estate intended to be sold. See Baliles at 623. In exceptional cases, the

application of the

doctrine of equit

able estoppel has bee

n used to mitigate the harshness of this rule, “where to enforce the statute of frauds would make it an instrumentof hardship and oppression, verging on actual fraud.” Baliles, 578 S.W. 2d 624 (citing Covington v. McMurray, 4 Tenn. C.C.A. 378 ( 1913); and Gheen v.Osborn, 58 Tenn. 61 (1872). See also De c herd v. Blanton, 35 Tenn. 373 (1855) ; Williams v. Conrad, 30 Tenn. 412 (1850); Bloomstein v. Clees Brothers, 3 Cooper’s Tenn. Ch. 433 (1877); and Interstate Co. v. Bry-Block Mercantile Co., 30 F2d 172 (D.C.W.D. Tenn.) (1928)).

The record in the inst

ant case is devoid

of proof of the ma

terial terms of a

ny agree ment to convey the real estate, including, but not limited thereto , the terms of t he p erfo rma nce, pri ce, i f any, andthe specific property covered by the alleged agreement. Mr. Farley ’s own testimony tended to negate a certain oral agreement for convey ance of the title to the property

. Under the state

of this record, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be used to order a conveyance of the proper ty. To do so would be in effect

making a contract for the parties. Courts do not make contrac

ts; they only interpret and enforce them. See Turner v. Zager , 363 S.W.2d 512, 519 ( Ten n. Ct. App. 1962). However, Mr. Farley is not without relief. The proof demonstrates that Mr. Farley was granted a license to enter and

occupy some

of Ellis’s proper

ty for as lon

g as he wished if

he paid the property-8-

taxes. We distinguish Mr. Farley’s right from a lea

se, as he was gr

anted permission b

y Mr. Ellis under their agreement which was not a leasehold.

“A ‘license’, with

respect to real estate, is an authority to do a particular act or series of

acts on another’s land without

possessing any

estate therein.” Barksdale v. Marcum , 7 Tenn. App. 697, 708, cert, den., (1928).

In Heiskell v. Cobb , 58 Tenn. 638 (1872 ) the Court held

an oral agreement enforceable that allowedthe plaintiff to erect a milldam which flooded a section of the adjacent land owned by the defendant,

where the defendant not only encouraged the plaintiff to build the dam, but a

lso assisted in its construc t ion, and acquiesced in the use of the dam for several yea rs. The Heiskell

Court stated:

If

one enters upon the land of another by virtue of a parol license, givenfor a consideration, and e rect fix tures, such license becomes irrevocable.
Id. at 639.

In Daugherty v. Toomey, 222 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949) the parties owned adjoining property and orally ag reed to bui ld a wall near the property line to serve as a shared garage wal

l. The wall, and part of the defendants’ garage, were on the plaintiffs’ property, a fact of which the plaintiffs were aware. Id. Several years after the wall was built, the plaintiffs sought to require the defendants to remove that part of their garage loca ted on the plaintiffs’ property. Id. The trial court decision, denying pl aintiffs’ reque

st, and apply

ing the doctrine

of equitable

estoppel
was affirmed on appe

al. The Daugherty Court quoted the following from 53 C.J.S., Licenses § 90:

Where the licensee has acted under the license in good faith, and has incurred expense in the execu

tion of it, by ma

king valuable improve ments orotherwise, it is regarded in equity as an executed contract and substantially

an easement, the

revocatio

n of wh ich would be a fraud on the licensee, and therefo re th e licensor is estoppedto revok e it, particularly where the licensor joins in the enterprise and accepts the be nefits of the licensee’s labor and expense; and the rights of the licensee will co nt inue for as l ong a time as the nature of

the license calls for. It has also been held that the license cannot be revoked without reimbursing the licensee for his expenditures or otherwise placing him in statu quo. Dougher ty, 222 S.W.2d at 196 (emphasis added). The Court also stated that the plaintiffs had acquired an estimate of the cost to move and rebuild defendants garage, y et they had made no offer to pay the expense, or to reimburse the defendants. T here fore, the Court reasoned, it would be a manifest inequity to grant the plaintiffs the sought relief. Id. at 197.-9-

