[Cite as Leecue v. Trumbull Cty. Combined Health Dist., 2018-Ohio-4268.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO 

LORI LEECUE, : 

: 

O P I N I O N 

 Petitioner-Appellant, CASE NO. 2018-T-0025

: 

 - vs - 

: 

TRUMBULL COUNTY COMBINED 

HEALTH DISTRICT, 

: 

 Respondent-Appellee. : 

Civil Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2017 CV 

01272. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and William J. Danso, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 

44481 (For Respondent-Appellee). 

David L. Engler, Engler Law Firm, 181 Elm Road, N.E., Warren, OH 44483 (For 

Petitioner-Appellant). 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Lori Leecue, appeals from the February 21, 2018 judgment of 

the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, ruling in favor of appellee, Trumbull 
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County Combined Health District (“TCCHD”). Leecue argues that the trial court 

improperly granted TCCHD summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

{¶2} On July 25, 2017, Leecue sought a declaratory judgment stating that 

property she purchased at 6442 Love Warner Road, Cortland, Ohio 44410, was exempt 

from TCCHD’s point-of-sale inspection requirement. Leecue relied on TCCHD’s 

December 7, 2014, resolution, which exempts certain kinds of property transfers, 

including foreclosure sales, from mandatory point-of-sale inspections. Leecue asserted 

that the Cortland property fell into the foreclosure sale exemption because she allegedly 

purchased it from a sheriff’s sale of foreclosed properties. Leecue attached a copy of 

the February 11, 2014 Limited Warranty Deed to her complaint, showing that she 

purchased the property from the Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”). 

{¶3} On September 7, 2017, TCCHD filed a motion for summary judgment, 

arguing that Leecue’s property did not fall under any applicable exemptions from its 

point-of-sale inspection requirement. TCCHD attached documentation showing that the 

Cortland property was sold at a sheriff’s sale of foreclosed properties to FNMA, who 

then sold the property to Leecue. 

{¶4} On January 30, 2018, Leecue filed a brief in opposition to TCCHD’s 

motion for summary judgment. She stated that TCCHD had not adopted the December 

7, 2014 resolution when FNMA purchased the Cortland property from the sheriff’s sale. 

Thus, the foreclosure sale exemption was not in effect. Absent the exemption, Leecue 

argued that TCCHD’s failure to conduct a point-of-sale inspection of FNMA’s property 

resulted in a waiver of inspection rights. Alternatively, she argued that TCCHD’s failure 

to perform the mandatory inspection resulted in equitable estoppel. 
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{¶5} On February 7, 2018, TCCHD filed a response to Leecue’s opposition to 

TCCHD’s motion for summary judgment. TCCHD admitted that the December 7, 2014 

resolution had not been adopted, but argued that it merely restated a resolution in effect 

since 2003. TCCHD included this prior resolution as State’s Exhibit G and State’s 

Exhibit G-1. Thus, TCCHD again asserted that FNMA was excused from the mandatory 

inspection because it purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, but that Leecue 

failed to qualify for any exemptions. 

{¶6} On February 21, 2018, the trial court granted TCCHD’s motion for 

summary judgment, finding that Leecue was not eligible for the foreclosure exemption 

because she purchased the Cortland property from FNMA. The court stated, “The 

transfer from FNMA to Leecue was not a foreclosure sale. In fact, that transfer was 

more than six months after the Sherriff’s Deed was recorded as a direct result of the 

Judgment Entry ordering that deed in the foreclosure action...” 

{¶7} On appeal, Leecue raises the following three assignments of error: 

{¶8} “[1.] The trial court committed prejudicial error by granting summary 

judgment to defendant Trumbull County Combined Health District in that the trial court 

did not construe the record indulgently toward plaintiff Lori Leecue and the trial court did 

not address valid arguments presented by plaintiff Lori Leecue. 

{¶9} “[2.] The trial court did not address or decide whether defendant Trumbull 

County Combined Health District waived its right to conduct a point of sale inspection of 

the property purchased by plaintiff Lori Leecue. 
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{¶10} “[3.] The trial court did not address or decide whether defendant Trumbull 

County Combined Health District was equitably estopped from conducting a point of 

sale inspection of the property purchased by plaintiff Lori Leecue.” 

{¶11} In her first assignment of error, Leecue argues that the trial court erred 

when it granted summary judgment to TCCHD. 

{¶12} “Summary judgment is a procedural tool that terminates litigation and thus 

should be entered with circumspection. Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 

64, 66 * * * (1993). Summary judgment is proper where (1) there is no genuine issue of 

material fact remaining to be litigated; (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one 

conclusion, and, viewing the evidence in the non-moving party’s favor, that conclusion 

favors the movant. See e.g. Civ.R. 56(C).