In Lee Highway & Associates, L.P., v. Pryor Bacon Company, supra, the Eastern Section of this Courtheld that a license for a right of access could be revoked “without working a fraud on the plaintiff p rov ided the defenda nt fully reim

burses the plaintif

f for the monies it e

xpended in building the cut-through.” Id. at *5.
In the instant case, the record indicates that Charles Ellis gave Chris F arley per mission to
en terand occup y the su

bject pro perty for as lon

g as he wi

shed, as l ong as he paid the ta

xes. We agree with the trial court that the consideration provided by Mr. Farley pursuant to his agreement
was that he “move his home in Arkansas to Crockett County, Tennessee to help Charles Ellis care for Dorothy Ellis.” However, we believe the evidence preponde rates ag ainst

the trial court’s finding that the agreement was an oral contract for the sale of land. I nstead, we believe tha

t Mr. E llis granted Mr. Farley a license, allowing Mr. Farle y to occu py the property in exchange for the consideration he provided, as long as he paid the taxes. Th e record shows that upon Mr. Ellis’s representatio

ns, Mr. Farl ey moved his family to Crockett County , taking up residence on the property adjacent to the ho

me of Charles and Dorothy Ellis. Mr. Farley paid the property ta xes from 1994 though 1997, while

Charles Ellis owne

d the property. He attempted to meet the condition of his occu pan cy b y m ailing a check to Wanda Ellis for the 1998 property taxes, however, was prevented from fulfilling his obligation in 1998, as she returned the check.

Based on the trialcourt’s findings which are supported by the record and under the above authorities , Mr . Ellis is estopped from removing Mr. Farley from the property without proper reimbursement

for the damage

s lawfull y due. When parties would be estopped, their heirs and privies in estate are also estopped. See LaRue v. Gree ne County Bank , 179 Tenn. 394, 166 S.W.2d 1044, 1052 (1942) and Heiskell v. Cobb , 58 Tenn. 638 (1872). Therefore, although it was Mr. Ellis that gran ted a li cens e to Mr. Farl ey, W and a El lis , as the pres ent own er of the pro pert y, is estopped to revoke Mr. Far

ley’s licen

se without tendering reimbursement to Mr. Farley for his expenditures for permanent improvements on the land.

In hiscomplaint, Mr. Farley sought the alternative relief of damages to reimburse him for his labor and the mate

rial purchased i

n making perman

ent improvements to

the property

as well as his moving expenses. Although Mr. Farley claims that he spent somewhere be tween $15,000 and $16,000 in improving the land, the record does not establish the value of the improvements

on the land. It appears th

at Mr. Farley

and his wife did muc

h of the work thems

elves and were a

ble to trade som e of t he m ate ria ls. Mr. Farl ey should no t receive reimbursement for the property taxes paid nor for his relocation expenses, as these appear to be part of the licensing agree ment. Also, no additional rent is due Mr. and Mrs. Ellis, as he provided the consideration agreed to and when requested to vacate the premises, he was not tendered reimbursement for the improvements made. The case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of damages based upon the value of the permanent improvements to the land.

The decree of the

trial court setting as

ide the deed of the

property to

defendant Wanda

Ellis is reversed, and

that part of the de

cree ordering

Charles Ellis to dee

d the property

to Chris Farley is reversed. The decree is modified to order that the pla int iff and cou nte r-d efen dan t, C hri s Far ley,-10-

remove his m obile home and vacate the property upon reimbursement by Wanda Ellis for the permanent

improvements made to the property by Mr. F ar ley. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the value of the permanent improvements made

to the property by Mr. Far

ley. Costs of t

he appeal are a

ssessed one-half

to Chris Farley

and his surety and
one -hal f to cou nte r-p lai nti ffs , Ch arl es E lli s an d Wa nda Ell is, and the ir s uret y.

__________________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD , PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.