{¶13} “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may not 

weigh the evidence or select among reasonable inferences. Dupler v. Mansfield 

Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 121 * * * (1980). Rather, all doubts and questions must 

be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 

356, 359 * * * (1992). Hence, a trial court is required to overrule a motion for summary 

judgment where conflicting evidence exists and alternative reasonable inferences can 

be drawn. Pierson v. Norfork Southern Corp., 11th Dist. No. 2002-A-0061, 2003-Ohio6682, ¶36. In short, the central issue on summary judgment is, ‘whether the evidence 

presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 251-252 * * * (1986). On appeal, we review a trial court’s entry of 
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summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 * * * 

(1996).” (Parallel citations omitted.) Meloy v. Circle K Store, 11th Dist. Portage No. 

2012-P-0158, 2013-Ohio-2837, ¶5-6.

{¶14} We must make an independent analysis to determine whether the trial 

court correctly granted summary judgment to TCCHD. 

{¶15} The December 7, 2014 resolution, exempting foreclosure sales from 

TCCHD’s point-of-sale inspection, has no application here because it was adopted after 

both FNMA and Leecue purchased the Cortland property. However, TCCHD previously 

passed an identical resolution, taking effect August 20, 2003. The 2003 resolution was 

available for the trial court’s review in State’s Exhibit G and State’s Exhibit G-1. Leecue 

failed to present any evidence showing that the 2003 resolution was no longer in effect 

during the events of this case. 

{¶16} The 2003 resolution states, in relevant part, “All transfers and partitions of 

real property under order of a court of competent jurisdiction, including, but not limited 

to: foreclosure sales, probate property sales, and divorce decrees” are exempt from the 

point-of-sale inspections mandated by TCCHD. 

{¶17} Construing the record in the light most favorable to Leecue, we 

nevertheless find that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion in this case. 

The 2003 resolution exempted the transfer to FNMA from point-of-sale property 

inspection, because FNMA made its purchase from a court-ordered sheriff’s foreclosure 

sale. However, Leecue failed to qualify for the foreclosure exemption since she 

purchased the Cortland property from FNMA, over six months after the foreclosure sale. 
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{¶18} Finding no other applicable exemption in the resolution, the trial court 

properly entered summary judgment for TCCHD. 

{¶19} Leecue’s first assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶20} In her second assignment of error, Leecue argues that the trial court erred 

by failing to address whether TCCHD waived its right to conduct a point of sale 

inspection of the Cortland property. She argues that if no exemption resolution was in 

force, then TCCHD had a duty to inspect the Cortland property at the time of the 

sheriff’s sale. Thus, TCCHD waived its right to future point-of-sale inspections when it 

failed to inspect the property. 

{¶21} “(A) waiver is an intentional relinquishment, either expressly or 

constructively, of a known right.” See In re Perme, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-T-0056, 

2006-Ohio-2771, ¶17. 

{¶22} Here, the trial court found that a TCCHD resolution was in force when 

FNMA purchased the Cortland property. Thus, it was not compelled to address whether 

TCCHD waived its right to conduct future point-of-sale inspections. 

{¶23} Leecue’s second assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶24} In her third assignment of error, Leecue argues that the trial court erred by 

failing to address whether TCCHD was equitably estopped from conducting future pointof-sale inspections of the Cortland property. Absent an exemption resolution, Leecue 

argues that TCCHD’s failure to inspect the Cortland property at FNMA’s point-ofpurchase amounted to a representation to future property purchasers that the property 

bore no inspection problems. Leecue asserts that she reasonably relied on this 
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misleading representation, and that TCCHD should be equitably estopped from 

inspecting her property. 

{¶25} “‘“A prima facie case for equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to prove 

four elements: (1) that the defendant made a factual misrepresentation; (2) that it is 

misleading; (3) (that it induced) actual reliance which is reasonable and in good faith; 

and (4) (that the reliance caused) detriment to the relying party.”’” See JRC Holdings, 

Inc. v. Samsel Servs. Co, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2005-P-0028, 2006-Ohio-2148, ¶28. 

{¶26} This court has stated, “[I]t is generally the rule that the doctrine of 

equitable estoppel is not applicable against a state agency. . . by analogy, the same 

logic applies to a local political agency or subdivision. . .” See Protzman v. Painesville, 

11th Dist. Lake No. 2004-L-069, 2005-Ohio-3404, ¶23. 

{¶27} As in the second assignment of error, the trial court found that an 

exemption resolution was in force when FNMA purchased the Cortland property. Thus, 

it correctly chose not to address Leecue’s arguments relying on the absence of any 

applicable resolution. 

{¶28} Leecue’s third assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶29} For the foregoing reasons, Leecue’s assignments of error are not welltaken. The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J., 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., 

concur.